MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE AND WITTGENSTEIN'S

CRITICISM OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF TYPES*

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context
principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's
writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory
of symbolismfunctions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.

1. INTRODUCTION

The aphorism 3.3 of the Tractatus has been the source of some debate
about the interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy:
Only the proposition has sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have
meaning. (1961, sec. 3.3)
The majority of Wittgenstein's commentators recognise in this aphorism
the influence of Frege's context principle, which is most clearly stated
at the beginning of The Foundations o f Arithmetic as one of Frege's
fundamental methodological principles:
[N]ever to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a
proposition. (1953, p. x)
The bias according to which commentators have mainly interpreted
this central thesis in the Tractatus is semantic, i.e., it has almost always
been seen as suggesting a theory of meaning or of object-construction.
It is not my aim here to deprive this interpretative tendency of its
legitimacy, but it seems clear that the semantic question is not among
Wittgenstein's primary motivations at the very beginning of his philos-
ophy. In my opinion, if the semantic bias today seems to be one of the
most attractive aspects of the Tractatus, this is because of the great
emphasis placed on questions concerning language in contemporary
philosophy.
What I intend to do here is to elaborate the role played by the context
principle in the criticism of Russell's theory of types, as formulated by
Wittgenstein in his pre-Tractatus writings. The context principle as a
central thesis of the very early Wittgenstein has the negative role of
showing the dispensability of the theory of types, as formulated in

Synthese 98: 401-414, 1994.

© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the .Netherlands.
402 MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

Russell's Principia Mathematica, as well as the positive role of providing

an adequate account of the mechanism of symbolism. The connection
between Wittgenstein's criticism of the theory of types and an adequate
theory of symbolism has already been stressed by some commentators
(see, for example, Ishiguro, 1981). What I intend to show is that the
context principle plays a fundamental role in this connection.

2. WITTGENSTEIN, RUSSELL, AND THE THEORY OF TYPES

Of the multiplicity of questions involved in the philosophical dialogue

between Wittgenstein and Russell, a topic that seems to have had
decisive importance for Wittgenstein's very early philosophy (and also
a decisive influence on the later elaboration of the Tractatus) is that
regarding the theory of types. Wittgenstein's criticisms concerning this
topic assume special relevance by involving some questions of the ut-
most importance in the theory of the symbolism, which were certainly
to shape later the central theses of the Tractatus. The significance of
this criticism has been ignored or underestimated by most com-
mentators because of the lack of a historical examination of Wittgen-
stein's early philosophy.
Russell sets out the version of the theory of types, which is the focus
of Wittgenstein's criticism, in Chapter II of the Introduction of Principia
Mathematica. I According to Russell, when one reviews the main para-
doxes, which until that time had tormented logicians and mathemati-
cians, one can perceive as their common characteristic the presence of
self-reference on reflexivity (Russell and Whitehead, 1973, p. 63).
Terms such as "truth", "falsity", "function", "property", "class", etc.,
which typically occur in the formulation of such paradoxes, include an
ambiguity of meaning that, once concealed in ordinary discourse, leads
to the emergence of what Russell called "vicious-circle fallacies" (ibid.,
p. 64). That is, the formulations which lead to paradoxes may be, by
means of some appropriate analysis, shown to be reducible to ex-
pressions of the type "q~(~p2)", where "q02" expresses a propositional
function. They are, therefore, cases in which the function is taken as
an argument of itself.
The principle according to which formulations of this kind must be
forbidden in logico-mathematical discourse is established by Russell
through two arguments. First, the previous comprehension of the total-
ity of its values is necessary for the intelligibility of a function (p~. It
 CRITICISM OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF TYPES 403

follows that a function cannot have among its values an object that
presupposes the function itself; in other words, expressions of the form
" , ~ ( ~ ) " are not well formed, for in this case we could not consider the
totality of its values as intelligible before the function itself is intelli-
gible, thus generating a vicious circle.
Russell's second argument is based on the explanation, by means of
direct inspection of the corresponding "logical intuition", of the nature
of what corresponds to the word "function" and of what differentiates
it from the nature of individuals. This difference in nature between
function and individuals implies that not only expressions of the type
"p(~2)" are nonsensical, but also expressions of the form "0(~z)",
when "0~" and " ~ " denote any functions for which there exists an
argument a such that °' q)a" and "~a" were both meaningful (i.e., when
and p belong to the same logical type). Russell's approach to the
nature of a function is one of the most important points of this chapter
of Principia. It contains observations like the following:

The question as to the nature of a function is by no means an easy one. It would seem,
however, that the essential characteristic of a function is ambiguity. (Ibid., p. 39)

and later:

A function, in fact, is not a definite object, which could be or not be a man: it is a mere
ambiguity awaiting determination, and in order that it may occur significantly it must
receive the necessary determination, which it obviously does not receive if it is merely
substituted for something determinate in a proposition. (Ibid., p. 48)

The kind of ambiguity mentioned above is also an essential character-

istic of proportional functions. For Russell, the propositional function
denotes its values ambiguously (ibid., p. 40); in other words, ~ , for
instance, simultaneously denotes the values q~a, q~b, ~c, etc., but none
in particular:

We may regard the function itself as that which ambiguously denotes, while an undeter-
mined value of the function is that which is ambiguously denoted. (Ibid., p. 40)

There is, of course, a good deal of obscurity in this Russellian notion

of ambiguous denotation, as there is in the procedure of direct inspec-
tion involving logically primitive notions. What can be emphasised,
nevertheless, is that the method involved in the formulation of the
second argument above is the direct consideration of the propositional
404 MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

function itself. And this direct inspection involves regarding the func-
tion as having a kind of thing-hood.
Finally, Russell presents in Section V of this chapter the famous
hierarchy of logical types for functions and propositions. The rigorous
observance of this hierarchy would suffice to avoid the emergence of
anfinomies in the construction of logical systems.
The very idea of a theory of types as Russell conceives it raises
crucial questions about the nature of its method and its epistemological
character. What, after all, is it talking about? And is its procedure
legitimate? As regards the theory itself, it gives the impression of telling
us something new, i.e., presenting new information. But from where
does this form of knowledge get its appearance of novelty and, at the
same time, of necessary truth? Russell's position with respect to this
point is to be linked with his general ideas on epistemology of logic. A
good synthesis of Russell's thought on this topic can be found in his
'Logical Data' of 1913. There, Russell provides an account of what he
calls "acquaintance with logical objects". He sees acquaintance, in a
formalised way, as a relation established between two objects, one of
which is the knowing subject and the other the object of knowledge:
[E]xperience is a dual relation of subject to an object, though it is not necessary to assume
that we experience either the subject or the relation, but only the object and (sometimes)
the complex subject-experiencing-object. Assuming that this analysis is correct, we called
the dual relation in question "acquaintance". (Russell, 1979a, p. 100)

According to the kind of object that occupies the second position, in the
experience-relation we shall have also different kinds of acquaintance:
We then considered various kinds of acquaintance. The first classification is according to
the logical character of the object, namely, according as it is (a) particular, (b) universal,
or (c) formal, i.e. purely logical. (Ibid.)

The existence and the nature of the third kind of acquaintance men-
tioned in the quotation, i.e. with logical objects, is the main preoccupa-
tion of the text in question, and it is made possible on the basis of two
transcendental arguments presented by Russell. First, for our discourse
on terms such as "function", "relation", "logical form", etc., to be
intelligible, as it in fact is, it is necessary that objects correspond to
these notions with which we are already familiar:
It is not at all clear what is the right logical account of "form", but whatever this account
may be, it is clear that we have acquaintance (possibly in an extended sense of the word
 CRITICISM OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF TYPES 405

"acquaintance") with something as abstract as the pure form, since otherwise we could
not use intelligently such a word as "relation". (Ibid., pp. 98-99)

The second argument is that experience of logical objects is a neces-

sary condition of our understanding of certain sentences that describe
situations of whose actuality we still have no information:

If we are acquainted with a and with similarity and with b, we can understand the
statement "a is similar to b ' , even if we cannot directly compare them and "see" their
similarlity. But this would not be possible unless we knew how they are to be put together,
i.e., unless we are acquainted with the form of a dual complex. Thus all "mental
synthesis", as it may be called, involves acquaintance with logical form. (Ibid., p. 101)

The conclusion, that in our logical discourse logical objects correspond-

ing to formal notions are referred to, is extended not only- to terms for
forms or logical types, but also to logical connectives and operators:

Besides the forms of atomic complexes, there are many other logical objects which are
involved in the formation of non-atomic complexes. Such words as or, not, all, some,
plainly involve logical notions; and since we can use such words intelligently, we must
be acquainted with the logical objects im~olved. (Ibid., p. 99)

W e have thus a sketch of Russell's opinions, and Russell should be

considered the main interlocutor of Wittgenstein's first works, the
'Notes on Logic' of 1913 and the 'Notes Dictated to G. E. M o o r e in
Norway' of 1914. 2 But we find Wittgenstein already voicing his first
critical observation regarding the theory of types in his letter to Russell
of 16 January 1913, some months before 'Notes on Logic' was written.
There, we read:

And further: every theory of types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of
symbolism . . . . What I am most certain is not however the correctness of my present
way of analysis, but of the fact that all theory of types must be done away with by a
theo13J of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolised
by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's place.
(Wittgenstein, 1974, pp. 19-20)

W h a t Wittgenstein here communicates to Russell cannot be seen, from

a systematic point of view, as assuming the form of a well-articulated
objection. It would be preferable to describe it as a manifestation of a
certain discontent with the fact that with Russell's theory of ty~es one
had to imagine a field of objects or logical primitive ideas referred to
by logic.
W h a t we find in the 'Notes on Logic' on this topic is also, according
406 M A R C O A N T O N I O RUFFIINO

to this interpretation, an echo of this rejection, but one which is still

not completely articulated:
It is easy to suppose that "individual", "particular", "complex" etc., are primitive ideas
of logic. Russell, e.g., says "individual" and "matrix" are "primitive ideas". This error
presumably is to be explained by the fact that, by employment of variables instead of
the generality-sign, it comes to seem as if logic dealt with things which have been deprived
of all properties except thing-hood, and with propositions deprived of all properties
except complexity. (Wittgenstein, 1979a, p. 107)

As we can see, Wittgenstein here attributes the source of this miscon-

ception to the fact that Russell was also making use of variables outside
a quantificational context, which creates the illusion that one is dealing
with something without any other property than thing-hood. Here,
Wittgenstein rejects Russell's view, but without explaining why. Rather,
what Wittgenstein proposes is an explanation of the origin of the necess-
ity of assuming the reality of logical objects, but without providing
reasons why this is a false step. Further evidence that, at the time of
writing the 'Notes on Logic', Wittgenstein himself had not yet reached
complete clarity on this topic is provided by his comment in his letter
to Russell of 17 October 1913:
Types have got a good deal clearer to me on the journey. (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 29)

If this objection does not yet seem completely articulated, the oppo-
sition between the recognition of a field of logical objects as what
confers significance on logical discourse and Wittgenstein's conception
of philosophy (already present in the 'Notes on Logic') is nevertheless
quite clear:
Philosophy gives no picture of reality.
Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions (not only ot:
primitive propositions). (Wittgenstein, 1979a, p. 106)

To recognise the existence of logical objects would also imply the

acceptance of a logical reality whose description (true or false) would
be the task of philosophy, which contradicts what Wittgenstein says in
the first sentence above. On the other hand, it would also be to go
beyond the proper task of philosophy, i.e., the description of the logical
forms of empirical language (propositions of science or simply the
symbolic notation for such propositions) - which is expressed in the
second sentence above. This reveals the conflict between Russell's ap-
 C R I T I C I S M OF R U S S E L L ' S T H E O R Y OF T Y P E S 407

proach of the "logical experience" presented in 'Logical Data' and the

primary purposes of the logico-analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Logic as such must be restricted to formal analysis of language and,
hence, to a theory of symbolism; and its investigation must be com-
pletely independent of the existence of any kind of 'logical facts'.
That Russell's theory of types functions as a paradigm of how, in
Wittgenstein's opinion, one should not proceed in logic is something
we can infer from above, together with the following remarks from
Notebooks 1914-1916:
If syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all, then the whole theory of things,
properties, etc., is superfluous. It is also too obvious that this theory isn't what is in
question either in the Grundgesetze or in Principia Mathernatica. Once more: loNc must
take care of itself. (Wittgenstein, I979, p. 2e, remark of 22 Aug. 19t4)
It must in a certain sense be impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly
expressed by saying: Logic must take care of itself. This is an extremely profound and
important insight. (Ibid., remark of 2 Sept. 1914)

That logic should "take care of itself" here expresses the philosophical
demand that logic should not be made possible by recourse to some
kind of reality (be it empirical, psychical, or even logical). The impossi-
bility of error in logic which Wittgenstein mentions here is not due to
a special kind of rigour in its procedure or to the exactness of :its
method, but rather to the nature of its task. Logic should deal only with
the description of syntactical rules for the use of symbols:
In philosophy there are no deductions; it is purely descriptive. (Wittgenstein, 1979a, p.
106)

And here it is impossible to go wrong. But such a kind of descriptive

activity cannot, for Wittgenstein, rely on any kind of experience. What
the symbolism presents to us, i.e. its primitive constituents (Bausteine)
and the form of their articulation in sentences, should suffice for this
descriptive activity:
If the existence of the subject-predicate sentence does not show everything needful, then
it could surely only be shewn by the existence of some particular fact of that form, And
acquaintance with such a fact cannot be essential for logic. (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 3e,
remark of 4 Sept. 1914)

But why have I made this digression through Wittgenstein's concep-

tion of the legitimate task of philosophy? And what is the relevance of
this aspect of Wittgenstein's thought to the main question at hand -
408 MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

the role played by the context principle in the refutation of Russell's

theory of types? Because I am trying to defend the following point of
view: the reason for Wittgenstein's rejection of Russellian theory of
types is not motivated by the detection of formal errors of any kind in
it, but rather has deep motivations in his conception of logic (and hence
of philosophy). Wittgenstein not only rejected the misleading focus of
Russell's theory, but also showed h o w an adequate theory should be
constructed, i.e., limited to the symbolism.3 The construction of a
'correct' theory of types is intimately connected with an adequate an-
swer to the question about what really symbolises, and it is here that
the context principle plays a decisive role. In other words, the context
principle does not motivate the very early Wittgenstein's criticism of
the theory of types, but it is essential in showing its dispensability. As
far as I know, this point has not been made in previous discussions of
the role of the context principle in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

3. THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE AND THE THEORY OF SYMBOLISM

Wittgenstein's alternative to the theory of types is most clearly formu-

lated in his 'Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway', of April, 1914.
We may say that here Wittgenstein had finally reached the clarity he
sought both in his correspondence with Russell and in his 'Notes on
Logic' regarding the theory of types, and also that the essential features
of his thought on this matter had assumed their definitive form. Among
a multiplicity of topics dealt with, we find the following observation:

Therefore a THEORY of types is impossible. It tries to say somethingabout the types,

when you can only talk about the symbols. But what you say about the symbolis not
that this symbolhas that type, whichwouldbe nonsensefor [the] same reason: hut you
say simply: This is the symbol,to prevent a misunderstanding.(Wittgenstein,1979a, p.
109)

The first sentence of the quotation clearly reinforces the difference in

Wittgenstein's perspective regarding the theory of types. But the second
sentence reveals something new: what a correct theory of types should
be like, i.e., an elucidation of what is really symbolising in a certain
symbol. Hence, an elucidation of what transforms a 'dead' sign in a
'living' symbol. (It is true that the idea that what really symbolises is the
occurrence of a sign combined with other signs had already appeared in
 CRITICISM OF RUSSELL'S THEORY OF TYPES 409

the 'Notes on Logic', but, there, it is still not in connection with the
criticism of the theory of types.)
The most general formulation of an answer to the question about
what symbolises can be found below:
What symbolizes in &~ is that ch stands to the left of a proper name and obviously this
is not so in - p . What is common to all propositions in which the name of a property (to
speak loosely) occurs is that this name stands to the left of a name-form, (Wittgenstein,
1979b, p, 116)

And further:
~b cannot possibly stand to the left of (or in any other relation to) the symbol of a
property. For the symbol o f a property, e.g., O/x is that q~ stands to the left o f a name
form . . . . (Ibid.; my emphasis, except for "that")

We can see from both quotations that what symbolises for Wittgenstein
are the signs "4~" or "~" in a certain position in relation to neighbouring
signs (those of a different logical type). In other words, what symbotises
is the perceptible sign plus its relative position in propositional signs.
Position here is understood as some kind of relation (spatial or tempo-
ral, according to the nature of the sign employed) that the sign main-
tains with other signs which are members of the complete propositional
sign. In my opinion, this is not more than the context principle in a
special formulation which I shall call syntactic, 4 i.e., only in the articu-
lated context of perceptible signs .forming a propositional sign does a
simple sign acquire symbolic nature. We can find a clear indication
about this point in the following passage:
The reason why, e.g., it seems as if "Plato Socrates" might have a meaning, while
"Abracadabra Socrates" will never be suspected to have one, is because we know that
"Plato" has one, and do not observe that in order that the whole phrase should have
one, what is necessary is not that "Plato" should have one, but that the fact that "Plato"
is to the left o f a name should. (Ibid.)

"Plato" as such is merely a perceptible sign, but the .fact that "Plato"
occurs to the left of another name is what has meaning.
For Wittgenstein, what plays the role of a theory of types is merely
showing, for a symbol, the relation that its perceptible part has to the
perceptible part of the other symbols of the propositional symbol (e.g.,
being to the left of a name, or between two names, or to the right of
a relation, etc.). The whole theory of types is, hence, reduced to talking
about the characteristic positions of certain symbols in the propositional
410 MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

context. In other words, talking about the positions that a certain

symbol can occupy in a complete propositional symbol without forming
nonsense. In this sense, terms such as "thing", "property", "relation",
etc., all refer to specific positions that these symbols may occupy. But
these positions are already a constitutive part of the symbol. In other
words, it is impossible to pick a certain symbol and then to go on to
talk about its formal properties, because, in order to identify a given
symbol, we must have already specified precisely those formal proper-
ties. So, against assertions such as 'symbols like this are of such and
such logical type', Wittgenstein poses the objection:
This you can't say because in order to say it you must first know what the symbol is: and
in knowing this you see the type and therefore also [the] type of [what is] symbolized.
I.e. in knowingwhatsymbolizes,you know all that is to be known; you can't say anything
about the symbol. (Ibid., p. 110)
Let us take as an example the proposition " a R b " , and let us consider
the possibility of saying something about the logical type of " R " . First,
we should make clear what the symbol is here: the occurrence of the
sign " R " between two others ( " a " and "b") in the propositional sign.
If we now want to assert that this symbol is a binary relation (and
'binary relation' here means simply a kind of sign that can occur be-
tween two names), this information has already been expressed in
specifying what it is that symbolises. It is a consequence of this fact
that the assertion that this symbol is a binary relation is something
absolutely trivial and tautological, because the correct description of
what symbolises already embodies this information. This is, in my opin-
ion, what Wittgenstein means in the following remarks:
E.g., in " a R b " , " R " is n o t a symbol, but t h a t " R " is between one name and another
symbolizes. Here we have n o t said this symbol is not of this type but of that, but only:
This symbolizesand not that. (Ibid., p. 109)
And, the triviality of talk about logical type is the point of the following
remark:
Even if there w e r e propositions of [the] form "M is a thing" they would be superfluous
(tautologous) because what this tries to say is something which is already s e e n when you
see " M " . (Ibid., p. 110)

We may see here how the famous doctrine of what can be said and of
what can be shown is a natural consequence of a correct answer to the
question of what symbolises. We need to make the distinction between
 C R I T I C I S M OF R U S S E L L ' S T H E O R Y OF TYPES 411

saying and showing because nothing can be said in respect to formal

properties of symbols that is not already contained in the explanation
of what we are talking about. In an ideal notation, such constitutive
aspects of the symbol are already clear in the choice of the kinds of
signs employed and in their possible positions, in such a way that all
talk of logical forms becomes superfluous, because it merely reflects
that which is already clear in the notation.
An important feature of the theory of types so conceived is that,
once it is derived from an adequate theory of the symbolism, the logical
types considered here are essentially complementary. Complementarity
here means only that the determination of a type of symbol already
implies, in a certain manner, the determination of the type (or types)
of symbol (or symbols) that, together with the former, forms a proposi-
tion:
The type of a symbol of a relation is partly fkxed by [the] type of [a] symbol of [a] thing,
since a symbol of [the] latter type must occur in it. (Ibid., p. 111)

This becomes clear when one considers that in "0a", for example, one
cannot say that " 0 " occurs to the left of "a" without it also being
implicit that "a" occurs to the right of " 6 " . The complementarity
between logical types is thus a natural consequence of the way in which
Wittgenstein conceives the theory of types, i.e. as a theory of symbolism
based on the context principle, and means simply that, in the partition
of the symbol of a complete proposition, complementary symbols are
obtained.
In Russell's theory, to the contrary, it seems that this idea of comple-
mentarity is somewhat problematic. For, as we have seen, Russell
allows himself to consider the nature of a function in itself, by direct
speculation on the "logical intuition" corresponding to the term "func-
tion". It follows that the thesis according to which "function" and
"individual" seem to denote complementary logical types is due to a
property of the arrangement of logical objects corresponding to these
terms.
A second remarkable feature of Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism
is that self-reference or self-predication is not only an error, but is also
actually impossible. For, if we write "(q~(q~))", even if we are using
the same letter for function and argument, the constituted symbols are
in fact different, since what symbolises is not only the sign but also the
fact that "q¢' occurs at the left of a name (or, if " ~ " symbolises a
412 MARCO ANTONIO RUFFINO

function of second-order, the fact that " 9 " occurs at the left of a first-
order function symbol). As Wittgenstein said later in the Tractatus,
what is common to both functions in the expression above is only the
letter q~, which
by itself signifies nothing, (1961, sec. 3,333)

(A stronger consequence of this reasoning is that it excludes, in a

natural way, not only self-predication as shown above, but also any
predication of the form $(q~) for first- or higher-order functions. This
stronger result is not, at first sight, achievable in Russell's account.)
The difficulty caused by self-predication arises, therefore, merely from
an imperfection in our notation. In an ideal notation, different types
of symbols (with different syntactical rules) have different kinds of signs
(as is the case with Frege's notation in the Begriffsschrift and in the
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, although there are, of course, many other
aspects of Frege's notation that Wittgenstein regarded as involving
fundamental logical mistakes). This eliminates the possibility of the
emergence of paradoxes whose common source is, as we saw, self-
reference or self-predication.

4. CONCLUSION

The question concerning the theory of types involved in the Wittgen-

stein-Russell dialogue in the pre-Tracmtus writings seems to have had
a much deeper influence on the ideas of the Tractatus than is normally
recognised. In order to show the dispensability of the theory of types.
Wittgenstein develops a theory of what changes a sign into a symbol,
and this theory is based on what I have called the syntactical formulation
of the context principle. This important role of the context principle
seems to have escaped most of Wittgenstein's commentators.

NOTES

* I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universit~it
Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a
previous version of this paper.
1 A detailed account of the evolution of Russell's opinions concerning the theory of types
is given in Cocchiarella (1980, 1989) and Consuegra (1989); the ontological implications
of Russell's logical doctrines is the main topic of Quine (1966).
2 For a reconstruction of the Wittgenstein-Russell dialogue during the period of the pre-
 C R I T I C I S M OF R U S S E L L ' S T H E O R Y OF TYPES 413

Tractatus writings, see McGuinness (1972, 1974), Btackwell (t981), Hacker (1986, pp.
1-27), and Ishiguro (1981).
3 For this reason, Wittgenstein's general attitude towards the theory of types may seem
contradictory at first sight. Wittgenstein does indeed reject the possibility of a theory of
types in the Russellian style, but recognises the legitimacy of a theory of types restricted
to the different kinds of symbols. The contradiction is, therefore, merely apparent.
4 Here I am using the term 'syntactic' not in the modern sense of linguistics, i.e. as
opposed to 'semantics', but rather in the same sense that Wittgenstein uses in the
Tractatus (3.33) of the "logische Syntax" as a general descriptive theory concerning logical
properties of occurrences of symbols. 'Syntactic' seems to me an adequate term to
characterise a style of investigation that gives priority to formal features of linguistic
expressions and logical relations between sentences containing these expressions as rel-
evant data for the formulation and solution of philosophical questions.

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