Hypatia, Inc.

Against Marriage and Motherhood

Author(s): Claudia Card
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 1-23
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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AgainstMarriageandMotherhood
CLAUDIA CARD

Thisessayarguesthatcurrentadvocacyof lesbianandgayrightsto legalmarriage

and parenthoodinsufficientlycriticizesbothmarriageand motherhood as theyare
currentlypracticedand structured by Northern legalinstitutions.
Insteadwe would
do betternot to let the State defineour intimateunionsand parentingwouldbe
improvedif thepowerpresentlyconcentrated in the handsof one or two guardians
weredilutedanddistributed an
through appropriately concernedcommunity.

The title of this essayis deliberatelyprovocative,because I fearthat radical

feminist perspectiveson marriageand motherhoodare in dangerof being lost
in the questfor equal rights.My concerns,however,arespecific.I am skeptical
of using the institution of motherhood as a source of paradigmsfor ethical
theory.And I am skeptical of legal marriageas a way to gain a better life for
lesbian and gay lovers or as a way to provide a supportiveenvironment for
lesbian and gay parents and their children. Of course, some are happy with
marriageand motherhood as they now exist. My concern is with the price of
that joy bore by those trappedby marriageor motherhoodand deeplyunlucky
in the company they find there. Nevertheless, nothing that I say is intended
to disparagethe charactersof many magnificentwomen who have struggledin
and aroundthese institutionsto make the best of a tryingset of options.

BACKGROUNDS

My perspectiveon marriageis influencednot only by other'swrittenreports

and analysesbut also by my own historyof being raisedin a lower-middle-class
white village family by parents married(to each other) for more than three
decades,by my firsthandexperiencesof urbansame-sexdomesticpartnerships
lasting from two and one half to nearly seven years(good ones and bad, some
racially mixed, some white, generally mixed in class and religious back-
grounds),and by my morerecent experienceas a lesbianfeministwhose partner
Hypatiavol. 11, no. 3 (Summer1996) ? by ClaudiaCard
2 Hypatia

of the past decade is not a domestic partner.My perspectiveon child rearing

is influenced not by my experience as a mother, but by my experience as a
daughterrearedby a full-time mother-housewife,by having participatedheav-
ily in the raisingof my youngersiblings,and by having grownto adulthoodin
a community in which many of the working-classand farmingfamiliesexem-
plified aspectsof what bell hooks calls "revolutionaryparenting"(hooks 1984,
133-46).
bell hooks writes, "Childrearingis a responsibilitythat can be sharedwith
other childrearers,with people who do not live with children. This form of
parentingis revolutionaryin this society because it takes place in opposition
to the idea that parents, especially mothers, should be the only childrearers.
Many people raised in black communities experienced this type of commu-
nity-basedchild care" (hooks 1984, 144). This form of child rearingmay be
more common than is generally acknowledged in a society in which those
whose caretakingdoes not take place in a nuclear family are judgedby those
with the power to set standardsas unfortunateand deprived.Although bell
hooks continues to use the languageof "mothering"to some extent in elabo-
rating"revolutionaryparenting,"I see this revolutionas offeringan alternative
to motheringas a social institution.
Becauseit appearsunlikely that the legal rightsof marriageand motherhood
in the EuropeanAmericanmodelsof those institutionscurrentlyat issuein our
courts will disappearor even be seriously eroded during my lifetime, my
oppositionto them here takesthe formof skepticismprimarilyin the two areas
mentioned above: ethical theorizingand lesbian/gayactivism. I believe that
women who identify as lesbian or gay should be reluctant to put our activist
energy into attaining legal equity with heterosexualsin marriageand mother-
hood-not becausethe existing discriminationagainstus is in any wayjustifi-
able but because these institutions are so deeply flawed that they seem to me
unworthyof emulation and reproduction.
Formorethan a decade,feministphilosophersand lesbian/gayactivistshave
been optimistic about the potentialities of legal marriageand legitimated
motherhood.This should be surprising,consideringthe dismalpolitical gene-
alogies of those institutions, which have been generallyadmitted and widely
publicized by feminist thinkers. Yet, in the project of claiming historically
characteristiclife experiences of women as significant data for moral theory,
many are turning to women'sexperiences as mothers for ethical insight. Not
all focus on marriageand motherhood. Feminist philosophersare taking as
valuable theoretical paradigmsfor ethics many kinds of caring relationships
that have been salient in women's lives. MarilynFriedman,for example, has
explored female friendshipin WhatAre FriendsFor?(1993). SarahHoagland
(1988) offersvalue inquirybased on experiencesof lesbian bonding in many
forms.Mothering,edited by Joyce Trebilcot(1983), includes essaysrepresent-
ing critical as well as supportivestances regardingmotherhood.These works,
 ClaudiaCard 3

however, are exceptions to a wider trend of theorizing that draws mainly

positive inspirationfrom the experiences of women as mothers. Thus, Sara
Ruddick'sMaternalThinking(1989), which acknowledgesthe need forcaution,
is devoted to developing ethical ideas based on experiences of mother-child
relationships. Nel Noddings's Caring (1984) and Virginia Held's Feminist
Morality(1993) likewise take inspirationfrom the experience of "mothering
persons"and other caregivers,and to some extent, Annette Baierdoes likewise
in MoralPrejudices(1994). These last four philosophersurge an extension of
motheringvalues to more public realmsof activity.
In Black FeministThoughtPatricia Hill Collins also speaks of "a more
generalizedethic of caring and personalaccountabilityamongAfrican-Amer-
ican women who often feel accountableto all the Blackcommunity'schildren"
(1991, chap. 6). Her models for an "ethic of caringand personalaccountabil-
ity,"however,differsignificantlyfromthe models characteristicof the workof
so manywhite feministsin that her modelsalreadyinvolve a widercommunity
that includes"othermothers"as well as "bloodmothers,"modelselaboratedby
bell hooks as instancesof "revolutionaryparenting"(hooks 1984, 133-46). My
skepticism is not aimed at such "revolutionaryparenting,"which I find has
much to recommend it. Yet "parenting"by a wider community is a form of
child care not currently enshrined in Northern legal systems. It is not the
model guiding lesbian and gay activists currently agitating for equal rights
before the law. For more communal child care, the languageof "mothering"
and even "parenting"is somewhat misleadingin that these practicesare not
particularly"mother-centered"or even "parent-centered" but are centered on
the needs of children and of the community.
Audre Lorde,who wrote abouther relationshipwith her son (1984, 72-80),
has left us with reflectionson yet anothermodel of parenting,that of a lesbian
relationshipstrugglingagainstthe models of heterosexualmarriageand patri-
archal motherhood in her social environment. Nevertheless, she does not
attemptto generalizefromher experienceor to treatit as a sourceof inspiration
for ethical theory.
When confronted with my negative attitudes towardmarriageand moth-
erhood, some recoil as though I were proposing that we learn to do without
water and oxygen on the ground that both are polluted (even killing us).
Often, I believe, this reaction comes from certain assumptions that the
readeror hearer may be inclined to make, which I here note in order to set
aside at the outset.
First, my opposition to marriageis not an opposition to intimacy,nor to
long-termrelationshipsof intimacy,nor to durablepartnershipsof manysorts.1
I understandmarriageas a relationshipto which the State is an essentialthird
party.Also, like the practicesof footbinding and suttee, which, accordingto
the researchesof Mary Daly (1978, 113-52), originatedamong the powerful
classes, marriagein Europewas once available only to those with substantial
4 Hypatia

social power. Previouslyavailable only to membersof propertiedclasses, the

marriagerelation has come to be available in modem Northern democracies
to any adult heterosexual couple neither of whom is already married to
someone else. This is what lesbianand gay agitationfor the legal rightto marry
is about.This is what I find calls for extreme caution.
Second, my opposition to motherhood is neither an opposition to the
guidance, education, and caretaking of children nor an opposition to the
formation of many kinds of bonds between children and adults.2Nor am I
opposed to the existence of homes, as places of long-term residence with
others of a variety of ages with whom one has deeply committed relation-
ships. When "the family" is credited with being a bulwarkagainst a hostile
world, as in the case of many families in the African and Jewish disaporas,
the bulwarkthat is meant often consists of a variety of deeply committed
personal (as opposed to legal) relationships and the stability of caring that
they represent, or home as a site of these things. The bulwark is not the
legitimation (often precarious or nonexistent) of such relationships
through institutions of the State. The State was often one of the things that
these relationships formed a bulwarkagainst.
Marriageand motherhood in the history of modem patriarchieshave been
mandatoryfor and oppressive to women, and they have been criticized by
feminists on those grounds. My concerns, however, are as much for the
children as for the women that some of these childrenbecome and for the goal
of avoiding the reproductionof patriarchy.VirginiaHeld, one optimist about
the potentialities of marriageand motherhood,findsmotherhoodto be partof
a largerconception of family,which she takesto be constructedof noncontrac-
tual relationships.She notes that although Marxistsand recent communitari-
ans might agree with her focus on noncontractualrelationships,their views
remain uninformedby feminist critiques of patriarchalfamilies. The family
fromwhich she would have society and ethical theoristslearn, ultimately,is a
postpatriarchalfamily.But what is a "postpatriarchalfamily"?Is it a coherent
concept?
"Family" is itself a family resemblance concept. Many contemporary
lesbian and gay partnerships, households, and friendship networks fit no
patriarchal stereotypes and are not sanctified by legal marriage,although
their members still regardthemselves as "family."3But should they? Many
social institutions, such as insurancecompanies, do not honor such concep-
tions of "family."Family,as understood in contexts where material benefits
tend to be at stake, is not constituted totally by noncontractual relation-
ships. At its core is to be found one or more marriagecontracts. For those
who would work to enlarge the concept of family to include groupingsthat
are currentlytotally noncontractual,in retainingpatriarchalvocabularythere
is a dangerof importingpatriarchalidealsand of inviting treatmentas deviant
or "secondclass"at best.
 ClaudiaCard 5

"Family,"our studentslearn in Women'sStudies 101, comes fromthe Latin

familia, meaning "household," which in tum came from famulus, which,
accordingto the OED, meant "servant."The ancient Romanpaterfamilias was
the head of a household of servants and slaves, including his wife or wives,
concubines, and children. He had the powerof life and death over them. The
ability of contemporarymale heads of households to get awaywith battering,
incest, and murdersuggeststo many feministsthat the familyhas not evolved
into anything acceptable yet. Would a household of personswhose relation-
shipswith each other transcended(as those of familiesdo) sojournsunderone
roof continue to be rightlycalled "family"if no membershad significantsocial
support for treating other members abusively?Perhaps the postpatriarchal
relationshipsenvisionedby VirginiaHeld andby so manylesbiansand gaymen
should be called something else, to mark that radical departurefrom family
history.But it is not just a matterof a word.It is difficultto imaginewhat such
relationshipswould be.
In what follows, I saymore aboutmarriagethan aboutmotherhood,because
it is legal marriagethat sets the contexts in which and the backgroundagainst
which motherhood has been legitimated, and it defines contexts in which
motheringeasily becomes disastrousfor children.

LESBIAN(OR GAY) MARRIAGE?

A specialvantagepoint is offeredby the experienceof lesbiansand gaymen,

among whom there is currentlyno consensus (although much strong feeling
on both sides) on whether to pursuethe legal right to marrya same-sexlover
(Blumenfeld,Wolfson, and Brownworth,all 1996). When heterosexualpart-
ners think about marriage,they usually consider the more limited question
whether they (as individuals)should marry(each other) and if they did not
marry,what the consequenceswouldbe for children they might have or raise.
They consider this in the context of a State that gives them the legal option
of marriage.Lesbiansand gay men are currentlyin the position of having to
considerthe largerquestionwhetherthe legal option of marriageis a good idea,
as we do not presentlyhave it in relation to our lovers. We have it, of course,
in relationto the other sex, and manyhave exercisedit as a cover,as insurance,
for residentalien status,and so forth. If it is becausewe alreadyhave rights to
marryheterosexuallythat right-wing attackersof lesbian or gay rights com-
plain of our wanting "special rights,"we should reply that, of course, any
legalizationof same-sexmarriageshould extend that "privilege"to heterosex-
uals as well.
The questionwhether lesbiansand gay men shouldpursuethe rightto marry
is not the same as the questionwhether the law is wrongin its refusalto honor
same-sex marriages.RichardMohr (1994, 31-53) defends gay marriagefrom
that point of view as well as I have seen it done. Evan Wolfson develops
6 Hypatia

powerfullyan analogybetween the denial of marriageto same-sexcouplesand

the antimiscegenation laws that were overturned in the United States just
little more than a quartercentury ago (Wolfson 1996). What I have to say
should apply to relationshipsbetween lovers (or parents) of differentraces as
well as to those of same-sexlovers (or parents).The wayswe have been treated
are abominable.But it does not follow that we should seek legal marriage.
It is one thing to argue that others are wrong to deny us something and
another to arguethat what they would deny us is something we should fight
for the right to have. I do not deny that others are wrongto exclude same-sex
lovers and lovers of differentracesfromthe rightsof marriage.I question only
whether we should fight for those rights,even if we do not intend to exercise
them. Suppose that slave-owning in some mythical society were denied to
otherwisefree women, on the groundthat such women as slave-ownerswould
pervert the institution of slavery. Women (both free and unfree) could
(unfortunately) document empirically the falsity of beliefs underlying such
grounds. It would not follow that women should fight for the right to own
slaves, or even for the rights of other women to own slaves. Likewise, if
marriageis a deeply flawed institution, even though it is a special injustice
to exclude lesbians and gay men arbitrarilyfromparticipating in it, it would
not necessarily advance the cause of justice on the whole to remove the
special injustice of discrimination.
About same-sex marriageI feel something like the way I feel about prosti-
tution. Let us, by all means, decriminalizesodomy and so forth. Although
marriagerights would be sufficientto enable lovers to have sex legally, such
rights should not be necessaryfor that purpose.Where they are legally neces-
saryand also availablefor protection againstthe social oppressionof same-sex
lovers,as for lovers of differentraces,there will be enormouspressureto marry.
Let us not pretend that marriageis basicallya good thing on the groundthat
durable intimate relationships are. Let us not be eager to have the State
regulateourunions. Let us workto removebarriersto ourenjoyingsome of the
privileges presently available only to heterosexual marriedcouples. But in
doing so, we should also be carefulnot to supportdiscriminationagainstthose
who choose not to marryand not to supportcontinued state definition of the
legitimacy of intimate relationships.I would rather see the state deregulate
heterosexualmarriagethan see it begin to regulatesame-sexmarriage.
As the child of parents marriedto each other for thirty-two years, I once
thought I knew what marriage meant, even though laws vary from one
jurisdictionto another and the dictionary,as Mohr notes, sends us aroundin
a circle, referringus to "husband"and "wife,"in turn defined by "marriage."
Mohr arguesconvincingly that "marriage" need not presupposethe gendered
concepts of "husband" and "wife" (1994, 31-53). I will not rehearse that
ground here. History seems to support him. After readingcover to cover and
with great interest John Boswell's Same-Sex Unions in PremodernEurope
 ClaudiaCard 7

(1994), however, I no longer feel so confident that I know when a "union"

counts as a "marriage."Boswell, who discussesmany kinds of unions, refrains
fromusing the term "marriage" to describethe same-sexunions he researched,
even though they were sanctifiedby religiousceremonies.Some understand-
ings of such unions, apparently,did not presupposethat the partnerswere not
at the same time marriedto someone of the other sex.
Mohr, in his suggestionsfor improvingmarriagelaw by attending to the
experience of gay men, proposes that sexual fidelity not be a requirement
(1994, 49-50). What would remainwithout such a requirement,from a legal
point of view, sounds to me like mutualadoption,or guardianship.Adoption,
like marriage,is a way to become next-of-kin. This could have substantial
economic consequences. But is there any good reason to restrict mutual
adoption to two partiesat a time?If mutualadoption is what we want, perhaps
the law of adoption is what we shoulduse, or suitablyamend.And yet the law
of adoption is not without its problematicaspects,some similarto those of the
law of marriage.For it does not specify precisely a guardian'srights and
responsibilities.Perhapsthose who want legal contractswith each other would
do better to enter into contractsthe contents of which and durationof which
they specificallydefine.
As noted above, my partnerof the pastdecade is not a domesticpartner.She
and I form some kind of fairly common social unit which, so far as I know,
remainsnameless.Along with such namelessnessgoes a certain invisibility,a
mixed blessingto which I will return.We do not sharea domicile (she has her
house; I have mine). Nor do we form an economic unit (she pays her bills; I
pay mine). Although we certainly have fun together, our relationship is not
basedsimplyon fun. We sharethe sortsof mundanedetails of daily living that
Mohr finds constitutive of marriage(often in her house, often in mine). We
know a whole lot about each other's lives that the neighbors and our other
friends will never know. In times of trouble, we are each other'sfirst line of
defense, and in times of need, we are each other'smain support.Still, we are
not married.Nor do we yearnto marry.Yet if marryingbecame an option that
would legitimate behavior otherwise illegitimate and make available to us
social securitiesthat will no doubt become even more importantto us as we
age, we and manyotherslike us might be pushedinto marriage.Marryingunder
such conditions is not a totally free choice.
Because of this unfreedom, I find at least four interconnected kinds of
problems with marriage.Three may be somewhat remediable in principle,
although if they were remedied,many might no longerhave strongmotives to
marry.I doubt that the fourth problem,which I also find most important,is
fixable.
The firstproblem,perhapseasiest to remedyin principle (if not in practice)
is that employersand others (such as units of government) often make avail-
able only to legallymarriedcouplesbenefits that anyone could be presumedto
8 Hypatia

want, marriedor not, such as affordablehealth and dental insurance,the right

to live in attractiveresidentialareas,visitation rightsin relation to significant
others,and so forth. Spousalbenefitsfor employeesare a significantportion of
many workers'compensation.Thus marriedworkersare often, in effect, paid
more for the same labor than unmarriedworkers(Berzon 1988, 266; Pierce
1995, 5). This is one way in which people who do not have independentaccess
to an income often find themselves economically pressuredinto marrying.
Historically,women have been in this position oftener than men, including,
of course,mostpre-twentiethcenturylesbians,manyof whom marriedmen for
economic security.
The second problemis that even though divorce by mutualconsent is now
generallypermittedin the United States, the consequencesof divorce can be
so difficult that many who should divorce do not. This to some extent is a
continuation of the benefitsproblem.But also, if one partnercan sue the other
for supportor receive a share of the other's assets to which they would not
otherwise have been legally entitled, there are new economic motives to
preserveemotionally disastrousunions.
The third issue,which would be seriouslytroublesomefor many lesbians, is
that legal marriageas currentlyunderstoodin Northerndemocraciesis monog-
amousin the sense of one spouseat a time, even though the law in manystates
no longer treats "adultery"(literally "pollution")as criminal.Yet many of us
have more than one long-term intimate relationship during the same time
period.Any attempt to change the currentunderstandingof marriageso as to
allow plural marriagepartners(with plural contracts) would have economic
implicationsthat I have yet to see anyone explore.
Finally,the fourth problem,the one that I doubt is fixable (depending on
what "marriage"means) is that the legal rightsof access that marriedpartners
have to each other'spersons,property,and lives makesit all but impossiblefor
a spouseto defendherself (or himself), or to be protectedagainsttorture,rape,
battery, stalking, mayhem, or murderby the other spouse. Spousal murder
accounts for a substantialnumberof murderseach year.This factor is made
worseby the presenceof the second problemmentioned above (difficultiesof
divorce that lead many to remain marriedwhen they should not), which
providemotives to violence within marriages.Legalmarriagethus enlists state
supportfor conditions conducive to murderand mayhem.
The point is not that all marriagesare violent. It is not about the frequency
of violence, although the frequencyappearshigh.The points are, rather,that
the institution places obstacles in the way of protecting spouses (however
many) who need it and is conducive to violence in relationshipsthat go bad.
Battery is, of course, not confined to spouses.Lesbian and gay battery is real
(see Renzetti 1992; Lobel 1986; Islandand Letellier 1991). But the law does
not protect unmarriedbatterersor tend to preservethe relationshipsof unmar-
ried loversin the waythat it protectshusbandsand tends to preservemarriages.
 Claudia Card 9

Why, then, would anyone marry?Because it is a tradition, glorified and

romanticized.It grantsstatus. It is a significant (social) markof adulthoodfor
women in patriarchy.It is a way to avoid certain hassles from one's family of
origin and from society at large-hassles to oneself, to one's lover (if there is
only one), and to children with whom one may live or whom one may bring
into being. We need better traditions.And women have long needed other
social marksof adulthoodand ways to escape familiesof origin.
Under our present exclusion from the glories of legal matrimony,the usual
reasonwhy lesbiansor gay men formpartnershipsand stay together is because
we carefor each other.We maybreakup for other kinds of reasons(such as one
of us being assignedby an employerto anotherpartof the countryand neither
of us being able to affordto give up our jobs). But when we stay together,that
is usuallybecauseof how we feel about each other and about our life together.
Considerhow this basic taken-for-grantedfact might change if we could marry
with the State'sblessings.There aremanymaterialbenefitsto tempt those who
can into marrying,not to mention the improvementin one'ssocial reputation
as a reliable citizen (and for those of us who are not reliable citizens, the
protection againsthaving a spouseforced to testify againstus in court).
Let us consider each of these four problemsfurther.The first was that of
economic and other benefits, such as insurance that employersoften make
availableonly to marrieds,the right of successorshipto an apartment,inheri-
tance rights,and the right to purchasea home in whateverresidentialneigh-
borhoodone can afford.The attachmentof such benefits to maritalstatusis a
problemin two respects.First,becausethe benefits are substantial,not trivial,
they offeran ulteriormotive for turninga lover relationshipinto a marriage-
even for pretending to care for someone, deceiving oneself as well as others.
As Emma Goldman argued in the early twentieth century, when marriage
becomes an insurancepolicy, it mayno longerbe compatiblewith love (1969).
Second, the practice of making such benefits available only to marrieds
discriminatesagainstthose who, for whateverreason,do not marry.Becauseof
the firstfactor,manyheterosexualswho do not fundamentallyapproveof legal
marriagegive in and marry anyhow. Because of the second factor, many
heterosexualfeminists,however,refuselegal marriage(althoughthe State may
regardtheir relationshipsas common law marriages).
Now add to the spousalbenefits problemthe second difficulty,that of the
consequences of getting a divorce (for example, consequences pertainingto
sharedproperty,alimony,or child supportpaymentsand difficultiesin termsof
access to children), especially if the divorce is not friendly.Intimate partner-
ships beginning fromsexual or erotic attractiontend to be of limited viability,
even underfavorablecircumstances.About half of all marriedcouples in the
United States at present get divorced, and probablymost of the other half
should. But the foreseeableconsequences of divorce provide motives to stay
marriedfor manyspouseswho no longer love each other (if they ever did) and
10 Hypatia

have even grownto hate each other.Stayingmarriedordinarilyhampersone's

ability to develop a satisfyinglover relationshipwith someone new. As long as
marriageis monogamousin the sense of one spouseat a time, it interfereswith
one's ability to obtain spousalbenefits for a new lover. When spousesgrow to
hate each other, the accessthat was a joy as lovers turnsinto somethinghighly
dangerous.I will returnto this.
Third, the fact of multiplerelationshipsis a problemeven forrelativelygood
marriages.Mohr, as noted, arguesin favor of reformingmarriageso as not to
requiresexual exclusivenessratherthan officiallypermittingonly monogamy.
Yet he was thinking not of multiple spousesbut of a monogamousmarriagein
which neither partner expects sexual exclusiveness of the other. Yet, one
spouseperpersonis monogamy,howeverpromiscuousthe spousesmaybe. The
advantagesthat Mohr enumeratesas among the perksof marriageapplyonly
to spouses,not to relationshipswith additionalsignificantothers who are not
one's spouses.Yet the same reasonsthat lead one to want those benefits for a
spouse can lead one to want them for additionalsignificant others. If lesbian
and gay marriageswere acknowledgedin Norther democraciestoday, they
would be legally as monogamousas heterosexual marriage,regardlessof the
numberof one's actual sexual partners.This does not reflect the relationships
that many lesbiansand gay men have or want.
Boswell wrote about same-sex unions that did not preclude simultaneous
heterosexual marriages(1994). The parties were not permitted to formalize
unions with morethan one personof the samesex at a time, however.Nor were
they permittedto have children with a personof the other sex to whom they
were not married.Thus, in a certain restrictedsense, each formal union was
monogamous,even though one could have both kinds at once.
Christine Pierce argues,in supportof the option to legalizelesbian and gay
marriages,that lesbian and gay images have been cast too much in terms of
individuals-The Wellof Loneliness(Hall 1950), for example-and not enough
in termsof relationships,especially seriousrelationshipsinvolving long-term
commitments(Pierce 1995, 13). Marriagegives visibilityto people "ascouples,
partners,family,and kin," a visibility that lesbians and gay men have lacked
and that could be importantto dispellingnegative stereotypesand assumptions
that our relationshipsdo not embodymany of the same idealsas those of many
heterosexualcouples,partners,family,and kin (Pierce 1996). This is both true
and important.
It is not clear, however, that legal marriagewould offer visibility to our
relationshipsas they presentlyexist. It might well change our relationshipsso
that they became more like heterosexualmarriages,loveless afterthe firstfew
years but hopelessly bogged down with financial entanglements or children
(adopted or products of turkey-basterinsemination or previous marriages),
making separation or divorce (at least in the near future) too difficult to
contemplate, giving rise to new motives for mayhemand murder.Those who
 ClaudiaCard 11

never previouslyfelt pressureto marrya lover might confront not just new
options but new pressuresand traps.
My views on marriagemay surprisethose familiar with my work on the
militaryban (Card 1995). For I have arguedagainst the ban and in favor of
lesbian and gay access to militaryservice, and I arguedthat even those who
disapproveof the militaryshouldobject to wrongfulexclusionsof lesbiansand
gay men. In the world in which we live, militaryinstitutions may well be less
dispensablethan marriage,however in need of restraintmilitary institutions
are. But for those who find legal marriageand legitimate motherhood objec-
tionable, shouldI be moved here by what moved me there-that it is one thing
not to exercisean option and anotherto be denied the option, that denyingus
the option for no good reasonconveys that there is somethingwrongwith us,
thereby contributing to our public disfigurementand defamation, and that
these considerationsgive us good reasonsto protest being denied the option
even if we never intend to exercise it? I am somewhatbut not greatlymoved
by such argumentsin this case. The case of marriageseemsto me morelike the
case of slaverythan like that of the military.
Marriageand militaryservice are in many ways relevantlydifferent.Ordi-
narily,marriage(like slavery) is much worse, if only because its impacton our
lives is usuallygreater.Marriageis supposedto be a lifetime commitment. It is
at least open-ended.When available,it is not simplyan option but tends to be
coercive, especiallyfor women in a misogynistsociety. For those who choose
it, it threatensto be a dangeroustrap. Militaryservice is ordinarilyneither a
lifetime nor open-ended commitment; one signs up for a certain number of
years.Duringwar,one may be drafted(also for a limited time) and, of course,
even killed, but the issue has not been whether to draftlesbiansand gay men.
Past experience shows that gay men will be draftedin war,even if barredfrom
enlistment in peace. When enlistment is an option, it does not threatento trap
one in a relationship from which it will be extremely difficult to extricate
oneself in the future.There is some analogy with the economically coercive
aspect of the marriage"option.' Because those who have never served are
ineligible for substantialeducationaland health benefits, many from low- (or
no-) income familiesenlist to obtain such things as college educationand even
health and dental insurance.However, the service one has to give for such
benefits as an enlistee is limited comparedto spousalservice. Being killed is a
risk in either case.
In such a context, pointing out that many marriagesare very loving, not at
all violent, and proclaimto the world two people'shonorablecommitment to
each other, seems to me analogousto pointing out, as many slave-ownersdid,
that many slave-ownerswere trulyemotionallybonded with their slaves, that
they did not whip them, and that even the slaves were proudand honored to
be the slaves of such masters.
12 Hypatia

Some of the most moving storiesI hear in discussionsof gay marriagepoint

out that the care renderedthe ill by families is a great service to society and
that the chosen families of gay AIDS patients deserve to be honored in the
same way as a family based on a heterosexual union. The same, of course,
applies to those who care for lesbian or gay cancer patients or for those with
severe disabilitiesor other illnesses. But is this a service to society?Or to the
State?The State has a historyof dependingon familiesto providecare that no
human being should be without in infancy, illness, and old age. Lesbiansand
gay men certainly have demonstratedour ability to serve the State in this
capacityas well as heterosexuals.But where does this practiceleave those who
are not members of families? Or those who object on principle to being
membersof these unions as sanctifiedby the State?
To remedy the injustices of discriminationagainst lesbians, gay men, and
unmarriedheterosexualcouples, many municipalitiesare experimentingwith
domestic partnershiplegislation. This may be a step in the right direction,
insofaras it is a much more voluntaryrelationship,more specific, more easily
dissolved. Yet, partnerswho are legally marriedneed not share a domicile
unless one of them so chooses; in this respect, eligibility for the benefits of
domestic partnershipmay be more restrictive than marriage.And the only
domestic partnershiplegislation that I have seen requiresthat one claim only
one domestic partnerat a time, which does not distinguish it from monoga-
mous marriage(see Berzon1988, 163-82).
Whatever social unions the State may sanction, it is importantto realize
that they become State-defined, however they may have originated. One's
rightsand privilegesas a spousecan change dramaticallywith one's residence,
as Betty Mahmoodydiscoveredwhen she went with her husbandto Iranfor
what he had promisedwould be a temporaryvisit (Mahmoody with Hoffer
1987). She found after arrivingin Iran that she had no legal right to leave
without her husband'sconsent, which he then denied her, leaving as her only
option for returningto the United States to escape illegally (which she did).
Even if a couple would not be legally recognizedas marriedin a particular
jurisdiction,if they move fromanotherjurisdictionin which they werelegally
recognizedas married,they are generallylegally recognizedas marriedin the
new jurisdiction, and they are held to whatever responsibilities the new
jurisdictionenforces. The case of Betty Mahmoody is especially interesting
becauseit involves her husband'srightof access.Spousalrightsof accessdo not
have the same sort of contingency in relation to marriageas, say, a right to
familyratesfor airline tickets.
Marriageis a legal institution the obligations of which tend to be highly
informal-i.e., loosely defined, unspecific, and inexplicit about exactly what
one is to do and about the consequences of failing. In this regard,a marriage
contract differsfrom the contract of a bank loan. In a legal loan contract, the
parties'reciprocalobligations become highly formalized.In dischargingthe
 ClaudiaCard 13

obligations of a loan, one dissolves the obligation. In living up to marriage

obligations, however, one does not dissolve the marriageor its obligations;if
anything, one strengthensthem. As I have arguedelsewhere,the obligations
of marriageand those of loan contractsexhibit differentparadigms(Card1988,
1990). The debtor paradigm is highly formal, whereas the obligations of
spouses tend to be relatively informal and fit better a paradigmthat I have
called the trustee paradigm.The obligations of a trustee, or guardian,are
relatively abstractlydefined. A trustee or guardian is expected to exercise
judgment and discretion in carryingout the obligations to care, protect, or
maintain. The trustee status may be relatively formal-precisely defined
regardingdates on which it takes effect, compensationfor continuing in good
standing, and the consequences of losing the status. But consequences of
failing to do this or that specific thing may not be specified or specifiable,
because what is requiredto fulfill duties of caring,safekeeping,protection, or
maintenance can be expected to vary with circumstances,changes in which
may not be readilyforeseeable.A largeelement of discretionseems inelimin-
able. This makes it difficult to holda trusteeaccountablefor abuseswhile the
status of trustee is retained, and it also means that it is difficultto prove that
the status should be terminated.Yet the only significant sanction against a
trusteemay be withdrawalof that status.Spousalstatusand parentalstatusfit
the trusteemodel, ratherthan the debtormodel, of obligation.This meansthat
it is difficult to hold a spouseor a parentaccountablefor abuse.
Central to the idea of marriage,historically,has been intimate accessto the
persons,belongings,activities, even historiesof one another.More important
than sexual access, marriagegives spouses physical access to each other's
residencesand belongings,and it gives accessto informationabouteach other,
includingfinancialstatus,that otherfriendsand certainlythe neighborsdo not
ordinarilyhave. For all that has been said about the privacy that marriage
protects,what astonishesme is how much privacyone gives up in marrying.
This mutual access appearsto be a central point of marrying.Is it wise to
abdicate legally one's privacy to that extent? What interests does it serve?
Anyone who in fact cohabitswith anothermayseem to give up similarprivacy.
Yet, without marriage,it is possible to take one's life back without encounter-
ing the law as an obstacle.One may even be able to enlist legal help in getting
it back. In this regard,unclosetedlesbiansandgaymen presentlyhave a certain
advantage-which, by the way, "palimony"suits threaten to undermine by
applying the idea of "common law" marriageto same-sex couples (see, e.g.,
Faulknerwith Nelson 1993).
Boswell arguedthat, historically,what has been importantto marriageis
consent, not sexual relations. But, consent to what? What is the point of
marrying?Historically,for the propertiedclasses,he notes, the point of hetero-
sexual marriagewas either dynastic or propertyconcerns or both. Dynastic
concers do not usually figure in argumentsfor lesbian or gay marriage.
14 Hypatia

Although propertyconcerns do, they are among the kinds of concerns often
better detached from marriage.That leaves as a central point of marriage
the legal right of cohabitation and the access to each other's lives that this
entails.
It might still be marriageif sexual exclusivity,or even sex, were not partof
it, but would it still be marriageif rights of cohabitation were not part of it?
Even marriedswho voluntarilylive apartretainthe rightof cohabitation.Many
rightsand privilegesavailableto marriedstoday might exist in a legal relation-
ship that did not involve cohabitation rights (for example, insurancerights,
access to loved ones in hospitals, rights to inherit, and many other rights
presently possessedby kin who do not live with each other). If the right of
cohabitation is central to the concept of legal marriage,it deserves more
critical attention than philosophershave given it.
Among the trappingsof marriagethat have received attention and become
controversial, ceremonies and rituals are much discussed. I have no firm
opinions about ceremoniesor rituals.A far more importantissue seems to me
to be the marriagelicense,which receives hardlyany attention at all. Ceremo-
nies affirminga relationshipcan take place at any point in the relationship.
But a license is what one needs to initiate a legal marriage.To marrylegally,
one appliesto the state for a license, and marriage,once entered into, licenses
spouses to certain kinds of access to each other's persons and lives. It is a
mistake to think of a license as simply enhancing everyone'sfreedom.One
person'slicense, in this case, can be another'sprison.Prerequisitesfor marriage
licenses are astonishinglylax. Anyone of a certain age, not presentlymarried
to someone else, and free of certain communicable diseases automatically
qualifies. A criminal record for violent crimes is, to my knowledge, no bar.
Compare this with other licenses, such as a driver'slicense. In Wisconsin, to
retain a driver'slicense, we submitperiodicallyto eye exams. Some stateshave
more stringent requirements.To obtain a driver'slicense, all drivershave to
passa writtenand a behind-the-wheeltest to demonstrateknowledgeand skill.
In Madison,Wisconsin, even to adopta cat fromthe humanesociety,we have
to fill out a form demonstratingknowledge of relevant ordinances for pet-
guardians.Yetto marry,applicantsneed demonstrateno knowledgeof the laws
pertaining to marriagenor any relationship skills nor even the modicum of
self-controlrequiredto respect anotherhuman being. And once the marriage
exists, the burdenof proof is alwayson those who would dissolve it, never on
those who would continue it in perpetuity.
Furtherdisanalogiesbetween drivers'and marriagelicenses confirmthat in
our society there is greaterconcern for victims of bad drivingthan for those of
bad marriages.Youcannot legallydrive without a license, whereasit is now in
many jurisdictionsnot illegal for unmarriedadultsof whateversex to cohabit.
One can acquirethe statusof spousehoodsimplyby cohabitingheterosexually
for several years, whereas one does not acquire a driver'slicense simply by
 ClaudiaCard 15

drivingfor yearswithout one. Drivingwithout the requisiteskills and scruples

is recognizedas a greatdangerto others and treatedaccordingly.No compara-
ble recognition is given the dangersof legally sanctioning the access of one
person to the person and life of another without evidence of the relevant
knowledge and scruplesof those so licensed. The consequence is that married
victims of partnerbatteringand rapehave less protection than anyone except
children. What is at stake are permanently disabling and life-threatening
injuries,for those who survive. I do not, at present,see how this vulnerability
can be acceptablyremoved from the institution of legal marriage.Measures
could be taken to renderits disastrousconsequences less likely than they are
presentlybut at the cost of considerablestate intrusioninto our lives.
The rightof cohabitation seems to me centralto the questionwhether legal
marriagecan be made an acceptable institution, especially to the question
whether marriagecan be envisagedin such a way that its partnerscould protect
themselves, or be protected, adequately against spousal rape and battery.
Although many states now recognize on paper the crimes of marital rape
and stalking and are better educated than before about marital battering,
the progress has been mostly on paper. Wives continue to die daily at a
dizzyingrate.
Thus I conclude that legalizinglesbian and gay marriage,turninga personal
commitment into a license regulableand enforceableby the state, is probably
a very bad idea and that lesbiansand gay men areprobablybetteroff, all things
considered,without the "option"(and its consequentpressures)to obtain and
act on such a license, despite some of the immediate material and spiritual
gains to some of being able to do so. Had we any chance of success,we might
do better to agitate for the abolition of legal marriagealtogether.
Nevertheless, many will object that marriageprovidesan importantenvi-
ronment for the rearingof children. An appreciationof the conducivenessof
marriageto murderand mayhem challenges that assumption.Historically,
marriageand motherhood have gone hand in hand-ideologically, although
often enough not in fact. That marriagecan provide a valuable context for
motherhood-even if it is unlikely to do so-as an argument in favor of
marriageseems to presupposethat motherhood is a good thing. So let us
considernext whether that is so.

WHY MOTHERHOOD?

The term "mother"is ambiguousbetween a woman who gives birth and a

female who parents,that is, rearsa child-often but not necessarilythe same
woman. The term "motherhood"is ambiguousbetween the experience of
mothers (in either sense, usuallythe second) and a social practice the rulesof
which structurechild rearing.It is the latterthat interestsme here.Justas some
today would stretch the concept of "family"to cover any committed partner-
16 Hypatia

ship, household,or close and enduringnetworkof friends,otherswouldstretch

the concept of "motherhood"to cover any mode of child rearing.That is not
how I understand"motherhood."Just as not every durableintimate partner-
ship is a marriage,not every mode of child rearingexemplifies motherhood.
Historically,motherhood has been a core element of patriarchy.Within the
institutionof motherhood,mother'sprimarycommitmentshave been to father
and only secondarily to his children. Unmarried women have been held
responsible by the State for the primarycare of children they birth, unless
a man wished to claim them. In fact, of course, children are raised by
grandparents, single parents (heterosexual, lesbian, gay, asexual, and so
on), and extended families, all in the midst of patriarchies.But these have
been regardedas deviant parentings, with nothing like the prestige or social
and legal support available to patriarchal mothers, as evidenced in the
description of the relevant "families" in many cases as providing at best
"brokenhomes."
Apart fromthe institution of marriageand historical ideals of the family,it
is uncertain what characteristicsmother-childrelationshipswould have, for
many alternativesare possible. In the good ones, mother-childrelationships
would not be as characterizedas they have been by involuntaryuncompen-
satedcaretaking.Even today,an ever-increasingamountof caretakingis being
done contractually in day-care centers, with the result that a legitimate
mother'srelationshipto her child is often much less a caretakingrelationship
than her mother's relationship to her was. Nor are paid day-care workers
"mothers" (even though they may engage briefly in some "mothering
activities"),becausethey arefree to walk awayfromtheir jobs. Their relation-
shipswith a child maybe no morepermanentor specialto the child than those
of a babysitter.Boswell'shistory The Kindnessof Strangers(1988) describes
centuries of children being taken in by those at whose doorstepsbabies were
deposited, often anonymously.Not all such children had anyone to call
"Mother."Children have been raised in convents, orphanages,or boarding
schools ratherthan in households.Many raisedin householdsare caredfor by
hired help, rather than by anyone they call "Mother."Many children today
commute between separatedor divorcedparents,spendingless time in a single
household than many children of lesbian parents,some of whom, like Leslea
Newman'sHeather,have two people to call "Mother"(Newman 1989). Many
children areraisedby oldersiblings,even in householdsin which someone else
is called "Mother."
My point is not to supportNewt Gingrichby glorifyingorphanagesor other
hired caretakersbut to put in perspectiverhetoric about children'sneeds and
aboutthe ideal relationshipsof children to mothers.Much ink has been spilled
debunkingwhat passesfor "love"in marriage.It is time to considerhow much
of the "love" that children are said to need is no more love than spousal
attachmentshave been. Children do need stable intimate bonds with adults.
 ClaudiaCard 17

But they also need supervision, education, health care, and a variety of
relationshipswith people of a varietyof ages.What the State tends to enforce
in motherhood is the child's access to its mother, which guaranteesnone of
these things, and the mother'sanswerabilityforher child'swaywardness,which
gives her a motive for constant supervision,therebyremovingcertainburdens
from others but easily also endangeringthe well-being of her child if she is ill
supplied with resources. Lacking adequate social or material resources,
many a parent resorts to violent discipline in such situations, which the
State has been reluctant to prevent or even acknowledge. This is what it
has meant, legally, for a child to be a mother's "own":her own is the child
who has legal rights of access to her and for whose waywardness she
becomes answerable, although she is largely left to her own devices for
carryingout the entailed responsibilities.
By contrast,children raisedby lesbian or gay parentstoday are much more
likely to be in relationshipscarefullychosen and affirmedby their caretakers.4
Even though that would no doubt continue to be true oftener of the children
of lesbian and gay parents in same-sex marriagesthan of the children of
heterosexualparents,marriagewould involve the State in defining who really
had the statusof "parent."The State has been willing to grantthat statusto at
most two personsat a time, per child. It gives the child legal rightsof access to
at most those two parties.And it imposes legal accountabilityfor the child's
waywardnesson at most those two parties. Under the present system that
depriveslesbianand gayparentsof spousalstatus,manylesbianand gaycouples
do their best anyway to emulate heterosexual models, which usuallymeans
assumingthe responsibilitieswithout the privileges.5Others I have known,
however, attempt to undermine the assumptionthat parental responsibility
should be concentrated in one or two people who have the power of a child's
happiness and unhappinessin their hands for nearly two decades. Children
raisedwithout such models of the concentration of powermaybe less likely to
reproducepatriarchaland other oppressivesocial relationships.
The "revolutionaryparenting"that bell hooks describes(1984) dilutes the
power of individualparents.Although children retain special affectionalties
to their "bloodmothers,"accountability for children'swaywardnessis more
widely distributed.With many caretakers(such as "othermothers"),there is
less pressureto makeany one of them constantlyaccessibleto a child and more
pressureto make everyone somewhat accessible. With many caretakers,it is
less likely that any of them will get away with prolonged abuse, or even be
tempted to perpetrateit.
In my childhood, many adults looked out for the children of my village. I
had, in a way, a combination of both kinds of worlds.My parents,marriedto
each other, had the legal rights and the legal responsibilitiesof patriarchal
parents. Yet, some of those responsibilities were in fact assumed by
"othermothers,"including women (and men) who never marriedanyone.
18 Hypatia

Because it could alwaysbe assumedthat wherever I roamedin the village, I

would never be amongstrangers,my parentsdid not think they alwaysneeded
to superviseme, although they were also ambivalentabout that, as they would
be legally answerablefor any troubleI caused.I used to dreadthe thought that
we might move to a city, wheremy freedomwouldprobablyhave been severely
curtailed,as it was when we lived in a large,white middle-classurbanenviron-
ment duringWorldWar II. In the village, becauseeveryone assumed(reason-
ably) that someone was watching us, we children often escaped the intensity
of physical discipline that I experienced alone with my mother amid the far
largerurbanpopulation.
There are both worse and better environments that can be imagined for
children than stereotypicalpatriarchalfamilies.Urbanenvironmentsin which
parents must work away from home but can neither bring their children nor
assumethat their children are being watched by anyone are no doubt worse.
Childrenwho have never had effective caretakersdo not makegood caretakers
of each other, either. Feminism today has been in something of a bind with
respect to the so-called postpatriarchalfamily.If both women and men are to
be actively involved in marketsand governmentsand free to become active
membersof all occupations and professions,when, where, and how is child
care going to be done?The solution of many feminists has been, in practice,
for two parents to take turns spending time with the children. There is an
increasing tendency today for parents who divide responsibilities for the
children to pay others to do the child care, if they can affordit, when their turn
comes. To the extent that this works, it is evidence that "mothering"is not
necessaryfor child care. Children who have had effective caretakersmay be
better at taking care of themselves and each other, with minimal supervision
to protect them againsthazardsto life and health, than is commonlysupposed.
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's solution in Womenand Economics(1966) and
Herland(1992) was twofold. On one hand, she would turn child care into one
of the professionsthat everyone with the requisitetalents and motivations is
free to enter.At the sametime, she wouldmakethepublicsafeeven forchildren,
by an ethic that incorporatedaspects of good caretaking. Virginia Held's
FeministMoralityalso suggeststhe latter strategy.A dangerof this strategy,of
course, is instituting paternalismamong adultsbut spelled with an m instead
of a p. Still, the idea of improving the safety of the public environment is
compelling. If it were improvedenough, there might be no need for mother-
hood-which is not to say that children would not need to bond with and be
supervisedby adults.
In FeministMoralityVirginiaHeld maintainsthat the mother-childrelation-
ship is the fundamentalsocial relationship,not in a reductivesense but in the
sense that so much else depends on one's relationshipsto primarycaretakers
(Held 1994, 70). This idea, also urgedby Annette Baier (1994), seems to me
in a certainsense incontrovertibleand its generalappreciationbyphilosophers
 Claudia Card 19

long overdue.The sense in which it seems to me incontrovertibleis that when

one does in fact have a primarycaretakerwho has, if not the power of life and
death, then the power of one's happinessand unhappinessin their hands for
many yearsin the earlystagesof one's life, the influence of that experienceon
the rest of one's life is profound.It seems, for example, to affectone's abilityto
form good relationshipswith others in ways that are extremely difficult to
change, if they are changeableat all. Yet, there is another sense in which the
observationthat the mother-childrelationshipis fundamentalmaybe mislead-
ing. It may be misleading if it suggests that everyone really needs a single
primarycaretaker(or even two primarycaretakers)who has the powerof one's
happiness and unhappiness in their hands for many years during the early
stages of one's life. Perhapspeople need that only in a society that refusesto
take and shareresponsibilitycollectively for its own consciouslyand thought-
fully affirmedreproduction.In such a society,conscientious mothersare often
the best protection a child has. But if so, it is misleading to say that such a
relationship as the mother-child relationship is the, or even a, fundamental
social relationship.It has been even less fundamentalfor manypeople, histor-
ically, than one might think, given how many children have been raised in
institutionsother than householdsor raisedby a varietyof paidcaretakerswith
limited responsibilities.
Becausemothersin a society that generallyrefusesto take collective respon-
sibility for reproductionare often the best or even the only protection that
children have, in the short run it is worth fighting for the right to adopt and
raise children within lesbian and gay households. This is emergencycare for
young people, many of whom are alreadyhere and desperatelyin need of care.
There is little that heterosexualcouples can do to rebel as individualcouples
in a society in which their relationshipis turnedinto a common law relation-
ship after some years by the State and in which they are given the respon-
sibilities and rights of parents over any children they may raise. Communal
action is what is required to implement new models of parenting. In the
long run, it seems best to keep open the option of making parenting more
"revolutionary" along the lines of communal practices such as those
described by bell hooks. Instead of encouraging such a revolution, legal
marriage interferes with it in a state that glorifies marriageand takes the
marriagerelationship to be the only truly healthy context in which to raise
children. Lesbian and gay unions have great potentiality to further the
revolution, in part because we cannot marry.
If motherhood is transcended,the importanceof attending to the experi-
ences and environments of children remains. The "children" if not the
"mothers"in society areall of us.Not each of us will choose motherhoodunder
present conditions. But each of us has been a child, and each futurehuman
survivorwill have childhood to survive.Among the most engagingaspectsof
a majorfeministtreatiseon the institutionof motherhood,Adrienne Rich'sOf
20 Hypatia

WomanBorn (1976), are that it is written from the perspectiveof a daughter

who was mothered and that it is addressedto daughtersas well as to mothers.
This work, like that of Annette Baier,VirginiaHeld, bell hooks, PatriciaHill
Collins, and SaraRuddick,has the potential to focusourattention not entirely
or even especiallyon mothersbut on those who have been (or have not been)
mothered, ultimately, on the experience of children in general. Instead of
finding that the mother-child relationshipprovides a valuable paradigmfor
moral theorizing,even one who has motheredmight find, reflecting on both
her experience as a mother and her experienceof having been mothered,that
motheringshouldnot be necessary,or that it shouldbe less necessarythan has
been thought, and that it has morepotential to do harmthan good. The power
of mothers over children may have been historicallyfar more detrimentalto
daughtersthan to sons, at least in societies where daughtershave been more
controlled, more excludedfromwell-rewardedcareers,and morecompelled to
engage in family service than sons. Such a finding would be in keeping with
the project of drawingon the usuallyunacknowledgedhistoricallycharacter-
istic experiencesof women.
In suggestingthat the experience of being motheredhas greatpotential for
harm to children, I do not have in mind the kinds of concerns recently
expressed by political conservatives about mothers who abuse drugs or are
sexually promiscuous.Even these mothers are often the best protection their
children have. I have in mind the environmentsprovidedby motherswho in
fact do live up to contemporarynormsof ideal motherhoodor even exceed the
demandsof such norms in the degree of attention and concern they manifest
for their children in providing a child-centered home as fully constructedas
their resourcesallow.
Everyone would benefit from a society that was more attentive to the
experiences of children, to the relationshipsof children with adultsand with
each other,and to the conditions underwhich childrenmakethe transitionto
adulthood. Moral philosophy might also be transformedby greaterattention
to the fact that adult experience and its potentialities are significantlycondi-
tioned by the childhoods of adultsand of those children'srelationshipsto (yet
earlier) adults. Whether or not one agrees with the idea that motherhood
offersa valuableparadigmfor moral theorizing,in getting us to take seriously
the significance of the child's experience of childhood and to take up the
standpoint of the "child" in all of us, philosophical work exploring the
significanceof mother-childrelationshipsis doing feminismand moralphilos-
ophy a greatservice.
 Claudia Card 21

NOTES

Thanks to HarryBrighouse,Vicky Davion, VirginiaHeld, SaraRuddick,anonymous

reviewersfor Hypatia,and especiallyto LynneTirrellfor helpful comments and sugges-
tions and to audiences who heard ancestorsof this essay at the Pacific and Central
Divisions of the American PhilosophicalAssociation in 1995.
1. Betty Berzonclaims that her book PermanentPartnersis about "reinventingour
gay and lesbian relationships"and "learningto imbue them with all the solemnityof
marriagewithout necessarilyimitating the heterosexualmodel" (1988, 7), and yet by
the end of the book it is difficultto think of anythingin legal idealsof the heterosexual
nuclearfamilythat she has not urgedus to imitate.
2. Thus I am not an advocate of the equal legal rightsfor children movement as
that movement is presented and criticizedby Purdy(1992), namely, as a movement
advocatingthat childrenhave exactly the samelegal rightsas adults,includingthe legal
right not to attend school.
3. See, for example,Weston (1991), Burke(1993), and Slater (1995). In contrast,
Berzon(1988) uses the languageof partnership,reserving"family"for social structures
based on heterosexualunions, as in chap. 12, subtitled"IntegratingYourFamiliesinto
YourLife as a Couple."
4. An outstandinganthology on the many varietiesof lesbianparentingis Amup
(1995). Also interesting is the anthropologicalstudy of lesbian mothers by Lewin
(1993). Both arerich in referencesto manyresourceson both lesbianandgayparenting.
5. Lewin (1993) finds, for example, that lesbian mothers tend to assume all
caretaking responsibilitiesthemselves, or in some cases share them with a partner,
turning to their families of origin, rather than to a friendshipnetwork of peers, for
additionallyneeded support.

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