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RUSSIA AND THE CFE TREATY:

The Limits of Coercion
Adam Boger, Research Intern

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On November 19, 1999, the states parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
treaty signed an adaptation amendment which, if ratified by all the parties, would result in a
radically restructured agreement. The adapted treaty is both more flexible than the previous
document and better suited to the current geopolitical situation, including NATO expansion and
peacekeeping. However, as was its predecessor, the adapted treaty regime will likely be plagued
by illegal Russian actions in the North Caucasus and the former Soviet Socialist Republics.
Moscow views noncompliance as consistent with its security interests and therefore is willing to
risk ostracism while the NATO states are deterred from punishing Russia because they are not
harmed by the Russian actions.

The Original Treaty

The original CFE treaty, negotiated between March 1989-November 1990, was intended to
prevent NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) from acquiring the ability to
successfully conduct a surprise conventional attack. It placed overall numerical limits on heavy
weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces over 100mm caliber, combat
aircraft, and attack helicopters – collectively called Treaty Limited Equipment or TLE) and
established a framework for further reductions and confidence building measures. Because of its
success in accomplishing these tasks, the CFE treaty is often described as the "cornerstone" of
European Security.

The treaty specified a balance of forces at the alliance level, with the individual states parties
responsible for its smooth implementation. The treaty delineated two "groups of states parties,"
one consisting of states parties that had signed the NATO founding documents, the other
consisting of states parties that had signed the WTO founding document. Group limits provided
numerical parity between the groups of states parties while zonal limits were intended to prevent
a concentration of forces in central Europe. The treaty also included information exchanges and
inspection regimes to support the numerical and zonal limits. These regimes were critical to the
treaty, for without them, compliance with treaty obligations would have been difficult to verify.

The numerical and zonal limits, as well as the inspection regimes, were based on the assumption
that states parties within each group would be allies. If that were not the case, the "balance of
power"central to the treaty would be disrupted, as well as the functioning of the inspection
regimes and the zonal limits. Fearing such a situation, the Russian Federation threatened to
withdraw from the treaty when NATO expanded.

The Adapted Treaty

The adapted treaty addresses the issue of NATO expansion by dispensing with the groups of
states parties and replacing them with individual national and territorial limits. The national limits
cap the amount of TLE a state party has, while the territorial limits cap the amount of TLE
stationed on a state party's territory. The inspection regimes were also rewritten to reflect the
new treaty structure. While the revised treaty was primarily intended to accommodate the
changes introduced by NATO expansion, it also attempted to resolve long standing issues of
Russian noncompliance with flank limits and the stationing of Russian troops abroad without
host state consent.

The issue of noncompliance with flank limits originated in the early nineties. The original CFE
treaty, as an aspect of the zonal limits, created "flank zones." In these "flank zones," each group
of states parties could station 4,700 battle tanks, 5,900 armored combat vehicles, and 6,000

http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue10/cfe.html Fri 28 May 2010 05:20:17 PM CEST

Russia and the CFE Treaty: the Limits of Coercion - The Defense Monitor - Center For Defense Information Page 2

overall group of states parties limit, while the TLE stationed in the rest of the European USSR
only counted towards the later. Because these MDs were not on the Cold War front lines, the
USSR left most of the flank TLE entitlements to its WTO allies. When the WTO collapsed and
the USSR crumbled, the North
Caucasus became Russia's
southern border. Furthermore,
Russia was required to divide its
flank entitlements with the other
Soviet successor states in the
flank zone – Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Ukraine. As a result, the
Russian Federation emerged
with flank entitlements for 1300
battle tanks, 1380 armored
combat vehicles, and 1,680
pieces of artillery.

These entitlements may seem

large, but they must be
considered within the context of
what Russia considers to be its
security requirements. Russia views local wars and unrest near its borders as a primary security
concern. Before the first Chechen War in 1994, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated
that Russia's interests in the North Caucasus region required 1,100 battle tanks, 3,000 ACVs,
and 2,100 artillery pieces. The conflict in Chechnya, of course, only increased the material
requirements of the region further.

It became clear that Russia would exceed the flank limits when they came into force in
November, 1995. The NATO states were unwilling to jeopardize the CFE treaty by declaring
Russia noncompliant. Instead, they negotiated an agreement resolving the issue in time for the
first review conference in May, 1996. The Final Act of the First Review Conference removed
several administrative districts of the North Caucasus MD and the Pskov Oblast in the
Leningrad MD (on the north) from the flank zones, adding them to the next innermost sub-zone.
It established an overall limit on ground-based TLE in the old flank zones, with explicit limits on
deployment in the zones other than the new "reduced" flank zone. Russia was permitted to
station 1,897 battle tanks, 4,397 ACVs, and 2,422 pieces of artillery within the old zone until
May 1999, and 1,800 battle tanks, 3,700 ACVs, and 2,400 artillery pieces thereafter.

Even so, Russia continued to violate the flank limits. One provision of the CFE adaptation
amendment raised the TLE limits in the reduced zone to 1,300 battle tanks, 2,140 ACVs, and
1,680 artillery pieces and eliminated the limits in the original flank zone. Russia, in exchange,
would cede the right to increase the number of ACVs stationed in the reduced zone through
temporary deployments.

The Treaty Today

In general, the West has been willing to tolerate Russian noncompliance with the flank regime
because Russian compliance with other aspects of the treaty has been very good. Russia has
consistently complied with its overall numerical limits and the requirements of the inspection and
information regimes. Therefore, it has not been a threat to the NATO states parties, though its
buildup in the flank region could be interpreted as a threat to the security of the smaller, non-
NATO states along its borders.

For its part Russia has been willing to risk possible NATO condemnation and sanctions (such
as the cessation of economic aid). For example, it continues to station troops in states which
have not given their consent. Like flank limits, the issue of state consent has persisted since the
mid-nineties. In 1994, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw its troops from Moldova, but
never did so. Similarly, Moscow concluded a treaty with Georgia in 1995 giving it access to
three bases in Georgia, but the treaty was never ratified by the Georgian parliament. Russian
troops, however, remained in Georgia.

The CFE adaptation agreement addresses this issue. It states that troops may only be stationed
on the territory of another state "in conformity with international law, the explicit consent of the
host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council." . 1 This
represents the first attempt by the states parties to use the CFE regime as a mechanism for
resolving these disputes.

http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue10/cfe.html Fri 28 May 2010 05:20:17 PM CEST