Is God's omnipotence a coherent idea ?

Some people refer God as the Omnipotent, that is to say a being that has unlimited
power, and is able to do everything. God has four different attributes, he is
omniscient, simple, eternal and omnipotent. The latter raises some difficulties, and
paradoxes. In a first part I will show how omnipotence can be defined differently, how
radical omnipotence differs with limited omnipotence and the issue with logic. Then I
will show how God’s omnipotence raises some paradoxes and contradictions, by
relying on the paradox of the stone and the problem of evil. Finally I will try to answer
some questions concerning God’s ability to sin, to bring about the past, and to do
things not done by him. Does God’s powers have a limit, could it then be possible
that God’s omnipotence isn’t logic ?

The concept of omnipotence and God is not that easily understood. Indeed many
philosophers have different conceptions of God’s extent of power. Omnipotence is a
kind of supremacy, all-powerfulness. Following that definition, the omnipotence of
God is an absolute, and radical one. This is Descartes’ view, according to him God
can do the logically possible as well as the logically impossible, he can make a
square circle and change the laws of mathematics. Indeed, ‘God can do whatever we
are able to understand, but not that He cannot do what we are unable to understand.
For it would be presumptuous to think that our imagination extends as far as His
power’ (Descartes, 1630). In other words, it is for us Humans impossible to imagine
and understand a notion as illogical as a square circle, however God created
everything, and that includes logic. Therefore it is for him perfectly possible and
coherent to draw a square circle, or make the number 2 higher than the number 9.
However Aquinas claims that ‘this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly
understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible’ (Peterson, 2001,
p.124). The definition of omnipotence being God is able to do everything, is now
limited to God can do everything that is possible. And by everything that is possible,
Aquinas means everything that is logically possible. As a result it is incoherent for
God to draw a square circle. However his inability to do so does not prevent God
from being omnipotent ‘it does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’
(ibid, p.125), indeed this self contradictory phrase represents a ‘non-question’.
Richard Swinburne has the same position as Aquinas and argues that ‘ a logically
impossible is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which purport
to describe an action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose
could be done’(Swinburne, 1993, p.153). Therefore it would not be coherent to
construct a spherical cube, as it is only two words put together which does not
represent anything. Moreover Swinburne believes that certain actions are logical,
such as getting married, but they become logically impossible when they are
performed by a certain kind of people, for instance : get married to a bachelor. So the
action itself is not considered logically impossible, but it is the combination of the
person and the situation, that makes it logically impossible. So being omnipotent is
not only being possible to do everything logically possible but is an “ability to bring
about any logically possible state of affairs” (Swinburne, 1993, p.150). According to
this view, God’s omnipotence is a coherent idea.

Can God create a stone heavier that he can lift ? Considering that God is
omnipotent, he is able to create such a stone, however he is not able to lift it. If he
cannot lift it, then he is not omnipotent This act seems illogical and self-contradictory,
Mavrodes states that such acts are ‘pseudo-tasks’, ‘the fact that they cannot be
performed implies no limits on the power of god’(Mavrodes, 2005, p.262), but as
Aquinas pointed out, the act of lifting this stone requires an illogical power, therefore
God cannot lift it as he is able to do everything that is logically coherent. But it does
not derive him from being omnipotent.
Moreover if God is radically omnipotent, he is not bound by logical laws, therefore the
illogical act of creating the stone is possible, consequently the illogical act of lifting it
is possible as well.
We can also imagine that t1 is the time when God creates the stone, and t2 the time
he lifts it. At t1, God’s omnipotence allows him to create the stone, then the stone
being created he can lift it at t2. Indeed Mavrodes (2005) argues that ‘nothing in the
argument required the theologian to admit any limit on God’s power with regard to
the lifting of the stones ... And if God’s power to lift is infinite, then his power to create
may run to infinity also without outstripping the first power’(Mavrodes, 2005, p119). In
other words those two actions are successively possible, as God’s power is infinite in
both cases.Yet some would argue that in t2 the stone still cannot be lifted by God as
he created it being this way.
The paradox of the stone shows that there is an incoherence concerning God and
omnipotence. There has to be some limits to his power. But where do those limits
extend?

As well as being omnipotent, God is morally good and benevolent. How could there
be evil in the world if God is omnipotent, his power should prevent any existence of
evil as he is morally good. Those attributes combined should eliminate evil. Yet,
everyday we witness evil. To understand the presence of evil in the world one has to
either admit that God is not omnipotent, or that his omnipotence is incoherent ; or
admit that he is not benevolent. However it can be argued that for good to exist, evil
has to exist and that it would be illogical to think that good could exist on its own.
(Mackie, 1955)The claim that ‘evil is necessary as a counterpart to good’ (Mackie,
1955, p.203) errs, indeed we can again assert that as God made the laws of logic it
would be possible for only good to exist in the world.
Nevertheless the existence of evil in the world is required to prove what good really
is. Without evil, everything, every actions are considered good. But if good is
everywhere, it becomes difficult to measure it, and we cannot compare it with other
actions. To be good is to possess and display moral virtue, but how can we do that if
evil does not exist ? Good has to be opposed to evil, for it to exist. It then does not
distract it with God’s omnipotence. Mackie (1955) reckons that first order evil such as
‘pain and misery’ contrasts with first order good ‘pleasure and happiness’. Moreover
a second order good such as ‘sympathy’ can only exist if there is a second order evil
‘suffering’, similarly with ‘heroism in facing danger’ (Mackie, 1955, p.206). But
according to Mackie this claim fails, in fact the second order evil that is ‘cowardice’ or
‘cruelty’ (Mackie, 1955, p.207) is rising as much as another second order good. And
if God were omnipotent and morally good he would try and eliminate those evils.
Regarding evil and omnipotence many philosophers have taken the position that
human have freewill and are independent of God. And that would explain why there
is evil and how god remains omnipotent. Freedom is considered as good for the
society and humans. If humans were not free, it would undermine god’s morally good
attribute. Thus it is logic for him to create humans who are free. Yet Mackie (1955)
argues that if God could create humans who are free to choose between evil and
good, he could therefore help them into choosing what is good. However this view
can be reconsidered, in fact it would be an illogical action to create free agents and
then to force them to always lean towards what is good. Besides Swinburne (1993)
insists on how the creation of a world where humans are forced to act a certain way
would deprive humans of fulfilling themselves, and benefiting from interactions with
each other. According to the thinker a ‘A good God, like a good father, will delegate
responsibility. In order to allow creatures to share in creation, he will allow them the
choice of hurting and maiming, or frustrating the divine plan.’(1993, p.71)
Thus human freewill does not detract God from his omnipotence, but it limits it.
Indeed, God is benevolent so freedom has to exist in order for humans to experience
and learn from their consequences. As Swinburne puts it ‘as parents we regard it as
a good thing that our children have power to do free actions of moral significance
even if the consequence is that they sometimes do evil actions.’ (1993, p.76)

The relationship between omnipotence and benevolence clashes once again when
we wonder if God is able to sin. Indeed, God is able to do everything, therefore he
should be able to sin. But God is morally good, so he cannot sin. Therefore God is
not omnipotent. However it is not logically possible for God to sin and to be
omnipotent, and according to Aquinas this is a non-question, it does not derive God
from his omnipotence. Besides God is a perfect being, he cannot allow anything that
would cause and imply any imperfection of his being. We can assert that it is god’s
omnipotence that prevents him from sinning ‘to sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is the be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to
omnipotence’ (Aquinas, 2001, p.125). Yet, one can argue that God is able to sin but
chooses not to. Indeed how could God be morally good if he does not have the
choice to sin ? The fact that he is able to sin but chooses not to makes him
benevolent, and does not derive him from his omnipotence.

Finally, we can raise two problems concerning god’s omnipotence. Is he able to bring
about the past ? Is he able to do things not done by god ?
According to Aquinas God can affect actions before they are performed, for instance
he can decide for Socrates not to run before he has ran ‘therefore, when he has run,
God could effect that he did not run’(Aquinas, 1265-1274). However Aquinas points
out that Socrates cannot be sitting, and not sitting at the same moment,
consequently it is self contradictory to say that Socrates sat and did not sit. It is
highly illogical and it ‘does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything
that implies a contradiction’. (Ibid)

If we consider (1) ‘There is a table which has not been made by an omnipotent
being’, can we say that this table has been created by God ? If God could not create
this table he is not omnipotent. However God could have possibly created that table,
then maybe God is omnipotent. (Van der Brink, 1994). Aquinas claims that ‘His will is
the cause of all things ; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to
those things’ (1265-1274) in other words God is able to do things not done by him
considering that he made everything, ‘the determinist might reply that anyone who
makes anything determines its ways of acting, and so determines its subsequent
behaviour’ (Mackie, 1955, p.211). This makes it clear that God can do things that non
omnipotent beings do.

God’s omnipotence is confronted to many contradictions and paradoxes. But does it

make it incoherent? I trust that God’s omnipotence is coherent. Indeed I believe that
God can create a square circle, a stone heavier that he can lift, and he can do things
not done by him, as he created the laws of logic. However when concerning human
beings, I believe that God is bound by logical laws but it does not derive him from his
omnipotence. Indeed, as Swinburne (1993) stated, it would be impossible for
someone to marry a bachelor, it is self contradictory, besides it logically impossible
for God to bring about the past. Furthermore, as evil is necessary for the notion of
good to exist and God is able to sin but chooses not to, I assume that God can be
omnipotent and benevolent.
It can be assumed that an omnipotent being is not someone who does everything
because he is all powerful, in fact ‘a being may remain omnipotent for ever because
he never exercises his power to create stones too heavy to lift forces too strong to
resist or universes too wayward to control’ (Swinburne, 1993, p161).
Aristotle v Parmenides

What is Aristotle’s account of the nature of change? How is it intended to answer

Parmenides’ argument against the possibility of change?
In this essay I will be discussing Aristotle’s account of the nature of change and how
it differs to Parmenides’ account. I think Aristotle’s account is intended to provide a
credible alternative view to Parmenides’ view. But does he succeed in doing so? I will
be examining whether or not he does. In order to do this we need to look at how
each of them describe the nature of change and what differentiates the two
arguments. This leads to a number of other questions like did Parmenides fail to
consider the possibility of there being more than one type of change? How do we
actually define the things that are changing? Are they unitary wholes or as Aristotle
would say composite wholes or sunholon made up of matter and form? If there is
change what is its source and why does it happen in the first place? In answering
these questions I hope to clarify Aristotle’s argument and show how it is a sound
response to Parmenides’ assertion that change does not exist.
Parmenides says change is something coming out of nothing. However he
concludes that it doesn’t actually happen, that change is only an illusion (Politis,
2004, page. 51). This view does seem like a radical position to take however
Parmenides argues it in a convincing way. He says change is something coming out
of nothing. But because we cannot coherently think of nothing because if you are
thinking at all you are thinking of something, something cannot come from nothing,
therefore we cannot think of change. Therefore, change does not exist; it only
appears that things change.
Aristotle acknowledges that if you look at change in this way you will come to that
conclusion. However given the integral part that the assumption that change exists
plays in everyday experience, he finds this conclusion to be unacceptable (politis,
2004 page. 51). Therefore he says that there is a substratum of change (Copleston
2008 page. 306), meaning it is a permanent underlying feature of all physical things.
He says change is not something coming out of nothing but that it is the process
where by something moves from something that is into something else that is,
acknowledging Parmenides’ view that nothing can come from nothing. However he
claims that Parmenides failed to see the distinction between qualitative changes and
change involving generation and destruction (Shields 2007 page 61), that instead
Parmenides saw all change as generation. This is according to Aristotle a
fundamental flaw in Parmenides’ argument. But how does Aristotle differentiate
between change involving generation and destruction and qualitative change.
First we will look at qualitative change, which is the addition of a new, or change in
an old characteristic of something i.e. a man “M” becomes musical or an unmusical
man becomes musical (Aristotle, physics book 1, 189b34-190a4). He makes it clear
that the man “M” remains “M” both before and after the change (109a10-109a12).
This type of change obviously involves the existence of “M” in the first place and
therefore is not something coming out of nothing. Here Aristotle demonstrates how
he thinks things should be viewed as having a substance and a quality, i.e. the man
and his musicality. However Parmenides would argue that the man “M” is “complete,
immovable and without end” (fragment 8) and therefore when he becomes musical
he is no longer “M”, (the man he was).
Change involving generation and destruction is the process where by something
“comes to be”(Aristotle, Physics Book 1 189b34) or is destroyed. Again, Aristotle
says nothing comes to be from nothing, but comes to be from something that is. Let’s
look at the example of a seed and a tree. The tree came to be from something that
is not a tree, however it still came to be from something that is, a seed. But in this
case it appears there is no substratum, but Aristotle argues that the tree always
existed in potentiality as the seed (Klein, Philosophers.com). But why then can we
not call the seed the tree? This is where we need to look at essential and non-
essential characteristics. If we ask ourselves what is a tree? We would say a tall,
wooden, rigid thing. Of course the seed will not meet the credentials for it to be a
tree, but it is clear that the tree comes from the seed. Whether or not the seed is the
tree or not depends on how prevalent the essential characteristics are for each, in
other words whether the seed has the form of an actual tree. This is where Aristotle’s
Hylomorphism comes into play.
While Aristotle sees things as composite wholes (sunholon), he believes they are
composed of matter and form. Matter cannot exist in its own right, except as existing
as pure potentiality. It also is resistant to change and is “underlying and persisting”
(Shields 2007 page 55). Form is the thing that makes something what it is in giving
the matter’s potentiality actuality. It is a positive attribute gained in the process of
change (Shields 2007 page 410) however the form itself is changeless as long as the
thing exists (Politis 2004, page 53). If we take the example of a bronze statue the
matter is the bronze and the form is the statue. You can melt down the statue back to
a lump of bronze in which case the form has changed but the matter shows itself to
be resistant to change. However, it doesn’t always appear that this is the case. For
example when a cow eats grass and grows as a result it seems that the grass matter
is not there anymore, that it has been turned into something completely different i.e.
muscle (Copleston, 2003, page 307). But, the point is that it has remained material
throughout. The matter in question may not remain, but matter (what the scholastics
called materia prima) itself is resistant to change (Copleston, 2003, page 307). This
view of Hylomorphism and potentiality is key part of Aristotle’s refutation of
Parmenides’ assertion that change does not exist (Shields 2007 page 61) and it
explains how something can “come to be” by taking on the form of something.
But Parmenides doesn’t view things in this way and with his assumption of what
something is we get a clearer understanding of his conclusion. He sees a thing as a
whole, something that is equal in all directions and from all perspectives, and
something that “…cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another”
(Parmenides, Fragment 1). It is also indivisible because if it were not it would be
divided into something other than itself (Copleston, 2003 page 50). With this in mind
we can say that for Parmenides an attribute cannot be added to or taken away from
something because if it were how could we still describe it as the thing because “it”
has to be “ complete immovable and without end” (Parmenides, Fragment 8).
This helps us to understand his conclusion that change is an illusion because if this
thing is in anyway different from what it was; it is no longer what it was. For example
if we have a simple table “T” defined only as a plank of wood supported by 4 legs
and suppose one of the legs fell off. It would no longer be “T”; the table “T” has gone
out of existence (into nothing), but what has come into existence is a three-legged
table type thing. Parmenides says that this process is one we perceive to be change
from the table “T” into the three-legged table type thing but that it isn’t actually this
direct change given the table’s non-existence in between.
But is Aristotle’s Hylomorphism a sufficient answer to Parmenides’ argument? Well
it explains and gives a much more comprehendible answer to the question what the
changing thing is and explains what is happening but that is assuming that change
does happen. We need more to explain something’s existence/change than just the
material and formal cause (matter and form). The fact that the matter is lacking in
some way or in a state of “privation” is important and necessary for change. Aristotle
distinguishes matter and privation by saying matter is a positive attribute i.e. it is,
which remains while privation is something which “ by it’s own nature is not” and is
lost through the process of change (Aristotle, Physics 192a4-192a8). It is this state of
privation which allows something to eligible for change. It follows that form, matter
and privation are the three presuppositions of change (Copleston 2003, page 308).
But what caused the lump of bronze to become a statue in the first place and how
did that happen? These questions can be explained by Aristotle’s account of the
efficient cause and the final cause. The efficient cause is the initiator of change, it
tells us who or what caused something to change (Shields, 2007 page 64). In terms
of the statue it is the sculptor and in the case of the tree it is the “unmoved mover”
who created the environment for the seed to grow and develop. But Aristotle makes it
clear that it is really the form of the sculptor or the form of the “mover” that is the
efficient cause (Politis 2004, page 54). The final cause is the purpose the thing fulfils.
In terms of the statue, it could be to please the Gods and in terms of the tree it is to
provide oxygen, food or shelter. Again he says that the end at which the change has
been directed i.e. the final cause, is a result of the form of that thing (Politis, 2004
page 55). The material, formal, efficient and final causes are necessary to explain not
only something’s existence but also the change something experiences.
While Aristotle does start with the assumption that change exists, he deems it
necessary to show where Parmenides made his mistakes and to provide a coherent
alternative. He redefines change into not merely generation but both generational
and qualitative change. This view is compatible with his account of Hylomorphism
where things are composite wholes made up of matter and form and are not
complete wholes like Parmenides said. Aristotle draws on the four causes to explain
what initiates change and why it happens in the first place, something naturally
Parmenides doesn’t deal with given his belief that change is an illusion. But when
Aristotle explains the process like this he strengthens his position as it gives a
credible account of what the purpose of change is and how change would happen. I
think we can say that Aristotle’s account of change does what it is intended to do
which is to provide an alternative to Parmenides’ view and given the assumption that
change exists plays in everyday life it is a more acceptable position to take.

How successful was Aquinas in establishing philosophical grounds for the

immortality of the soul?

‘It is on the soul that is founded, in religion, the belief in immortality.’ (Clément,
Demonque, Hansen-Love & Kahn 1997, p12) Does it mean that an individual can
only experience immortality through his or her soul? This is a common account of the
phenomenon of immortality, found mainly among religious circles. On this point,
Thomas Aquinas provides an original position. At a time where the boundary
between philosophy and theology can hardly be seen, he tries to establish
philosophical grounds of the immortality of the soul. How successful is he?
Aquinas defends Aristotle’s rather materialist view of the soul. The soul, in Latin
‘anima’, ‘is ‘that which animates’ or ‘that which gives life’ (Davies 1992, p209). It is
the principle that differentiates animated from unanimated beings, the core difference
between me and my pen. A living thing is therefore an ‘ensouled body’ (Ibid). Thus,
animals have a soul as well as human beings. The essential point Aquinas takes
from Aristotle and which differentiates him from the Platonic view of the soul is that
the soul is ‘united as a form to the body’ (Aquinas, article 1). It is present in the
whole body. The soul is not an independent entity and has no existence without the
body. Aquinas says, in the response to the twelfth objection in Disputed questions
on the Soul, that ‘the soul has some dependence on the body inasmuch as the soul’s
species is not complete without the body’. I am not my soul. To have a complete
existence and be myself, I need to be a compound of soul and body, of spiritual and
corporeal substance. So the soul and the body are not separable.
As we have mentioned, this view, considered as a form of ‘Physicalism’ by Brian
Davies (1992, p 209), is opposed to the view Aquinas ascribes to Plato in his
writings. For Plato, the soul has a ‘complete nature of a species’ and a man is ‘a soul
joined to a body in such a way that it is related to the body as a pilot is to a ship’
(Aquinas, article 1). The individual is identifiable to his or her soul which uses the
body. As the pilot skippers his ship, the soul commands the body. I am my soul,
connected to a body. As a consequence, the soul is independent from the body.
 This view, also strongly asserted by Descartes, is referred to as Dualism. Soul and
body are separable and so, the human being has a kind of dual nature. According to
Brian Davies, Aquinas is not a Dualist as ‘he denies that people are essentially
incorporeal’ (1992, p209).
Augustine, Descartes and other Christian philosophers preferred the platonic vision
of the soul mainly because of their religious commitment: they need to prove the
immortality of the soul which is a core dogma in the Catholic faith (Marenbon 1987,
p122). According to them, the soul is independent and separable from the body. So,
when the individual dies, his or her body, namely, the corporeal substance,
disintegrates whereas the soul or incorporeal substance remains. Therefore, the
immortality of the soul is safeguarded and this philosophical position agrees with the
Catholic doctrine. It is in this view that, in religion, it is often on the soul that the belief
in immortality is founded as has been said at the beginning. But, for Aquinas, as we
have seen, the soul and the body are not separable.
How can I survive the death of my body if my soul is the form of it? In other words,
‘how can the form endure apart from its matter?’ (Ibid) It seems hard for Aquinas to
prove the immortality of the soul as he preferred Aristotle’s view of the soul rather
than Plato’s. But he was a Dominican monk. He must therefore provide some
reasons for the soul to be immortal.
For Aquinas, the soul is not only the form of the body, it is also a ‘particular self-
subsisting thing’ (Aquinas, article 1). The soul makes a human being a rational
animal. It is through the soul that individuals have intellect and will. As the exercise of
reason does not depend on the body1, the soul must be a particular thing and thus,
an independently existing thing in its own right. As a consequence, according to
Davies, Aquinas is not a Physicalist either as ‘he does not think that people are
nothing but a collection of physical processes’ (Davies 1992, p209). Besides, ‘It
belongs to the very essence of a particular thing to subsist of itself’ (Aquinas, article
1). A subsistent thing can also be a common object as a table or a tree, but these are
perishable. The soul, as it does not depend on matter remains. So the soul can
survive the death of the body, as it is independent from it and thus, Aquinas proves
the immortality of the soul.
But, to enjoy fully immortality, I have to survive as myself and we have seen before
that ‘myself’ for Aquinas, is the compound of body and soul. I am not my soul. So, if
my body dies, and my soul remains, it is not really I who experiences immortality.
And indeed, Aquinas asserts that the soul will not enjoy immortality apart from the
body. How does he solve this apparent difficulty? For him, as for some biblical
authors, ‘life after death is not a matter of what we might call “the immortality of the
soul”. It is a matter of resurrection’(Davies 1992, p217). When I die, my body, which
is corporeal, will disintegrate and my soul will remain. But then, my body and my soul
will resurrect together and so be reunited. Thus, I, as myself will enjoy immortality.
Aquinas acknowledges, in his Commentary on the Corinthians, that ‘if the
resurrection of the body is denied, it is not easy, yea it is difficult, to sustain the
immortality of the soul’ (p 197). The phenomenon of resurrection means that the
matter dies, but then it comes again to life. Aquinas does not explain how that is
possible. He does not try to demonstrate it either. His belief in God is boundless, and
so, he trusts fully in God’s power. As God is omnipotent he can make such a thing
possible. In Disputed questions on the soul, Aquinas also gives an account of the
immortality of the soul based on faith. He explains, in the response to the fifth
objection, that, at the beginning, namely in the Garden of Eden, death did not exist.
But then, because Adam and Eve disobeyed God – this is known as the ‘Original Sin’
-, God condemned them to die as a punishment. They would be saved only after
resurrection. So ‘it is accidental that the body does not share in the incorruptibility of
the soul’. Finally, Aquinas does not think that we can claim that everybody will enjoy
immortality. Who will resurrect and who will not is God’s choice and we cannot know
his decision. ‘For him, therefore, there is no “proof of the immortality of the soul”’
(Davies 1992, p216).
1 Again, Aquinas refers to Aristotle saying that it is proven in De anima that the soul
needs no bodily organ to operate.
Aquinas makes the immortality of the soul possible without espousing Descartes’
dualist vision of the soul. However, asserting that the soul is an independently
existing thing in its own right can lead to identifying the individual with his or her soul.
This problem is raised by the third objection which goes even further saying that ‘if
the soul is a particular thing, it follows that it is an individual’. Thus, we are left with
the Cartesian point that I am my soul. If we add that the soul is a subsistent thing,
then, Aquinas’ theory can become a ‘threat to the unity of the human being’
(Kretzmann and Stump 1993, p134). Aquinas wanted to show that I am a compound
of soul and body, of corporeal and incorporeal substance. But here, what I am
tempted to think is that I am my soul and therefore, I am essentially constituted with
incorporeal substance. This point is closer to Descartes’ but also to Plato’s who gives
much more importance to everything immaterial. The problem here is that Aquinas
gets further from Aristotle’s rather materialist theory he wanted to adopt. Russell in
his History of Western philosophy is even close to saying that Aquinas’ interpretation
of Aristotle work was a failure. Aquinas theory can be simplified saying that he does
not think that the whole world can be explained in physical terms but neither does he
believe that the immaterial part is more important. This is why Davies says that
Aquinas’ position is ‘midway between the extremes of Dualism and Physicalism’
(Davies 1992, p209). But maybe this ambiguity is the weakness of his argument…
Although the soul is a particular thing in its own right, it ‘needs the body in order to
complete its species’ (Aquinas, response to objection n·1). This is also why, for
Aquinas, I am not my soul but a compound of body and soul. The example of the
soul’s ‘operation’ here can be useful here. ‘Aquinas calls the activity of which
something is naturally capable its “operation”’(Marenbon 1987, p123). My intellectual
life comes from my soul. So its operation is to reason. Aquinas does not believe that
we have innate ideas; all knowledge comes through the senses. As it comes through
the senses and as the soul is the form of the body, it acquires its knowledge through
material things. Thus, it needs the body to exercise its reason. But Aquinas asserted
that the soul needs no bodily organ to operate and because of that, it is a particular
thing. So there seem to be another ambiguity - or maybe is it a contradiction - in the
nature of the soul. It does not need any material thing to operate, but it operates
through material things. This can be a threat to the nature of the soul because, if it is
really a contradiction, then it cannot be true and the soul is a particular thing as it is
dependent on the body. The question of the soul’s dependence on the body is raised
in the twelfth objection: ‘whatever depends on something else is not a particular
thing’. As a response, Aquinas says that the soul depends on the body only to
achieve its species but it is not dependent on the body to exist. This would mean that
something can exist without having achieved its species; but is it necessarily true?
Again, this can be a weakness to Aquinas’ position.

Aquinas starts adopting Aristotle’s position but gets further from it to prove the
immortality of the soul. There’s a slight risk of confusion associated with it. It seems
as if Aquinas tried to ‘be all things to all people’, true to Aristotle’s theory but at the
same time true to his Christian faith. But maybe the main grounds for objection lie in
the fact that Aquinas does not demonstrate wholly the immortality of an individual on
philosophical grounds. At some point, when talking about resurrection, he has to call
on his faith. It is then hard to make people agree with his position as not everybody
believes in resurrection – even if in Aquinas’ time the situation was different. There is
not even a general consensus that souls exist; it has not been proven scientifically,
so we still struggle with the same questions as people some seven centuries ago...

As theories of human behaviour the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the problem
of ‘collective action’ assume that humans will always make selfish choices in
their own rational self-interest. Do you think this is a useful way to analyse and
offer solutions to political problems?

The economists' assumption that all human behaviour is self-interested, or rationally

motivated, has only recently been adopted by some political scientists to form a new
branch of political study known as 'rational-choice theory'. (RCT) It constitutes the
latest in a long and varied history of approaches to the discipline of political analysis.
While the predictive models offered by RCT are certainly appealing, it remains to be
seen whether the method is any better than the scientific tradition that reached it's
peak in the 1960s, the empirical tradition championed by John Locke and David
Hume, or even the philosophical tradition of Ancient Greece. In this essay I will lay
out the basics of the theory and assess the weight of the arguments for and against
it, in particular the 'tragedy of the commons' and the problem of 'collective action'.

RCT asserts that all human interaction is based on rational decisions made by the
individual solely with his or her maximum personal betterment, or utility, in mind. It is
an assumption that has worked well in neoclassical economics, enabling the
construction of formal, and largely predictive, models of human behaviour based
upon procedural rules. (Scott, 2000:126) It was this apparent success that originally
lured other social scientists to consider a similar approach. The idea of rationality
itself was by no means a new concept; however even those who pioneered studies in
it, such as Max Weber, were reluctant to attribute to it all human action. Weber built
an influential typology of habitual, emotional, and various forms of value-oriented
action alongside the purely rational types of action. (ibid) The distinguishing
characteristic of RCT is that it denies the existence of any kind of action other than
the purely calculative. Using RCT, 'all social action can be seen as rationally
motivated, as instrumental action, however much it may appear to be irrational or
non-rational.' (ibid) This idea that complex social phenomena can be explained in
terms of it's component elementary individual 'actions-parts', is fundamental to all
variants of the theory. The standpoint is known as 'methodological individualism', and
is best surmised by Jon Elster : 'The elementary unit of social life is the individual
human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they
arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals' (ibid) The theory has
been applied to voting behaviour analysis, where attention is shifted from the
traditional determinants - social conditioning and party identification - to the individual
voting in his or her personal self-interest. 'Issue voting', as it is known, seems an
increasingly verifiable phenomenon in our postmodern, pluralistic and individualistic
society. A subfield of RCT, public-choice theory, applies the same rational decision
making process to the public sector. This model of bureaucracy is based entirely on
the premise that the bureaucrats themselves are exclusively interested in their own
personal advancement. (Heywood, 1997: 385) Another example of RCT’s application
is party politics. The premise is that the 'political market' parallels the economic
market, in that politicians act essentially as entrepreneurs seeking votes, meaning
that parties behave very much like businesses. Power thus ultimately resides with
the 'consumers', i.e. the voters. (ibid,: 277) Parties seek to 'shape' or mobilise public
opinion as well as respond to it, in much the same way that businesses do using
advertising and R&D.
Despite these apparently successful applications, the theory remains problematic.
Not least is the difficulty in assimilating 'collective action' with the general laws of
RCT. Some critics, such as Ian Shapiro (2000), argue that the lack of a proper
solution to this problem, among others, shows the need to go beyond, or even to
abandon, the theory. The problem lies in explaining why individuals participate in
groups, associations and other forms of joint action. If individuals really calculated
the cost-benefit ratio of such co-operation and acted accordingly, there should be no
institutions of collective action at all. If they really are only self-interested, why should
they ever choose to do something that will benefit others more than themselves?
(Scott, 2000: 129) Political parties, trades unions and other organisations may be
described as 'collective actors' - decision-making apparatuses that aggregates or
homogenises individual intentions, thus fitting into the the formula of RCT, but this is
not the real problem the theory faces. The problem is explaining how such
organisations come to be formed in the first place. (ibid) Why, for example, should
someone join a trade union if they receive any negotiated wage increase in any
case? Rational individuals will calculate that the cost of membership is high and that
their participation can have no significant effect on the organisation's bargaining
power, and so they should conclude that they have nothing to gain from membership.
(ibid) Each potential member will judge that a trade union's bargaining power
depends on the sheer size of it's membership; thus one extra member will make no
difference. This example is not wholly dissimilar to the 'tragedy of the commons'
scenario coined by Garrett Hardin in 1968 for a dilemma that has no technical
solution, but instead requires collective, co-operative action. The image is derived
from the choice that faces every herdsman using a communal pasture to graze his
livestock. If Herdsman A adds one additional beast to the commons, he gains +1
utility of revenue from that animal. The costs of adding the additional animal is
shared amongst every herdsman in the co-operative and thus Herdsman A's
individual cost is a fraction of -1. It is therefore the rational choice of not only
Herdsman A but also of all his fellow herdsmen, to continue adding animals to the
commons until the pasture is completely overgrazed and barren. 'Ruin is the
destination to which all men rush – freedom in a commons brings ruin to all'
(Hardin,1968) In our above example the trade union is the commons, and the
potential members; the herdsman. The utility drawn from the commons in this
instance is individual benefit of not having to 'cultivate' it by abstaining from
membership. However the existence of the commons means that it's produce, i.e
wage protection etc. is shared by all. The same thinking can be applied to process of
voting. The cost of voting far outweighs the infinitesimal odds of an individual
effecting a result. This leads to the 'free rider' paradox; if each potential member or
voter makes this same calculation, as RCT expects, then no one would ever join the
union and no one would ever vote. (ibid,:130) In the first case unions would have little
or no bargaining power, and so no one would receive any negotiated pay rises or
improved conditions of work. In the second, representative democracy would cease
to exist. The fact that people do join organisations and do vote must mean that there
is something missing from the simple rational action model. (ibid) Alternative
adaptations of the meaning of rationality are sometimes offered to allow for these
facts. For example, voters are sometimes deemed to be maximizing their 'sense of
civic virtue'. The model does not, however, offer any solutions to these 'problems'.
They are 'problems' of course, because a 0% turnout to an election never comes
about unless influenced by external factors. In the case of the commons however, it
could be argued that RCT was the reason for enclosure of land and the introduction
of private property laws. Thereafter it was no longer a rational decision to continue
adding animals to the land, as the land-owner bore all of the gains and costs
involved.
Nonetheless, it would appear that RCT is undermined more frequently than it is
vindicated. The applications mentioned above, voting behaviour, party politics etc. all
ignore the fact that people seldom possess a clear set of preferred goals and rarely
make decisions in the light of full and accurate knowledge. Even when they do, their
range of choice is often narrow. (Heywood, 2007:15,277) In the case of 'issue' voting,
the individual is abstracted completely from their socio-cultural context and the root
fact that the ability to evaluate issues and calculate self-interest largely originates
from broader party attachments and group loyalties is completely ignored. (ibid,:268)
Defenders of the theory such as Morris P. Fiorina (2000) apologise for other
practitioners over-enthusiastic claims. He still contends however, that it is more than
just a useful analytical device. He maintains that in high politics, for example, a
Senate vote on a Supreme Court nomination, RCT is certainly applicable because of
the fact that 1 in 100 votes is worth far more than the single vote in mass political
elections. This may be true, but it seems that all to often, this is the very arena in
which RCT is applied. Ian Shapiro takes a far more sceptical view of the method. He
challenges RCT practitioners that after forty years of 'infusion of the methodologies of
economics into the academic study of politics', the concept did not aid the
constitutional designers after the collapse of Communism and that it has yet to offer
'anything important about more conventional politics that was not previously known.'
(Shapiro, 2000) He claims that 'typically RC theorists either ignore or recycle
conventional wisdom through their models or that they specify the models so vaguely
as to render them compatible with every possible outcome.' (ibid) He dismisses the
adaptations of the meaning of rationality as intellectual squirming rather than
admitting to a banal model. Finally, he attacks RCT's dependence on the 'all other
things being equal' assumption of it's models. In economics, this concept is known as
'ceteris paribus' and in terms of markets it is often an acceptable simplification, but
when utilised with the far more complex subtleties of human choice it renders the
models otiose. The true answer often lies in the ignored variables that are held
constant. Shapiro fears that the reason for the proliferation of RCT is entirely due to
the allure of developing a universal deductive theory of political study. He warns that
in search of RCT's applications, practitioners often exemplify the old adage 'that
when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything around you starts to look like a
nail.' A better approach, he contends, is that of the empirical tradition, where theories
can be 'tested by the predictions they make, modified when they fail, and tested
again and again' He concludes that this inductive approach may or may not lead one
day to a general theory of politics, but that at least in the interim it is far more likely to
'illuminate political arrangements and behaviour than the endless elaboration of
models that purport to explain everything and as a result explain nothing.' (ibid)

Thus, it is clear that RCT is far from an infallible formula of political theory. It is
unlikely to offer any radical solutions to problems such as 'collective action' if any at
all, for it seems to contradict very problem's existence. What's more, there is a
danger that RCT is being advanced at the expense of other fruitful approaches such
as empiricism and normative theory. RCT is an interesting concept and is certainly a
useful analytical mechanism in small numbers, such as the example of the US
Senate – but it should not outreach it's grasp. As outlined in the introduction, Political
Science has gone through many phases of methodology; RCT is the most recent and
it is likely to be around for some time to come; the quality of it's legacy, however, is
dubious.

Is free will compatible with determinism?

The perhaps intuitive belief that man is free in his actions is widely regarded as the
reason why he can both firstly attempt self-validation of those actions and secondly
be held accountable to them. Indeed, without this belief there would appear to be
good reason for him to, at the very least, consider abandonment of said actions. It is
the intention of this paper to argue and demonstrate that man need not do this; this
paper aims to show that man is in truth free to act in accordance with his will.
Nevertheless, attention must be drawn to the fact that in stating man is free to act,
this is not an attempt to directly refute the concept of determinism, whilst appreciating
the inherent difference between both types; soft and hard. Rather, it is a statement
that the concepts of free will and soft determinism operate together, both existing as
radically different perspectives on the same principle and relying upon the other for
foundation. Ultimately, they can together be combined to allow for the existence of
moral responsibility in the world. This paper is therefore an argument for
compatibilism. Initially the appropriate definitions of the relevant terms in
consideration will be addressed before a variety of arguments will be considered
which support the concept of compatibilism. Equally, the largely divergent argument
of incompatibilsm, made up of hard determinism and libertarianism, will be evaluated
with the intention of addressing why they do not provide adequate solutions to the
free will question.

Initial conceptions to the ordinary person of free will and determinism are often ones
which appear to prevent the sharing of common ground. That we seem to be
“natural incompatibilists” in our day-to-day lives is often the root cause of either
extending this thinking to either inferring we have absolute free will or contrasting that
we lack it completely (Pink 2004, p.13). However, much of this belief of their
apparent incompatibility can be seen to have arisen from a lack of both preciseness
and validity in defining what it means for an individual to possess free will. Classical
compatibilists such as David Hume and Thomas Hobbes respectively defined free
will as being an agent in the position of having “the power of acting or not acting” and
there being “no stops in doing what he has the desire to do” (Hume 1975, p.95, Kane
2005, p.13). These definitions suggest that an individual is in control of freedom
when they have the capacity for action whilst conversely, when they are constrained
in being unable to exert the capacity for action they can be seen as lacking freedom.
Constraint on an individual can be seen as be the prevention of what the individual in
question would otherwise have done, had it not been for the overpowering
constraining influence (Strawson, Gallen 1998, 2004). This constraint can be of
several forms, including coercion, physical and mental influences and moreover
through a denial of opportunity. Essentially, this therefore means that the freedom of
an individual can be denied through matters such as imprisonment, threat and
intimidation, psychiatric problems and physical impairment. At this stage it is crucial
to note that regardless as to whether an individual’s actions are determined by prior
events in their life, they can still be seen as possessing freedom so long as there are
no external constraints to their will. Freedom therefore, is solely a question of being
able to act in the manner the individual desires given how that individual is.
Furthermore, this account of free will also ensures that an individual also has the
capacity to have done otherwise, in that the individual would have done differently
had they wanted to.

In some instances, the account of freedom presented above draws scepticism from
those who either demand of free will that man be an ‘unmoved mover’ or rather
indicate as Arthur Schopenhauer does that ‘man can do what he wants, but cannot
will what he wants’ (Aristotle, 2004, Schopenhauer, 1839). However, this problem as
to the self-consciousness that the individual has over his will can also be answered
by a compatibilist account of free will. Indeed, whilst an individual’s self-
consciousness may be the product of determination, the mere fact the individual
recognises himself as being presented with choice ensures that the freedom he
enjoys is distinct from non-self-conscious animals, importantly separating man from
lower animal. Whilst moreover, Harry Frankfurt indicates that ‘one has free will if one
wants to be moved to action by the motives that do in fact move one to action’
(Frankfurt 1982), indicating freedom comes with reason.

An individual’s intuitive feeling on their capacity for freedom is often greatly affected
by their misinterpretation of what the concept of determinism means. Indeed,
determinism is typically viewed as being contrary to free will because people may
have the belief that the forces of nature in the world are working against our will.
However, this perhaps is not accurate. Whereas an individual may believe that
predetermination of his actions means that he has no influence over his existence,
from a compatibilist perspective the choices that the individual has made, have
instead been produced by the circumstances and events of his life. In this, it can be
seen that the causality necessitated by prior events and the laws of the world do not
form part of the barrier to freedom, i.e. they are not constraining influences. A.J.
Ayer’s account on determinism is particularly relevant at this point because it
expands upon David Hume’s, which under scrutiny and in the case of the
kleptomaniac can be viewed as allowing for unfree actions to count as free. Ayer
suggests “someone is free just in case, if they chose to do otherwise, they would
have. The reason that I’m not free when I’m under control is that, even if I had
chosen to do otherwise, I would not have” and thus in the example of the
kleptomaniac, the individual with the mental impairment would not be free from
stealing even if they did not desire to cease from doing so (Kane 2005, p.18).

The concept of soft determinism is reliant upon the validity of causality. This paper
contends that as a principle, causality is both valid and present in all facets of the
world. When observing the world, it is apparent that the behaviours of things are
indeed subject to determination, and this determination comes as a result of their
inherent nature. For example, an apple falling from a tree does so because it is both
biologically consistent to do so when it reaches a stage of ripeness and is affected by
gravity. To deny the evident cause and effect of this sequence would be incoherent,
and to a large extent it would in effect be to suggest that this event occurred solely
randomly. C. J. Ducasse suggests “no change occurs and no state persists without a
cause”, and for this principle to exist in the world, it must exist in all thing; as the
apple is affected by causality, so too is man (Ducasse 1969, p.45). Moreover, in
accepting causality, it is critical to recognise that the type of free will individuals
expect to influence comes directly from the decision making process. This is
particularly relevant because one should not expect decisions to come about free
from antecedent events but rather as the combined result of an individual’s
circumstances, made up from their experiences and beliefs. By addressing the issue
of actively making decisions and having thoughts which appear to allow for free will
within the context of causality, a stronger link can be established between freedom
and determinism. Indeed, without the validity of causality, and as with the falling of
the apple, the thoughts and desires of humans would otherwise be as equally
random.

In this context, the concept of libertarianistic free will becomes objectionable because
it essentially seeks to deny the pathway of causality. If indeed causality holds merit,
an individual cannot be an ultimate originator, acting distinct from any influencing
force. This however would directly oppose with a wealth of research in social
psychologically which contrastingly indicates that an individual’s life is heavily
influenced by the environment in which they grow up and live in. In addition, the
libertarian would also be committed to stating that as a condition of free will, an
individual should be able to act regardless of their desires.

Furthermore, it is equally similar that there are as powerful objections to hard

determinism, which states that free will is an incoherent concept given the arguably
completely deterministic nature of the universe. The issue that arises here is the
direct opposition that the apparent existence of moral responsibility offers to hard
determinism, in that one cannot exist unless the other does not. P. F. Strawson
states that “it is psychologically impossible to stop holding persons morally
responsible for their conduct” and the seemingly naturalistic moral responsibility that
man intuitively feels opposes the otherwise chain of events which would have given
risen to a world with no overriding concern, or even concept, of moral responsibility
(McKenna 2004).
In conclusion, it can be seen that neither libertarianism nor hard determinism provide
accounts of free will that seem in truth with the facts. Rather, to excise free will is to
excise choice without constraint and to have the capacity to have done otherwise.
This, within the context of the validity of causality and soft determinism, creates a
strong backing for the argument of compatibility. By uniting these concepts, the
intuitive feel for moral responsibility that largely dominates the actions of man can be
supported.

Is there a limit to the rights of the majority in a democracy?

This essay considers the meaning and the workings of democracy today. It argues
that there is a necessary limit to the rights of the majority therein, for moral and for
practical reasons. The limit is imposed according to the institutional configuration of
the system in question, but most clearly in federal systems and by the third branch,
and is championed in postmodern rights discourse. Democracy is an essentially
contested concept. A democratic system is founded on the principle that the majority
preference rules. As Stoker said, ‘politics exists because we do not agree with one
another. Politics is about choosing between competing interests and views often
demanding incompatible allocations of limited resources’ (Haywood: 2007, 10).
Minorities, whether racial, cultural, defined or undefined, must be protected within
constitutional, legislative, meta-cultural norms; without such protections, a
democracy cannot work. The Federalist papers set this out clearly when Hamilton
argued that it is better to control the effects of the natural mischief of faction, rather
than remove the causes of the mischief by destroying liberty or giving every person
‘the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests’ (Schmidt, Shelley,
and Bardes, 2009-2010: 561).

Abraham Lincoln’s famous phrase describing democracy as ‘government of the

people by the people for the people’ is the dominant pop culture definition of
democracy. The Greek word demos conjures an image of an all-encompassing order
or system of rule. As Heywood notes, central features include ‘party competition and
electoral choice [in regularly held free and fair elections], and it observes a clear
distinction between the state and civil society, thus allowing for the existence of
autonomous groups and private property’ (Haywood, 2007: 88). At the heart of
democracy as a system of ordering society is the basic tension between satisfying
the demands of the majority and protecting the needs of the minority. Representative
democracy, whether parliamentary, presidential or mixed, has superseded over
direct democratic models for obvious practical reasons. One becomes a minority ‘if
the political majority in the polity decide that certain groups do not belong to the
supposedly ‘homogeneous’ people’ (Benhabib, 2004:55) Democracy protects the
minority not only because individuals have rights but for functionality. Members of the
majority on one issue may fall into the minority on the next issue, and thus are keen
to have safeguards, even though it may mean falling short of the best possible
outcome in their view.

Rights discourse has found champions in political science and wider multi-
disciplinary writing today in such people as Seyla Benhabib, who contends that the
rights of individuals supersede concepts of freedom and justice (Benhabib, 2004).
‘We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live
in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to
belong to some kind of organized community only when millions of people emerge
who have lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political
situation’ (Arendt, 1951/1968: 177). The Irish constitution, in its preamble, states that
‘in seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice
and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, [and]
true social order attained’ (Kelly, 1984:5). Constitutions and the role of the judiciary
are crucial means of protecting minorities in society. Even in Britain, where the
constitution is unwritten, a new British Supreme Court in operation since October
2009, formalizing the role of the Law Lords. Indeed, modern democracy is
undergoing a process of judicialization across civil and common law systems. South
Africa’s Constitutional Court is one of the most vociferous proponents of social and
economic as well as political rights in a divided society with scarce resources and
predominant party power. Minority rights have also been championed in the
globalization juggernaut. In Ireland recently, the European Court of Human Rights
has ruled that the Irish government have ‘failed to properly implement the
constitutional right to abortion where a woman is entitled to one where her life is at
risk’ (O’Brien & McGee, 2010), bringing a contentious issue to the fore in Irish
political life once again.

The democratic debate that surrounded the establishment of the United States is
most illustrative of the aforementioned tension. Hamilton, Jay and Madison wrote the
Federalist Papers to delineate their view of order in the new country, which would be
steeped in recognition of the importance of separated powers. ‘Hamilton’s federalism
was characterized by a deep distrust of democracy, support for an active central
government and the desire to boost manufacturing industry through national fiscal
and economic policies. ‘Hamiltonianism’ thus came to represent the idea of a
powerful national government with strong executive authority able to support the
emerging national economy’ (Heywood, 2007: 168). The framers were determined
that minorities would be protected and installed in the American constitution a
network of checks and balances in dividing power between the Presidency, the
House of Representatives and the Supreme Court. Federalism is thus often exported
to fractured parts of the world today such as the Nigeria or South Africa and to large
diverse societies such as Canada and Germany. Political scientists market the
unique balance the system holds between the rights of the individual with the need to
manage the collective.

This essay has outlined the reasons why there is, and must be, a limit to the rights of
the majority in democracy. No matter how one defines democracy, or more
importantly, no matter how any democratic system plays out in reality, protecting the
minority from the tyranny of the majority is fundamental. The federal system grew out
of a historical experience that had a unique empathy for the tyranny of the majority,
and so may be keenly suited to countries where the minority are especially at risk, for
example in the aftermath of civil war. In other democratic models, the court acts a
crucial stabilizing mechanism. Independent judges ensure legislative bargains are
upheld, guarantee the role of the opposition in political life, and uphold the sanctity of
constitutional rights. Overall, the purpose of separated powers in modern liberal
democracies ‘is to fragment government power in such a way as to defend liberty
and keep tyranny at bay. It demands independence… [but] also implies
interdependence, in the form of shared powers’ (Heywood, 2007: 339). Direct,
representative, federal, unitary, parliamentary, presidential: democracy is a
consummate example of Gallie’s essentially contested concept (1964). Achieving the
best realization of the term is an ongoing endeavour. However, it is accepted and
agreed by all that installing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority is as
important a project as the initial decision to try to rule by majority.