International law

Doesn’t solve I law – PMC’s from same company are used in Afghanistan and violate International law
Chakrabarti '08 (Shantanu, "Growth and Implications of PrivateMilitary Corporations", Research Fellow at the
Institute for Defence and Strategic Analyses in India, Summer 2008, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_2_1_
schakrabarti.pdf //)

In the conflict zone of Afghanistan, things are no better. Though other PMCs have been present, the most prominent to
operate during the US led coalition’s involvement in Afghanistan has been “DynCorp International”, a leading professional services and project-
management firm serving governments, corporations, and international organisations worldwide with 14,000 employees in about 33 countries. It is headquartered at Irving, Texas. The United States Department of State has recently awarded DynCorp
International a contract to train, equip, and build the capacity of the police forces in Afghanistan. The potential value of the award is $117,236,158 for the first year and $85,275,734 and $87,487,630, respectively, for two option years. This is a follow-
on award for DynCorp International, which has been training the newly created police force in Afghanistan since 2003.9 Apart from organising Growth and Implications of Private Military Corporations 114 Journal of Defence Studies • Vol. 2 No. 1

such training programmes, Dyncorp is also involved in providing security to the Afghan political leaders and was until recently in charge
of the Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s security. The company is also involved in missions destroying poppy cultivation fields in order
to target a major source of funds to the insurgent groups like the Taliban. Several recent reports, however, have been critical
of the operations and functions of such PMCs. Many PMCs have been accused of gross human rights abuse and participation
in illegal activities, apart from being generally insensitive to the local populace in the conflict zones in which they operate .
Several Dyncorp employees, for instance, were accused of being involved in running a prostitution ring consisting of under-age refugee or
orphaned girls during the Bosnia crisis. The antidrug production operations in Colombia, also involving the Company, have also been reported to have led to gross human rights violations. Several PMC employees have also been accused
of being involved in the recently reported atrocities committed on Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison. Several acts of “high-handedness” by the Dyncorp employees have also

been reported from Afghanistan.

Alt cause – DUB’s in Iraq violate international law

Parker '03 (Karen, "The Illegality of DU Weaponry", lawyer and expert in the International Law of Armed Conflict,
http://www.grassrootspeace.org/karen_parker_du_illegality.pdf

War crimes and crimes against

Some argue that use of DU weaponry, while in violation of existing norms, would not constitute a war crime or crime against humanity.24 I disagree.

humanity are defined in the Nuremberg Charter, in the “grave breach” articles of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and in other sources as set out in international treaties on war crimes and crimes against

humanity.25 In the 4th Geneva Convention (protection of civilians), for example, grave breaches include “willful killing . . . or inhumane
treatment, . . . willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” of civilians -- which is exactly
what DU weapons do.26 Article 85 of Protocol Additional I adds indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians and other acts that necessarily occur with the use of DU weaponry to the enumeration of “grave
breaches.” The genocidal effects on people long after hostilities cease is another ground for consideration of DU

weapons use as a crime against humanity.

Status Quo solves – PMC’s held accountable to I law through Montreux Document
Isenberg ‘08 (David, analyst in national and international security affairs at CATO, "Busting the Unaccountability
Myth", 10/10/8, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9710#
For it was on Sept. 17 that the "Montreux Document" was released. That document, the "Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict," was the culmination of nearly three years' work of the both the Swiss
Initiative on Private Military and Security Companies and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It also involved experts from a number of governments, including the
United States, as well as other stakeholders from the private sector and non-government organizations. The document, while not legally binding, recalls existing obligations

regarding private security companies during armed conflict and identifies good practices to assist states in ensuring
respect for international humanitarian law and applicable human rights law, and in otherwise promoting
responsible conduct in their relationships with private security companies during armed conflict The document was
signed by Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United States. The
signatories represent an interesting mix of past and present experience with private contractors. Afghanistan and Iraq are obvious choices, by dint of the enormous presence of contractors in those countries. The United States and
Britain, which are the world's largest users of contractors presently, and the countries where the vast majority of private security contractors are headquartered, also must be included. Finally, Angola, Sierra Leone and South
Africa were all countries that had to deal with the now defunct Executive Outcomes, the mother of all security contractors. EO, based in South Africa, had fought in the civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone. As a consequence,

The document is divided into two sections. The first

both South Africa and Sierra Leone had passed some of the most detailed legislation anywhere in the world on how to regulate private security contractors.

highlights existing international laws with which such companies should comply. The bottom line is that under
existing international law, states cannot circumvent their obligations by using private military contractors. They
have to take appropriate measures to prevent any violations of international humanitarian law and human rights
law and to provide the necessary remedies for the suppression of such violations. They are directly responsible for
the conduct of contractors if these enterprises act in a governmental capacity. The second lists some 70 "good practices" for assisting countries in
fulfilling their legal obligations. These include: avoiding the use of contractors for activities that clearly require the use of force; states must assure the good reputation of companies they send abroad, and they are encouraged to
create a system of control, surveillance and sanctions in case of breaches; companies should be regulated and licensed; and the personnel from these companies, among other things, must be trained in the rules of international

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 humanitarian law. Why is this document important? First, it confirms that the number of private military and security contractors is growing worldwide. They operate in more than 100 countries around the world.
Thus now is the time to remind states of their international obligations if they contract with such companies. Second, as the document points
out, it is not true that private military companies are operating in a legal no-man's-land. As Paul Seger of the Directorate for International Law at

the Swiss foreign ministry noted, "There are plenty of rules anchored in general international legislation, in humanitarian laws and human rights. It is not about

banning military companies, but we would like to create model rules of best practice as part of a set of common legal standards of

applicable international law." It is true that not all these practices will be welcomed by the industry. In regard to avoiding the use of contractors for activities that require the use of force, one industry
leader said, "It's unrealistic, given the current climate where protective force is used, and you can't always depend on government force because it is not available. The WPPS (Worldwide Personal Protective Services) contract is a

U.S.
good example. You have to depend on market needs, because there may not be enough State Department agents. That is a decision the government made." Still, because the United States has given its approval,

companies will not have much choice other than to comply. U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III said, "The good practices noted in the Montreux
Document provide helpful and practical guidance to states that contract with private security companies, to states on whose soil they operate, and to states in which they are based or incorporated." He also said, "Greater reliance on
contract personnel requires vigorous oversight and accountability mechanisms. The United States fully supports the application of professional standards to the operations of military and private security companies."

Kurdish Secession

Turkey-Russia cooperation, votes on Armenian Genocide, and

Carpenter '10 (Ted, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at Cato, Falling Out, 4/23/10,
http://nationalinterest.org/article/falling-out-3460

For more than six decades , U.S. officials have regarded Turkey as an important, loyal U.S. ally . Throughout the Cold War, Washington viewed Turkey as
NATO's indispensable "southeast anchor." When the Cold War ended, many members of the American foreign-policy community insisted that Turkey was an even more important U.S. security partner than before. Paul
Wolfowitz, who would become deputy secretary of defense under President George W. Bush, was one of several prominent experts who argued that there were a handful of "keystone powers" in the international system, and that
Turkey was high on that list. Pro-Turkish analysts argued that in a post-Cold War environment, Turkey not only remained NATO's southeast anchor, it was also a crucial bridge between the Middle East and Europe and a valuable

But over the past seven or eight

conduit for Western, secular influence in much of the Muslim world, especially the Central Asian republics that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union.

years, Turkey's international behavior has begun to cause noticeable uneasiness among U.S. officials and members
of the foreign policy community. A chill has developed in U.S.-Turkish relations, and it is likely to get worse. The
first major blow to the relationship occurred in early 2003 when U.S. leaders sought permission from Turkey to
open a northern front from Turkish territory for the impending conflict with Iraq . Turkish leaders demanded a huge sum (reportedly in excess of $30
billion) for permitting such an operation. Even if Washington had agreed to such thinly veiled extortion, though, it is not at all clear that Ankara would have gone ahead with the agreement. It was the Bush administration's bad luck
that an Islamist government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), had taken power following the electoral rout of the traditional Kemalist secular parties in November 2002. That government was not inclined to back
another U.S. war against a Muslim country. Washington could not count on support from the secular Turkish military for that venture either-a point that embittered U.S. military leaders, who complained about the ingratitude of
America's ally. But Turkish military commanders were at least as worried as the civilian politicians about the probable impact of the strategy to depose Saddam Hussein. In their view, such a step would exacerbate the problems
with the Kurdish region of Iraq that the Persian Gulf War and the imposition of the northern no-fly zone had already caused since the early 1990s. Ousting Saddam, they believed, would fatally weaken the government in Baghdad

and allow Kurdish secessionist forces in northern Iraq to run amok. That was not a minor issue for Turkey. About 20 percent of the Kurdish
population in the Middle East reside in Iraq, but fully 50 percent live in southeastern Turkey , where a low-level insurgency by the
Marxist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) remained stubbornly persistent. Any emergence of a Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq was seen as a potential threat to the unity of the Turkish state. The gap

between U.S. and Turkish views regarding Iraq has grown to a chasm in the years since the overthrow of Saddam's
regime. Turkish leaders have seen Iran's influence in Iraq on the rise, epitomized by Tehran's cozy ties with the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, a development that almost no one in Turkey welcomed. Even worse, from Ankara's standpoint, is the now ostentatious de facto independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. To Turkish leaders, both military and civilian, that
undesirable development was the inevitable product of a myopic U.S. policy, and they are seething over it. To make matters worse, the PKK insurgency, which had subsided in the years since the capture of the organization's
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999, flared again as Iraqi Kurdistan consolidated its de facto independence. PKK fighters used Kurdish territory in Iraq as a sanctuary from which to launch attacks inside Turkey. Ankara's complaints
to Washington about that situation and the Kurdish regional government's failure to take action against PKK fighters mounted steadily. Finally, the Turkish government, under pressure from the military, warned Washington in
late 2007 that it would launch an offensive into northern Iraq to clean out PKK sanctuaries. U.S. officials sought to mediate between Ankara and the Kurdish regional government, facing the prospect that its long-time NATO ally
and the most pro-American faction in Iraq might well go to war against each other. Washington ultimately managed to prevail on the Turkish military to scale-down the scope of its intervention and pressured the Kurdish regime to

avoid direct confrontation with invading Turkish forces. But neither side was happy with the arrangement, and Turkey continues to stir the pot by threatening to launch new offensives. At a minimum,
Ankara's behavior has complicated Washington's already troubled mission in Iraq, and U.S. officials are
understandably unhappy. The Turkish government's repeated warnings that it will not tolerate Iraq's oil-rich city of Kirkuk to come under the jurisdiction of the Kurdish regional government is also a
growing source of tension. From Washington's standpoint, Turkey has not been acting like much of an ally with respect to Iraq

policy. From Ankara's standpoint, U.S. policy in Iraq is clumsy, obtuse and undermines important Turkish interests. That dispute has clearly been a catalyst, perhaps the principal catalyst, for the noticeable deterioration in
U.S.-Turkish relations. But the foreign-policy sources of the growing estrangement lie deeper. Ankara is quite deliberately deemphasizing ties with its traditional NATO allies, including the United States, and is placing greater
emphasis on strengthening links within the Muslim world, especially the Arab nations. The government of Prime Minister Erdogan not only has distanced itself from Washington's wildly unpopular policy in Iraq, but key
differences have emerged about how to deal with Iran. Ankara continues to oppose the U.S.-led strategy of imposing multilateral economic sanctions on Tehran because of that government's apparent quest to build nuclear

weapons. That stance puts Turkey in the same camp as China and Russia on the Iran issue, much to Washington's chagrin. But it is consistent with Ankara's overall rapprochement with Moscow . Turkey is not
only cooperating closely with Russia on energy issues, but it has tilted toward its onetime adversary on other
matters. Most notably, the Turkish government did not back the angry U.S. reaction toward Russia during that country's 2008 war against Georgia. Nor has Turkey been supportive of Washington's goal to add Georgia and
Ukraine to the roster of NATO members-a move that Moscow regards as hostile to its interests. If Washington is unhappy about the increasingly friendly ties

between Turkey and Russia, it is even more distressed about the rapidly escalating animosity between Turkey and
Israel. Ankara's blunt criticism of the Israeli military offensive in Gaza last year is the most visible indicator of deteriorating Israeli-Turkish relations, but it is hardly the only one. Those ties reached their nadir earlier this year
when the Israeli deputy foreign minister humiliated the Turkish ambassador-by, among other actions, making him sit on a couch blatantly lower than his host's, thereby making him look like a school child awaiting a scolding from
the principal. The frosty relations between Turkey and Israel have had a further negative impact on U.S.-Turkish ties. Washington is deeply unhappy that Ankara has apparently become unfriendly toward America's favorite ally in

The latest blow to the U.S.-Turkish relationship came last month when the House Foreign Affairs
the region.

Committee voted to approve a resolution condemning the Armenian genocide that occurred during the final years
of the Ottoman Empire. Previous resolutions on that topic had always died in committee. The reaction to the latest
vote in Turkey was one of fury, and Ankara recalled its ambassador to Washington for several weeks. Although congressional leaders and even Turkey's long-standing friends in the U.S. military are
beginning to have second thoughts about the reliability of the political and security partnership with Ankara, the Obama administration has not yet given up on its goal to establish closer ties with Turkey. That will not be an easy

The foreign-policy differences between Washington and Ankara are now both numerous and profound.
task, though.

Going forward, the United States is likely to have a rocky relationship, at best, with that keystone power.

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Middle East proliferation inevitable
Eland '98 (Ivan, director of defense policy studies at the Cato, "Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Coping with the
Inevitable", 6/2/98, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5868#
Pakistan has now tested its own nuclear device . No security guarantees from or economic penalties imposed by the United States would have dissuaded that uneasy nation from doing
what its security interests dictated. Although the United States and the other established nuclear powers are uncomfortable with

nuclear proliferation, India and Pakistan both have a right to self-defense in a rough neighborhood (Pakistan borders India and Iran,
India borders a nuclear-armed China).

The United States must realize that, over time , proliferation will probably occur in an even wider group of nations. Rewards -- both in prestige and treasure -- accrue to
nations with nuclear programs.

The West paid off North Korea in an attempt to end its nuclear program (although whether that outlaw nation will actually give up its aspirations is a dubious proposition). The United States first tried economic penalties to slow or
halt Pakistan"s nuclear program. Then it contemplated lavishing rewards on Pakistan to prevent it from taking that program to a new level. Some proposals to reward Pakistan -- for example, extending U.S. security guarantees --
would have had worse effects on U.S. security than the nuclear test they are designed to prevent.

While the prospect of a future limited nuclear exchange on the South Asian subcontinent is not pleasant, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs pose little immediate threat to the United States. Neither of those nations is
actively hostile to the United States (unlike other nations, such as Iran and North Korea). India and Pakistan probably do not yet have warheads deployed on missiles. Even if they did, neither country has -- and will not have for
some years to come -- a missile that can hit the United States.

Rather than impose sanctions, the United States should encourage India and Pakistan to adopt confidence-building measures similar to those established by Russia and the United States during the Cold War.

Mandatory economic sanctions against both India and Pakistan in the wake of nuclear tests will only antagonize both nations unnecessarily and diminish U.S. influence when it is most critically needed. As usual, other rich
Western nations are reluctant to tie trade and security issues, leaving the United States to carry the burden of playing "bad cop." In addition, using sanctions as a message to dissuade other nations from conducting nuclear tests is

Those nations that are either undeclared nuclear powers (Israel) or close to becoming such powers
unlikely to have much effect.

(North Korea and Iran) will probably not be deterred from testing if they deem it to be necessary for their national
security. Congress and the president would probably repeal the sanctions law before they would impose sanctions on Israel in retaliation for a nuclear test. The United States has little influence with the unfriendly
governments in Iran and North Korea and cannot ratchet sanctions up much higher than the stringent measures that have already been imposed on those nations.

Iranian Prolif inevitable

Bolton '10 (John, "Get Ready for a Nuclear Iran", 5/2/10, http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB1000142
4052748703871904575216260958684670.html
Speculating about regime change stopping Iran's nuclear program in time is also a distraction. The Islamic Revolution's iron fist, and willingness to use it against dissenters (who are currently in disarray), means we cannot know
whether or when the regime may fall. Long-term efforts at regime change, desirable as they are, will not soon enough prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons with the ensuing risk of further regional proliferation. We

There are only two options: Iran gets nuclear weapons, or someone uses pre-emptive military
therefore face a stark, unattractive reality.

force to break Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and paralyze its program, at least temporarily. There is no possibility the Obama administration
will use force, despite its confused and ever-changing formulation about the military option always being "on the
table." That leaves Israel, which the administration is implicitly threatening not to resupply with airplanes and weapons lost in attacking Iran—thereby rendering Israel vulnerable to potential retaliation from Hezbollah and
Hamas. It is hard to conclude anything except that the Obama administration is resigned to Iran possessing nuclear weapons. While U.S.

policy makers will not welcome that outcome, they certainly hope as a corollary that Iran can be contained and deterred .
Since they have ruled out the only immediate alternative, military force, they are doubtless now busy preparing to make lemonade out of this pile of lemons. President Obama's likely containment/deterrence strategy will feature
security assurances to neighboring countries and promises of American retaliation if Iran uses its nuclear weapons. Unfortunately for this seemingly muscular rhetoric, the simple fact of Iran possessing nuclear weapons would
alone dramatically and irreparably alter the Middle East balance of power. Iran does not actually have to use its capabilities to enhance either its regional or global leverage. Facile analogies to Cold War deterrence rest on the

Even if
dubious, unproven belief that Iran's nuclear calculus will approximate the Soviet Union's. Iran's theocratic regime and the high value placed on life in the hereafter makes this an exceedingly dangerous assumption.

containment and deterrence might be more successful against Iran than just suggested, nuclear proliferation doesn't
stop with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others will surely seek, and very swiftly, their own
nuclear weapons in response. Thus, we would imminently face a multipolar nuclear Middle East waiting only for someone to launch first or
transfer weapons to terrorists. Ironically, such an attack might well involve Israel only as an innocent bystander, at least initially. We should recognize that an Israeli use of military force would be neither precipitate nor
disproportionate, but only a last resort in anticipatory self-defense. Arab governments already understand that logic and largely share it themselves. Such a strike would advance both Israel's and America's security interests, and

also those of the Arab states. Nonetheless, the intellectual case for that strike must be better understood in advance by the American public and Congress in order to ensure a sympathetic reaction by Washington. Absent
Israeli action, no one should base their future plans on anything except coping with a nuclear Iran.