The Governance of Organised Crime in Canada

Author(s): James Sheptycki

Source: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 28, No. 4
(Autumn, 2003), pp. 489-516
Published by: Canadian Journal of Sociology
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The Governanceof OrganisedCrime in Canada

James Sheptycki

Abstract:The paperexaminesthe governanceof organisedcrimein Canadaas it developedover the

course of the 1990s. It looks especially at the micro-processesof knowledge constructionabout
organisedcrimegroupsas it was carriedout in the policing sectorin Canadaduringthe period.On
the basis of empirical fieldwork, it describes in detail the process of measuring the threat of
organisedcrime and explores its lacunae.The paperobserves thatthe object of governancethatis
organisedcrime is not all that organisedcrime can be. It argues furtherthat what can be observed
aboutthe governanceof organisedcrime is more governancethroughorganisedcrime.

Resume: Cet article porte sur l'exercice des pouvoirs du crime organise au Canadapendantles
annees 1990. II s'attarde surtout aux microprocessusde la constructionde connaissances sur les
groupes de crime organise que le secteurdu maintiende l'ordre au Canadautilisaitpendantcette
periode.En se basantsur du travailsur le terrain,I'auteurdecriten detail le processusqui consiste
a evaluer la menace de crime organise et en explore les lacunes. II fait remarquerque l'objet de
l'exercice des pouvoirsqu'est le crimeorganise,n'est pas si organis6qu'il pourraitl'etre et que ce
que l'on peut observerau sujet de cet exercice de pouvoirsreleve plutotde l'exercice de pouvoirs
au moyen de crime organise.

Introduction

Organisedcrime is a notoriouslydifficult concept to define. As Dick Hobbs,

one of Britain's leading scholars in the field, noted some time ago, when it
comes to organised crime, "the issue of definition threatens to kill off both
descriptionand debate"(1997, p. 801). Organisedcrime, it can be confidently
asserted, is one of the most contested terms in academic criminology. This is
at least partlybecause "therangeof organizationaland structuralvariationson
this admittedlyambiguoustheme is immense"(ibid. p. 801). And yet, despite

CanadianJournalof Sociology/Cahicrscanadicnsde sociologic 28(4) 2()03 489

 Journalof Sociology
490 Canadian

the evident difficulties of arrivingat a consensusdefinitionof the term,it is "a

traditionalobject of criminology's attention"and "one that has always been
within criminology's speculative horizon"(Pavarini,1994, p. 48, emphasis
added).Duringthe decadeof the 1990s risingconcernswere expressedwithin
the policy makingand governmentalcircles of the OECDcountriesaboutthe
problemof organisedcrime, andespecially transnationalorganisedcrime, and
therewas a consequentefflorescenceof criminologicalworkon the topic (eg.
EdwardsandGill, 2002a and2002b;Beare,2002) thatdid nothingto dispel the
definitionalquagmire.Definitionalvicissitudesnotwithstanding,there was a
markedtendency wherebyorganisedcrime became an object of governance,
and this trendwas, more or less, global.
Thepurposepursuedhereis not to tryandexplainwhy organisedcrimeand
transnationalorganisedcrimebecamemattersof governmentalconcernduring
this period.That would be a muchbiggerundertaking(see Sheptycki2002 for
a widerdiscussionof these issues). Rather,the aim is limitedto describingthe
way in whichthesephenomenaweremadeanobjectof governance.Thispaper
aims to uncoverthe governmentaltechnologiesthathave been broughtto bear
on the fluid, manifoldanddiverserangeof activitiesthatacademiccriminolo-
gists have long struggledto discipline underthe headingof organisedcrime.
It looks especially at the knowledgeprocessesof the policing intelligencesys-
tem and suggests that what we have become accustomedto thinkingof as
"organisedcrime"is, in fact, largely an institutionalconstruction.In simple
terms, the argumentis that organisedcrime is not so much somethinghap-
pening "outthere"in society as it is a productof the institutionalisedthinking
thatgoes on in some of the majorsocial institutionsthatgovernsocial life. As
such, the analysis pursuedhere is of generalinterest to sociologists, since it
casts empiricallight on some specific processesof knowledgeconstructionand
governance.The paperexaminesthe micro-processesof institutionalthinking
about organised crime carried out by police "intelligence analysts" and,
somewhattangentially,looks at severalotherkey institutionalsites wherethe
agenda for the governance of organised crime in Canada was established
duringthe middle years of the 1990s. At issue is the centralityof the role of
state actors.Duringthe decade of the 1990s, the heydayof transnationalneo-
liberalism,the analysis of governancetendedto suggestthat,underconditions
of globalisation, the nation-state was being "hollowed out" (Jessop, 1993;
1994). Turningorganisedcrime into an objectof governancewas one way for
sovereignstate actorsto re-assertthe importanceof the statein the practiceof
governance.But we are getting aheadof ourselves.
The argumentpursuedhere proceedsin a numberof stages. FirstI situate
the discussion within the literatureon governance.I surveywhat is, for me at
least, the key literaturethathas underscoredthe studyof governanceandshow
why a considerationof organised crime would help to furtherinform this
literature.The second and longest partof this paper,gives over to a detailed
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada491

empirical description of the "mentalities"evident in the technologies of

Canadianpolice intelligence systems and their knowledge products. In the
third section the concern is with the governanceof public opinion regarding
organised crime in Canada.Here the focus is on the media presentationsof
organisedcrime in Canadain the relevantperiodandthe constructionof public
opinion via the technology of social surveys.The fourthpartturnsto a consi-
deration of the way that knowledge about the disparate phenomena that
underwrite the concept of organised crime were expressed by elected
politicians and thus affirmed as a governmental project. Following this,
Canadiandevelopmentsare contextualisedin relationto transnationalones in
order to show that the governanceof organised crime in Canadais part of a
much largerprojectof global governance.I end by askingif Canadiansare not
living in microcosm what would be best describedas the transnationalrise of
governance throughorganisedcrime (cf. Simon, 1997).

Governance and organised crime; some initial considerations

In an importantreview of the literatureon governance and crime Russell
Smandych(1999) arguedthat"recentyearshave witnessedan apparenterosion
of state power accompaniedby the rise of many different and new forms of
governancewhich arebeginningto take the place of state law and statejustice
institutions"(p. 1). He pointedto "numerousstudies ... thatprovidedataon the
effect these new and changingformsof governanceare having on individuals,
communities and nation states" (ibid. p. 1). In his contributionto these dis-
cussions David Garland (1999) dwelt on the "limits of governmentality
analysis,"its "terminologicalconfusion"andthe "incompletenessof its genea-
logy" (pp. 27-28). According to him, in engaging with the literature on
governmentalityone does "not find a set of ready-madeanalyses"but rather
"respond[s] to its invitation to take up specific lines of researchin order to
addresscertainproblemsin ourpresent."(p. 28). The governanceof organised
crime is just such a specific line of research.Differencesaside, governmental-
ity scholars are tied togetherby a common interestin Foucault's theorisation
of governmentalpower. Governancein this literaturecan be defined broadly
as the development and implementationof policies for surveillance, control
and maintenanceof populations and territory.As such it requiresa range of
measurementtactics employed within and outside the state in the pursuitof
such aims (Deflem, 1997; Foucault, 1991; Haggerty,2001; Smandych, 1999).
Elsewhere, RichardEricson and Nico Stehr (2000) raised a not un-related
issue. For them the interesting thesis to explore did not so much concern
governance,but ratherthe contradictionsinherentin it since "modernsociety"
was, to all intentsandpurposes,ungovernable.If the notionof governancethat
arose in the modernperiodconcernedthe rationalmanagementof populations
and territory,then the history of modernity could be characterisedby the
492 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

growingdisjuncturebetweentheeverexpandingexpectationsof governmental
purview, and the capacityof agencies of governanceto deliver. The analysis
they pursuedcontainedmanyinterestingfacets.It intersectswith the concerns
of this paperin thatit encouragesscepticalquestionsaboutorganisedcrime as
a category of governance.The expansivenessof the term "organisedcrime"
has contradictoryimplicationsfor governance.On the one handit can be an
awkwardcategoryto governsince, fromtime to time, its capacityto overflow
definitional limits raises challenges based on effectiveness criteria.On the
otherhandthe opposite view may hold;thatthe very vaguenessof the termis
facilitative of institutionbuilding.On this view, periodiccrises broughtabout
by chronic failuresof governanceserves to reinvigorategovernmentallogic.
The themes of fear and anxiety were well expressed in the literatureon
governance,no more so thanwhencrime issues were in focus. Anxieties that
arose out of the conditionsof globalisationmay be assuagedby an appeal to
the efficacy of the powerof the state,whetherit be local or national(andeven
transnational).Hencepopulisttough-on-crimerhetoricremaineda staplein the
linguistic armouryof politiciansof virtuallyevery OECDcountry,as it was in
Canada.It may perforceseem naturaland easy to subsumeorganisedcrime
into such a rhetoricalequation.Crimeis a seriousissue, seriouscrime all the
more so, and organisedcrimejust might be the most seriousof all. Organised
crime representsan interestingproblemof governmentalobjectification.It is
useful and importantto try to understandthe governmentalrationalities
brought to bear on this issue area, not least because, during the 1990s,
organisedcrime assumedsuch importancein public debate.

Police intelligence systems and organised crime

The centralconcernin this paperis withmicro-processesin the governanceof
"organisedcrime."Herethe most importanttechnologiesareembeddedin the
processes of "intelligence-ledpolicing" (Dintino and Martens,1983). Intel-
ligence gatheringis long-practisedwithinpolice organisations,butsuchactivi-
ties gained added presence in the police agencies of the OECD countries
duringthe 1990s (Sheptycki,2003). This was partlyas a resultof the adoption
of new informationand communicationstechnologies(ICT) that gave a new
impetus to the gathering,storing,analysis and disseminationof information
(Chan et al, 2001). The adoptionof ICT, not only in the police sector but in
virtually all large organisations,put a new premium on informationand
knowledge work,but in the police environmentthese changeswere concomi-
tant with new and evolving policing prioritiescentring on the control of
seemingly ever expandingillicit marketsin a varietyof controlledcommodi-
ties (Sheptycki,2002).
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada493

These developments had special implications in the Canadian context

because of the complicated arrangementscircumscribingfederal policing.'
Historically, Canadahas had one federal police agency (the Royal Canadian
MountedPolice). However,the almostinnumerablemunicipalpolice agencies
andtwo provincialpolice forces in OntarioandQuebec,plus othergovernmen-
tal agencies with quasi-police powers (eg. Customs) and private policing
agencies meant that, overall, the Canadianpolice sector was highly complex.
This complexity partlyexplains the establishmentof the CriminalIntelligence
Service Canada(CISC)in 1970. CISC was establishedso as to function as the
central hub of an police intelligence system connecting criminal intelligence
units (CIUs) in all of these other agencies. According to the CISC Annual
Reportfor 1999:
CriminalIntelligenceService Canada(CISC)is an organizationthatprovidesthe facilities to unite
the criminalintelligenceunitsof Canadianlaw enforcementagencies in the fight againstthe spread
of organized crime in Canada. CISC is comprised of a CentralBureau [which] functions on a
nationalscale ... Regularmembersof CISC... currentlyincludethe RoyalCanadianMountedPolice,
the Quebec Police Force,the OntarioProvincialPolice, the Royal NewfoundlandConstabularyand
morethan 120 municipalandregionalpolice departments... CISCalso has associatemembers... and
affiliatemembers,which have investigativeandenforcementpersonnelfromthe privatesectorand
government.[which] total over 255 agencies (CISC, 2000, p. x).

The flow of informationwithin and across the policing sector raises many
issues that have been analysedby sociologists of policing organisationsfrom
a variety of angles (eg. Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Manning 1992, 1997;
Punch, 1998). Whereit concernsthe governanceof organisedcrime in Canada
duringthe 1990s, the concernis how the manufactureof "strategicintelligence
assessments" set priorities and established policies. This is how organised
crime was made an object of governance.At the time of my field researchin
Ottawa the importantdevelopment in this area was Project Sleipnir.

Project Sleipnir- surveyingpolice and measuring organised crime

In 1998 the RCMP took the first steps towards implementing a systematic
analytical method for measuring the threat posed by organised crime.
Christened "Project Sleipnir" this was an attempt to canvass the views of
knowledgeable criminalintelligence practitionersacross the whole Canadian

1. See Mawby, 1990 for a slightly dated, but thorough overview of the development of the
Canadianpolicing infrastructure.See Gill, 2000, especially pages 98-102 and 138-146, for an
account of the changes in the intelligence infrastructurethat took place in Canadaduringthe
1990s.
494 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

policing sector as to the organisedcrime threat.2Sleipnirdeveloped out of

earlier work, started in 1994, when a similar methodology was used for
counter-terroristthreat assessment. The aim of Sleipnir was to produce a
"reliableconsensus"among police intelligence specialists as to the relative
threatposed to Canadiansociety by differentorganisedcrimegroupsacrossall
the regions of the country(from tapedinterview,June29, 2000).
Sleipniremployedthe Delphi surveymethod.The objectiveof virtuallyall
Delphi surveysis the collection and interpretationof informationsuitablefor
decision making where no paradigmof normalscience reigns. It is perhaps
worthnotingthatDelphi refersto the hallowedsite of the most reveredoracle
in ancientGreece where forecastsand advice from gods could be had via the
medium of an oracle. The term might thereforesuggest that the method that
goes underits nameis an occult practice,butthis wouldbe wrong.The Delphi
methodaims to make the best of less thanperfectknowledge.It is a structured
process for collecting and distilling knowledge from a groupof experts by
means of a series of questionnairesinterspersedwith controlled opinion
feedback.It is a communicationdevice thatfacilitatesthe formationof group
judgementamong experts.It was first used at the RAND (shortfor Research
and Development)Corporationin the late 1940s to studythe broadsubjectof
inter-continentalwarfareon behalf of the US military.
In 1959 researchersat the RAND publisheda paperon "TheEpistemology
of the Inexact Sciences," which provided a philosophical basis for the
technique(Fowles, 1978). This paperarguedthat, in fields that have not yet
developedto the point of having scientific laws, expertopinionoffers a useful
guide. The problemis how to use this expertknowledgeand,specifically, how
to combine the testimonyof a numberof expertsinto a single useful statement
or expression of commonly held knowledge. The developers of the Delphi
methodrecognised humanjudgementand expertiseas legitimate and useful,
but also that individual experts may suffer from biases, while face-to-face
group meetings may suffer from "follow the leader"tendencies. Moreover,
because of the social needs to "save face" both individualsand groups of
experts may exhibit a reluctance to abandonor modify previously stated
opinions, even when presentedwith good reasons for doing so. The Delphi
methodis one way to garer such expertknowledgewhile controllingfor these
problems.

2. Sleipniris a creature from Norse Mythology.It is the name of Odin's horse who was lent to
Hermodon his unsuccessfuljourneyto the underworldto recoverthe soul of Balderwho had
be slain in an act of deviousnessperpetratedby the troublemakerLoki.Reportedlythis project
name was generatedby a randomprocessand was not the resultof deliberatechoice.
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada495

Sleipnirwas a textbookperfect applicationof the Delphi method;it was an

exercise in groupcommunicationamong a panel of geographicallydispersed
expertson organisedcrime groupswithinthe Canadianpolice sector (Criminal
Analysis Branch, 2000). In general, the technique requires a series of ques-
tionnaires, sent either by mail or via computerisedcommunications systems,
to a pre-selected groupof experts. Such questionnairesare designed to elicit
and develop individual responses to the problems posed - in the Sleipnir
application,to do with groupsof active criminals- and to enable the experts
to refine their views as theirelaboratelyorganised,mediated,but nevertheless
collective "groupthink"progresses.The main point behindthe Delphi method
is to provide anonymity and controlled feedback to respondents in the
productionof quantifiableknowledge aboutthe problem area under scrutiny.
In the case of ProjectSleipnir,this was achieved by a two-step process which
used questionnairessent out to various experts who provided their individual
judgements about a set of attributes pertaining to organised crime. The
responses from the first survey were compiled and analysed by the project
officer and then revised questionnaires were again sent out. The second
instrumentincluded with it a synopsis of the first set of responses. In the
second survey respondentswere asked to consider the initial feed-back to the
questionnaire and either reconsider or defend their own views. The first
Sleipnirsurvey was conductedin 1998, the second in 1999 and analysis of the
two surveys was completed in early 2000.
Who were the people tasked with completing the survey instrument?How
many people did so? What kinds of questions were asked about the threat
posed by organisedcrimeandhow did they evolve throughthe Delphi process?
These are the questions that any social scientist would be interested to ask
about the applicationof this method. According to the project supervisor,the
first national survey was sent to "in excess of 200 people" across Canadain
1998. In interview he reportedthat the list of recipients primarily included
members of the RCMP criminal intelligence programme, including both
strategicintelligence analysts and criminal investigators. Also included were
some criminal intelligence personnel in other Canadianpolice organisations
and "selected other people well known for their expertise in dealing with
organised crime"(from taped interview June 29, 2000). Additionally, copies
of thesurvey were sent to the Departmentof Justice andthe Solicitor General's
Department"justto make surewe were not raising hackles"(ibid.). According
to the project supervisorthe response rate was about 25%, which yielded
approximately50 completed questionnaires.This was said to be quite a good
response rate. According to the project supervisor:
"Iaskedpeople to cut themselves out if they didn'thave sufficientexpertise ... I hadquite a number
of people call me and say 'look I've only been doing this for a year and I really don't think I know
496 Canadian Journal of Sociology

enough to be able to help you.' I was interestedin gettingpeople who were interestedenough in
whatthey were doing thatthey would wantto participatein this. Thatthey could see the potential
value of it and would wantto say theirpiece becausethose arethe people who arepayingattention
to the problem. So there is a self-selection process happeningthere that seems to work out
reasonablywell; judging from the namesof the people who came backto me and what I knew of
them"(from tapedinterview,June29, 2000).

Some social scientistswouldrightlyraiseeyebrowsaboutthisself-selection

process. There seems little doubtthatthe two-stepDelphi methodproduceda
scientifically reliable methodof threatassessment.Thatis, it seems likely that
the communityof experts questionedwould reliablyreturnthe same sorts of
answersto the same sorts of questionstime aftertime. However,it is possible
to ask questionsaboutthe criterionvalidityof the measure.Criterionvalidity
relates to the extent to which the measure(in this case the "threat"posed by
identifiedcrime groups)accuratelyportraysthe entiretyor the phenomenonin
question.It is possible thatthe communityof expertssurveyedoperatedwithin
a narrowoperationalambit therebylimiting the understandingof the "orga-
nised crime problem."This is not to argue that the organisedcrime groups
identifiedby ProjectSleipnircannotbe said to constitutepart of a problemof
organised crime in Canada.It is merely to suggest that, given the (possibly)
narrowswathof expertisetappedinto in this Delphisurvey,the measuremight
miss out on crucial facets of the problem and thereforelack an element of
scientific validity due to sample bias. Given the circumscribednatureof my
researchaccess and the closed natureof the communityof police organised
crime expertsit is somewhat difficultjudge this matteras it relatesto Project
Sleipnir.What is possible to say is that, without a doubt,the productof the
Sleipnir methodology represented the collective knowledge of a selected
communityof experts.
What were these experts asked? Sleipnir progresseda set of "weighted
attributes"for the measurementof the relativethreatposedto Canadiansociety
by a variety of criminal groups. The initial nationalsurveyput forwarda list
of 19 "attributes"of organisedcrime groupedin alphabeticalorder.Respon-
dents were encouraged to think critically about these items and either
recommendtheir inclusion or exclusion from the second stage and to rank
them as to orderof importance.Respondentswere also encouragedto suggest
other"attribute"indicatorsof their own.
The iterativeDelphi processresultedin a rankorderedlist of attributesand
theirattendantoperationaldefinitions.It wouldbe too involved to describein
detail the Delphi process relating to the Sleipnir surveys and it is simply
asserted here that Project Sleipnir was an attempt to inductively develop
operationaldefinitions of terms for measuringthe relativethreatof organised
criminalgroups.The list of termsthatresultedfromthis processis revealing:
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada497

1. corruption- the continual efforts to corruptpublic figures, representa-

tives of the justice system and business leaders through the practices of
illicit influence, exploitationof weaknessand blackmail;also the ability to
place organisedcriminalsin sensitive positions;
2. violence - a clear willingnessto use developedexpertisein the application
of violence and intimidationthroughthreats of violence to further any
organisationalobjective;
3. infiltration - continualefforts to gain a footholdwithinlegitimate public
and private institutions,organisations,and businesses for the purposes of
money laundering,and the pretenceof propriety;the facade of legitimacy
is used to protect and conceal criminal enterprises,and for intelligence
gathering;
4. expertise - the use of expertise to enhance their abilities to commit
criminalactivities, such as the acquisitionof expertisein chemistry,money
laundering,or the use of weaponry;
5. sophistication - operationsdisplayan abilityto develop andemploy com-
plex methods in such areasas communications,technology, asset manage-
ment, political/judicialfunction and penetrationof enforcementagencies;
6. subversion - a clear willingness andexpertiseto subvertany of society's
legislated procedures and laws for their own ends through corruption,
intimidation,violence ormanipulationof law enforcement,government,the
courtsorothercontrolbodies such as commissionsandregulatoryagencies;
7. strategy - the intent of organisedcriminalsto maintainor increase their
size, sphere of operationsand influence, and so maintainor increase the
power and influence which result from the accumulationof wealth;
8. discipline - the enforcedpracticesof coercing obedience which hold the
organisation'sstructuretogether,often characterisedby fear and violence,
carriedout with ruthlessnessand withoutregardfor life or property;
9. insulation - the mainfiguresprotectthemselvesfromprosecutionthrough
the use of subordinates,fronts and corruption;
10. intelligence use - the intelligenceandcounter-surveillancecapabilitiesof
organised criminals which is used to defend themselves against law
enforcementand rival groups, and to identify new targets;
11. multiple enterprises - illicit activities are diversified, with key compo-
nents being control and profit;
12. mobility - a willingness and ability to move and operate criminal
enterprises across provincial, national and internationalboundaries and
jurisdictions;
13. stability - the stability over time of the organisational structure and
personnel of criminalorganisations;
14. scope - the geographicsphereof operationsandinfluenceof the organised
crime group;
 Journalof Sociology
498 Canadian

15. monopoly - controlover one or more specific criminalactivities within

a geographicareaof operations,withno tolerancefor competition;does not
preventpartnershipsof profitableconveniencebetweenor amongorganisa-
tions; violence or intimidationare the usual methodsused to establishor
maintainmonopoly;
16. group cohesiveness - strong bonds are fostered at both individual to
individualand individualto organisationlevels in orderto createcriminal
solidarityand commonprotection.The bondscan be createdthroughsuch
factorsas commonbackgrounds,bloodrelationships,financialrelationships
and geographic origins; often institutedthroughrites of initiation and
"compelled"criminalacts of loyalty;
17. continuity - the continuity over time of criminal activities as well as
practiceswhich supportthose activities;
18. links to other organised crime groups - links to otherorganisedcrime
groups within Canadaand internationally;
19. links to criminal extremist groups - links to criminal extremists or
terrorists.

ProjectSleipnirproduceda threatmeasurementbased on the above set of

"attributes"and the assignmentof appropriatevalues for each. What is im-
portantto draw out is the assumptionembedded in the above definitional
universe.Here organisedcrime is understoodas somethingoutsidethe social
body. Organisedcriminals infiltratelegitimate businesses, legitimate busi-
nesses do not engage in criminal acts for themselves. Organisedcriminals
corrupt public officials; public officials are not corrupt for themselves.
Organisedcrime is contagionthat, by use of violence and underits own dis-
cipline, worksto subvertnormalsocial life andturnit to criminalends. But it
is not organisationcrime and so, for example, the inadequateenforcementof
health and safety legislation or the inappropriatetreatment of hazardous
materials is not, despite any illegality this may entail or harmit may cause,
organisedcriminalviolence. The assumptionbuiltintothe SleipnirProjectwas
that organised crime is, in essence, Mafia-type crime. It is possible to
challenge this narrowview. For example, thereis a long historyof academic
writing that argues that the "crimes of the powerful"- of business and
political elites - is also partof the organisedcrimephenomenon,butit is not
anywherein evidence in the SleipnirProject(eg. Carson,1982;, 1992;Pearce
and Snider, 1995;PearceandWoodiwiss, 1993;Rawlinson2002; Sutherland,
1983; Woodiwiss, 2001). We shall returnto this point in the conclusion.
The resultsof subsequentsurveyscarriedout using the definitionsarrived
at throughthe Delphi surveys were chartedon matrixesused for systematic
comparisonof organisedcrimegroups,thusproducinga "relativemeasurement
of threat."Groupsbeing comparedcould be listed along the horizontalaxis of
 of OrganisedCrimein Canada499
TheGovernance

such a matrix and the nineteen rankorderedattributesalong the vertical axis.

Such a matrix could be filled with the respective values for each attributefor
each group. According to RCMP documents which detail the use of the
Sleipnir model: "[t]his allows the data to be presented and compared in a
concise and comprehensiveway, and makes it possible to sort the groupsinto
rank order"(CriminalAnalysis Branch, 2000, p. 4-5). The systematic appli-
cation of the above terminology produceda common calculus for use in the
police sector across Canada.This made possible the measurementof threat
attributedto organisedcriminalityin Canada.Accordingto the architectsof the
Sleipnir matrix, this "is the most comprehensive and transparentmethod we
now have to presentrecommendationsand supportingintelligence in a concise
manner, and so inform the deliberationsof senior managerssetting priorities
in our efforts against organized crime" (ibid. p. 5).
The Sleipnir methodology is an exemplar of the "mentality"- in the
Foucauldiansense - held by police experts who specialise in the governance
of organisedcrime. It is difficult to faultthe rigourwith which the participating
governmental programmersapproachedthe task of measurement, or their
attentionto detail. Having said that,the measurementof somethinglike "orga-
nised crime"almost invariablyprovokes questions that are difficult to settle.
The official answers can be got at throughan examination of the authorised
pictureof organisedcrime in Canada.Confidentialityand securityrestrictions
preclude a discussion of the portraitsof particularorganisedcrime groupsand
the measurementof their relative threatcapacities as providedin the Sleipnir
matrixes. However, by looking at the content of CISC Annual Reports, it is
possible to say, in general terms, what priorities emerged as a result of the
measurementpracticesdescribedabove. But beforesaying somethingaboutthe
contents of these reports(publishedfor public consumption)it is necessary to
make one importantcaveat. The CISC annualreportsarecompiled on the basis
of longstanding administrative reporting mechanisms which the Sleipnir
methodology refined, extended and codified. The results of Sleipnir surveys
themselves were not included in CISC publications.Regardless, both Project
Sleipnir and the CICS annual reports exemplify the same rationality about
organised crime in Canada since they are mutual products of the same
mentality.
Looking at the table of contents for the AnnualReportof OrganizedCrime
in Canada (CISC, 2000) is immediately revealing. This lists the CISC "na-
tional priorities"for thatyear as being: Asian organisedcrime;east European-
based organisedcrime; traditionalorganisedcrime;outlaw motorcycle gangs;
and the sexual exploitationof children.It also lists several "emergingissues":
contrabandsmuggling(involving aboriginal-basedorganisedcrimegroups,the
illegal movement of firearms, and organised crime groups operating in
Maritimeports);illegal gambling;illegal migration;technological crime; and
 Journalof Sociology
500 Canadian

the criminalthreatassociatedwith Y2K. In conversationand correspondence

about this document, and previous reports going back to 1990, it became
evidentthat"prioritiesdo not changeall thatmuch,"butthey do "evolve over
the years into more specific grouptargetsand [as a resultof the] additionof
certain emerging issues" (written correspondence,June 2000). Thus Asian
based organised crime groups had been a priority since 1996 and east
European-basedgroups since 1995 (when the annual report was largely
devoted to this phenomenon).As might be expected, "traditional"organised
crime groups featured as a priorityevery year duringthe 1990s as, indeed,
were outlawmotorcyclegangs. A varietyof activitieswere also given moreor
less consistent levels of interest during the course of the decade: drug
trafficking,counterfeitingandillegal migration.Otherissues, suchas Y2K and
the sexual exploitationof children,were given sporadicattention.
It is perhapsnot surprisingto find that outlaw motorcycle gangs were a
perennial concern within the police community during the course of the
decade. This is symptomaticof the assumptionthatorganisedcrime is limited
to gang-typeor group-typeactivities.Not only were outlawmotorcyclegangs
a perennialconcern,but they consistentlyretainedthe highest threatratings.
This consistencyis probablymorereflectiveof the amountof police resources
dedicatedto monitoring"outlaw"motorcyclistsandless the resultof an accu-
ratemeasureof theirobjectivethreatto Canadiansociety. This is not to argue
that membersof such groups do not participatein (sometimes very serious)
criminality,or that such crime is not productiveof social harm. Persistent
newspaperreportageabout"turfwars"betweenrivalcriminalgangsin Quebec
throughoutthe 1990s, gave such groupsan undeniablyhigh public profile.
However,thereareothertypes of crime - white collar crimes and crimes
againstthe environment,for example - which historicallyhave not had the
same amountof police resourcesdedicatedto them. CISC annualreportsdo
from time to time recognise that crimes againstmajoreconomic enterprises
constitutea significantthreatto Canadiansociety; witness the 1999 mention
of Canada'snew diamondmining industryunderthe heading of "emerging
issues." Public sector corruptionand illegal activity in privatesectoroccupa-
tions such as the law and accountancyare also mentionedin these documents
from time to time. Such documentsalso make occasional mention of such
things as environmentalcrime. However, the accent is almost always on the
traditional"underworld" of organisedcrime.While attentionto manytypes of
organisedcrimeproblemsporadicallyappear,attentionto "theusualsuspects"
remainsconstantand is always highly visible (Gill, 2000). It should not be at
all controversialto say that the pattern of constancy in the pictures of the
organisedcrime in Canadaowes as much to the preoccupationsof the narrow
groupof governmentalprogrammerswho attemptits measurementas it does
to any objective threatin the "realworld."
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada501

The media and public representations of organised crime

Interviews with police intelligence specialists and analysis of criminalintelli-

gence "strategic product" shows that the micro-technologies of police in-
telligence analysis are aimed predominantlyat "traditional"organisedcrime,
that is: covens of criminalsknown more for violence than for corruptionand
whose criminal conspiracies continue over time. Disorganised activities in
criminal markets,or crimes by those more suave and less violent seem a less
prominenttarget.But the microcircuitsof police intelligence are not the only
system for the production and distributionof knowledge about organised
crime. In order for the product of police intelligence systems to maintain a
semblance of balance and objectivity, it is necessary that police knowledge
about organised crime coheres with knowledge producedby and for "public
opinion."
Although somewhattangentialto the primaryconcern of this paper(which
is to illuminate the micro-processesof knowledge work on organised crime
that are internalto the policing institution),analysis of media representations
of organised crime is undeniablyan importantelement in the governance of
organisedcrime. This is because the way thatorganisedcrime phenomenaare
framed by and for public opinion sustains the plausibility of the knowledge
products that flow out of the police intelligence system. Organised crime
phenomena are multitudinous but, as has been demonstrated, the official
picture is rathermore singular. In order for the official image to not seem
incredibleit must exist in a wider knowledge environmentthatis conducive to
it. So how were images of organisedcrime presentedin the Canadianmedia
during this period?Fortunately,the Nathanson Centrefor the Studyof Orga-
nized Crime and Corruption conducted an environmental scan of media
representationsof these issues for the relevant period (Beare, and Ronderos,
2001). This studyprovidedan analysis of some twenty-eightthousandarticles
publishedbetween January1995 andMarch2001. These articleswere selected
on the basis of a word searchfor twenty-onetermsthatrelate or correspondto
organisedcrime. NineteenCanadianprintsources(newspapersandmagazines)
provided the source materialfor this sample.
Severalinterconnectedthemesareevidentin the NathansonCentreanalysis.
Firstly, media coverage did not correspondto increases or decreases in the
amount of organised crime activity in Canadanor did it seem to particularly
correspondto the relativeprevalenceof particulartypes. Neitherdid the media
coverage concentrateon forms of crime most harmfulto Canadiansociety.
Instead, and perhapspredictably, the media tended to concentrateon high-
interesttopics that sell newspapers.It is thushardlysurprisingthatthe content
analysis picked up on the media fascination with motorcycle gangs. Three
events in Quebec precipitatedmore or less sustainedmedia attention across
502 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

Canadaaboutthisorganisedcrimephenomenonduringtheperiod.These were:
1) the accidental car-bombkilling of eleven year old Daniel Desrochersin
1995;2) politicalcontentionbetweentheprovincialgovernmentin Quebecand
the federalgovernmentover legislation aimed at curbing"bikerviolence" in
1996-97; and 3) the shooting of Michel Auger, a journalistin Montr6alin
2000. The report'sauthorstheorisedthat, once a particulartopic has demon-
stratednewsworthiness(ie. the ability to sell papers), it creates a cycle that
more or less guaranteessignificantmedia exposure.
When a topic has demonstratedits potentialto grabheadlines,it is likely
to become politicised. The political and jurisdictionalcontestationover the
bikerissue in 1996-97 was at least partlyfuelled by the predispositionin press
reportage to editorialise about the desperate need for additional policing
powersin orderto combatOMGs(outlawmotorcyclegangs).Accordingto the
NathansonCentreanalysis, even with successfulprosecutionsunderexisting
law, press attentiontendedto emphasisethe need for more legislation. Loud
cries for legislative innovationin the editorialpages of Canada'snewspapers
meant that politicians of every hue and stripe, in every region, and at every
level of government were drawn to debates about the issue. This may be
becausepoliticiansandgovernmentalpersonnelsimplycannotavoidcomment
on issues that achieve such intense media exposure, whetherindividualsare
cynically motivatedto make personalpolitical capital or not. Regardless of
individualmotivation,in passing comment,even when it is banal,politicians
furtheramplifyawarenessof the issue. This cycle has long beenrecognisedby
academic criminologists. It has been aptly described as "crime-wave re-
portage"which leads to "deviancyamplification"and "moralpanic"(Cohen,
and Young, 1973).
Academics workingon organisedcrime topics in Canadareportedfeelings
of greatfrustrationregardingtheirinterfacewith the media which invariably
reducedsubtle and detailed accountsof organisedcrime phenomenainto the
dichotomous categories of good-guys and bad-guys. In some cases, when
academic knowledge did not fit the guiding presuppositions of media
reportage,academiccriminologistslaidchargesof deliberatemisrepresentation
(NathansonCentreNewsletterNo. 5, Summer2002, pp. 21-23). The produc-
tion of knowledge about organised crime that takes place across various
institutionsis not deliberatelyengineeredin the mannerof a conspiracy. In
whatKarlPopperwas happyto call the "opensociety,"the differencesof view
held by personneloperatingwithinmajorsocial institutionsmeanthatconflict
is a featurethe governmentalisation,and never more so thanwhen the object
of governanceconcernsphenomenasuch as organisedcrime.
So, how do members of the public understandthe meaning of the term
"organised crime"? It might be supposed that the processes previously
 The Governanceof OrganisedCrime in Canada 503

describedmechanisticallyproducea broadconsensus aboutorganisedcrime.

However, even media representationscaptured and presented elements of
ambivalence in public perceptions of the issue. As Jonathan Simon well
observed, "while media representationof crime is clearly a factor in the
politics [andgovernance]of crime, it providesjust as much of a questionas an
answer"(1997, p. 175). Thus, for example, while police in British Columbia
were interestedto portraythe cultivation of marijuanaas a major organised
crime activity, press coverage could not avoid a strong current of opinion
supporting cannabis decriminalisation and suspicions about the supposed
dominanceof organisedcrime groupsin "homegrow operations."3Even folk
devils such as "outlaw"bikers had spokespersonsand sympathisers.It is not
possible to gauge public perceptions of organised crime only by looking at
media accounts. That is why the results of a survey undertakenby a private
polling organisationon behalf of the Solicitor General'soffice in 1998 are so
interesting.
There are few surveysof the generalpublic on this topic, and none specific
to Canadauntil 1998. The telephone survey of a sample of 1,509 adults was
conducted between October 28 and November 5 1998 and the analysis of
results was returnedto the Solicitor General'soffice on December 7 thatyear.
The marginof errorwas said to be 2.7%, but since full details of the sampling
were not made generally available it is not possible to confirm or challenge
this.4 The results reported were not unexpected or particularly counter-
intuitive. They are summarisedin the following table:

3. Law enforcementpersonneland governmentalprogrammersalike often stressedthat, when it

comes to drug enforcement, the main aim was against "harddrugs,"especially heroin and
cocaine. It is interesting to note, therefore,that in the mid-1990s in Canada,63% of all drug
related arrestspertainedto cannabis,while cocaine relatedoffences accounted for 22% and
heroin 2.8%. Estimatesof drug use among the generalpopulationat the time were that about
7.4% of the population15 years of age or older used cannabisat least once in any given year
while only 1%were reckonedto have used cocaine. Duringthe 1990s, heroinwas used so rarely
andby such a small population,thatthe best estimatesforusage wereover the entirelife course,
notjust the previousyear.In the mid-1990s, it was estimatedthata mere0.5%of the population
had ever used heroin.Faced with such statistics,it seems that,if real social harmis associated
with "harddrugs,"Canadadid not have a statisticallylarge drugproblem.It is also clear that
most policing activity was targetedat enforcingcannabisprohibition.
4. The discussion pursuedhere is based on a summarydocumentof the resultsof the survey that
was circulatedin the policing sector.A wordof cautionis perhapsin order.The polling firmthat
undertookthis survey was (and remains as of this writing)very reputable.However, in the
absence of sustainedindependentmethodologicalscrutinythe reliabilityand validity of the
survey findings remainsa matterof surmise.
504 Canadian Journal of Sociology

Table 1. The Canadian Public's Conception of Organised Crime

CrimeType Conceptionof OrganisedCrime

Definitely an Possibly an Not an example

example of O.C. example of O.C. of O.C.

High-level DrugTrafficking 88% 11% 1%

Drug Importing 86% 12% 1%
Illegal GamblingOperations 64% 31% 5%
Selling Drugson the Street 60% 33% 7%
Money Laundering 58% 35% 6%
Alcohol and TobaccoSmuggling 51% 41% 8%
ImmigrantSmuggling 42% 44% 14%
CarTheft 41% 49% 10%
Cheatingon the stock market 26% 52% 22%
Illegal Disposal of Toxic Waste 25% 46% 30%

Thistabulationis notincongruentwiththe issues highlightedby the Sleipnir

process. However,it may do to note that,fromthe point of view of the police
intelligence expert,the table also betraysa degreeof ignoranceon the partof
the generalpublic since such intelligenceofficers considermoney laundering
to be centralto what constitutesthe most serious organisedcrime. Neverthe-
less, a clearhierarchyof expectationsaboutorganisedcrimeis exhibitedin this
tabulationand it is broadlyisomorphicwith the police view. Not only do the
resultsof this surveyindicatethatCanadianpublicopinionon the whole counts
drug importationas organisedcrime, it also does not see the (possibly much
more harmful)illegal dumpingof toxic wasteas such. And why is therea total
absenceof public official corruptionin the reportedsurveyresults?Mightthat
not count as "organisedcrime,"at least in the eyes of some citizens? Perhaps
they were not even asked.
The Canadianssurveyedevidentlyplaced a special emphasison the role of
the federalgovernmentin the responseto organisedcrime problems.Report-
edly more than 90% of survey respondentsendorsed the view that the
government of Canada should spend more money on "combating (sic)
organisedcrime."Fightingorganisedcrime was deemedto be moreimportant
than: foreign aid (85%), new equipmentfor the military (80%), improving
living standardsfor Native Canadians(66%);Pay Equity(64%);or reducing
the nationaldebt (53%). Only one public sectorissue earnedhigherspending
priorityratingsand that was healthcare.
The degree of congruencebetweenpublic opinion aboutwhat constitutes
organisedcrime andthe standardproductsof police intelligencesystems begs
questionsaboutthe relationshipbetweenthese differentforms of knowledge.
To what extent do preconceptionsaboutwhat constitutes"realpolice work"
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada505

emanate from that occupational group and to what extent are they part of a
broaderset of culturalexpectations?Are police intelligence systems determi-
native of the culturalconstructionof images of organisedcrime, or visa versa?
Mightthe relationshipbetweenthe two be overdeterminedby otherunspecified
factors? This is difficult to unravel. What is revealed here is that there is a
widely shared common sense about what organised crime is, and that this
common sense is articulatedboth aroundthe kitchen table and in the police
intelligence conference room. The isomorphism of these views might be
enough, or nearly enough, to explain why corporate "scandals"- such as
those surroundingcontemporaryeconomic crimes of powerful groups- the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the energy giant Enron,
WorldComandothers- do notpuncturethe conceptualuniverseof organised
crime discourse. These cases largely remain"corporatescandals,"and hardly
ever come to be seen as matters of organised criminality, but they do raise
questions about the governanceof organisedcrime.

The governance of organised crime in Canada

Analysis of the survey resultsjust summarisednoted that "the two offences

closest to white collar crime were the least likely to be considered as an
example of organised crime" and suggested that "public legal education is
necessary if the public is to understandthat organized criminal activities are
not restricted to the importation and distribution of illegal drugs." This
admonitionis all the more telling, because whatreally standsout is the overall
degree of congruence between public expectations about what constitutes
organisedcrimeandthe expressedandconsideredview of criminalintelligence
experts. Excepting the relative obscurity of "money laundering,"which for
many citizens seemed to appearas an esoteric category not readily recognis-
able as being related to organised crime, both the criminal intelligence
specialist and the general citizen saw almost eye-to-eye on the problem of
organised crime. In that view, the traditionalimage of criminal gangs, and
closely analogous criminalphenomena,dominated.
So too it was with elected politicians. A press release issued in 1998, and
announcingthe resultsof anotherstudyconductedfor the FederalGovernment
by an independentcontractresearcher,stated:
A majorstudy of the impactof organizedcrime confirmsthatthe governmentis on the righttrack
in its development of a national strategy to fight organized crime (Solicitor General Canada,
Highlightsof the OrganizedCrimeImpactStudy, August 24, 1998)

According to this pressrelease, the studyconcluded thatthe drugtradehad

the greatest impact on Canadian society; other crimes listed as having
particularlyhigh costs to society were economic crime (specifically securities
506 CanadianJournalof Sociology

and telemarketingfraud),immigrantsmuggling,andcounterfeitproducts(ie.
intellectual property theft). This press release suggested that there was "a
strongand growingnationalconsensuson the overalldirectionfor combatting
organizedcrime"(ibid., emphasisadded).
Membersof the public could be forgiven the belief thatthe governmental
programmershadsucceededwheregenerationsof academiccriminologistshad
failed. Not only was therean apparentconsensuson whatconstitutedorganised
crime, therealso seemed to be agreementon whatto do aboutit. However,on
closer inspection, accordance on "the problem of organised crime" was
overstated.Considerthe closing paragraphof the actualreportsummarisedin
the above quotedpress release from the SolicitorGeneral:

OC[organisedcrime]in Canadais notjust somethingengagedin by "Mafia"stylegroupsin specific

sectors. It is not just "drugsand thugs," and its impactgoes farbeyond the terrorand casualties
incurredduringsuch high profileeventsas the "bikerwar."Theorganizedcriminalpursuitof profit
needs to be recognized in all its forms along with its variedconsequences.These consequences
rangefromreadilyrecognizedviolence andeconomicloss to the less easily quantifiedbut no less
importantenvironmental,social health and safety implications of some OC-relatedactivities
(Porteous,1998, p. 21).

The OrganizedCrimeImpactStudyitselfemphasisedthateconomicorganis-
ed crimeincludedactivitiessuchas bidriggingandpricefixing andstatedthat:

Recognizing economic or "white collar"crime as a significant OC activity acknowledgesthat

organizedcriminalactivityis not confinedto traditional"Mafia"or visible and ethnic minorities.
Organizedcrimeencompassesanyorganizedprofit-motivated criminalactivitiesthathavea serious
impact(ibid. p. 12).

It went on to note that "therehas been a generaldecline over the past five
years in the numberof law enforcementinvestigationsand chargesrelatedto
economic crime"(ibid.p. 12). Withregardto fraud,andeconomiccrimemore
generally, the study reported that "[e]nforcementofficials agree that the
decline in investigations and charges relating to economic crime does not
reflect a decline in criminalactivity;ratherit is a resultof declining enforce-
ment resourcesand capacitydirectedtowardsthe problem"(ibid. p. 12).
The study highlightedthe relative lack of resourcesdevoted to economic
organisedcrime,butit placedeven greateremphasison anothernon-traditional
organisedcrime relatedactivity, crimes againstthe environment:
environmentalcrime,particularlythe improperstorageor disposalof hazardouswaste,is assessed
as second only to illicit drugsin impacton Canada.Theprimaryimpactsof this OC-relatedactivity
are on the health of Canadiansand the environmentin general.Much more effort needs to be
directedtowardsassessingthe scope and impactof this OC-relatedactivity(ibid. p. 2).

In 1998 the Canadianfederalgovernmentwas committedto workingtowards

a national action plan. In announcingthe findings of the OrganizedCrime
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada507

Impact Study, the Solicitor General remarkedin a speech to the Canadian

Association of Chiefs of Police that:

Organizedcrime is the federalgoverment"s NumberOne law enforcementpriority... [because]

in a recentpoll, 91 percentof Canadiansidentifiedorganizedcrime as a seriousproblem... thatis
why the governmenthas been workingin close cooperationwith the police and the provincesover
the last four years, taking a numberof steps to strengthenthe fight againstorganizedcrime.

He went on to argue that

To combatthe menace of organizedcrime,we need nothingshortof a strategicpartnershipbetween

the federalgovernment,the provincesandthe territories,andthe police community,so thatwe can
bringourcombinedweightto bear.If we succeed, we will have forgeda partnershipunprecedented
in Canada,and will take the fight against organizedcrime to a new level" (The Hon, Andy Scott,
formerSolicitorGeneral,in a statementto the CanadianAssociationof Chiefs of Police, 93rdAnnual
Conference, August 24, 1998)

The national action plan to which he referredwas described as "work in

progress,"aimed at creatinga "seamlessnet of greaternationalco-ordination."
Hearkeningback to the earlierdiscussionof the variegatednatureof the police
sectorin Canada,it can be seen thatthe concernaboutorganisedcrimeprovided
a useful issue areafor strengtheningthe capacitiesof the Canadianfederalstate,
andindeedof the statecapacitiesat all levels of governancein Canada.Concern
about organised crime, and its sister menace transnationalorganised crime,
allowed for the reassertionof the modernistWeberiandictum,which claims for
the state a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the governance of a
specifiedpopulationanddefinedterritory.The world"wentglobal"in the 1990s
and there was much talk about the relative decline in the power of the state.
Looked at in terms of domestic politics, the development of the organised
crime problematicprovided an occasion to increase the power of one depart-
ment of the state, the keystone of modernexecutive government:the police.
The governance of organised crime in Canada that evolved during the
course of the last decade of the 20thcenturytendedto focus on the high profile
and spectacular,particularlywhen it involved criminal gangs and an element
of violence. Crimesof the powerful,crimes againstthe environmentandother
crimes that may be "organised"but which do not conform to the traditional
picture of organised crime, were less in evidence as objects of governance.
Given the architectureof the nationalpolice intelligence system (exemplified
by the SleipnirProject),the predilectionsof public opinion and perorationsof
politicians how could it be otherwise?

International trends in the governance of organised crime

The constructionof organised crime as an object of governance during this
period was not unique to Canada.The trendwas a global one, and its date of
508 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

commencement might be set on the occasion of the World Ministerial

Conferenceon transnationalorganisedcrime held in Naples in Novemberof
1994 (Sheptycki,2003). The movementwas largely consolidatedby the end
of the decade, on the occasion of the 10thUN Congresson the Preventionof
Crime in 2000 (Sheptycki2002, p. 113). Both of these meetings provideda
world tour of local crime woes, but the theme was transnational.Invited
speakerstalkedaboutthe ten majorcrime "corporations," the profitsof "dia-
mond gangsters,""drugbarons,"and "humantraffickers"andthe stereotypes
of organisedcrimewereprojectedontothe worldstage.This was anexpression
of globalisationitself. As the Commissionon GlobalGovernanceput it:

The term globalisation has been used primarily to describe some key aspects of the recent
transformation of worldeconomic activity.But severalother,less benign(sic), activities,including
the drugtrade,terrorism,andtrafficin nuclearmaterials,have also been globalized.The financial
liberalizationthatseems to have createda borderlessworldis also helpinginternationalcriminals
... (Commissionon GlobalGovernance,1995, p. 10)

By the end of the 1990s transnationalorganisedcrime had been given a

high priorityon the agendafor global governance.As emphasisedthroughout
this paper,the rangeof criminalacts thatcan be broughtunderthis headingare
varied and multifaceted.They include such mattersas environmentalcrime:
illegal fishingandlogging;illegal tradein endangeredspecies andtheproducts
thereof; and the illegal transportationof hazardoussubstancesand banned
industrialchemicals such as chloroflurocarbons(CFCs)(Brackand Hayman,
2002). They also includesuchmattersas publicsectorcorruption(Rider,1997)
and the routine crimes of corporatecapital (Box, 1983; Pearce and Snider,
1995). These areimportantmatters,andscholars,policy analysts,membersof
the "international civil service"andgovernmentalprogrammerstheworldover
did cultivate some awarenessof them.
However,the manufactureof "organisedcrime"as an objectof governance
(transnationaland otherwise) tended to be more focused; the images of
"suitableenemies" associated with the term tended towardsthe traditional
versionof whatconstitutesorganisedcrime.So, as one commentatornoted,"it
is clear thatmost - althoughcertainlynot all - transnationalcrimesinvolve
traffickingin some kindof illicit productsandservices,or in licit productsthat
have been obtainedby illicit means"(Williams, 1999,p. 241). Foremoston the
list of illicit productswere illegal drugs.Of the licit productstradedillegally,
tobacco gained the lion's share of attention - but the law enforcement
operationsin this field tended to focus on the "small fish," ratherthan any
complicityby thetobaccocompaniesthemselves(Beare,2002). Incomparison,
far less resourceswere devoted to measuringthe illicit tradein environmen-
tally harmful substances and other crimes against the environment
(http://www.eia-international.org/). Some academicsin the field were highly
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada509

critical of this trend. As Didier Bigo observed, "only some phenomena

amenable to categorisation as crime are defined as such by politicians and
policy-makers:terrorism,drug trafficking,organisedcrime (what could that
mean?), and immigration" (2000, p. 89). Other problems that might be
reasonablyhave been highlighted in this governmentalprogrammewere left
out of the picture altogether, or at least edged to the very margins. The
consequence was that governmental awareness of some types of criminal
activity was heightened (perhapsout of proportionto the social harm they
entail) while awarenessof other types of criminalactivity was dulled.
There were local and nationalconsequencesdue to the rise to prominence
of this issue in transnationalgovernance.These were set in motion by calls for
betterinformationsystems to cope with the problemof organisedcrime, calls
made with no small sense of urgency:

The overall impression from this analysis is that although governments are responding to
transnationalcriminalorganizationsandtransnationalcriminalactivities,they aredoing too littletoo
late.Effortsneed to be expandedespecially in the areaof reliableanduniformdatacollection. More
sophisticatedmethodologiesneed to be devised and greateruse made of the informationavailable
... as a matterof urgency a centralclearing house needs to be establishedwith a focus on illicit
marketactivities of all kinds and a recognitionof the cross-linkagesand synergies that are being
developed [between criminalgroups]"(Williams, 1999, p. 241).

Several studies that relate to the development of European police co-

operationin Europe generally, and the cross-nationalresponses to organised
crime specifically, noted somethingof a convergencetrendin the police sector
(Anderson, 1993; Andersonet al, 1995; den Boer and Doelle, 2000; den Boer,
2002). Thus, accordingto den Boer (2002), while "thereare no indicationsof
an integral or wholesale convergence of nationallaw enforcement structures
[in Europe]thereare some convergencetendenciesconcerningthe creationof
national structures for the control of organised crime" (p. 41). The way
differentcountriesreconfiguredtheir nationalpolicing systems in responseto
the problem of organisedcrime dependedvery much on the already existing
organisationalstructuresand controlcultures(whatden Boer called the "neo-
functional contingency thesis"). In many places aroundthe world, albeit to
greater or lesser extents, policing agencies were changing as a result of the
adoption of intelligence technologies and these changes gained coherence as
a set of governmentalpracticesaimed at "organised"crimeproblems.The call
for more, better and more standardised information on the problem of
organisedcrime resultedin changes to differentnationalpolicing systems and
thus, globally, they began to blur into one another.
Recall the discussion in an earliersection of this paperwhich describedthe
complexity of the police sector in Canada and recall also that the rise to
prominence of concerns relating to organised crime led to a national action
510 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

plan for the co-ordination,evaluationand measurementof "theproblem."It

would not an exaggerationto say thatthe trendsand processes underwayin
Canada during the 1990s exhibited in microcosm a set of developments
occurringglobally. As the informationprocessesof the Canadianpolice sector
were re-engineeredin orderto bettermeasureand evaluate organisedcrime
threats, so too was it in other countries. The result was a change in the
architectureof the police sector across the globe as it developedthe capacity
to measureand therebygovern "organisedcrime."

Conclusion
One question remains.In observingthese processes were we witnessing the
governanceof organisedcrime, or is it more apt to describeit as governance
throughorganisedcrime?Put in this simple form the questionmay appearto
be sociologically naive; the formera lazy functionalism,the lattervergingon
conspiracy theory. It is useful, as well as interesting,to look at the way in
which organisedcrime has become an object of governanceover the recent
past. This is so because the, inevitablydisputatious,theoreticalliteratureon
governancehas done so much to chartthe transformationsin the practicesof
social power. In a world that has "gone global," where the relationships
betweenpopulationsandterritoryarechanging,it is helpfulto look at specific
practicesof governanceso as to shed light on these broadershifts. The advent
of organisedcrime (transnationaland otherwise)as an object of governance
oughtto tell us somethingaboutthe generalcharacterof thesetransformations.
This paperexaminedin detail the micro-processesof policing intelligence
systems in orderto show precisely how organised crime was turnedinto an
object of governance in Canadaduringthe course of the 1990s. What was
shown was that, in spite of the capacity of organisedcrime phenomenato
overflow the boundariesof official definition(whereverthosemightbe said to
lie), the mentaliteof policing intelligence tendedto be focussed on elements
thatarenarrowlycircumscribed.Moreover,the evidence to handsuggeststhat
the general public was largely in accordwith the vision of organisedcrime
groupsof the "traditional" or "Mafia"type. It is temptingto tryto disentangle
this isomorphism.But this is a distractionfrom a more importantquestion,
which asks how, specifically, organisedcrime was turnedinto an object of
governance. This feat was accomplished during a period that exhibited a
considerable sense of anxiety and fear, and this was not peculiar to the
Canadianscene. Probablysuchexistentialangsthadmanysources,butit seems
inescapablethatpartof its fundamentpertainedto transformationsassociated
with "globalisation."People worried, during the 1990s that society was
becomingun-governable.Whateverelse, perceptionsof a risingtide of serious
 TheGovernance
of OrganisedCrimein Canada511

criminality peppered globalisation-crisis-talk. It is thus plausible to echo

Jonathan Simon (1997) and argue that "governing through crime, at its
broadest, might be looked at as a response to this crisis" (p. 177) and, to
amplify his observation to say that the governance of organised crime in
Canadais but a microcosm of more global tendencies.
Organised crime provided an occasion for the re-articulation and re-
establishmentof state'scapacitiesin an erawhen, globally, many signs pointed
to the "hollowing out" of the nation-stateand a diminutionof its capacities
(Jessop, 1993; 1994). In such a climate, crime controlpresentedan issue area
wherestategovernmentalprogrammerscould rely on the traditionallegitimacy
of the state's monopoly of coercive force in order to assert their position.
Further,even whencrimecontrolbecame an issue of transnationalgovernance,
it still remainedan issue area where the state qua state was an active, indeed
leading, partnerin the governmentalprogramme.Transnationalorganised
crime appearedas a phenomenon too large in scale for the national state to
handle (Williams and Savona, 1995). But organisedcrime is manifest locally
and so needs be governed locally (cf. Hobbs, 1998). Globalisationpresents a
bewildering proliferationof platforms of governance. Some governmental
capacities have been transferredto a supranationallevel. Otherexpressionsof
states' capacities have been removedto restructuredlocal or regional levels of
governancewithinthe nationalstate. Then too thereareaspectsof governmen-
tal capacity in emerging horizontal networks of regional transnational
governance connecting across states' boundaries.The state qua state - the
Canadian federal state is but one example - emerged as one of the key
brokersin the transnationalgovernanceof organisedcrime; its capacities for
governancewere reassertedin importantways throughthe rise to prominence
of this issue area. Hence governing throughorganisedcrime.
There is anotherreason to suggest that the governanceof organisedcrime
was, in practice, governancethroughorganisedcrime. Because the construc-
tion of organised crime as an object of governance tended, in the main, to
focus on "theunderworld"of Mafia-typeorganisedcriminalgangs, andtended
to devote much less attention to the crimes of the powerful who inhabit
"legitimate"and formal institutionalstructures,it became plausible to assert
that the emergence of the organised crime problematic amounted to an
ideological smoke-screen (Chomsky, 1991). This is a contentious issue, as it
is wheneverthe issue of ideology is raised.However, this view has substantial
weight in the academic literature on white collar and corporate crime.
Observingthe extensive calls for law and orderagainst "streetcrime" and the
muted calls for enforcementagainst "suitecrime,"JefferyReiman concluded
that the "richget richer and the poor get prison"(1995). In Canada,Laureen
Snider (1993) provided evidence to suggest that the social harm due to a
512 Canadian
Journalof Sociology

variety of corporatecrimes was much more significantthan "conventional"

types of crime.5In commonwith otherscholarsin the white-collarcrimefield,
she arguedthatthe lack of emphasison the economic crimesof the powerful
was at least partlyexplicable by whatwas, in effect, a symbioticrelationship
between corporatecapital and the state. In a special issue of the Journal of
HumanJustice [3(2), 1992] the issue editorsput these pressuresin a global
context arguing, in part, that nationally based states are keen to promote
"business confidence" and minimise pressuresfor capital flight. Minimal
attention to corporatemalfeasance thereby becomes part of a package of
special incentives that lure multinationalsto invest in national economies
(Pearceand Snider, 1992).
The analysisof "crimesof the powerful"indicatesan increasein the power
of global capital (and the social elites associated with it) and a connected
diminutionin the ability of local communitiesto influence or block hurtful
changes (ibid. p. 41). The concernhereis not so mucha "hollowingout of the
state"but rathera diminutionin the ability of local communitiesto govern
themselves and (in termsof the concernsthatanimatethis paper)specifically
to governthe crimogenicfeaturesof globalisation,forexamplethatof criminal
despoliationof the environment(Block, 1993;PearceandTombs, 1993;Brack
and Hayman, 2002). The diffuse range of anxieties indicated by the term
globalisationraises many challenges for governancevia states' apparatuses
generally.Whenthe specific concernis the governanceof organisedcrime,the
observationstandsthat,by andlarge,duringthe last decadeof the 20thcentury
perceptionsof whatconstitutesthe problem(perceptionsheld by citizens and
governmentalprogrammersalike) focused on the "traditional"image and
neglected othertypes of organisedcrime. This is, mutatismutandis,equally
trueof transnationalorganisedcrime. Therecan be little doubtthat the great
preponderanceof effort in controllingorganisedcrime duringthe 1990s was
focused on "theusual suspects."In such circumstances,at least some people
holding political and economic power were able to criminally abuse their
positions in a more or less organisedfashion and remainfairly secure in the
thoughtthat police resourceswere not directedat them. While it is unlikely

5. Moreover,in Canadathese sorts of views were amplified,in the work of the investigative
journalist Paul Palango.His book Above the Law (subtitled:The Crooks,the Politicans, the
Mountiesand Rod Stamler- the lattera formerRCMPAssistantCommissionerand a former
head of the Economic Crime Directorate)tracedcases of bid-rigging,fraudand influence
peddlingin high places as well as the marginalisationof effortsto police white collarcrimein
Canada.
 The Governanceof OrganisedCrime in Canada 513

that the emergence of governancethroughorganisedcrime has been the result

of a strategicdecision as such, the observed practicesof crime control reveal
something much less that the governanceof organisedcrime.

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