Source: Review published by Johanna Granville of Yves Boyer and Isabelle Facon,

La politique de sécurité de la Russie: entre continuité et rupture (Paris, 2000) in

International Affairs (July 2002), vol. 78, no. 3, p. 647.

This book is edited by Yves Boyer and Isabelle Facon, Assistant Director and

Research Director, respectively, of the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research.

The book consists of nine essays on Russian foreign policy and security by noted

French and Russian political analysts and statesmen. The Russian authors include the

Ivan Tulin (professor, Moscow State Institute of International Affairs); Irina

Kobrinskaya (Director, East-West Institute, Moscow); Dmitri Trenin (Assistant

Director, Carnegie Center, Moscow); Yurii Fyodorov (scholar, Institute for the Study

of the United States and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences); and Konstantin

Makienko (Assistant Director, Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,

Moscow). Besides Boyer and Facon, the French authors include Anne de Tinguy of the

same Foundation for Strategic Research, and Dominique David (École Spéciale

Militaire de Saint-Cyr).

Two especially interesting essays are Boyer’s first one (“Les Russes”) and de

Tinguy’s final essay (“La Russie peut-elle avoir une ambition asiatique?”). Boyer

explains that the West’s hope for change in Russia has disappeared. If not for its

nuclear power, Russia would now be considered a “pariah state.” The economy

remains stagnant despite considerable international support. The mafia prospers

and provokes the West. Influential policymakers from Paris to Washington

disagree about the war in Chechnya. The White House has accused the Kremlin of

maintaining sinful relationships (des relations coupables) with Iran and Iraq (p. 7).
Boyer argues that the real source of the West’s discomfort with Russia is its policy

or “national sentiment dominated by a will to win.” This sentiment places Russia

outside the norms (hors norme) of those to whom it seeks to appeal—policymakers

and influential writers in the West (p. 8).

In her essay, de Tinguy points out that “Russia is neither European, nor

Asian, but Eurasian, a world geographically, historically and culturally separate.”

(p. 191.) Russia’s partnership with China, defined since 1996 as “strategic,” was

established after the shockwaves of the USSR’s collapse had dissipated. De Tinguy

argues that constant lectures by Russian and Chinese leaders about the need for

multipolarity stem from their shared desire to limit the power of the United States

and to preserve the power of the UN Security Council, of which they are both

permanent members (pp. 196-197). This shared belief prompts the Russians and

Chinese to disapprove of NATO missions in Iraq, Kosovo, and East Timor. They

disapproved of the U.S. and British bombing of Iraq, because the UN Security

Council had not approved the action. They also condemned the NATO air raids of

Kosovo and the U.S.-Japanese antimissile defense theater in the Pacific. Finally,

both Russia and China rejected all peace plans for East Timor that were not

endorsed by the Indonesian government or were not approved by the Security

Council.

De Tinguy explores all angles of the question she raised. While some see

Russia and China as natural allies, others see such an alliance as a threat to Russia’s

relationships with both Western and other Asian countries. Still others see China as

a possible menace to Russia, since their alliance is unequal: one is a declining power
and the other is a rising power. Condemned to being a “junior” partner, Russia

risks being led far from its own interests in its efforts to support its Chinese ally.

In short, this volume contributes to the growing literature on current

Russian foreign policy issues and should be recommended to graduate and

advanced undergraduate students who read French.