Security Review

7/CAR/1

PROJECT SCOPE STATEMENT

PREPARED BY Paul Elton

RULES PROJECT SPECIALIST

10 November 2009
7/CAR/1 Security Review Project Scope Statement

Project Scope Statement Acceptance

Accepted by
The following signatures represent acceptance of this project scope statement:

Name Title Signature Date

Acting Manager Rules
Heather Woodcock [file copy signed] 12 Nov 09
Development

Peter Blackler Technical Manager - Rules [file copy signed] 16 Nov 09

General Manager Government

Simon Clegg [file copy signed] 12 Nov 09
Relations, Planning & Strategy
Manager Security;
Acting General Manager
Chris Ford [file copy signed] 10 Nov 09
Personnel Licensing & Aviation
Services

Mike Haines Manager Aeronautical Services [file copy signed] 9 Nov 09

Mark Hughes General Manager Airlines [file copy signed] 16 Nov 09

Manager Aviation & Security,

Glen-Marie Burns [file copy signed] 9 Nov 09
Ministry of Transport

Document Audience / Distribution

In addition to the personnel listed above, the following personnel are to receive a copy of
this document:

Name Organisation Title/Area

Hugo Porter Civil Aviation Authority Senior Technical Specialist (Security)

Aviation Community Advisory

Brian Whelan Chairman
Group
Board of Airline Representatives
John Beckett Chief Executive
of New Zealand

Chris Tosswill Aviation Security Service Chief Operating Officer

New Zealand Airports

Kevin Ward Chief Executive
Association
New Zealand Airline Pilots’
Paul Lyons Secretary, Aviation Security Coordinator
Association
Federation of Air New Zealand
Chris Williams Technical Director
Pilots Inc.

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Name Organisation Title/Area

Flight Attendants & Related
Pete Bentley General Secretary
Services Association
(contact name to be Engineering, Printing and
advised) Manufacturing Union

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Document Change History

The following Change History log contains a record of changes made to this document:

Release Date Version Author Section / Nature of Change

10 Nov 2009 0 Paul Elton Original issue

Version — Original issue

Project Scope Statement Inputs

Prepared by
The following personnel have provided input into this project scope statement.

Name Title Role

Paul Elton Rules Project Specialist Project Manager

Hugo Porter Senior Technical Specialist Project Team Member

Chris Ford Manager Security Advisor

Helen Robertson Senior Advisor (MoT) Advisor

Input Documents
The follow documents have been used as reference during the preparation of this project
scope statement:

Title Version Date

ICAO Annex 6 Part 1 Amendment 32 20 Nov 08

ICAO Annex 17 Eighth Edition Apr 06

ICAO Document 9811 First Edition 2002

Cabinet Minute of Decision (09) 16/20 11 May 09

FAA Advisory Circular 25.795-1A 24 Oct 08

FAA Advisory Circular 25.795-2A 24 Oct 08

FAR 25.795 15 May 09

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Table of Contents

Project Scope Statement Acceptance ................................................................... i 

Accepted by ..................................................................................................................... i 
Document Audience / Distribution ...................................................................................i 
Document Change History .................................................................................... iii 
Project Scope Statement Inputs ........................................................................... iii 
Prepared by ................................................................................................................... iii 
Input Documents ........................................................................................................... iii 
1.  Rule Project Brief ............................................................................................ 1 
1.1  Background ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1  Flight deck barriers .................................................................................... 2 
1.1.2  Security Committees .................................................................................. 2 
1.1.3  Security Training ........................................................................................ 3 
1.1.4  Vehicle Security Identification Systems ..................................................... 3 
1.1.5  Security Controls for International Transit Operations ............................... 3 
1.1.6  ANZA Operators and Part 108 Security Programmes................................ 4 
1.2  Assessment........................................................................................................... 4 
1.2.1  Security measures required by Cabinet ..................................................... 4 
1.2.2  Other issues ............................................................................................... 5 
1.3   Project Policy Statement ....................................................................................... 6 
1.4  Statement of Intent ................................................................................................ 6 
2.  Project Objectives ........................................................................................... 7 
2.1  Overall Objectives ................................................................................................. 7 
2.1.1  Flight deck barriers .................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2  Communication between flight and cabin crew .......................................... 7 
2.1.3  Security committees................................................................................... 7 
2.1.4  Security training requirements ................................................................... 7 
2.1.5  Vehicle security identification systems ....................................................... 7 
2.1.6  Security controls for international transit ops ............................................. 7 
2.1.7  ANZA operators and Part 108 security programmes ................................. 7 
2.2  CAA Rules Development Team Objectives ........................................................... 7 
3.  Key Stakeholders ............................................................................................ 9 
4.  Project Scope ................................................................................................ 10 
4.1  In-scope Items..................................................................................................... 10 
4.2  Out-of-scope items .............................................................................................. 10 
4.3  Key Issues........................................................................................................... 10 
4.4  Affected Rule Parts ............................................................................................. 11 
5.  Assumptions, Dependencies and Constraints .......................................... 12 
5.1  Assumptions........................................................................................................ 12 
5.2  Dependencies ..................................................................................................... 12 
5.3  Constraints .......................................................................................................... 12 
6.  Project Resourcing ....................................................................................... 13 
6.1  People ................................................................................................................. 13 
6.1.1  CAA ......................................................................................................... 13 
6.1.2  External .................................................................................................... 13 
6.2  Project Cost......................................................................................................... 13 
6.3  Key Milestones .................................................................................................... 14 

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1. Rule Project Brief

This rule project has two aims:
(a) To give effect to Cabinet direction regarding:
• strengthened flight deck barriers for aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats
that operate domestically

• formation of security committees at airports that service aircraft with 19 or more

passenger seats

• enhanced security education and training for airport and airline staff.
(b) To address the regulatory gaps identified by the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) audit processes.

1.1 Background
This project was initiated to address the aviation security issues identified by the Domestic
Security Review (the Review). The outcomes of the Review prompted Cabinet to require
specific regulatory action to improve domestic aviation security.
Cabinet directed that the following measures be progressed through the Civil Aviation
Rule development process.

• Installation of strengthened flight deck barriers on aircraft of more than 30

passenger seats that operate domestically.

• Establishment of security committees at all airports that service regular air

transport passenger services on aircraft of 19 or more passenger seats.
Cabinet also directed that a Civil Aviation Rule project to enhance the education and
training for airline and airport staff be given high priority in 2009/10.
In addition, there are three issues relating to ICAO compliance that can be addressed
concurrently as part of this rule project (provided they do not impede implementation of
the measures required by Cabinet).
Aviation security is addressed internationally by ICAO Annex 17 – Security. This annex is
aimed at safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. A
fundamental requirement is that each contracting state establishes a national civil aviation
security programme. In New Zealand the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP)
fills this role; and encapsulates regulations, rules and other legislation applicable to
aviation security.
The three ICAO compliance issues that will be addressed through this project are:

• Vehicle Security Identification Systems

• Security Controls for international transit operations

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• operations under the Australia New Zealand Aviation (ANZA) Mutual

Recognition Principle in respect of Part 108 Security Programmes.

1.1.1 Flight deck barriers

Aeroplanes with more than 30 passenger seats are currently required to have a lockable
door between the passenger and flight crew compartments. This requirement is contained
in Part 121.
To give effect to Cabinet direction, this rule project proposes to incorporate international
standards associated with flight deck barriers in ICAO Annex 6 Part I section 13. These
standards require that a flight deck barrier is one that is:

• designed to resist forcible intrusion

• designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel

• capable of being locked from either pilot’s station.

In addition, the standards require that the area outside the flight deck must be able to be
monitored from either pilot’s station, and the cabin crew must be able to discretely
communicate with the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breach in
the cabin.
The lack of a rule requirement regarding communication between cabin and flight crew
was the subject of an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audit
finding in March 2006.
With the exception of Airwork and Air Chathams, New Zealand registered international
operators currently comply with some of these requirements. Within the domestic
operating environment, this issue concerns operators of air transport aircraft with more
than 30 passenger seats. Therefore, in addition to Airwork and Air Chathams, the affected
operators are Mount Cook Airline, and Air Nelson.
There may also be an impact on ANZA operators who will be required to comply with
equipment rules regarding flight deck barriers if those requirements are not mirrored in
Australian legislation.

1.1.2 Security Committees

Security committees are currently established at security designated airports – Auckland,
Hamilton, Rotorua, Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch, Queenstown and
Dunedin. There is no legal requirement which mandates security committees; rather the
committees adhere to guidelines provided in Section 5 of the National Aviation Security
Programme (NASP). The NASP has no legal mandate.
Cabinet has directed that airport security committees be established through a rule, at all
airports which service regularly scheduled passenger services on aeroplanes with 19 seats
or more. To give effect to Cabinet direction, in addition to the eight security designated
airports, 20 additional airports will be required to establish security committees.

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The 20 additional airports affected are:

• 14 regional airports that operate under Part 139 certificates – Bay of Islands
(Kerikeri), Chatham Islands, Gisborne, Hawke’s Bay, Invercargill, Marlborough,
Nelson, New Plymouth, Taupo, Tauranga, Timaru, Wanganui, Westport, and
Whangarei.

• 6 smaller airports that service aeroplanes of 19 or more passenger seats –

Hokitika, Kaitaia, Masterton, Oamaru, Wanaka, and Whakatane.
This issue is being treated with a degree of urgency, and is currently being progressed by
the Ministry of Transport which is encouraging voluntary compliance from the affected
airports in the absence of a regulatory requirement. The form that any rule making might
take will depend upon the outcome of the Ministry’s efforts to achieve voluntary
compliance.

1.1.3 Security Training

The ICAO Security Audit of New Zealand in September 2006 resulted in two
recommendations stating that New Zealand should–

• require initial and recurrent training criteria for all categories of staff responsible
for the implementation of security measures; and

• provide sufficient guidance for all stakeholder to develop their training

programmes.
In addition, Cabinet has also directed that existing security training requirements for airline
and airport staff be enhanced.

1.1.4 Vehicle Security Identification Systems

ICAO Annex 17- Security requires that identification systems are established in respect of
persons and vehicles to prevent unauthorised access into airside areas and security
restricted areas.
Current rule provisions in New Zealand provide for identification systems in respect of
persons (CAR 19.357) and their identity verification at designated checkpoints (CAR
140.A13) before access is allowed. However, there are no requirements for vehicle
identification systems in the current rules.
While vehicle identification systems of a varying nature are practically in effect at most
international aerodromes the requirement should be formalised by rule amendment for
security designated airports to ensure full ICAO compliance.

1.1.5 Security Controls for International Transit Operations

Amendment 11 to ICAO Annex 17 - Security requires that measures are taken to ensure
that passengers on commercial flights that disembark from an aircraft do not leave items on
board that aircraft. This amendment, which became effective in 2006, expanded the
applicability from flights under an increased level of threat, to all flights (regardless of

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threat level). Current Civil Aviation Rule 108.55(b)(9) still reflects past ICAO
requirements.
This proposal will require air operators to implement procedures that may see them
requiring their passengers to remove all carry-on items from the cabin of an international
transit stopover, in cases where this does not occur already.
Should they choose to, airlines may develop operational solutions to deal with passengers’
(duty-free) goods that would fall under the liquids, aerosols and gels limitations for the
outbound sector.

1.1.6 ANZA Operators and Part 108 Security Programmes

This issue seeks to address a gap that has arisen between the New Zealand and Australian
aviation security regulatory environments. Organisational changes such as the senior
person responsible for security programme control are not reflected in the conditions for
the AOC as they are in New Zealand. This can be addressed by expanding the
requirements in rule 108.65 to cover the mismatch in regulatory requirements.
The currently affected operators are Qantas and Jetstar.

1.2 Assessment
1.2.1 Security measures required by Cabinet
The risks, potential costs and impacts of the security measures required by Cabinet were
identified in the Review.
Flight deck barriers – ballistic and intrusion resistant
The Review identified that the installation of ballistic and intrusion resistant flight deck
doors (FAA AC 25.795-2A compliant), on aircraft with 30 passengers or more, was
technically and operationally feasible. While strengthened flight deck barriers do not
prevent carriage of a weapon on board, they prevent access to the flight deck. This
mitigates the opportunity for individuals to hijack the aircraft, use it as a weapon or use it
for a subsequent siege-hostage scenario.
Advice was sought from industry on the likely capital and ongoing operational costs of
installing intrusion and ballistic penetration resistant doors in aircraft of 30–90 passenger
seats. The cost to install such barriers for the entire domestic fleet was estimated by
industry to be $2.599 million in the first year and $0.465 million ongoing (these ongoing
costs relate to fuel, maintenance and lost capacity associated with the additional weight of
the flight deck barriers).
Securing the flight deck also includes adopting ICAO standards for locking/unlocking the
flight deck door from either pilot’s station, monitoring of the area outside the flight deck
door, and discreet communication between the cabin and flight crew members.
Security committees
The Review determined that the establishment of security committees at regional airports
would complement current arrangements that apply to security designated airports.
Security Committees provide a collaborative community approach to aviation security by

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bringing together airlines, airports, the local police and other key stakeholders to discuss
relevant security matters. These Committees will improve New Zealand’s aviation
security culture, facilitating improved sharing of security information among key
organisations within each airport environment. The costs of these committees are not
expected to be high.
Security training requirements
Rules regarding security training and education already exist. However, there is currently
insufficient guidance for all stakeholders to develop their training programmes. The
Review determined that specific syllabus, competency, re-currency and training record
requirements could be enhanced and strengthened.
The rules that could be reviewed and updated as part of this project are Part 108 Air
Operator Security Programme; Part 139 Aerodromes – Certification, Operation and Use;
and Part 172 Air Traffic Service Organisations – Certification.
Some airports and airlines already have substantive training programmes in place that
provide for the outcomes sought from these recommendations. In these situations, costs are
likely to be minimal and would be primarily associated with any necessary updating of
internal documentation.
In other situations, more substantive costs may be incurred if there is a need to overhaul
existing training programmes to ensure the delivery of required training requirements and
supporting internal documentation.
There will be costs to CAA, associated with the development of technical standards and
guidance material supporting the Rule amendment.

1.2.2 Other issues

The risks, potential costs and impacts for the actions required to resolve non-compliances
with ICAO standards are noted below—
Vehicle security identification systems
Due to systems being in place at security designated airports that comply with the annex
provisions there is no significant security risk at the present time. However, New Zealand
cannot expressly point to specific rules that require vehicle security identification systems.
Consequently, New Zealand will remain non-compliant with ICAO Annex 17 paragraph
4.2.3 unless Part 139 is amended.
Given that some aerodromes already have formal vehicle identification system in place for
safety compliance purposes, implementation costs cannot be estimated until appropriate
consultation is carried out. At a minimum, some costs will be incurred associated with
exposition amendment to reflect amended rule requirements.
Security controls for international transit operations
Current rule requirements only apply to identified high threat flights. ICAO has
determined the international security environment requires the application of those
measures to all transit operations. If New Zealand does not have a regulatory regime in
place that meets international baseline standards then this creates potential vulnerabilities

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in the international civil aviation system. Theses vulnerabilities may become susceptible
to exploitation by those with intent to carry out acts of unlawful interference.
Some airlines that transit New Zealand airports voluntarily exceed the current requirements
and already comply with the amended Annex 17 requirements. For the others, some
procedural changes will be required for compliance; however, the cost is not expected to
be substantial.
ANZA Operators and Part 108 Security Programmes
The risks and potential impacts regarding the ANZA operators consists of the vulnerability
associated with inadequate levels of oversight capability on the part of CAA, and the lack
of operator management accountability for the control, maintenance and implementation of
procedures required under Part 108.
The costs to resolve this issue are expected to be minimal in that they relate only to the
updating of security programmes to identify relevant management accountabilities, and the
documenting of change control processes.

1.3 Project Policy Statement

Aviation security threats are not necessarily constrained by national boundaries, and
security provisions need to operate in an internationally cohesive manner. Furthermore,
the CAA is cognisant of similar rulemaking taking place internationally and is committed
to ensuring that the security provisions adopted in New Zealand are not out of step with the
international aviation community.
Of the affected rule parts, the most significant change will occur as a result of the flight
deck barrier requirements. The CAA intends that ICAO standards will be met in order to
satisfy Cabinet’s requirements.

1.4 Statement of Intent

Rule amendments implemented as a consequence of this project are expected to deliver
enhanced safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, and the general public in all
matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
These amendments will—
• give effect to Cabinet’s domestic aviation security requirements;

• align with international best practice with regard to aviation security;

• achieve a satisfactory level of oversight with regard to ANZA operators.

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2. Project Objectives
2.1 Overall Objectives
2.1.1 Flight deck barriers
• Mitigation of security vulnerabilities associated with the flight deck, identified in
the Domestic Aviation Security Review.

• ICAO compliance.

2.1.2 Communication between flight and cabin crew

• Address ICAO USOAP finding, and therefore ICAO compliance.

2.1.3 Security committees

• To create a collective security culture at regional airports, where stakeholders co-
operate, coordinate and collaborate to improve security awareness and
preparedness.

• Mandate current arrangements around security committees at security designated

airports.

2.1.4 Security training requirements

• Appropriate and consistent level of security training, and effective regulatory
oversight.

• ICAO compliance.

2.1.5 Vehicle security identification systems

• Consistent level of security at all security designated aerodromes.

2.1.6 Security controls for international transit ops

• Apply security controls that are consistent with international practices.

• ICAO compliance.

2.1.7 ANZA operators and Part 108 security programmes

• Achieve an appropriate level of security regulatory oversight.

• Ensure operator management accountability and document change control.

2.2 CAA Rules Development Team Objectives

The CAA Rules Development Unit will deliver rules that contribute to an affordable,
integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable transport system by ensuring:

• Efficient and effective communication with the aviation community during the
development of the rule amendments.

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• Efficient and effective communication with the CAA operating groups and the
Ministry of Transport during the development of the proposed rule amendments.

• The rule project is undertaken using appropriate project management

methodologies including issues management and quality management.

• ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices relating to the proposed rule

amendments are reviewed and incorporated into the amendments where
appropriate.

• Compliance with the legislative requirements for the Minister of Transport to

make rules, including the development of a regulatory impact statement, if
required.

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3. Key Stakeholders
The following have been identified by the Civil Aviation Authority as key stakeholders in
this rule project:

• Minister of Transport

• Ministry of Transport

• CAA Security Regulatory Unit

• CAA Airlines Group

• CAA Aeronautical Services Unit

• Air operators of aircraft with 19 or more passenger seats including Part 129
operators

• Australian AOC holders with ANZA privileges (9 or more passenger seats)

• Aerodrome operators

• Aviation Security Service

• New Zealand Police

• Airways New Zealand

• New Zealand Airports Association

• Aviation Industry Association

• Board of Airline Representatives of New Zealand (Inc)

• Airline pilots and their representative organisations

• Flight attendants and their representative organisations

• The travelling public

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4. Project Scope
This section defines the scope of this rules project. Changes to the scope will be managed
through the change control process. Any item not explicitly stated as in-scope in this
section is automatically considered out-of-scope.

4.1 In-scope Items

• Review ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices relating to this project and
incorporate them into the proposed rule amendments where appropriate.

• Ensure compliance with legislative requirements of rule making under the Civil
Aviation Act 1990.

• Review flight deck security, including monitoring of the area immediately

outside of the flight deck door and communication between cabin and flight crew.

• Review security committee requirements at airports that service regular air

transport passenger services on aircraft of 19 or more passenger seats.

• Review security training requirements for airport and airline staff.

• Review vehicle security identification systems.

• Review security controls for international transit operations.

• Review ANZA operator requirements with regard to Part 108 security

programmes.

4.2 Out-of-scope items

• Flight deck barriers for aircraft configured for less than 30 passenger seats.

• Airports that do not service aircraft of 19 or more passenger seats.

4.3 Key Issues

The cost of flight deck barriers, locking systems, and monitoring systems have been
identified as a key issue for this project. Cost will depend upon the design standard that
will be adopted in the course of the technical development of the proposed rule
amendment.
As noted in paragraph 1.3, alignment with other States is particularly relevant in the area of
aviation security; therefore the project working group should maintain awareness of
international rulemaking direction. Alignment with ICAO standards, where possible, is
one method of achieving appropriate levels of security requirements.

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4.4 Affected Rule Parts

Part 21 Certification of Products and Parts
Part 26 Additional Airworthiness Requirements
Part 119 Air Operator – Certification
Part 121 Air Operations–Large Aeroplanes
Part 129 Foreign Air Transport Operator–Certification
Part 139 Aerodromes – Certification, Operation and Use
Part 108 Air Operator Security Programme
Part 140 Aviation Security Service Organisations–Certification
Part 172 Air Traffic Service Organisations–Certification

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5. Assumptions, Dependencies and Constraints

The following assumptions, dependencies and constraints were current at the time of
drafting this project scope statement.

5.1 Assumptions
That there are no changes to ICAO standards and recommendations relevant to the scope
of this rule project.
That a change in government would not alter aviation security policies.
That there are no significant domestic or international aviation security incidents that
would drive a change in security policies.
With regard to making rules for security committees, that a satisfactory level of voluntary
compliance is not achieved.

5.2 Dependencies
The availability of CAA and industry people who have appropriate technical competencies
to participate in the project working group.

5.3 Constraints
It is outside the scope of this project to consider alteration of the ANZA Agreement.

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6. Project Resourcing
6.1 People
The following sections lists the initial resources (both internal and external) required for
the project objectives to be successfully met.

6.1.1 CAA

Operating Group Position/Area of Expertise Role and Responsibility

Security Regulatory Senior Technical Specialist Project team member

Unit

Airlines Group Airline Inspector – Flight Operations Project team member

Airworthiness Engineer Project team member

Aeronautical Services Aeronautical Services Officer – Aerodromes Project team member

6.1.2 External
Organisation Position/Area of Expertise Role and Responsibility
Project working group membership
ACAG Industry advisory group
advice
Flight operations and engineering
Airline operators Project working group input
and security
Aerodrome operators /
Aerodrome operations Project working group input
Airports Association
Aviation Security
Airport security Project working group input
Service
Ministry of Transport Senior Advisor - Aviation Parliamentary process
Senior Advisor – Security Security committees policy

6.2 Project Cost

The initial scoping study has not revealed any areas where cost may be incurred that have
not already been identified in the rules programme.

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6.3 Key Milestones

The following table provides a summary of the project’s key milestones and the expected
dates of delivery.

Key Milestone Target Date

Rule design document complete July 2010
Draft NPRM to Ministry of Transport October 2010
Draft final rule to Ministry of Transport June 2011
Final rule signed by Minister December 2011

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