Repdnt€d frorr

Th. Sca"di"6lisn |o&"al ol Pcyclnlogt

r97r, Vol. t2, No. r, ?9-52

THE NEW FUNCTIONALISM

L E N N A R T S J OD E R G

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL . STOCKHOLM

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 THE NEW FUNCTIONALISM

LINNART SIoBrRc

Deputndt aJAlcholast, Untu*rny oJGdtebols,S@edd

SJdBRd,L. The new functionalism, S.da J. Pt,nol., 1971,r 2, 29-s2.-

The paperrevi€wsthe dev€lopmentof Btuswik's probabilisilc functionalism,
Brussikt major contibution is hdd to be his €onsistentcnph$is of the
imporEnce of tle e.olocr. Bri€f revicws are the! siven of the m.ny recenr
dpplications fundion,lismin per.eption,le.rnins,andapplied
of probabilistic
psycholosy. tpproachto psycbolosy
Fjrally, a mentalistic is cotsidcrcdss sn
alt$native to functionalism-

In modernpsychologyon€ usually associates the rerm functionalismwith the Chicagoschool

andthe nanes Dewey (1896),Angell (r9o7) and Caff (I9r5, r93o). The functionalists,uDder
in{uen€e of Darwin md Willi.n James(r89o), regardedthe task of psychologyto be the
study of the importance of consciousnesand behavior for the adaptationof the organism.
Hotr€ver, the Chicago functionalists v€te eclectics. They never developed an experimental
proglam that difiered much flom that of other contemporary psychology (€xcept fron the
stlucturalism of Wundt and Titchener). BoriDs (1952)and Heidbfeder G933) describeth€
development of Chicago functionalisn as a eradual a.d va$e merging withthe core ofAme-
rican psychology.After Carr there was hardly any prominent functionalist left in the USA
providcd, of course,that Americu psychologyis not co$idered asintrinsicallyfuncrionalist.
But that nould b.oaden the meaning of the term functionalism so much as to render it

Howcver, a fu!.tionalistic plogram was under preparationin Eulop€ at the sme time as
Chicagofunctionalismlanguished.TheEuropeanfunctionalismdevelopedwithinthepsycho-
logy of perception,or, more specifically,iD the study of the perceptualconstancies.
The significationof the constancyphenomenais that perceptiontends to miror certain
propertiesof the environment (of the objects,the so-calleddistal stimuli) rather than the
strongly varying pattern of stimulation that is in direct contact with the sensory receptors
(the proximal stimulus). For example,we experiencethat a person has I certain corstant
height regardless of his distance, despite the fact that the retinal image of the persoD vari€s
as a function of distaoce. It seems, then, that the perceptual system corr€cts for certain
unimpoltant, accidentalvariation in the pattern ofstimulation. We seemto be programmed
to see,hear and feel asolid and constantenvironment.
Th€ constancyphenomenahave been discussedby many authors since the beginning of
psycholosy (see Boring, 1943 nd 1952). The Chicaso functiomlists were, of course, awar€
of the existence of these phenomena. The following quotation flom Angell's r9o4 text
€ntitlcd 'Psychology:an introductory study of thc structule and functionofhumanconscious-
ness' illustratesclearly this awareness:
'Now it requjies orly a moment's reflection to convince us that, as w€ stmd at a little distance
from the chai!, the imse of its seat, shich is reflected on th€ retina, is not squar€ at aIl, but is
a kind of rhomboid, with two acute ard two obtuse dgles . . . Now, how do€sit com€ .bout that

r..od, J, ftt.ho|., vo1.1r, r97r 29

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

30 LENNARTSJO3ERC

we cm perceiv€ a rhomboid 6 a square, which we mquestiombly do in this case?'(Angell,

A largee{perinenl,l program seemsnot to havebeen initiated beforeratherlale,hoNever.

See Katz (r9rr). Latz did not belong to the core Gestalt psychologists,but it goeswithout
saying that thc lattef were also intcnsely intercsted in the constmcy phcnomena (see Kofika,
1 9 3 5 ,c h a p . 6 ) .
The tust steps toward a functionalist psyc[ology of pe.ception were, hovever, taken by
Heider (19"6, r93o).1Heider stressedthat r study of perceptionmust take into accountthe
role of perception in adaptation. This role is to establish a contact between the organism
and its solid environment; to enable,as it {ere, the organism to see'through' the s€nsory
stimulation to the constant €trvironment. The €nvironment car be a world of objects or a
world of munings, as it is when we see 'through' the l€tters to the underlying mcaning.
These objects and meanines constitute causal centersin our environment. They are the
ultimate sources of the sensory stimuli that reach us. Adaptation can never be succesful
without a prior contact {ith th€se crusal cent€rc.
However, secory stimulation is ambiguous.It gives only incomplcte informatioD about
its sour€e. The sam€ stimulatioD can be caused by several objects. Hence, the task of the
perceptual system is to integrate many cues, each of which is itself, to a certain extent, un-
reliable. The perceptual slstem is usually quite succesful in accomplishing this task.
The following quotation from Heider illustrates his thinking.r
'Dds wadtli.he und ltual;ante ih I'Vdlrnehnnesc$.tuhd lieEt it.ler Beziehne del be;.lcn
Schihten D und D', d€r Ors.nismus lebt hit ud in dem Dhsen, dem lebensrelev@ten
G€scheheD,ud das ehz€li€ der V€rmitduns ist w€itsehend varierbar, ersetzbar und ohne
absoluteZuordnuns dazwischengesetzt.. .' (Heider, r93o, p.385, author'sitalics)

Egon Brunswik, partly under the i!fluence of Heider, started an extensiveresearchpro-

gram on the perceptualconstanciestoward the eild ofthe rgzo's. He summlized his resuls
and presenteda functionalist program in the book 'Wahrnehnung und Gegenstaqdswelt'
(1934) with the subtitle'Grundlegung einer Psychologievon Gegenstandher'.
This important work has not yet been translated into English, exc€pt for a few sample
passages availablein a volume edit€d by Hammond (1966).A nore readily availabled€scrip-
tion of the functionalistic program was later written in the form of a journal article (Bruns-
wik, 1937).Tolman's review of the bookis alsolucid and well worth reading(Tolnan, 1934).
Some of the main them$ of th€ book may be illustrated by the folloving sumary of
Brunswik's work on the so-c 1led const@ct rahio. F\$t, the task of perception is defi.ed in
terms of some applopriate physical measufe.For example,supposethat we study the per-
c€ived height of objects.A corrct perception should, in some serse, be in tune with the
measuredheight. In practice,perceptionis studiedbymeans of verbaljudgmentsor match-
ings. Srunswik suggesteda simple index of how well the respons€scorlespond with the

r Heider's mos! import.nt lapers are availablcin an Enslish translation(Heider, r9s9).

' D denotesr lhysic.l object rnd D' the cor€spondins subjcctivccxp€ricnce,

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 THn NlW IUNCTIONAI-ISM 3r

In this equation,c is the constancyratio, / the resPonse(a verbaljudgment or a mtching, in

any c6€ expressed on a physical scale), B the co[ect value and P the value that would have
'directly relevanCproxinal stimulus had been at-
been the subject's responseif only the
tended to (total lack of constancy).
The foltowing exanple mry further clarify the meaning of the constancy ratio Consider'
again,our experimenton the perceptionof height. A certain standardstimulus is presented
at a certain distance from the subject. His task is to match the size of the stadard bv varying
the size of variable stimulns at a difretdt d;stance. Here B : the height of the standard sti
mulus, /:the actual matching produced by the subjcct and P:the matching that would
have been produced if the subject had totaily disregafdedthe distancesto the stimuli and
matchedthe visual anglesofthe standardand the variablestimuli.
When th€ matching is eaactly correct (B-l) we have .: I when the matching follows
the proximal stimulus we have F:r and e:o. The constancyratio has certaindravbacks,
butwe shattby-passthem in the presentcontext(seeBrunswik, r94o). Instead' w€ not€ that
the usc of the constancyratio led to some intelesting emPiricalresults. Firstly, the ratio wts
usually lessthan r, indicating a lack of p€lfect coctancy Secondly,the iatio was di$erent
for difierent perceptualcontinua.Sizeconstancywascleariybetter than brightnessand shape
constancy.Thirdly, there was an effect of set on the constancyratio. The nornal value in
thc caseof size was about o.8o. When the subject was instructed to disregarddistanceand
judge the visual angle (projected size in a froatal plane) the ratio dropped, as expected,to
about o.3o. Further re;nforcem€nttowards either of th€ two extremeswas produced by
instructionsto utilize knowledgeabout the geometryofperspective,etc. It was then possible
to increas€the ratio to o.9o and to decrede it to o.r5.
This summary ofthe researchon the constancyntio toucheson cenain recurent themes
jr BruDswik'sthinkiDg that w€ shdl meet againand againin his later works. Thev are:
(r) It is assun€d that perceptionutilizes c€ltain cuesin thc proximal stimulatiofl. How-
ever, only ore such cue is not sufncient to account for the pefceptual constancv.In our
examplethe size ofthe retinal image is a cue to the size ofthe obj€ct But, surelv'Perception
must also utilize other cues;for example,cues that carry information about the distanceof
r h eo b j e ( r .B r u n ' $ i k s r , e s s . dj .u " ( [ k e H e i d e rh r d d o a e .t h a i e v e n\ e r y g o o dc u e sc a r o o n L v
probabilistic information about the distal objects.Becauseof this perceptionmav be con-
sidereda seliesofhypoth€sesabour the distal world.
(2) Perceptionis habitually directed towards c€rtain distal proPetties.In our exampleit
may be argued that perception is mainly direct€d towards the physical size of objects The
empirical evidence for this asseftion is the finding that it is usually more difficult to change
the constancyratio towaids o than towards r by meansof changesin set.
(3) Behador is defined as achievement.This means thar we observebehavior bv means
'right' or rwrong'. Such formal classification rules ivere
of classifyi.g behavior irstances rc
also common itr th€ cotrtemporary testing movenent and itr animal studies of leahing.
In closing tbis introduction, we may ask in what way Brunswik's position difiered from
thrt of th€ Chicngo functionalists. There se€ms to be many similarities betwecn Brunswik
and the latter. However, there were also certain imPortant difierences ln the first place,
Brunswik postulatedthat perceptionmust be founded on insufficientevidenceand attempted
to analyzein a detailed manner the implications of this uncertainty. S€condlv, Blunswik

Scdrd-I.Pst.bol.,Vol. 12,reTt

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 32 LENNARISJ6BERC

aimed at an objective psychology. Thirdly, Brun$,ik started the iNestigation of the im_
portance of the ecology for adaptation and he discussed the consequenca of such an ecolo_
gical orientation for experimental de€ign.
Brunswik was, of course, under the influence of other trends in the psychology of his
time (say, 1925-1935).we have already mentioned Heider,s importance. The goal of an
objective psychology had, of course, been ser by behaviorism. Brunswik,s most orieinal
contriburions mry be found in his discussionsof rhe imporranceof rhe ecology.
But all this will be treated in som€ d€tail larer in this paper. We now turn to some bio-
gfaphical and bibliogriphical notes.

LIFE AND WORKS OF EGON BRUNSWIK

Woths
Brunswik's producrion was not very extensive and the literature about his ideas is rather
limited. An incomlete listing of his writings may be found in Hammond,s volume (1966).
Brunswih's most important publications, except rhc book ,Wahnehmung und cegen_
standswclt', are the monographs'Disral focussingof perception:size-constancyin a repre_
sentativesampleof situations'( rgaa), ,The conceptualframeworkof psycholosy,( 1952)and
'Perception
and the representativedesign of psychological*perimcnts' G947; 1956).Two
journal articlesare particularly jmportant (Tolman & Brunswik, 1935;Brunswik, 1955).
Btunswik teDded to be somewhat repetitive ir his wrirings. A study of two of the mono-
sraphs (r9S2; 1956)gives a very sood comprehesive view of his Nhole production.
The most important cont.ibutions to the discussionofBrunswik's ideasmay be found in
the publishedpape$ presentedat a 'Symposium on the probabiliry approachin psychology,
(Psr.hologial Redru, 1955, 62, No.3), and in papers by Tolman (1956) and postman &
Tolman G9S9). Heider gav€ some inrerestingcomments(1939), as well as Hull
G943). rn
Hamnond s volune 'The psychology of Egon Brunswih, the present author found the papers
byHammoDdhim,dfrndb\Leepprrobepatri.ulcrtyhelpful.Houever,Lh*"i-"oa..lr
that the best review ofBlunswik's work is the oDegiven by postmar & Tolnan.

L;fe
Brunsiltk was horn in r9o3 in Budapest. He studied in Vienna, where he receivedhis
doctor's d€greein 1927and became.n a3sisranrplofessorin 1934. In 1933Tolman visited
Vienna and he and Srxnswik becameacquainted.Tolman and Brunsx,ik found ouicHv a
r e m a r k . b l ec o n v c r g e n coef r h € i r l i n e so f ' e e d r . h . o n e i n p e r c e p d o n( B r u n s q i L )a n d r h e
oth"r in leuning (Tolman). The -e.utr was rhe fcmou, joinr paper (Totman & Brunswik,
1935) and mutual, stlongly positive reviews. Thus Brunswik reviewed Tolman,s ,purposive
behavior in animals and men' fot the ze;tschift fib p'J.rorop, (1935) and Totrnan reviewed
Bnnswik's 'Wahrnebmung und cegenstandswelt' tor rl]te p1.hotagical Buttet;n (r%9.
A few years later Bnnswik join€d the B€rteley departm€nt of psychology, where he re-
mained until his death in 1955. Ir appears that Snnswik,s emigrarion to the USA iDvotv€d
a chans€ in his stle of research. In Vienna he had been invotved in an extensive enpirical
p.ogram with many co-worters and students. In Berkeley, holvever, he @ncentlated his
interest on theoretical analysis and rhe history of psychology.

sc6A. J. Plrtbal.,Yol. t2, te7,

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 33

MOLAR BEHAVIORISM

We haveseenthe beginni.gs of a functionalisticpiogram in the study ofconstancypheno-

me.a around r93o. The meetirg of Tolnan .nd Brunswik connectedthis program to the
contemporarybehavioristicstudy of learning.
A cenfualquestionin the study oflearning was how to definebehrvior. Watson'sown posi
tion rvc vulnerable.He treated the question,e.9., in the book 'Psychologyfrom the stand-
poiot of a behaviorist'(r9r9, pp. ro-r2). Watsor seemsto have believedthat it was possible
to dcfine beharior fo! psychologyin a manner quite similar to that of physioiogy('nuscle
twitches'). The orly difierefte world be that behavior, as studied in psychology,is more
complex and extendedin time.
It was soon found in the empilical study oflearning that this view neglecteda distinction
betweenpsychologyand physiologywhich was of paramount importance. It appearedthat
the animal did not learn an invariant, albeit complexand extendcd,responsechainin, e.g.,
a maze. Instead, the animal behaved,from a peripheral poirt of view, quite dilTer€ntlyat
ditrerent trials. A famous jllustration of this fact was made by Macfanane (r93o). In his
study rats first learneda maze in the usual manner. The maze $'as thcn filled with later.
The result was, dut the rats were successfulin the waterfilled version of the maze, in spite
of the requir€ment of quite dilTerentphysical movements.
It was natuial to corclude from such studies that the animals changedin sone centnl
aspectsin the course of the experiment. Learning did not appear to be strengtheningof
associaiioDsbet{een physical stimuli and proximal responses('nuscle twitches'). The
animalslearned,apparently,to reacha distal goal accordingto severaldiferent and mutually

Thcse problems rvere acknowledgedby all the leading learning theorists around r93o:
Lashley (r9"9), Hunter (r93r) and Tolman (r93r), to nme only the possiblymost inflnen-
tial names.Some authors had recommendedthe study of distal acbi€v€menteven earlier,
e.g. E. B. Holt (!9r5), who also voiced argum€ntsconsonantrith Heider's and Brunswik's
'psychologyfrom thestandpoint ofthe object'. Weiss(r9?S)
fomulated the fanous raindrop
analogy,which goesas follows. Th€ raindropsfall in many difierentplacesand movein rnany
ditrerent directionswith varying velocities.But I thesevery difierent novemenis haveone
thing in comon: they all leadto the sea.Inth€ samemannerthere is a confusingvariability
of behavior,uhich can be clarifredonly by an understandingof the fact that behaviorconver-
ges to certain go.ls. When these goals are understood we can also explain behavior and irs
variability is no longer seeminglychaotic.
After r93o the most inportant theoreticaldevelopmentsare due to Tolman (r93r). He
suggestedthat certain conceptsshould be placed between the stimulus and the response
terms of the theoreticalsyst€m.Tolman often gaveth€seconceptsa mentalistic nane (e.g.
expectancy)ed he argued for the heuristic value of common sens€and phenomenological
analysis.However,the conceptshaveno cldm to an existenceoftheirown outsidethetheore-
tical system;the system is connectedwith empiiical facts only in the stimuli and the re-
sponses.Tolman calledthis type ofconcept an inteivening variable.Heiefollows an e{ample
oftbe use ofthe inteflening variable'purpose'.

s..nd.l. Pltrbol., VoL t2, !97r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

34 LENNART SJOBERG

Inlercue about rtltlo'e ba'ed on a beha"r, nudr

Supposethat a rat is moving on an obstaclefree plane.At a certainmoment we can observe
the direction in which the lat i€ moving. The problem is to infer the purposeof its motions,
if any.
This problen h approachedby placing the animal in new positionsand observingits new
movement directions. Four cales are possible.

trtrll
L ' l:-'l
at )N-
1 "
I r ll/\l
It-.--l

Frc. i. Conkrscnt beh5vio.. Frc. 4. No sic! of gool-dir€ctedbehavior,

Flc, 2, Dive.sent behavior. Frc. 5. Imprcw€d infolmtion by mole than two observations.
Frc. 3. A distant goal.

(r) The two directionsintersectin a certain point P (convergingbehavior).Conclusion:the

aninai intends to reachP. See Fig. r.
(2) The two movement directions diverge from a point P. Conclusionrtherat avoidsP.
See Fig. z.
(3) The two directionsare parallel.Conclusion;the animal movestoward o! from a distant

(4) Behavioris not consonantwith cas€ I-3. Conclusion:the raCsbehavioris Dot purpo-
sive or the purposewas difierent at the two occasions.SeeFig 4
Th€ conclusioDs can be reinforced by naking several obseflations in idditiotr to only
two. A caseofconvergent b€havioris illustiated in Fig. 5.
A similar ki.d of reasoningcan be applied to behaviorwhich cannot be describedexhaus-
tively in spatialterms. The method is, generally,to study behaviorin severalditrerentsitua-
tions, e.g. by introducing obstlclesin the sittration.In eachsituation we can usually not dif-
ferentiate among severalPossibleintentions,but wh€n the number of situationsis increased
ve deffeae the core of possiblealternativehypothesG. Wc may, of course,find that ',
hypothesiscan explain all behavior sampl€sand that would correspondto case4 abov€ In
practice we probably conclude that the int€ntion is the one consistentwith most behavior
sampl€s and that is clearly a better explanation th.D th€ next best hypoth€sis.
Some dramatic advances in the history of psychology have been concemed with the estab-
'deep' and connect behaviorsarnplesthat are *emingly un-
Iishment of intentions that lay
related (psychoanalysis).

EMonnal aspe.tsofintdreri
S oat;dbtes
An interesting aspectof the power of good inteffening conc€ptsis the economicalone
(Miller, 1959).The intervening variable gives a concisesunmary of the relatiom mons a

Scd"d.I. Ptl.hol., Vol. ! 2, 47,

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 THt NEw F.NCTIONALTSM
35
number of stimulus and responsevariabtes.The folowing .dictionary eaample,givesan
illustratioD of this function of the intersening variable.
Supposethat we have 5o extinct languagesand 5o livin8 tanguages.We wlllt to translate
from each extinct langlage to €ach living language and {or this purpose v€ need a number of
dictionaries.At airst glanceitseemsthat z,5oodictionaies are necessary. Anorherapproach

T
T Fr.. o. Thc econo crl fulRjon
able: the didionary €xamDle
or,n inteftnin! var!

is to write, firstly, dicrionaries for traGlarion from each extinct languag€ to an intemediary
language (e.g. English) and, scondty, fd translation from the intermediary language
to
eachliving iangtage. This strategyrequiresonty roo di.tionnies: a reduction to onty j.7" or
the original amount of worL. The two app.oachesare illustEted jn Fie. 6.
The intermed,ary languagecorrespondsro an inrervening uriabte in a ps)chotogicat
theory. The information from the stimulu variables (the exrind languages) is concentnted
in a point (the int€mediary language)and then it bems out to the tivi,g tanguages(the
response variables). In this way it is possible to simptii, and sunmarize the descriprion of
the stimulus responserelations.

Sunnary of nolal behaaibism

Tolman's molar behaviorism is impoitant for the purposes of the pr€sent paper for three

( r ) The attempt at a periphenl or proximal definition of behavior was abandoned. Instead,

class of behaviorinsranceswer€ u.ed, vhose elenenrs couLi be ent;rety dissimitarfron a
physiological point of view. The ctasseswere based on achievemenc reachingthegoal boxin
the maze,prGsing rhe lever in a Stinner-box, etc.
(2) Theofies w€re insened betweetr stimuti and !€sponses. phenom€nolosical anatvsis
and common-sensenorionswere ofren uritized in the initial phae of rhe creari* .r,r,. ,i..
ories. Later, metrtalistic t€rminotogy ws often kept.
(3) If successful, the int€rvening variables a[owed a tremendous simplification of
th€
description of stimulus-response retations.

Final cotundt on nolt beha.;tin

Tolrnan's intervening variables connected stimulu and response but they gave no advice
.s to on what basis one should er€ct the srimulus and response variables th€mselves. What
rules of clasification should be used?

5.4*1. I. P'rcbol., Val. r2,r97.

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

36 LENNARTsJoBERc

This question has rarely been discussed(see, however, Skinner' 1935). Hull tried to
approachthe issueswith his conceptof a'hierachical habtt family' (1934). Hull proposed,
that a closestudy would revealc€rtaifl proximl similaritiesamoDgall responsesbelonging
to a c€rtain category('fractionrl antecipatorygoal respoftes'). Howev€r, th€ existeDceof
th€seeventscouldneverbe actuallydemonstratedin a convincingmarner. Hull alsodeselted
the idea rather soon (ct Heider, 1939).Neither did Tolm.n makc much Progr€sswith the
problen. His last important theoretical paper (t959) gives nothing new on this issue as
comparedto his 1932book.
The problen requires the formation of disjunctive concepts.Expedmental studies of
concept foimation have demonstratedthat such concepts are Particulally hard to form
(Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956). Comider the tsk of predicting responses,given r
cc*ain stimulus. The fotm of this prediction is a disjunctive rule: given S, we predict the
occurrenceof RD or R,, or &, ctc. We simply have no orderly phenomcnauntilrules have
been found for forming thesedisjunctiveiesPonsecoDcePts
Thus, each behavioralvariable may be regaided as a classificationof behavior instances
The systen of disjunctive rules must be applied at this basiclevel. The problem should not
be confusedwith the discussionof tdt ahtJ (e.g. Nliller, 1959),which conccrnsclassesof
.a/ublrs rather than behaviorinstances.Such classesof variablesare often discussedin trait
pslchology, where it is attempt€d to collect severalvatiablesthat measurethe same latent
trait (e.s. Lazarefeld,1959).The cla$ification of indicantshas beenmuch more frequently
discussedthan the .lassificationof behavior istances.
In conclusion:thc first and fo.emost question for all psychologicallesearchconcernsthe
definition of behavior variables.However, molar behaviorismquickly acceptedthe notion
that behavior should be definedand studied as achievement.Andthisnotionwasfounded on
the insight that the achievementvariable was generatedby i disjunctiverul€: the vicarious-

Achicvement and vicariousness-the door htd been left wide open to functionalism.

PROBABILISTIC FUNCTIONALISM

A.quintion ol hntuhdsc and WPosirP bPhaior

We have followed the development of corst.ncy research and molar behaviorism until
1935.At this time Totman & BrunswiL, (1935) perceivedthe greatsimil ities betweenthe

Constancy research developed a systematic view of the .cquisition of knowledge.r We

may conceiveof the acquisition of knowledgeas a seriesof events lirst, we consider the
environmental conditions that are of importance to the organism-th€ distal stimutus
(S,). However, theseare rot directly accessibl€to the organism.He is in co.tact only with
certain cuesor proximl stinuli (Sp). It is, then, up to the organismto integratethesecues
to an inferenceconcerningthe distal conditions.This integrationis, in the caseofperception,
rath€r automatic and unconscious.
Molar behaviorismdev€lopeda sinilar point of view as to purPosit€ behavior and need
I BruffriL himself was mostly interesiedin perception,but his onalysiscm be applied to all kinds
of acquisition of lnoNledse.

S'.oA. I. Ptr.bol., V ol. 12, 47 t

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 THE NIW NTNCTIONALISM

satisfaction.We starr out with a certain need, formulated as a dsired relationbetw€enth€

organism and the environment. This d€sir€d ielation can be obtained in several ways, all
of which are, however,usually uncertain. The final act of consurotion co.cludes the series

Fis. t l'is. 2
Frc. 7. The lensmodelappliedto perception,
Frc, 8, Thc lcre mod€l applied io purposivebehavior,

We may summarize the formal resemblance of th€ two analysesas follows:

Aequis;tion of kwwledge
(r) Certain infornation desired A cenain relation to the
environment desired
(z) Cues are 'studied'
0) rnference

The two approachesmay also be illustrated of Brunswik's l€ns model (seeFigs. 7 and 8).
The lens model has inspired a very effcient and subtle aoalysisof the acquisitionof Lnow-
ledge (Hursch, Hammond & Hursch, 1964).If stimuli and responsescan be givetr metric
descriptions,as is the case,e.g.,lvith size perception,it is possibletousecorrelationstatistics
in order to desclibe and analyzethe achievementsof the organism.tThe most importmt
terms of the lens model an^lysis ate the eeologi.al ulTtli€r, which r€fer to the corrGpondence
b€tween.s, and Sp, and th€ degreesof cue utilization, which refer to the correspondence
between Sp and X, the response. Another important factot isthe;ntla-aologi.al.6telatiotlt,
i.e. the intercorrelationsofthe various cues.
The applicltion of th€ lens model to purposive behavior involves the assumptionrbat a
need generatesceitain 'habits' with valying degreesof probability. These 'habits' in turn
lead to the nnal goal with varying d€grees of probability. The nodel has only rarely been
applied to purposive behavior, probably because it seems difficult to 6nd resonable empi-
dcal interpretationsof its key conc€pts.
Thus, the acquisition of knovledge and puryosive behavior became the two main themes
r The csse of non-metric $imuli dd ftsponses must be appro.ch with prolabilit statisti€, S€e

S@d.l.Pt rbal.,VoL t2, teT r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

38 LINNARTsJOBnRc

of functionalism. Brt at the sam€ time certrin important qucstions were relatively neglected.
How is knowledgeused in purposive behavio!?And how is the acquisition of knowledge
guided by needs?The two themesw€le clearly delin€ated,but their interactionrvasinsuffi-
ciently attendedto. Parts ofthe areaof resench generaredby rhe interaction questionshas
later been much studied in psychologyunder the heading'decisionnaking'.
The definition of a goal as I certair relation betweenthe organism and its cnvironmenr
leadsto difficulties. It is preferrableto defrnea goal as a cerrain condition of rhe ego (need
satisfaction).The following erampl€ mly illustrarethis idea. Supposerhatweobserve a man,
who is Iooking fo( an open grocery store. His goal could be defined asrhar of finding such a
storc, and it would then be phrasedinterms ofa relationbetweenthe mln and his environ-
ment. But, suddendy, the man resignsand enters a restauianr.He has made a shift to an
€ntirely ditrerent purposive responsechain, bnt his need is of coursethe same.Thus, de-
6ning a goal as need satisfiction gi1'es a clearer picture of behavior than defining it in terns
of organism-environmentrelations.
This approach to the defrnition of a find goal introducesa .ew form of vicariousness,
which Brunswik did not clearly distinguishfrom the vicariousnes of cues and methods.r I
refer to the vicariousnessof consummatoryacts. This is a basic notion in psychoanallric
thinking (Brunswik, 1952),but natunlly also a comnonsensenotior litde nore r€markable
than the facr that the hung€! drive is satisfied both by a Hamburger and a steal. lt is im-
poltant that the vicariousnessof consummatoryacts be distinguishedfrom that of 'habits'
and cues.The rclevantknowledgein the caseofconsummatory acts refersto the anticipated
efiect of dre act on the organism itself ("F. on the state af need). The kno\\ledee concerning
'habits' is directed exactly in the opposite diiection:
what is dre ctrect of behavior on the

We may also frame these considerations in terms of ditrerent kinds of hienrchical struc-
tures. Firstly, we must @Bider the convergenceofbehavior on certain relationsbetweenthe
orgmism and the environment. Secondly,we must considerthe fact that there is a kind of
vicariousnesswithin certain classesof such r€lations.This is the questioDofthe srrucrure of
the consummatoryacts. In order to explain behavior we must take both structuresinto ac-

Brunswik presenteda bistoricalanalysist952) in which he tried to show that psychology

converg€stowards thc functionalisticapproach.Here follom a brief summary of his histo-

A very important theme in the analysis consists of a splitting up of psychological problens

into severalregions- With a basis itr the central organismic region (O) we may illustrate
Brunswik's conceptsas follows:

Distant and "deep" causes Objccr Stimulation O Muscle movement Effects Distal effecrs
c b a O A B C

Early psychophysics (and contempo(ary psychophysics, too, for that mrtter) was directed
towardsrelationsbetwe€n& and O. Structuralism uder influenceofthe atomistic physio-
--;;;; B.""",,ik'" disasion or prycho.nalysis( ! es2).

se"d. L Ptrcbol,Yal.12,retr

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 ,THENEWTUNCTIONALISM
39
logy ofthe sensesofthe rgth century-directed its attentionto 4-O, searchiDgfor sensation
elementsin experience(i.e. in O). The relation . O has 1at€rbeen attendedto in studies of
social perception,r beins mental eventsin another individual (Heider, 1958).The psycho-
physicists and structuralists were succeededby the Gestalt psychologists,who interested
thcmselvesin other a- and O-properties (6eld propelties), but still mostly studied d O
relat;ons.All ofthe three early apprcachesto p€rceptionNeie dependenton a rather informal
use of languagein order to study O processes.BrDnswikconsideredtheir interest in central
events unfortunate and thcir methodology naive. He naturally also @ndemned their interest
in a events:the distal events (, and .) are decisivein the acquisirionof knowledge,iyhile
proximal eventsare 'chaotic'. Finally, .ll three schoolsneglectedto study achicvement.
Contemporary with the European revolution against structnralism the USA produced
another revolution .gainst the same targets, but with a very difierent result behaviorism
(Watson, r9r3). Classicalbehaviorism{as at leastin priDcipledirectedtowrrds the study of
r ,4 relations. Watson made shucturalism objective.The sensations,lverereplacedas ele-
ments by conditioned renexes,associationby conditioning. Conscquently,behaviorismhas
been criticized much in the samemanner 6 structuralism.l Classicalbehaviorismwas ant;
theoreticaland neglectedthe importanceof motivation.'
The later dev€lopmert of behaviorism,nolably due to Hull, naturally involved an intense
interest in both psychologiei theory and motivational phenomena(Hull, 1943). But, ac-
cording to Brun${ik, Hull rvasstil ti€d, rt leastin principle, to a-l relitions, althoughhis
researchof courseinvolved also the study ofB-variables.
We should finally note in vhat ways Brunswik disagleedwith Tolnan's molar behalio-
rism. Brunswik was not enthusiasticabout interest in the studv of O events.nor in theories
about such events.True, he did flot consid€!such a ccntrally focussedpsychologyas naive
or unpermissible,but he held that one should give p.iority to a functionalistic analysisof
organismicachievements,i.e. ,-B relations,or, in the future, . 3 oi r ., B relntions.

Brunswik's functionalism was piobabilistic from two difierent points of vierv. F;st, he
consideredthe task ofthe organismto be adaptationto an environmentthat $as only larely
perfecily predictable /o/ tle o/gu su. (This has nothing to do with the question of whether
sciencewill ever achieveperfect predictions.) Bruswik's probabilism in this senseseems
correct and almost unavoidable.However, he took a fulther siep and argued that because
the organismlives in a piobabilistic world, a theoiy about the organismmust also be proba-
bilistic. This is Brunswik's'nethodological postulateof behavior-research isomorphism'.
The r€quirement of in principle deteministic fheories is no long€r taken seriously by
nany psychologists.Howeler, it has been defendedfairly recently (Hull, 1943). In older
works one may even 6nd the notion that non-deterministictheories are 'unscient'fic' (e.g.
Borine, r92r).
1 SeeHumphrcy 09sr, chap. r). Se€ .lso Dewey G896) vho dticip,ted both G€stdt psycbolosy
ard ttl€ *eak points of beiaviorism almost 20 yeas bcfore the rwo.chools developed.Humphr€y's
exposirionis, however,more cohpl.te md clen..
1 Both thesepropertiesssm slilL to charaderizepaft of the *udy of irtelligencevnhin dife.erti.l
lsychology. It 's interestinsto note rhat tcst psycholosywas founded in ils modem fom in rhe USA
durins th€ hay d,ys ofclasical behaviorism,wiz.the decde 1915-192s.

5.6d. I, Pirchol.,, VaL 12, rsTt

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

40 IINNART SJOBERC

Most contemporary psychologistswould, then, probably a$ee with Brunswik in his

plea for a probabilistictheor/. However, it is still of inter€stto analyzehis point of view, for
it seemsthat Brunswik's own line of reasoDingwas not tenable. There is another recon,
more acceptablein the view of the presentauthor, why behaviord€6!ed as achievementis in
pinciple not perfectly predictablefrom a psychologicaltheory, except in certain conftived
laboratory situations.
Brunswil's postulateis not at dl convincingas it stands.Behavio! need not be unpredic-
table just becausethe organism cannot prcdict €ventsin its environment. On the contrary,
uDc€ltaintymay well lead to stcrotype,and easilypredictable,behavior.
But considerthe fact that behavioris defin€dasachievenent,i.e. $ a result in the environ-
ment. A man is trying to build a house.Ifhe succeeds,'ive note a cae of 'correcr' behavior,
and if he fails we note a case of incorrect' behavior. But suppose that just before the man
drives in the last nail the houseis struck by thunder and @mpletely destroyed.Clearly this
is then a caseof incorrect' bch.vior.
In order to predict the behavioial variable 'house building' we need (at least) a theory
about the man and one about thunderstorms. If we only have a psychologicaltheory we
cannot hope to make perfect predictionsof his achievements.Thus, functionalism must be
probabilistic, siriply b€causebehavior has been defined so as to be dependentboth on the
organismand on certaineventsin the environment.And if the psycholosicaltheory concerns
only the organismit doesnot deal with the other causalagent. The exampleshows that an
a.alysis of the ecologyis neccssaryif behavior is to be predicted as lotrg a we stick to rhe
functionalisticdefnition of behavior.
A tiaditional way out of the dilemna is, of cours€,to construct an ecolosj (a laboratory)
sher€ ive can guaranteea univocal relationbetweenbehaviorand its etrectson the environ-
ment. Behavior could still be definedas achievement,but as long as we wo.k in this univocal
enviroDmentwe would need to take only one causalagent i.to account:the organism.This
showsat leastthat psychologyis possiblewithout rn analysisof the naturalecologyand that a
probabilistic psychologyin any casedoesnot necessarilyfollow frcm the d€firition of beha-

IMPORTANCE OF THE ECOLOGY: SYSTEMATIC

VS REPRESENTATIVE DESIGN

As noted above, it may Nell be thtt Brunswik's plea for repres€ntadvedesign was thc
most original part of his functionalism. Brunswik arguedagainstrhe traditional ideolosyof
the laboratory in severalways, always reachingthe conclusionthat the organism must be
studied in its natuial environment. The efects of independentvariableson behavior could
then be studied with suitablestatisticalmethods, such as partial corehtions.
Bnrnswik's starting point was th€ notion that the task ofpsychology is to pr€dict and ex-
plain the achievementsof the organism.Since the achievemcntsdcpend parrly on the envi-
.onment, Ne must ask ourselves:achievencnt in what environment?It is certainly rempting
to refer to the normal or natural env;o.ment. In rhis mannerwe re{ch in a narural say rhe
requirement of a repiesentativesampling of situations, as contrastedto the manipulated,
conhived environmentof the laboratory.

Scd,l.J.Plr.baL,Vol.P, re7r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 THE NEW FUNCTIONAI,TSM

Brunswik's position nas entirely empirical. He did not discussthe possibility of making
predictionsfrom relevalt theory concerningthe organismand the environment (seeBjdrk-
man, 1969r). Inst€ad, Blunswik attackedthe systematicexperimentjust becauseir involves
manipulating the environment.
The present author does not agree with Brunswik's requirement of .epr€sentative design,
but his discussion is still enlightening from cert.in points of view. First, it becomesclear that
a detailed study of the ecology cannot be avoided if we want to predict behavior defined as
achievern€nt. A r€alization of the importance of ecology hs come very late and slow in
psychology. Brunswik should probably be attributed with much of the hotror for the awaken-
ing that $'e now witness.Second,it may be argued that analysisofthe ecologyshould have
great heuristic value. What are the problems facing the organisn? If we knew th€ answers
to that questionwe should be in a favorableposition to study the structur€ and function of

We now turn 6rst to a discussion of tr{o of th€ most important arglments for representa-
tive dcsign put fomard by BrunswiL.
The present section is concluded with sorne remarks corce ing efiects of experimental
manipulationand the statusofthe dependentvdiables in Brunswik's system.

Suppose that we work with persons as stimuli, e.g. in the fom of photographs.We
instruct our subjectsto rate th€ intelligenc€of the persons.Then we study how theseratings
correlrtc with stimulus variables.Clearly, ve must suspectthat the rBufts depend partly
on rhe particdar sampleof pe$ons that we use.Therefore we should havesampledour per-
sonsrandonly fiom some specifed population of interest.
H€re, the requirement secns r€asonable(and rather easyto live up to), but the example
doesnot allow codclusionsabout system,tic elperiments in gen€El.
When scrutinized,we find the argument to be a somewhatnew form of the ancient idca
ofuniqueness(we never enter the sameriver twice). The ideathat every situation is unique
catr, of cours€, b€ voiced against ur)r' enpirical research (and it keeps on being redjscovered by
everynew generationof personologicalpsychologists).We must alwaysnake the assumption
that €ertain propertiesof an experimentaldesignwere ofno importancefor the results.And
such assumptionsmust alsobe madewhenstimuli havebeenrandomlysampledfrom a speci-
fied popul,tion ofstimuli. This is so becausethe populationitsclf has many unique ploper-

In summary, it is clear that the uniqucnessargument cm be voiced againstall empirical

research. It cannot be used, as Brunswik did, to .rgxe against ststematic in favor ofr€presen-

In the 3o's Brunswik conducteda study of the perceptionof artificial faccs. He used a
factorial design and worked with such independent variablesas nose length and distance
betw€en eyes. However, cerlain combinations of values of the independent variables gave
rise to ridiculous stimuli that had to be deletedfrom th€ study. According to Biunswik, such
strangestimuli could have been avoid€d if a representativesample of faceshad be€n used.

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

42 LENNART SJOAERC

This seens, however,not at all to be assured.Is it Dot th€ casethat celtain real facesare
ridiculous or terlifying?
The real importance of the example is quite difierent from what B!uns{;k auempted to
show, viz. that m experiment alwa)s involves giving the subject a certain structured task.
The task implies, among othe! things, certain €xpectationsregarding the stimuli. And this
n rruc both of sysremaricard repreg(ntatiteerperimenrs.
Thus, the subjecthas an expectatiorregardingwhat type of stimuli is go;ng to be exposed.
And he is set to behavein a cenain vay towards these stimuli. If we suddenly elpose a
dilTerentand maybe enotionally piovocativestimulus there is reasonto expecta breakdown
ofthe subject'sset and a resultantconfused,incomparabteresponse.Inall controlledpsycho-
logical rcsearchthere must be a congruencebetwe€nexpectedand exposedstirnuli (ifwe are
not actually studyin8 the efiect of incon$uence). This has nothing to do with the stimuli
being replesentativeor not. Representativestimuli may well be incongruent.

The efre.t oJ nan;pulat;rn

Systematicdesign makes it possibleto predict the eliect of manipulation on behavior.
This cannot be done as efficiently if we hav€ only studied the effect o{ naturally occurring
variation of the independentvaiiables.We have here an aspectof systematicdesign which
was neglectedby Brunswik.
Inpssing, we note that it may be relevantto extend the requirementof representativeness
to include also representativemanipulations.Such a clain seemsto be in place at least in
certain appLiedwork. Fo! example,supposethat we want to investigatethc eficct ofa certain
kind of psychotherapy.We co.side( a largescaleapplicltioD of the techniqueifif is success-
ful. In this c$e it seemssuitabletoworkwith iepreseltativesamplesofboth rherapistsand
patieDtsin order to make possibleawell founded conclusionregardingthe value ofthe treat-

The neglect of manipulation in Brunswik's system has v€ry serious consequences.We

may ask What type of functionalistic researchaccordingto BruDs\rik'spresdiptiors could
guide us in maling pfedictions regardingthe efiectsofshifting from one ecologyto another?
To make such predictionswe must have knowledgeconcerningthe oiganism as a separate
entity, ditrerent from thc particular ecologyir which it is studied.It is thc viewofthe present
author that the necessityofsuch knowledgeis a decisiveargument in favor of a treatment of
the orgmism and the ecologyas separat€dfrom eachothcr.

The de,e dert aad indeten ldt ,a/;abl6

Brunswik required only the values of the ikdepekdekt variables to be r€presentatively
sampled. His treatment the depehde4t \ariables w6 quite conventional:he used only oneor
a few variables picked on a p-bt grounds. Once or twjce he s€ernsto have played with the
thought ofsampling depeDdcntvariables,but he did not follow this line of thousht very far.
Had he done so, the result might have be€nquite interesting,sincea sampling of dependent
var;ableswas discussedin contemporarytest theory (e.g. Tryon, r957).
Blunswik claimed, that it was possibleto study maDy more independent variablesin a
repr€sentativedesjsn than in a systematicone. This is not necesslrilycorrect. An analysis
of the etrectsof many independentvariablesrequires a lalge nunber of observations,even

Scdnd.
l. Prt.bal.,VoL e, r97r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 TIIE Nnlv TUNCTToNALISM 43

if it is, of €ourse, rot necessary to 6tudy all possible combinations, as in ' complete factorial
design.(In the caseof systematicresearchit is also possibleto avoid studyiry all conbina-
tions.) It is not at all self evident that it is easiered cheaP€rto male all theseobservations
in the caseof represefltativedesign.In addition to this i. doesnot seemthat the quesrionof
availability is what k€eps resruch workers fron including nany indep€ndent variablesin
their studies.The main re6on appearsto be the difficulty of interpreting the rcsults usually
encountered in studi€s using many independent variables. Such diffrculties are, of coursq to
be expectedboth in representativeand systematicdesigns.They can even be larger in the
lepresentativecase,becauseof the difnculties connectedvith the P.oblem of causality in
non-experimentaldesigns.
A final comment: Brunswik's terminology sometimes conveys th€ imPression that to him
the variableshad, asit were,a life oftheir owr Thus, he criticized the early Psychophysicists
and claimed that their single independentvariablesin reality sere variablepsckages.But,
of course,a1lsiturtions are variablepackages.The variablesmerely constituteconceptsthat
we use to describethe stimutus s;tuations.A simple univariate vaiiation in onc conceptual
system may be replesentedas a complex compositeof variabl€sin a ditrerentsystem But
this doesnot mean that thc secondsystem necssarily is in any sese better or indicative of
a mor€ profound iDsight than the first. It merely reflectsour choiceto describeieality in a

what variablesrr,r/d be used?In other words, what is a relevantdescriptionof the eco-

logy? The question is of fundamental importance to any functionalistic psychology We
shall have opportunity to touch it aSainlater in this paper. Brunswik's neglectof this ques-
tion is perhapsthe ultimat€ teasonfor his tendencyto write a if he regardedthe systemof
variable as self evident.

APPLICATIONS

we have now discussedthe basic themesof Brunswik's probabilistic functiomlism The

paper will be concluded with a few additio.rl critical comments. But before that we turn to
a brief revielv of someofthe enpirical researchthat has beeninsPiredby pfobabilistic func-

Rcsearchon p,cePtiot
Al i ust/atioestudr aJ s;2, .mta,c,. Brunswik invcstigatedthe importancc of distal and
proxinal cuesin size perceptionin a famousstudy (Brmswik, r9+4). The subject made size
judgnents of objects in a natural environment. The distancebetweenthe subject and the
stimuli varied. For cachobject its real size wrs measuredand rhe sizeof its retinal prcjection

Thejudgm€nts were made und€r a naive and an analyticalattitude. In the latter caseth€
subject was instructed to €stimate the retinal size The number of objects was 93.
The correlation betw€ea real and tetinal size, conputcd over the 93 objects, was o93.
Thc correlationbetweennaive sizejudgmentsand the real size w6 o 99. Hence' the subject
must have made use of other cuesin addition to retinal size.The correlationbetweenjudg-
ments and retinal sizewas o.73.When the subj€ctadoptedan analyticalattitud€ this corela-

Sc."d.J.P$.hal.,Val. 12, reTr

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 44 LENNARTsl6BrRc

tion increasedto o.85. This illustratesa rather typical etrectofset. While an analyticalser is
to a certain extent efiecientit is still lessso than the naive, realisticattitude.
Another interesting result was the finding that retinal size seemedto bc a rather unim_
portant cue. The partial correlation betweenjudgments and real size with r€tinal size held
constantwas as high .s o-98! This shows clearly the imporranceof cues other thaD .etinat

Othet?erceptualrcsearch.Brunswik has publishedgood reviewsof the perceptuatresearch

caried out urder his direction (1934, 1956).The excellentreviw paperby postman &Tol_
maD (r959) may also be consulted.
The theme of Brunswik's perceptualresearchwas to investigatethe degreeofadaptation
possible and which cues w€re used to re.ch it. Furthernoie, he 1{asalso inrer€ste.Iin the
inportance of set as well as in the efects of learningand devetopmenton pelceptuatadapta_

Many sensorymodalitieswere studied, often in interactionaldesigns,such as studies of

the size-weightillusionwherea kinesreticand avGualcue interact.In somestudiesBrunswik
investigat€djudgmentsofthe aleaof stimuli madeup of coinsand stamps.He found that the
judgments were influencedby the monetaryvalue of the stimuli. Brunswik consideredthese
stndiesto be palticularly interestingbecausethey itlusrratethe importanc€ ot ^ t arurt cle
(monetaryvalue) on pefceptualjudgments. It is also poxibte to seethesestudiesas i ustra_
tions ofthe interactionbetweensensoryand grtioh cues;an instanceof interactionbetween
thinking and perception.The latter point of view '1ay be most congenialfor thoseinter€sted
in so-cilled motivat€d perception.This line of r€searchwas iniriated under the influenceof
Biunswik's studies(Brune. & coodnm, r9,t7). However, Brunswik himself alwaysstlessed
adaptation, the tendency ro lespond at least appiox;mately correct. Othe! psychologists
(e.g. Brune4 uere riostly inlerest€d in these phenomenabecausethey revealeda r€lative

Lcaming studies constituted only a very minor part o{ Blunswik's perceptualresearch.

He argued,however,thar the perceptualsystemin cerrainsituatio.s could be influcncedby
learning. Such ls.ning is often independentof inteltectualinsight. Iurthermole, it takes
placein a slow and unstableway (von Ficandt, 1936,1938).
Brunswikwas alsointerestedin developmentatspects ofpcrceprion. He studiedthe d€vel_
opmcnt ofthe perceptualconstanciesand found that they improved up to the ageof ro.
The elTectsof learning rnd developmenton perceptionhave, of course,auracted much
interest since thc time of Brunswik's pioneeringetrolts (sce postman, 1965;Epstein, rq67;
Gibson, r969).
Brunswik made nuch use ofthe method of progressivecu€ reducrion in order to elplore
the impo.tance of various cues. The starting point in .n application of the method is a
natural situation where all cucsare allowedto influenceperceptionro rheir maximum capa-
city. The cues are thcn eliminated stepwiseand the efficiency of the perc€ptualsystem is
measuredanew at eachstep. In studiesof vision one may, e.g., go f.om binocular to mono_
cula. vision and, thus, eliminate the cue ofretinal disparity. Another cue may be eliminated
by fixating the subject'sh€ad so as to eliminarea possibtecue resulting from the efiectsof
head movementsotr the retinal imag€. In this way one can, in principle, elimimte all postu-
lated cues,after which there exist only a Dumber of uDtDow., subtie cues,whose combined

ScaA. l. P!r.bal., Vol. t2,1s7r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 lHE NEW FUNCTIONAL]SM

ef€ct we may fina1ly m€asure. An example of a reccnt study using Brunswik's method is
giren by Kiinnapas (r968).
Modelh o;t;.isn aJ Bru.s@,n'sr/er. Gibson (1959) and Hochbers (1966)pointed out that
the retinal imagemay yield more inJolmation than Brunswik seens to haveconsidefed C€r-
tain higher-orde{ variables,such ns density, make po$ible a univocal correspondencebe-
tw€€n distal and proximal stimulus. This strong claim need not be accePtedbut, still, one
may clearly argue that the'e is no'e information in the proximal stimulus than Brunswik

The criticism appean well founded mainly becauseBrunswik seemsto have been little
interested in a more profound analysisof sensory processes.what we should accePt 3
proximal stimulus must, ultimately, depend on the sensorycapacityof the orglnism, the
way it utilizes,as it ere, the physicalpattern ofstimulation.
Th€ point raisedby Gibson is oflitde use as long as we h,ve not shown that the informa-
tion presentfrom a logical and physicatanalysisofthe pattern ofstimulation can also ir fact
be utilized by the sensory-perceptualsystem.Thc uncertainry of the proximal cues, thus,
has tivo sources:a lack of correlationb€.w€endistal and proximal stimuli and a lack of sen-

Cotrelation xs. rcgles;ar [om. The dualism of contemporary psychology between the
study of achievcmentand the study of mental processesbecomcsparticularly clear ifwe,for
a moment, considerBrunswik as a psychophysicist.He was, of course,a psychophysicistin
the sensethat he studied the relation between responsesand distal stimuli. However, he
was not interestedin the/o/ro oftbis relation. He was concernedwith how well h€couldpte-
dict the response,givcn the stimulus. Dlta analysiswas carried out by mea.s of corielation

'establishment'in the'new psychophysics'(such as S. S. Stevens

For the contemporary
'new psychophysics'is con-
and G. Ekman) Brunswik's question must appear trivial. The
cernedwiththe form of the reglessionfunctionris it logarithmic (Fechner)or a simPlepower
function (Stevens)o! a power function Nith a constantaddedto the stimulus scale(Ekman)?
what appearedto Brunswik as the true core ofpsychologicalphenonena appearsto be only
ilrelevant'scatter' to contemporarypsychophysicists-
The du.lisln appearedas early as in the work of Fullerton & Cattell (1892),vho denicd
that it was possible to measuresubjective intensity. Inst€ad, they proposed to study the
achievementsof the perc€ptualsystem. It is interestirg to note that Thurstone (r927a, ,)
d€viseda m€thod ivherebya scaleof intensity can be deived from disffiminationdata This
was, in a sense,an anticipation of molar behaviorism.In both casesone started from beha-
vior, defin€d in tems of achiev€ment,ard tried to reach conclusionsabout mcntal events,
specifiedwithin the frame$'ork of theoreticalsystems.
Thiih;ng-?erceptiott. Brun$vik discussed in mny places the Problem ofwhat kind of
pro@ss had seneratedthe responses(e.g. Brunswik, 1956, 1957). Brunswik's ideas about
this problem uere quite interesting,but the Plesentauthor vonders about their place in the
frameworkofprobabilistic functionalism.Does it, from a functionalisticpoint of view, matter
ifa certain achievementwas nade possibleby thinking or percePtion?
We should firet mention certain support for at all making a distinction betweenperception
and thinking. It is, e.g., well known that certain illusions renain in spite of the subject's

Scnd. I. Pstchol.,VoL r2, re7r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

46 LlNNAxr sldBERc

being fully inforned about their nature (Miiller-Lyer). Researchon perceptuallearningalso

indicates,as mention€d abov€, that the perceptualsystem erists as a rather automatic and
pre-programmedsystem,diffficult to inffuenceby l€arning.
To commit the stimulus error in a perceptualstudy involves permitting analyticalcon-
siderationsto influenc€the respons€s.Brunswik tri€d to approachthis problem by instrucr-
ing his subjectsto mdim;ze the stimuius error and use all knowtedgeabout the stimuli that
they.onddered to be relevut ('bettirg attitude')-The resultsunder rhis condirion could rhen
be compar€d with other conditions and conclusionscould be ieached as to the relativein-
d€pendenceof th€ stimulus error. An elegantstudy by Bolles & Bailey (1956)aifordsanother
exampleof how to obtain relevant information concerningrhe influenceof thinting onper-
c€ptualjudgments. They replicatedB.unswik's classicalstudy of size perceptionGg44)with
the change that the subject was never allowed to see the stimuli, only to hear what type of
object they were. The correlation betweenjudgments and real size was surprisingly high,
but lower than Brunswik's value.
The last senteDcein Brunswik's 1956 monograph gives r fai sumary of his extensive
work on the distinction b€tlve€n thinking and perceptioJrand des€ es to be cited in its
entirety also for its distinctive Brurswikian styl€:
'Pei.eption, then, emergesas that relativelyprimirive, parrly
autonomous,institutionrlized,
ratiomorphic subsystemof cognitionwhich achievesprompt and richly detail.d orientation
habituallyconcenins the vitally r€levant,mostly distalaspectsof the enviroMent on the basis
of mutually vicarious, relatively restricted md stereoRped, hsufficienr evidence in mcertainty-
geated interaction md compromise. seemingly followins the highesr probability for smallness
of €tor at the eapens€of the hishest frequercy of pr€cision.'(Brunswik, 1956,p. t46)

We finally mention papersby Jenkin & Hymatr (1959)and by Carlson(1960).Judgments

made under a naive attitude were coffelated with judgments under an aralytical attirud€.
The two types of judgment lppeared fairly uffelated. This is further support for the
distinction betweenanalyticaland intuitiv€ (cf. Sjijberg, 1968).

Brunswik was also interested in ploblens of learning, possibly due to influence from
Tolnan (Brunswik, 1939).He was one of the first to study the efects of varying reinforce-
ment probabilities.These were allowed to tahe valuB other than o ard r. Thus, the situa-
tion was made nncertain and cameto resemblea natural ecology.
Probability learning wm one of the themes of the mathematicall€arnins theoliesdev€l-
oped in the so's (e.9. Est€s, 1959).Attempts wefe made to formulate mathematicalmicro
theories for this type of drta. A more directly functionalistic attitude waq howev€r, not very
conmon amons learnine theoriestsof the so's (see Srnedslund,1955,for an exception).It
appeas that functionalisticresearchon learnisg is at the pr€sentbecoming mor€ common
(Uhl, 1963; N€wton, r965i Todd & Hammond, 1965;Azuma & Cronbach, 1966;secalso
Hursch, Hammond & Hursch, 1964). We should also mention the work car.ied out by
Bjiirkman, who earlier was less concernedwith the €cologicalapproach(1965) but larer hs
dBcribed a functionalistic progran (1966, i969r) and repolted functionalistic studies of
l€arnins (r968, r969a).
Recent work has been devoted to an interestinedeveloDmentof Brunswik's lers mod€l

rrtM. I. f!t.bat , vor. r2, t97r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 47
(Hursch, Hanmond & Hursch, 1964;Bjorkinan,r967) which rnakespossibleamore detail€d
descriptionof achievementin the metric (Hurcch et al.) dd non-metric (Bjijrkman) cases.
Bjorkman (1966) ofered a formal anallsis of the types of problems the otganism is facins

The distinction betweetranal!'ticaland intuitive functioning is relevantalso in the caseof

learning. Lindahl (1964, 1968, r97o) has given interesting demonstrationsimplyirg that
subjects seem to prefei intuitive functioning, if such functioning is possibie, and that certain
exp€riment manipulationsmay causeth€ subjectsto chang€to an analyticallevel.

Studies of Mtula y occuttiis behaa;or

Brunswik criticized Lewin, arguing that Lewin's psychologywas 'encapsulated','posF
perceptul and pre-behavioral' (Brunswik 1943, 1952). Lewh d€nied this to some extent
(1943,but his argument are not very convincing).Ho{ever, Bruns\tik's criticism cameto be
of great irnportancc for the further developmentof Lewinian psychology.Cartwright has
describedhow Lewin and his co-workeregradually cameto be more and more interestedin
th€ €colosicalapproach(r9S9).
Barker & wright have, under the joint influence of Brunswik and Lewin, studied the
behaviorofchildren in natu.al situations(Bark€r & Wright, 1955;Barker, 1963,1965).This
is a line ofr€s€afch that leadsto probtemsand resultsquite ditrerentfrom what is produced
by the traditional psychologicallaboratory.Th€se studiesactualizewhat may be self evident
but still somchowoften negl€ctedin the academictndition: the fact that behaviorlargely is
produced by intentions (cl Thu6tone, 1924).Maybe the reison for our reglect is that the
expenmentalpaadigm is most easily followed if the environment is used as the agent of
influence. Thus we have folgotten the importance of causalfactors other than those that
are locatedin the environment. It appsrs that studi$ of'spontaneous'behavior are neces
sary to study phenonena of will ard intention.
However, an ecological approach does not appear absolutely essential for such studies.
Studies of vill in the labolatory are, ho$ever, exceedinglyrare in modeln psychology.
Neith€r 'intention' nor 'will' occur 6 ertrles in the Prychological ,4rrta.&. The research
c ried out under the hading'decision making' is, while quite ;nterestingin itself, certainly
nowher€ near a psycholosy of volition.

Applbd plytholosy
Most appled functionalistic $ork has been carried out in the clinical field (Grebstein,
1963; Hammond, 1954, 1955; Hammond, Hulsch & Todd, 1964; Hamnond & O'Kelly,
rgSS;Hotrman, 1960; Sarbin, Taft & Bailey, 1960). Bjitrkman (1966) and Brehrner(1967)
have approached baffic psychology within a functionalistic framework.
Brunswik's influence on applied psychology appears stilt to be small, though it is, possibly,
increasing.It doesnot appearthat Brunswik himselfwasvery interestedin appliedproblems.
For exanple, he did not dealwith the acquisitionof information through v€rbal cornmunica-
tion, which appearsto be a problem ofparamount applied importance,though it was hardly
dealtvith by the experimentalpsychologyof Brunswik's time.

scard.l. Pltcbol., vol. ' 2, 'e7 r

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

+8
CONCLUSTONS

In certain ways functionalism is conventional and justifiabte only on vagu€ srrutegic

grounds by referring to 'fruitful' and 'interesting' empidcal implications. Quire possibly,
it must be the casefor any psychologicalresearchideology ihat its ultimate justifcation is
to be sought in such stlategic notions,although this is often not anticiparednor acc€ptedby
its originator (e.g. Saugstad,1965;Sjitberg,1966).
It is convenientto discusss€pamtelydependentand indepe.dent variabl€sin the final
cornmentson functiomlism that now follow.

We have earlier ffiticized the rapid adoption of achieveoent variables within molar be-
haviorisrn. The decision does not seem to have been founded on a extensile analysis of
alternativebehavioraldefinitions. However, in the caseof functionalism it is quite narural
to b4e the definition of behavioron achievementcriteria.
But there is a problem in the definitioDofbehavior alsofof functionalism.Achievementis
definedwith lef€lence to the organism'sirrrrbr. How are w€ to find out about intentionsl
Brunswik's transition from the constancyratio to the use of correlatios (rgao) was not
justified on the ground that colrelationswere b€tter mesures of achievement.The reason
was simply that he wanted to study the interactionof severil cues,which is hard to do with
constancyratios.Andstill, th€ transition implied a vely important changeasto the definitiotr
of achievemcnt:attentiotr was no longer paid to the full metlical correspondencebetween
stimuli and responses,only to th€ degreeof linear relationship.Supposethere is a large con-
st4nt erlorin thersponses. This is simply neglectedin computing the correlationcoeflicient,
though it obviously.a, be of crirical importanc€to adaptation.
It appears that functionalistic psychology has not attmpted to make a profound analysis
ofhow one should go abotrt defining achievehentwith refe!€nceto the organism'sintention.
Thus, ue do not know ifthe corr€lationcoefficientconstitutesa relevantme6ule of achieve-

Functionalism is in principle objective. Tolman used the phrase 'a behnviorism' in his
rcaie\| of Wahnehnung und Geg^tan.lsuelt (r%5). But SruBwik's objectivity was lirtle
but theo.etical.Itr his empirical woik he usedverbal reports.Now od then he hinted at the
po$ibility of using objectiv€performancem€dures but he reve! did so. BrunswiL was, in a
vay, a mentalist in behavioristicdisguise.The fact thlt he found verbal iepons useful (he
like so many others) cafl be tahen as a starting point frcm which to develop quite a ditreienr
attitude towards psychologythan Bruswik did. We shall pr€sentlyreturn to the mentalistic

In.lepdddt uiables
We have eaflier pointed out that Brunswik's proximal variableswere not basedon a pro-
found anallsis of sensoryprocesse. They insteadt€nded to be rather 'dist l' in nature, rhe
outcomes of fomal considerations.
And what about th€ distal variablesthenselves?They had to be specifiedby meansof
physical conceptualsystems(e.e. length). Certainly fiey were not somerhing'out there'.

J.tu. 1 (! t.ttot.,v ot, r 2, r 9Jr

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg

 TII' NEw FUNCTTONAIiSM
49

They wer€ cultural conventions. Physical length is the outcome of a long culturat develop_
menr leadingto currenr physicalconvenrjon..
Brunswik was clearly awaie of this fact (Brunswik, 1937). But why should we axune a
coincidence of iDt€ntioo and scientific convention? The difficutty is particularly clear itr
Brunswik'sstudiesofsocial perception.His subj€ctswere instructedtojudge Ie frorn photo_
graphs.The distal variablewas defined s the test scoresof the stimulus Dersonsl

The n.ntaliti altmathJe

We have often pointed ro meDtalismas an alternativeto functionalism.Fifty_sevenyears
have passed since the behavioristic y'rrs., d4 yeq b-day mentalism appears very nuch
alive. The good rGults obtainedby meansofveibal reportsjustify the mentalist,sclaim.
Smedslund !€cently pointed to the need for .psychological diagnosrics' ( r
969 6) in a manner
quite convincingto the presentauthor. His pessimisricattitude towardspsychologicattheory
(1969a)need,however,not be acceptedwithin the mentatisticframework.
Smedslurd argued that the ph€nomenaof psychologyare mental events and that thele
are no 'lawtul' relations between such ev€nts and srimuti and behavior. The problem of
objectivity is approachedby refeffing ro 'pubtic meanings',i.e. to socialconsensusof inter-
pietation. In the realm of mental evenrsthere is no place for causatcoDnections,only for
logical ones. PcychologiLalrhcory become., r\en. simply Lautologicat,common-sense

The present author prefers to regard physical events (stinuli and b€havio4 as the pheno_
rncnato bestudied bypsychology. These can,in principleat least,be studiedin an objective
nanner. As stressedin severalpiacesabove,the raw instancesofbehavior must be ciassified
bcfore anything fulther is done. Such classificrtionmay wel be done to-day on the basisof
'public neanings'
but it should, eventually, be made on a theoreticrl basis. Smedstund,s
claim that th€re is no 'la$ful' relation between,e.g., stimulus and m€aning is misle.ding.
The question is not how to connect rhe two 'woflds' but how to find us€ful conceptual
schemesfor dealingwith stimuti and responses.Maybe Smedstundcame to his pessimistic
attitude ultimat€ly becauseh€ apparently consid€redthat psychologyshoutd be built on
mental stufi rather than physical, that it, a it were, should be about ,me-from the inside,
rather than 'you ffom the outside'. Be that as it may, the presenrauthor wishes to pledge
his allegianceto the 'you-from the outside' canp.

This firet draft of this paper was wiitten while the author {s a visitins associateDrofesor
n r h ed r p a r h e n r o f P s y c h o l o c yU. n i v € r , i r yo f C , l : f o m i aa r B e r k p l e yT.h a t n a t w o , L $ a s s u o -
p o r r e db v , h e S w e d i ( hC o u ( i l t o , S o c i d lS . , p , ( e R e s c a r c hw, h i c h a h o p a , , t i n t u u r h e c ; t s
of publishins this paper.

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sd"Z. !. Ptrchol.,Vol, r 2, r97,

Copyright © 1971 Lennart Sjöberg