ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO.

46496; 27 FEB 1940]

Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc
(NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the
NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one.
The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is
a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is
the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the
CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence
as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth. So ordered.

Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964]

En Banc, Paredes (J): 8 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications
with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates
for commercial and other non-residential customers for general lighting, heating and/or
power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of its
residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were
approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August
1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general
power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31
August 1955. Previous to these applications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for
revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the
Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of
Meralco’s books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited
the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to
the Commission on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner
Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 “for the purpose of
considering such further revision of applicant’s rates as may be found reasonable.” On
said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant
and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to
receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an “informal
hearing”, and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to
define the issues “so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this
informal hearing”. Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated
11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the Commission, in which he
asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco “a rate of return of only 8% on its
invested capital.”. The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report and
letter of Dr. Gil and on a letter-report addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the
Commission on 21 November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil.
Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an
answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco
filed its answer to the GAO’s report, specifying its objection, and prayed that the cases
be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first
reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity,
as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report
dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present
evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and
controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision,
granting the petition for the reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set
aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on
a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of “proper
notice and hearing” in administrative cases.

Held: The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared
before “Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate
Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence
of the parties”, and the record shows that the hearing held before the said
Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, “I said at
the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to
some kind of understanding.” Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision
of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated “upon proper notice and hearing”, as
required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the
Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a
party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the
Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to
the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process
of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and
everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law guarantees notice and
opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act
contemplated.
G.R. No. 72492 November 5, 1987

NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and

ARTURO UMBAC, petitioners,
vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS
UYPITCHING, respondents.

Facts: The respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Dumaguete to punish non-members for legislative contempt was
halted by this special civil action of certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order questioning the very existence of the power in
that local legislative body or in any of its committees.

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition)
sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners. The investigation to be
conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending legislation
related to the operations of public utilities". Petitioners contend that the respondent
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena.

Issue: Whether or not the Local government of dumaguete has the power the power
to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.

Held: No.

Ratio; There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly

granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and
the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete
is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim
that it can exercise these powers.

The contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial

nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can
they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To
allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these
powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of
the fundamental law did not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has
asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the
government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative
functions to local legislative bodies.