MA. LOURDES T.
DOMINGO,p et iti on er, ultimate questions, namely:
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA,r es p on d ent.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then
Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged.
Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with ther e co mm end ati on that the
penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in
accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the
recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case because of the nature of the position of
Reyala as occupying the highest position in the NLRC, being its
Chairman. Long digest by Ernani Tadili.It was ordered that Rayala be
dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally
referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found
Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of service for the
maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially
arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)
petitions.
G.R. No. 155831 ± Domingo Petition -
1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and
2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential appointees.
G.R. No. 155840 ± Rayala Petition
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
1. He¶s act does not constitute sexual harassment;
a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-
employment, or continued employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against
the employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual
harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any
sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her
continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the
acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely
Domingo¶s perception of malice in his alleged acts ± a "product of her
own imagination"25 ± that led her to file the sexual harassment
complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP¶s interpretation, as upheld by the CA,
that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of
malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered
an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole.
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA
7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual
harassment:
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1.Forms of Sexual Harassment. ± Sexual
harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not
limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same
purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for
purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying,
disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand,
request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as
contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to
procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the
power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional
forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of
sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700 - Republic
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the P hilippines may
validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the
NLRC for committing acts of sexualharassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala¶s acts constitute sexual harassment
under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of
affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are
generally annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA¶s reduction of
the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala¶s dismissal is valid and
warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC
Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one
(1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the
penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a
presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law.
Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts
imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by
dismissal from the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala¶s position
is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he
should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article
215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC
holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good
behavior.33 Since Rayala¶s security of tenure is conditioned upon his
good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he
has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two
(1) Did Rayala commit sexualharassment? - guilty
(2) Ifhe did, what is the applicable penalty? -
suspension
CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual
harassment. They only differ in the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of ± and was guilty of
sexual harassment ± is, therefore, the common factual finding of not
just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the
CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial
evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should
bind us.40
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual
harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that
there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling
inA quino v. Acosta.42
We find respondent¶s insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which
states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can
proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force
to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.
Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual
Harassment Defined. ± Work, education or training-related
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in
the employment, re-employment or continued employment of
said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way
would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee¶s rights or
privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the
unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes
the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for
administrative cases,v iz . :
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-
related, Education or Training Environment. ± It shall be the
duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or institution, to prevent
or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to
provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end,
the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations
in consultation with and jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their
duly designated representatives, prescribing the
procedure for the investigation or sexual
harassment cases and the administrative
sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to
prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts
of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to
this section (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace
and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and
investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The
committee shall conduct meetings, as the case
may be, with other officers and employees,
teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors
and students or trainees to increase
understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation
of the alleged cases constituting sexual
harassment.
The employer or head of office, educational or training
institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the
information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala¶s culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is
charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the
Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala¶s acts strictly by the standards set
in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true
that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo¶s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having
inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for
school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making
statements with unmistakable sexual overtones ± all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a
sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala¶s claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondent¶s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an
intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by
the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and
the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after
the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to
another unit.