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AVIAN INFLUENZA VACCINATION

---> OIE information document


---> Verona Recommendations*

Background
This document was prepared with the support of FAO and the valuable input of
the OIE ad hoc group on AI vaccination guidelines, which first met in March
2006. Members of the ad hoc group are: Dr Annemarie Bouma (The
Netherlands), Dr Hualan Chen (China), Dr Baltus Erasmus (South Africa),
Dr Peter Jones (International Federation on Animal Health), Dr Stefano
Marangon (Italy) and Dr Joseph Domenech (FAO).

The kind technical information provided by the vaccine companies Merial,


Intervet and Fort Dodge is kindly acknowledged.

The reports of the first and follow-up meetings of the ad hoc group were
submitted, in accordance with OIE procedures, for endorsement by the
Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases and the OIE International
Committee.

The document was first distributed to OIE delegates during the 74th General
Session in May 2006 and has now been updated with the recommendations
following the international scientific conference in Verona, Italy from 20 to 22
March 2007.

This document was developed, in conjunction with the guidelines published by


FAO in September 2004, to provide urgently needed information to OIE
Member Countries. This input from FAO in the preparation of the guidelines, is
highly appreciated.

Introduction safeguard food security and the livelihoods of


farmers in developing countries.
The OIE recommends eradication of highly The control of HPAI has become a more
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) at its complex issue than in the past. The
poultry source to decrease the virus load in unprecedented and almost worldwide spread
susceptible avian species and environment of HPAI infections, and the related serious
and therewith to decrease the risk of human animal and human health implications have
infection with those avian influenza (AI) increased the need to develop control
viruses that have zoonotic potential, to secure strategies complementary to a stamping out
the production sector and trade, as well as to policy, which has traditionally been used to
eradicate this disease.

*
OIE/FAO/IZSVe Scientific Conference, co-organised and supported by European Union
Vaccination: a tool for the control of avian influenza, Verona (Italy), 20-22 March 2007

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The first line of defence is early detection of manufacturers advise a withdrawal period
disease outbreaks followed by a rapid after vaccination related to the use of certain
response. This is strongly linked to a high adjuvants, during which period the poultry
level of awareness among veterinarians and meat should not be consumed. This is always
animal owners, and high quality veterinary stated in the accompanying information and
services. Veterinary services should comply should be taken into account.
with the OIE standards on the Quality of
Veterinary Services. Compensation remains a Scope of the document
strong point of discussion in infected and at
risk countries, and having a compensation
The present document is aimed at providing
mechanism in place will encourage reporting
information regarding to the use of
and notification of AI by bird owners. Control
vaccination against avian influenza viruses in
strategies based on a combination of
poultry.
stamping out, movement restrictions and
emergency vaccination could maximize
eradication efforts in certain situations. Analysis of the current situation

Controlled elimination of infected poultry, Before a vaccination program can be designed


movement restrictions, improved hygiene and and implemented, it is necessary to analyse
biosecurity, and appropriate surveillance the current situation in the country and in the
should result in a significant decrease of viral global context, and to analyse the logistical
contamination of the environment. These requirements for conducting an effective
measures should be taken whether or not campaign.
vaccination is part of the overall strategy.
Vaccination is an additional measure aimed Knowledge of the prevailing epidemiological
primarily at a reduction of viral replication situation is of critical importance. Ideally, an
and viral shedding. The availability of updated epidemiological assessment should
strategic stocks of vaccines in all at risk be available, including the results of any
countries will contribute to the possibility of a surveillance, the status of neighbouring
rapid response, using all eradication countries and trade partners, and of the risks.
measures, including vaccination if needed. The human health implications may also be
part of this analysis.
The scientific basis for the use of a
vaccination strategy is the induction of a The poultry production system in place
protective immunity in the target population. influences the risk of HPAI introduction and
A good vaccination program would raise the spread. The structure of the poultry industry,
levels of protective flock immunity and farming practices (free range, industrial,
increase the resistance to infection. An rural), the poultry species reared, farm
exposure to AI virus may not lead to infection density, biosecurity levels and the trading
in the vaccinated birds or, if infection were to patterns are data that should be collected.
occur, the clinical presentation should be less
severe and viral shedding reduced in terms of Logistical factors can influence the outcome
amount and duration. In combination with the of any vaccination campaign. The logistical
implementation of effective biosecurity constraints should be identified as a first step
measures, vaccination could prevent the in the adequate planning of any field
introduction of the AI virus, or alternatively in interventions. Logistical information should
reducing its spread, minimizing the negative address the contingency planning and
impact on poultry production and decreasing readiness of the country, structure and
potential economic losses. Moreover, the risk capacity of the veterinary services, the
of human exposure to AI viruses with zoonotic availability of human resources, the culling
potential and the consequent human cases, capacity, and the ability to introduce
may be reduced by vaccinating poultry. movement restrictions and controls.

It is essential that the consumption of meat The diagnostic capacity should be


from vaccinated poultry does not present a determined, since this greatly affects the
human health risk. Some vaccine possibility of implementing surveillance

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programs and using the DIVA1 strategy. heterologous neuraminidase subtype;
Whether there is a compensation mechanism this depends on the neuraminidase
in place or not may have a large effect on the of the circulating virus and on the
willingness of farmers or bird owners to report neuraminidase present in the
disease. An effective and transparent disease vaccine.
reporting system assists efficient
ƒ Combination vaccines (other
implementation of the regular control
antigens): if it is foreseen that a
methods.
prolonged vaccination program may
Preventive vaccination in an area that is not be required, the use of combination
yet contaminated should be based on risk vaccines should be considered.
analysis, using information from existing
surveillance programs. When contemplating o Live recombinant vaccines (fowlpox H5):
vaccination in a contaminated area, additional these are efficacious only in chicken
information is required: the virus type, bird species, and then only in day-old chicks
species and the type of husbandry in the area as exposure in later life to wild-type fowl
(production sectors 1, 2, 3 and 4 as pox virus would preclude the use of the
described in the “FAO recommendations on vectored vaccine.
the prevention, control and eradication of
It is essential to use a vaccine against the
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Asia”
virus hemagglutinin type that is currently
September 2004) should be taken into
circulating in the country or against the virus
account.
that is expected to be introduced into a
country that is still free. The currently
Implementation of vaccination
available vaccines and their usage are also
described in the “FAO recommendations on
In making a decision on which vaccine to use, the prevention, control and eradication of
the factors listed above should be taken into Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Asia”
account. The vaccine should be produced September 2004. A list of vaccine producers
according to the OIE Manual of Diagnostic which currently produce vaccines according to
Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals and the OIE Manual, can be found On the OIE
evidence should be provided that the vaccine website (www.oie.int).
significantly reduces virus excretion from
vaccinated birds if they are subsequently
Decision on vaccination strategy
infected. Vaccines should be selected on the
basis of evidence that the product is able to
prevent virus circulation in the target species. “Any policy leading to the vaccination use
It is desirable that the quality control tests must include an exit strategy”
associated with this degree of efficacy are
reflected in individual batch documentation.
In general terms, for the use of vaccination
The following vaccine types are currently against AI infections in target species,
available consideration should be given to the objective
of the campaign:
o Inactivated vaccines
o Emergency vaccination in the face of an
ƒ Monovalent including either H5 or epidemic,
H7strains
o Preventive vaccination (i.e. prophylactic)
ƒ Bivalent including H5 and H7 carried out if a high risk of virus incursion
strains is identified and early detection/ rapid
ƒ Both monovalent and bivalent response measures may not be sufficient
vaccines can contain homologous or o Routine vaccination performed in endemic
areas.
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A strategy in which vaccinated animals can be Emergency vaccination is an option when
differentiated from infected animals (see there is evidence of AI introduction, or
www.oie.int).

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whenever the epidemiological situation At least 2 categories of risk may be identified:
indicates that there could be massive and
o High risk of infection with either H5 or H7
rapid spread of infection. In general terms,
subtype (e.g. from exposure to potentially
emergency vaccination might be implemented
infected wild/migratory birds);
in a protective (vaccination-to-live) or a
suppressive (vaccination-to-kill) way. o High risk of infection with a known
subtype (e.g. live bird markets or from
Protective vaccination (vaccination-to-live) outbreaks in neighbouring countries or
means that vaccinated animals are allowed to trading partners).
live out their normal economic lives. If
protective vaccination is to be used during an In the first case, a bivalent (H5 and H7)
HPAI epidemic, it is essential to implement vaccine should be applied, whilst in the
measures to determine virus circulation in the second case, a monovalent (either H5 or H7)
flock (implement a DIVA vaccination strategy) vaccine could be a better choice.
for the early detection of any newly HPAI
affected flock. The discrimination between A surveillance program in accordance with the
infected and vaccinated birds and flocks is Terrestrial Code should be ongoing for the
fundamental for progressive disease control early detection of, and rapid response to,
and eventual eradication. HPAI virus incursions. This program could be
extended through the application of a DIVA
It is suggested that veterinary authorities strategy, provided that the virus subtype at
consider this strategy in cases of: risk of introduction has been identified, or
through the monitoring of unvaccinated
o the detection of AI infection in an area
sentinel birds, which must be present in each
with a high poultry density. In this event,
vaccinated flock.
protective vaccination could be envisaged
as a tool along with the implementation of Prophylactic vaccination should be carried out
complementary eradication measures as long as the risk of infection exists, and can
(including movement restrictions, culling, also be used in a targeted manner for limited
controlled marketing, zoning and periods of time. Based on the identified risk
compartmentalisation); factors for AI introduction, a clearly defined
o evidence that an outbreak cannot be exit strategy should be formulated before
contained by the culling of infected, preventative vaccination is undertaken.
suspected, or dangerous contact poultry
holdings alone. The implementation of an AI surveillance
program in accordance with the Terrestrial
With regard to trade implications, the new OIE Code is a pre-requisite for avoiding the
Terrestrial Code chapter on AI recommends application of unjustified trade restrictions on
the continuation of trade in the presence of poultry commodities originating from the
vaccination, provided that the exporting country/zone/compartment where preventive
country is able to produce surveillance and vaccination has been carried out.
other data that confirm that AI is not present
in the flock or establishment from which the Routine vaccination can be an appropriate
exports originate. method where the disease is endemic and due
to local conditions:
Preventive (prophylactic) vaccination for H5
and H7 subtypes of AI viruses is a long term o containment and eradication of infection
measure that may be applied when there is can not be enforced;
evidence that a country/region/compartment o movement control cannot be instituted;
faces significant risk of AI and when other
prevention tools are considered to be o widespread occurrence is documented;
insufficient. Vaccination should then be o a DIVA strategy cannot be effectively
applied within the framework of a DIVA implemented.
strategy.

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From a financial/livelihood standpoint, the immediately, a choice of categories can be
cost of maintenance of an effective made based on the risk analysis.
vaccination program is a significant factor.
Ring vaccination is vaccination in a defined
Used properly, routine vaccination can be area around an outbreak, and is therefore only
valuable in reducing mortality and production relevant to an emergency vaccination, and
losses. In the longer term, it could also may be used to bring the outbreak under
decrease the prevalence of infection to a level control as quickly as possible. The vaccination
where stamping out and surveillance could be should be used additional to the culling of the
applied. It is possible, then, to make the infected flocks and other measures and
continued use of routine vaccination should be used in the framework of a DIVA
unnecessary as long as there are effective strategy.
contingency plans in place to deal with the
possible re-emergence of the disease. Vaccine availability
Various vaccination strategies can be applied:
and vaccination procedure

o Mass vaccination: vaccination is applied There is sufficient vaccine production


to all susceptible birds. capacity in the international animal health
industry for emergency and large scale
o Targeted vaccination: vaccination is
vaccination programs. The supply time
applied to defined categories of birds.
depends on the availability of product at the
o Ring vaccination: vaccination is applied in time of ordering. If stock is not available, the
a defined area around an outbreak. supply time can be 4 to 8 months from the
start of the production process. Potential
Mass vaccination can be used as an supply problems can be caused by a sudden
emergency, preventive or routine vaccination. unexpected and substantial rise in demand.
Vaccination is applied to all susceptible birds Availability of vaccines when needed can be
in a country or part of a country. All poultry safeguarded by a vaccine bank which has to
are to be vaccinated. The choice for this be instituted well in advance (see appendix I).
option can be made when it is unlikely that an
outbreak (present or at risk) can be controlled Only high quality vaccines produced
in any other way. according to OIE standards should be used in
vaccination programs. Governments should
Targeted vaccination is one in which ensure that vaccine producers comply with
vaccination is only applied to defined OIE standards continuously, with special
categories of birds. A risk analysis should be emphasis on bio-containment standards. In
carried out and should address the bio- the absence of independent quality
security levels of the holdings, the value of certification, batch testing by an organisation
the flocks and the extent of the threat of the independent from the manufacturer is useful.
infection. The compensation mechanism in This independent service could be
the case of an outbreak will influence commissioned from an OIE / FAO Reference
willingness to notify disease outbreaks and Laboratory with proven experience in vaccine
therefore also the decision whether to practice testing and appropriate biosecurity facilities.
targeted vaccination or not. It may be decided
to vaccinate only certain species, certain Evidence should be provided that all vaccine
compartments or only one or more of the batches produced by the same means (i.e. not
sectors 1-4 (the “FAO recommendations on an individual batch requirement) in the same
the prevention, control and eradication of manufacturing plant fulfil the requirements.
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Asia” Storage and transportation conditions of the
September 2004). When sufficient vaccine vaccines, and the vaccination schedule and
quantities are unlikely to be available, it may application should be in strict adherence to
be decided to vaccinate only valuable parent manufacturers’ recommendations. Vaccines
flocks. When mass vaccination is preferred should be applied by trained personnel.
but there is insufficient vaccine available Special attention should be given to
biosecurity measures. Appropriate protective

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gear and equipment for personnel should be Several methods for the detection of field
provided. virus in vaccinated flocks should be
considered, depending on the kind of vaccine
Vaccination records should be kept by the used (homologous, heterologous or
Competent Authority, and the holdings. The recombinant), the vaccination strategy
records should include: implemented and the availability of proper
diagnostic facilities and tools.
• Holdings, locations and categories of
animals One method is to use unvaccinated
• Vaccine used: brand, batch numbers, seronegative sentinel birds housed with the
number of doses vaccinated population. This is the only
possible method when homologous vaccines
• Date of vaccination have been used. All birds, except the sentinel
• The total number of susceptible birds, of the targeted population should be
animals in the holding vaccinated and the non-vaccinated sentinels
should be properly identified in order to avoid
• Operators who applied vaccination confusion or substitution. Daily clinical
investigations should be undertaken and,
Monitoring ideally, periodic serological investigation.
Clinical disease or mortality amongst these
Monitoring of the efficacy of vaccination can sentinels should be properly investigated to
be done in 2 ways: (1) vaccination exclude avian influenza infection. Should the
compliance and (2) level of protection in the sentinel birds show clinical signs and AI virus
population. confirmed, or specific sero-conversion
documented, virus circulation within the flock
Monitoring of vaccination compliance can be (or virus re-introduction) is confirmed. This
done on all species (e.g. antibodies and rings could be an appropriate method for
applied at the same time as vaccination). commercial poultry.
Monitoring of the level of protection can only
be done in species where there is an A second method to monitor virus circulation
established or at least likely relation between in a vaccinated population is to determine the
antibodies and protection. To demonstrate serological response of vaccinated birds
this, a large part of the population should against the neuraminidase glycoprotein of the
show sero-conversion with a satisfactory mean field virus. This is only possible when
titre, and titres should be consistently above heterologous vaccines have been used and the
the threshold values for protection. Other details of other circulating AI viruses are
than chickens and turkeys, little is known of known. Exposure of the vaccinated population
protective titres post vaccination, though it to field virus leads to the development of
has been repeatedly documented that antibodies to the different neuraminidase
immunity in ducks and domestic geese wanes antigen of the field virus not present in the
quicker than in chickens and these species vaccine.
would therefore require more frequent When there is a suspicion of AI in a
vaccinations. Inaccurate vaccination may lead vaccinated flock, based on clinical signs, virus
to insufficient immunity and the development isolation, RT-PCR or validated antigen
of apparently healthy virus carriers. detection tests should be used for diagnosis.
A vaccination campaign which is not managed After vaccination, all flocks should be
appropriately is likely to result in the virus checked for freedom from infection before the
becoming endemic. Therefore, a monitoring birds are transported. The diagnostic tests
program should be implemented in vaccinated and procedures described in the OIE Manual
populations to determine whether virus is still can be used. The methodology of the classic
circulating in these populations; this can be diagnostic procedures is described in the
based on either the DIVA principle or the use Manual. Many novel rapid commercial tests
of sentinel birds. In addition, serological have appeared on the market in recent times
analysis can be used to monitor efficacy and
coverage of the vaccination.

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and it is essential that, for all diagnostic tests, o The IBAR/ PACE attest receipt of the
fitness for purpose has been demonstrated. vaccines.

The diagnostic test procedures in an outbreak o The OIE pays the providers.
situation must be under responsibility of the Furthermore, the OIE is recently
Competent Authority. implementing, with the support of Canada a
new vaccine bank mechanism eligible for all
Other issues to be considered developing countries of the five regions.

Sero-response has been demonstrated in bird


Appendix 1
species other than those for which the
products were registered, but efficacy may be National vaccine bank for Avian Influenza
unknown. Therefore, serology to monitor the vaccines
efficacy of vaccination can only be applied in
The contingency plan for a potential outbreak
chickens, and possibly ducks.
of Avian Influenza might provide for a
An issue for vaccination is that the vaccine vaccination campaign. The vaccine industry
has to be applied to each bird individually by cannot guarantee continuous availability of
injection. sufficient quantities at all times. A vaccine
bank will safeguard availability of the
The vaccine storage conditions (cold chain) required vaccine within days after the
are pivotal for a successful vaccination decision to start vaccination.
program. There are different ways in which a vaccine
In addition to the technical aspects of bank can be arranged. In all options the
vaccination, an awareness program and vaccine is fully tested and released in line
communication strategy should be with the OIE Manual and the specifications
implemented. Adequate communication to of the manufacturer.
the broad society on all aspects of AI 1. Purchase by the ordering country, storage
vaccination is essential for a successful in the country of destination: In this option
vaccination campaign. Specific points that the Government purchases the vaccine,
should be addressed are the public health the vaccine is imported in the country
aspects of AI, the beneficial effects of and locally stored at a central point. In
vaccination, food safety issues, the risk of this option the time between decision to
carrier birds, the trade impact and the vaccinate and the first vaccination is the
appropriate technical and scientific basis for local distribution time. This option is the
vaccination. fastest and most secure option.
The OIE and AU/IBAR2 have signed an 2. Purchase by the ordering country, storage
agreement for the management of a virtual at the manufacturer: In this option the
bank of vaccines for Africa Government purchases the vaccine and
the vaccine is stored at the manufacturer
o AU/IBAR/PACE3 assess the national needs in the country of origin. The advantage is
and transmit an order to the OIE secure storage in cooled facilities. The
o The OIE manages a vaccine fund currently time between decision to vaccinate and
financed by the EC. the first vaccination is the transport time
between country of origin and country of
o The OIE consults providers and selects destination plus local distribution time.
one or several that will be committed to
send selected vaccines (produced in 3. Tailor-made solutions: Other solutions,
compliance with the OIE international such as emergency stocks based upon a
standards) to countries. rolling system, or a commitment from the
supplier on prioritary production could be
negotiated the ordering party and the
2
AU: African Union, IBAR: Inter African Bureau
supplier.
for Animal resources
3
Pan-African Control of Epizootics

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OIE/FAO/IZSVe Scientific Conference, co-organised and supported by European Union
Vaccination: a tool for the control of avian influenza, Verona (Italy), 20-22 March 2007

RECOMMENDATIONS

Vaccination: a tool for the control of avian influenza

Considering: at farm, household and market level, and


movement controls.
1. The occurrence and dynamics of H5N1
strain in the current HPAI epizootic. 10. That vaccination is a logistically
demanding and costly method with
2. The OIE standards, guidelines and inherent uncertainties under field
recommendations, the FAO guidelines conditions regarding the level and
and recommendations, and the FAO/OIE duration of protection against infection.
global strategy on HPAI.
11. That the overall aim should be not to rely
3. The experience with AI control on vaccination on a long term basis and
programmes in countries or regions such an exit strategy should be defined based
as Italy, Mexico and South East Asia. on a regular review of the disease
situation.
4. The successful control of HPAI outbreaks
using vaccination as one of the critical 12. That accessibility to poultry can be
control measures in countries such as difficult in dispersed backyard and small
Vietnam, Hong Kong SAR and other parts holder farming systems.
of China
13. The need for overall transparency on the
5. The need to stop the spread of H5N1 at use of vaccination, to have knowledge on
animal source and to decrease the risk of the effectiveness of vaccination
human infections and potential campaigns and virus circulation post-
emergence of a human pandemic strain, vaccination and the need to share these
when detection, reporting and/or field data.
implementation of other control measures
are delayed. 14. The need to prevent unjustified trade
barriers related to vaccination
6. The importance of disease awareness and
surveillance programmes for the early 15. The need to preserve and protect valuable
detection and warning of infection birds such as specific poultry breeds
(conservation of genetic biodiversity), zoo
7. The experimental and field evidence that birds, pet birds, ornamental birds and
vaccination with high quality authorized (grand) parent flocks,
vaccines increases the resistance against
infection, decreases the excretion rate of 16. That there are no elements indicating
the virus into the environment and in so negative human health implications
doing decreases the probability of related to the vaccination of poultry and
infection of poultry, other animals and the subsequent consumption of their
humans. products.

8. The scientific advancement in the 17. The indispensability of high quality


development of novel AI vaccines that Veterinary Services to implement and
allow using the DIVA concept and the monitor vaccination strategies as well as
accompanying diagnostic tools. all other preventive measures and control
programmes including early detection and
9. That vaccination is not the only tool response.
available for control of AI, can not
eliminate the virus alone and when 18. The need to involve public and private
applied must be combined with other sectors together with Veterinary Services
methods such as culling of (potentially) for successful prevention and control of
infected animals, increase of bio-security HPAI.

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19. That sustainability of vaccination • The consideration of preventive
strategies requires private / public blanket vaccination to control the virus
commitment and cost sharing. in endemically infected countries.

20. The need for good veterinary governance, • The structure of the poultry production
strong political commitment and sectors 1-4, the market chain and
appropriate legislation. poultry density

21. The need for appropriate communication • The risk of introduction and
and general awareness on risks of avian subsequent secondary spread
influenza for both poultry and humans as • The expected costs and benefits of
part of a vaccination campaigns. vaccination to different stakeholders
taking into account impacts on
The meeting recommends:
consumption in rural and urban
1. To implement the OIE standards, environments, production and trade in
guidelines and recommendations, the different farming systems.
FAO guidelines and recommendations, • The feasibility, constraints and costs
and the FAO/OIE global strategy on HPAI. of applying vaccination compared to or
2. That importing countries respect the OIE in combination with other methods.
standards to avoid unjustified trade • The availability and quality of
barriers related to vaccination against veterinary diagnostic laboratories.
avian influenza
• The quality of the Veterinary Services
3. To adopt an iterative approach to disease and the institutional environment
prevention and control by continuously
assessing the HPAI disease situation and • The capability of the Animal Health
the success of the implemented Systems to implement the various
prevention and control strategies to be prevention and control measures
able to modify/ adjust these strategies including vaccination
when needed. • The availability of quality controlled
vaccine authorised according to local
4. That the objectives of any vaccination
regulatory standards
strategy should be defined before
implementation in a country or region. • The possible impact on consumers
behaviour (fears regarding food safety)
5. To consider vaccination when relevant as and subsequent market price
an additional tool to classical methods development
such as stamping out and increase of
biosecurity, but always in combination • Appropriation of policies by
with these classical methods stakeholders including poultry owners

6. To consider vaccination to be a valuable 8. To build a decision support method for


approach in reducing infection in an policy makers that should be incorporated
endemic situation and to consider these into national preparedness plans based
countries as high priority for on the criteria mentioned under 7
implementing preventative blanket
vaccination programs. 9. Vaccination plans should be an integral
part of the contingency and emergency
7. That vaccination should be considered on preparedness plans.
the basis of a comprehensive analysis
including risk assessment of the country 10. That in countries or sub regions a
situation and context covering: comprehensive approach by utilising the
combined tools and measures for HPAI
• The disease situation in the country prevention, containment and elimination
(e.g. endemic, number and location of should be adopted.
outbreaks)

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11. That any vaccination policy should 17. For countries to provide the appropriate
include an exit strategy which results in legislation and governance to implement
termination of vaccination depending on HPAI control measures including
a reconsideration of the conditions which vaccination and the means to enforce it
prevail at the regional and national level. and to streamline the regulatory process
of vaccine authorization.
12. For countries to consider vaccination to
protect valuable birds such as specific 18. To evaluate and strengthen the Veterinary
poultry breeds (conservation of germ Services, public private partnerships
plasm genetic biodiversity), zoo birds, pet including farmers organisations.
birds, ornamental birds, (grand)parent
flocks and fighting cocks when there is an 19. To promote the cost sharing of the
increased risk of infection. respective Public or Private Good
dimensions, to advocate for investments
13. For countries to address in the from Governments and International
vaccination plan specifically the issue of Community to assure the sustainability of
vaccination in small holder and backyard intervention strategies.
farming systems where high level
vaccination coverage is difficult to 20. That the commercial poultry industry
achieve. Participatory community based reinforces its engagement in the control
approaches under supervision of on HPAI with national authorities.
veterinary authorities may be integrated
in the vaccination plan 21. To increase investments into quality
vaccine production through private led
14. For countries to ensure the availability of initiatives with local partnerships and to
sufficient quality controlled vaccines in make these vaccines available particularly
the contingency plans, when necessary in developing countries.
through the establishment of vaccine
banks and/or strategic stockpiling of 22. To develop and fund research
vaccines and/or specific arrangements programmes in the following fields:
with vaccine producers.
• The epidemiology of AIVs including
15. For countries to design all accompanying the molecular epidemiology, the role of
measures, methods and protocols for the wild birds and other animal species.
necessary post vaccination monitoring:
• Development of decision support
• Post vaccination immunity evaluation models taking into account all relevant
factors.
• Monitoring of field virus circulation in
vaccinated flocks. • The onset, level and duration of
immunity after vaccination for
• Routine testing of dead birds on farms
different species under laboratory and
• Clinical inspections and monitoring of field conditions and
live bird markets immunosuppressive factors that may
• Monitoring of the genetic and interfere with the development of
antigenic characteristics of the immunity.
circulating field virus • The combination of the AI vaccination
16. For countries to develop appropriate with the control of other poultry
capacity building programmes including diseases particularly Newcastle
training in epidemiology, disease disease.
surveillance and reporting, field and • Development of new and improved
laboratory diagnosis, vaccination skills, vaccines including accompanying
campaign implementation, farming diagnostic tests and the definition of
system guidance, socio economic requirements for high quality vaccines
analysis, programme evaluation, decision
making and policy development. • Development of antigen banks

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• Optimise methods for surveillance to coordinate global research efforts on
strategies. avian influenza.
• Possible social and economic impacts
23. To provide urgently an evaluation and a
of vaccination including impacts on
peer-interpreted summary of published
production, consumption and trade
and presented information on avian
with vaccination vis a vis other control
influenza vaccination.
methods
• Design of cost-effective vaccine 24. To develop communication strategies to
administration methods (“one shot”) enhance the vaccination coverage, to
and delivery systems particularly mitigate the possible market impacts, to
regarding small holders and backyard clarify the consumer concerns of food
systems (Participatory approaches, safety issues and concerns of farming
private sector delivery) communities.
• Collection and analysis of data 25. To recognise that control of HPAI
generated during vaccination including vaccination has a substantial
campaigns for the purpose of Global Public Good component and that
epidemiological and economical the international community should
analysis. continue to support this control
• Consider stakeholder alliances with particularly in developing countries.
OFFLU and platforms like the ETPGAH

_______________

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Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale • World Organisation for Animal Health • Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal
12, rue de Prony • 75017 Paris • France
Tel.: 33 (0)1 44 15 18 88 • Fax: 33 (0)1 42 67 09 87 • www.oie.int • oie@oie.int

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