The Urban South in The Great Depression

Southern Historical Association
The Urban South in the Great Depression

Author(s): Roger Biles
Source: The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 71-100
Published by: Southern Historical Association
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The Urban South
in theGreat Depression
By ROGERBILES
H ISTORIANSCONTINUETO BE FASCINATED
WITH THE QUESTIONOF
continuityand change in the modernSouth. Most studies have
focusedon theyearsof thenineteenth centuryfollowingtheCivil
War-onReconstruction, Redemption, thefateoftheplanter
class,
riseofa newmercantile
theputative class,thetransitions
insouthern
theredefinition
agriculture, ofblackstatusthrough thedevelopment
of sharecropping and JimCrow,and a hostof othertopics-
whether
questioning theconceptof a "New"Southaccurately por-
trayedthe realityof thatera. Understandably, historianshave
concernedthemselvesless with the region'scities; afterall, the
South'surbanareashadalwaysbeensmallerandlessimportant
than
theindustrial
behemoths oftheNortheast ' As W. J.
andtheMidwest.
Cashconcludedin hisseminalTheMindoftheSouth,theregion's
fewrealcities"wererathermeredepotson theroadtothemarkets
I On theNew Southsee C. VannWoodward,OriginsoftheNew South,1877-1913 (Baton
Rouge, 1951); Barrington Moore, Jr.,Social OriginsofDictatorshipand Democracy:Lord
and Peasant in theMakingof theModern World(Boston, 1966); Dwight B. Billings,Jr.,
Plantersand theMakingofa "NewSouth":Class, Politics,and Developmentin NorthCaro-
lina, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill, 1979); Jonathan M. Wiener,Social OriginsoftheNew South:
Alabama, 1860-1885 (BatonRouge, 1978); David L. Carlton,Mill and Townin SouthCaro-
lina, 1880-1920 (Baton Rouge, 1982); GavinWright,ThePoliticalEconomyof theCotton
South: Households, Markets,and Wealthin the NineteenthCentury(New York, 1978);
PatrickJ. Hearden, Independenceand Empire: The New South'sCottonMill Campaign,
1865-1901 (De Kalb, Ill., 1982); BroadusMitchelland GeorgeSinclairMitchell,TheIndus-
trialRevolutionin theSouth(Baltimore,1930); Paul M. Gaston,The New SouthCreed: A
Studyin SouthernMythmaking (New York,1970); RogerL. Ransomand RichardSutch,One
Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation(Cambridge,Eng., and
othercities, 1977); JayR. Mandle, The Roots of Black Poverty:The SouthernPlantation
EconomyAfter theCivil War(Durham,N. C., 1978); JamesTice Moore,"RedeemersRecon-
sidered:Changeand Continuity in theDemocraticSouth,1870-1900,"JournalofSouthern
History,XLII (August1978), 357-78; JamesL. Roark,Masters Without Slaves: Southern
Plantersin theCivil Warand Reconstruction (New York,1977); NumanV. Bartley,"Another
New South?"GeorgiaHistoricalQuarterly,LXV (Summer1981), 119-37; JamesC. Cobb,
"Urbanizationand theChangingSouth:A Reviewof Literature,"SouthAtlanticUrbanStud-
ies, I (1977), 253-66; and JamesC. Cobb, "BeyondPlantersand Industrialists:A New Per-
spectiveon theNew South,"Journalof SouthernHistory,LIV (February1988), 45-68.
MR. BILES is an associateprofessorof historyat OklahomaStateUniver-

sity.
THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERN HISTORY

Vol. LVI, No. 1, February1990
72 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY
of theworld,mereadjunctsto theplantation,thanlivingentities
in theirownright,afterthefashionof BostonandNew Yorkand
Philadelphia."2
Yetbythelastquarter ofthetwentiethcenturytheSouth'scitieshad
mushroomed intosprawling, gleamingmetropolises withbustling
airports,downtown convention centers,professionalsportsfran-
chises,andmounting crimerates,proving thata "New"Southhad,
forbetterorworse,actually arrived. FromAtlanta'sPeachtreeStreet
toHouston's Galleria,changehadbecomeso commonplace thatcrit-
ics, infusedwiththemelancholy spiritoftheNashvilleAgrarians,
lamented thehomogenization thatdestroyedtheslower-paced gen-
tilityand aestheticdistinctivenessthatonce characterizedDixie's
cities.Now,theygrumbled, "modernization" and "progress" had
wipedoutvirtually all remnantsofanearliercivilization.
Thetrans-
formationwascomplete, theonlyquestion beingwhenthecitieshad
succumbed.I
HistorianBlaineA. Brownellcontended thatan urbanethoshad
emergedin southern citiesbythe1920s,butotherstudents ofthe
questiondesignated the1930sas thetimewhensweeping changes
engendered bytheGreatDepression begantoclosethegapbetween
urbanDixieanditsnorthern counterparts.Forexample, inhisstudy
of thepersistent in southern
politicaltradition politics,GeorgeB.
TindallconcludedthattheNew Deal "jeopardized" thetraditional
sourcesofpowerinlocalgovernment andreoriented southern urban-
itesawayfrom cityhallstoward thenation's capital.InCotton Fields
andSkyscrapers, DavidR. Goldfield arguedgenerally fortheper-
sistent oftheregion's
distinctiveness cities,saying:"Butthesouthern
becausetheSouthis different.
cityis different Inthatregion, thecity
is muchclosertotheplantation thanitis toChicagoandNewYork."
Goldfield notedthatchangecamegrudgingly to theurbanSouth,
whichdidnotexperience sweepingtransformation untilwellintothe
twentieth century. Andyet,admitting thatsomemeasureof the
South'suniqueness survivedtothepresent, Goldfield alsoalludedto
theimpact ofthefederal government inbreaking thegripoftradition
insouthern cities.TindallandGoldfield sawFranklin D. Roosevelt's
New Deal as havingtheunintended effectof initiatinglong-term
changesinthesouthern urbanlandscape.4
2 WJJ. Cash, TheMind oftheSouth(New York,1941), 99.
3 On thecitiesof theSun Belt see RupertB. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath,eds., The
UrbanSouth(Chapel Hill, 1954); David C. PerryandAlfredJ.Watkins,eds., TheRise ofthe
SunbeltCities (BeverlyHills, Calif., 1977); Carl Abbott,TheNew UrbanAmerica: Growth
and Politicsin SunbeltCities (Chapel Hill, 1981); and RichardM. Bernardand BradleyR.
Rice, eds., SunbeltCities: Politicsand GrowthSince WorldWarTwo(Austin,Texas, 1983).
4 Blaine A. Brownell,The UrbanEthos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, 1975);
GeorgeB. Tindall,ThePersistentTraditionin New SouthPolitics(BatonRouge, 1975), 71;

URBAN SOUTH IN GREAT DEPRESSION 73
Recenthistorical studieshavenotedthelimitedimpactoftheNew
Deal in thecities.In Pittsburgh,BruceStaveconcluded,theNew
Deal relievedunemployment andimproved housingsomewhat but
hadlittleeffect
onthemorelasting problems ofeconomic stagnation
and physicaldecay.A numberof studiessuggestthat,insteadof
undermining the strength of the big citypolitical machines,
Roosevelt supported thosebossesloyaltonationalDemocratic plat-
formsandpolicies.CharlesH. Troutfoundthat"during theentire
New Deal period,policiesfromWashington alteredBoston,but
justas surelyBostonmodified federalprograms."RichardC. Wade
concluded that"theNewDeal might haveproduced a revolutionary
rearrangement in formalgovernmental institutions
and agencies,
butit leftmostof thecountry's urbanfabricintact."Or, as Zane
Millersummarized, "Thefederalresponsetodepressioninthecities
was conservative. The NewDeal's urbanpolicyneither envisaged
norproduceda radicaltransformation of metropolitan formand
structure."'5
Thisstudyexamines thesixlargestsouthern citiesin 1930-New
Orleans,Houston, Atlanta, Dallas,Birmingham, andMemphis (the
Southbeingdefined as theelevenstatesoftheConfederacy). Towhat
degreedidthesesouthern communities alterlong-standing traditions
to deal withtheeconomiccrisis?Did local leadersembracenew
politicalstructures
orsocialarrangements? Did localinstitutions or
federalagenciesbendmoretoaccommodate theother?In short,did
theOld Southperishat thehandsoffederalbureaucrats during the
depression decade?The NewDeal willbe examined in fourareas,
thoseoflocalgovernment, relief,labor,andracerelations. In these
sixcitiesthefederalgovernment exerted littleinfluence onmunici-
palgovernance. Cityhallsandcommunity elitesresponded desulto-
rilytotheeconomicupheavalsofthe1930sandwerecommitted to
balancedbudgetsandlimitedreliefspending.Opponents of labor
unionism tobe successful.
continued TheNewDeal intheSouth,as
inotherregions,attempted nomassiveassaultonracialdiscrimina-
David R. Goldfield,CottonFields and Skyscrapers:SouthernCityand Region, 1607-1980
(Baton Rouge, 1982), 3 (quotation).See also David R. Goldfield,"The New Deal as a Big
Deal forSouthernCities,"Newsletterof theNorthCarolina InstituteofAppliedHistory,III
(March 1984), 10-13; and David R. Goldfield,"The UrbanSouth:A RegionalFramework,"
AmericanHistoricalReview,LXXXV (December 1981), 1009-34.
5 Bruce M. Stave, "Pittsburghand theNew Deal," in JohnBraeman,RobertH. Bremner,
and David Brody,eds., TheNewDeal: TheStateand Local Levels (Columbus,Ohio, 1975),
376-402; Lyle W. Dorsett,"Kansas City and the New Deal," in Braeman,Bremner,and
Brody,eds., The New Deal, 407-18; Roger Biles, Big CityBoss in Depression and War:
MayorEdwardJ.KellyofChicago (De Kalb, Ill., 1984); CharlesH. Trout,Boston,theGreat
Depression,and theNew Deal (New York,1977), 315 (quotation);RichardWade quotedin
Trout,Boston,x; and Zane L. Miller,The UrbanizationofModernAmerica:A BriefHistory
(New York,1973), 168-69. In TheNewDeal in the UrbanSouth(BatonRouge and London,
1988), Douglas L. Smithmakesthecase forchangeduringthe 1930s.
tion,andtheplightofblacksremained essentially unchanged. New

Deal largessprovidedwelcomeassistancebutdid notaltertradi-
tionalinstitutions. In manyessentialrespects,southerncities
responded totheNewDeal inmuchthesamewaythatmunicipalities
didinotherregions ofthenation-that is, therewasmorecontinuity
thanchange.6
In thesolidlyone-party Southofthe1930s,theDemocratsheld
swayinallsixcities.Ineachlocation municipal leaderspledgedtheir
fealtyto President Rooseveltandobservedwhatbecamea riteof
politicalorthodoxy by affirming theirsupportof theNew Deal.
Rhetoricaside, however, theattachment to Washington remained
partisan, notideological.Mindful oftheprecariousness ofa national
partyallying blacks,labor,thebigcity'spolyglot masses,anda con-
servative South,thepresident carefully cultivated thesupportof
Dixie'ssachems whileoverlooking theirdeviations fromofficialpol-
icies. Moreover, he reacheda modusvivendiwiththeregion'sbig
citypoliticosas wellas withthegalluseddemagogues ofthebackwa-
ters.LiberalbackersofRoosevelt andtheNewDeal founditdifficult
toacknowledge support forthepresident fromsuchunsavory south-
ernersas TheodoreG. BilboandEllisonD. ("CottonEd") Smith-
justas theyblanched atbeinginleaguewithequallyunattractive big
citybossesoftheFrankHagueandThomasJ. ("Tom")Pendergast
ilk.ButRoosevelt, alwaysa cold-blooded realist,sawinthesevari-
ousDemocrats a sourceofvotesnottobe spurned simplyforreasons
of ideologicalpurity. As longas theydelivered theirprecinctsand
kepttheirdefalcations toan acceptablelimit,disreputable southern
Democrats-like theirnorthern counterparts-remained inthepresi-
dent'sgoodgraces.7
Strainsonsucha tenuous alliancepredictably developed inMem-
phis,wherethelocal Democratic machineof EdwardH. ("Boss")
Crumpmaintained unquestioned hegemony throughout thedecade
andwellintothepost-World WarII years.Firstas a congressman and
lateras a privatecitizen,theMemphis bosssupported all NewDeal
measures.Whileservingin theHouseof Representatives, Crump
votedforeveryRoosevelt-endorsed law,remained in his
unstinting
praise of theNew Deal, and arguedthat"Roosevelt. . . has done
morefortheSouththananypresident-aidto thefarmers,
public
works,TVA. . . ." CrumpclashedwithRoosevelton occasion and
6 U. S. BureauoftheCensus,Fifteenth I
CensusoftheUnitedStates:1930.Population,
(Washington,1931),18.
tiestotheSouthsee FrankFreidel,FD.R. andtheSouth(BatonRouge,
' On Roosevelt's
1965);JamesT. Patterson,
CongressionalConservatismandtheNewDeal (Lexington,
Ky.,
1967); GeorgeB. Tindall,TheEmergence oftheNewSouth,1913-1945(BatonRouge,
1967),chaps.11-18;andJamesMacGregor Burns,Roosevelt:
TheLionandtheFox(New
York,1956),135-38,341-43.
balkedat themoreliberalNewDeal experiments, buthe remained

loyalbecauseofthelargessafforded hismachine andtheautonomy
heenjoyed inpresidingoveritsdistribution.
Citygovernment appro-
priatedverylittlemoney, butCrumpwas empowered tonamelocal
reliefagentswhotookchargeof dispensing federalfunds.Shelby
County, whichincludedMemphis,withroughly one-ninth of the
state'spopulation,receivedone-seventh of theWorksProgress
Administration (WPA)jobs. Overtheyearsthecombinedenroll-
mentsof theFederalEmergency ReliefAdministration (FERA),
CivilWorks Administration(CWA),WPA,andPublicWorks Admin-
istration(PWA)brought thousandsofjobs to Memphis-jobsthat,
though created andfunded bythefederal government, passedintothe
handsofneedyMemphians throughthegoodofficesoftheCrump
organization. Notonlydidthefederal government makenoeffort to
dislodgethelocalDemocratic machine, butitsbeneficentpatronage
policyamounted totacitapprovalofMr.Crumpandhisminions.8
LikewiseinNewOrleans,Roosevelt waswillingtoassociatewith
a disreputablepoliticalmachine-in fact,whichevermachine
appearedto holdtheupperhand.MayorT. SemmesWalmsley, the
scionofan old andrespected NewOrleansfamily, claimedthesup-
portofthelocalDemocratic machine, the"Old Regulars." Indeed,
onlytheopposition of theOld RegularskeptU. S. SenatorHuey
Longfrom wielding completecontrolinLouisiana,so Longusedhis
dominancein thestatelegislature to wage war againsttheNew
OrleansDemocrats. As theLong-dominated trimmed
legislators aid
tothestate'sleadingcity,thefederal
government, mobilizing against
theKingfish, cutbackitscontributions toNewOrleansas wellas to
othercitiesin thePelicanState.MayorWalmsley issuedseveral
plaintiveappealstothepresident, affirming hisloyaltyandarguing
thathe andhiscitywerebeingpunished unfairlywhenLongalone
shouldbe disciplined. Rooseveltrefused to intervene,andtheOld
Regularsboltedto Long'sfaction.Deprivedof patronage and cut
adrift
byhisownparty, Walmsley becamea forlorn figurehead and
finallyresigned in 1936.9
8 Shields
McIlwaine,
MemphisDowninDixie(NewYork,1948),379-80(quotation);
Wil-
liamD. Miller,Mr. CrumpofMemphis(BatonRouge,1964), 179-80;LyleW. Dorsett,
FranklinD. Rooseveltand the CityBosses (PortWashington,N. Y., 1977), 40; and Roger
Biles,"ThePersistence intheGreatDepression,"
ofthePast:Memphis Journal ofSouthern
History,LII (May1986),209-12.
9T. HarryWilliams, HueyLong(NewYork,1969),425-27,675, 849-53;BettyMarie
Field,"ThePoliticsoftheNewDeal inLouisiana,1933-1939"(Ph.D. dissertation,
Tulane
1973),83-84,109-12,286-87;Work
University, Projects "Administrations
Administration,
oftheMayorsofNewOrleans,1803-1936,"n.p., March1940,LouisianaDivision(New
OrleansPublicLibrary);T. SemmesWalmsleytoFranklinD. Roosevelt,August25, 1933,
copyofa letterprovidedtotheauthor
byProfessorArnoldR. Hirsch.Onthehistory ofthe
Old RegularsinNewOrleanssee GeorgeM. Reynolds, MachinePoliticsinNewOrleans,
1897-1926(NewYork,1936).
AfterHueyLong'sdeath,thosewho inherited his organization,

principallyGovernor RichardW. Leche andLieutenant Governor
Earl K. Long,choseRobertS. Maestrito succeedWalmsley. As
mayor, according to a contemporary, Maestri"breakslaws,rules,
and regulations withhigh-handed disregard"and even seemed
headedforfederal prisonforincometaxevasion.In 1937hereached
a settlementwiththeInternal RevenueService,paid$134,000,and
was notindicted.Meanwhile,MaestriandLechequicklymended
fenceswiththeRooseveltadministration, andtheflowof federal
dollarsintoLouisianaresumed.In thestruggle forcontrolofNew
Orleans'sDemocratic leadership, Roosevelt sidedwiththeeventual
winner, theOldRegulars -despitetheir connections withHueyLong
andtheirsordidreputations
Intheotherfourcitiesconservative elitesdominated localgovern-
ments.In Dallas thedriveto bringcityhallmorefirmly underthe
controlofthebusinesscommunity cametofruition inthe1930s.The
silk-stockingCitizensCharter Association (CCA) successfullycam-
paignedtoreplacethemayor-council form ofgovernment witha city
manager-council arrangement. In 1935an opposition factioncom-
posedofseasonedpols,knownas theCatfish Club,bestedtheCCA
togaincontrol ofthecitycouncil.In 1937,however, twohundred of
thecity'scorporate presidents andchiefexecutive officersformed
theDallas Citizens'Counciltobreathe newlifeintothedyingCCA.
Theinitiativewas provided byoneman,R. L. ("Bob")Thornton. A
former tenantfarmer whomismanaged severalbusinesses intobank-
ruptcy,Thornton finally struck itrichas a bankerandbecameoneof
thecity'smostesteemed philanthropists. By themid-1930s he had
growntiredoftheinefficiency oflocalgovernment andresolvedto
seizeauthorityforthecity's"natural leadership." In 1939thecandi-
datesofthefledgling Citizens'Councilparlayed rumors ofgraft in
theincumbent administration intoa resounding victory.The coun-
cil's1941slate ranunopposed, anditsdominance oflocalgovern-
mentcontinued intothe1960s. A local newspaper observed:"In
manycities,powerdescendsfroma smallgroupofinfluential busi-
nessmento thecitycouncil.Whatdistinguishes theDallas power
groupfrom othersis thatitisorganized, ithasa name,itisnotarticu-
latelyopposedanditwas highly publicized.""
10 DonEddy, theSecond,"AmericanMagazine, CXXVIII(November
"Kingfish 1939),79
286-87;EdwardF. Haas,
Field,"ThePoliticsoftheNewDeal in Louisiana,"
(quotation);
"NewOrleanson theHalf-Shell: LouisianaHistory,XIII
The MaestriEra, 1936-1946,"
(Summer 1972),288-99;NewOrleansBureauofGovernmental "CityProblems
Research,
Series,"No. 46, September28, 1936, LouisianaCollection(Howard-TiltonMemorial
Library, NewOrleans).
TulaneUniversity,
II WPA Writers'Project,Dallas Guide and History(Dallas, 1940), 193-94; Dallas Morn-
ingNews,January ofinterview
26,March23,27, 1967;transcript Jr.,
withR. L. Thornton,
November 8, 1980,Dallas MayorsOralHistoryProject(Dallas PublicLibrary);Warren
InBirmingham a fiercelyconservativemunicipalgovernment gave

no indicationof New Deal influence.WiththeKu Klux Klan's
endorsement, trucking executive JamesM. ("Jimmy") Jones,Jr.,
wonthepresidency ofthethree-member citycommission in1925and
heldtheofficeuntilhisdeathin 1940.Relinquishing thesupport of
thehoodedempire,Jonesdrifted intotheorbitofthecity'spreemi-
nentindustrialmoguls,theBigMules.He responded tothedepres-
sionby slashingcityservicesandfiringemployees-much to the
approval ofthedominant steelinterests.
Intheearly1930stheother
twocommissioners mitigatedJones'sparsimony, primarily by
decreasing thenumber offirings. TheBigMulesfought back,ledby
TennesseeCoal & Iron's(TCI) CharlesF. DeBardeleben, withan
extensive propaganda campaign. TheylobbiedAlabamanewspaper
editorsandfinanced thereactionary, anti-NewDeal weeklymaga-
zine,Alabama.As a result,thebalanceofpowerinthecommission
swungbacktotheconservatives in1937withtheelectionofEugene
("Bull")Connor,a renowned radiosportscaster.Fullydominating
thecommission, Jonesreaffirmed localgovernment's defense ofseg-
regation,opposition tounionization, andaversion topublichousing
that,he argued,wouldundermine theprivatemarket forlow-rent
housing.Thoughhe openlycriticized theNew Deal infrequently,
Jonescontinued toexerthisindependence fromWashington.'2
InAtlanta andHoustonthelinkages betweencityhallandthecen-
tralbusinessdistrictmayhavebeenlessobviousthaninBirmingham
andDallas,buttheywerenolessbinding. Byall accounts, theywere
a gooddealmoreadhesive thananyconnections between cityhalland
Washington, D. C. In Atlanta,JamesL. Keyservedas mayorfor
threeconsecutive termsfrom1930 to 1936-thankslargelyto the
support of theChamberof Commerce, RetailMerchants Associa-
tion,Manufacturers' Association, andAssociatedGeneralContrac-
tors,all of whichendorsedhis austerity measures.Disenchanted
withwhattheyperceived tobe Key'slacklusterrecord,thebusiness
community deserted hiscandidacy in1936andsupported statelegis-
latorWilliamB. Hartsfield, whowonaftera bitter struggle.As one
historiannoted:"Thougha hotlycontestedelection,insteadof
changingthedirection of local government, Hartsfield's victory
Leslie,Dallas, Publicand Private(New York,1964), 64 (quotation).See also Stanley
Walker,TheDallas Story(Dallas, 1956), 32-36.
12 Edward Shannon LaMonte,"PoliticsandWelfareinBirmingham, Alabama:1900-75"
(Ph.D. dissertation,
UniversityofChicago,1976),135-36;Robert J.Norrell,"Laboratthe
BallotBox:Birmingham's BigMulesFightBack,1938-1948," unpublished papergivenatthe
Southern Historical
Associationannualmeeting
inLouisville,Ky.,November 2, 1984,10-
11; "Miracle Man,"Alabama: TheNews Magazine oftheDeep South,II (May 17, 1937), 4;
JamesM. Jones,Jr.,toWilliamB. Hartsfield,June2, 1938,JamesM. Jones,Jr.,Papers
(AlabamaDepartment ofArchivesandHistory,Montgomery, Ala.); Birmingham Times-
Herald,February 8, 1940.
assuredcontinuity." In officeHartsfield achievedsomenotoriety by

vetoing anordinance establishing
a housing andbyinviting
authority
thered-hunting U. S. HouseCommittee onUn-American Activities
toferret outCommunist subversives inAtlanta.In 1940Hartsfield
lostinhisbidforreelection toformer Chamber ofCommerce Presi-
dentRoyLeCraw.In Houstonfour-time mayorOscarF. Holcombe
faithfully representedtheconcernsof thelocal Democracyled by
bankerandReconstruction FinanceCorporation directorJesseH.
Jones.Againbusinessinterests wereserved,andthefederal govern-
mentplayedno majorrole.'3
Indeed,thelocal governments ofthesesix citiesshowedno evi-
denceoffederalintrusion duringthedepression decade.The elec-
toralsuccessesofDemocrats owedless to Franklin D. Roosevelt's
coattailsthantotraditional regionalvotingpatterns. In mostofthe
cities,firmly entrenched conservative businesselitescontinued to
dominate thelocalpolity;inmachine-governed citiestheNewDeal
madeno effort to unseatthegroupsinpower.Justas thepresident
showedconsiderable forbearance inhisassociation witha variety of
alliesinstateandnational politics,so toodidhesuffer insilencehis
relationswithsouthern urbanleaders.FromAtlanta toHouston, just
as inChicagoandPittsburgh, Roosevelt kepthandsofflocalpolitics
as solidlyDemocraticadministrations returnedhealthyvoting
majorities atelectiontime.IntheSouth'slargest cities,theNewDeal
exerted no influence on thecomposition ofcommunity leadership.
Tothemassiveunemployment crisisofthe1930s-bothbeforeand
aftertheinception oftheNewDeal-southerncitiesresponded inan
extremely limitedfashion.At theoutsetof theGreatDepression
southern citiesrankednearthebottomin socialservicesgenerally
andintheprovision ofreliefspecifically-thecontinuationofa long-
standing traditionthatwasdeeplyimbedded bythetwentiethcentury.
Whenthestockmarket crashedin October1929,noneof thesix
citiesoperatedmunicipally fundedreliefbureaus.From1916 to
1924 Birmingham administered sucha bureau,butit constantly
struggled to obtainadequatefunding andneverreceivedmorethan
13 NewYork Times,March20, 1932;KesavanSudheendran, "Community PowerStructure
in Atlanta:A Studyin DecisionMaking,1920-1939"(Ph.D. dissertation,GeorgiaState
University,
1982),117;DouglasLee Fleming,"Atlanta,
theDepression, andtheNewDeal"
EmoryUniversity,1984),214 (quotation); to
WilliamB. Hartsfield
JamesL. Jones,Jr.,July18, 1938,JamesM. Jones,Jr.,Papers;Atlanta Sep-
Constitution,
tember1, 1940; HaroldH. Martin,WilliamBerryHartsfield:MayorofAtlanta(Athens,Ga.,
1978),32; E. ThomasLovell,"Houston's Reactionto theNewDeal, 1932-1936"(M.A.
thesis,
UniversityofHouston,1964),2-3, 168-87;DavidG. McComb,Houston:TheBayou
City(Austin,Texas,1969),226-27;HoustonPost,April19,1933.Inhis1953studybasedon
Atlanta,FloydHunternotedthata permanenteconomic tomakeallimportant
elitecontinued
community decisions,
primarily
workingbehindthescenesandthrough officials.
surrogate
PowerStructure:A StudyofDecision Makers (Chapel Hill, 1953).
Hunter,Community
$18,000a yearfromcityofficials. After1924thecitymadea small

annualcontribution totheCommunity Chest'sfamily reliefagency.
Atlanta's government underwrote someof theexpenseof indigent
careat thecity'sGradyHospitalandcontributed to severalof the
local Community Chest'sthirty-ninecharitable agencies.In 1929
onlytheMemphisCommunity Fund,whichhadbeenorganized six
yearsearlierthrough theeffortsoftheChamber ofCommerce and
theCouncilofSocialAgencies,functioned as a welfareagency.In
NewOrleansa largenumber ofprivateandsectarian agenciesdis-
pensedrelief;in Houstonand Dallas, Community Chestsdid the
same.14
As conditions worsened, manufacturing reductions andbusiness
failuresled to mounting unemployment ratesandwage cuts.The
TennesseeCoal & IronCompany, Birmingham's leadingemployer,
loweredwagesbetween 50 and75 percent by 1933 andthreatened
workerswithdismissalif theyprotestedthe policy.Memphis
employers adopteda standardthirty-hourworkweekandpledgednot
tohirewomen;between1929and1932employers intheBluffCity
handedoverto menapproximately 6,000jobs previously heldby
women.InHouston thenumber ofunemployed ballooned from1,100
to nearly30,000 in slightly morethana year.An Atlantasocial
worker estimatedin 1933thatunemployment ratesreached30 per-
centcitywide andas highas 75 percentinsomeblackneighborhoods.
In NewOrleansthevolumeofforeign tradedecreasedover50 per-
centfrom1928to 1933,andfederalsurveys reported thatall indus-
trialconcerns reducedtheir
workforcesandoperated onlya fewdays
a weekatmost.Clearly, though theextent ofjoblessnessandmisery
mayhavebeengreater insuchnorthern citiesas ChicagoandDetroit,
bythewinter of1932-1933southern citiessuffered severely from the
weightof thedepression.15
Cotton
14 Goldfield, FieldsandSkyscapers, "TheUrbanSouth
39-44;BlaineA. Brownell,
ComesofAge,1900-1940,"inBlaineA. Brownell
andDavidR. Goldfield,
eds.,TheCityin
SouthernHistory:The Growthof UrbanCivilizationin theSouth(PortWashington,
N. Y.,
andLondon,1977),155; DouglasL. Smith,"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth"(Ph.D.
dissertation, ofSouthern
University Mississippi,1978),239;Fleming,"Atlanta,theDepres-
sion,andtheNewDeal,"47; Memphis Community Fund,"Annual Report,1940"(Memphis
PublicLibrary);MarionAlcornto Aubrey Williams,April14, 1934,FERA StateFiles,
1933-1936,Louisiana403-420,FieldReports (406),RecordsoftheWorks ProjectsAdmin-
istration,
RecordGroup69 (NationalArchives andRecordsService,Washington, D. C.);
Houston Press,December4, 1934;Dorothy Dell DeMoss,"Dallas,TexasDuringtheEarly
Depression:TheHooverYears,1929-1933"(M.A. thesis,University ofTexasat Austin,
1966),29-31; andWPAWriters' Project,Dallas GuideandHistory, 489-90.
"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth,"
15 Smith, 35; Biles,"ThePersistence
ofthePast,"
188;William E. Montgomery,"TheDepression inHouston,1929-1933," inRobertC. Cot-
ner, ed., Texas Cities and the Great Depression (Austin, Texas, 1973), 156; Fleming,
theDepression,
"Atlanta, andtheNew Deal,"80-81; GlennMartinRunyan, "Economic
TrendsinNewOrleans,1928-1940"(M.A. thesis,TulaneUniversity,
1967),22; AliceE.
Stenholm, ofa FieldTrip,December
"Louisiana:Report 5-12, 1931,"StateFile:Louisiana,
TABLE 1
RELIEF EXPENDITURES BY CITY GOVERNMENT
AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
January 1 to March 31, 1931
Municipal($) % of Total Private($) % of Total Total($)
Atlanta 20,493 26.7 56,183 73.2 76,676
Birmingham 74,544 50.4 73,326 49.6 147,870
Dallas 34,622 48.3 37,109 51.7 71,731
Houston 12,329 20.4 48,224 79.6 60,553
Memphis 11,190 8.8 115,317 91.2 126,507
New Orleans 0 0.0 27,103 100.0 27,103
TOTAL 153,178 30.0 357,262 70.0 510,440
NOTE: provided60.4% and privatesources,39.6%.
Nationwide,local governments
SOURCE:U. S. Bureauof theCensus,ReliefExpenditures and PrivateOrga-
byGovernment
nizations,1929 and 1931 (Washington,1932), 6, 32-33.
Faced withunprecedented demandsforrelief,local governments

respondedbut not in a substantialway. The six cities contributed
littleforrelief,roughlyhalfas muchas cities did nationally(see
Table 1). Burdenedbyreducedtaxcollections,theycutexpenditures
to keep fromgoing heavilyin debt; thisin turnresultedin paltry
appropriations forvitalcityservices.In thisregard,Memphisfitthe
South'stypicalpatternof keepingtaxrateslow and spendingmodest
amountson services.The nation'sthirty-sixth largestcityin 1933,
Memphisspentonly$18.21 percapita,placingitsixty-eighth outof
seventycitieswithover100,000 population(see Table2). FromJan-
uary1933 untilSeptember1934 ShelbyCountydependedentirely on
federaland statefundsforits $2 millionemergencyreliefexpendi-
ture.In 1935 Memphisbecamethelastmajorsoutherncityto estab-
lish a permanent welfaredepartment. 16
Ifanything,theothercitiesprovedjustas niggardly in theirprovi-
sionofrelieffortheunfortunate. As lateas 1934 New Orleanscould
claim thedistinction of beingthenation'slargestmunicipality that
did not providea singlepennyforfamilyrelief;public employee
donationsand bond issues constituted theonlyways in whichcity
hall responded.Even afterMayorT. SemmesWalmsleydecidedto
spendtaxdollarsforrelief,theresponsewas minimal:fromJanuary
1933 to December1935 local fundscomprisedonly3 percentwhile
the federalgovernmentcontributedroughly97 percentof relief
Records of the President'sOrganization for UnemploymentRelief, Record Group 73
(NationalArchives).
16 U. S. Departmentof Commerce,StatisticalAbstractof the U. S., 1935 (Washington,
1936), 220-21; MemphisPress-Scimitar,February18, 1935; and MemphisBoard of Com-
missioners,"Resolution,"December 3, 1935, Folder 9, Box 10, WatkinsOvertonPapers,
MississippiValleyCollection(MemphisStateUniversityLibrary,Memphis,Tenn.).
TABLE 2
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 1935
Population National
Rank Total($) Rank
Atlanta 31 24.60 58
Birmingham 34 15.58 69
Dallas 33 24.81 57
Houston 24 22.27 60
Memphis 36 18.21 68
New Orleans 16 24.91 56
Charities,
Health& National Hospitals,& National
Sanitation($) Rank CorrectionalFac. ($) Rank
Atlanta 2.48 39 2.50 48
Birmingham 1.01 64 0.38 63
Dallas 1.69 55 5.54 32
Houston 1.63 56 1.78 53
Memphis 1.84 50 1.45 55
New Orleans 2.76 32 0.71 60
SOURCE:U. S. Departmentof Commerce,StatisticalAbstract
ofthe U. S., 1935 (Washing-
ton, 1936), 220-21.
funds.To guard againstboondogglingand extravagantliving by

thoseon thereliefrolls,themayorandotherhighcityofficialsvisited
thehomesand inspectedtheautomobilesof theneedy.Birmingham
reliefrecipientsacceptedpaymentin "foodchecks"redeemablefor
cannedtomatoes,driedbeans,potatoes,rice,milk,andshortening-
notin cash that,officialsfelt,mightbe squanderedon nonessential
itemslike liquor and tobacco. Determinedto cut spending,tight-
fistedCommissionPresidentJimmyJonessaid: "I am as muchin
favorofrelieffortheunemployables as anyone,butI amunwillingto
continuethisreliefattheexpenseofbankrupting theCityofBirming-
ham."In a replyto U. S. SenatorHugo Black's queryregardingthe
of increasedfederalaid to citiesforrelief,Jonesreplied
desirability
negatively.
17
17 AlexanderKendrick,"HueyLong's 'Revolution',"Nation,CXXXIX (August22, 1934),

208-9; RobertE. Moran, Sr., "Public Relief in Louisiana from1928 to 1960,"Louisiana
History,XIV (Fall 1973), 372; Alice E. Stenholm,"Louisiana"; New Orleans Bureau of
Governmental Research,"CityProblemsSeries,"Numbers26 and 43, Louisiana Collection;
IrvingBeiman,"Birmingham: SteelGiantWitha Glass Jaw,"inRobertS. Allen,ed., OurFair
City(New York,1947), 118; Memorandum,untitled,n.d. (quotation),andJamesM. Jonesto
Hugo L. Black, telegram,February3, 1932, bothin JamesM. Jones,Jr.,Papers; New York
Times,July25, 1932; andJohnWilliams,"StrugglesoftheThirtiesin theSouth,"in Bernard
Sternsher,ed., The Negroin Depressionand War:Prelude to Revolution,1930-1945 (Chi-
cago, 1969), 173 (quotation).
Mounting debtsleftcitiesatthemercyoflocalbanks,whichman-
dateddraconian budgetcutsandemployee layoffs
beforegranting
loans. On one occasion Birmingham avoidedbankruptcy only
becauseOscarWells,headoftheFirstNationalBank,approved a $1
millionloantothecity.In 1934onlyan $800,000advancefromthe
Coca-ColaCorporation keptAtlantasolvent.To meetpayrollsthe
cityissuedscrip,whichlocalmerchants frequentlydiscounted to a
fractionofitsintendedvalue.WhenWilliamB. Hartsfield became
mayorin 1937thecitystoodover$3 millionin debt,andthenew
chiefexecutiveavoidedbankruptcy byconvincingRobertW.Wood-
ruff,presidentof Coca-Cola,to providea loansufficient
to cover
one monthof thecity's$730,000monthly payrollfor4,000 city
employees.18
A historian of thedepressionin Houstonnotedthatthecity's
responses "weresimilartothoseoftheHooveradministration ....
Bothwereadherents to theorthodox economictheories oflaissez-
faire anda freemarket, andbothwerebelievers ingovernment fru-
galityandbalancedbudgets." Indeed,thecityended1935 witha
$386,000 surplusand 1936 witha $75,000 cushion.Similarly,
ledger-minded Dallas boastedofbalancedbudgetsachievedbythe
trimming ofoperating expenses by$1 milliona year.As themonthly
caseloadofthecitywelfare department rosetoanaverageof2,800in
1931,cityofficialsinstituteda planwhereby theunemployed labored
onedayperweekonpublicworksprojects andwerepaidas littleas
eighteen centsan hour.Economycontinued tobe thefirst priority.19
Withmunicipal governments scrupulouslyplayinga limited role,
itfelltoprivatecitizenstoexpandphilanthropic activity inexisting
agenciesortoorganizead hocorganizations tomeetthecrisis.Com-
munity Chestsincreasedtheirbudgetsand intensified theirfund-
raisingcampaigns. Hardtimescurtailed givingbythosefortunate
enoughtokeeptheir jobs,butmuchoftheresistance tofund-raising
foremergency reliefstemmed fromfirmly entrenched ideological
objectionsto the"dole'"Forwhatever reasons,contributions fre-
quently proveddisappointing. When,forexample, MayorWalmsley
of NewOrleanssentouttwothousand lettersto thecity'swealthy
launching a charity
campaign, hecollected only$600forhisefforts.
WhenWilliamJacobs,pastorof theFirstPresbyterian Churchof
Houston,suggested thatthecity'sproblems couldbe alleviatedif
18 Beiman,"Birmingham," 115-16; AtlantaConstitution,
February2, 1932, December30,
1934; Martin,WilliamBerryHartsfield,20; and Fleming,"Atlanta,theDepression,and the
New Deal," 222-25.
19 Montgomery, "DepressioninHouston,"153 (quotation),166; HoustonPost, January25,
1936; NewYorkTimes,August13, 1934; andDorothyDell DeMoss, "Resourcefulness in the
FinancialCapital: Dallas, 1929-1933,"in Cotner,TexasCitiesin theGreatDepression,124-
26.
twentyor thirty
millionaires
donated$5,000each,Dr. E. B. West,
pastoroftheSecondBaptistChurch, exclaimed,
"I do notbelievea
moredangerous doctrine
haseverbeenpreached ina pulpitinHous-
ton."TheDallasMorningNewseditorialized,"Therichestoftherich
inDallashavefallendownonthetask.Theyhaveshirked intheface
ofthewinter's need."20 AndtheMemphis
desperate Community Fund
concluded:"Comparisonswithcitiesbothnorthandsouthshowthat
the per capita givingin Memphisis low. . . . Our difficulties
of
financing willcontinue untilthemenandwomenofwealth withinour
citygivemoregenerously oftheirmeanstothecausesofsocialwel-
farethantheyhavebeeninthehabitofdoinginthepast. '21 Theinade-
quacyofindividual effortswas manifest inall sixcities.
Cityhallscloselyadheredto a policyof low taxesand limited
expenditures whilestriving forbalancedbudgets.Stateresources
weresimilarly limited,andthefederalgovernment becamethelast
resort.Through FERAs directreliefmeasuresandthrough public
worksagenciessuchas theCWA,PWA,and,mostimportant, the
WPA,millions offederaldollarsmadetheirwaytosouthern cities.
WhilePresidentRoosevelt'sofferof assistancemetwitheager
acceptance, thisdidnotreflect a changeinthecommunities' attitudes
toward publicwelfare.TheNewDeal meantsimply temporary mea-
surestohelpthebeleaguered citiessurvivehardtimes.22
Insomesouthern citiesresistancetoanexpanded federal presence
restrictedtheamount ofaidmadeavailabletothepoor;often recalci-
trantstategovernments threwup elaboratedefensesagainstwhat
theyviewedas excessiveNew Deal incursions. Governor Eugene
TalmadgeofGeorgiainsisted thatfarmers desperately neededhelp
butthatcitydwellerswere"bums"and "chiselers." As a result,
according to WPAfieldrepresentative AllenJohnstone, Talmadge
refused toletFERAadministrator GayShepperson doherjob. John-
stonereported that"daysandweeksofdelayinterrupt theorganiza-
tionand interpretation. Appointments are heldup. The Governor
insistsonsigning everycheck.Wantstoknowthenameandaddress
ofeverypersonon staffandalmostthenameandaddressofevery
personon relief.Harassestheadministration by continued criti-
cism."Talmadge toldShepperson, ina widelyreported remark,that
thebestwayto handlereliefapplicants wouldbe to "linethemup
againsta wall and give thema dose of castoroil." Conditions
20 New YorkTimes,April 3, 1932; HoustonPost-Dispatch,October5, 1931; and Dallas
MorningNews, December4, 1931.

21 MemphisCommunity Fund, "AnnualReport,1931,"p. 5 (MemphisPublic Library).
discussionofNew Deal agenciesandprogramscan be foundinWilliam
22 A comprehensive
E. Leuchtenburg,FranklinD. Rooseveltand theNew Deal (New York,1963); and Otis L.

Graham,Jr.,andMeghanRobinsonWander,eds., FranklinD. Roosevelt,His Lifeand Times:
An EncyclopedicView(Boston, 1985).
84 THE JO URNA L OF SO UTHERN HISTORY
improved whenavowedNew Dealer EurithD. Riversreplaced

Talmadgein 1936,buta tightfisted legislatureundermined Rivers's
blueprintfora "LittleNewDeal."Finally, thestate'srefusaltoraise
revenueformatching grantsledRoosevelt toterminate all WPAand
PWAfundstoGeorgia.23
Resistance tofederalcontrol surfaced inothercitiesas well.New
Deal administrators chronicled theopposition theymet,as in Bir-
mingham, whereDirector ofPublicWelfare Roberta Morganrefused
to cooperatefully.FERA regionalsocial workerLoula Dunn
reported Morgan'sintransigence and addedthat"theold private
agencyattitudes andmethods stillprevailonthewholeinthedirec-
tionoftheprogram, andI sometimes question howablewewillever
be tomakeanyrealprogress inBirmingham." FERA representative
ElmerScottsimilarly notedthedesireofHouston's leaderstoaccept
outsideaid withoutshouldering any responsibilities in turn;it
shockedhim"howparasitica local community maybecome."In a
moment ofcandor, theHouston Pressacknowledged thehypocrisyof
itscity'srelianceon statesrightsdogma,saying:"Werecognized
stateboundaries whenwe werecalledon to give,butforget them
whenUncleSamis doingthegiving.'24
In Memphistherefusalto supplement federalspendingunder-
scoredtheunchanged priorities of community leaders.In 1937
Memphis allocatedone-tenth of1 percent ofitsbudgetforcharities,
whileauthorizing morethanthatforrecreation. WPAchiefHarryL.
HopkinsaccusedMemphis ofshirking itsduty,a chargethatMayor
WatkinsOverton deniedbyarguing thatMemphis haddoneyeoman
workin1931-1932beforethefederal government becameinvolved.
Hopkinsrejectedthisargument, whichapparently did notbother
Overton atall. As onehistorian noted,Democratic bossEdwardH.
CrumpandOverton "applaudedtheinvolvement ofWashington in
welfarewhileorganizing a local reliefapparatus onlymarginally
sympathetic to thejobless and indigent." ElmerScottobserved,
"Memphisgave thedistinctfeelingthata warmwelcomewas
extendedto government concerning itselfwiththeplightof the
unemployed, andpaying thebills-as longas itistheFederalgovern-
23 AllenJohnstone toHarryHopkins, September18,1933,FERAStateFiles,1933-1936,
Georgia401.2-420,FieldReports(406), RG 69; JaneWalkerHerndon, "Ed Riversand
Georgia's 'LittleNewDeal',"AtlantaHistoricalJournal,
XXX(Spring1986),99-103(quota-
tiononp. 99); and"PWAandGeorgia:TheState'sNo-DebtPolicyRousesthePresident's
Ire;"Newsweek, XII (December 5, 1938),12.
24 "ServicetoHumanity: TheCareerofRoberta Morgan,"Folder12,Box1, Roberta Mor-
ganPapers(Birmingham PublicLibraryArchives);
LoulaDunntoRobert P.Lansdale,Octo-
ber19, 1934,FERAStateFiles,1935-1936,Alabama401.3-420,FieldReports (406),and
MarionAlcornto Aubrey Williams,April9, 1934,FERA StateFiles, 1933-1936,Texas
401.2-410,FieldReports (406),bothinRG 69; andHouston Press,March23, 1936(Scott
quotation).
TABLE 3
RELIEF BENEFITS BY CITY, JULY 1934-JUNE 1935
Population AverageReliefBenefits
Rank Per FamilyPer Month($)
Atlanta 31 21.13
Birmingham 34 17.11
Dallas 33 16.38
Houston 24 17.56
Memphis 36 21.97
NewOrleans 16 28.46
Average= 20.44
Akron,Ohio 35 29.08
Columbus, Ohio 27 28.09
Denver,Colorado 30 36.24
Providence,RhodeIsland 37 35.94
St. Paul,Minnesota 32 41.75
Toledo,Ohio 28 26.70
Average= 32.96
SOURCE:ArthurE. Burns,"FederalEmergencyReliefAdministration," inClarenceE. Ridley
and OrinF. Nolting,eds., TheMunicipal Yearbook,1937(Chicago, 1937), 415-16.
ment.The local cityand countygovernment thusalso welcomes

absolutionfromresponsibility-moral orfinancial.
?25
Paltryallotments to reliefrecipientsin southern citiesfurther

underscored community Thefederalgovernment
priorities. divided
thenationintofourregionsto establishvariableWPApay rates
approximating local standards.The southeasternregion,including
Atlanta,Birmingham, andMemphis,receivedthelowestmonthly
stipends;thesouthwestern region(NewOrleans,Dallas, andHous-
ton)faredslightlybetter,andtheNortheast wasthemostgenerously
endowed region.Certainlyreliefstipendsfellshortofdesirable lev-
els nationwide, butsouthern urbanwelfarebeneficiaries suffered
most,receiving from 33 to65 percentofthenational average"emer-
gencystandard oflivingexpense"identified byfederalauthorities.
NewDeal officials reportedthatWPAwagesforAtlanta's unskilled
workers, adjustedforcostof living,constituted thelowestin the
nationandthattheratesinotherDixiemunicipalities werecompara-
ble(seeTable3). BitterAtlanta referred
unionists tothelocaldispen-
25 Memphis
Press-Scimitar, 18, 1935;U. S. BureauoftheCensus,Financial
February
1940), 186-87; Smith,"The
StatisticsofCitiesOver100,000 Population,1937 (Washington,
NewDeal andtheUrbanSouth," ElmerScottto HarryHopkins,
264-65(firstquotation);
FieldReports,
April15, 1934,HarryL. HopkinsPapers,Box60, Folder"Tennessee 1933-
1936,"Group24 (FranklinD. Roosevelt
Library,
HydePark,N. Y.) (secondquotation).
sationofreliefas "legalizedpeonage."26
Indeed,substandard payrates,theimplacability ofstateandlocal
themiserly
officials, topublicrelief,thenearlyabso-
contributions
luterelianceon federalfunds,andthetestimony ofNewDeal offi-
cialsallpointtoa dubiousrecordonthepartofsouthern cities.These
municipalitiesdidestablish,forthefirsttime,permanent, publicly
funded welfarebureausbut,according toa studyofBirmingham that
seemstoreflect intheothercitiesas well,"notbecauseof
attitudes
anyconviction ofthepublicatlargethatreliefwasa responsibility
of
thewholepeoplerather thana philanthropytobe supported bya few
individuals;rather. . . because of theavailabilityof federalfunds
through a publicdepartment." Responding tardilyand sparingly,
localofficialsandcharity-minded citizenskepttheirfaithina fiscal
orthodoxy thatpreachedthevirtuesof a balancedbudget.The
acceptance ofNewDeal fundsprovided a waytocleavetothesehal-
lowednotionswhiletemporarily expanding reliefcoverage.When
directreliefbythefederalgovernment was terminated bythecrea-
tionoftheWPAin 1935,localofficials madenomovetotakeupthe
slack;without federalfunds, relief vanished
virtually (seeTable4).27
As tables1, 2, and3 indicate,thesesouthern citiescontinued to
providereliefin lesseramounts thandidothercitiesin thenation.
Theyplaceddecidedly lowerinpercapitareliefexpenditures thanin
nationalpopulation rankandpaidlowerreliefamounts thandidcities
in otherregions.As a result,theindigent in thesesouthern cities
reliedmoreonprivate thanmunicipal aid-whereastheopposite pre-
vailednationwide. Southern citiesaccepted federalfunds as a tempo-
raryexpedient, butthisconcessioncertainly didnotacknowledge
anyneedtochangethesouthern customs, attitudes,andinstitutions
relatedtoproviding relieftothepoor.Farfrombeinginfused with
anynewspiritofsocialwelfare, thesesixsouthern citiesseemnotto
havealteredtheirpolicieson indigent careat all during thedepres-
sionyears.
Whether entirelyintended or not,theNewDeal hada profound
impact onlaborunionsbymeansofsuchlandmark piecesoflegisla-
tionas Section7a,whichauthorized workers toorganizeandbargain
ontheir ownbehalf, oftheNational IndustrialRecovery Act(NIRA),
theNationalLaborRelations Act(NLRA),andtheFairLaborStan-
dardsAct.Labor'ssuccessesinthe1930snotonlyactivated a listless
"TheNewDeal andtheUrbanSouth,"
26 Smith, 225-26;DonaldS. Howard,TheWPAand
FederalReliefPolicy(NewYork,1943),178; andMichaelS. Holmes,"TheNewDeal in
Georgia:AnAdministrative (Ph.D. dissertation,
History" ofWisconsin,
University 1969),
213,237.
27 AnitaVandeVoorf, "PublicWelfare
AdministrationinJefferson (M.A. thesis,
County"
TulaneUniversity,1935),99.
TABLE 4
SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR RELIEF PROGRAMS, 1935-1936
Federal Percentof
TotalSpent Dollars Spent Totalfrom
Cityand Time on Relief($) on Relief FederalSources
1935 5,910,810 5,051,153 85.5
Atlanta 1936 0 0 0
1935 5,452,319 5,072,506 93.0
Birmingham 1936 140,209 51,996 37.1
1935 1,776,400 1,429,494 80.5
Dallas 1936 0 0 0
1935 2,422,159 1,931,037 79.7
Houston 1936 0 0 0
1935 2,280,031 2,123,861 93.2
Memphis 1936 0 0 0
1935 9,241,949 8,973,956 97.1
New Orleans 1936 0 0 0
FinalStatistical
SOURCE:WorksProjectsAdministration, ReportoftheFederalEmergency
Administration
Relief (Washington,1942), 327, 335, 343, 374, 376, 377.
American FederationofLabor(AFL) butledindustrial unionists to

breakawayfromthecraftunion-controlled AFL to formtheCon-
gressof Industrial Organizations (CIO). Bothorganizations won
notablevictoriesresultinginrecognition, collectivebargaining, and
improved wagesandconditions, buttheymetstiff resistanceinthe
South.Well-publicized violenceerupted inthecoalminesofHarlan
County,Kentucky, thetextilevillagesoftheCarolinaPiedmont, and
thecottonfieldsofplantation Arkansas;andstaunch opponents of
theclosedshop,higher wages,andemployee rights manned thebar-
ricadesin urbanfactories as well. Determined to protect
regional
wagescales,whichpresumably gavesouthern a com-
industrialists
boost,andthreatened
petitive by rumorsof Communist influence
andracialmixingin theCIO, big citygovernments curtailedcivil
andemployed
liberties violenceas readilyas didruralelites.Witha
fewexceptions,organized labor'sfoesinthesesixcitiesenjoyed con-
siderablesuccess.28
Without question,organizedlabor'sgreatest breakthrough in the
Southoccurred inBirmingham in1937whentheUnitedStatesSteel
28 The standard oflabor'sstrugglesinthe1930s remainsIrvingBernstein,Turbu-
treatment
lentYears:AHistoryoftheAmericanWorker, 1933-41 (Boston,1970). On southernattitudes
towardlaborsee C. VannWoodward,OriginsoftheNewSouth,especiallyChap. 8; Tindall,
TheEmergence
oftheNewSouth,351, 523; Cash,MindoftheSouth,296-99;andF. Ray
Marshall,Labor in theSouth(Cambridge,Mass., 1967), 24-36.
Corporation, parentcompany of theTennesseeCoal & Ironfirm,

signeda collectivebargaining agreement withtheCIO-affiliated
SteelWorkers' Organizing Committee (SWOC).Thisactionbrought
morethantwenty thousand steelworkers inBirmingham anditssub-
urbsunderunion-management agreement. TCI disbanded itscom-
panyunion,andin1941SWOCobtained exclusive bargaining rights
within thecity'ssteelindustry.Although obtaining recognition from
thecity'sleadingemployer constituted a notableachievement, it
wouldbewrongtoconcludethatresistance toindustrial unionism in
Birmingham hadbeencrushed. After all,theunionprospered locally
onlybecauseof a nationalsettlement, and membership remained
small.Immediately thechairman of RepublicSteelrushedto Bir-
mingham to assertthathiscompany hadno intention offollowing
U. S. Steel'slead in bowingto organizedlabor.The city'spolice
chiefannounced hisintentionto quashall strikes andresponded to
thecriticism hisremarks provoked bysayingthat"communist rav-
ingsfromNew Yorkare likeso muchwateron a duck'sback."A
resurgent Ku KluxKlanterrorized a minister whoallowedUnited
MineWorkers organizerstomeetinhischurch. In 1937JamesSimp-
son, a statesenatorfromBirmingham, wroteand helpedsteer
through thelegislaturea bill prohibiting picketing;in 1939 he
rewrote thestate'sunemployment compensation lawtodisallowben-
efitsforstriking workers.If anything, TCI's pathbreaking conces-
sionin1937seemedtostiffen resistance toorganized labor.In 1940
thelocalChamber ofCommerce grudgingly admitted thatunionshad
madesomegainsintheir cityoflatebutcountered that"thedistrict is
stillopenshopandindications areitwillremainSo."129
Opposition throughouttheSouthtotheCIO wascausedlargely by
theunion'sputative racialliberalism, andresistance was especially
stiffin Birmingham whereapproximately 41 percentof thesteel-
workers, 56 percent of theore miners,and63 percent of thecoal
minerswereblack. In 1933 onlythreeor fourof Birmingham's
unionshadlistedanyblackmembership. Therewerea fewsmall,
separatelocalsofblackplasterers andmusicians, anda handful of
blackbricklayers andpostmen belonged tounions.Butbytheendof
thedecaderecruitment efforts by theUnitedMine Workers, the
UnionofMine,MillandSmelter Workers, andtheSWOCincreased
blackmembership intheunions,perhaps toas muchas 30 percent.30
29 LucyRandolph
Mason,ToWinTheseRights:
A PersonalStoryoftheCIO intheSouth
(New York,1952), 62; Marshall,Labor in theSouth, 186; George R. Leighton,"Birming-
ham,Alabama: The CityofPerpetualPromise,"Harper'sMagazine,175 (August1937), 241;
New YorkTimes,August2, August5, 1937, p. 18, col. 3 (firstquotation);Norrell,"Labor at
the Ballot Box," 15; and Billy Hall Wyche,"SouthernAttitudesTowardIndustrialUnions,
1933-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Georgia, 1969), 61 (second quotation).
30 Norrell,"Labor attheBallotBox,"7-8; Horace R. CaytonandGeorgeS. Mitchell,Black
Thesouthern headquarters oftheCommunist party werelocatedin

Birmingham, and thatpresenceexplainswhychargeswerefre-
quently madeaboutCommunist influence on laboractivitiesthere.
Membership inthepartyneverexceededabout250 (mostofwhom
wereblack),butthelocalbranch office published a widelycirculated
newspaper, Southern Worker, andtheCommunist-funded Interna-
tionalLaborDefensekepta highprofile.Fearofradicalism led to
violentretributionbytheKu KluxKlan,American Legion,White
Legion,SilverShirts,andAlabamaBlackshirts. The Birmingham
policedepartment formed a "redsquad,"led bya privatedetective
whowaspaidbyTCI andRepublicSteel,toharassCommunists and
laborleaders.The city'sofficiallabornewspaper, Southern Labor
Review,blamedlocal authorities forattempting to"'passthebuck'
for'so manystrikes' and'so muchdisorder' totheCommunists....
Thepurpose oftheoperators is togetthepeople'sattention ontheso-
calledCommunists so theywillnotsee therealcauseofthetrouble
..... Fueledbythefearofradicalism as wellas byan aversion to
integration,Birmingham's leaderscontinued to fighta rear-guard
actionevenaftertheunionization oftheredoubtable TCI.31
Labor'swidelyheralded victory intheBirmingham steelmillsdid
notresultina city-wide capitulation onthepartofcivicandbusiness
leadership,nordidnewsofthebreakthrough fororganized laborlead
to massivechangeselsewhere.A fewisolatedvictoriesforlabor
attracted attention,principally becausetheywereuniquein the
South.Forexample, theUnited AutoWorkers (UAW)stagedtheauto
industry'sfirst
sit-down strikeinAtlanta's FisherBodyandChevrolet
plants.Precipitatedbymanagement's threattofiretwoworkers for
wearing unionbuttons, thesit-down lastedonlyonenight, andpick-
etingresumed outsidetheplantswhenGeneralMotorsagreednotto
produce priortoa strikesettlement. TheUAWheldoutforoverthree
months intheunusually snowywinter of 1936-1937,andmember-
shipinthepreviously tinyorganization increased. TheAtlanta Con-
and theNew Unions(Chapel Hill, 1939), 315, 328; HerbertR. Northrup,
Workers Organized
"CasteinSteel:Jim
J.Norrell,
LaborandtheNegro(NewYork,1944),33, 45; andRobert
Crow Careersin Birmingham,
Alabama,"JournalofAmericanHistory,LXXIII (December
1986),672-80.
31 Cayton
andMitchell, Black Workersand theNew Unions,337-41;Marshall, Labor in
theSouth,183;U. S. Senate,Committee onEducation andLabor,75 Cong.,1 Sess.,Pursu-
anttoS. Res.266,"Hearings onViolationsofFreeSpeechandRights ofLaborBefore a Sub-
Committee onEducation andLabor," Part3, p. 762; SouthernLaborReview,May9, 1934.
See alsoWilliamR. Snell,"MaskedMenintheMagicCity:Activities oftheRevisedKlanin
Birmingham, 1916-1940,"Alabama HistoricalQuarterly,XXXIV(FallandWinter 1972),
206-27;BruceCrawford, "BulletsFellonAlabama'" Nation,CXLI (September18, 1935),
319-20; ThomasA. Krueger,And PromisesToKeep: The SouthernConferenceFor Human
1938-1948(Nashville,1967),10-21;andRobert
Welfare, Violence
P. Ingalls,"Antiradical
inBirmingham
Duringthe1930s,"Journal History,
ofSouthern XLVII(November 1981),
521-44.
stitutioncondemned tacticand praisedtheAFL for

thesit-down
refusingtoemploy it.Thestrike endedinunionrecognition, andthus
a symbolic victory fortheCIO, butthesuccesswas isolated.From
1935to 1938onlytwenty-four strikesbrokeoutinthecity,withno
resultantincreasesin prevailingpay scales. As a historianof
depression-age Atlantaconcluded,"ThoughtheWagnerActbol-
steredAtlanta's unions,theystillremained smallin numbers and
strength in 1940."32
Community leaderscommitted tothepreservation ofopenshops
workedassiduously to minimize theinfluence oflabororganizers.
ThelocalChamber ofCommerce boastedthatDallas"wasoneofthe
firstopenshopcitiesofthecountry" andadvertised nationallythe
virtuesofthecity'sdocilelaborforce.Itadduced:"Thepercentage of
foreign bornis negligible. Fromthesevastlaborresources Dallas
industries maydrawanunlimited supplyofnative,intelligentlabor,
easilytrained,loyal and efficient." The chamber's"Open Shop
Bureau"tookan activeroleinpolitics,supporting anti-unioncandi-
dates.TheDallasOpenShopAssociation, formed in1919bya cote-
rieoflocalbusinessmen, guaranteed thesolvency ofall itsmembers
incaseofwork-stopping strikes
through theuseofa rumored two-to-
three-million-dollar reservefund.Furthermore, it subjectedany
member whoknowingly hiredunionworkers toa $3,000fine.The
successof thebusinesscommunity in safeguarding theopenshop
resulted in totalcapitulation by thelocal AFL leadership, as wit-
nessedbytheCentral LaborCounciloffering tohelptheChamber of
Commerce keeptheCIO outof thecommunity. In Memphis,Ed
Crumpso tightly controlledtheAFL-affiliated unionsintheTrades
andLaborCouncilthattheytooenlisted intheanti-CIOcrusade.The
bossusedtheradicalspecter oftheCIO tolureindustry toMemphis
bypromising thatlocal authorities wouldkeepthedreadedunions
fromgaininga foothold there.Severalfirmsbuiltlargeplantsin
Memphis afterreceiving thepromise ofthelocalChamber ofCom-
merce,as wellas thecovertassurances ofthecityadministration,
thattheCIO wouldbe keptout.33
Whenall else failed,municipal officials
resorted toviolence.In
Memphis localofficialsdrewthebattlelinesattheentrances ofthe
32 Neil Herring
andSue Thrasher,
"UAWSit-down
Strike:Atlanta,1936,"in MarcS.
Miller,ed., Working
Lives: TheSouthernExposureHistoryofLabor in theSouth(New York,
1980),173-79;Atlanta Constitution,
February7, 1937;Mason,ToWinTheseRights, 34-36;
andFleming, "Atlanta,
theDepression,andtheNewDeal,"350 (quotation).
33 Dallas Chamber of Commerce, "The Dallas Market,"
Dallas, 1941 (Dallas Public
Library),12 (firstquotation),
13 (secondquotation);NewYorkTimes,January 5, 1930,
sec. 3, p. 1; GeorgeLambert,"DallasTriesTerror,"Nation,
CXLV(October 9, 1937),377;
andRogerBiles,"Ed CrumpVersustheUnions:TheLaborMovement inMemphis During
the 1930s,"Labor History,XXV (Fall 1984), 533-52.
city'sauto-related concerns(FordMotorCompanyand Firestone

TireandRubberCompany).NormanSmith,a veteranUAWorga-
nizer,wasviciously beatenontwooccasionsbyunknown assailants.
Despitestrenuous protestsby theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion
andtheidentification ofthethugsbyseveraleyewitnesses, thepolice
made no arrests.WhenSmithrecoveredsufficiently, theUAW
recalledhimto itsnationalheadquarters-a movesymbolic of the
union'sfailuretocracktheFordfortress. Within a fewmonths Crump
triumphantly boastedthat"everyone hasforgotten theCIO downthis
way.Don'thearanything aboutit."In 1940therelative calmofthe
previoustwoyearsevaporated as theUnitedRubberWorkers (URW)
traineditsgunsonthecity'sFirestone plant,thelargest unorganized
rubber factoryinthenation.Ananti-union mobbrutally pummelled
a URWspokesman, andtheorganizing campaignfaltered. At the
closeof1940theCIO's failure toorganizetheworkers atFirestone,
punctuated by theequallyfruitless effortsat Ford,keptthevast
majority ofMemphis's unskilled workforcefreefromtheinfluence
ofindustrialunionism.34
InAtlanta theCIO metequallystiff opposition.The1934General
StrikebytheUnitedTextile Workers ignitedsparksthroughout Geor-
gia, andstrikers inAtlantaclosedall tenofthecity'scottonmills.
ThreefemalepicketsattheExposition CottonMillsuedthecompa-
ny'sexecutive vice-president forrunning themdownwithhis car.
Another picketer diedafterbeinghitbya runaway autoattheFulton
Bag andCottonMill. Policeteargassed an estimated one thousand
strikerswhorefused tocleartheSouthern Railroadtracksnearthe
Exposition plant.Thestrike ragedinthemidstofthestate's guberna-
torialprimary, an unpropitious momentforincumbent Eugene
Talmadge, whopromised thathewould"never usethetroopstobreak
up a strike."
On theverynightof theprimary, however, Talmadge
calledoutthestate'sentirefour-thousand-man NationalGuardand
declaredmartial law.Guardsmen beatandbayoneted thestrikersand
thensentthemtoa makeshift internment campatFortMcPherson.
Thegovernor releasedthe16womenand119menpicketers, whohad
beenkeptin a barbed-wire enclosureforseveraldays,whenthe
strikeended.TheGeneralStrikefailedtotally, andtheAtlanta mills
34 MemphisPress-Scimitar,September Mr.Crump
22,23, 1937;Miller, ofMemphis, 215;
Mason,ToWinTheseRights,104-5;E. H. CrumptoKenneth D. McKellar,April6, 1938,
Crump-McKellar Correspondence, Box3, Kenneth D. McKellarPapers,Memphis-Shelby
County Archives,Memphis PublicLibrary RogerBiles,"Ed CrumpVersusthe
(quotation);
Unions,"543-46.Onetheory theassailants
identified as Pinkerton
agentsemployed bythe
FordMotorCompany. See JohnClarencePetrie,"Memphis MakesWaronCIO,"Christian
Century,LIV (October13, 1937),1273-74;andMemphis CommercialAppeal,August 25-
30, December 24, 1940.
92 THE JO URNA L OF S O UTHERN HIS TORY
reopenedwithno changein theirrigidopen shop policy.35

InNewOrleansandHoustonlaborconflict centered almostexclu-
sivelyon theraciallychargedbattleto controlthedocks.In New
Orleansthecitycounciladoptedan ordinance stipulatingthatonly
certifiedregisteredvotersbe employed on thewaterfront. Black
longshoremen descended uponCityHall toprotest, andinresponse
citycouncilpasseda revised ordinancerequiringa two-year-old poll
taxreceiptas a preconditionforemployment, whichstillprevented
blacksfromworking on thedocks.To circumvent Section7a ofthe
NationalIndustrialRecovery Act,theNewOrleansSteamship Asso-
ciationorganizedseparatecompany unionsforwhitesandblacks.By
theendofthe1930s,the700whitelongshoremen worked regularly;
the2,100blackmembers, whoeachpaidhigherdues,didnot.The
HoustonShipChannelbecamethelocusof periodicviolence,and
severalpeoplewerekilledingunfights between picketers andstrike-
breakers.Laborwonfewvictories, however. In 1931,forexample, a
longshoremen's unioncalleda strikewhensteamship operatorslow-
eredwages fromeightyto sixty-five centsper hour.Afterthree
weeksofbitter fighting,thestrikers
acceptedseventy centsperhour
andresumed work.36
As countlessepisodesinthesesixlocalities
demonstrate, therewas
a largeamount ofunionactivity insoutherncitiesinthe1930s.The
violencetriggeredbyCIO organizing effortsmadeitclearthatlocal
authorities
believedthatunionsthreatenedestablished southernlabor
relations.
Laborrecorded somenotablevictories-inthecaseofthe
Birmingham steelmills,thevictory
wasduetoa national agreement;
butin otherinstances, suchas in theAtlantaautofactories, local
effortswontheday.Nonetheless, themajorbreakthroughs forthe
CIO wouldcomeinthenextdecade.Thisbelatedsuccess,achieved
earlierinotherpartsofthenation, was forestalled bythepersistent
effortsoflocalauthoritieslikeMemphis's Ed Crumpandorganiza-
tionsliketheDallas OpenShopAssociation.As F. Ray Marshall
concluded inhiscomprehensive survey ofsouthern labor,"inspiteof
considerableferment during the1930s,southern unionmembership
was concentrated mainlyin theolderAFL unionsandtherailway
35Atlanta Constitution,
September 5-23,1934;andJohnE. Allen,"TheGovernor andthe
Strike:EugeneTalmadge andtheGeneralStrike,1934"(M.A. thesis,GeorgiaStateUniver-
sity,1977),2 (quotation),
3, 112-26.
36 Daniel Rosenberg,"Race, LaborandUnionism:New OrleansDockworkers, 1900-
1910"(Ph.D. dissertation,CityUniversityof NewYork,1985),303; RobertC. Francis,
"Longshoremen inNewOrleans," XIV(March1936),84; CarrollG. Miller,"A
Opportunity,
Study oftheNewOrleansLongshoremen's Unionsfrom 1850to1962"(M.A. thesis,Louisi-
anaStateUniversity,1962),30-31,36-37;Northrup,Organized LaborandtheNegro,149-
50; NewOrleansTimes-Picayune, July2, 1938;HerbertR. Northrup, "TheNewOrleans
Longshoremen,"
Political Science Quarterly,LVII (December 1942), 544; HoustonPost-
Dispatch,October1, 22, 1931;andLovell,"Houston's
ReactiontotheNewDeal,"77.
TABLE 5
POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION, 1930
TotalPopulation Blacks (0%o)
Atlanta 270,366 90,075 (33.3)
Birmingham 259,678 99,077 (38.2)
Dallas 260,475 38,742 (14.9)
Houston 292,352 63,337 (21.7)
Memphis 253,143 96,550 (38.1)
New Orleans 458,762 129,632 (28.3)
SOURCE:U. S. Bureauof theCensus, Negroesin the UnitedStates, 1920-32 (Washington,
1935), 54.
brotherhoods."
AndGeorgeB. Tindallcouldwellhavebeenspeaking
oftheregion's
citieswhenheobservedthatsouthern cam-
organizing
paigns"assumed. . . thecharacterofguerrillaactionspunctuated
by
occasionalvictories,"implying that,despitenominal gainsinmem-
bershipandthelayingofa foundation forfuture
growth, "theSouth
remained predominantly nonunion andlargelyantiunion."37
Blacksinthesesixsouthern citieswerethevictimsofa rigidracial
castesystem, weresaddledwiththelowest-paying jobs,andsuffered
disproportionatelyfromtheravagesoftheeconomy's collapse(see
Table5 forthesize oftheblackpopulation inthesixcities).Tradi-
tionally"lasthiredandfirstfired," blackshadunemployment rates
thatdwarfed thoseforwhites.Ineachofthesixcities,incomparison
withwhiteresidents, blackswerelesslikelytoowntheirhomes(and
morelikelyto ownhomesof lessvaluewhentheydidso), shared
theirlivingunitswithmorepersons,and moreof themoccupied
dilapidatedstructures.Theyendured ofa JimCrow
theindignities
system ofsegregation stillinitsprime,experienced politicalpower-
lessnessbased upon systematic disfranchisement, and, though
lynchings occurred less frequently fellvictimto a
thanpreviously,
campaignofviolenceandintimidation designedto preserve white
supremacy. The New Deal suppliedreliefbutalwaysunderthe
watchful eyeoflocalauthorities. Federalmoney helpeda goodnum-
berofdestituteblackssurvive, a considerable
accomplishment given
thetenorofthetimes,butit causedno changesin theracialcaste
system.3
37Smith, "The New Deal andtheUrbanSouth,"519-22; Marshall,Labor in theSouth,222;
and Tindall, TheEmergenceof theNew South,515, 522.
38 Roger Biles, Memphisin the GreatDepression (Knoxville, 1986), 92-93; Smith,"The
New Deal and theUrbanSouth,"38; JamesMartinSoRelle, "The DarkerSide of 'Heaven':
The Black Community in Houston,Texas, 1917-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation,KentStateUni-
versity,1980), 133; -AlwynBarr,Black Texans:A HistoryofNegroesin Texas, 1528-1971
(Austin,Texas, 1973), 154-55; RandyJ. Sparks,"'HeavenlyHouston'or 'HellishHouston'?
Black Unemploymentand Relief Efforts,1929-1936," SouthernStudies, XXV (Winter
94 THE JO URNAL OF SO UTHERN HISTORY
JimCrow continuedto flourishas public accommodations

remained separateandunequal.Publicschoolsystems keptblackand
whitepupilsstrictly segregatedandappropriated farfewerresources
fortheeducationof blacksthanforwhites.In Birmingham, for
example, whiteteachers earnedan averageannualsalaryof$1,466
andblackteachers only$682. InAtlanta theaveragepupilexpendi-
tureforwhitestudents stoodat $95.20butat $30.55forblackstu-
dents.Publicparksand playgrounds also borethestampof Jim
Crow,as inHouston, whereblackshadaccesstoonlyoneoftwenty-
sevenmunicipal parksandoneoftenplaygrounds. InthatTexascity
an ordinance mandated separateseatingonbuses,butsomedrivers
refusedtotakeanyblackpassengers atall; inBirmingham streetcars,
largemovablepartitions clampedonthebacksofseatserected barri-
ers betweenblackandwhiteseatingareas. Taxicabsoperatedby
whitesrefused blackpassengers, andonly"Harlemcabs"accepted
blackfares.TheAtlantaCityCouncilpasseda barbershop segrega-
tionlaw preventing blackbarbersfromservingwhites.Somereal
estateagentsprotested, fearinglossofmoneyifblack-owned shops
closed,andtheAtlanta Constitutionnotedthatblacksserving whites
didnotviolateacceptedcustoms. Thecitycouncilreconsidered and
adopted a weakerlawthatonlyprohibited blackbarbers from serving
whitewomenandchildren.39
Segregated housing prevailed,bycustom ifnotbylegalfiat.Inthe
1920sAtlanta, Birmingham, andNewOrleansalladopted residential
segregation statutes to assuretheseparation of theraces,butthe
U. S. Supreme CourtdecisionofSmith v.Atlantain 1926ruledthe
practiceillegal.In1926theTexasCourtofCivilAppealsabrogated a
Dallas residentialsegregationlaw,butDallas legislators led a suc-
cessfulfightfora newstatelawthatproduced segregation
bypermit-
tingmunicipal controloverbuildingpermits.In all of thecities
blacksinhabited themostundesirable topographical areas,con-
1986), 353-66; U. S. Bureauof theCensus,Negroesin the UnitedStates,1920-32 (Wash-
ington,1935), 277-81. On theimpactof theNew Deal on blackssee HarvardSitkoff, A New
Dealfor Blacks: TheEmergenceofCivilRightsas a NationalIssue (New York,1978); John
B. Kirby,Black Americansin theRooseveltEra: Liberalismand Race (Knoxville, Tenn.,
1980); RaymondWolters,Negroes and the Great Depression: The Problemof Economic
Recovery(Westport,Conn., 1970); RichardSterner,TheNegro'sShare:A StudyofIncome,
Consumption, HousingandPublicAssistance(New York,1943); RalphJ.Bunche,ThePoliti-
cal StatusoftheNegroin theAge ofFDR (Chicago, 1973); AllenF. Kifer,"The NegroUnder
theNew Deal, 1933-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Wisconsin,1961); and Leslie
H. Fishel, Jr.,"The Negro in theNew Deal Era," WisconsinMagazine ofHistory,XLVIII
(Winter1964-1965), 111-26.
39 CharlesS. Johnson, PatternsofNegroSegregation(New York,1943), 22, 50; Marcia E.
Turner-Jones, "A Political Analysis of Black Educational History:Atlanta, 1865-1943"
(Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Chicago, 1982), 194; Jesse 0. Thomas,A Studyof the
Social WelfareStatusoftheNegroesinHouston,Texas(Atlanta,1929), 93-94; SoRelle, "The
Darker Side of 'Heaven',"97; and Sudheendran,"CommunityPowerStructurein Atlanta,"
280-82.
signedtotheleastcovetedlandnearswamps,creeks,bayous,main
railroadlines, spurlines, terminals,and manufacturing areas.
Unlikethesituationinmostnorthern cities,whereblackssucceeded
otherimmigrant groupsandformed expansive ghettos in theinner
cityadjacentto downtowns, landin southern citieswas usuallyset
asideforscatteredblackhousingsites.Therefore,blacksclusteredin
neighborhoods like"SlipperyLog Bottoms," "QueenBee Bottoms,"
and"Shinertown" inMemphis; "BeaverSlide"and"Tanyard Bottom"
in Atlanta;"ElmThicket" and"Oak Cliff'in Dallas; and"Tuxedo
Junction" inBirmingham.40
Keenlyawareof theseveresocioeconomic limitations imposed
uponthem,blacksfoundno hopeforamelioration in thepolitical
realm.Primarily throughtheuseofJimCrowlawsbutalso through
forceandintimidation, municipal government disfranchised thou-
sandsofpotential blackvoters.In Texasthewhiteprimary formed
theprincipalhurdle.In 1936a groupofthestate'smostinfluential
blacks,includingAntonio MaceoSmithandMaynard H. Jackson of
Dallas andCliffordRichardson andRichardR. Grovey ofHouston,
organizedtheProgressive VotersLeague to fosterblackpolitical
activism.Theirprincipalgoalcontinuedtobe therepealofthewhite
primary law,buttheyenjoyed nosuccessinthe1930s.Notuntil1944
didtheU. S. Supreme Courtrulethewhiteprimary unconstitutional
inthelandmark Smithv.Allwrightdecision.InDallas andHouston,
therefore,fewblacksvotedorevenpaidtheirpolltaxes-only3,400
in Dallas in 1938 and 400 in Houstonin 1935.41
in Louisiana,Alabama,andGeorgiautilizeda
Statelegislatures
varietyofmethods to barblacksfromvoting,including polltaxes,
grandfatherclauses,understanding tests,andprop-
clauses,literacy
ertyrequirements,in additionto whiteprimaries. Of the117,347
votersinNewOrleansin1930,only2,128wereblack;by
registered
1940only609 blacksremained on therolls.In Birmingham blacks
40 PatternsofNegroSegregation,176; Brownell,UrbanEthosin theSouth,183-
Johnson,
84; "TheAtlantaZoningPlan,"Survey, XLVIII(April22, 1922),114-15;Birmingham Zon-
ingCommission, "ZoningOrdinance ofBirmingham, Alabama:EffectiveAugust4, 1926,"
n.p.,n.d.,Department ofSouthernHistory (Birmingham MichaelL. Port-
PublicLibrary);
er,"BlackAtlanta: StudyofBlacksontheEastSideofAtlanta,
AnInterdisciplinary 1890-
1930"(Ph.D. dissertation,EmoryUniversity, 1974),27; Barr,BlackTexans,140; Robin
Flowerdew, "SpatialPatterns
ofResidentialSegregationina Southern ofAmer-
City,"Journal
icanStudies,XIII (April1979),96-100;Rayburn W. Johnson, "LandUtilizationinMem-
phis"(Ph.D. dissertation,Universityof Chicago,1936), 50-52; DorothySlade, "The
EvolutionofNegroAreasintheCityofAtlanta" Atlanta
(M.A. thesis, 1946),23-
University,
28; JamesK. Howard,"AnEconomicandSocialHistory ofDallas,Texas"(Ph.D. disserta-
tion,Harvard 1956),39; andOtisDismuke,
University, "TheOtherSide:TheStoryofBir-
mingham's BlackCommunity," ofAlabamainBirmingham
n.p.,n.d. (University Library).
Haynes,"BlackHoustonians
41 Robert andtheWhiteDemocratic Primary,1920-1945,"in
CenturyUrbanFron-
FranciscoA. Rosales and BarryJ. Kaplan, eds., Houston:A Twentieth
172-
N. Y., 1983),122-37;SoRelle,"TheDarkerSideof'Heaven',"
tier(PortWashington,
94, 300-307; Barr,Black Texans,136; and Bunche,Political Statusof theNegro,466.
96 THE JO URNA L OF SO UTHERN HISTORY
madeuproughly 38 percent ofthepopulation butlessthan2 percent

of theelectorate.In Atlanta,wherea varietyof civicand church
groupsin theblackcommunity hadworkedfeverishly duringthe
decadetocounter disfranchisement, thenumber ofblackregistered
votersincreased onlyfrom500 in 1930to 1,500in 1940,andfewer
actuallyvotedbecausetheywereunabletopaytheirpolltaxes.Only
inMemphis didlargenumbers ofblacksexercisethefranchise-and
thenonlyat thesufferance of theomnipotent Crumpmachine.
Crump usedthestate'spolltaxtohisadvantage bypaying thelevyfor
blackvoters, keepingthereceipts untilelection
day,andthendistrib-
utingthemto"reliable" voters.BlacksvotedinMemphis ingreater
numbers thananywhere else intheSouth,buttheirvoteswerecon-
trolledbya whitepoliticalmachine.42
Thepoliticalpowerlessness ofblacksreflectedtheirvulnerability
inallareasoflifeinthe1930s.Periodic violenceandsustained perse-
cutionofblacksunwilling to adhereto prescribedbehavioral roles
servedas grimreminders ofwhitesupremacy. Although theKuKlux
Klanhaddisappeared inmostplacesbythemid-1920s, itcontinued
tooperate ona reduced scaleinBirmingham andDallasinthe1930s.
As lateas 1939theAtlanta Klan,sixhundred paradedinfront
strong,
of theofficesof theAtlantaConstitution
to protestthenewspaper's
editorial
policies.Forseveralmonths in 1930,another paramilitary
organization,theBlackShirts,ledthecrusadeforwhitesupremacy
inGeorgia'scapital.Ledbyformer mayor WalterA. Sims,theBlack
Shirtsblamedunemployment oncompetition fromblackworkersand
"servednotice"on Atlantabusinessesto replaceblackwithwhite
workers. Whenitsleaderswerejailedforpassingfraudulent checks,
drunken driving, andtaxevasion,theorganization unraveled-but
notbeforeitfocusednationalattention on theNewSouthcitythat
laterprideditselfonbeingtoobusytohate.43
Throughout the1930sAtlanta was thesouthern citymostvisibly
engagedinthepersecutionofdissident blacks.Inthemostcelebrated
42 DonaldE. DeVore, "TheRisefromtheNadir:BlackNewOrleansBetween theWars,
1920-1940"(M.A. thesis, University ofNewOrleans,1983),12-42,124;Norrell, "Laborat
theBallotBox,"7; Clarence A. Bacote,"TheNegroinAtlanta Politics,"
Phylon,XVI (Fourth
Quarter,1955),342-43;Augustus AlvenAdair,"A Political
History oftheNegroinAtlanta,
1908-1953"(M.A. thesis,Atlanta University,
1955),39-50;andBunche, PoliticalStatusof
theNegro,300, 485. Thelasttwosentences ofthisparagraph areparaphrased fromRoger
Biles,"Robert R. Church, Jr.ofMemphis: BlackRepublican LeaderintheAgeofDemo-
craticAscendancy, 1928-1940," Tennessee
HistoricalQuarterly, XLII (Winter1983),372.
43 Snell,"MaskedMenintheMagicCity," 225; Barr,BlackTexans, 139;NewYorkTimes,
November 27, 1939,sec. 1, p. 7; JohnHammond Moore,"Communists andFascistsin a
Southern City:Atlanta,1930,"SouthAtlantic Quarterly, LXVII (Summer 1968),444-53;
EdwinTribble, "BlackShirtsin Georgia,"NewRepublic,LXIV (October8, 1930),204-6
(quotedphraseonp. 205); andCharlesH. Martin, "WhiteSupremacy andBlackWorkers:
Georgia's'BlackShirts'CombattheGreatDepression," LaborHistory,XVIII (Summer
1977),366-81.
cases thecitychargedthe"Atlanta Six" andAngeloHerndon with

violatingan obscure1866blackcodethatprohibited "attempting to
inciteinsurrection andcirculating insurrectionary literature."
The
plightof someonelike AngeloHerndonmightbecomea cause
ce'lbre,butforcountless thousands of otherblacksarbitrary vio-
lenceandsubjugation remained everyday reminders oftheirinferior
status.Blacksin theIronCityreferred to theirhometown as "Bad
Birmingham," inreference toPoliceCommissioner Eugene("Bull")
Connor'sbrutallegions.Policehomicidesproliferated there,and
"resisting
arrest" becameoneoftheleadingcausesofthehighmor-
rateamongthecity'sblacks.TheMemphis
tality policehada similar
reputation,enhanced bysuchepisodesas thekilling ofblackpostman
GeorgeBrooksin 1938. Policesergeant A. 0. Clarkfatallyshot
Brooksaftera whitewomen,whosenametheauthorities hadnot
bothered to ask whenrecording hercomplaint, accusedtheletter
carrierof annoying her.His superiors quicklyexonerated Clark.
Thoughviolenceagainstblackstranspired less frequently in the
otherfivecities,blackscomplained of theirpoortreatment at the
handsoflocalauthorities. Theabsenceofmoreviolencegavetesti-
monytothefearandhopelessness thatpervaded theblackcommuni-
tiesofthatera."
In sucha benighted atmosphere, theNew Deal understandably
madefewinroads,andsouthern-based federalbureaucrats didnot
launchunpopular reform campaigns.Southerners fearedtheNew
Deal's reputationofbeingliberalon theissueofrace,eventhough
Rooseveltinitiatedfewefforts designed specificallytoaidblacksand
hisadministration'scelebrity canbestbe attributed totheunofficial
effortsofa fewactivists suchas HaroldL. Ickes,AubreyW. Wil-
liams,andEleanorRoosevelt.As in areaslikepoliticsandlabor,
localadministrators exercisedconsiderable autonomy intheapplica-
tionof New Deal programsand policies. For example,lack of
enforcement of theNationalRecoveryAdministration's (NRA)
"color-blind"provisions becamelegendary. Southern businessmen
arguedthatwhiteshadalwaysreceivedhigherpayandtermed the
prevailingNRA wage scale muchtoo generousforblacks.Long
beforetheU. S. SupremeCourtdismantled theNRA,manyMem-
phisemployers simplydisregarded thecodes'mandatory equalpay
fortheraces.InAtlanta theChamber ofCommerce andthepurport-
edlyprogressive Committee on Inter-racialCooperation tookthe
44 Walter
Wilson,"Atlanta's
Communists'"Nation,CXXX(June25, 1930),730-31;David
Entin,
"AngeloHerndon"(M.A. thesis,
University
ofNorth
Carolina,1963),21-61;Charles
H. Martin,TheAngeloHerndonCase and SouthernJustice(BatonRouge, 1976); DorothyA.
Autrey,
"TheNationalAssociation of ColoredPeoplein Alabama,
fortheAdvancement
University
1913-1952"(Ph.D. dissertation, ofNotreDame,1985),65, 124-29;Bunche,
March 26, 1932.
Political Statusof theNegro,493-94; and HoustonInformer,
leadinestablishing a wagedifferentialbaseduponrace.In despera-

tion,Atlanta'sblackChamber ofCommerce accededtoa two-tiered
scalebuthopedthebottom ratewouldbe raisedtoa moreacceptable
minimum. TheAtlanta DailyWorld sardonically calledtheNRAthe
"NegroRemovalAct."45
Blatantdiscrimination alsocharacterizedthedispensation ofNew
Deal reliefand publicworksjobs. DespiteRoosevelt's executive
orderandadministrative guidelines barringracialdiscrimination in
theWPA,localagentsopenlypaidblackworkers lessthantheypaid
whites.In 1935Atlanta's averagemonthly reliefawardtowhites was
$32.66andtoblacks$19.29;Houston gavewhites$16.86andblacks
$12.67. Certification officialsin Birmingham commonly turned
downblackapplicants afterintensivequestioning foundthemunde-
serving.In HoustonandMemphisofficials registered blacksonly
whenall whiteapplicantshad been providedfor.The Memphis
branchoftheNationalAssociation fortheAdvancement ofColored
People(NAACP)inveighed againsttheCivilWorksAdministration
practiceof assigning
officials' blackwomento homesof personal
friendsfordomestic workas a prerequisite forreceiving aid. The
Memphis branchoftheNationalYouthAdministration (NYA)basi-
callylimiteditsjob trainingprograms forblackstodomestic workin
responsetothecrythat"goodhelp"wasbecoming increasingly hard
tofind.46
Segregation alsoproved unassailablebyNewDeal agencies.Many
programs enforced separation,as didtheWPAin itssewingrooms
andtheCivilianConservation Corps(CCC) initscamps.Theincho-
ate publichousingprogram preservedresidential segregation first
undertheaegisofthePWAand,subsequently, undertheU. S. Hous-
ingAuthority (USHA). All six citiesbeganconstruction of public
housingprojectsduringthe1930sanddesignated at leastsomeof
themforblackoccupation. No questioneveraroseaboutthesuitabil-
ityofsegregated housingunits,butimplementation oftheprogram
arousedsomecontroversy nevertheless.InHouston blackhomeown-
erswithhouseslocatedinthewayoffederalpublicworksprojects
hadnorecourse buttoacceptfromthegovernment a fraction ofthe
45 Gloria
BrownMelton,"BlacksinMemphis, Tennessee,1920-1955:A Historical
Study"
Washington StateUniversity,
1982), 148-49;AnnWellsEllis, "The
Commission onInterracial
Cooperation, andResults"
1919-1944:ItsActivities (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, 1975),294-98;MichaelS. Holmes,"TheBlueEagleas
GeorgiaStateUniversity,
'JimCrowBird':TheNRAandGeorgia'sBlackWorkers," Journal ofNegroHistory, LVII
(July1972),277-79;Atlanta CityBuilder,September10, 1933;andAtlantaDailyWorld,
August17, 1933.
46 Howard, WPAandFederalReliefPolicy,292; RuthDurant,"HomeRuleintheWPA,"
SurveyMidmonthly, LXXV (September1939), 274; Tindall,Emergenceof theNew South,
547; Johnson,PatternsofNegroSegregation,37; SoRelle, "DarkerSide of 'Heaven',"138-
39; andBiles,Memphis
intheGreatDepression,
94 (quotedphrase).AlsoseeEdwardLewis,
"TheNegroonRelief,"
Journal
ofNegroEducation, V (January
1936),73-78.
valuefortheirproperty; iftheyrefused, thegovernment leveledthe

structures anywayto makeroomforimprovements. DespitePWA
andUSHAhousing contracts'stipulationsthatblacksbe employed in
construction, local authorities failedto honortheagreement. Site
selection wasunsettling andstressful forblacks.Birmingham blacks
protested theirexclusion from decisionmaking, especiallyregarding
theconstruction oftheSmithfield Courtproject forblacks.In Mem-
phisauthorities razeda blackneighborhood to erectwhites-only
Lauderdale Courtsanddestroyed oneofthecity'sfinest middle-class
black enclavesto build Foote Homes. The unilateraldecisions
regardingpublic housingconfirmed whatmanyblack leaders
feared-that theprimary function ofpublichousing wastomaintain
existingracialsegregation ratherthantoaddressinadequate housing.
Local officials setguidelines andimplemented policiestoreinforce
existing racialnorms-with littleorno federalinterference. Blacks
continued tobe second-class citizensinthesesixcities.47
The NewDeal didnotdrastically alterlifein thesesix southern
cities.Trueenough,federally funded projectsgavethema face-lift,
as newbuildings shotupdowntown, andexisting sewers,and
streets,
otherpublicfacilities receivedmuch-needed repairs.Theselargely
cosmetic changes mayhaveimproved theappearance ofthecitiesbut
apparently achievedlittleelse. TheNewDeal workedthrough local
cityhallsbutexerted virtually no influence onwhomadepolicyin
them.Alphabet agenciesallowedthecommunities tomaintaintheir
minimal contributions toindigent carewhilefederal relief
carried the
overwhelming portion oftheburden.No increasein socialwelfare
activityinthesecitiesensuedtoreflect anexpanded commitment to
relief.The abortiveattempts of theCIO to establisha beachhead
underlined thedegreetowhichlocalauthorities effectively
opposed
all thatJohnL. Lewis'sunionsrepresented-the closedshop,black
participation in thelabormovement, collectivebargaining, and,
reputedly, radicalism. Blackssurvived thedepression in somewhat
betterfashion becauseofNewDeal aid,buttheirstatusinsouthern
communities remained unchanged. In short,President Roosevelt's
policiespresented southern community leaderswitha "can'tlose"
proposition, theprovision of emergency palliation withno strings
attached.
Undoubtedly theNewDeal hada greatimpacton someaspectsof
southern life.As historians PeteDaniel,GilbertC. Fite,andJack
TempleKirbyhaveshown,federalprograms initiatedduringthe
47HoustonInformer, May 20, 1940; SoRelle, "DarkerSide of 'Heaven',"147-49; Robert
C. Weaver,"Racial Policy in Public Housing,"Phylon,I (Second Quarter1940), 153-54;
E. W. Taggart(president,BirminghamNAACP) to J. C. DeHall, May 4, 1936, JamesM.
Jones,Jr.,Papers; and Biles, Memphisin theGreatDepression, 94-96.
10 0 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN HISTORY
1930srevolutionized southern agriculture.Becauseoftheincentives

establishedbyNewDeal farmprograms, plantation tenancy evapo-
rated,sharecroppers desertedtheland,and modernmechanized
farming steadilyenvelopedtheregion.And as economistGavin
Wright haspersuasively argued,NewDeal legislation liketheNIRA
andtheFairLaborStandards Act,alongwithwork-relief programs
liketheWPA,raisedsouthern wagelevelsandthereby nudgedthe
regionintothenational labormarket. Thesesignificant changesnot-
withstanding, theNewDeal hadfewerrepercussions intheregion's
cities. Curiously,giventhe South'slongtimestatusas a rural-
dominated region,thecitiesprovedmoreresistant thanthecountry-
side to the forcesof change loosed by the intrusivefederal
government inthedepression era. In theurbanSouththeforcesof
conservatism successfully resisted-atleasttemporarily-the chal-
lengestotraditional political,social,andeconomicconditions.48
As thisstudy suggests, itwouldbe anoversimplification toascribe
theerosionofsouthern cities'distinctiveness
totheimpact offederal
government policiesofthe1930s.IfGoldfield andTindallwerecor-
rectinsuggesting thatunintended changescamelater,thenwhendid
thetransformation occur?In TheBurdenof Southern HistoryC.
VannWoodward referred totheastounding growth ofsouthern cities
as the"Bulldozer Revolution" andpinpointed thetakeoff ofDixie's
urbanboomtothe1940s.Tobesure,thefederal government playeda
significantroleinthatdevelopment duringandafter WorldWarII by
thelocationofmilitary installations,shipbuilding yards,andother
defense-related concerns in theregion'smoderate climate.Federal
policiesdoubtlessly contributed totheenrichment oftheSouth'scit-
ies andtothehegiraofmodern-day homesteaders fromtheNorth's
decliningmetropolises southward. Accordingly, the 1940s does
appeartobea likelier candidate forthecrucialdecadeofchange.The
federal government's impactonsouthern citiesinthe1930scanbest
be understood inconjunction withthefindings ofrecentNewDeal
scholarship;thatis,thepaucity ofchangewascausedbythestrength
of entrenched elites,thestaunch commitment to traditionalvalues
andinstitutions,thepoliticalimpotence ofthehave-nots, andPresi-
dentRoosevelt's limitedagendaforreform. In short,itwas hardly
whathistorian CarlN. Deglercharacterized theNewDeal as being:
"a revolutionaryresponse toa revolutionarysituation."49
48 Pete Daniel, BreakingtheLand: The Transformation ofCotton,Tobacco,and Rice Cul-
turessince 1880 (Urbana and Chicago, Ill., 1985); GilbertC. Fite, CottonFields No More:
SouthernAgriculture,1865-1980 (Lexington,Ky., 1984); JackTempleKirby,Rural Worlds
Lost: TheAmericanSouth,1920-1960 (Baton Rouge, 1987); and GavinWright,Old South,
New South:Revolutionsin theSouthernEconomySince theCivil War(New York,1986).
49 Woodward, ofSouthern
TheBurden (BatonRouge,1960),6; andDegler,Outof
History
Our Past: TheForces ThatShaped ModernAmerica(New York,1959), 416.

The Urban South in The Great Depression

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Southern Historical Association

The Urban South in the Great Depression

MR. BILES is an associateprofessorof historyat OklahomaStateUniver-

THE JOURNALOF SOUTHERN HISTORY

GeorgeB. Tindall,ThePersistentTraditionin New SouthPolitics(BatonRouge, 1975), 71;

tion,andtheplightofblacksremained essentially unchanged. New

balkedat themoreliberalNewDeal experiments, buthe remained

AfterHueyLong'sdeath,thosewho inherited his organization,

InBirmingham a fiercelyconservativemunicipalgovernment gave

assuredcontinuity." In officeHartsfield achievedsomenotoriety by

$18,000a yearfromcityofficials. After1924thecitymadea small

Faced withunprecedented demandsforrelief,local governments

funds.To guard againstboondogglingand extravagantliving by

17 AlexanderKendrick,"HueyLong's 'Revolution',"Nation,CXXXIX (August22, 1934),

MorningNews, December4, 1931.

E. Leuchtenburg,FranklinD. Rooseveltand theNew Deal (New York,1963); and Otis L.

improved whenavowedNew Dealer EurithD. Riversreplaced

ment.The local cityand countygovernment thusalso welcomes

Paltryallotments to reliefrecipientsin southern citiesfurther

American FederationofLabor(AFL) butledindustrial unionists to

Corporation, parentcompany of theTennesseeCoal & Ironfirm,

Thesouthern headquarters oftheCommunist party werelocatedin

stitutioncondemned tacticand praisedtheAFL for

city'sauto-related concerns(FordMotorCompanyand Firestone

reopenedwithno changein theirrigidopen shop policy.35

JimCrow continuedto flourishas public accommodations

madeuproughly 38 percent ofthepopulation butlessthan2 percent

cases thecitychargedthe"Atlanta Six" andAngeloHerndon with

leadinestablishing a wagedifferentialbaseduponrace.In despera-

valuefortheirproperty; iftheyrefused, thegovernment leveledthe

1930srevolutionized southern agriculture.Becauseoftheincentives

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