Philosophy Faculty Reading List 2010-2011 EVNINE, S., Donald Davidson (Oxford: Polity, 1991). [chs. 5-7].
MCDOWELL, J., ‘In Defence of Modesty’, in Michael Dummett: Contributions to
PART II PAPER 08:
PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
SYLLABUS
Philosophy of language:
ƒ Understanding and truth-conditions; realism and anti-realism.
ƒ Indeterminacy of meaning, rule-following.
Topics in logic:
ƒ Conditionals.
ƒ The logic of plurals
The nature of logic and mathematics:
ƒ Logic: analytic versus empirical.
ƒ Conventionalism about logic and mathematics.
ƒ Logicism: traditional and contemporary.
ƒ Intuitionism: traditional and contemporary.
ƒ Structuralism and fictionalism.
An asterisk* indicates a classic item or one which provides a good route into a topic.
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
Understanding and Truth-Conditions
*DAVIDSON, D., ‘Radical Interpretation’, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]
* DAVIDSON, D., ‘Reply to Foster’, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]. Also in G. Evans & J. McDowell, eds., Truth
and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976)
*DUMMETT, M., ‘What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)’, in Truth and Meaning: Essays
in Semantics, edited by G. Evans and J. McDowell. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976). Also in M. Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993) [Available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]
DAVIDSON, D., ‘The Structure and Content of Truth.’ Journal of Philosophy 87
(1990): pp. 279-328.
DUMMETT, M., The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 1991).
[chs. 4, 5 & 14].
1 2
Philosophy, edited by B.M. Taylor. (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987). [See also
Dummett's reply, in the same book, pp. 253-268]
Realism and anti-realism
(i) Dummett and his Critics
* DUMMETT, M., ‘Realism’. Synthese, 52 (1982): 55-112. Reprinted in his Truth
and Other Enigmas. (London: Duckworth, 1978).
* DUMMETT, M., ‘Realism and Anti-Realism’, in The Seas of Language. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993). [Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]
* DUMMETT, M., ‘The Reality of the Past’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
69 (1968 -1969): 239-58. Reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas.
(London: Duckworth, 1978).
*EDGINGTON, D., ‘Meaning, Bivalence, and Realism.’ Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 81 (1980-1): 153-73.
CRAIG, E.J., ‘Meaning, Use, and Privacy.’ Mind 91 (1982): 541-64.
DUMMETT, M., The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (London: Duckworth, 1991).
[Introduction & ch. 15].
LOAR, B., ‘Truth Beyond All Verification’, in B. Taylor, ed., Michael Dummett:
Contributions to Philosophy (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 81-116.
MCDOWELL, J., ‘On ‘The Reality of the Past’’, in Action and Interpretation, edited
by C. Hookway and P. Pettit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), pp. 127-44. Reprinted in his Meaning, Knowledge and Reality
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 295-313.
PEACOCKE, C., Thoughts: An Essay on Content (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) [Parts I
& II].
WRIGHT, C., ‘Introduction’, in Realism, Meaning, and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell,
1993).
(ii) Putnam's internal realism
LEWIS, D., ‘Putnam's Paradox.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984): 221-
36.
PUTNAM, H., ‘Realism and Reason’. Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, 50 (1977): 483-498. Reprinted in his Meaning and
the Moral Sciences. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
PUTNAM, H., Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981). [chs. 2 & 3].
(iii) Relativism
* DAVIDSON, D., ‘The Inscrutability of Reference’, in Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]
* DAVIDSON, D., ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Inquiries into
Truth and Interpretation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Also
available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
BLACKBURN, S., ‘Paradise Regained.’ Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 79 (2005):
1-14.
NAGEL, T., The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
QUINE, W.V., ‘Ontological Relativity’. Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 185-212.
Reprinted in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 26-68.
RORTY, R., ‘Introduction’, in The Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-
1980. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982).
Indeterminacy of Meaning
*HOOKWAY, C., Quine: Language, Experience and Reality (Cambridge: Polity,
1988). [chs. 8-10].
* QUINE, W.V., Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960). [ch. 2].
DAVIDSON, D., ‘The Inscrutability of Reference’, in Inquiries into Truth and
Interpretation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com
EVANS, G., ‘Identity and Predication.’ Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 343-63.
Also in his Collected Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
HEAL, J., Fact and Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). [chs 2-4].
LEWIS, D., ‘Radical Interpretation’, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983). [Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
MCGEE, V., ‘Inscrutability and Its Discontent.’ Nous 39 (2005): 397-425.
QUINE, W.V., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1969). [ch. 2].
QUINE, W.V., ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, in Theories and Things
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
Rule-Following
*KRIPKE, S., Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell,
1982). [chs. 1-2. Available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=174146]
*WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958 (1967, 1968)). [§§ 143-242].
3 4
AHMED, A., Saul Kripke (London: Continuum, 2007). [ch. 4].
BLACKBURN, S., ‘The Individual Strikes Back.’ Synthese 58 (1984): 281-302.
BOGHOSSIAN, P., ‘The Rule-Following Considerations.’ Mind 98 (1989): 507-49.
CRAIG, E., ‘Privacy and Rule Following’, in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by J.
Butterfield. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
MCDOWELL, J., ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.’ Synthese 58 (1984): 325-63.
Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
STROUD, B., ‘Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity.’ Philosophical Review 74
(1965): 504-18. Also in E. Klemke, ed., Essays on Wittgenstein (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1971); and also in P. K. Moser, ed., A Priori
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
WRIGHT, C., ‘Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project
of Theoretical Linguistics’, in A. George, ed., Reflections on Chomsky
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Reprinted in C. Wright, Rails to Infinity,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 2001).
TOPICS IN LOGIC
Conditionals
(i) Indicatives
*BENNETT, J., A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2003). [chs 2, 3. Also available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=200722].
*STALNAKER, R., ‘Indicative Conditionals.’ Philosophia 5 (1975): 269-86. Also in
F. Jackson, ed., Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
EDGINGTON, D., ‘On Conditionals.’ Mind 104 (1995): 235-329.
JACKSON, F., Conditionals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). [Chs 1, 2, 5. This book is
other than the collection Conditionals, which he edited.].
LEWIS, D., ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.’
Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 297-315. Also with a postscript, in F.
Jackson, ed., Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
LEWIS, D., ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities (II).’
Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 581-89. Reprinted in F. Jackson, ed.,
Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
MELLOR, D.H., ‘How to Believe a Conditional.’ Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993):
233-48.
(ii) Counterfactuals
*BENNETT, J., A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2003). [chs 10-13 (possible worlds semantics), 18-19 (direction of time). Also
available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=200722].
* LEWIS, D., Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973; revised printing 1986). [chs.
1 & 3. Possible worlds semantics].
*MACKIE, J.L., Truth, Probability, and Paradox. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973). [chs. 1 & 3 possible world semantics.].
LEWIS, D., ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.’ Noûs 13 (1979): 455-
76. Also with postscripts in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1986). Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com. Also
available without all the postscripts, in F. Jackson, ed., Conditionals (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991).
STALNAKER, R., ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in Causation and Conditionals, edited
by E. Sosa. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Also in F. Jackson, ed.,
Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) [Possible worlds
semantics. Also available in Camtools]
The distinction assumed here between indicative and counterfactual conditionals
has itself provoked criticism, see e.g.
DUDMAN, V., ‘Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals.’ Analysis 48 (1988): 113-
22.
The Logic of Plurals
*OLIVER, A., and T. SMILEY, ‘Strategies for a Logic of Plurals.’ Philosophical
Quarterly 51 (2001): 289-306.
BOOLOS, G., ‘To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some
Variables).’ Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984): pp. 430-49. Also in Logic, Logic,
and Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1991).
HAZEN, A., ‘Against Pluralism.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1993): 132-
44.
LEWIS, D., Parts of Classes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). [§ 3.2]
OLIVER, A., and T. SMILEY, ‘Is Plural Denotation Collective?’ Analysis 68 (2008):
22-34.
OLIVER, A., and T. SMILEY, ‘A Modest Logic of Plurals.’ Journal of Philosophical
Logic (2006): 317-48.
OLIVER, A., and T. SMILEY, ‘Plural Descriptions and Many-Valued Functions.’
Mind, 114 (2005): 1039-68.
RAYO, A., ‘Word and Objects.’ Noûs 36 (2002): 436-64.
5 6
SHARVY, R., ‘A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions.’ Philosophical
Review 89 (1980): 607-24.
SIMONS, P., ‘Plural Reference and Set Theory’, in Parts and Moments: Studies in
Logic and Formal Ontology, edited by B. Smith. (Munich: Philosophia, 1982).
YI, B.-U., ‘Is Two a Property?’ Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 63-90.
THE NATURE OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS
Logic: Analytic vs Empirical
DUMMETT, M., ‘Is Logic Empirical?’ in Truth and Other Enigmas. (London:
Duckworth, 1978), pp. 269-89.
HAZEN, A., ‘Logic and Analyticity’, in The Nature of Logic, edited by A.C. Varzi.
(Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1999). [Also in
the Philosophy Faculty offprint collection]
PUTNAM, H., ‘The Logic of Quantum Mechanics'‘, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. I:
Mathematics, Matter and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), pp. 174-97.
Conventionalism about Logic and Mathematics
* QUINE, W.V., ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’. Synthese 12 (1960): 350-74. Reprinted
in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1976).
* QUINE, W.V., ‘Truth by Convention’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays
Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,. 1976). Also in P.
Benacerraf & H. Putnam, eds, Philosophy of Mathematics: selected readings,
1st ed. only (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964).
CRAIG, E., ‘Arithmetic and Fact’, in Exercises in Analysis, edited by I. Hacking,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 89-112.
CRAIG, E., ‘The Problem of Necessary Truth’, in Meaning, Reference and
Necessity, edited by S. Blackburn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975), pp. 1-31.
DUMMETT, M., ‘Wittgenstein on Necessity: Some Reflections’, in his The Seas of
Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com. Reprinted in P. Clark & B. Hale, eds, Reading
Putnam (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
DUMMETT, M., ‘Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.’ Philosophical Review
68 (1959): 324-48. Also in his Truth and Other Enigmas (Duckworth, 1978),
pp. 166-185; and in P. Benacerraf & H. Putnam, eds., Philosophy of
Mathematics: selected readings, 1st ed. only. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964).
GÖDEL, K., ‘Is Mathematics Syntax of Language?’ in Collected Works, Vol. 3
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
GOLDFARB, W., ‘The Philosophy of Mathematics in Early Positivism’, in Origins of
Logical Empiricism, edited by R.N. Giere and A.W. Richardson.
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [ch.
11. Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com].
WRIGHT, C., ‘Inventing Logical Necessity’, in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by
J. Butterfield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 187-209.
Logicism: Traditional and contemporary
(i) Introductory
GEORGE, A., and D.J. VELLEMAN. Philosophies of Mathematics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002). [ch. 2].
KÖRNER, S., The Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Hutchinson, 1960). [chs. 2
& 3].
(ii) Fregean Logicism
*FREGE, G., The Foundations of Arithmetic, Translated by J.L. Austin (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1950). [auf Deutsch: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik].
* PARSONS, C., ‘Frege's Theory of Number’, in Mathematics in Philosophy:
Selected Essays. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). [Also
on Camtools and in the Faculty Library offprint collection.]
BOOLOS, G., ‘The Consistency of Frege's Fundations of Arithmetic’, in The
Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by W.D. Hart (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
GILLIES, D., Frege, Dedekind and Peano on the Foundations of Arithmetic (Assen:
Van Gorsum, 1982). [Clear exposition of the main ideas of the Grundlagen.].
POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [chs.
2 & 4. Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
(iii) The Context Principle
DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973) [ch. 14]
DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1991).
[chs. 16-18].
FIELD, H.H., ‘Platonism for Cheap? Crispin Wright on Frege's Context Principle’ in
his Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Oxford: Blackwell,1989), pp. 147-70.
7 8
(iv) Neo-Fregean Logicism
*HALE, B., and C. WRIGHT. ‘Introduction’, in The Reason's Proper Study. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001). [Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com]
HALE, B., ‘Dummett's Critique of Wright's Attempt to Resuscitate Frege.’
Philosophia Mathematica 2 (1994): 122-47.
SULLIVAN, P., and M. POTTER. ‘Hale on Caesar.’ Philosophia Mathematica 5
(1996): 132-52.
WRIGHT, C., Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1983).
(v) Russellian Logicism
*RUSSELL, B., Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin,
1919).
GÖDEL, K., ‘Russell's Mathematical Logic ‘, in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,
edited by P.A. Schilpp. (New York: Tudor, 1944). Also in P. Benacerraf & H.
Putnam, eds., Philosophy of Mathematics: selected readings (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1964); 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
and in Gödel's Collected Works, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990).
POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [chs.
5-8. Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com].
RAMSEY, F.P., ‘The Foundations of Mathematics’, in The Foundations of
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, edited by R. Braithwaite (London:
Routledge, 2000). Also in his Philosophical Papers, ed. D. H. Mellor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
Intuitionism: Traditional and Contemporary
(i) The Nature of Mathematical Intuition
DUMMETT, M., ‘What Is Mathematics About?’ in The Seas of Language, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 429-45. Also available online at:
www.oxfordscholarhip.com. Also in A. George, ed., Mathematics and Mind
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
ISAACSON, D., ‘Mathematical Intuition and Objectivity’, in Mathematics and Mind,
edited by A. George, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 118-40.
PARSONS, C., ‘Intuition and Number’, in Mathematics and Mind, edited by A.
George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 141-57.
PARSONS, C., ‘Mathematical Intuition.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80
(1980): pp.145-68. Also in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
(ii) Kant
*KANT, I., Critique of Pure Reason. [Consult index for sections on 'arithmetic',
'geometry' or 'mathematics'.].
*PARSONS, C., ‘Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic’, in his Mathematics in Philosophy:
Selected Essays. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp.
110-49. Reprinted in C.J. Posy, ed., Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), pp. 43-79. [Also in the Faculty Library offprint
collection.]
PARSONS, C., ‘Arithmetic and the Categories’. Topoi 3, (1984): 109-21, Reprinted
in Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by C.J. Posy. (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1992), pp. 135-58.
POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [ch. 1.
Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com].
(iii) Brouwerian Intutionism
*GEORGE, A., and D.J. VELLEMAN. Philosophies of Mathematics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002). [ch. 4].
BROUWER, L.E.J., ‘Intuitionism and Formalism’. Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society 20, (1913): 81-96. Available online from
http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bams/1183422499.
DETLEFSEN, M., ‘Brouwerian Intuitionism.’ Mind 99 (1990): 501-34. Also in M.
Detlefsen, ed., Proof and Knowledge in Mathematics (London: Routledge,
1992); and in D. Jacquette, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics: An
Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
HEYTING, A., ‘The Intuitionist Foundations of Mathematics’, in Philosophy of
Mathematics: Selected Readings, edited by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1964). Also available in a 2nd edition (Cambridge
University Press, 1983) and in D. Jacquette, ed., The Philosophy of
Mathematics: an anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
KÖRNER, S., The Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Hutchinson, 1960). [chs. 6
& 7].
MOORE, A., ‘A Problem for Intuitionism: The Apparent Possibility of Performing
Infinitely Many Tasks in a Finite Time.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 90 (1989): 17-34. Also in D. Jacquette, ed., The Philosophy of
Mathematics: an anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
(iv) Dummettian Intuitionism
* DUMMETT, M., ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’, in Truth and Other
Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978). Also in Putnam & Benacerraf, eds.,
Philosophy of Mathematic. 2nd ed. (CUP, 1983); and in W. D. Hart, ed., The
Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1996).
9 10
BURGESS, J., ‘Dummett's Case for Intuitionism.’ History and Philosophy of Logic 5
(1984): 177-94.
DUMMETT, M., Elements of Intuitionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977;
2nd ed.: 2000). [Introductory Remarks and chs 1 & 7].
DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1991). [ch.
24].
PRAWITZ, D., ‘Meaning and Proofs: On the Conflict between Classical and
Intuitionistic Logic.’ Theoria 43 (1977): 2-40.
Structuralism
(i) General
*BENACERRAF, P., ‘What Numbers Could Not Be.’ Philosophical Review 74
(1965): 47-73. Also in P. Benacerraf & H. Putnam, eds., Philosophy of
Mathematics: selected readings, 2nd ed. only (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
*SHAPIRO, S., Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997). [ch. 3. Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com].
DEDEKIND, R., ‘The Nature and Meaning of Numbers’, in his Essays on the
Theory of Numbers. (New York: Dover, 1963). Only preface. Reprinted in W.
B. Ewald, ed., From Kant to Hilbert, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996). [Also in the Faculty Library offprint collection.]
PARSONS, C., ‘The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects.’ Synthese 84
(1990): 303-46. Reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [ch. 3.
Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
(ii) Modal Structuralism
HELLMAN, G., ‘Modal-Structural Mathematics’, in Physicalism in Mathematics,
edited by A.D. Irvine.(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990). [or see his Mathematics
without Numbers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 1-44.]
PUTNAM, H., ‘Mathematics without Foundations’, in Philosophy of Mathematics:
Selected Readings, edited by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. only, 1983). Also in W. D. Hart, ed., The
Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Fictionalism

(i) Benacerraf's Problem

*BENACERRAF, P., ‘Mathematical Truth.’ Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661-79.

Reprinted in P. Benacerraf & H. Putnam, eds, Philosophy of Mathematics:
selected readings, 2nd ed. only (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983).
HART, W.D., ‘Access and Inference.’ Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 53 (1979):
153-65. Reprinted in W. D. Hart, ed., The Philosophy of Mathematics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
HEMPEL, C., ‘On the Nature of Mathematical Truth’. The American Mathematical
Monthly 52 (1945): 543-56. Reprinted in Philosophy of Mathematics:
Selected Readings, edited by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1964; 2nd ed.: 1983).
MADDY, P., Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). [chs.
1-3. Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com].

(ii) The Indispensability Argument

*COLYVAN, M., The Indispensability of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2001). [chs. 1 & 2. Also available online at
www.oxfordscholarship.com].
BURGESS, J., ‘Why I Am Not a Nominalist.’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
24 (1983): 93-105.
FIELD, H.H., ‘Introduction’, in Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1989).
PUTNAM, H., Philosophy of Logic (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

(iii) The Dispensability Argument

* FIELD, H.H., Science without Numbers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). [Preliminary

remarks and chs. 1-5].
MACBRIDE, F., ‘Listening to Fictions: A Study of Fieldian Nominalism.’ British
Journal of Philosophy of Science 50 (1999): 431-55.

11