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Wireless Network Security

M.Hemavathy
A.Kavitha
S.Sivakumar

Member Research Staff


Central Research Laboratory
Bharat Electronics
Bangalore
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Agenda
Overview of Wireless Networks
Wireless Network Security & Issues
Introduction to WAP
WAP Security
Introduction to Ad-hoc Networks
Securing Ad-hoc Networks

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Overview of Wireless Networks

What is Wireless Network?


Why Wireless Networks?
Classification of Wireless Networks
Access Techniques
Limitations of Wireless Networks

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What is wireless
A technology that enables two or more entities
to communicate without network cabling
A tool for convenience, for when mobility is
required in computing
A Wireless Networks uses electro magnetic
waves as carrier

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Why Wireless
No wires. Convenience, flexible
Improved wireless technologies
Significant drop in cost for service providers
Significant reduction in price of wireless services
More affordable to end users
Wireless service is mobile and can be deployed
almost anywhere
Wireless service can be deployed faster and
cheaper than fixed service

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Classification of Wireless
Networks
Satellite Networks
Wireless WANs/MANs
Wireless LANs
Wireless PANs
Ad-hoc Networks

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Satellite Networks
Wide area coverage of the earth’s surface
Broadcast transmission
Very high data rates
Deployment costs can be enormous
Long transmission delays
Links subject to short term outages or degradations
Extremely high quality of transmission

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Wireless WANs/MANs
Uses cellular / digital cellular networks
Provides essentially world-wide access
Uses a dial up connection
Comparatively low bandwidth
Examples : Cellular, CDPD
3G networks promise improvement

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Wireless WANs/MANs …
1G (Past)
AMPS, TACS: Analog, voice only
2G (Past/Present)
IS
- 136, GSM: <10Kbps circuit switched data
2.5G (Present)
GSM
- GPRS, GPRS
- 136: <100Kbps packet switched
3G (Immediate Future)
IMT
- 2000: <2Mbps packet switched
4G (Future)
20
- 40 Mbps
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Wireless LAN
An extension of wired LAN
Higher bandwidth
Example : 802.11 a/b/g
802.11 - key technology
Versions:
802.11b – currently widely deployed
802.11a – higher bandwidth
802.11g – higher bandwidth
– backward compatible with 802.11b

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Wireless PAN
Short range data transfer
Low bandwidth (up to 1mb per second)
Primarily meant for networking personal devices
(music systems, speakers, microwaves, refrigerators, etc.)
Lower data rates and transmission ranges (low power)
Essentially a cable eliminator
Limited to about 30’ between devices
Examples : IRDA, Bluetooth (802.15), UWB

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Ad-Hoc Networks
Infrastructure less wireless networks
Typically applications - Military or disaster relief
Single and Multi hops
Mobile nodes function as forwarders/routers
Typical data rates (on a per-link basis) same as WLAN
significantly smaller end-to-end data rates

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Wireless link issues
Multiple nodes need the medium
Shared wireless spectrum
Lead to concurrent transmissions
Many transmissions at the same time
Results in collision
Vital to prevent or minimize collisions
Controlled access
Collision avoidance / minimization
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Access Techniques
 TDMA - time division multiple access
Divides time into small slots
 FDMA - frequency division multiple access
Each node transmits on a different frequency
 CSMA - carrier sense multiple access
listen wireless channel (on a given frequency)
transmit when channel free
 CDMA - code division multiple access
different spreading codes
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Types of Wireless networks
CDPD - Cellular Digital Packet Data
HSCSD- High Speed Circuit Switched Data
PDC- P- Packet Data Cellular
GPRS- General Packet Radio Service
1xRTT- 1x Radio Transmission Technology
Bluetooth
IrDA- Infrared
LMDS- Local Multipoint Distribution Service
MMDS- Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service
802.11 – WLAN- Wi- iF– Wireless Fidelity
802.16- WiMAX- Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access CENTRAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Limitation of Wireless Networks
Availability Factors
Interference can be caused easily
Due to other devices
Intentional jamming
Network outage
Largely inaccessible in rural areas

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Limitation of Wireless Networks
Environmental factors
Weather
Rain, lightening affect RF signals
Solar flares
RF interference from ambient sources
Microwave towers
Radio towers
Electromagnetic interference
Generators
Power plants
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Wireless Network Security and
Issues
Wired vs. Wireless
Hacking and Cracking
Security goals
Types of Attacks
Security solutions
Case studies

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Wired Vs Wireless
Wired networks offer more and better security
options than wireless
More thoroughly established standards with wired
networks
Wireless networks are much more equipment
dependent than wired networks
Easier to implement security policies on wired
networks

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Hacking and Cracking
Wireless networks more susceptible to hackers/crackers
RF signals allow for more unauthorized attempts
Ubiquitous wireless networking devices allow access
Hacking
Gaining unauthorized access to networks/devices
by algorithms or penetration programs
Cracking
Extending the use of devices past original intentions

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Security goals
Authentication – to prove identity
Authorization – what can be done
Accounting – tracing what was done
Integrity – to ensure data is not tampered
Confidentiality – to prevent eavesdropping
Availability – to ensure services and resources
Non Repudiation – to prevent denial of ownership

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Types of Attacks
All the vulnerabilities that exist in a conventional wired network
apply to wireless technologies
Man in the Middle Attacks
Attacker intercepts identification information of the sending
and receiving parties.
Substitutes own key in both situations
Gives access to all information passed between parties
Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of Service
TCP SYN ACK Flood or Buffer Overrun – Typical DoS

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Types of Attacks …
“Weak key” attacks on 802.11b
Involve algorithms in RC4 hashing algorithm and WEP
(Wired Equivalent Privacy)
Both implementations use easily broken algorithms
Dictionary attacks
Attackers use pre- populated list of frequently used
passwords and regular words

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Security Solutions
Solve the problem
Application layer with encryption
SSH, SSL
Network level through link encryption
WEP, EAP or VPN, IPSEC
Wireless Intrusion Detection system
Wireless Intrusion Prevention system

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Security Solutions …
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
A protocol to protect link-level data
Wireless communication between clients and AP
Encrypts data using 128 bit encryption
Provides authentication based on MAC address
Not based on users
WEP is easily breakable

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Security Solutions …
IEEE 802.11i – Authentication and Security
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
Subset of 802.11i
WPA has two major components
Authentication
TKIP encryption

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Security Solutions …
Authentication
IEEE 802.1x
Defined for session establishment
Both wired and wireless networks
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
Generic wrapper for authentication traffic

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Security Solutions …
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
Stronger privacy
Still uses RC
- 4encryption
Key rollover (temporal key)
Stronger integrity
Message Integrity Code (MIC)
Computed with own integrity algorithm (MICHAEL)
Separate integrity key
Integrity counter measures
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Security solutions …
Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
Establishes secure tunnel
Uses tunneling protocol
Tunneling mechanism
To encapsulate an IP packet within another IP packet
IP Security Protocol (IPSec)
Standard for secure IP communications
By encrypting and authenticating all IP packets

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Case studies

• Wireless Application Protocol and security issues


• Ad-hoc Networks and security issues

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Wireless Application Protocol
and
security issues

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AGENDA

Introduction
WAP – Market share
WAP Architecture
WAP Challenges
WTLS
WTLS security challenges
References and resources

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What is WAP?
 Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)
• an open standard architecture
• set of communication protocols for wireless devices
 Enables manufacturer, vendor, and technology independent
access to the Internet and advanced telephony services

Other approaches for WWW access through mobile


 i- Mode (from NTT DoCoMo)
 WAP is a TRAP (http://www.freeprotocols.org/wapTrap)

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WAP Scenario

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WAP Forum
 Co-founded by Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, Phone.com
 450 members
• Handset manufacturers,
• Wireless operators,
• Infrastructure manufacturers
• Software companies – platform software, content & applications
 Goals
• deliver Internet services to mobile devices
• enable applications to scale across a variety of transport options and
device types
• independence from wireless network standards
• GSM, CDMA IS-95, TDMA IS-136, 3G systems (UMTS, W-
CDMA)

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Device Manufacturers

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Wireless Operators

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Infrastructure Manufacturers

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Platform Software

SOFTLINE

CL

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Content & Applications

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Content & Applications

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WAP Applications

 Location
- based services

 Enterprise solutions

 Financial services

 Travel services

 Gaming and Entertainment

 -M Commerce

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WAP Market Situation

Market potential for WAP technology & services over time


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Market Survey
Forrester Research
1/3 of Europeans,219 million consumers,90% of e-commerce
executives

Report by Semico Research


79% of internet appliances will have web-capable phones

A survey by New York - based Cap Gemini America and


Corechange Inc. of Boston
Internet access via mobile phones will rise from 3 percent to a
massive 78 percent of the U.S. Internet population

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WAP Architecture

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WAP –Internet technology comparison

Runs on top of WDP


Provided lightweight X-oriented service
• Unreliable 1-way request
MicroBrowser (WML,
• Reliable 1-way/2-way req./response
WMLScript, WTA, WTAI)

Lightweight SSL
Uses WIM/PKI-Cards

Datagram service on different


bearers
Convergence between bearer
services

Different Wireless Tech.

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WAP challenges

Hand
- held devices
 Smaller display
 Different input device
 Limited memory
 Restricted power consumption
 Less powerful CPU

Wireless data networks


 Less bandwidth
 More latency
 Less connection stability
 Less predictable availability
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WTLS
Wireless Transport Layer Security
 Based on the TLS/SSL (Transport Layer
Security/Secure Socket Layer ) protocol
 Goal – to provide
• privacy (encryption)
• data integrity (MACs)
• authentication (public- k
ey and symmetric)
 New features
• Datagram support
• Optimised handshake procedures
• Dynamic key refreshing
 Optimized for low- bandwidth communication channels
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WTLS Internal Architecture

Transaction Protocol (WTP)

Handshake Alert Application Change Cipher


WTLS Protocol Protocol Protocol Spec Protocol

Record Protocol
Record protocol

Datagram Protocol (WDP/UDP)

Bearer networks

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WTLS Classes

Class 1
Anonymous encryption
Data is encrypted
Certificates are not exchanged between client and gateway

Class 2
Encryption with server authentication
Data is encrypted
Client requires a digital certificate from server

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WTLS Classes

Class 3
Encryption with client and server authentication
Data is encrypted
Client and server exchange digital certificates

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Message Flow in Full Handshake

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Message Flow in Abbreviated Handshake

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Message Flow in Optimized Handshake

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X.509 certificate
The subject's name
The issuing CA's name
The certificate's validity period
The asymmetric and symmetric algorithms used for key exchange
The subject's public key
The digital signature of the issuing CA
Alternative names for the subject (optional)
Allowed key usage- for example, whether the subject's public
key may be used for encryption, server authentication, signing
other certificates, and so on (optional)
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WTLS certificate

The subject's name


The issuing CA's name
The certificate's validity period
The asymmetric and symmetric algorithms used for
key exchange
The subject's public key
The digital signature of the issuing CA

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WTLS Security Challenge

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WTLS attacks and possible solutions

 Man
- in
- the- middle

 IP Spoofing

 The XOR MAC and stream ciphers

 The PKCS#1 attack

 Unauthenticated alert messages

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References and Resources
 Books
 Mobile communications: Jochen Schiller, Addison Wesley 2000
 Understanding WAP
 Official Website (specifications)
 www.wapforum.org
 Technical/Developer Info and tools
 www.palopt.com.au/wap
 www.wap.net
 Major players
 www.nokia.com/wap
 www.ericsson.se/wap
 phone.com
 OpenSource effort
 www.wapgateway.org (Kannel WAP gateway project)

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Ad hoc Networks and security issues

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Outline
• Factors of influence
• Infrastructured networks
• Infrastructureless networks
• Mobile ad hoc networks
• Characteristics
• Issues
• Challenges

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Introduction
• Get rid of cables
• Proliferation of wireless technologies
• Billions of service subscribers
– Voice communication
– Data communication
• More prevalent than traditional wireline

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Factors
• Improved wireless technologies
• Lower installation cost than wireline
• Significant drop in cost for service providers
• More service providers
• Significant reduction in price of wireless
services
• More affordable to end users

Anytime, Anywhere Communication


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Applications
• Civilian environments
– Group / Community / Enterprise / Home
networks
• Emergency operations
– Fire / Disaster / Rescue operations
• Military environments
– Tactical Battlefield area
– Sensors / UAV / UGV - NCW
• Sensor networks
• Vehicular networks
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Sensor networks
• Environmental sensing network
• Surveillance network
• Industrial automation
• Traffic sensor network - congestion
monitoring
• Chemical/biological weapon detection
• Military sensor network to detect enemy’s
movement CENTRAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
Vehicular networks
• Temporary Networks
– Moving vehicles
– Land transportation infrastructure
• Traffic lights, road signs etc.
– Other vehicles
• Ensuring smooth traffic flow
• Traffic diversion from congestion area
• Highway with limited network coverage
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Wireless…
• Nodes transmit - electromagnetic propagation
• Transmitted signal received within a distance
• Transmission (Tx) range
– Power level
– Terrain
– Obstacles
– Scheme

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Classification
• Wireless networks
– Basis of coverage area
• WAN / MAN / LAN / PAN
– Basis of infrastructure
• Infrastructured
– Cellular network
– WLAN
• Infrastructureless
– Ad hoc network

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Infrastructured Networks
• Wireless extension
• Facilitate end-to-end communication
• Cellular architecture
– End user devices
• Small mobile phones
– Radio transmission towers
• Cover a service area
• Coverage - top of buildings/towers/high grounds
• Stationary
– Interconnected through a static wireline network

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Infrastructured Networks …

Cellular network
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Infrastructured Networks …
• Device communicate to closest RT tower
• RT tower responsibilities
– Send data meant to nodes under coverage
– Receive data transmitted from nodes under
coverage
– Unreachable destination
• Local tower locates destination
• Retransmit to destination
• Multiple nodes need to retransmit / repeat

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Infrastructured Networks …
• WLAN - wireless extension to wired LAN
• IEEE 802.11 - Wi-Fi
• Provide wireless connectivity for PC/Laptops
• Comparatively high speeds (small distances)
• Utilizes fixed access points (RT towers)
• APs aggregate and retransmit to destination
• APs interconnect to external networks

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Infrastructured Networks …

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Infrastructured Networks …

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Infrastructured Networks …
• Dependent on fixed nodes (RT towers / APs)
• Require fixed infrastructure to interconnect
• Widely deployed successful architecture
– Variety of voice and data services
– Despite being inflexible (requiring fixed nodes)
• New standards for wider coverage /
bandwidth

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Infrastructureless Networks
• Architecture
– where infrastructure is not available
– where infrastructure is available - incapable in addressing
needs
– where infrastructure is not necessary
– No time to establish infrastructure
• Example
– “Ad hoc” mode of 802.11
– No access points
– Single hop wireless ad hoc network
• Nodes
– Computing and communication devices
– Laptops, PDAs, mobile phones, sensors
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Single hop

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Infrastructureless Networks …
• Direct communication to reachable
nodes
• Nodes not reachable need help from
neighbors
• Nodes discover neighbors
• Neighbors receive and forward
• Repeats until destination
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Multi hop
Source

Destination

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Mobile ad hoc network
• Collection of cooperating
autonomous portable wireless
mobile nodes located arbitrarily
forming a temporary network without
fixed infrastructure and centralized
administration

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Characteristics
• Wireless communication - Multi-hop
• Infrastructure-less or with less infrastructure
• Self-organizing and self-managing
• Most or all of the nodes are mobile
• Network topology changes dynamically
• Node is both a host and a router
• Portable devices
• Variation in scale
• Heterogeneity
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Constraints
• Dynamic topology
• Mobile routers
• Bandwidth-constrained
• End-to-End data rate, throughput,
latency
– Network size, Network diameter etc.
• Energy-constrained
• Security
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Issues - Multi Layer
• Physical Layer
- Adapt to changes in link characteristics
• DL Layer
- Minimize collisions, fair access
- Reliable data transport over shared medium
• Network Layer
- Determine to route packets
(efficient/effective)
- Interoperable

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Issues - Multi Layer…
• Transport Layer
- Packet loss due to transmission error and
not caused by congestion
- Delay as route changes
• Application Layer
- Handle disconnections and reconnections
- Adapt to varying delay and packet losses
- Situational awareness
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Challenges
• Mobility management
– Addressing and routing
• Network management
– Join, leave, merge and split
• Resource management
– Resource allocation and energy efficiency
• QoS management
– Dynamic reservation
– Adaptive error control techniques
• Error control and failure
• Security
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Routing
• Typical routing protocols operate efficiently
– Frequent movements
– Intermittent connectivity
– Network splits and joins
– Events generate large amount of overhead
– Significant time to reach stability after events
• IETF - creation of novel routing protocols
• Focus on routing protocols and multicast
• www.ietf.org/html.charters/manet-charter.html
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Routing
• Proactive
– Table driven
– Every node keeps routing information of others
– Routing information is updated periodically
• Reactive
– On demand
– A route is only formed upon request
• Hybrid
– Hierarchical clusters / zones

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Outline

• Security analysis
• Vulnerabilities
• Attacks
• Measures to secure MANET
• Benefits
• Challenges

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Security analysis
• Assessment of
– Vulnerabilities
• Flaws in the system
• State of being exposed to danger
– Threats
• Means to affect the system
• Methods / things to exploit - Agents
– Attacks
• Attempt to bypass a mechanism
• Events – success / failure

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Attacks
• Success of attacks
– Inherent system vulnerability
– Effectiveness of existing countermeasures
– Deployed mechanism
• Examples of attacks
– Alter, release, delete or deny data
– Steal data
– Obtain illegitimate privileges
– Insert false data
– Modify information
– Analyze network traffic
– Obtain illegitimate access
– Disrupt operation
– System Halt

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Classification
• Passive attacks
– Passively listen to wireless medium (sniffing)
– Only listen without modifying or tampering
– Target confidentiality of system
– Gathering information lead to active attacks
– Easier to launch than other attacks
• Active attacks
– Malicious action (Passive attack)
– Modify / inject packets
– Disrupt network services
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Vulnerabilities
• Channel vulnerability
– Interception with physical access to Tx medium
• Cable, fiber, etc.
• Tapping into media
– Any node within Tx range potentially decode
• Capture without sender or intended receiver knowledge
• Operating frequency and attributes (modulation, coding,
etc.)
• No clear boundary and easy injection
• Mobility
– More geared to fairly static elements
– Frequent changes in networkCENTRAL
structure
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Vulnerabilities
• Checkpoints
– Rely on traffic checkpoints
• Security devices inspect traffic
• Security policies and response
– No node can play special role
• Absence of centralized Infrastructure
– Few centrally located for management (Security / NW)
– Not applicable / No centralized control
• Routing protocols
– Matured Fixed / static elements
– Dynamic topology
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Vulnerabilities
• Resource vulnerabilities
– Power supply
• Stable power source
• Battery operation
– Bandwidth
• Comparatively high bandwidth
• Limited bandwidth
– Connectivity
• Continuous connection
• Mostly intermittent connections
– Processing power
• Comparatively high
• Limited capabilities
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Sources of attack
• Outsider
– Nodes not part of the network
– Try to join without authorization
• Insider
– Authorized nodes
– Compromised by unauthorized user
– Physical capturing of device
• Prevention
– Strong Identity management scheme - Device
– Strong multi factor authentication - User
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Routing attacks
• Routing
– Easily misused
– Lead to several types of attacks
– Most protocols are prone to attacks
• Designed for efficiency and minimizing overheads
• Allow every node in routing process
• Lack of protocol redundancy
• Single node can impact operation
– Attack on routing tables
– Attack on routing protocols
– Disseminate false routing information
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Black hole attack
• Malicious node
– Interested in packets to a particular node
– Advertises shortest path to that node
– Receive traffic destined
• To destination
• For other nodes
– Drop packets to perform DOS
– Perform man-in-the-middle attack
• redirecting packets to pretending destination nodes
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Spoofing attack
• Malicious node
– Attempt to take over identity of legitimate node
– Attempt to receive all packets destined
– Advertise fake routes
• Prevention
– Each node sign each routing message
– Assumption - Key management infrastructure exists
– Overhead
• Signing each message
• Increased bandwidth overhead
• Increased CPU utilization
• Increased end-to-end delay
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Modifying routing packets in transit
• Malicious node
– Modify a routing message sent by another node
– Intention of misleading other nodes
– Parameters indicating freshness of routes
– Difficult to detect node modifying the message
• Prevention
– Each node sign each routing message
– Node modifying routing packets be undetected
– Detect illegal modifications and discard
– Not mislead other nodes
– Overhead
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Selfish Nodes
• Malicious node
– Routing depends on participation / cooperation
– Non participating selfish nodes
– Overloaded nodes
– To conserve battery power
– Many selfish nodes- network down
• Prevention
– Protocol to monitor node participation
– Encourage node participation
– Measure based incentives
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Other attacks
• Wormhole attack
– Collude to transport in out of band
• Using different channels
• Routing messages
• Data packets
– Interfere with protocol operation
• Rushing Attack
– Adversary rush routing packets to destination
– Lead to problem in routing table overflows
• Packet dropping
– Advertises routes - receive traffic destined
• Stop forwarding and drop packets
• Variation – drop routing messages
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Measures to secure Manet
• Prevention approaches
– Attacker from penetrating the network
– Causing harmful effects
– Prevention mechanisms need cryptographic techniques
(Authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non
- repudiation)
• Detection approaches
– Detect penetration of preventive barriers
– Augment prevention
• Response and recovery approaches
– To ensure complete cooperation
– After detecting the penetration of barriers
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Prevention
• Asymmetric cryptography
– Public keys / digital certificates securely distributed
– Network with n nodes require n public keys
– SAODV / ARAN
• Symmetric cryptography
– Symmetric keys are pre-negotiated securely
– Network with ‘n’ nodes require n*(n+1)/2 pair wise
keys
– SAR / SRP
• One-way hash chains
– To protect modification of routing information /
metrics
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– SEAD and Ariadne
Intrusion detection
• No traffic concentrators (firewalls/gateways)
• Every node participate in detection and response
• Own individual IDS agent
• Monitor user / system / communication activities
• Responsibility of each node
– To detect signs of intrusion locally
– Independently
– Collaborate for broader investigation - Global IDS

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Response and recovery
• Type of intrusion response
– Type of intrusion
– Type of network protocols
– Confidence in veracity of audit trace data
• Responses
– Reset communication channels between nodes
– Identifying compromised nodes and precluding them
– Notification to user for further investigation / action
– Re-authentication request to all nodes / users
– Only re-authenticated nodes recognized as legitimate nodes

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Best practices
• Securing Manet very challenging task
• No one-size-fit-all and no perfect security exists
• Multiple layers of defense
• Use security as a first class constraint
– Incorporate security requirements in design
• Use a systems approach in security design
– Divide MANET security into components
– Identify and analyze each component
• Assess threats and vulnerabilities
– Discover / verify cross layer weaknesses

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Challenges
• Mobility management
– Addressing and routing
• Network management
– Join, leave, merge and split
– Group-membership and access control
– Authentication and identity persistence
• Resource management
– cooperation incentives
– Resource allocation and energy efficiency
• QoS management
– Dynamic reservation
– Adaptive error control techniques
• Security
– Self-organized key management
– Trust management

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Benefits
• Less dependent on infrastructure-based network
communication
• Cheaper service cost
• Saving cost on creating more network infrastructure
• Local community
– Promotes local cooperation
– Resource sharing
• Infrastructure-based network coverage
– Complement
– Extend
• Emergence of new types of
– Services
– Business models CENTRAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
References
• Manel Guerrero Zapata “SAODV Routing”
• Bridget Dahill, Brian Neil Levine, Elizabeth Royer, Clay
Shields. A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks,
10th Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), November
2002
• S. Yi, P. Naldurg, and R. Kravets Security-Aware Ad hoc
Routing for Wireless Networks The 2nd ACM te r .
Symposium html
ne t- c h a r
on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking r te r&s /m a
Computing (MobiHoc'01),
2001 h tml. ch a
.ie tf .o r g /
ww w
• Panagiotis Papadimitratos and Zygmunt J. Haas Secure
Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks SCS Communication
Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and
Simulation Conference (CNDS 2002), San Antonio, TX,
January 27-31, 2002.
• Yih-Chun Hu, David B. Johnson, and Adrian Perrig.
CENTRAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
SEAD: Proceedings of the 4th IEEE Workshop on Mobile
Computing Systems & Applications (WMCSA 2002), pp. 3-
Thank you

CENTRAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

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