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GENGHIS KHAN AS MIL THEORIST

1. Intro. Temujin, founder of Mongol Empire, was born in 1162 at Khentii

Mtns ,Mongolia. After founding the Mongol Empire and being
proclaimed "Genghis Khan", he started the Mongol invasions and
raids of the Kara-Khitan Khanate, Caucasus, Khwarezmid
Empire, Western Xia and Jin dynasties. By the end of his life, the
Mongol Empire occupied a substantial portion of Central Asia
and China. He died in 1227 after defeating the Tanguts. His
descendants went on to stretch the Mongol Empire across most
of Eurasia by conquering and/or creating vassal states out of all of
modern-day China, Korea, the Caucasus, Central Asian ctys, and
substantial portions of modern Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Mil Campaigns
2. Fol mil campaign were fought by Genghis Khan:-
a. Western Xia Dynasty (1206).
b. Jin Dynasty (1211).
c. Kara-Khitan Khanate(1218).
d. Khwarezmian Empire(1220).
e. Georgia and Volga Bulgaria(1237-40).
Genghis Khan as Mil ldr
3. The mil tac and org helped the Mongol Empire to conquer nearly all of
continental Asia, the Middle East and parts of eastern Europe. In many
ways, it can be regarded as the first "modern" mil sys .The original
foundation of that sys was an extn of the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols.
Tech useful to attk fortifications were adapted from other cultures, and
foreign technical experts intg into the comd structures.
a. Org and Char. Genghis Khan org the Mongol sldrs into
gps based on the decimal sys. Units were recursively built from gps of 10
(Arav), 100 (Zuut), 1,000 (Minghan), and 10,000 (Tumen), each with a ldr
reporting to the next higher lvl. The ldrs on each lvl had significant license
to exec their orders in the way they considered best. This comd structure
proved army to be highly flexible and allowed the Mongol to attack en
masse, divide into somewhat smaller gps to encircle and lead enemies into
an ambush, or divide into small gps of 10 to mop up a fleeing and broken
army.
b. Breaking tribal connections. When integrating new sldrs into
the army, Genghis Khan divided the sldrs under different ldrs to break up the
social and tribal connections, so there was no div based on heritage of tribal
alliances. Thus, he helped to unite several disparate peoples and gave them new
loyalties to each other. Promotion was mainly based on merit
c. Mob. Each Mongol sldr typically maintained 3 or 4
horses. Changing horses often allowed them to travel at high speed for
days without stopping or wearing out the animals. Their ability to live off
the land, and in extreme situations off their animals (mare's milk
especially), made their armies far less dependent on the traditional log

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apparatus of western agrarian armies. In some cases, as during the
invasion of Hungary in early 1241, they covered up to 100 miles per day,
which was unheard of by other armies of the time.
d. Trg and discp. Most European armies consisted of a few
professional men at arms, and knights, and large levies of peasants
or militia. Only the knights and the few professional fighting men trained
reg. Offrs and troopers alike were usually given a wide leeway by their
superiors in carrying out their orders, so long as the larger objs of the plan
were well served and the orders promptly obeyed. The Mongols thus
avoided the pitfalls of overly rigid discp and micromgmt which have proven
a hobgoblin to armed forces throughout hist.
e. Cav. Six of every ten Mongol troopers were lt cav horse
archers, the remaining four were more hy armd and armd lancers. Mongol lt
cav sldrs, called keshik, were extremely lt tps compared to contemporary
stds, allowing them to exec tac and mnvrs that would have been
impractical for a heavier enemy (such as European knights).
f. Log. The Mongol armies traveled very lt, and were able to live
largely off the land. Their eqpt incl fish hooks and other tools meant to
make each warrior indep of any fixed sup source. The most common travel
food of the Mongols was dried and gr meat "Borts", which is still common
in the Mongolian cuisine today. Borts is lt and easy to tpt, and can be
cooked with water similarly to a modern "instant soup"
g. Comm. The Mongols estb Yam, a sys of postal-relay
horse stas, similar to the sys emp in ancient Persia for fast tfr of written
msgs. The Mongol mail sys was the first such empire-wide svc since the
Roman Empire. Additionally, Mongol b fd comm utilized sig flags and horns
and to a lesser extent, sig arrows to comm mov orders during cbt.
h. Wpns
(1) Mongol Bow. The primary wpn of the Mongol
forces was the Mongol bow. It was a recurve bow made
from comp materials (wood, horn, and sinew), and at the
time unmatched for accuracy, force, and reach. The bow's
geometry allowed to make it relatively small so it could be
used and fired in any dir from horseback.
(2) Swords. Mongol sword was a slightly
curved scimitar which was more useful for slashing
attks than stabbing and thrusting, making it easier to
use on horseback.
(3) Catapults and machines. Tech was one of the imp
facets of Mongolian warfare. For instance, siege
machines were an imp part of Genghis Khan's warfare,
especially in attacking fortified cities. The siege engines
were disassembled and carried by horses to be rebuilt at the
site of the battle. The engineers building the machines were
recruited among captives, mostly from China and Persia.
When Mongols slaughtered whole populations, they often

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spared the engineers and techs, swiftly assimilating them
into the Mongol armies.
j. Strat. The Mongol b fd tacs were a combination of
masterful trg combined with excellent comm and the ability to
follow orders in the chaos of cbt. They trained for virtually
every possibility, so when it occurred, they could react
accordingly. Unlike many of their foes, the Mongols also
protected their ranking offrs well. Their trg and discp allowed
them to fight without the need for constant supervision or
rallying, which often placed comds in dangerous posns.
(1) Int and planning. The Mongols carefully scouted
out and spied on their enemies in adv of any invasion.
Prior to the invasion of Europe, Batu and Subutai sent
spies for almost ten yrs into the heart of Europe, making
maps of the old Roman roads, estb trade routes, and
determining the lvl of ability of each principality to resist
invasion. They made well-educated guesses as to the
willingness of each principality to aid the others, and
their ability to resist alone or together.
(2) Psy warfare. The Mongols used psy
warfare successfully in many of their battles, especially
in terms of spreading terror and fear to towns and cities.
They often offered an opportunity for the enemy to
surrender and pay tribute, instead of having their city
ransacked and destroyed.
(3) Deception. The Mongols also used deception
very well in their wars. For instance, when apch a mob
army the units would be split into three or more army
gps, each trying to outflank and surprise their
opponents. This created many b fd scenarios for the
opponents where the Mongols would seem to appear
out of nowhere and that there were seemingly more of
them than in actuality.
k. Gr tac . The Tumens would typically adv on a broad front, five
lines deep. The first three lines would be composed of horse
archers, the last two of lancers. Once an en force was loc, the
Mongols would try to avoid risky or reckless frontal aslts (in sharp
contrast to their European and Middle-Eastern opponents). Instead
they would use diversionary attks to fix the en in place, while their
main forces sought to outflank or surround the foe. First the horse
archers would lay down a withering barrage of arrow fire. Addl
arrows were carried by camels who followed close by, ensuring a
plentiful sup of ammo.
(1) Flk. In all b fd sit the tps would be divided into separate
fmns of 10, 100, 1,000 or 10,000 depending on the reqs. If
the tp split from the main force is significant like 10,000 or

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more they would be handled over to a significant or sec in
comd ldr while the main ldr conc on the front line. The ldr of
the Mongols would gen give the tac used to attk the en. For
instance the ldr might say when seeing a city or town, "500
to the lt and 500 to the rt" of the city and those would be
relayed to the 5 units of 100 sldrs and they would try to flk or
encircle the town to the lt and rt.
(2) Encirclement and opening. The main reason for this is to
encircle the city so that they cannot escape and to obviously
overwhelm from both sides. If sit deteriorated on one of the
fronts or sides, the ldr from the hill dir the army to sp the
other. If it appears that there is going to be significant loss,
the Mongols would retreat to save their tps and would
engage the next day or the next month after having studied
the ens' tac.
(3) Feigned retreat The Mongols commonly practiced the
feigned retreat, which is perhaps the most difficult b fd tac to
exec. This is because a feigned rout amongst untrained tps
can often turn into a real rout if an en presses into it.
Pretending disarray and defeat in the heat of the battle, the
Mongols would suddenly appear panicked and turn and run,
only to pivot when the en was drawn out, destroying them at
their own leisure.
Conclusion
4. Genghis Khan was one of the greatest conquerors the world has ever
seen. He had conquered a vast area stretching from northern China to the
Caspian Sea. In addition, he had laid the foundation for the continuance of his
empire by building a strong army and establishing basic laws of governance.

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