Hans-Bernd Zöllner
16
Figure 1: Demonstrators of
1988, carrying a picture of
Aung San, national hero and
father of Aung San Suu Kyi
Courtesy of Bertil Lintner,
(1990: 132).
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A-W chpt16_pp268-277.indd 268-269
Disputed legitimacies
Behind the smoke of ‘myth’ and
‘counter-myth’: Contours of what
happened in Burma in 1988
Hans-Bernd Zöllner
Introduction
I
would like to begin with a rather personal, as well as philosophical
remark. Some forty years back, I was introduced to the field of
oriental studies at the University of Hamburg. Accidentally or not,
I would meet Baas Terwiel for the first time at the same institution some
decades later, on the twelfth floor of the Philosophenturm, the ‘Tower of
Philosophers’. At that time the Faculty of Theology of the then special
department of Middle East Studies, where I studied Hebrew, was also
there and, some floors down, I tried to master the Arabic letters. In
addition, I was exposed to an abundance of myth-killing onslaughts
from the teaching staff, and through what they recommended as reading
materials: Jesus born in Bethlehem? No way. A man named Jesus of
Nazareth must have been born in that Galilean town, the name of
which helped to differentiate him from other persons called Jesus. It was
the same with the stories of the Old Testament. I was not surprised to
learn that the world was not necessarily created in seven days. However,
I also came to understand that this Biblical account, which my
co-students in other faculties might have denoted as a myth,
was in fact an early case of demythologisation: The Hebrews,
while prisoners of war in Mesopotamia, had transformed the
local stories of creation, in which a huge dragon called Tiamat
played a significant role, into a very rational account of how
the world came into being through the word of God.
Looking back, this early intellectual experience can be
summarised as follows: That which kills or replaces a myth
may become a myth as well. Some time after that, I learned
from the philosopher Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker that in
our modern days the belief in science could be regarded as the
hegemonic civil religion.
Later, my early experiences with myths were substantiated
by theoretical and practical insight. This led me to bracket
the word ‘myth’ in quotation marks when applied to the
investigation into the stories, histories and their interpretation
related to the history of Burma or Myanmar. I would like
to use the word myth to describe the great sacred stories
of mankind. What I am talking about here can be called
‘legitimising stories’.
Burmese history provides an abundance of such legitimising stories.
This is because legitimacy has always been a contested issue in the
country’s history, from the time of the Pagan kingdom onwards. The
disputes circled around kings, rulers, ethnic groups and governments,
but also spread to the field of historiography (Zöllner 2000). This is
understandable at least for two reasons.
One is related to the academic discourses on post-modernity, post-
structuralism and de-constructivism, urging us to not take any clear
distinction for granted between reality and our perception of it. This
means, for example, that investigating the issue of de-colonisation implies
a reflection of the state of de-colonisation in the researcher’s mind.
A second argument for the interconnection of history and
historiography can be illustrated by an example taken from Burmese
history. Three years after the end of the first Anglo-Burmese War,
King Bagyidaw (as a consequence of the unsatisfactory outcome of
the war) forbade the use of the term ‘defeat’ in chronicling the battle.
He assembled some of his learned advisors and requested that they
compile a new history of the kingdom of Burma, a work which later
received the title ‘The Glass Palace Chronicle’ – named after the part of
the royal palace where it was compiled. A just ruler needed a blemish-
free history that was in keeping with the requirements of purity of the
Buddha-dhamma. The chronicle not only purified the history of Burmese
kings and disposed of erroneous details, it also associated the ruling
king with the solar race of Lord Buddha; thus relating it with the sacred
sphere of human myth.
This sphere of the sacred is invoked too in what I contribute here,
which deals with the events of 1988 in Burma. A popular uprising took
place that was put down by force. Many people died during this pivotal
time, and the lives of these people should be regarded as sacred. The
question is who was responsible for what in the events that ensued? On
one side, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma’s national hero,
claims that the brutal military dictatorship is to blame. This regime was
established in 1988 on the backs of those who took power in 1962. On the
other side, it has been argued that, like in 1962, the stability of the nation
was once again in danger, and the military stepped in to save it. Each side
challenges the legitimacy of the other. These accusations and counter-
accusations have created a huge debate, producing much confusion, such
that what really happened in 1988 may never be fully known.
The sources and a skeleton of facts
Besides the vast array of scattered information mostly available on the
internet, and in propaganda brochures from both sides,1 there are three –––––––––––––––––
comprehensive accounts of the events of 1988. These are by authors who 1 For the Government, see Hla
Min n.d. For the Opposition:
were, in different ways, involved in the incidents they wrote about. The Voices of 88. Burma’s Struggle for
first published account was Bertil Lintner’s Outrage in 1989, shortly after Democracy 1998.
the events in question.2 A Bangkok-based Swedish-Austrian journalist 2 This paper uses the second
married to a Shan wife born in Burma, Lintner founds his narrative and edition. Bertil Lintner 1990².
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interpretation on statements collected from Burmese witnesses of the
incidents both from inside the country and from those who had fled Burma
to Thailand to avoid arrest. In his acknowledgements Lintner states that he
follows the wishes of the people he interviewed to ‘tell it as we saw it’; thus,
he supposedly counters the military’s attempt to rewrite history.
A second account was written by ‘A Tatmadaw (Army) Researcher’ and
published in early 1991 in the first volume of an extended series (which
was terminated after the second volume). This short volume contains
information about what happened between March and September 1988.3
The third account was written in English by Maung Maung,4 who
was the last Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP),
and Head of State under the constitutions of 19 August, 1974 and 18
September, 1988. He was the leading jurisprudent and historiographer
of Burma after independence. He was also very close to Ne Win, whose
role in Burma’s history he describes in detail.5
All three accounts are based on the same events, but differ rather
widely in their respective interpretations. While they all relate the events
to the greater historical context, each one, more or less openly, attempts
to legitimise the actions of certain parties involved in the conflict. For
example, Lintner tries to justify the demonstrator’s ‘outrage’ against
the government, and their demand for the military to step down and
give way to the installation of an interim government. Conversely, the
‘Tatmadaw (Army) researcher’ supports the military’s actions. Maung
Maung defends his and his party’s decision to hold a referendum on
the question of multi-party elections instead of stepping down, and
accuses politicians of selfishness for acting in their own interests. Given
these circumstances, perhaps we will have to wait for many years before
we gain a clearer picture of what really happened. However, before I
consider suggestions of what might have taken place, a short account
of some of the undisputed facts related to the events of 1988 in Burma
will be given.6
The economy of the country is in shambles after twenty-six years of
the ‘Burmese Way of Socialism’. People’s discontent is formulated
on 7 March in an open letter to Ne Win by retired Brigadier Aung
Gyi. On 12 March, a tea shop brawl escalates into a clash between
the police and students. At first only one student dies, in the next
––––––––––––––––– days more casualties occur. Students take the demonstrations into
3 A Tatmadaw Researcher
1991. The volume covers the the town. Schools and Universities are closed. The Government
events until September 1988, appoints an Enquiry Commission. Ne Win leaves the country for
a second volume follows up his annual Europe trip.
the events from October 1988
until March 1990 before the At the end of May, schools and universities reopen. Demonstrations
May elections. start again and clashes between students and military units
4 Maung Maung 1999. The occur. While there are deaths on both sides, larger numbers of
book was published five years demonstrators are killed. The unrest spreads to other parts of the
after the author’s death. country. A curfew and an extraordinary congress of the BSSP are
5 Maung Maung 1969 Burma announced. Communal clashes happen in Prome, Ne Win’s home
and General Ne Win. Rangoon, town, and other cities.
Religious Affairs Department.
6 The account is mainly based At the beginning of the party congress, Ne Win announces his
on Lintner’s chronology resignation on 23 July. He recommends economic reforms and a
(Lintner 1990: 193-199). referendum on the abolition of the one-party-system. The congress
270
A-W chpt16_pp268-277.indd 270-271
Hans-Bernd Zöllner
accepts the resignation but does not vote in favour of the referendum.
General Sein Lwin, named ‘the butcher’ by the students, is elected
BSPP chairman and later President of the Union.
Demonstrations continue; leaflets calling for a general strike
on August 8 (8-8-88) are distributed. Martial law is declared in
Rangoon but the demonstrations continue. On 8 August and later
demonstrators are shot at and killed by soldiers. Sein Lwin resigns
on 12 August, Maung Maung succeeds him on 19 August.
Although demonstrations continue, martial law is lifted on 24
August. On 26 August, Aung San Suu Kyi addresses several hundred
thousand people at Shwedagon Pagoda. Two days later, a student
union is formed. Student leader Min Ko Naing (a pseudonym
meaning ‘One who conquers kings’) is elected acting chairman.
On 5 September, an ultimatum demands the government to give
way to an interim government or face an ongoing strike. The
ultimatum is ignored. Former Prime Minister U Nu proclaims a
parallel government.
On 10 September, another BSPP emergency congress proposes
general elections under a multi-party system. The following day the
parliament votes accordingly. On 12 September, opposition leaders,
including Aung San Suu Kyi, support the demand of an interim
government. Demonstrations, unrest, and violence continue.
At 4 p.m on 18 September, the military announces that it has
assumed power. Street battles continue. People are gunned down.
Many students flee to the borders and prepare themselves for a
battle against the military junta. Some join other rebels from various
ethnic groups that have been fighting the central government in
Rangoon for years.
As we know, the preparations for the multi-party-elections, which
commenced under the last BSPP administration the parliament voted
in, were held in May 1990, but the new parliament was never convened.
Thesis: The fighting parties shared
the same political concept
This short overview demonstrates that there were many players involved
in what happened. In fact, many more were involved than mentioned
above. There was a clear line drawn between the players on the side of
the government (BSPP, police, and army) and the opposition (people,
students, and individuals). Some individuals may have changed sides to –––––––––––––––––
the other camp, but there was definitely no third party which could have 7 According to Maung Maung
(1999: 97), the highest council
acted as mediator.7
of the sangha appealed to both
It is my hypothesis that this ‘Us or Them’ position taking, which side to compromise, but most
is common to all the active parties in the conflict, is deeply rooted of the younger members of
in Burmese political traditions. One central element to this is the the monastic order joined the
assumption of a special relationship between a ‘charismatic leader’ demonstrators. Thus, like in
1990, when Mandalay monks
and ‘the people’. In addition, it will be argued that it was Ne Win’s started boycotting military
unexpected and unprecedented decision to resign, and the equally personal, the sangha was
unexpected and unprecedented entry of Aung San Suu Kyi into the actually divided, too.
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Figure 2: Ne Win on a state
visit to China, May 1985,
with Deng Xiao Ping
Source: http://carlos-
enestemundo.blogspot.com
–––––––––––––––––
8 The full text as reproduced
in the Working People’s Daily’s
issue of 24 July, 1988 was
published in the Online
Burma Library: http://www.
burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/
archives/199911/msg00331.
html. Maung Maung (1999:
38-42) gives a reproduction
of the speech’s first parts
together with a commentary.
272
A-W chpt16_pp268-277.indd 272-273
political scene, that contributed heavily to the escalation
of the conflict.
I will now attempt to substantiate my hypothesis
through an albeit quite brief analysis of two speeches
which had an impact on the events. The first is Ne Win’s
resignation speech given at the party congress on 23 July.
The second is Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech presented at
the Shwedagon mass meeting on 26 August.
Ne Win
Ne Win was 77 years of age at the time he gave his speech.
He had already served in different posts for some forty-
six years, since becoming one of the commanders of the
Burma Independence Army under Aung Sans’s leadership in 1942.
Nevertheless, his announcement of his retirement came as a complete
surprise to Burma’s public and international observers. Many suspected
that he retired just pro forma and continued to exert his influence in the
army and in the state from behind the scenes. Even if such suspicions
are not unfounded, one can ask why people would or would not take
Ne Win at his word.
One reason that was and remains prevalent among Westerners is a
tendency to think about people like Ne Win as power-hungry despots
who are unwilling to relinquish power. Looking at the issue from a
Burmese perspective, the reason for disbelief may be different. In the
history of the country, rulers had either died in office or were removed
through the intervention of others. This long-standing tradition
continued – with three arguable exceptions – even after the last Burmese
king was taken into exile by the British. All the Prime Ministers under
the semi-democratic constitution of 1935 had been overthrown through
non-confidence motions. Aung San was assassinated. U Nu passed the
premiership to Ba Swe for one year after his party suffered heavy losses
in the 1956 elections. He was then persuaded to hand power over to
Ne Win in 1958. Ne Win stepped down in 1959 after he could not fulfil
his promise to organise elections within six months but resumed office
after Parliament changed the Constitution. He handed power back to
Nu after the elections of 1960, yet ousted him for good in a coup d’état
in 1962.
Although the above litany suggests a pattern of power switching
hands through coercion, Ne Win’s announcement had no precedence.
As the speech in which he explains his decision is available,8 one may
wonder why it has yet to be analysed. Here is this author’s summary of
that speech, which can be divided into four parts:
a. The reason for the proposed referendum on the introduction of a
multi-party-system in Burma: The disturbances of March and June
indicate a lack of confidence in the government and the BSPP. It
should be tested if a majority or a minority of the population has
lost faith in the present system. The referendum should be held as
soon as possible and after quick action should be taken according to
the respective outcome.
Hans-Bernd Zöllner
b. Because he is ‘not totally free from responsibility…for the sad events
in March and June, and because I am advanced in age’, Ne Win
asks for permission to relinquish the party chairmanship and to quit
the party.9
c. With regards to the (communal) unrest that started in Prome one
week before, he makes clear that he ordered the troops to ‘go’,
because the integrity of the country must be protected. In case of
future ‘mob disturbances’ the whole nation should know that the
army will shoot and hit.10
d. The longest part of the speech deals with the destruction of the
Students’ Union building twenty-six years back in July 1962. Ne
Win tries to prove that he did not order it but as the head of the
army at that time assumed responsibility. He points at Aung Gyi as
the one who actually gave the orders. Aung Gyi in one of his letters
to Ne Win had alleged that the Chairman of the Revolutionary
Council had agreed to destroy the building.
One of the main issues in Ne Win’s speech is responsibility. Ne Win
and his ‘confidants’ had once assumed responsibility for the country.
Now, it was being given back to the people through the constitutional
bodies, party and parliament. Responsibility here is conceptualised as a
very personal category which establishes a relationship between people.
A leader’s political as well as private responsible action should take into
consideration, and be able to distinguish between, what the people in –––––––––––––––––
one’s responsibility want and what they need. Whereas ‘wants’ can 9 According to Maung Maung,
be ascertained through public surveys, determining ‘needs’ should be this part of the speech was
read by Htwe Han, the party’s
guided by ethics and moral criteria which determine the relationship secretary (Maung Maung
between the leader and the people. 1999: 39). According to party
rules, a special amendment
was needed to fulfil Ne Win’s
wishes. The names of four
Aung San Suu Kyi other leading party members
and ‘confidants’ of Ne Win
Aung San Suu Kyi’s address, which she delivered on 26 August, close were listed who wanted to
to where Ne Win said farewell to politics, was the maiden speech of this resign with him. Many others
future leader. Her appearance in Burmese politics was as unexpected not mentioned by name
wished to do the same.
as Ne Win’s departure. She initially returned to Rangoon in April
10 The wording of this part of
1988 to care for her mother who had suffered a stroke. Her first public the speech is controversial.
statement was an open letter to the government on 15 August proposing Lintner’s translation, included
the formation of a People’s Consultative Committee.11 On 24 August, in his review of the book,
the day martial law was lifted, she gave a talk in front of the Rangoon deviates from both the text
reproduced from the Burmese
General Hospital. Her upcoming speech was announced the next day.12
newspaper and by Maung
According to some eye witnesses, the scene looked like this: Maung. See http://www.
A huge portrait of her father, Aung San, had been placed above asiapacificms.com/articles/
burma_uprising/.
the stage alongside a resistance flag from World War Two. Loud-
11 For the entire text, see Aung
speakers were directed towards the audience. Due to the enormous
San Suu Kyi 1988a.
crowd,13 her car had to stop outside the meeting grounds, and she
walked the remaining stretch up to the stage amidst deafening 12 It is not quite clear who
spread the information. Most
applause and cheers. Htun Wai, a well-known Burmese film actor, likely, the students did.
introduced Aung San Suu Kyi and told the restive crowd to sit down 13 Estimations range from
and listen to her speech (Lintner 1990: 115). between 500,000 to 1,000,000
people.
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–––––––––––––––––
14 Aung San Suu Kyi apparently
alludes to the splits in
post-war Burma and the
assassination of Aung San
ordered by Saw, a political
rival.
274
A-W chpt16_pp268-277.indd 274-275
She translated her speech into an English-language version, which
was later published as ‘Speech to a Mass Rally at the Shwedagon
Pagoda’ (Aung San Suu Kyi 1988b). Here is a summary:
a. The aim of the rally is to inform the whole world that the people of
Burma want multi-party democracy. Therefore, unity and discipline
are necessary. The students and their willingness to sacrifice their
lives made this opportunity possible. (Minute of silence for the
sharing of the students’ merit).
b. Aung San Suu Kyi explains her part in the movement. Like her
father, she preferred to stay away from Burmese ‘power politics’.
But as her father’s daughter, she couldn’t remain indifferent to the
present crisis, in this ‘second struggle for national independence’.
c. Aung San wanted Burma to be a democratic country. To achieve
that goal, unity and discipline are necessary.
d. The armed forces, created by her father, should be united with the
people. They should behave in a way that the people can trust them;
the people should forget what has happened and maintain their
appreciation for the military. All have to go forward, united using
peaceful means.
e. The students are capable of and should be united in overcoming
the boundaries that result in establishing different organisations.
The gulf between the young and the old generation also must be
bridged.
f. The strength of the people must be controlled by the individuals’
discipline not by outward control. It is clear that the people want a
multi-party democracy. Therefore, the referendum proposed by Dr.
Maung Maung is unnecessary. It is clear what the nation wants, and
it is clear that the people have lost confidence in the government. To
achieve the common goal, more demonstrations are necessary. For
the sake of the country’s future, this must be done in a disciplined way.
Aung San stressed this last point, and it cannot be repeated too often.
g. The main objective of the movement is to create a ‘strong and
prosperous Union of Burma’. This goal is within reach, but any
divisions can endanger it. With regard to the relationship between
the ethnic Burmans and the other ethnic groups, and the people
outside and in the ruling party, the party should exercise restraint
towards the people, who are in a weaker position than those in power.
h. After a final appeal for unity and discipline, the main demand of
the rally is reiterated: The one-party system must be abolished and
a multi-party system should be established as soon as possible.
The main theme of Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech is unity. United,
disciplined, peaceful demonstrations of the people, led by the students,
against the existing one-party system will achieve everything desired.
Something new is in the making, yet also a continuation of Aung San’s
legacy. The ‘second struggle for independence’ must avoid the dangers
of Burmese ‘power politics’ that contributed to the failure of the first
independence struggle.14 The potentially destabilising forces coming
from weaker sectors of society, which could endanger attaining the
goal by maintaining divisions, can be neutralised through the greater
Hans-Bernd Zöllner
strength of a people united. Aung San Suu Kyi offers to help the
people in achieving their unfulfilled goals which her father had
once proclaimed.
Comparison
Both speeches are very different in many respects, for the obvious
reason that in the first speech an experienced elderly man says
goodbye to his role in a political era, while in the second, a young
woman, upon whom hopes are pinned, opens the horizon of a
new era. But within these differences, similarities are also present.
Both speakers view Burmese history both as a continuum of Figure 3: Aung San Suu Kyi
eras and as new beginnings. What connects the new age with the old is on a rally in Rakhine (Arakan),
that the current era of decline also began as a promising future, which December 2002. Source:
is now threatened by the dark forces of anarchy (Ne Win) or disunity http://i.pbase.com/u29/
(Aung San Suu Kyi). The latter, herald of the new epoch, stresses that to dassk/upload/18036487.
reach the goal should only be done through peaceful means. When Ne Dasskchinstate.bmp
Win recaps the events of 1962, around the destruction of the Students’
Union Building, he underscores that then just as now he was motivated
by the desire to practice restraint. But as a responsible leader of the
state, he cannot tolerate challenges to the State’s monopoly on violence.
Aung San Suu Kyi quotes her father who, in turn, quoted a Pali saying
in one of his last speeches:
Unity is the foundation. Let this fact be engraved in your memory, ye
who harken to me, and go ye to your appointed tasks with diligence
(Aung San 1972: 100).
In addition, she refers to some of the basic virtues of the ideal
Buddhist ruler summed up in the Ten Royal Virtues, for example
sacrifice (paricagga), integrity (ajjava) and non-violence (avihaµsa).15 All
virtues taken together can be summarised as ‘responsible’ action. Ne
Win (like Aung San Suu Kyi) claims to tell the people the truth, thus
preserving his own integrity. He also claims not to want to oppose the
will of the people (avirodha), a virtue that, according to Aung San Suu
Kyi, is linked to the ideals of democracy.16 Therefore, both speakers
frame their respective messages in a sense of morality deeply rooted –––––––––––––––––
15 For her interpretation of the
in Burmese and Buddhists traditions. This concept of the righteous Pāli terms, see Aung San Suu
Buddhist ruler can be traced to the Hindu-Buddhist myth of the Kyi 1989.
Mahasammata, the Great Elect, who according to the Buddhist Holy 16 Aung San Suu Kyi 1989: 172-
Scriptures was the first king on earth, elected by the people in order to 173.
prevent greed and lawlessness.17 17 The story is contained in
Ne Win and the daughter of his comrade in arms, share the belief the Aggañña Sutta. For a
that ‘the people’ are the ones who decide, and that the rulers must abide detailed interpretation see
Stanley Tambiah 1976.
by the people’s decision. According to Ne Win, the people shall decide For an assessment of the
in a referendum. According to Aung San Suu Kyi, the people have Mahasammata myth by Aung
already decided. Therefore, the referendum is no longer needed. San Suu Kyi, see Aung San
This leads to the question of who represents the desires of the Suu Kyi 1989: 169-170.
people and how solutions can be implemented. In Aung San Suu Kyi’s 18 The elections of April 1947 in
which Aung San campaigned
speech, her father is invoked as the one who, in Max Weber’s sense,
for the AFPFL resulted in an
was a charismatic leader of the people. He led the first struggle for overwhelming victory. See
independence and his leadership was endorsed by the people.18 Now, Prager 1998: 279-285.
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–––––––––––––––––
19 As Lintner (1990: 116) states,
‘…during her speech, the 43-
year old daughter of Burma’s
foremost hero won the hearts
of her audience. She emerged
as the leading voice for the
opposition that demanded
the restoration of democracy
in Burma. “We were all
surprised”, Aung Win says.
“Not only did she look like her
father, she spoke like him also:
short, concise, and right to the
point”.’
20 See, for example, Lieberman
1984: 68-78.
276
A-W chpt16_pp268-277.indd 276-277
Hans-Bernd Zöllner
the students and – if we take the audience’s reaction to her appearance The confrontation of 1988 was caused by the fact that all sides involved
into account – Aung San Suu Kyi herself come to fill the same role.19 in the political struggle shared the same concept, which only allowed
On the other hand, Ne Win and his government have to admit that they for one virtuous person to be the head of the society. Two unexpected
have lost their charisma, and consequently represent only a mixture of and unpredictable events were instrumental in the confrontation going
the Weberean types of traditional and legal authority. Whereas Aung out of control. These were Ne Win’s retirement, the first at least semi-
San Suu Kyi, as her father’s successor, was entitled to represent the voluntary resignation for good of a ruler in Burmese history, and Aung
unity of the people, Ne Win stepped back to make way for somebody San Suu Kyi’s appearance on the political scene. Whereas the former
else to fill the nation’s need for a chairman. event created a vacuum of power, the latter produced the hope that
Thus, both sides share a common notion about legitimate this vacuum would be filled by a new charismatic leader. This would,
leadership. The legitimacy of the rulers is deduced from the people’s ideally, result in Burma’s move towards true independence, which would
will, and based on his or her moral superiority. Disunity of the people hopefully be beneficial for the people as a whole.
– as well as the moral and material defects in society – indicates the This hypothesis can be substantiated by an analysis of how the
ruler’s lack of legitimacy. This conception, which makes a compromise above cultural-political concept helped Aung San, the father of Burmese
extremely difficult because unity cannot be divided, is a modification of independence and national hero, to become the paramount leader. It
the concept upon which the reign of the Burmese kings rested.20 It was can be argued that he was seen as a minlaung, a future king, and thus
modified by other notions of legitimacy, namely the rule of law and the another unifier of Burma. In this context, he followed in the footsteps
rule of the ballot-box. of the great kings and founders of dynasties in Burmese history (Prager
With regard to these ‘modern’ notions, the symmetry between Ne 2003). Furthermore, Aung San’s victory in the elections of 1947 could
Win and Aung San Suu Kyi described thus far ends. Both envisage a be regarded as approval à la Mahasammata (Zöllner 2004: 17-20). Taking
new system of government, a multi-party system, but the contested into account that U Nu and Ne Win, who followed Aung San as Burma’s
issue is the question of how to achieve it. Ne Win, as well as Maung leaders, were his associates, the confrontation of 1988 and its aftermath
Maung later, advocates a constitutional solution. But Aung San Suu can be interpreted as a fight over who had the legal and moral right to
Kyi seeks an extra-constitutional one. In other words: The ‘democratic’ succeed Aung San as the legitimate ruler – the military or his daughter.
opposition used a ‘monarchical’ argument, whereas the abdicating Of course, studies like this do not mean that no one was to blame
strongman advocated ‘democratic’ means. for the violence of 1988, but the deliberations in this paper may be
In effect, the Party Congress put the kibosh on both arguments when helpful as a frame to investigate further what really happened in 1988.
it decided not to go along with Ne Win’s proposal. Ironically, its decision A detailed history of this crucial year still has to be written.
was something like a ‘democratic’ vote in favour of the continuation of
authoritarian rule. This decision and the choice of Sein Lwin as the References
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