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Diacritics.

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"THE TIME IS OUT OF JOINT"

ERNESTOLACLAU

Since this singular end of the political would correspond to the

presentationof an absolutelyliving reality, this is one more reason to
thinkthat the essence of the political will always have the inessential
figure, the very anessence of a ghost.
-Jacques Derrida,Specters of Marx

Halfway throughSpecters of Marx, Derridalinks the concept of productionto that of

traumaand speaksof "thespectralspiritualizationthatis at work in any tekhne"[SM97].
He immediatelyconnects this assertionto Freud'sremarksconcerningthe threetraumas
inflictedon the narcissismof the decenteredman: the psychologicaltraumaderivedfrom
the psychoanalyticdiscoveryof theunconscious,the biological traumaresultingfromthe
Darwinianfindingsabouthumandescent,andthe cosmological traumaproceedingfrom
the Copernicanrevolution. To this Derridaadds the decenteringeffects coming from
Marxism,which, accordingto him, accumulateand put togetherthe other three: "The
centuryof'Marxism' will havebeenthatof thetechno-scientificandeffective decentering
of the earth,of geopolitics, of the anthroposin its onto-theologicalidentityor its genetic
properties,of the ego cogito-and of the very concept of narcissismwhose aporiasare,
let us say in orderto go too quickly and save ourselves a lot of references,the explicit
theme of deconstruction"[SM 98].
So deconstructioninscribes itself in a secular movement of decentering,to which
Marxismitself belongs. In fact, at variouspointsof SpectersofMarx, Derridainsiststhat
deconstructionwould be either inconceivableor irrelevantif it were not relatedto the
spiritor the traditionof a certainMarxism. And yet deconstructionis notjust Marxism:
it is a certainoperationpracticedin the body of Marxism,the locating in Marx'stexts of
an area of undecidability which, in Derrida's terms, is that circumscribedby the
oppositionbetweenspirit andspecter, between ontology andhauntology. The perform-
ing of this deconstructiveoperation-to which the last two chaptersof the book are
devoted-is farfroma purelyacademicexercise: the very possibilityofjustice-but also
of politics-is atstake. Withouttheconstitutivedislocationthatinhabitsall hauntology-
and that ontology tries to conceal-there would be no politics, just a programmed,
predeterminedreductionof the otherto the same.

It is easy to go from disadjustedto unjust. Thatis ourproblem: how to justify

this passage from disadjustment(with its rather more technico-ontological
value affectinga presence) to an injusticethat wouldno longer be ontological?
And what if disadjustmentwere on the contrarythe condition of justice? And
what if this double register condensed its enigma, precisely [justement], and
potentialized its superpower in that which gives its unheard-of force to
Hamlet's words: "Thetime is out of joint"? [SM 19-20]

To find a doublelogic in Marx'swork,to detectin the Marxiantexts a doublegesture

thatthetheorymakespossible butis unableto controlconceptuallyin a crediblesynthesis:
all this looks ratherfamiliar. Since the end of the nineteenthcentury,this duality,deeply

86 diacritics 25.2: 86-96

Ii9 gic
inscribedin Marx'swork,has been the objectof countless analyses. The dualityof or the
oppositions between economic determinismand the ethical orientationof socialism,
between economism and the primacyof politics, even between the "scientific"and the
"ideological"componentsof the theory,have been not only recurrentthemes in Marxist
discussions but the very issues thathave made possible a historyof Marxism. However,
noneof these apparentreformulationsof thetermsof a widely perceiveddualismhasbeen
similarto the others. We arenot dealingwith a purelynominalisticoperationof renaming:
the displacementthat these reformulationsoperate,the logics of the social they imply,
and, above all, the political strategiesthey make possible are radicallydifferent.
Derridadoes not tracethe genealogy of his interventionin the Marxiantext. This is
regrettable,in partbecause the specificity, originality,and potentialitiesof his interven-
tion do not come sufficiently to light. In what follows, I will try to stress some of these
specific features,as well as theiroriginalityvis-a-vis othercomparableattempts. To this
end, I will referto what I think are the two centraltheoreticalpoints in Derrida'sbook:
the logic of the specter(the hauntology)and the category of messianism.

TheLogic of the Specter

[T]he specter is a paradoxical incorporation,the becoming-body,a certain

phenomenaland carnalformof thespirit. It becomes,rather,some "thing"that
remainsdifficultto name:neithersoul nor body,and bothone and theother.For
it is flesh andphenomenalitythat give to the spirit its spectral apparition,but
whichdisappearrightaway in the apparition,in the verycomingof the revenant
or the returnof the specter. There is something disappeared,departed in the
apparitionitself as reapparitionof the departed. [SM 6]

Anachronism is essential to spectrality: the specter, interruptingall specularity,

desynchronizestime. The very essence of spectralityis to be foundin this undecidability
between flesh and spirit: it is not purely body-for in that case there would be no
spectralityat all;butit is notpurespiriteither-for the passagethroughthe flesh is crucial.

For there is no ghost, there is never any becoming-specterof the spirit without
at least an appearance of flesh, in a space of invisible visibility, like the dis-
appearingof an apparition.For there to be ghost, theremustbe a returnto the
body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenicprocess
correspondsthereforeto a paradoxical incorporation.Once ideas or thoughts
(Gedanke)are detachedfrom their substratum,one engenderssome ghost by
giving them a body. [SM 126]

Fromthis point onward,Derridamakesa classic deconstructivemove: the specterbeing

undecidablebetween the two extremes of body and spirit, these extremes themselves
become contaminatedby that undecidability. Thus, having shown how, in Marx's
analysis of commodity,exchange value depends for its constitutionon a spectrallogic,
Derridaconcludes thatthis logic is not absent from use value either:

The said use-value of the said ordinarysensuous thing, simple hule, the wood
of the wooden table concerning whichMarx supposes that it has not yet begun
to "dance,"its veryform,theformthatinformsits hule,mustindeedhaveat least
promised it to iterability,to substitution,to exchange, to value; it must have
madea start,howeverminimalit mayhave been, on an idealizationthatpermits
one to identifyit as the same throughoutpossible repetitions,and so forth. Just

diacritics / summer 1995 87

 as there is no pure use, there is no use-value which thepossibility of exchange
and commerce... has not in advanceinscribedin an out-of-use-an excessive
signification that cannot be reducedto the useless. [SM 160]

Similarly,if the spiritis somethingwhose invisibilityhas to produceits own visibility, if

the very constitution of spirit requiresthe visibility of the invisible, nothing is more
difficult than to keep a strict separationbetween spiritand specter. Once this point has
been reached,the conclusionsfollow quickly. We find in Marxa hauntology,anargument
aboutspectralityat the very heartof the constitutionof the social link. Time being "out
of joint," dislocation corruptingthe identity with itself of any present, we have a
constitutiveanachronismthat is at the root of any identity. Any "life"emerges out of a
more basic life/deathdichotomy-it is not "life"as uncontaminatedpresencebut survie
that is the condition of any presence. Marx, however, attemptedthe critique of the
hauntologicalfrom the perspectiveof an ontology. If the specterinhabitsthe root of the
social link in bourgeois society, the transcendenceof the latter,the arrivalat a time that
is no longer"outofjoint," the realizationof a society fully reconciledwith itself will open
the way to the "endof ideology"-that is, to a purely "ontological"society which, after
the consummationof the proletarianmillennium,will look to hauntologyas its past. And
since hauntologyis inherentto politics, the transcendenceof the split between being and
appearancewill mean the end of politics. (We could, in fact, put the argumentin Saint-
Simonian terms: the transitionfrom the governmentof men to the administrationof
things.) If, however, as the deconstructivereadingshows, "ontology"-full reconcilia-
tion-is not achievable,time is constitutively"outof joint,"andthe ghost is the condition
of possibilityof anypresent,politicstoo becomesconstitutiveof thesocial link. We could
say of the specterwhatGrouchoMarxsaidaboutsex: it is going to staywith us fora while.
This contaminationof presence by the specter can be considered from the two
perspectivesinvolved in a doublegenitive. Thereare, in the firstplace, spectersof Marx,
insofar as Marx himself-an abbreviationfor communism-is hauntingus today as a
horizon preventing the possibility of its final exorcism by the apparentlytriumphant
capitalist"democracies"(herethe mainreferenceis to Fukuyama).But therearealso the
specters of Marx that visited Marx himself and prevented him from establishing a
nonhauntedontology. Thus, the groundwe reach-that of a presentneveridenticalwith
itself-is the very terrainof this phantasmatic,anessentialpracticethatwe call politics.
Whatto say aboutthis Derrideansequence? A first remark-first, both temporally
and logically-is that I have nothing to object to. The deconstructiveoperation is
impeccable, the horizons that it opens are far-reaching,and the intertextualitywithin
which it takes place is highly illuminating. However,as with any deconstructionworthy
of the name,thereis a pluralityof directionsin which one can move, and it is to consider
this plurality that I would like to pause for a moment. My own work has largely
concentratedon the deconstructionof Marxisttexts, and I could,primafacie, relatewhat
I have called hegemonic logic--which silently deconstructsMarxistcategories-to the
logic of thespecterasdescribedby Derrida.Otherstoo haverecentlylinked"deconstruction"
and "hegemony." Simon Critchley,for instance,asserts:

Against the troubling tendency to subordinate the political to the socio-

economic within Marx's "ontology". .. Derrida's argumentfor a logic of
spectralitywithinMarxismcan be linkedto the claimfor the irreducibilityof the

1. Thebasicformulation concerningtheconceptof "hegemony" canbefoundinLaclauand

Mouffe,Hegemony and Socialist 3
Strategy,chapters and 4. I have the basic
reformulated
dimensionsof this concept,linkingit morecloselyto the categoryof "dislocation,"in New
Reflectionson theRevolutionof OurTime.

88
 political understoodas that moment where the sedimentedmeanings of the
socio-economic are contested. Following Ernesto Laclau's radicalization of
Gramsci,one might link the logic of spectralityto the logic of hegemony;that
is, if one renounces-as one must-the communisteschatological "a-theodicy"
of the economic contradictionsof capitalisminevitablyculminatingin revolu-
tion, then politics and politico-cultural-ideological hegemonizationis indis-
pensable to thepossibility of radical change.

I hesitate, however, to entirely endorse such an apparentlyobvious assimilation. Al-

thoughthereis no incompatibilitybetweenhegemonyandspectrallogic as faras the latter
goes, a hegemonic logic presupposestwo furthersteps beyond spectralitythat I am not
sure Derridais preparedto take:
1. Spectralitypresupposes,as we have seen, an undecidablerelationbetween spirit
and flesh which contaminates,in turn,these two poles. It presupposes,in that sense, a
weakenedform of incarnation.Weakenedbecause a full incarnation-an incarnationin
the Christiansense-transforms theflesh intoa purelytransparentmediumthroughwhich
we can see an entirelyspiritualrealitywith no connectionto its incarnatingbody. God's
mediationis whatestablishesthe linkbetweenspiritandflesh insofaras He is at an infinite
distance from both. So the lack of naturalconnection between both poles is what
transformsthe flesh into the mediumthroughwhich the spiritshows itself. At the same
time, however, it is this lack of connectionthatpreventsthe contaminationof one by the
other. No doubtthis Christianpolaritycan be deconstructedin turn,but the point is that
this deconstructionwill not take place throughthe collapse of the frontierbetween spirit
andspecter. Forin the specterthe relationbetweenspiritandflesh is muchmoreintimate:
thereis no divine mediationthatbothsanctionsandsupersedesthe essentialheterogeneity
of the two poles. Now, a hegemonicrelationis one in which a certainbody presentsitself
as the incarnationof a certainspirit. The hegemonicrelationis certainlyspectral:a certain
body tries to presentits particularfeaturesas the expressionof somethingtranscending
its own particularity. The body is an undecidable point in which universality and
particularityget confused,butthevery factthatotherbodies competeto be the incarnating
ones, thatthey arealternativeformsof materializationof the same"spirit,"suggests a kind
of autonomizationof the latterwhich cannot be explained solely by the pure logic of
spectrality.
2. Of what does this autonomizationconsist? This is our second step. Let us
remember that any step that is taken out of the logic of spectrality cannot be in
contradictionto the latterbut must,on the contrary,presupposeit. If the autonomization
of the "spirit"is to take place within spectrality,"autonomy"cannotmean identitywith
oneself, self-representation,because that would, precisely, restore a rigid frontierbe-
tween "spirit" and "specter." But autonomy does not require full identity as its
precondition: it can also emerge out of a constitutive impossibility, an absolute limit
whose formsof representationwill be necessarilyinadequate.Let us suppose a situation
of generalizedsocial disorder:in such a situation"order"becomes the nameof an absent
fullness, and if thatfullness is constitutivelyunachievableit cannothave any contentof
its own, any formof self-representation."Order"thusbecomes autonomousvis-a-vis any
particularorderinsofaras it is the nameof an absentfullness thatno concretesocial order
can achieve (the same can be said of similar terms such as "revolution,""unity of the
people,"etc.). That fullness is present,however, as that which is absent and needs as a
result to be representedin some way. Now, its means of representationwill be
constitutivelyinadequate,for they can only be particularcontentsthatassume, in certain
circumstances,a functionof representationof the impossibleuniversalityof the commu-
nity. This relation,by which a certainparticularcontentoverflows its own particularity
and becomes the incarnationof the absent fullness of society is exactly what I call a

diacritics / summer 1995 89

hegemonic relation. As we can see, it presupposesthe logic of the specter: the fullness
of the "spirit,"as it hasno contentof its own, canexist only throughits parasiticattachment
to some particularbody;but thatbody is subvertedand deformedin its own particularity
as it becomes the embodimentof fullness. This means, interalia, thatthe anachronistic
languageof revolutions,which Marxrefersto andDerridaanalyzes,is inevitable: the old
revolutionis presentin the new one, not in its particularitybut in its universalfunctionof
being a revolution,as the incarnationof the revolutionaryprincipleas such. And the
Marxianaspirationof a revolutionarylanguagethatonly expressesthe present,in which
the "content"overcomes "phraseology,"is a pure impossibility. If the fullness of the
revolution-as all fullness-is unachievable,we cannotbut have a dissociationbetween
the revolutionarycontent and the fullness of a pure revolutionaryfoundation,and this
dissociation will reproduce sine die the logic of spectrality and the split between
"phraseology"and "content."
Whatprecedesis an attemptto show the type of move thatI would make out of the
logic of spectrality. But, as I said, it is not the only move thatone can make. The steps
thatlead from the logic of spectralityto a hegemoniclogic aresteps thatthe formerlogic
certainlymakes possible, but not necessarycorollariesderivedfrom it.
But what politicalconsequencesdoes Derridahimself drawfromhis deconstruction
of Marx'stexts? Althoughthese consequencesarenotentirelydevelopedin his book, we
can get a broadhintof the directionthatDerridais takingif we move to oursecond theme:
the questionof the messianic.

TheQuestion of the Messianic

Let us quote Derridaagain. After having indicatedthatboth Marxismandreligion share

the formalstructureof a messianic eschatology, he asserts:

Whileit is commonto bothof them,withthe exceptionof the content... it is also

the case that its formal structureof promise exceeds them or precedes them.
Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as
undeconstructibleas thepossibilityitselfofdeconstructionis,perhaps,a certain
experience of the emancipatorypromise; it is perhaps even theformality of a
structuralmessianism,a messianismwithoutreligion, even a messianicwithout
messianism,an idea ofjustice-which we distinguishfromlaw or rightand even
from humanrights-and an idea of democracy-which we distinguishfrom its
currentconcept and from its determinedpredicates today. [SM59]

Here Derridasummarizesthemes that he developed in full in "Forceof Law." These

themes and concepts require,however, thatthey be reinsertedin the various discursive
contexts within which they were originally formulated,first because these contexts
considerablydiverge among themselves and, second, because the high metaphoricityof
some of the categories employed-such as the messianic-can lead to an undue
associationof those categorieswith the concretehistoricalphenomenato which they are
usuallyapplied. I cannotproperlydo thisjob in the limitedspace of a review, but let us,
atleast,makesome specifications.By the"messianic"we shouldnotunderstandanything
directlyrelatedto actualmessianicmovements-of the presentor the past-but, instead,
somethingbelonging to the general structureof experience. It is linked to the idea of
"promise."This does not meanthis or thatparticularpromise,but the promiseimplicit in
an originaryopening to the "other,"to the unforeseeable,to the pureevent which cannot
be masteredby any aprioristicdiscourse. Such an event is an interruptionin the normal
course of things, a radicaldislocation. This leads to the notion of "justice"as linked to

90
an absolute singularitywhich cannot be absorbedby the generalityof law. The chasm
betweenlaw andjusticeis one whichcannotbe closed. The existenceof thischasmis what
makesdeconstructionpossible. Deconstructionandjustice-or, rather,deconstructionas
justice-is what cannotbe deconstructed. Deconstructinglaw-which is finally what
politics is about-is possible because of this structureof experience in which the
messianic, the promise,andjustice are categories in a relationof mutualimplication.
On the basis of these premises, Derridaelaborates his concept of "democracyto
come" ("democratiea venir").This "a venir"does not involve any teleological asser-
tion-not even the limitedone of a regulativeidea-but simply thecontinualcommitment
to keep open the relationto the other, an opening which is always a venir, for the other
to which one opens oneself is never already given in any aprioristiccalculation. To
summarize: the messianismwe are speakingaboutis one withouteschatology, without
pregivenpromisedland,withoutdeterminatecontent. Itis simplythestructureof promise
which is inherentin all experienceandwhose lackof content-resulting fromthe radical
opening to the event, to the other, is the very possibility of justice and gives its only
meaning to the democracyto come. Singularityas the terrainof justice involves the
radicalundecidabilitywhich makes the decision possible.

It was thena matterof thinkinganotherhistoricity... anotheropeningofevent-

ness as historicitythatpermittedone not to renounce,buton thecontraryto open
up access to an affirmativethinkingof the messianicand emancipatorypromise
as promise: as promise and not as onto-theological or teleo-eschatological
program or design....
But at a certainpoint promise and decision, which is to say responsibility,
owe theirpossibility to the ordeal of undecidabilitywhich will always remain
their condition. [SM74-75]

Whatto say aboutthe various theoreticaloperationsthatDerridaperformsstarting

from this conceptualconstruction?I thinkthatwe can distinguishthreelevels here. The
firstrefersto the deconstructionof the conceptof messianismthatwe have inheritedfrom
the religious but also from the Marxist tradition. This deconstructionproceeds by
showingthecontingentcharacterof the articulationsthathavecoalescedaroundtheactual
historical messianisms. We can do away with the teleological and eschatological
dimensions,we caneven do awaywithall the actualcontentsof thehistoricalmessianisms,
but what we cannotdo away with is the "promise,"because the latteris inscribedin the
structureof all experience. This, as we have seen, is not a promiseof anythingconcrete;
it is some sort of "existential,"insofar as it is what prevents any presence from being
closed arounditself. If we link this to the relationlaw/justice,undecidability/decisions,
we can see the generalmovementof Derrida'stheoretico-politicalintervention,which is
to direct the historico-politicalforms back to the primaryterrainof their opening to the
radically heterogenous. This is the terrain of a constitutive undecidability, of an
experience of the impossible that, paradoxically, makes possible responsibility, the
decision, law and-finally-the messianic itself in its actual historicalforms. I find
myself in full agreementwith this movement.
Derrida's argument,however, does not stop there. Fromthis first movement (for
reasonsthatwill becomeclearpresently,I keepthis "from"deliberatelyvague, undecided
between the derivativeand the merely sequential)he passes to a sort of ethico-political
injunctionby which all the previously mentioneddimensionsconverge in the projectof
a democracyto come, which is linkedto the classical notion of "emancipation."Derrida
is very firm in his assertionthathe is unpreparedto put the latterat all into question. But
we have to be very carefulaboutthe meaningof such a stand,becausethe classical notion

diacritics / summer 1995 91

of emancipationis no morethananothernamefor the eschatologicalmessianismthathe
is trying to deconstruct.
Variousaspects have to be differentiatedhere. If by reassertingthe classical notion
of emancipationDerridadoes not meananythingbeyondhis particularway of reasserting
messianism-that is, doing away with all the teleo-ontologicalparaphernalia of the latter
andsticking to the momentof the "promise"-then I would certainlyagreewith him, but
in that case the classic idea of emancipation,even if we retain from it an ultimately
undeconstructiblemoment,is deeply transformed.I find it rathermisleadingto call this
operationa defense of the classic notion of emancipation. But-a second aspect-the
classic notion of emancipationwas something more than the formal structureof the
promise. It was also the crystallizationand synthesis of a series of contentssuch as the
eliminationof economic exploitation and all forms of discrimination,the assertion of
humanrights, the consolidationof civil and political freedom, and so forth. Derrida,
understandably,does not want to renouncethis patrimony,and it would be difficult not
to join him in its defense. The difficulty, however, is that in the classic notion of
emancipationthe defense and groundingof all those contentswere intimatelyconnected
to the teleological eschatologythatDerridais deconstructing.So, if he wantsto maintain
the results of his deconstructionand at the same time to defend those contents, as the
groundof the lattercan no longer be an eschatologicalarticulation,there are only two
ways open to him: eitherto show thatthose contentscan be derivedfrom the "promise"
as a generalstructureof experience,or to demonstratethatthose contentsare grounded
in something less thansuch a general structure-in which case the "promise"as such is
indifferentto the actualnatureof those contents.
There is, finally, a thirdaspect to be distinguished. The previousdistinctionshave
to be situatedagainstthebackgroundof the realtargetof Derrida'sdiscussionin Specters
of Marx: the exposure of a prevalentcommon sense (that he exemplifies throughhis
brilliantcritiqueof Fukuyama)accordingto which thecollapse of thecommunistregimes
is supposed to mean humanity'sarrivalat a final stage where all humanneeds will be
satisfied and where no messianic consummationof time is any longer to be expected.
Derridareactsagainstthis new dominantconsensus and its Hegelo-Kojeviangrounding
by showing, at the empiricallevel, the gap between historicalreality and the capitalist
West's satisfied image of itself and, at the theoreticallevel, the inconsistencies of the
notion of an end of History. It is againstthe backgroundof this polemic that the whole
discourseaboutthe alwaysreturningspectersof Marxhasto be understood.WhatDerrida
is finally saying is that isolated demands, grievances, injustices, and so forth are not
empiricalresidues of a historicalstage which has-in all essentials-been superseded,
thatthey are, on the contrary,the symptomsof a fundamentaldeadlockof contemporary
societies thatpushes isolated demandsto some kind of phantasmaticarticulationwhich
will result in new forms of political reaggregation.The latterare not specified beyond
Derrida's quick allusions to the historical limits of the "party"form and to a "New
International" in themaking. Itis, however,clearthatanyadvancein formulatinga theory
of political reaggregationcrucially dependson how the transitionbetween the general
structureof experience-the promise-and the contents of the classical emancipatory
projectis conceived.
This is the thirdlevel at which the argumentof Spectersof Marxcan be considered:
the type of link it establishesbetween the promise as a (post-)transcendentalor (post-)
ontological (non-)ground and the ethical and political contents of an emancipatory
project. This is the level at which I find the argumentof Specters less convincing. For
herean illegitimatelogical transitioncan easily be made. I am not necessarilyasserting
thatDerridais makingthattransition,but, at any rate,it is one frequentlymade by many
defendersof deconstructionand one to which the very ambiguityof the Derrideantexts
gives some credence. The illegitimatetransitionis to thinkthatfromthe impossibilityof

92
a presenceclosed in itself, froman "ontological"condition in which the openness to the
event, to the heterogeneous,to the radicallyother is constitutive, some kind of ethical
injunctionto be responsibleand to keep oneself open to the heterogeneityof the other
necessarilyfollows. This transitionis illegitimatefor two reasons. First,because if the
promiseis an "existential"constitutiveof all experience,it is always alreadythere,before
any injunction. (It is like the voluntaristicargumentcriticizedby Ortegay Gasset: on the
one hand it asserts that life is constitutive insecurity; on the other, it launches the
imperativeViverepericolosamente,as if to do it or not to do it were a matterof choice.)
But, second and most important,from the fact that there is the impossibilityof ultimate
closure and presence, it does not follow thatthereis an ethical imperativeto "cultivate"
thatopenness or even less to be necessarilycommittedto a democraticsociety. I think
that the lattercan certainlybe defended from a deconstructionistperspective,but that
defense cannotbe logically derivedfromconstitutiveopenness-something more has to
be addedto the argument.Preciselybecauseof the undecidabilityinherentin constitutive
openness, ethico-political moves different from or even opposite to a democracy "to
come" can be made-for instance,since thereis ultimateundecidabilityand, as a result,
no immanenttendency of the structureto closure and full presence, closure has to be
artificiallybroughtaboutfrom the outside. In thatway a case for totalitarianismcan be
presentedstartingfromdeconstructionistpremises. Of course, the totalitarianargument
would be as much a non sequituras the argumentfor democracy: either direction is
equally possible given the situationof structuralundecidability.
We have so far presentedour argumentconcerning the nonconnectionbetween
structuralundecidabilityandethicalinjunction,startingfrom the "ontological"side. But
if we move to the "normative"side, the conclusions are remarkablysimilar. Let us
suppose, for the sake of the argument,thatopenness to the heterogeneityof the other is
an ethical injunction. If one takesthis propositionat face value, one is forcedto conclude
thatwe have to acceptthe otheras differentbecause she is different,whateverthe content
of thatheterogeneitywould be. This does not sound much like an ethical injunctionbut
like ethical nihilism. And if the argumentis reformulatedby saying thatopenness to the
otherdoes not necessarilymean passive acceptanceof her but ratheractive engagement
which includes criticizingher, attackingher, even killing her, the whole argumentstarts
to seem rathervacuous: whatelse do people do all the time withoutany needfor anethical
injunction?
Yet I think that deconstructionhas importantconsequences for both ethics and
politics. These consequences, however, dependon deconstruction'sability to go down
to the bottomof its own radicalismand avoid becoming entangledin all the problemsof
a Levinasianethics (whose proclaimedaim, to presentethics as first philosophy,should
from the start look suspicious to any deconstructionist). I see the matter this way.
Undecidabilityshouldbe literallytakenas thatconditionfrom which no course of action
necessarilyfollows. This means thatwe should not make it the necessarysource of any
concretedecision in the ethical or political sphere. In a first movement deconstruction
extendsundecidability-that is, thatwhich makesthe decision necessary-to deeperand
largerareas of social relations. The role of deconstructionis, from this perspective,to
reactivatethe momentof decision thatunderliesany sedimentedset of social relations.
The political and ethical significanceof this first movementis thatby enlargingthe area
of structuralundecidabilityit enlarges also the area of responsibility-that is, of the
decision. (In Derrideanterms: the requirementsof justice become more complex and
multifacetedvis-a-vis law.)
But this first movementis immediatelybalancedby anotherone of the oppositesign,
which is also essentialto deconstruction.To thinkof undecidabilityas a bottomlessabyss
thatunderliesany self-sufficient"presence"would still maintaintoo muchof the imagery
of the "ground." The duality undecidability/decisionis something that belongs to the

diacritics / summer 1995 93

logic of any structuralarrangement. Degrounding is, in this sense, also part of an
operationof grounding,except thatgroundingis no longer to refersomethingback to a
foundationwhich would act as a principleof derivationbut, instead, to reinscribethat
somethingwithin the terrainof the undecidables(iteration,re-mark,differance,etc.) that
make its emergencepossible. So, to go back to our problem,it is no longer a questionof
finding a groundfrom which an ethical injunctionshould be derived(even less to make
of undecidabilityitself such a ground). We live as bricoleursin a pluralworld, havingto
takedecisionswithinincompletesystemsof rules(incompletionheremeansundecidability),
and some of these rules are ethical ones. It is because of this constitutiveincompletion
thatdecisions have to be taken,butbecause we arefaced with incompletionand not with
totaldispossession,the problemof a total ethicalgrounding-either throughthe opening
to theothernessof the other,or throughany similarmetaphysicalprinciple-never arises.
"Thetime is out of joint,"but because of thatthereis nevera beginning-or an end-of
time. Democracydoes notneedto be-and cannotbe-radically grounded.We can move
to a more democraticsociety only througha pluralityof acts of democratization. The
consummationof time-as Derridaknows well-never arrives. Not even as a regulative
idea.
This leaves us, however, with a problem: how to conceive of emancipationwithin
thisframework.Whatkindof collective reaggregationis open to us once we have moved
away fromthe eschatologicaldimensionof the classical emancipatorymodel? This will
be my last discussion, and I will broach it by locating Derrida'sinterventionwithin the
traditionof critiqueand reformulationof Marxism.

TheQuestionof the Tradition

Derridavery cogently maintainsthatone thinksonly from within a traditionand shows

thatthis thinkingis possible only if one conceives one's relationwith thatpastas a critical
reception. Now, the receptionof Marxismsince the turnof the centuryhas turned,in my
view, aroundthe discussion of two capital and interrelatedissues: (1) how to make
compatible-if it canbe doneat all-the variouscontradictoryaspectsof Marx'sthought,
as in Derrida'sversion, which relatesthe "ontological"and the "phantasmatic"; (2) how
to thinkformsof reaggregationof politicalwills andsocial demandsonce theobviousness
of the identificationof theworkingclass with theemancipatoryagency startedto dissolve.
It is my contention that the deconstructionistinterventionrepresentsa crucial turn in
connectionwith both issues. To show this, let us recapitulatethe broadlines of the main
classical attemptsat recastingMarxism.
1. A first tendency representsthe accentuationof the ontological dimension (in the
Derrideansense) of Marx'sthought.The absolutereconciliationof society with itself will
arriveas a resultof the eliminationof all formsof distortedrepresentation.The latterwill
be the consequenceof the proletarianrevolution. This tendencycan be found in a vulgar
materialistversion(for example,Plekhanov)or in anapparentlymore"superstructuralist"
one, centered in the notion of "false consciousness" (as in Lukacs). There is here no
reaggregationof collective wills (therevolutionaryagentis theworkingclass), andhuman
emancipationis fixed in its contentsby a full-fledged eschatology.
2. The various forms of "ethical"socialism, to be found in Bernsteinand in some
currentsof Austro-Marxism.The common featureof all these tendenciesis a returnto a
Kantiandualism. Herethe ontological dimensionbecomes weaker: the "necessarylaws
of history"become moreerratic,the agentof emancipationbecomes morecontingentand
indeterminate,and the Endziel loses most of its eschatologicalprecision. However, the
determinacywhich has been lost at the level of an objectivehistoryis retrievedat the level

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of an ethical regulative idea. The moment of the political decision is as absent as in
Marxistorthodoxy.
3. The Sorelian-Gramsciantradition. It is here that the phantasmaticdimension
finally takes the upperhand. The anchoringof social representationsin the ontological
bedrockof an objective history startsdissolving. The unity of the class is, for Sorel, a
mythical unity. For Gramsci,the unity of a collective will resultsfrom the constitutive
role of an organicideology. Historybecomes an open and contingentprocess thatdoes
not reflect any deeperunderlyingreality. Two aspects are importantfor us: (a) the link
betweenconcretematerialforces andthe functionthatthey fulfill in the classical Marxist
scheme becomes loose and indeterminate. "Collective will," "organic ideology,"
"hegemonicgroup,"andso forthbecome emptyformsthatcanbe filled by anyimaginable
political and social content. They arecertainlyanchoredin a dialecticsof emancipation,
but as the latteris not necessarilylinked to any particularcontentit becomes something
like an "existential"of historicallife and is no longer the announcementof a concrete
event. Now, is this not somethinglike a deconstructionof eschatologicalmessianism:the
autonomizationof the messianic promise from the contents that it is attached to in
"actuallyexisting"messianisms?(b) The distinctionbetweenthe ethicalandthe political
is blurred.The momentof the ethico-politicalis presentedas a unity. This can, of course,
be given a Hegelian interpretation,but my argumentis that what is really at stake in
Gramsci'sinterventionis a politicizationof ethics, insofaras the acts of institutionof the
social link arecontingentactsof decisionthatpresupposerelationsof power. This is what
gives an "ontological"primacyto politics and to "hegemony"as the logic governingany
political intervention.

I havesaid enoughto makeit clearthatfor me it is only as an extensionandradicalization

of this last tendency that deconstructioncan present itself both as a moment of its
inscriptionin the Marxisttraditionas well as a point of turning/deepening/supersession
of the latter. My optimisticreadingof Spectersof Marxis thatit representsa step forward
in the prosecutionof this task. The main stumblingblock that I still see for this to be
accomplished-at least as far as Derridais concerned-is thatthe ambiguitypreviously
pointed out between undecidabilityas a terrainof radicalizationof the decision and
undecidabilityas the source of an ethical injunctionis still hovering in Derrida'stexts.
Once this ambiguityis superseded,however, deconstructioncan become one of the most
powerfultools at handfor thinkingstrategically.
This rethinkingof politics in a deconstructivefashion can (if we start from the
Marxisttradition)producethreetypes of effect. Inthe firstplace, if we arethinkingin the
terms of the third tendency within Marxism, we can recast and extend its system of
categories far beyond the intellectualtools to which Sorel or Gramscihad access. This
recastingin termsof the logic of differancecan open the way to muchmorerefinedforms
of strategicthinking.
Second, the logics of hegemonic reaggregationface, in the contemporaryworld,
much more serious challenges than those that a Gramsci was confrontedwith. Our
societies are far less homogeneous than those in which the Marxian models were
formulated,and the constitutionof the collective wills takes place in terrainscrossed by
far more complex relationsof power-as a result, inter alia, of the developmentof the
mass media. The dissolutionof the metaphysicsof presenceis not a purelyintellectual
operation. It is profoundly inscribed in the whole experience of recent decades.
Deconstruction,as a result,faces the challenge of reinscribingthe Marxianmodel in this
complex experience of present-daysociety.
Finally, operatingdeconstructivelywithin Marx's texts can help in a thirdvitally
importanttask: reinscribingMarxismitself andeach one of its discursivecomponentsas
a partialmomentin the wider historyof emancipatorydiscourses. Derridais quite right

diacritics / summer 1995 95

to combatthe currentamnesiaof the Marxisttradition. But let us not makethe opposite
mistakeand thinkthatthe historyof Marxismoverlapswith the historyof emancipatory
projects. Many more ghosts than those of Marx are actuallyvisiting and revisiting us.
Benjamin'sangel should become a symbol constantlyremindingus of our complex and
multilayeredtradition.I rememberthatduringmy childhood,in Argentina,in thecinemas
of continuousperformancetherewas an announcementsaying,"Theperformancebegins
when you arrive."Well, I thinkthat"emancipation"is the opposite: it is a performance
at which we always arrivelate andwhich forces us to guess, painfully,aboutits mythical
or impossible origins. We have, however, to engage ourselves in this impossible task,
which is, among otherthings, what gives deconstructionits meaning.

WORKS CITED
Critchley, Simon. "On Derrida's Specters of Marx." Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy. Seattle, October 1994. Forthcomingin Philosophy and
Social Criticism.
Derrida,Jacques."Forceof Law:The' MysticalFoundationof Authority."Deconstruction
andthePossibilityofJustice. Ed.DrucillaCornellet al. New York:Routledge,1992.
. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Workof Mourning,and the New
International.Trans.Peggy Kamuf.New York: Routledge, 1994. [SM]
Laclau,Ernesto.New Reflectionson the Revolutionof Our Time.London:Verso, 1990.
Laclau,Ernesto,and ChantalMouffe.Hegemonyand Socialist Strategy.London:Verso,
1985.

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