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As recently as a few months ago, there still appeared to be a reasonable chance that
the summits would be used by both sides to put their disputes behind them. Faced
with obvious difficulties in Iraq, the Bush administration had begun to change course.
President George W. Bush seemed willing to give the United Nations a more
prominent role, transfer full sovereignty to a new Iraqi government and moderate
American military tactics to avoid civilian casualties—all policies called for by the
Europeans.
Those changes made it possible to imagine Europe accepting American overtures for
help. European leaders were also acutely aware that instability and chaos in Iraq
would be catastrophic for their countries as well as for the United States.
The American hope was that the Europeans, including the French and Germans,
would agree to support a NATO role in Iraq, to begin training Iraqi security forces, to
offer debt relief and reconstruction aid, and possibly even agree to provide more
troops after the handover of sovereignty, which occured two days earlier than
scheduled and took place Monday morning this week.
Now that scenario appears highly unlikely. A series of events—the rise of violence in
Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal and Bush's warm endorsement of Ariel
Sharon's controversial plan to pull out of Gaza - have all combined to make the U.S.
president so politically radioactive that European leaders fear making common cause
with him.
No European leader wants to suffer the fate of former Spanish Prime Minister José
Maria Aznar, who was rejected by voters last March in part because of his close
association with Bush and the United States. Pro-American leaders in Britain, Italy,
Poland and elsewhere also have to worry that they will now pay an electoral price if
they get too close to the American administration.
Given that inauspicious backdrop, the goal of the NATO summit is no longer to get
more European troops for Iraq or even to define an explicit NATO role. Turkey,
France and Germany all argue that their military contributions would make little
difference on the ground, that a NATO failure in Iraq could damage the organization,
and that NATO would be no more welcome in Iraq than the United States is.
They add, somewhat implausibly, that NATO troops need to be saved for other
contingencies. But the most compelling explanation is that they are simply unwilling
to support what they believe is a failed American policy, and are loath to do anything
that would help Bush rebut Senator John Kerry's charges that Bush administration
policies have isolated the United States.
Thus the Istanbul summit has a sort of "Waiting for Godot" quality about it—
European leaders biding time, neither creating a crisis nor mending fences, in the
hope that the American election in November will somehow spare them from the
choice between having to deal with Bush and letting Iraq, and NATO, slide into
further disarray.
Ultimately, the rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance cannot even begin to heal until the
United States and its key allies develop a common approach to the issue that has most
divided them—Iraq. Despite differences over the war itself, Washington, Paris, Berlin
and London all now at least have a common interest; they want to foster a stable,
democratic, self-governing Iraq.
This month's summits would have been the perfect place to start working together on
that goal and mending relations within the alliance. Apparently, that will have to wait
at least until the American elections in November.