THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008]

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a
prospective, not retroactive, effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a guilty
person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These
are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa

ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na
kriminal.

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal
possession of a firearm.

The Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch
order[2] from the desk officer.[3] The order directed him and three (3) other
policemen to serve a warrant of arrest[4] issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against
petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.[5]

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner,

checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.[6] Eventually, the team
proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon
City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.[7] SPO2
Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.[8] They put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.[9] Found tucked
in his waist[10] was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315[11] with five (5)
live ammunition.[12]

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.[13]

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[14] Epifanio Deriquito, the records verifier,
presented a certification[15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief records
officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.[16]

Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[17] as amended. The Information read:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 “Charter Arms” revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.

(Sgd.)

GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP

Assistant City Prosecutor[18]

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.[19] Trial on the merits
ensued.

SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated
above.

Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined
testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and
Adrian Yuson.

Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house
of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.[20] He
was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes
bolted the room.[21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled him out of the
room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet.[23] The raiding
team went back inside and searched and ransacked the room.[24] SPO2 Disuanco
stood guard outside with him.[25] Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!”[26]

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that “we are authorized to shoot you
because there’s a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do so
something, do it right now.”[27] He was also told that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest.[28] However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for
it.[29] Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30]

According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun
seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was,
however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm because it
was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when he was
incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was
he allowed to see or talk to his family.[31]

Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with
the Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-
wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said police officer. Col.
Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the Ombudsman by his wife. Col.
Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the search in
his boarding house.[32]

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a
Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 1993[33] covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3
Timbol identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested,
testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he
was preparing for school.[36] They grabbed his shoulder and led him out.[37]
During all those times, a gun was poked at him.[38] He was asked where petitioner
was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s room.[39]

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He witnessed how they pointed a
gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his underwear.[41] He also witnessed how
they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room.[42] While a policeman remained
near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room.[43]
They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,[44] which
yielded the subject firearm.[45]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as
maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).

The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP.

SO ORDERED.[46]

Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.
[48] He appealed to the CA.

On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition.
The fallo of the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is
modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[49]

His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied through a Resolution dated
August 3, 2004,[51] petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND

LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE
OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

NOT UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF
THE MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and
ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.[53]

The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through
the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the
firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than petitioner himself.
[56]

As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified

that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the
Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized pistol was
not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a certain Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[57] As proof, Deriquito presented a certification
signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.[58]

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative
of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and
Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

The certification is outside the scope

of the hearsay rule.

The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.[60]
Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being hearsay.[61]

On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.

It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of
the facts stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting
evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than
an acquittal.

The assessment of credibility of

witnesses lies with the trial court.

First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search
was conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he was
occupying.[62]

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual
findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses.
However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v. Rivera:[63]

x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness

stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on
the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling
the truth or lying through his teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the
question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the
defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed
as correct and entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given
the highest degree of respect if not finality.[64] (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find
no compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.

Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only
claims to be highly decorated,[65] but have effected a number of successful
arrests[66] as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that
framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting
officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up,
they could have easily “planted” a more incriminating evidence rather than a
gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there
indeed was one.

The pieces of evidence show that

petitioner is not legally authorized to

possess the subject firearm and its

five (5) ammunition.

Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm
and its ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the
PNP Narcotics Command.[67]

Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen
are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties,
[68] it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The
prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance to
petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner
based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.[69]
However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination[70] would
reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints.
Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable circumstances.

Failure to offer an unlicensed

firearm as evidence is not fatal

provided there is competent

testimony as to its existence.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been
excluded as evidence because they were not formally offered by the
prosecution[71] in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.[72]

We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the
Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the
subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner’s act may result to an absurd
situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the subject
firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt
useless.
In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg to stand on.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm[73] and its five (5) live
ammunition[74] were offered in evidence by the prosecution.[75] Even assuming
arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must still fail. The
existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without
its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-presentation of the pistol
did not prevent the conviction of the accused.

The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.[77]

As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live
ammunition were established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[78] Yuson
also identified said firearm.[79] Petitioner even admitted its existence.[80]

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is
presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for
example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent
testimony as to its existence.

Penal and civil liabilities

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It
provides that “[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.”

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed
the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on
July 6, 1997,[81] during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present
law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .
380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
(Underscoring supplied)

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law.[82] An exception to this rule,
however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief
Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the
penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.”[83]

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is
still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to
prision correccional in its maximum period[84] from reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which

ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the
prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its
medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and
two [2] months).[86] Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum
term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in
consonance with the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals[87] and
Barredo v. Vinarao.[88]

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition
should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code[89] which provides,
among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED
in full.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura, JJ.,

concur.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] New Civil Code, Art. 4.

1-a Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

[2] Exhibit “D.”

[3] TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.

[4] Exhibit “B.”

[5] TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

[6] Id. at 11.

[7] Id. at 3. INP is now Philippine National Police (PNP).

[8] Id. at 4.

[9] Id. at 5-6.

[10] TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 10.

[11] Exhibit “E.”

[12] Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.”

[13] TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6.

[14] TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.

[15] Exhibit “C.”

PNPFED 12 Jul[y] 1996

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter Arms, Cal. 38 with serial number 52315
is registered to RAUL PALENCIA SALVATIERA of Sampaloc, Manila, acquired thru
transfer f[ro]m Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card d[a]t[e]d 10 December 1990.

This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve.

FOR THE CHIEF, FED:

EDWIN C[.] ROQUE (Sgd.)

P/Sr. Inspector

Chief, Records Br[.]

[16] TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20.

[17] Entitled “An Act Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,

Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for
Relevant Purposes.” This law was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 29, 1983. See Zuño, Sr. v. Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223
SCRA 584, 598.
[18] Rollo, p. 35.

[19] Id. at 38.

[20] TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21.

[21] Id. at 21.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 22.

[24] Id. at 3, 6.

[25] TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5.

[26] Id. at 4.

[27] Id. at 10.

[28] Id. at 11.

[29] Id. at 12.

[30] Id. at 14.

[31] Id. at 21-22.

[32] TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26.

[33] Exhibit “1.”

[34] Exhibit “1-A.”

[35] TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.

[36] TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.

[37] Id. at 8.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 8-9.

[40] Id. at 9.

[41] Id. at 10.

[42] Id.

[43] Id. at 11.

[44] Id. at 12.

[45] Id.

[46] Rollo, p. 44.

[47] Exhibit “E.”

[48] Exhibit “F.”

[49] Rollo, p. 31.

[50] Exhibit “I.”

[51] Exhibit “B.”

[52] Rollo, p. 125.

[53] Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402;
Mallari v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19, 1996, 265 SCRA 456;
People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547.

[54] TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

[55] TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.

[56] TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.

[57] TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.

[58] Id. at 19-20.

[59] People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219; Ungsod v.
People, G.R. No. 158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 282; People v. Lazaro, G.R.
No. 112090, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435, citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402; Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 106229-30, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 123; People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos.
108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82. See also Mallari v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 53; People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 255.

[60] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 36.

[61] The United States Federal Rule of Evidence defines hearsay as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Cleary,
E.W., McCormick on Evidence (1984), 3rd ed., p. 729, citing Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(c). Accordingly, hearsay evidence is objected to due to the following
reasons:

Oath. Among the earliest of the criticisms of hearsay, and one often repeated in
judicial opinions down to the present, is the objection that the out-of-court declarant
who made the hearsay statement commonly speaks or writes without the solemnity
of the oath administered to witnesses in a court of law. The oath may be important
in two aspects. As a ceremonial and religious symbol it may induce in the witness a
feeling of special obligation to speak the truth, and also it may impress upon the
witness the danger of criminal punishment for perjury, to which the judicial oath or
an equivalent solemn affirmation would be a prerequisite condition. x x x

Personal presence at trial. Another objection early asserted and repeated of late is
the want of opportunity, in respect to the out-of-court declarant, for observation of
his demeanor, with the light that this may shed on his credibility, that would be
afforded if he were a witness on the stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace can scarcely fail to
impress the witness, and falsehood no doubt becomes more difficult if the person
against whom directed is present.

Moreover, personal presence eliminates the danger that in the oral reporting of an
out-of-court statement that the witness reporting the statement may do so
inaccurately. It seems probable that the reporting of words spoken is subject to
special dangers of inaccuracy beyond the fallibility common to all reproduction from
memory of matters of observation, and this seems a substantial danger in the
admission of hearsay. x x x

Cross-examination. It would be generally agreed today that noncompliance with the

third condition is the main justification for the exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack
of any opportunity for the adversary to cross examine the absent declarant whose
out-of-court statement is reported by the witness. x x x In perhaps his most famous
remark, Wigmore described cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” (Underscoring
supplied) (Id. at 727-728.)

[62] Rollo, pp. 8, 136.

[63] 433 Phil. 343 (2002), citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January
25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Phil. 543 (2000); People v.
Deleverio, G.R. Nos. 118937-38, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547; People v. Zaballero,
G.R. No. 100935, June 30, 1997, 274 SCRA 627.

[64] People v. Rivera, id. at 352.

[65] Rollo, p. 61.

[66] TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25.

[67] Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138.

[68] Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818 (2000), citing People v. William, G.R.
No. 93712, June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA 808; People v. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320,
August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194. See also RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).

[69] TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.

[70] Id. at 7-11.

FISCAL: I am asking you why your office likewise issued [a] Memo Receipt if he [i.e.,
Colonel Angelito Moreno] normally issue (sic) a firearm for [an] officer of the PNP?

A: Because our office has also authorized us to issue.

Q: And who authorized your office?

INTERPRETER:

Witness cannot answer.

Q: Where does the Commanding Officer derive his authority?

A: What I know is that the Commanding Officer is authorized to [issue] firearm that
will be issued to a PNP Officer but I do not know who gave the authority to our
officer.

xxxx

Q: As such, do you keep inventory of such supplies?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you have the inventory of this particular gun, the original?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you have that inventory with you, that inventory of such gun, the Memo
Receipt?

A: That firearm was not in my custody.

Q: But you said a while ago it is with you, which is which, do you have or do you not
have the listing of such inventory?

A: None, Sir.

xxxx

FISCAL: Mr. Witness, other than this case, were there any instances where you
issued Memo Receipt as verbally directed by your alleged Commanding Officer
Moreno?

A: Yes, Sir, I'm only a RSO since November 1993.

Q: Precisely, 1991 to 1993, for a period wherein you claimed you hold an office of
RSO, has (sic) this the only time you issued?

A: Many time[s], Sir.

COURT: Let's clarify this. The Court understands to (sic) your previous answer that
this is the first time that you have done this procedure of issuing guns to an officer.
Are you changing that this is the first time and not many times?

A: That is the only first (sic) time, as instructed by the Commanding Officer, Your
Honor. (Underscoring supplied)
[71] Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.

[72] Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.

[73] Exhibit “E.”

[74] Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.”

[75] TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.

[76] G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82, 95-96.

As Mr. Justice Feliciano held for the Court:

x x x Upon the other hand, we note also that the allegedly unlicensed murder
weapon was not presented in evidence by the prosecution. What the prosecution
did present to show absence of a license or permit to possess the firearm used to
kill Teoberto, was a certification issued by the Bohol Regional Headquarters of the
Integrated National Police, dated 20 December 1989, x x x:

xxxx

We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm used by
Modesta Orehuela in killing Teoberto Cañizares was a firearm which Orehuela was
not licensed to possess and to carry outside his residence on the night that
Teoberto Cañizares was shot to death. That that firearm was a .38 caliber pistol
was shown by the testimony and report of NBI Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When the
above circumstances are taken together with the testimony of the eye-witness that
Modesto Orehuela was in fact in possession of a firearm and used the same to kill
Teoberto Cañizares, we believe that accused Orehuela was properly found guilty
of aggravated or qualified illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
(Underscoring supplied)

[77] G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34. See also People v. Taan,
supra note 59; People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366 (2000).

[78] TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

[79] TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.

[80] TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.

[81] People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.

[82] Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457, 472. An
ex post facto law is one which:

1.Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;

2.Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

3.Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed;

4.Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

5.Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and

6.Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has

become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.

[83] People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923), citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e
Interpretacion de las Leyes.

[84] Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 2001 ed., p. 1021. PRISION
CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD. - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years

Minimum : 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Medium : 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months and 20 days

Maximum : 5 years, 4 months and 21 days to 6 years

[85] Id. at 1026. RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA. – 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua

Minimum : 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months

Medium : 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years

Maximum : Reclusion perpetua

[86] Id. at 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD. – 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months

Minimum : 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days

Medium : 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Maximum : 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years and 2 months.

[87] 343 Phil. 297 (1997).

[88] G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007.

[89] Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime.
– Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it
was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed. (Underscoring supplied)