The British Journal of Sociology 2010 Volume 61 Issue 2

No place called home: the causes and social

consequences of the UK housing ‘bubble’ bjos_1311 231..255

John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

Abstract
This paper examines the key causes and social consequences of the much debated
UK ‘housing bubble’ and its aftermath from a multidimensional sociological
approach, as opposed to the economic perspective of many popular discussions.
This is a phenomenon that has affected numerous economies in the first decade of
the new millennium. The discussion is based on a comprehensive study that
includes exhaustive analysis of secondary data, content and debate in the mass
media and academia, primary data gathered from the monitoring of weblogs and
forums debating housing issues, and case histories of individuals experiencing
housing difficulties during this period. This paper is intended to provide a broad
overview of the key findings and preliminary analysis of this ongoing study, and is
informed by a perspective which considers secure and affordable housing to be an
essential foundation of stable and cohesive societies, with its absence contributing
to a range of social ills that negatively impact on both individual and collective well
being. Overall, it is argued that we must return to viewing decent, affordable
housing as an essential social resource, that provides the bedrock of stable indi-
vidual, family and community life, while recognizing that its increasing treatment
as a purely economic asset is a key contributor to our so-called ‘broken society’.
Keywords: Housing bubble; credit crunch; buy to let; broken society; marketiza-
tion; social justice; well being

Homes are the building blocks of our communities. They affect our health,
our wealth, and our opportunities for happiness. (Department for Commu-
nities and Local Government. (DCLG Housing Green Paper, July 2007)

Introduction

It is fairly evident that one of the most significant socio-economic events of the
first decade of the twenty–first century has been the housing market volatility

Bone (School of Social Sciences, University of Aberdeen) and O’Reilly (Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University)
(Corresponding author email: j.bone@adbn.ac.uk)
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 ISSN 0007-1315 print/1468-4446 online.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA on behalf of the LSE. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2010.01311.x
232 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

that, as a central feature of the credit boom and bust of this period, has rocked
economies across the developed world.
NEVER before have real house prices risen so fast, for so long, in so many
countries. . . . According to estimates by The Economist, the total value of
residential property in developed economies rose by more than $30 trillion
over the past five years, to over $70 trillion, an increase equivalent to 100%
of those countries’ combined GDPs. Not only does this dwarf any previous
house-price boom, it is larger than the global stockmarket bubble in the late
1990s (an increase over five years of 80% of GDP) or America’s stockmar-
ket bubble in the late 1920s (55% of GDP). In other words, it looks like the
biggest bubble in history. (Economist, 16 July 2005)
What has been exceptional about this particular period of housing market
instability, beyond its scale and ubiquity, is that its causes and consequences
can be understood as being one feature of a wider climate of instability and
excess that has its roots in the (re)marketization of economy and society, and
the deregulation of financial markets, that emerged in the late 1970s. It is now
clear that this economic sea-change, from the managed, redistributive social
capitalism of the postwar era, has produced growing income and wealth
inequalities, burgeoning indebtedness, and increasingly insecure work, as well
as general economic and, crucially, housing market volatility, particularly in the
nations, such as the UK and USA, who wholeheartedly embraced it (Elliott
and Atkinson 2008; Harvey 2007).
Public policy, particularly but not exclusively in the UK and USA, in housing
as in most other areas of economy and society, continues to be dominated by
a neo-classical economic orthodoxy – a dusted down variant of nineteenth
century laissez faire – which has informed and provided the theoretical legiti-
mation for this neoliberal socio-economic shift. This economic model,
imparted to several generations of economics graduates, continues to consti-
tute an almost unassailable common sense for the majority of our politicians,
officials and policymakers and has at its core several almost ‘sacred’ assump-
tions – that free markets most efficiently price and allocate resources and
risk, operate competitively, reflect the outcome of the free choices of
rational actors, tend towards equilibrium, and produce economically optimal
outcomes – all of which have been at the very least been called into serious
question long before the recent crisis (Keen 2001; Ormerod 1994).
As is argued below, the divisive, destabilizing and risk-inducing effects of
neoliberalism as they have impacted upon financial, labour and, in this case,
housing markets have seriously undermined the conditions that support well
being, social cohesion, family formation and, potentially, social and political
stability. With respect to the housing market, specifically, it is our view that
runaway inflation, property speculation, and the cultural, legislative and finan-
cial arrangements that have fostered these developments, have made a major
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 233

contribution to a broad range of social problems, undermining the UK gov-

ernment’s asserted aims across a range of crucial policy areas.

Methods

In exploring the issues surrounding the housing bubble phenomenon, debate

and writings in the press, financial journals, government documents and aca-
demic literature were collated and analysed as a means of coming to some
understanding of the causes and consequences of global hyper inflation in
housing markets around the world, as well as charting the particular effects
within the UK.
A broad-based and intensive study was also undertaken over a three year
period, involving email, telephone and face to face interviews, content analysis
of responses to a BBC forum (‘Have your Say’) and observation of three other
weblogs (PricedOut.org.uk, HousePriceCrash.co.uk and First Rung.com). A
dedicated website was also set up with a view to gaining contacts and case
histories. This included a call for email interviews, with links to the site being
posted on the weblogs. This generated 46 analysable and in-depth email inter-
view responses, 2 of which we also piloted as telephone interviews and 2 as face
to face interviews. The monitoring of weblogs has also generated literally
hundreds of brief, but analysable, responses. The research is currently ongoing
tracing developments in the housing market; notably the effects of the credit
crunch.
Overall, from the variety of these sources we have been able to build a
picture of both the way in which various features of the global financial system,
and the cultural climate it has engendered, have coalesced to produce volatility
in the UK housing markets, with a range of social and personal consequences
across a number of dimensions.

The causes of the boom

Until around the latter half of 2007, the accepted wisdom amongst leading
economists and disseminated in the UK press and mass media was that the
house price boom that began in the early years of the decade was simply a
consequence of increased demand for housing that was outstripping supply; a
particularly vigorous upturn in the UK’s cyclical property market (Barker
2004; Hamnett 1999). Various factors were cited as having contributed to an
upsurge in demand, such as a rise in divorce and individuals choosing to live
alone, increased immigration, as a well as a lack of housing supply due to slow
rates of building, scarcity of land and a sclerotic planning system. It has become
increasingly evident, however, at least since the advent of the credit crunch,
British Journal of Sociology 61(2) © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010
234 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

Table I: Household growth, house prices and general inflation

Year of UK households % Average GBP house % General

census millions (ONS) Change price (Nationwide) Change inflation
(Q.4) (BOE)

1981 20.18 – 23,798 – –

1991 22.39 11% 53,635 125% 78%
2001 24.13 8% 92,533 73% 29%
2006 25.28* 5% 172,065 86% 14%

Note:
* Household numbers for 2006 are projected.

that such a straightforward explanation is wholly unsatisfactory. Even aside

from what we now know about the nature of housing finance during this
period – more of which below – there are other very obvious reasons for
questioning such an analysis.According to the Nationwide (2009), house prices
in the UK rose by an average of 198 per cent between 1997 and 2007, well
beyond their long term trend and a rise that is very hard to account for by
simply referring to demographic shifts.
As illustrated in Table I, while there has been continuous household growth
in the UK, over recent decades this has been relatively stable at roughly
around 10 per cent per decade. As above, however, this does not adequately
account for the exponential increase in house prices, particularly between 2001
and 2006. Moreover, as is discussed below, while there was some mismatch
between household formation, demand and housebuilding during the boom
years that may have contributed to rising prices in some areas, particularly in
London, the South East and Wales, this could not explain the level of price
increases throughout the UK as a whole (Wilcox 2005).
We would also expect that house prices should increase broadly in line with
general inflation. As Table I also indicates, house prices through the 1980s rose
by roughly one and a half times the rate of general inflation, rising to two and
a half times in the 1990s. In the first half of the 2000s, however, the rate of house
price inflation was just over six times the level of general inflation. Overall,
these figures taken together support the view that something other than
‘normal’ growth, population pressures and so on has been driving UK house
prices in recent years, a notion supported by the recognition that the housing
boom occurred simultaneously across a range of nations despite widely
varying demographic characteristics (Economist, 16 July 2005).

Liquidity: interest rates, competition and ‘securitization’

It has now become accepted wisdom that the activities of the financial and
banking sector played a central role in generating housing market volatility, in
tandem with instability across the economy generally. This view is consistent
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 235

with a weight of informed opinion that views the housing bubble as just one of
a sequence of asset bubbles, rooted in neoliberal economic management and
the associated deregulation and growing power of the financial sector (Harvey
2007; Hutton 1995; Stiglitz 2003; Hamnett 2009).
On this point, it is fairly clear that one of the key factors that influence
people’s decision to purchase a home is the price and availability of credit.
Interest rates globally have been historically low for most of the last decade,
while a number of commentators have cited this as a cause of rising house
prices, given the effects on affordability (Wilcox 2005; Cameron, Muellbauer
and Murphy 2006). In fact, it now seems clear that this argument holds con-
siderable merit. In the wake of the collapsing of a previous bubble, the
so-called ‘dot com’ boom, there was a fear that the fallout from crumbling
stock markets would feed through to the wider economies – particularly
although not exclusively in the UK and USA – reducing the consumption that
has been increasingly relied upon to drive economic activity. This reliance on
consumption had been increasing within these ‘service’ economies as manu-
facturing was in decline (Hutton 2002; Stiglitz 2003). The response to this
threat to consumption on both sides of the Atlantic was to lower interest
rates – known as the ‘Greenspan put’ in the USA and followed by the Bank of
England – to stimulate borrowing and spending to sustain consumption and,
thus, economic activity. Thus, ‘. . . cuts in interest rates sanctioned by the Fed
and the Bank of England led to property prices rising rapidly in both the USA
and the UK’ (Elliott and Atkinson 2008: 131). Rather than having experienced
a housing boom per se, the latter can be understood as being merely one
manifestation of the global credit boom, where runaway price increases have
occurred across various asset classes (Bank of England 2008).
Further features of the deregulation of the banking and financial sector have
also played a key role in producing the ‘housing boom’. The 1981 move that
allowed banks and building societies to compete in each other’s terrain, with
reduced reserve requirements, greatly increased competition and lending in
the mortgage market. This resulted in more lenders offering more ‘attractive’
packages on easier terms, pushing up property prices (Zacchaeus 2000 Trust
2005; Hamnett 2009). Moreover,
. . . as property prices rose, lenders became even more and more confident
in their lending – advancing ever higher proportions of the value of homes
at ever greater multiples of borrowers’ income. (Hutton 1995: 72)
As is clear, this quotation refers to the 1980s housing boom, rather than the
recent one. However, the factors that influenced the 1980s housing market, and
which led to the subsequent crash of the early 1990s, had developed even
further at the beginning of the new century, and had been further ‘enhanced’
by the expansion of another major ‘derivative’ of deregulation; mortgage
securitization (Hamnett 2009). While there are various complex levels of this
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236 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

process, put simply, through the combined efforts of mortgage lenders and the
financial markets, mortgages, rather than being merely granted and held by the
originators of the loans, were parcelled up into now infamous mortgage
backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and sold
to investors and financial institutions. The idea was that the risk of lending
would be spread amongst a larger number of actors, providing new areas for
investment and profit, while more funds would be available for lending. The
simple effects of this process, however, were twofold. Firstly, the original
lenders could relieve themselves of much of the risk of making loans, leading
to falling lending standards and, secondly, more lending could take place as
loans could be recycled providing capital for further loans (Mints 2007). The
problem of this system, however, first came to light with the US sub-prime
fallout and the Northern Rock crisis, as lax lending inevitably entailed that
many of these mortgages were much more risky than anyone envisaged,
including the rating agencies who were charged with evaluating them, and
many more debtors than anticipated defaulted. None the less, as we are now
acutely aware, for a time, securitization was a crucial factor in the competition
to lend as much as possible to as many as possible (National Audit Office
2009).
As Figure I illustrates house price increases in the UK were accompanied by
a significant rise in mortgage lending. In qualification, undoubtedly the direc-
tion of cause and effect might be debated, in that it might be argued that
mortgage lenders were merely responding to changing market conditions.
However, even if one were to accept this view, what seems certain is that house
prices could not have risen so far without what has, in retrospect, been widely
acknowledged as being a period of excessive and risky credit expansion in the
mortgage market (Hamnett 2009).

Figure I: UK House prices and mortgage lending (2000–2008)

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
00 01 02 03 04 005 006 007 008
20 20 20 20 20 2 2 2 2
Key:
UK Gross Mortgage Lending £000m (CML)
UK Mortgage lending for House Purchase £000m (CML)
UK Av. House Price (Q.4) £000s (Nationwide)

© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 237

Buy-to-let: homes as properties/investments

The proliferation of mortgage lenders, increasing competition and enhanced
availability of credit also led lenders to develop new products in their efforts to
secure and extend market share (Hamnett 2009). One of these products, the
‘buy-to-let’ mortgage, was aimed at encouraging ordinary investors to become
amateur landlords.
It must be noted that the emergence of buy-to-let – an example of what
Harvey (2007: 31) calls ‘the carrot of individualized entrepreneurship’ – was
supported by successive UK governments’ housing policy, that sought to
expand the private rented sector – just as it had sought to reduce the social
rented sector (through ‘right to buy’) – as a further plank of the marketization
of society. Private sector tenants, who had previously enjoyed relatively secure
tenancies and rent controls (deemed to have been necessary checks on unscru-
pulous landlords in the postwar era) found these securities being radically
eroded.The introduction of the Assured Shorthold Tenancy (first introduced in
the UK Housing Act of 1988 year and revised in the 1996 Act), enabled
landlords to grant a tenancy for a guaranteed period restricted to six months,
whereupon the tenancy, including the level of rent, could be renegotiated.
Before the 1990s, it was often difficult to regain possession of a property
once it was let out. So, if someone wanted to take a position on house prices
by buying and selling over a short space of time or, alternatively, to purchase
a desired property with the expectation of them or other members of their
family living in it at a later date, they were well advised to keep the property
empty. Now it is easy to regain vacant possession, so this encourages short-
term letting until the owner wishes to live in or dispose of the property. (Ball
2006: 3)
To some extent, as above, these changes might be viewed as providing a charter
for property speculation, where investors could buy properties, place a tenant
in them to cover loan repayments for a short period (in some cases many didn’t
bother), only to resell the property some months or years later for a quick
profit in a rising market (Elliott and Atkinson 2008). Moreover, with the odds
stacked in favour of landlords, and the risks thus reduced, it was perhaps
understandable that lenders regarded the ‘amateur’ private rental sector as a
potentially lucrative area for extended lending and profit growth. The provi-
sions of the AST also meant that lenders could offer these mortgages unbur-
dened by the concern that repossession might also involve the obstacle of a
secure sitting tenant. In fact, lenders regularly stipulated that buy-to-let loans
would only be granted on properties where the tenancy was for 12 months
or less.
Further strengthening the investor’s hand, in relation to first time buyers,
the UK government has allowed fairly generous tax concessions on buy-
to-let, allowing what have largely been private investments to be treated as
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238 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

businesses, where the cost of the investment (interest on mortgage payments)

could be offset against rental income for tax purposes.
The buy-to-let boom, which is currently doing so much damage, was also
government inspired. Mortgage interest tax relief was abolished for first-
time buyers, and handed to buy-to-let landlords. Now, if you buy a house to
live in, you have to pay the interest on your mortgage out of your own
after-tax earnings; but if you buy a house to rent out, the interest on your
mortgage is tax deductible. In other words, the very people who cannot
afford to buy homes are subsidising, through their taxes, the mortgages of
the people who can. Often these houses are left empty, as investments.
(McWhirter 2007)
‘Buy-to-let owners [have] a financial advantage over those trying to buy
their first home, pushing prices even higher – further out of reach. Why does
the government still offer tax incentives to those who buy simply to rent?
(Paul Diggory, President of the Chartered Institute of Housing, BBC
‘Money Box’ 23 June 2007)
Around one million BTL mortgages have been granted since these products
were introduced in 1996, while it is also suggested that many more landlords
have also entered the market with cash purchases and through undeclared
standard mortgages or mortgage equity withdrawal (see the gap between
Gross Mortgage Lending and Lending for House Purchase in Figure I). Many
have turned to housing investment to boost relatively stagnant occupational
incomes and due to a lack of faith in private/occupational pension schemes and
other forms of investment. It must be noted that some of these amateur
investors will themselves be among those caught out by the property
downturn. Overall, however, we would argue that one of the major effects of
this trend has been that risk and insecurity experienced by one generation, due
to market liberalization, has been shifted to the next generation and the less
well heeled, through raising the price of a home beyond the means of most first
time buyers, and through renting out these properties to the same on highly
insecure terms.
At the end of the 1980s, around 40% of 20–24 year olds and roughly 66% of
25–29 year olds were already owner occupiers. Now only 20% and 50% of
these age groups respectively purchase. This is a considerable social change,
with tens of thousands of the current generation of younger people opting
(our italics) to rent instead of owning. (Ball 2006)
As above, research by property economist Professor Michael Ball, conducted
for the Association of Residential Landlords (ARLA – see web sources
listing), appears to attribute a marked decrease in first time owner occupiers
and the deferment of house purchase to a change in choices that private
landlords are responding to. However, we would argue that this appears to be
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 239

at the very least a somewhat implausible conclusion by contrast to the more

compelling explanation that younger people are simply being forced to rent as
they have been priced out of the market by investors competing predomi-
nantly for first time buyer properties.
. . . the myth that BTL investors offer a professional service to the priced
out first time buyer is simply nonsense. If a tenant could afford to pay the
BTL investors mortgage then he or she could afford to buy independently.
BTL thrived on basic attrition – buy ahead of the first time buyer pack then
attempt to rent back to this group. (Holmes, Chief Executive, First Rung
2008)

‘An unresponsive market?’

The OFT is concerned that the market for home building is not working well
and there appears to be significant consumer detriment in the form of low
supply response to sustained rising prices, low levels of quality and a lack of
innovation. (Office of Fair Trading 2007)
Amongst other factors that may have influenced house prices during the
boom, there is the perception that housebuilders did not adequately respond
to increased demand and subsequent price rises in terms of increasing supply.
This, amongst other issues, prompted an investigation of the house building
industry by the UK Office of Fair Trading (2007). As illustrated in Figure II,
while house prices rose dramatically between 1997 and 2007, private sector
completions per annum rose by around 25 per cent, prior to declining as the
market peaked. New building during this period was also heavily skewed
towards, in particular, two bedroom city flats rather than much needed family
homes (ONS 2008a).
It may also be noted that, as the market began to decline, many builders
introduced ‘incentives’ (cash backs, ‘discounts’ and so on) that, might be

Figure II: UK House prices and housing completions (1997–2007)

250
200
150
100
50
0
97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07
19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

Key:
UK Private Sector Housing Completions 000s (DCLG)
New Build Average House Prices (Q.4) £000s (Nationwide)
UK Average House Price (Q.4) £000s (Nationwide)
UK Public Housing (RSL & LA) Completions 000s (DCLG)

British Journal of Sociology 61(2) © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010
240 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

viewed as involving the offering of de facto price cuts while maintaining above
market level ‘headline’ prices. Perhaps the most unsettling development in this
regard is the rise in deferred payment schemes. Thus, in a moribund market,
rather than a price reduction, an ‘interest free loan’ for a proportion of the
purchase price is offered, that must be paid back to the lender after a given
period (usually 5–10 years) (Northedge 2008). What is most concerning about
this development is that many first time buyers may run into serious financial
difficulties when, already paying high mortgages, they are called upon to repay
the extra loan, particularly as there is no guarantee that prices will have risen
sufficiently to fund additional payments. Overall, this could be perceived as
vendors offering a necessary price cut in a difficult market, merely to request
its return at a later date. The UK government’s decision to offer financial
assistance towards similar first time buyer schemes, rather than assisting aspir-
ing home owners, may be seen to be effectively subsidising aspirational pricing
practices while storing up future trouble for those who take up such offers
(Northedge 2008).

Inequality
According to the most common measure, the Gini coefficient, income
inequality in 2005–06 has reached its highest level since 2001–02, and is once
again statistically significantly higher than that which the Labour govern-
ment inherited. (Brewer et al. 2007)
The Labour government, at least until the credit crunch began to bite, made
much play of being ‘relaxed’ about growing inequality, so long as those at the
bottom attain a very basic level of income (Elliott and Atkinson 2008).
However, as is addressed below, in our view this perspective seriously under-
estimates the serious psychological and social consequences of burgeoning
relative wealth and poverty (Wilkinson 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).
Moreover, the housing market, as it currently operates, can be seen to be both
a reflection of and key catalyst for growing social and economic inequality in
the UK. Put simply, the purchasing power of the wealthy inevitably drives up
the cost of housing; a situation that is exacerbated by second home ownership
and, more particularly, buy-to-let investment. This generates a good deal of
social closure and social polarization as well as an upward redistribution of
wealth. Thus, the ‘housing poor’ are denied access to a limited but essential
commodity by the ‘housing wealthy’ unless they are willing to pay increasingly
onerous rents, or become increasingly indebted to meet inflated prices
(Zacchaeus 2000 Trust 2005).
In sum, we consider the housing boom, rather than being a product of
‘economic fundamentals’, to be a creation of global economic factors –
principally an abundance of historically cheap and accessible credit – together
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 241

with a variety of national factors, such as changing housing legislation, growing

labour market insecurity, stagnant earnings and inadequate pension provision,
as well as a deregulated financial sector and growing inequality of wealth and
income. Taken together, these various factors coalesced to fuel a speculative
bubble in the UK property market, assisted by a national culture where market
fundamentalism has been lionized to the detriment of the society as a whole.

The social consequences of inflated house prices

The social consequences of the housing boom have been manifest and serious,
undermining the stability, security and, indeed, ‘fairness’ of UK society on a
number of crucial areas, as housing has come to be seen as an investment vehicle
and key driver of consumption rather than as a secure place to live within a
stable community. In addition, government policy on housing and intervention
in the market – having broadly facilitated this redefinition of housing – has
brought with it a range of unintended or unacknowledged consequences
(Harvey 2007). In effect, government support for speculative investment and
high house prices has appeared to act in direct contradiction to the broad thrust
of its own housing policy and its much vaunted aims in several other crucial
areas, such as the creation of an open, fair ‘opportunity society’, an emphasis on
education and work as a route to success and upward social mobility, as well as
the centrality of stable families and communities to the ‘good society’.

The ‘priced out’

In 2004 the ratio of lower quartile house prices to lower quartile earnings
was 6.3, by 2007 it had deteriorated to 7.25, its worst ever position . . .
irrespective of which measure of affordability is chosen, all show a signifi-
cant deterioration in recent years, and all indicate significant pressure on
first time buyers.(National Housing Planning and Advice Unit (NHPAU)
2008)
As above, the most obvious group affected by the ‘boom’ has been first time
buyers. According to the various indices, this group has become an endangered
species, having been effectively displaced by investors at the lower end of the
market during the boom years and continuing to be priced out across much of
the country (NHPAU 2008). The estimated number of first time buyers fell
from 532 thousand in 2002 to 320 thousand in 2005; a 40 per cent drop and a
25 year low (Halifax 2006). This occurred as the average income multiple
required to buy the average home, a key measure of affordability, rose from 2.7
to 5.4 between 1995 and 2005, moving significantly higher in some areas as the
‘bubble’ peaked (Wilcox 2005). Moreover, our research indicates that the
British Journal of Sociology 61(2) © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010
242 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

negative effects of unaffordable housing are not restricted to those on lower

incomes, but are causing great difficulties for a significant cohort of degree-
level-educated young professionals, including some of well above average
earnings, whose life chances are now radically diminished in comparison to
their equivalents of previous generations.As is identified below, this has poten-
tially serious implications for the well-being and the stability of families and
communities, as well as political implications where a generation of young
British adults consider that their prospects of accessing a normal life trajectory
in our society have been irretrievably damaged, leading to a burgeoning under-
current of despondency, frustration and anger amongst this group.
Exacerbating such feelings of disenfranchizement is the perception that,
with the growing disjuncture between house prices and earnings, lifestyle,
‘opportunity’ and life chances have become increasingly dependent on prop-
erty ownership as opposed to occupation and education. For some, predomi-
nantly the skilled and well-educated, concluding that there is little opportunity
to realise their ambitions in the UK has driven them to look beyond our shores
as the only option available for achieving their aspirations. This may make
some sense of the fact that our much discussed immigration over the last few
years has been accompanied by record levels of emigration (ONS 2008b;
Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006).

Being honest and hardworking doesn’t pay when you have no opportunity
of taking part. Society has disenfranchized me even now I have a career as
a lecturer in Higher Education (but still vastly underpaid). The youth of
today are going to be in for a bit of a shock in later life. China, India and the
old Eastern Bloc have much cheaper labour rates and will take almost every
last manufacturing and service job there is. Companies do not have any
sympathy for local or national economies and go where the labour is
cheapest. Unemployment faced with these cheap imports will and could
cripple us back to the Victorian age. My only hope is that I can stay
employed, save some money and buy a house at the bottom of what I hope
is the biggest crash in history. (Subject AV)

A work colleague bought her house around five years ago with her partner
(a solicitor), but the mortgage payments alone take up over half their
combined wages every month, and I’m also glad I’m not in that position. The
simplicity of my parents’ situation in the late seventies – work hard, get a
good job, own your own home and make it somewhere to be proud of – now
seems totally out of reach. (Subject LS)

. . . probably will ultimately emigrate & work abroad, have done so for
periods in the past and thinking about doing this in the next 1–3 years on a
more permanent basis. (Subject EM)
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 243

Europe (apart from the language problem) offers so much more in afford-
ability and standard of living then does the UK. I would not be surprised to
see many others leaving the UK to live abroad. (Subject DB)
The above merely provides a few examples of the widespread discontent,
particularly amongst younger people, that is being generated by historically
high house prices and thus the gap between rhetoric and realization (Harvey
2007). None the less, these consequences, while serious, reach much further
than feelings of injustice, frustrated ambitions and aspiration.

Housing and the family

UK government ministers, and indeed their counterparts amongst the leading
political parties, have repeatedly asserted that the integrity and stability of
family life is sacrosanct and central to the stability and health of communities
and the nation as a whole. Thus, a good deal of political rhetoric and policy has
the avowed aim of supporting this institution. None the less, current market
driven housing policy has precisely the effect of seriously undermining families
as well as the communities that support them.
Rapidly rising prices and debt commitments could well have associated
social effects, for example on the age of having a first child, which are so far
largely un-researched. There have certainly been personal disasters for
several million households who have found themselves over-extended by
the long-term debt. (Zacchaeus 2000 Trust – Memorandum to the Prime
Minister – May 2005)
In the first instance, as above, young people being priced out of the market has
the obvious effect of making it more difficult for couples to form households
and, hence, start families in the first place (NHPAU 2008). This relationship
between postponed parenthood and housing is also recognized in the Institute
of Public Policy Research (IPPR) report ‘Population Politics’ (Dixon and
Margo 2006). Here, it is suggested that, ‘(a)s people delay family formation
they are often less likely to aspire to home ownership’ (2006: 103). However,
we would argue that it is largely cost barriers to home ownership, and a lack of
suitable, secure alternatives, that are deterring family formation, particularly
amongst young professionals.
The increased cost of suitable housing also almost inevitably entails that
family sizes will be more restricted than might otherwise be the case. Rampant
inflation has also ensured that the ‘steps’ on the property ladder have widened,
making it difficult for existing homeowners with expanding families to access
suitable homes.
We do not plan to have any children, in part due to the expense of living. We
cannot afford a mortgage AND children. (Subject JE)
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244 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

I worry about my friends, they all live at home, we all have student loans and
we have no stake in society (particularly the bricks and mortar bit) and exist
only to pay the pensions of older generations. The current house price
system is effectively a population control policy too. It seems no one is
bothered that debt is the new slavery, since the ones who vote have a vested
interest in keeping house building down, to protect the views from their
windows, the equity in their homes, and to force us to work harder and
harder to pay taxes and live. It seems all the family houses are owned by the
single elderly, the professional couple or the inheritee; the families with
young children are squashed up in flats. It’s as if we’re returning to Victorian
Britain again. (Subject H)

At the age of 37 we are not on the property ladder and have little prospect
of getting on the ladder. Academic pay is low and we live in an area of high
house prices. We can’t move as my son would have to move school so we
currently live in a council house. House prices are a huge issue in our lives.
We can’t have other children because we haven’t got the space. If we bought
a house for more space we would be so stretched financially that we couldn’t
afford to have more children. (Subject JA)

Housing affordability issues also place other pressures on family life. It is

clear that mortgages are increasingly assessed on the basis of dual earnings
and at increasingly high multiples of income, adding additional impetus for
increased working in our already long hours culture (Bunting 2004). This
being the case, evidently, if both parents are required to work longer hours,
perhaps also taking second jobs to meet onerous mortgage payments, then
there is little time left for parenting and family life (Watts 2008; Bunting 2004;
Dex 2003). This not only places a strain on marriages and partnerships, and
on relations between parents and children, but also undermines the parental
investment in the socialization of the next generation that is essential to
raising healthy, confident and socially responsible citizens (TUC 2004). From
an economic perspective, the burden of mortgage debt also restricts the con-
sumption that our service economy relies upon, which then is inevitably
accomplished through the incurring of debt that places a further stress on
families. Even for those who have been ‘winners’ in the housing boom, the
net effect has done little more than provide an illusion of increased wealth,
while the notional increase in the price of the family home has supported and
encouraged further borrowing that may expose families to increased financial
risk in future.

The Consumer Credit Counselling Service says that it is not just those on
lower incomes that are being hit by higher borrowing costs. Many middle
class families are also struggling to make ends meet because of the strain
huge mortgage payments place on the monthly budget. (Francis 2007)
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 245

Overall, if family life, albeit in its various forms, is the bedrock of a society then
secure, adequate and affordable housing is a prerequisite for its stability.

What’s wrong with (private) renting?

. . . not since the golden age of the Edwardians, when 90 percent of all
housing was rented, has the private rented sector looked so attractive to
private investors. (Association of Residential Letting Agents (ARLA) 2008)
For reasons that will be made clear below, the issue of family and community
stability has a bearing on another feature of housing policy; the cultivation of
an expanded private rented sector as part of the housing mix.
Private renting in nations such as Germany is often cited as an alternative
to owner occupation that might be emulated in the UK to resolve our own
housing difficulties. This view is reflected in a recent report on the sector,
provided by the Centre for Housing Policy at the University of York, which
advocates the expansion of the private rented sector as a plank of govern-
ment housing policy (Rugg and Rhodes 2008). It must be conceded that the
revival of the sector since the late 1980s has provided some more flexible
accommodation for young adults in transition and for students, particularly in
response to the expansion of higher education (Ball 2006; Smith 2008).
However, as above, we would suggest that such an approach to Britain’s
housing difficulties is misconceived, due to the fundamental differences
between UK and other European private rental markets. As Ball notes,
‘(m)any other countries, including most of Europe, have highly regulated
rental markets, with rent controls, legal precedents and security of tenure.
Therefore, growth of buy-to-let in the UK is a relatively unique phenomenon
worldwide’ (Ball 2006: 5).
In addition, and again in contrast to nations like Germany, UK renting
operates within a very different culture, and has long been associated with
poor housing and an exploitative relationship between landlords and tenants,
not least of all during the ‘golden age’ referred to above. In fact, it was largely
the recognition of the great social and political problems produced by land-
lordism, and a laissez faire approach to housing, that led to the regulation of
private tenancies and a move towards social/state provision in the mid twen-
tieth century (Gauldie 1974; Lawless and Brown 1986). Conversely, the
deregulation of the private rented sector, together with the demise of social
housing, appears to be reversing this process, resurrecting the spectre of past
ills, to the extent that private renting can be no more considered a suitable
form of housing for families than was the case in the pre-WWII era.
In addition to the high cost and poor quality of much private rented hous-
ing in the UK, as noted above, a key issue is security of tenure (Shelter
2008). While renting on Shorthold Tenancies may be suitable for those who
British Journal of Sociology 61(2) © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010
246 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

specifically require temporary accommodation, they present an impossible

situation for families, given the realistic prospect of being constantly moved on
by landlords seeking to realize gains in a speculation driven market. It could be
suggested that this presents us with a potential ‘Cathy Come Home’1 scenario
for the twenty-first century, while there is growing evidence of a transient
lifestyle being forced upon many families within the UK.

My partner and I are 30 and have two small children aged 3 and 1. We both
have reasonably paid jobs, my partner is a carpenter and I am an agency
nurse, but we cannot get onto the property ladder and have a secure home
for our children. Our main reason for this, is that while in our twenties
before having any responsibilities we decided to travel and work our way
around Asia and Australia for 2 years, the best time of our lives! But since
returning in 2003 we have certainly paid for it! Shortly after returning I fell
pregnant with our daughter, so we thought then was the right time to buy a
house, only to find house prices had trebled since we were away! So our only
option left (other than getting a ridiculous mortgage 4 or 5 times our
salaries!) has been to privately rent for 4 years, in that time we have been
moved on 5 times due to people cashing in on their buy-to-lets, have been
charge crazy fees by letting agents each time we have been forced to move.
(Subject Z)

While the above represents the most extreme situation in this regard, as
experienced by our own respondents, it is clear that this is far from being an
isolated case.

The biggest problem facing tenants in private sector rented accommodation

is the chronic lack of security. Six-month shorthold tenancies do not provide
a stable home for vulnerable families. The National Association of Citizens
Advice Bureaux found that the UK provides the least security of tenure for
private-sector tenants of the six European countries that it studied. In
Germany,51 per cent of people live in privately rented properties,mostly with
unlimited contracts; in Spain, where 10 per cent of properties are privately
rented, tenants have the right annually to extend contracts for up to five years.
We are the only country with six-month shorthold tenancies (our italics).

For vulnerable families, the consequences are desperate. A recent study of

homelessness in Northamptonshire found that, in 2006, no fewer than 17 per
cent, almost one in five, of homeless families housed by the local authority
were made homeless because their shorthold tenancies had come to an end
and had not been renewed. Councils have to pick up the pieces when that
happens, as people are almost being evicted from private rented homes.

A Shelter report, due to be published shortly, cites the survey of English

housing for 2005–6, which found that 38 per cent or just over a third of
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 247

people in private rented housing had been in their homes for less than a
year. That is four times the level for social tenants, and a staggering seven
times that for owner-occupiers. Only 5 per cent of owner-occupiers had
moved within the past year compared with 38 per cent of tenants in privately
rented property. There is massively greater insecurity for private tenants
than for any other group.
Behind those figures lies deep misery for many families. They are forced to
live a nomadic existence in private rented housing. As a result, the children
suffer constant disruption in their schooling and the parents sometimes have
problems in keeping their jobs, and there is the social disruption of having
constantly to move home. (Sally Keeble MP, debate on Private Rented
Sector Housing, from Hansard, Column 482WH 23 April, 2008).
As suggested, families under such conditions cannot provide a ‘secure base’
for themselves or, crucially, for the socialization of their children and, thus,
government policies in the areas of education, law and order and so on are
wholly incompatible with the current state of the private rented sector or its
promotion as an alternative to (affordable) owner occupation or decent social
housing. Moreover, given the above, Rugg and Rhodes’ claim that ‘(t)here is
insufficient evidence that existing tenancy frameworks are problematic’
appears highly questionable at best (Rugg and Rhodes 2008: xiii).

Housing and community

A further effect of buy-to-let/private letting has been its effect on
communities. It is clear that the ‘mobility’ imposed by insecure tenancies
means that the social connections that define communities cannot flourish in
areas where there are high concentrations of buy-to-let properties. This
loosens connections between people, undermining the social capital that once
stabilized community and society, promoted democratic engagement, and
supported people’s feelings of belonging to something beyond themselves
(Putnam 2000). Even if we embrace a postmodern conception of community,
one that that unties its relationship to place, being moved on is fundamentally
different to choosing to move on. Weakened ties and commitment to locality
also make it less likely that individuals will maintain the infrastructure of their
environment.
Buy-to-let has caused the physical degradation of the area. Landlords don’t
clean up the mess of old furniture and disused pizza cartons, and the stu-
dents, many from wealthy backgrounds, contribute no council tax, says
Lenton resident Maya Fletcher.
. . . There’s no more feeding next door’s cat or taking in parcels. The gov-
ernment talks of cohesion and community. We’ve lost it, she says.
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248 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

If you want to see the damage buy-to-let is doing to a community, then come
to Bath. We have a population of around 80,000 –20,000 of whom are now
students. The effect has been devastating in some places. One area of 2/3
bedroom Victorian terraces has been almost entirely taken over by buy-to-
let landlords, while the couples and young families who used to buy and
settle in the houses are priced out of the market . . . Insanity! And (mostly
absentee) landlords are profiting from the destruction of these communities.
(Levene 2007)
Aside from the issue of ‘studentification’2 and buy-to-let, other features of the
current housing boom have had a negative effect on community and society in
a wider sense. The polarization of different groups between high-end ‘residen-
tial’ and ‘low-rent’ housing, where the gap between the two has become
increasingly unbridgeable, has opened up a cultural and social as well as
economic chasm (Dorling et al. 2007). Thus, the social closure and division that
is emerging as the housing poor become locked out of the more desirable areas
is leading us towards a form of housing apartheid and ghettoization,with serious
knock on effects in terms of educational, cultural difference and an expanding
cycle of relative deprivation (Gregory 2009). Moreover, this trend is likely to be
amplified by inheritance over time as housing wealth further widens the gap
between rich and poor (NHPAU 2009). This is one of the reasons why govern-
ment initiatives to tackle the UK’s contracting social mobility, by focusing on
education and aspiration in isolation from wider structural inequalities, is
wholly inadequate (Grice 2009). Contrary to government thinking on these
matters, as noted above, difference and relative inequality matter a great deal,
while this widening gap cannot be regarded as being distinct from many of the
social ills that currently afflict UK society, and which are the focus of costly
policy interventions (Wilkinson 2005; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).

A bursting bubble
It is clear that the UK housing bubble, as with others across the globe, had run
out of steam by late 2007 and, while the extent and timing of any eventual
correction is incalculable at present, past experience suggests that we will see
prices in relation to earnings return to somewhere around their long-term trend
at some point in the future. On the upside, a return to normal levels of
affordability would go some way to assuaging some of the social issues
described above. However, even where, as is likely, this occurs, the consequences
in terms of negative equity, long term indebtedness and repossession may be
endured by many of those who bought during the height of the boom for years
to come. Perhaps the best way to restore stability would be for prices to be
allowed to decline, with government intervention focused on assuaging the
situation of owner occupiers (as opposed to investors) negatively affected by
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 249

onerous housing costs and falling prices. However, at present, such a straight-
forward approach to the unwinding of the housing bubble seems unlikely.

Housing policy
This Government believes that everyone deserves a place they can be proud
to call home, at a price they can afford. Homes are the building blocks of our
communities. (Yvette Cooper, Ministerial Foreword to the Department for
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Housing Green Paper,
‘Homes for the Future’, July 2007)
What are the right measures that you take to reward hard work, effort and
responsible risk-taking? (Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 13 October 2008)

As well as there being a profound inconsistency between housing policy and

other wider policy objectives, as implied above, there also appears to be a clear
inconsistency with housing policy itself. On the one hand the government’s
asserted aim is the assistance of first time buyers and the delivery of affordable
housing for individuals and families (DCLG 2007). However, at the same time
intervention appears clearly aimed at keeping prices high, whilst providing
various means by which first time buyers can access unaffordable housing at
great risk to themselves and their families. Thus, efforts are being focused on
resisting an inevitable and necessary correction, while sustaining unrealisti-
cally high house prices and housing investment as a driver of the economy.This
view is supported by the concern displayed by the Prime Minister and other
key players during the economic crisis that mortgage lending be returned to
‘2007 levels’ (boom levels) as swiftly as possible, as well as the support for
shared ownership and, as suggested, other ‘discount’ schemes (more on these
below). This view is also sustained by the Prime Minister’s remarks that ‘the
UK problem was not shortage of demand for homes at “the right prices” but
a shortage of mortgages “at the right prices for people to buy” ’ (BBC News 13
October, 2008). Moreover, while the government has consulted various groups
in the formation of policy, the prevailing view appears to have been informed
by the property and financial sector; those most aligned to its narrow economic
rather than wider social aims. Thus, the type of ‘assistance’ offered to first time
buyers, rather than providing real assistance, tends to be consistent with the
interests of those who directly benefit from high house prices.
In short, government initiatives circumvent the very obvious fact that the
best way to help first time buyers, those needing larger homes, and the longer
term stability of the market and society, is for house prices to return to
affordable and sustainable levels. Recognition of this logical inconsistency is
also reflected in the fact that government initiatives on housing are over-
whelmingly greeted with dismay, frustration and anger from first time buyers
themselves (PricedOut.org.uk; House Price Crash.co.uk).
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250 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

People don’t trust or want shared equity – regardless of what the scheme is
called. Let prices drift down to the point of affordability. Propping up the
current market price levels, harms first time buyers. (PricedOut.org.uk)
As above, first time buyers are clearly aware that what they need is cheaper
housing, rather than cheaper, easier loans, shared ownership, ‘discount’
schemes and stamp duty breaks, all of which are quite rightly viewed as devices
for sustaining inflated house prices.
Overall, it might be suggested that the government’s apparent willingness
to embrace the property lobby’s analysis and proposals on housing may be
viewed within the context of its own mixed motivations on housing policy.
On the one hand there appears to be a genuine desire to meet housing need,
through new building and a (limited) expansion of social housing. Con-
versely, however, there also appears to be a political motivation to sustain
currently inflated prices, presumably to retain ‘consumer confidence’ and a
‘feel good factor’ amongst homeowners, and in tacit recognition of the fact
that housing has operated as a major conduit of the debt-fuelled, consumer
led expansion that our economy has become increasingly reliant upon in
recent decades.
Further lobbying on housing has also come from private landlords and
associated interests. However, in our view any move to expand this sector, in
anything like its current form, would be both grossly unjust and socially
regressive. While recognizing that there is space for a private rental market in
the housing mix, to provide short-term housing to people in genuine voluntary
transition, curbing the expansion of this sector is essential to ensuring that
secure homes are available for individuals and young families at affordable
levels. Moreover, the worrying trend for some private landlords to seek to
expand their portfolios by exploiting existing homeowners during the current
downturn, through dubious ‘sale and rent back schemes’, should be brought to
a halt as quickly as possible.

Land tax?
One possible solution to the increasing accumulation of residential property
for investment purposes would be a tax on the value of residential land
holdings. This would be simultaneously economically and socially advanta-
geous, diverting capital from investment in unproductive assets while being
socially progressive. Together with the retention or extension of current inher-
itance tax levels, albeit against the tide of a currently vocal lobby, this would
deter the current return to landlordism, inequality and unearned hereditary
privilege that appears to be emerging in the UK, as well as potentially tackling
some of the remaining archaic vestiges of the latter (Zacchaeus 2000 Trust
2005; NHPAU 2009).
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 251

Social housing
While ideologically unfashionable at present, perhaps the most prudent use of
government aid to those who cannot buy would be in the provision of good
quality and secure social housing, a fact that, as noted above, the government
now appears to recognize to some extent (DCLG 2007). There is little doubt
that the social rented sector has a somewhat tarnished image in the UK.
However, it might also be argued that such perceptions are based on the fact
that what remains of the sector, of local authority housing at least, is largely the
‘rump’ that was not taken up under the ‘right to buy’ initiative. This overlooks
the fact, however, that a good deal of social housing in the UK was highly
successful, while a focus on revitalizing the sector would offer a more suitable
and socially progressive alternative to any further expansion of private
renting. Such a move could provide much needed employment in the construc-
tion sector as workers are being laid off by private builders, retaining skills and
generating a genuine boost to the economy, while also beginning to address the
UK’s housing crisis where market solutions have clearly failed. Greater
synergy between the private and public sector in terms of housing provision
could also prove beneficial. For example, a ‘right to sell’, in whole or part, to a
local authority could address a number of the difficulties presented by the
current housing market arrangements. This would allow families experiencing
unemployment or other financial difficulties to stay in their homes, without
recourse to the aforementioned risky ‘sale and rent back’ schemes, while
potentially producing more mixed communities of both socially rented and
private accommodation as a step back from the current trend towards increas-
ing polarization (Gregory 2009).

Conclusion

It is clear that the main beneficiaries of the housing boom have been investors,
the property industry and the financial sector (at least for a time). Conversely,
for most of the home owning public the benefits of high house prices have been
illusory, merely encouraging greater indebtedness, while being disastrous for
recent entrants, ‘hard working families’ and the priced out. Moreover, the
whole issue of housing affordability and the manner in which houses are
utilized – in particular the use of homes as investment vehicles – raises fun-
damental economic, political and, indeed, social questions.
In our view current policies aimed at supporting unaffordable house prices
are socially and economically undesirable and morally indefensible, being far
removed from the principles of ‘fair rules, fair chances, and a fair say for all’. It
is also clear that current prices are ultimately unsustainable, having climbed
significantly higher in relation to wages than in any other previous UK housing
boom, and cannot remain at these levels without a return to sustained ‘risky’
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252 John Bone and Karen O’Reilly

lending practices. At the time of writing, despite assertions to the contrary, it

appears that this is precisely what the UK government is attempting to
resurrect.
From an economic perspective, less reliance on the housing market as a
conduit for debt-fuelled expansion and consumption led growth would ulti-
mately lead to greater economic stability and more productive investment
Also, while the government appears concerned to ‘aid’ consumption by
keeping prices high, would it not be more prudent as well as socially desirable
if young families, who are likely to consume most, were able to access cheaper
housing and, thus, retain more of their disposable income, rather than employ-
ing the housing market as a vehicle for transferring wealth and income to older
homeowners who are more likely to salt it away for retirement?
From a political perspective, policy makers, while focusing on the interests of
existing homeowners and the property lobby, may be underestimating a
growing groundswell of opinion amongst younger UK adults that is vehe-
mently opposed to current housing policy. This growing disaffection appears to
be currently expressed, thus far, in latent but strong anti-government
sentiment. Fuelling this is the perception that the decoupling of wages and
house prices has seen a collapse in the relationship between education, hard
work and lifestyle, such that life chances appear more dependent on property
ownership than talent, education and/or effort. As suggested, these type of
arrangements in the housing market may be seen to provide the foundations
for a form of ‘rentier society’, where a privileged minority and their offspring
can live wholly from the efforts of others who have not been so fortunate in
terms of the timing of house purchase or the caprice of inheritance. This
crucially undermines any notion of an ‘opportunity society’, and represents a
regression towards the social arrangements that engendered much frustration,
despair, crime and social upheaval in the past.
From a social perspective, as suggested, unchecked house price inflation has
a severe negative effect on social cohesion. An increasing gulf between those
who can afford to live in different areas has divided our society, socially,
culturally and geographically, cultivating a fearful and resentful culture
amongst the excluded in the poorest areas (Dorling et al. 2007). Also, the move
towards private renting on current terms has produced areas of poor housing
provision and a nomadic housing underclass, creating a situation where com-
munities cannot flourish, families cannot put down roots and, thus, children are
exposed to a precarious and unpredictable education and socialization
process. While, as suggested, this sector has a role to play, in terms of both price
and security of tenure it cannot in its current form be considered as a viable
long term alternative to affordable owner occupation or social housing.

Now is the time for the government to finally disentangle itself from this
housing boom, and to distance itself from maintaining it, not to become
© London School of Economics and Political Science 2010 British Journal of Sociology 61(2)
 No place called home 253

complicit in the financial ruination of more young families. (PricedOut.

org.uk)
Finally, at a time when UK government ministers regularly bemoan the decline
of family life, well-being and community, and the social stability that they
support, should they be actively engaged in further undermining them in
favour of the narrow, and largely unearned, interests of a highly influential and
vocal minority who have imposed this instability on both economy and
society? It is surely to the long-term benefit of society as a whole to address
our housing crisis by, in the first instance, disincentivizing second and multiple
home ownership – especially where it involves the use of housing as an invest-
ment vehicle – together with revitalizing social housing, as crucial first steps in
supporting good quality affordable housing for all, whether owner occupied or
rented, as a social good. The alternative is to pursue a market driven housing
policy, aligned with an economy that depends on perpetual credit expansion,
and that delivers economic instability, growing indebtedness, burgeoning
inequality and social fracture. In short, it must be recognized that our current
housing market is a key contributor to our so-called ‘broken society’.
(Date accepted: February 2010)

Notes

1. 1966 BBC drama, written by Jeremy
Sanford and directed by Ken Loach, which
stimulated a national debate with respect to
issues of poor housing and homelessness.
2. While the above relates some fairly
negative comments regarding students, it is,
none the less, also clear that the expansion
of higher education has swelled their
numbers and that they must be housed
somewhere. In fact, student accommodation
is presenting a problem for universities and
students in many areas. However, relying on
buy-to-let/private landlords as the solution,
in addition to the impact on established
communities, presents problems both for
institutions and students themselves, as the
high rents that are necessary to cover buy-
to-let mortgages place an additional burden
on increasingly stretched student finances
(Smith 2008).

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British Journal of Sociology 61(2) © London School of Economics and Political Science 2010