FAMILY LAW- I 5TH TRIMESTER

DESERTION AS A GROUND FOR

DIVORCE
ANALYSING THE ‘FAULT’ GROUND WITH
SCOPE FOR ABUSE OF THE LAW

SUBMITTED BY: NAMRATA SHAH

I.D.NO.: 1676
2ND YEAR
B.A.LL.B. {HONS.}
DATE OF SUBMISSION: 15th January 2010.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................1

TABLE OF CASES...................................................................................................................2

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................3

CONCEPT AND ELEMENTS OF DESERTION.....................................................................4

TYPES OF DESERTION..........................................................................................................6

DESERTION AS A CONTINUING OFFENCE.......................................................................9

TERMINATION OF DESERTION.........................................................................................10

BURDEN AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF..............................................................................11

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................12

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................13

1
TABLE OF CASES

ENGLISH CASES:
1. Angel v. Angel (1946) 2 All ER 635.
2. Buchler v. Buchler (1947) 1 All ER 319.
3. Hopes v. Hopes (1948) 2 All ER 820.
4. Howard v. Howard (1962) 2 All ER 543.
5. Pardy v. Pardy (1939) 3 All ER 779.
6. Perry v. Perry, (1952) 1 All E.R. 1076.
7. Pike v. Pike (1953) 1 All ER 232.
8. Pulford v. Pulford (1947) 1 All E.R. 32.
9. Wanbon v. Wanbon (1946) 2 All ER 366.

INDIAN CASES:
1. Bhagwanti v. Sadhu Ram AIR 1961 Punj. 181.
2. Bipinchandra v. Prabhawati
3. Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534.
4. Dave Kantilal v. Bai Indumati AIR 1956 SC 115.
5. Jivubhai v. Ningappa AIR 1963 Mys. 3.
6. Jyotish Chandra v. Meera Guha AIR 1970 Cal 266.
7. K. C. Sikroni v. Sarla Sikroni (1989) 2 HLR 356 (Raj).
8. Laxman v. Meena 1964 SC 40.
9. N. B. Rukmani v. P. M. Srivastava AIR 1984 Kant. 131.
10. Rajini v. Ramswaroop (1995) 2 Civ LJ 74 (All).
11. Rangaswami v. Arvindammal AIR 1957 Mad 243.

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INTRODUCTION

“Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place, but from a state of things.”1

Halsbury’s Laws of India defines desertion as a ‘total repudiation of the obligation of

marriage’.2 The word ‘desert’ literally means ‘to abandon or give up or forsake without any
sufficient reason or intention to return.’3 In a marriage, if one spouse leaves the
matrimonial alliance without any sufficient cause he is said to be at ‘fault’.

Marriage is considered a sacrament and preserved as a social institution. 4 In olden times, it

was believed that this special contract could be put to an end only when one of the spouses
was guilty of an act which undermined the importance of this institution. This was the
foundation of the ‘fault’ based theory of marriage.5 In a bid to preserve this holy union, the
society reprimands the guilty spouse and provides no remedy of divorce for him, thereby
restricting the right to file for divorce to the spouse with the ‘clean hands’. The ambiguity and
complexities in the law have been interpreted by the judiciary which attempts to render
justice to the ‘innocent’ party. In spite of this attempt, there is a scope for abuse and misuse
of law by the ‘guilty’ spouse.

Through the course of this paper, an analysis of the theoretical and judicial interpretations has
been undertaken to illustrate the loop holes in law which provide an opportunity for the guilty
spouse to take advantage. Due to the paucity of space, the paper deals solely with the position
in Hindu Law with the position under English law being considered for the critique of the law
in India.

The paper has been divided into following subsections for better clarity: First, the researcher
deals with the essential ingredients and the types of desertion to illustrate the concept and law
of the land. Second, the nature of desertion as a continuing offence along with the means to
terminate it has been exemplified to analyse the latitude for misappropriation. Third, the
problems in discharging the burden of proof and finally the modern stance of the judiciary’s
contemporary stand on desertion in the 21st century have been discussed.

1
Pulford v. Pulford (1947) 1 All E.R. 32.
2
Halsbusry’s Laws of India: Volume 26 (New Delhi: Butterworths, 2007) at 267.
3
M. N. N., “"Desertion" as a Ground for Divorce” 83(7) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American
Law Register (May, 1935) at 906.
4
Dr. G. Kameswari, “Divorce and Judicial Separation – Need for a Uniform and Progressive Law” All India
Reporter (2002) at 97.
5
Ibid at 97.

3
CONCEPT AND ELEMENTS OF DESERTION
Section 13(1)(i b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with desertion as a ground for
divorce and the explanation of the same reads:
“The expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent of or against the wish of such
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and
its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly”.

There are mainly four basic elements which are primarily to be satisfied to constitute
desertion. The first two are to be present in the ‘deserting’ spouse.
1. The fact of separation (factum deserdendi)
2. The intention to desert (animus deserdendi)6

Desertion is a state which occurs only on the co-existence of both of these elements. If either
of these two ingredients is absent, the petition for divorce on desertion fails. 7 The interesting
phenomenon in desertion is that either of the elements can precede the other; however,
desertion will result only when both coincide and form a union.8

When a petition is filed, the first step is proving the fact of separation and the intention
separately while the second step is to prove their union. It is fairly easy to prove the physical
act of separation either from the conduct or from state of minds. The difficulty arises on
proving the animus i.e. the intention for desertion. This intention is required throughout the
period of desertion. The petitioner is expected to prove intention through conduct as a
person’s mind cannot be read.9 In this process, there are two ways in which the deserting
spouse has an opportunity to misuse the position of law:

There exist cases where the separation was consensual (like when the husband is on a
voyage) with no animus to desert.10 While separated, one of the spouses may develop the
intention to bring an end to the co habitation permanently on the expiry of the consensual
period. With the separation and the consequent formation of intention, the act of desertion
commences which the deserted spouse is expected to prove. The exact duration of this
supervening intention is difficult to prove thereby giving an edge to the deserting spouse and
6
Dr. P. Diwan and P. Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Codified and Uncodified) (12th edn., Haryana: Allahabad
Law Agency, 1998) at 118.
7
Rajini v. Ramswaroop (1995) 2 Civ LJ 74 (All).
8
R. C. Nagpal, Modern Hindu Law (2nd edn., Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2008) at 212.
9
K. C. Sikroni v. Sarla Sikroni (1989) 2 HLR 356 (Raj).
10
Pardy v. Pardy (1939) 3 All ER 779.

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the deserted spouse is in a worse off position as she had consented to something she could not
object (like husband leaving for a business trip).11

The quality of permanence in intention to leave the matrimonial home is one of the essential
sub-elements in desertion which differentiate it from wilful separation. If there is just
temporary separation without the intention to leave permanently, there is no desertion. 12 In
this law, if a person decides to return just before the expiry of two years and claims to have
no intention for permanent separation, the so ‘deserted’ spouse will have no recourse in law.

Apart from these elements in the deserting spouse, there are two other elements which have
to be present in the ‘deserted’ spouse:
1. Absence of consent
2. Absence of conduct which led to the other spouse leaving the matrimony.13

The deserted spouse filing the petition is the one who must sufficiently prove and provide
evidence for his conduct showing unmistakably that the desertion was against his will. 14
Courts have held that it is not enough for the petitioner to show that he was unwilling that the
respondent stay out rather he must have expressly declared his wishes to the ‘deserting’
spouse or make it clear that the absence was against his wish. 15 With this burden on the
deserted spouse, there arise times when illiterate and submissive women cannot expressly
convey their consent or rather lack of it. This creates problems in discharging their burden of
proof providing for the deserting spouse to take advantage of. If there is no proof of lack of
consent, the consensual separation is not a matrimonial offence using volenti non fit injuria.16

It is additionally important to note that for a matrimonial relief on the ground of desertion, it
is necessary to show the passage of the statutory period of two years and the same must be
continuous.17 This has been discussed in greater detail in the subsequent section. Therefore, it
can be illustrated that a deserting spouse has an opportunity to take advantage of the law right
from the fulfilment of basic elements of desertion.
TYPES OF DESERTION
There are mainly four types of desertion that are recognised by the law:
11
S. M. Cretney, Principles of Family Law (2nd edn., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1976) at 105-106.
12
Dr. Sir H. S. Gour, The Hindu Code: II (6th edn., Allahabad: Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1998) at 1082.
13
Supra note 6 at 118.
14
A. N. Saha, Marriage and Divorce (5th edn., Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1996) at 197.
15
Dave Kantilal v. Bai Indumati AIR 1956 SC 115.
16
Supra note 8 at 214.
17
S. A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law: II (17th edn., New Delhi: Butterworths, 1998) at 797.

5
 1. Ordinary Desertion:
When a spouse withdraws from the society and marital home without any cause or consent
with the permanent intention of not resuming co habitation is ordinary desertion. 18 In this
kind, there is actual separation (factum) and there is a co-incident intention to desert.
Ordinary desertion can arise as a result of a contractual and consensual separation (on
different grounds) with supervening intention or it can also arise when intention is formed
prior to the act of separation.19 This is a complete repudiation of the obligations under a
marriage where satisfying all the four elements mentioned in the preceding section need to be
satisfied and proved. In India, there is no ground for mutual separation or mutual desertion
which means that to fulfil pre requisites of desertion; it has to a fault based ground. 20 In this
type, it is fairly easy to prove intention from the conduct of the person as he physically leave
the home. Illustratively, in N. B. Rukmani v. P. M. Srivastava21the wife left the matrimonial
home as she did not get along with her husband. Consequently, she came surreptitiously to
her matrimonial home and took away all her jewellery and saris. Even after repeated attempts
by the husband to persuade her to return, she did not comply which the court held to be
desertion by the wife.

2. Virtual Desertion:
The law seeks to enforce the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the
married life and therefore, the mere withdrawal from the place and from the state of things
both amount to desertion.22 In virtual desertion, the deserting spouse does not actually leave
the matrimonial home but the deserting spouse refuses to perform any obligation towards the
other.23 In virtual desertion, there is de facto separation even when the spouses are living
under the same roof although they will be considered to be having separate households. 24
Illustratively, in Wanbon v. Wanbon25 a couple lived under the same roof but the wife never
addressed the husband except to find faults in him and refused to cook his meals or perform
any wifely duties towards him. Here, the courts held that there was desertion as there was an
abandonment of the state of things and the corresponding intention for the same.

18
Jivubhai v. Ningappa AIR 1963 Mys. 3.
19
S. V. Gupte and G. M. Divekar, Hindu Law: II (3rd Edn., Nagpur: All India Reporter Ltd., 1981) at 768.
20
G. A. Forrest, “Desertion” 4(1) The Modern Law Review (July 1940) at 60.
21
N. B. Rukmani v. P. M. Srivastava AIR 1984 Kant. 131.
22
Supra note 12 at 1079.
23
Angel v. Angel (1946) 2 All ER 635.
24
Hopes v. Hopes (1948) 2 All ER 820.
25
Wanbon v. Wanbon (1946) 2 All ER 366.

6
The ambiguity in the law comes in where the courts have stated that mere refusal or neglect
to perform one or more acts of marital obligations will not desertion so long as the intention
to co-habit continues. Therefore the mere refusal to have sexual intercourse is not desertion. 26
The deserting spouse can take advantage of this statement of the court and claim that there
was intention of the couple to live together though they were not performing marital
obligations. This provides a loop hole in the law for the deserting spouse to put forth a
contention which might succeed due to the discretionary powers given to the judges to decide
what exactly constitutes ‘non performance and discharge of marital obligations with the
intention of permanent abandonment’.

3. Constructive Desertion:
The law has been framed in such a way that the person who leaves the home is not always the
one who deserts. If one spouse expels the other from the marital home by conduct or words
making it impossible for the other to live there, it is the former who is in desertion and not the
one who is leaving.27 This is known as constructive desertion.

The elements of separation as well as intention need to be satisfied here. The mere conduct
providing sufficient reason for staying away is not enough as the person causing it must have
the intention to bring the consortium to an end. 28 Therefore, the test is not of abandoning (the
one who leaves in the deserted party) but the reason for the same and the intention on the
deserting party.29

The qualification in constructive desertion is that the deserting spouse must have intended the
consequences of his acts so the presumption of his intention is proved through his conduct
and words.30 Similar to the problem faced in criminal law, in the process of determining the
intention for constructive desertion, there arises a difficulty in differentiating between motive
and intention.31 The courts impute intention or infer intention due to which the subjectivity in
this process might advantage the deserting spouse who can claim that he was unaware of the
consequences of his act. There is no fixed rule or standard specifically laying down the test
for constructive desertion. The judges seem to work on an ad hoc basis to decide thereby
26
Bhagwanti v. Sadhu Ram AIR 1961 Punj. 181.
27
Jyotish Chandra v. Meera Guha AIR 1970 Cal 266.
28
Pike v. Pike (1953) 1 All ER 232.
29
A. A. M. Irvine, “Expulsive Conduct" as an Ingredient of Constructive Desertion” 29(4) The Modern Law
Review (July 1966) at 438.
30
Rangaswami v. Arvindammal AIR 1957 Mad 243.
31
F. Bates, “Animus Deserendi in Constructive Desertion” 33(2) The Modern Law Review (March 1970) at
149.

7
leading to a lack of consistency. Perhaps their ideology and philosophical view of life has a
hand in moulding the minds of the judges as to determination of the issue of desertion.

One of the most important caveats while proving constructive desertion is the necessity for
the conduct to be grave and convincing so as to force the deserted spouse to abandon the
house.32 The courts have warned in the past that every course of conduct will not amount to
sufficient factum. The conduct need not amount to cruelty in constructive desertion, however
it has been noted that between the two extreme standards to be proved there exists a no-man’s
land which provides scope for misuse by the deserting spouse.33

In constructive desertion, the deserting spouse is in possession of the matrimonial home. The
deserted spouse is left without any support and monetary compensation till he/she approaches
the court either to file for divorce (after 2 years) or maintenance. In India, due to the
traditional joint Hindu family systems, it is generally women who walk out of the homes after
incessant demands for dowry and ill treatment by the mother in law. 34 When they leave the
marital home, these women are usually left without any recourse in law or support thereby
bearing the consequences of the fault of other spouse.

4. Wilful Neglect:
The words ‘wilful neglect’ have been added to the explanation of s. 13(1) thereby providing a
broader base and new dimension on the interpretation of the word ‘desertion’. Wilful neglect
is the conscious reprehensible act and conduct of the party in the discharge of his marital
obligations thereby connoting a degree of abstention from an obvious duty attended by the
knowledge of likely results of the said abstention. 35 Therefore, the addition of wilful neglect
was to provide a concrete ground for proving constructive desertion. 36 This provides a new
dimension to desertion where if the offending party consciously neglects the spouse without
the intention to actually desert then this ground can be evoked.

The conditions for wilful neglect to be classified as desertion are not satisfied if the acts are
done accidently or inadvertently. This desertion can be abandonment of place or even the
matrimonial relation as such. Illustratively, in Howard v. Howard37the courts held the

32
A. Mookerjee, Marriage, Separation and Divorce (Calcutta: S C Sarkar and Sons, 1986) at 113.
33
Buchler v. Buchler (1947) 1 All ER 319.
34
Supra note 14 at 204.
35
Supra note 17 at 106.
36
Laxman v. Meena 1964 SC 40.
37
Howard v. Howard (1962) 2 All ER 543.

8
husband to be guilty of wilful neglect when he refused to provide accommodation for his
wife and child after he renewed co habitation with his wife.

The Parliament stated that this ground was introduced keeping in mind the state of Indian
women who are neglected by their husbands, denied sexual intercourse and maintenance. 38 In
these cases, it must be noted that the legislature did not think it fit to make the continued
unhappiness of one spouse caused by the unkindness, lack of consideration or the selfishness
of the other spouse a ground for obtaining relief as it has become necessary that there must be
forsaking or abandonment of the marital home which many Indian women are afraid to do
with the stigma and financial difficulties attached to it.39 This helplessness of women is taken
advantage of by the neglecting spouse.

DESERTION AS A CONTINUING OFFENCE

The petition for divorce on the grounds of desertion can be filed only after a period of two
years from the commencement of the co-existence of animus and the factum. Desertion is
known as a continuing offence as the element of permanence necessarily requires that the
factum and animus must continue during the entire statutory period preceding the
presentation.40 If the spouse returns before the expiry of two years and then leaves again, the
waiting period of two years commences all over again from the time he left again. If such
period is interrupted, the broken periods may not be added together so as to establish a sum
period of two years. The legislature provided this buffer period as a sort of ‘cooling off’
period so that couples can rethink and reconsider their decision before ending the holy
matrimony.41 Desertion is known as an inchoate offence as it continues from the day it
commences to the day it is terminated by conduct of the deserting spouse or by the
presentation of the petition.42 It becomes a complete fault based matrimonial offence only
when the deserted spouse files for divorce.

Keeping the intent of the legislature in mind, providing a period of two years is also
problematic in a few ways. There may be instances where the deserting spouse may return
within two years on reconsideration of his decision, but the law provides for
recommencement of the additional period of two years on his departure again providing him
with an opportunity to abuse the leeway provided for reconciliation. The legislature
38
Supra note 6 at 124.
39
Supra note 17 at 800.
40
Supra note 17 at 104.
41
P. M. Bromley, Family Law (5th edn., London: Butterworths, 1976) at 254.
42
Supra note 6 at 114-115.

9
overlooks the consequence on the deserted spouse who is left without any support or
maintenance. The trauma of being deserted for a period just less than two years might lead to
the attitude of non-acceptance of the renewal of the marriage by the deserted spouse. The
legislature might have good intentions in protecting the marriages but it seems to be working
on the assumption that the deserted spouse would always want the co habitation to resume as
soon as the deserting spouse returns. This presumption by the legislature provides the
deserting spouse a chance to abuse the law.

TERMINATION OF DESERTION
As seen above, desertion as a ground for relief differs from other such as adultery or cruelty
as in that offence the cause of action of desertion is not complete until the petition seeking
relief is filed.43 This means that through an act or conduct of the deserting spouse, the
desertion can be put to an end. Desertion can come to an end in the following ways:
1. Resumption of co habitation
2. Resumption of marital intercourse
3. Supervening animus revertendi or offer of reconciliation.44
Resumption of co habitation and marital intercourse should be with the intention for
permanency. The deserting spouse may return just before the completion of the statutory
period or engage in intercourse with the deserted spouse only to leave again. In both these
cases the offence of desertion is terminated although the deserter has no real intention to
resume co-habitation but merely seeks to forestall or defeat impending judicial proceedings.

When the offer of reconciliation is made, there lies an opportunity for misuse. Courts have
said that unjustified refusal of the offer for reconciliation would not only terminate desertion
but also reverse the process and ‘put the boot on the other leg’ making the innocent spouse
guilty of desertion now.45 This can be used by the deserting spouse for defence even when he
has no intention of actual reconciliation.

Recognising this loophole, the Courts have sought to restrict such abuse of this provision by
laying down stipulations such as casual acts of intercourse are not to be considered as proof
of resumption of marital relationship.46 Additionally, the offer of reconciliation must be
genuine and in good faith.

43
Supra note 19 at 780.
44
Supra note 6 at 125.
45
Supra note 16 at 202.
46
Perry v. Perry, (1952) 1 All E.R. 1076.

10
There may be instances where the deserting spouse has given just cause for leaving the
matrimonial home. In these instances, the deserted spouse cannot possibly be expected to
subject herself to a risk of recurrence and should be allowed to refuse reconciliation. Under
the Matrimonial Clauses Act, 1973, if parties resume cohabitation during the period of
desertion with a view to effect reconciliation but the same does not come about, desertion
will not be terminated but the period during which parties lived together will be deducted. 47
This should also be accepted by the Indian courts. They must do so by taking into account the
facts and circumstances both prior and subsequent to the desertion and also determine
whether the deserting spouse can be reasonably said to be ready and willing to resume the
marital relationship.

BURDEN AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF

The Court has held that the onus of proving desertion and all its elements rests on the
petitioner as, ordinarily, the burden lies on the party which affirms a fact, not on the party
which denies it.48 This principle accords with common-sense as it is “so much earlier to
prove a positive than a negative”49. However, the Courts are often faced with a problem of
conflicting evidence and it is difficult to decide which of the conflicting factual version given
by the two spouses is correct. This is especially so since such cases occur within the privacy
of the four walls of the house and in the absence of witnesses to corroborate evidence, the
circumstances are hostile to the discovery of the truth. This translates into an advantage for
the deserting spouse. Following the English Courts, the Supreme Court initially held that
such proof must be beyond reasonable doubt. Eventually, the courts held that matrimonial
offence may be proved on preponderance of probabilities 50. However, there have been
cases which have been decided on the beyond reasonable doubt standard thereby placing
immense burden on the innocent party to get relief and letting the deserter go scot free.

Due to the subjectivity and absence of any guidelines for the determination in desertion
petitions, the discretion and prejudices play a huge role in the process. It is true that every
case needs to be weighed according to the individual facts and background, however for
consistency in dispensing justice; there is a need to introduce guidelines for the judges.

47
L. N. Brown, “Constructive Desertion and Condonation” 26(6) The Modern Law Review (November, 1963)
at 701.
48
Bipinchandra v. Prabhawati
49
Dastane v. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534.
50
S. K. Mitra, Mitra on Hindu Law (New Delhi: Orient Publishing Co., 2000) at 554.

11
CONCLUSION
In recent times, to ensure that divorce is granted the petitioner combines the charges of
adultery and desertion. However courts have held that if adultery is not proved the petition
under desertion falls too. There has been no room provided for spouses who genuinely
believe that the other has been adulterous and leave the matrimonial home. 51 Desertion itself
is not cruelty however it is difficult to draw a line between them especially for constructive
desertion. The contradictory please of cruelty and desertion always fail as there is a necessity
to prove both of them separately.52

Due to the patriarchal nature of Indian society, the courts have held that if a woman is
working elsewhere she is not fulfilling her marital obligations resulting in desertion. In
addition, the deserted woman has a right to maintenance but no right to a separate residence. 53
In today’s day and age of perceived equality and social justice, to force a woman to resign her
job merely because she is living away from her husband would result in cutting off her source
of independence and subjecting her to beliefs that continue to confine women to patriarchal
ideals. There also is a need to duplicate the English stand of ‘deserted woman’s equity’ which
recognises a deserted woman’s right to reside in the matrimonial home because of her right to
consortium and the husband’s reciprocal duty to maintain her.54

In conclusion it can be said that desertion might be considered a fault based ground for
divorce but there are ways that the guilty spouse can manoeuvre around the law and deny
justice to the deserted spouse. There are two probable solutions to this problem: either to
adopt a new legislation which tackles these opportunities of misuse or move towards the
concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage to provide no necessity for the deserting
spouse to abuse the legal provision of desertion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES:
1. A. A. M. Irvine, “Expulsive Conduct" as an Ingredient of Constructive Desertion” 29(4) The
Modern Law Review (July 1966).

51
Supra note 14 at 211.
52
Supra note 17 at 112-113.
53
B. Sivaramayya, Matrimonial Property Law in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 51.
54
Ibid at 49.

12
 2. A. Irvine, “Mutual Desertion” 30(1) The Modern Law Review (January 1967).
3. Dr. G. Kameswari, “Divorce and Judicial Separation – Need for a Uniform and
Progressive Law”, All India Reporter (2002).
4. F. Bates, “Animus Deserendi in Constructive Desertion” 33(2) The Modern Law Review
(March 1970).
5. G. A. Forrest, “Desertion” 4(1) The Modern Law Review (July 1940).
6. L. N. Brown, “Constructive Desertion and Condonation” 26(6) The Modern Law Review
(November, 1963).
7. M. N. N., “"Desertion" as a Ground for Divorce” 83(7) University of Pennsylvania
Law Review and American Law Register (May, 1935).

BOOKS:
1. A. Mookerjee, Marriage, Separation and Divorce (Calcutta: S C Sarkar and Sons,
1986).
2. A. N. Saha, Marriage and Divorce (5th edn., Calcutta: Eastern Law House, 1996).
3. B. Sivaramayya, Matrimonial Property Law in India (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
4. Bhatnagar’s Manual of Marrriage and Divorce (2nd edn., Jodhpur: Rajasthan Law
House, 2000).
5. Dr. P. Diwan and P. Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Codified and Uncodified) (12th edn.,
Haryana: Allahabad Law Agency, 1998).
6. Dr. P. Diwan, Law and Marriage and Divorce (Allahabad: Wadhwa and Co., 1988).
7. Dr. Sir H. S. Gour, The Hindu Code: II (6th edn., Allahabad: Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
1998).
8. Justice R. Misra and Dr. V. Kumar, Mayne’s Hindu Law and Usage (16th edn., New
Delhi: Bharat Law House, 2008).
9. Lawmann’s Matrimonial Laws (New Delhi: Kamal Publishers, 2007).
10. P. M. Bromley, Family Law (5th edn., London: Butterworths, 1976).
11. Prof. P. Diwan, Women and Legal Protection (New Delhi: Deep and Deep
Publications, 1995).
12. R. C. Nagpal, Modern Hindu Law (2nd edn., Lucknow: Eastern Book Company,
2008).
13. S. A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law: II (17th edn., New Delhi: Butterworths, 1998).
14. S. K. Mitra, Mitra on Hindu Law (New Delhi: Orient Publishing Co., 2000).

13
 15. S. M. Cretney, Principles of Family Law (2nd edn., London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1976).
16. S. V. Gupte and G. M. Divekar, Hindu Law: II (3rd Edn., Nagpur: All India Reporter
Ltd., 1981).

DIGESTS:
1. Halsbusry’s Laws of India: Volume 26 (New Delhi: Butterworths, 2007).

14