Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace?

The Role of Rural Development in Peace-Building

Dr. Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas

Kabul, Afghanistan

Working paper, November 2005

“What Kind of Peace is Possible?” project
Final version to be published in a book
With other WKOP papers in mid-2006

Co-funded by the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
Ford Foundation
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Dr. Omar Zakhilwal

Omar Zakhilwal is an Afghan Canadian Economist. He is the founder of Afghanistan of

Afghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies (ACPDS). Prior to his current
job as the President of Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), Dr. Zakhilwal
served as the Chief Policy Advisor at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation &
Development (MRRD). However, this paper reflects the independent research of the
authors and is not an MRRD position paper. Over the course of his stay in Afghanistan,
Dr. Zakhilwal has been part of the two Loya Jirgas that elected the president for the
Afghanistan Transitional Government (June 2002) and ratified Afghanistan’s
Constitution (Dec 2003), served as an author of Afghanistan’s First National Human
Development Report (2004); and has been part of many other rural development iniatives.

Jane Murphy Thomas

Jane Murphy Thomas is a Canadian social anthropologist and independent consultant

specializing in Afghanistan, community development and participatory development
since 1984. Currently she is engaged by the Government of Afghanistan’s Ministry for
Rural Rehabilitation and Development to conceptualize the Afghanistan Institute for
Rural Development. [janethomas6@hotmail.com]

1
1. Introduction

Afghanistan is often depicted as being in a post-conflict situation, but questions remain if

this is an accurate description. While peace could be on the horizon, the distance to that
horizon is unclear. Overall, conditions are considered to have improved since the fall of
the Taliban in 2001, however, insecurity is widespread. What fragile peace exists is both
determined and threatened by numerous complex factors. As this paper’s title suggests,
development in rural areas where most of Afghanistan’s citizens live, could perhaps be
the most critical issue in determining the future.

In seeking to best understand the role of rural development in sustainable peace-building,

we address several key questions throughout this paper: What is the background that led
to the present situation and what implications does this have for today’s policy makers?
What factors or conditions will determine or threaten peace? What roles are foreign
military playing in peace building? What efforts are underway to rebuild the state
structures and create conditions that at least make peace feasible? What are the lessons
learned elsewhere in participatory rural development that can now be applied in
Afghanistan? What lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan’s history and the National
Solidarity Programme and applied to Afghanistan’s rural development as a whole?

This paper is set out in five sections. Following this introduction, Section Two gives a
review and background to provide historical context, examining how past rural
development policies, or lack of them, contributed to the cause of war and how
drastically different rural policies are needed now. Section Three, focuses on today’s
state-building and peace-building process, its threats and determinants, with an emphasis
on the links to rural development. Afghanistan where most citizens live in rural areas,
rural development, especially participatory rural development, and peace building are
largely dependent on each other. Section Four looks at the broad, international subject of
participatory rural development and within that framework, examines the largest such
programme underway in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Section
Five draws conclusions about rural development and peace, and what lessons from the
history of Afghanistan and the NSP has for Afghanistan’s rural development as a whole.

For this paper, information was collected from primary and secondary sources. A
thorough literature review was conducted, including both published and grey literature,
along with field work. Twenty nine villages in five provinces of Afghanistan were visited.
The five provinces, Ningahar, Logar, Wardak, Parwan and Herat. In each of the
provinces, villages were randomly selected. On the first visit to each of the villages,
surveyors conducted a survey using a questionnaire. One of the authors and his research
assistants then re-visited the same villages, collecting qualitative data through participant
observation, attending meetings, conducting interviews with key informants including
facilitating partners; leaders, members and non-members of CDCs, in the villages and on
CDC project sites, as well as with NSP officials.

Although the five provinces represent a diversity of ethnic groups, topography, economic,
security and other conditions, it was noted that the problems, weaknesses or strengths in

2
NSP activities across the 29 villages visited was relatively similar. Although no attempt
was made to rigorously compare villages, four villages with NSP problems and strengths
at least roughly representative of those observed in all the villages visited were chosen as
case studies. As shown below, this range of strengths and weaknesses was similar to
those identified in the national conference Community Development Councils in July
2005. See Endnotes for a list of all the villages visited.

2. Historical Background

Afghanistan presents a striking example of the connections among rural development,

war and peace. One constant in the country has been relations between Kabul and the rest
of the country, relations that at best have hardly existed, and at worst have caused social
unrest and war. While the majority of the population, roughly 70%, remains rural,
development infrastructure and services historically have been concentrated in the cities,
especially Kabul (ANHDR: 2004:168). This trend began in the 1950’s, strengthened
through to the 1990’s with the politicization of aid from western countries and the USSR,
and the decades of war.

A major turning point in Kabul-rural relations came in 1978, with a coup d’etat that
placed Nur Mohammad Taraki in power. Taraki and his communist party government
immediately began introducing and rapidly enforcing eight major reforms which were
directed at rural populations. While all the reforms were unpopular to varying degrees,
the land reform and literacy programmes are remembered as the most severe and
unacceptable. In its attempt at land reform, Taraki’s government sent representatives
backed by government troops to the villages to confiscate land and re-distribute it. A
nation-wide literacy programme was also imposed by Takaki’s government. It was
compulsory for everyone who could not read or write, and treated villagers and the rural
way of life with contempt. Even old people, who are held in high respect by Afghans,
where forced to attend. Literacy programme text books illustrated that being a farmer was
a ‘backward’ way of life, while working in a factory or office was superior.

All these reforms, were enforced by the military and soon met with up-risings around the
country, leading to the 1979 invasion by the USSR to prop-up the Afghan regime it had
created. A full decade later, after millions were killed or fled as refugees and the
country’s education, health and infrastructure destroyed, the USSR withdrew its troops in
1989. For over another decade, the Mujahideen and Taliban added their own chapters of
conflict and destruction.

A new crossroads was reached in 2001. In response to the terrorist events in the USA on
September 11, the US launched a military invasion into Afghanistan which resulted in the
collapse of the ruling Taliban regime. This military intervention was coupled with a UN-
mediated political framework, the Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001. While
re-building of the Afghan state has begun, the country’s security remains unsettled.

3
In this paper we outline what has happened since the 2001 Bonn Agreement, pointing out
the challenges and links among them for state building, peace building and rural
development. In a country where rural development policies have meant either almost no
government services, or the opposite extreme - unwanted reforms forced on the people
leading to uprisings and war - drastically different rural policies are needed, ones that are
sensitive, sustainable, and participatory.

Out of the Bonn agreement and unprecedented pledges and involvement of many
countries to help in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, many programmes and projects have
emerged. One of those, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), was designed for rapid
build-up of rural development on a country-wide basis. In this paper we examine the NSP
and what lessons can be extracted from it for Afghanistan’s rural development as a whole.
Throughout the paper, we explore what is needed in rural development for it to be a
catalyst in peace-building and state-building?

3. Today’s State Building and Peace Building Process

The 2001 Bonn Agreement set into action a number of steps in state-building. Most
significantly, it established an interim authority and transitional government. In January
2004, a new constitution was established. In October 2004, national presidential elections
were held in which Hamid Karzai became the first elected president of Afghanistan.
Parliamentary elections were held in September 2005.

Other hopeful results in building and stabilizing the state include the voluntary return of
over three million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere; the return of at
least four million children to school, one third of them girls; and the successful launch of
several major development and reconstruction initiatives, among them the NSP.

From the Bonn agreement, specific commissions were established either to directly
facilitate the political processes, or to lay the foundations for specific tasks: legal reform
and rule of law, the observance and protection of human rights and the future public
administration and its needed reforms. The Bonn Agreement also addressed the need to
fill the security vacuum by requesting the deployment of International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and specified the role of the United Nations in supporting the
state-building processes. Other critical elements in state building and peace building are:
participation by Afghan civil society; improvements in Kabul-rural relations, the state’s
own capacities to govern, provide services and to have the financial resources to do so.

Civil society, its integration, empowerment, buy-in and sense of ownership in building
peace and sharing responsibility for a strong, accountable state is essential. Afghanistan
does have various institutions (eg. shuras-village councils), traditional mechanisms, (eg.
jirgas-dispute resolution bodies) and religious networks; more recently emerged
indigenous NGOs; and a wide range of other institutions and groups with strong potential
for playing roles. From 2001 to the present there are a number of indications of increased
civil society involvement, not the least being a high voter turn-out in the first-ever
presidential elections.

4
Great challenges continue and Kabul’s relations with the rest of the country remain
uncertain. While a careful balance is clearly articulated in the new constitution,
translating this balance into reality represents a formidable challenge. The central
government has established a basic presence in all the provinces and districts but the
capacities are weak. In those locations, under the present conditions personnel’s loyalty
to government has taken higher precedence than competency. In some areas, powerful
local leaders still dominate. They raise and keep revenues, handing over only a fraction,
but growing, amount to central authorities. Due to the limited capacities, the central
government’s attempts to bring about the needed changes in both governance and
development in the provinces have thus far had only limited success.

‘Warlordism’ which has maintained divisiveness and insecurity throughout the country.
The central government has attempted to rein in warlordism through a strategy to include
some warlords in the interim government structures as a means of gaining their co-
operation. The risk of this strategy may soon be tested however, as several of the
warlords were recently elected into the parliament drawing sharp criticism of human
rights groups and Afghan citizens alike. In their campaigns, they used the wealth and
power they’ve gained through intimidation and their frequent connections with the
narcotics trade, and now have been ‘legitimized’ as leaders by the democratic process of
election. In the past they have ruled by the gun, in future the dangers could even be more,
as the vote entrenches and legitimizes them long term, a scenario that could be even more
divisive and add to any new parliament’s vulnerability.

The state’s finances and capacity to carry out its roles are also a major issues. At the
April 2005 donors conference in Kabul, President Karzai and his representatives
expressed concern about the tenuous position they see themselves in. While the state
must have the finances to build its own capacity and offer services, only about 23% of
international assistance is being channeled through the central government. Accusations
and counter-accusations by government, donor government representatives and NGOs
regarding waste or poor use of existing funds by the Afghan government and NGOs have
been rampant (New York Times: 2005:1).

While some waste and misuse is undoubtedly occurring, what is clear is the lack of
government’s own administrative capacities. Many senior managers were killed by
successive regimes during and since the 1978 coup d’etat or fled abroad as refugees. The
country now, as in the past, has very few people with higher education: probably
significantly less than 10% of the population has university education. Complicating this
scenario is the job placement of the most skilled Afghans. Most educated Afghans are
highly sought after and are currently employed with the UN and other international
agencies which can pay far higher than the Afghan government. To illustrate, government
civil servants are paid an average of US$60 per month, while Afghans working in UN
agencies, donors and NGOs earn and average of $1,000 per month (NHDR:2004:170).

The extreme shortage of highly skilled Afghans in the civil service has resulted in the
engagement of an increased number of foreign advisors to work in the ministries,
primarily to increase the Afghan government’s aid absorbency. However, the result is

5
that the Afghan government’s capacities are being enhanced rather than being built.
(Suhrke:2004:9). Probably exacerbating the problem is that by 2005, it is widely
observed that the scale of capacity building needed within government, while apparently
planned, has hardly begun. Why this is occurring should be questioned. As one analyst
noted, “the transition from humanitarian aid to national institution reconstruction has
been conspicuous by its absence, not only in Afghanistan but across the gamut of
humanitarian/security crises, in which the United Nations, military coalitions and small
armies of non-government aid agencies of varied agenda have sought to intervene” (Mills:
DATE:01).

4. What Kind of Peace in Afghanistan?

What is the status of peace in Afghanistan? One report calls it ‘conflictual peace’,
possibly the most accurate way to describe the transitory and uncertain nature of the
present situation. The authors explain that ‘conflictual peace’ refers to gaps or ‘built-in
elements of conflict that were either ignored or deliberately set aside’ in the Bonn process
(Suhre:2004:3) . Among the most obvious of the missing elements, was that ‘the UN did
not bring together warring parties to make peace’ (Rubin: undated:3). Solutions to this
problem however, have been initiated by the government of Afghanistan since the Bonn
Agreement, with the introduction of an amnesty for former Taliban. However it is
meeting with limited success, attributed to lack of suitable incentives.

Another study considers the extreme complexities of the conflict and its root causes, and
how this calls for going “beyond simplistic formulations such as ‘peace’ or ‘ending war’
to ‘conflict transformation’: an emphasis on transforming institutions, regionally,
nationally and locally. (ANHDR:2004:8) . This transformation means addressing
linkages among scarcity, inequality and institutional weaknesses.

When the status of peace is already so unsettled, what kind of peace is possible is even
more difficult to speculate.

5. Underlying Determinants and Threats

Despite the early successes in state-building that have led to the drafting of a constitution,
elections and the re-establishment of ministries and commissions, secured peace in
Afghanistan is far from guaranteed. As indicated above, one of the main threats or
determinants of peace is the dialogue and relations to be built between the state and rural
areas: especially through rural development policies and programmes. As pointed out
below, however, these developments are themselves complex and interdependent and
include security arrangements; human security; inclusive balanced development; local
values, social and cultural issues; a supportive international community, a co-operative
regional agenda and other factors, all discussed below in more detail.

6
5.1 Security Arrangements

As indicated earlier, the central government is beginning to show some presence in rural
areas but security problems in Afghanistan can be seen as linked either directly or
indirectly to the inability of government to extend its full authority outside Kabul. In the
provinces, control has often been in the hands of warlords and the central government by
itself lacks the means to control these destabilizing figures. This tense mix is the main
context for rural development.

To improve security, since late 2001, two sets of international military forces have been
present in Afghanistan to carry out different roles: at mid-2005, roughly 20,000 personnel
under the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), whose main goal is still
to route out Al Quaida and its Taliban base which are located mainly in the south and east.
The second force, is the UN mandated, NATO led, International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF), which number about 8,500 personnel from 29 countries, who are
stationed mainly in Kabul and whose role is to secure the capital, main airports, train the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police Force and provide Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs in particular are controversial as they play
contradictory roles: being soldiers or intelligence officers operating in rural communities
as aid workers, rebuilding schools or carrying out other humanitarian-type works. While
NGOs play the main roles in implementing rural development programmes throughout
the country, they have made repeated calls to ISAF and the PRTs for increased security
arrangements. At the same time, NGOs have taken a unified stance against the dual roles
of the PRTs (ACBAR:2003:2) through the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
(ACBAR), the main umbrella group of NGOs, pointing out that soldiers involved in
development activities adds to the confusion, putting real humanitarian workers more at
risk. As a result by mid-2005, some changes are occurring in the PRT roles, but
controversy remains.

Training the planned 70,000 member Afghan army to take over the security role is
underway and seen by many as essential. Yet analysts have pointed out many problems
being encountered with building up the army including the slow pace of training, failure
to get the multi-ethnic mix needed, and a high rate of desertion by recruits. In particular,
there is concern that the 70,000 member ANA could be outnumbered by the illegal
militias anyway. Even three years after the toppling of the Taliban regime, and the
completion of the UN-backed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-
combattants programme, there is still an estimated 1,800 illegal armed bands of men
comprised up to 100,000 individuals who pose a major security concern in many parts of
the country (IRIN:2005:__). As one analyst noted, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom and
ISAF forces are essentially buying time’ (Maloney: 2004:3) to see what happens. If the
ISAF and OEF forces withdrew before needed resolutions and transformations occur,
many fear that Afghanistan would revert to the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban internal conflict
period of the 1990’s (Maloney: 2004:3).

7
5.2 Human Security

What is most alarming is how the already poor conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated
further over the last decades. As stated in Afghanistan’s first ever National Human
Development Report (UNDP: 2004), conditions in child and mother mortality rates, low
literacy rates and lack of access to health care and safe drinking water have put
Afghanistan in 169th position out of 174 countries. War damage to infrastructure,
subsequent plunge in agricultural production and the country’s main exports, all
agriculture based (fruit, nuts, carpets, etc.), rendered further poverty.

Often neglected in the dialogue on security in Afghanistan has been the human security
needs of the people, but these may be the most crucial to national stabilisation. This is
especially true as expectations of the people have grown over the years, starting at least
16 years ago with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and now may be increased further
with the formation of a government.

5.3 Inclusive, Balanced Development

The rural areas of Afghanistan represent a diversity of cultures, topography, histories and
accessibility from the capital city. Rural development strategies, therefore must be
balanced and inclusive, based on addressing inequalities of gender, regions, religions,
ethnicities and locations. Otherwise, the strategies are unlikely to work and could
potentially be cause of renewed conflict.

While rebuilding physical infrastructure is important, a kind of reconstruction of the

social damage of war is perhaps an even bigger determinant of peace or conflict. This
means institution re-building or building on what institutions already exist. In this case
we mean institution in two senses: 1)an organization or administration; 2)an established
practice, custom, law or ‘rules that exist to govern or regulate the behavior of individuals’
(Pain:2004:1) at the national, regional, local and village levels.

Other major subjects which are essential to address are imbalances of assistance to urban-
rural areas and both stable and unstable areas. Another of the biggest threats and
determinants of peace may be to overcome what the Bonn agreement did not attempt:
how to include those who were excluded from the peace-building effort at that time, the
Taliban. Since the Bonn agreement, an amnesty programme introduced by the Afghan
government to draw-in former Taliban has met with limited success, at least partly due to
no incentives (eg. jobs or material goods) being offered.

Afghan women have historically been victims of imbalanced development, often

excluded from decision-making that affects them and under-represented in education,
health and in many other areas. While major constitutional steps have been taken to
ensure inclusion and representation of women in decision-making in the political spheres,
applying these changes successfully will depend on many factors, not the least of which
is how the international community chooses to support the changes Afghans wish to

8
make. It is especially important in re-building the country’s institutions at all levels, to
ensure women as well as men are included in the capacity building and hiring.

The fall of the Taliban finally brought to world attention the situation of Afghan women
but the problems are long standing and made even more complex from at least the time of
the Soviet invasion, 25 years ago. However, even by 2005, it is questionable if any
conditions for women have dramatically improved. For example, one of the earliest
reports on the mortality rates of Afghan mothers during the war, one published by the
American Center for Disease Control in 1986, placed Afghanistan as having the highest
birthing related mortality rate in the world (Thomas:1990:34). By 2004, the UNDP’s
Afghanistan National Human Development Report, shows Afghanistan still having the
world’s highest mortality rate of mothers, 1,600 per 100,000. Other conditions indicate
many complex inter-connected challenges: life expectancy of both men and women is
estimated at only 44.5 years, while the literacy rate of men is 16% , with women it is
12.7%. Such low conditions for both men and women, suggests that inclusive, balanced
development needs several considerations especially to include both women and men.

As well, there are other divides to be bridged: one between rural and urban women, and
women with and without formal education. In a society where purdah is the norm,
conditions for rural women are unlikely to change unless the educated women who tend
to be in urban areas, are able, willing and supported to take the leadership for change.

Essential, of course, are Afghan women doctors, health personnel, teachers, entrepreneurs,
policy makers, planners, managers, social mobilisers, and women as legislators and other
leadership positions. However, even with constitution guarantees for women, and
numbers of seats reserved for women in the 2005 parliamentary elections, it is
questionable how so many obvious needs can be addressed. The situation also raises
many questions about the international community’s actual commitment. As one report
states, ” Twenty three years of conflict –Soviet occupation, civil war, the Taliban, and
finally the US-led bombing campaign-have taken a toll on women in Afghanistan. Since
the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghan women have been the focus of much international
attention and the cornerstone of the largest gender-focused aid intervention. Yet today,
many people in Afghanistan believe that there is less funding for women and for gender
programs that there was three years ago ‘because we think we have solved the problems”
(Abirafeh:2005:3).

The above report and its title, ‘Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post-
Conflict Afghanistan…Learned?’ is possibly the most comprehensive critical analysis on
this subject and indicative of the challenges. It places many of the problems for Afghan
women in the aid community’s lack of understanding of Afghan culture; lack of
recognition of indigenous capacities; how ‘gender’ in Afghanistan has been treated as
only women and not included men which further divides Afghan men and women; the
need to match rhetoric with political will and funding, and several other shortcomings.

9
5.4 Local Values and Social and Cultural Issues

The events of 1978, attempted to force reforms on the rural people, reforms that rejected
Afghan social and cultural values. Yet is it within some of these local values that
development and peace building could be strengthened. In particular, international
assistance in Afghanistan has suffered from a lack of understanding and dialogue on the
role of culture and religion (Maley: 1998). Yet to be developed are strategies to translate
Afghan cultural or religious values into governance and assistance issues to avoid
polarizing domestic and international actors (Karim: 2001:5). From now into the future,
the success of rural development policies and programmes will heavily depend on respect
for these foundations.

5.5 Supportive International Community, International Aid and Intervention

Long term support by the international community is necessary to strengthen

Afghanistan’s development, rural development, peace and conflict prevention efforts and
economic recovery. However, while Afghanistan needs large amounts of aid to rebuild,
it is questionable whether the large amounts needed can bring lasting peace and stability.
As Afghanistan’s history has already shown in the lead-up to the Soviet invasion,
‘inappropriate or ill-conceived aid can tilt the balance toward peace or war’ (Karim:
2001:2). Moreover, assistance strategies that bypass the central government, and its sub-
national levels, miss very important opportunities for state building. This paper
emphasizes the need for more bottom-up government approaches, but these also require
strengthening at the top.

For many Afghans international commitments and assistance pledged now is a déjà vu
from the 1989 era, when the Soviets withdrew their troops and the international
community made large pledges for assistance, most of which were not realized. Despite
what has been learned internationally since then about the risks of abandoning ‘failed
states’, there still is Afghan anxiety and mis-trust over what is happening with the present
international assistance promises, whether they will last or if they will disappear as they
have done once before when the international community grows tired of unsettled
situations.

Within the international context, narcotics needs special mention, not only in relation to
the usual issues of health, well-being and criminal activity, but in particular on how the
narcotics trade helps sustain conflict and the vicious cycle of poverty in some rural areas.
Opium growing in Afghanistan is a major issue of power. The growers, most of whom
are the smallest farmers, get locked into indebtedness to the powerful traders whose quest
to maintain control fuels conflict. This often makes legitimate rural development far more
difficult. As part of peace-building, a multi-dimensional approach to the opium trade is
needed: government policies; international controls and programmes to lessen demand of
narcotics; and efforts to create better understanding of the power structures that trap these
farmers, then offer realistic options at the farm level, both short term and long term.

10
5.6 Peaceful, Co-operative Regional Agenda

The political environment of the region is also critical for progress in peace building.
Although alignments have been considerably altered since September 11, most actors of
the region maintain and cultivate their networks in Afghanistan. There has been partial
progress towards converting harmful interference into constructive engagement for the
rebuilding of the country. At present, the involvement of Afghanistan’s neighbors seems
to be aimed as much at maintaining options in case of renewed conflict as it does at
contributing to peace-building and reconstruction.

6. Rural Development in Peace Building

6.1: Participatory Rural Development

Not only is rural development essential to peace-building in Afghanistan, participatory

rural development needs to be seen as a main vehicle for peace-building among the
people and between the people and government. In many ways the war in Afghanistan
can be attributed to past rural development policies, or lack thereof.

What do we mean by rural development? Although an enormous body of literature exists

on rural development, and different theories, trends and concepts of it have evolved, for
the purpose of this paper we refer to it in two ways. First in the general way to meaning
assistance being provided in efficient quantities to rural areas. In Afghanistan even this
alone is a major change from the past. Second ‘rural development can be defined as the
process whereby rural communities progress from given situations to more desirable
situations in terms of quality of life. It depends on the utilisation of local, physical and
human resources, supplemented by investment, technology and services with full
participation of the local people in decision making.’ (INASP: 2004: 1).

Rural development services such as health, education, agriculture, and physical

infrastructure seen to be provided by a government to its populations are, of course,
extremely important both to poverty alleviation and in establishing and building
government credibility in the eyes of the population.

What do we mean by participation? One definition is that it is a ‘process through which

stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and
resources which affect them’ (Narayan: 1998: 4). During the years that Afghanistan has
been at war the participation paradigm has come into existence in other countries. This
paradigm evolved out of NGO work in Latin America, Africa and Asia, largely because
of dissatisfaction with how top-down aid programmes were not achieving what they were
meant to do. Theories and practices such as those of Paulo Friere, the Brazilian
educationist, the liberation theology movement in Latin America, and the co-operative
movement in India and Bangladesh provided poignant examples of more effectively
addressing poverty by working directly with the people at the grass roots to design and
implement policy and programs. By the 1980’s, specific attitudes and methodologies had

11
emerged for working with the poor to put them in charge of analysis and decision-making,
with their empowerment as the intended goal.

Robert Chambers’, Rural Development: Putting the Last First’, was a milestone in this
movement and argued for putting those who are usually left out or the last ones to be
considered in development –the poor- directly into analysis and decision-making roles.
This approach suggested that aid programmes adjust their own thinking and recognize the
strengths and priorities of the aid recipient. Today, social mobilization for rural
development is carried out by various NGOs and governments, using attitudes and
methods such as Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and
Participatory Learning and Action (PLA). These tools are intended to help enable
agencies to draw the target population, even the most vulnerable and voiceless, into a
process to do their own analysis, prioritization, planning, organizing, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation.

In this time, ‘there have been an increasing number of analyses of development projects
showing that ‘participation’ is one of the critical components of success in irrigation,
livestock, health, water, sanitation and agriculture projects. All the evidence points
towards long-term economic and environmental success coming about when people’s
ideas and knowledge are valued, and power is given to them to make decisions
independently of external agencies’ (Pretty:1995:60). Donor agencies, including the
World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations agencies, and donor governments
have for the last decade placed new emphasis on reconstruction and development that, at
least in rhetoric, required, ‘beneficiary participation’ in virtually every project.

The trouble is that while ‘participation’ in theory has become accepted in the broad
development field, there is far less common understanding about ‘participation’ or
‘empowerment’ in practice. Amongst specialists, many lessons have been learned and
best practices developed but in many places applying these consistently is still
enormously challenging. Looking internationally, some of the best practices include: the
need for clear concepts, methodologies and tools for participation, motivation and
empowerment; realistic time and resources; political will and the buy- in by all
stakeholder groups to share power; instilling local ownership; the need to recognize local
social contexts; the need for high levels of training, supervision and support of social
mobilisers; capacity building and long-term follow-up in communities to help avoid the
break-down of groups formed which often happens when groups are introduced from
outside; tools for targeting the poor and empowering them while dealing with the elites;
identifying and addressing root causes; avoiding dependence; setting up sustainability;
managing expectations; creating and maintaining linkages among villages, government
and other stakeholders. These best practices are more likely to be achieved when
specifically targeted beneficiaries and/or the whole community is involved, not just the
usual leaders and powerful people.

In Afghanistan, clarity about best practices in participatory rural development and sharing
of such information is very limited. ‘Compared to many other conflict zones,
Afghanistan has received limited attention from researchers and analysts’ (Atmar:

12
2001:12). This is especially true about the subject of development and aid. Publicly, there
has been little written critical analysis of international aid policies or programmes, with
almost no analysis of participatory programmes in Afghanistan. However, based on the
authors’ direct observation over most of the last 20 years, aid programmes have virtually
all involved different degrees of outside, top-down imposition. By default, having no
recognized central authority for many years, aid programmes have been ‘parachuted- in’
with little to no local consultation. The UN, donor governments and NGOs have decided
what is needed and to the extent possible, tried to provide it, usually to targeted parts of
the population, especially the most vulnerable. Thus community development, involving
the whole community participating in the decisions that affect them, is very new. With
few exceptions, such attempts have been made only in the last four years.

Best practices in participatory development, which evolved in other countries during the
years Afghanistan has been at war, should now be drawn on for Afghanistan. Genuine
participation means dialogue among the people and between government and the people,
as well as government being responsive to the needs and priorities as identified by the
people. It is the basis for dialogue, transparency, accountability, building common
understanding and trust that can substantially contribute to peace building, state building
and community building. From lessons learned in other countries, participatory
development needs to be multi-dimensional. It is not only ‘community-led’ or only
‘government-led’, instead it means all levels working together and reflecting each other.

Including rural Afghans in the development analysis, design and implementation is a way
to counter the tensions between perceptions of a modern state with its modern, urban elite
and a conservative, rural tribal people. Such dialogues and processes are especially
important in rural Afghanistan as fast paced change is often understood by conservative
rural Afghans as influence from the West, change they perceive as anti-Islamic and are
quick to reject (ANHRD:2004:194).

Moreover, careful consideration should also be given to working with traditional bodies
such as councils of elder and dispute resolution bodies (shuras and jirgas), even if these
bodies are not themselves inclusive. While these bodies are not without problems, in
some cases ‘these institutions may have played an extremely important role in providing
support networks to villages during the last 20 years, when state institutions have been
severely weakened or damaged’ (Pain/AREU: 2004:1).

When we look at how consultative or participatory practices have been neglected in

Afghanistan to date, it is unsurprising that almost all the major state-building elements
coming out of the Bonn Agreement have been seriously criticized for their lack of broad-
based participation, as until now, broad participation in central governance was neither
valued or practiced in Afghanistan. However, the new Afghan constitution takes a bold
step in officially recognizing and requiring local level participation. Article 140 states, ‘In
order to organize activities and provide people the opportunity to actively participate in
the local administration, a council shall be set up in districts and villages in accordance
with the law. Members of these councils shall be elected by the local people through free,
general, universal, secret and direct elections for a period of three years’.

13
While there now is the constitutional basis for participation from the bottom-up, putting it
into practice is another matter. As lessons learned elsewhere show and are confirmed
below in our case studies, having elected leaders does not guarantee equal or just
‘participation’. Amongst the many needs in Afghanistan is the need to have a clearly
defined vision of participation. It must be inclusive, to draw in those traditionally
excluded, namely women and girls, the landless, marginalized ethnic minorities and the
most poor. While this is challenging work anywhere, to be inclusive in Afghanistan
requires being aware of and dealing with many complexities.

With a central Afghan government at least partly in place, a newly elected leader and
upcoming parliamentary elections, the central government has begun some work in rural
areas. Most rural-focused programmes are financed by the international financial
institutions including World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and many donor
governments. Roughly $4.5 USD billion is targeted for several ‘National Priority
Programmes’, including the National Rural Access Programme, the National Skills
Development Priority Programme, National Agriculture Priority Programme, and other
national programmes for drinking water, irrigation and power, transportation, education,
health, and so on.

One of these national priority programmes, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), is
particularly relevant to explore and critically analyze to consider what it might suggest
for the country’s rural development as a whole.

7. National Solidarity Programme

‘At present, the most complicated and high stakes IFI-financed program in Afghanistan is
the World Bank-financed National Solidarity Programme (NSP)’(Carlin:2003:8).
Introduced in 2003 by the Afghan government’s Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and
Development (MRRD), the NSP by the end of May 2005, had approximately $207 USD
million from the World Bank and donor countries to cover what was originally estimated
at 20,000 qualifying villages, but has since been revised to 15,000 villages (NSP: 2005:1)
in three years. The NSP’s main goal is for the government to introduce community-based
development, a crucial step for the country’s stability.

As the first of its kind, the NSP may have major implications for the future of
Afghanistan’s rural development as a whole. This paper looks at the NSP and what
lessons it might have for the country’s rural development in the broadest sense.

Government documents refer to the NSP as its ‘flag ship’ programme. It is by far the
largest government programme in the country in terms of finance, scale and geographic
reach. NSP’s mandate is to implement community-supported development programs in
nearly every Afghan village in only three years, making the scale and speed of the project
perhaps unprecedented in the world. As the NSP is many rural Afghan’s first contact with
and assistance from the new government, the importance of results of the NSP can not be
over-stated. In particular, it has been envisioned that the NSP could play a role in helping
to secure at least the existing central fledgling government and at the same time, reduce

14
or at least effectively deal with the influence of destabilizing, divisive figures in the
provinces. However, its speed, scale, unsecured funding and other factors make it a high
risk programme. At mid-2005, half way through the project, while there are some signs
of success, some of these risks are already apparent, as our case studies below illustrate.

Overall, many of NSP’s pitfalls are directly linked to its rushed preparation. While best
practices in widespread participatory development indicate that the most successful
projects normally have gone through many months, if not years, of preliminary study,
analysis and design phases, often involving pilot projects, the NSP for Afghanistan did
not pass through any of these stages of preparation. Instead, it was adapted from the
design of similar World Bank projects in East Timor and Indonesia and initiated at full
scale on a very short timeline in Afghanistan. Introduced at its present scale in December
2002, NGOs held workshops in February and March 2003, to try to overcome the project
design flaws, but the main in-built risks remained: the scale and speed. Adequate time
was not allowed for many activities needed, most especially for the range of crucial
capacity building needed by the FPs and government. Although a very new approach in
Afghanistan, necessary skills in participation and broad community development were
assumed to exist in each FP. Within only a few more months, by September 2003 NGOs
were already implementing the programme on a large scale.

The NSP rush was part of the run-up to the Afghan presidential elections to follow the
next year. Careful programme preparation was given far less priority than the perceived
need to make visible things happen quickly and on a very large and wide scale. Possible
additional roles, such as peace-building and poverty alleviation were not clearly
integrated into the NSP as planned strategies, rather these major roles may have been
assumed only as possible consequences.

Now in its second year of operation, the NSP is implemented for the government’s
MRRD by the UN Habitat and about 20 international and Afghan NGOs, all of whom are
referred to as the facilitating partners (FPs). The FPs were selected based on their
existing expertise in Afghanistan and capacities to expand operations, and include such
international NGOs as: CARE, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Aga Khan
Foundation, Oxfam, and Actionaid. FPs are responsible for approaching communities and
letting them know about the NSP, its eligibility requirements, what it has to offer and
help the village through the whole NSP process. In September 2003, an Oversight
Consultant was appointed: GTZ, an agency of the German government, along with DAI,
an American consulting firm.

NSP documents (NSP:1383:3) describe itself as consisting of four core elements: 1) a

facilitated participatory planning process at the community level to assist with the
establishment and strengthening of community institutions; 2)a system of direct block
grant transfers to support the rehabilitation or development activities for such institutions;
3)capacity development to enhance the competence of communities for financial
management, procurement, useful technical skills and transparency; 4) activities which
facilitate links to other institutions and programmes with available services and resources.

15
The block grants are allocated to villages comprised of over 50 families at $200 USD per
family up to a maximum of $60,000 USD (NSP:2003:6) per village. These block grants
are to provide resources for public infrastructure, community assets, revolving funds,
social services and training identified as priority needs through an inclusive, participatory
village planning process. The village is to manage the block grants including preparation
of project proposals with technical assistance from the MRRD.

In the villages, the NSP is introduced and facilitated by a total of about 3,500 social
mobilisers employed by the FPs. Many of the FP’s social mobilisers who were field
workers in other projects have been diverted to the NSP, while due to the scale of the
project FPs also have had to hire many more people. As there is an extreme shortage of
Afghans with community development experience, many of those hired had to be given
basic training to act as social mobilisers. The FPs themselves have trained the social
mobilisers with input from NSP, with training focusing mainly on NSP management and
logistical matters. Thorough training on community development is largely missing.

To be eligible for a development grant from the NSP, communities are required to elect a
Community Development Council (CDC) which should be a representative, decision-
making body with both women and men on the council, or out of cultural sensitivity, men
and women could organise separate councils. The CDC is to hold a series of community
meetings to make decisions on development priorities, final choice of projects, size and
composition of community contributions, use of project funds, project implementation
and management, transparency arrangements, and arrangements for the operation and
maintenance of completed projects.

Each FP was given minimal NSP guidance on how to guide villages to hold elections so
each FP did it according to their own judgment. Under pressure to get the village
projects identified and underway, elections were held but village constitutions or bylaws
were not introduced. Without bylaws, there is no village agreement on matters such as
who can run for office, the obligations of elected leaders, how they can be removed if
they fail to meet the obligations, participation of women or minority sub-groups, or other
normal subjects of agreements made through bylaws. In most cases such formalised self-
regulation is yet to be introduced.

7.1 What has Happened?

Under the NSP, Afghanistan’s first CDCs were elected from August 2003 onwards and
the first block grant disbursements began in December 2003. By the end of May 2005,
about 9,000 villages had elected CDCs, and nearly 8,000 village project proposals had
been approved and first installments disbursed. The projects are divided into those for
drinking water, irrigation, reconstruction of schools, clinics, community centers; transport;
and energy with a smaller number pertaining to livelihoods and income generation
(MRRD:2005:4). Villages that are able to successfully implement projects during the first
year are to receive additional small block grants during their second year and third years
(NSP:2005/1). After this time, the CDCs and the villages are to sustain the projects
themselves.

16
7.2 Case Studies: Introduction and Rationale

With such a large number of villages involved, each with its own NSP activities, a wide
variety of undertakings and results are occurring, as seen in 29 villages visited for this
study. To illustrate some of these activities and outcomes, below are presented case
studies from four of the villages. These four were selected in an attempt to present
qualitative data on the NSP and of course make no claim of being representative of the
over 9,000 villages participating in the NSP. However, observations made even in these
few villages, raise important issues for the NSP to consider as it moves forward and also
suggests the kinds of problems to be prevented in rural development as a whole.

7.3 NSP CASE STUDIES:

Case Study 1: Upper Nawach Village, Parwan Province

The Nawach villages are located about 150 km north of the capital city of Kabul in the
District of Salang of Parwan Province. The Lower Nawach is across the main road that
crosses the Hindukush Mountains at the Salang Pass connecting the north of the country
with the south. Between the village and the road flows the Salang river. The Upper
Nawach is about 5 km or 2 hours uphill walking distance from the Lower Nawach. Each
village is made up of about 100 families. The villagers come from a single ethnic and
tribal group and most are related by inter-marriage.

When the NSP came to the two villages in the fall of 2003, the choice of what could be
done with the money was obvious for upper Nawach and not so clear for the Lower
Nawach.

“When community mobilizers of the MRRD came to our village and told us about NSP
we first didn’t believe anything they were saying” says Abdul Habib, the Chair of the
Upper Nawach Community Development Council (CDC).“Never in the history of
Afghanistan had the central government taken people into confidence and put them in
charge of a development project, so how could we believe it now?” he reasoned.
However, when they realized that the programme was real they elected a CDC. The
project they selected for their allotted NSP fund through a village wide consultation was a
tertiary road to connect them to the main road.

The villagers of Upper Nawach did not wait for the NSP money to arrive before they
started work on the road. Indeed, the road was 80 percent complete before they got their
first 20 percent of the $25,000 block grant. “The NSP was sort of a trigger. For years we
knew the road to be of need but we just couldn’t get ourselves organized to go about
building it – the NSP pushed us in that direction”, Mr. Habib explained. “And we don’t
see this as just a road”, he said, “it is way more. It is access to health, to school to the
market and to information.”. An engineer from UN Habitat, the FP in Parwan, said that
the estimated cost of the road is over $50,000 if carried out by an NGO but the village
people completed it for half the amount.

17
The CDC believed that the road would make higher education more accessible, and help
with other village problems as well. To continue studying past grade four offered in the
village, it is necessary for the children to walk to and from the upper school each day, a
total of four hours walking per day. With a road and vehicle transport it would become
more realistic to make that journey and there was hope that both girls and boys would be
encouraged to go to school and stay in school. Others also looked forward to being able
to reach a hospital for critical illnesses.

Prior to the CDC, Upper Nawach had never had a village development shura (council).
Every villager knew what the village’s needs were but never sat down to discuss them,
they explained. The NSP provided that opportunity for them. The CDC is now not only a
development council but an authoritative dispute resolving body as well. One elder who
is a member of the village’s CDC said, “The power of decision making was transferred to
people, therefore whoever designed NSP made the right decision. This is bringing unity
to people”.

There was however, a major problem with the road. It took many months of hard work to
be built through difficult terrain. The road was finished all the way from the Upper
Nawach to the upper edge of the Lower Nawach. It then had to go through the Lower
Nawach to get to the river, at which point a bridge on the river is needed to connect to the
main road. The problem is that the villagers of Lower Nawach will not allow the road to
go through it because they will lose scarce agriculture land and the bridge, yet to be built,
requires much more money– who will pay for it?

“Why didn’t they ask us first, before they built the road, if we would allow them to go
through our village?”, an elder from Lower Nawach stated. “And without the bridge this
whole road is useless – why didn’t they think of that first either?”

Case Study 2: Lower Nawach Village, Parwan Province

Lower Nawach is an internally divided village. Unlike Upper Nawach, which is made up
of closely knit families, Lower Nawach was divided long before the presence of the NSP.
They have chosen a micro- hydro plant for their block grant.

“The first day when NSP facilitators came to explain to us the program, I said we wanted
to do electricity for our village”, the CDC chairman said. “The reason we picked this is
because every other village along the river is doing the same – we don’t want to be
different from the other villages.”

“But did you discuss this in comparison to other things you could do with the money?”
the researcher asked.

“There was no need to do that – this was it”, the Chairman responded.

18
 Other villagers in private conversations with the researcher said that they had requested a
drinking water facility but the Chair didn’t listen because he had his personal interests in
the project.

“What interests?” the researcher asked.

“The Chair contracted out the project to himself”, a villager responded. “He claims that
nobody else stepped forward so what else could I do?”

When asked about this, the Chairman replied, “I am actually losing money on this project
– but I am doing it because I as the Chair am responsible for the successful conclusion of
this project.”

When the researcher went to see the project he heard a noise – two farmers, a father and a
son – were protesting (knowing that someone from Kabul was visiting the project) that
the MRRD had damaged their land. Two more farmers joined in claiming the same. The
researcher saw that their land, indeed, was vulnerable to the water intake for the project.

“But this is your project, you as a village picked it, so why complain about it?” the
researcher asked.

“No this is the Chairman’s project. We were not consulted – we don’t want this” the
farmers replied raising their voices. “But you need to resolve this through your CDC” the
researcher advised.

“The CDC is not a council (shura) that can resolve things – I want you to resolve this!”
one of the farmers demanded of the researcher.

Case Study 3: Zakhil Village, Nangarhar Province

Zakhil is a village located about 20 km to the South East of Jalalabad city, the capital of
Nangarhar province. It is inhabited by about 350 households, comprised of five or six
extended families. The village has never had a shortage of family quarrels and disputes,
which in return result in two or three rival blocks – each one with its own Malik (leader)
and its own program and function for social occasions and gatherings. The number of
Maliks in a village usually represents the number of divisions in the village, with more
serious divisions leading to separate mosques.

Such divisions often have a greater impact on male-to-male relationships in a village,

with women and their relationships not as greatly affected. This is for two reasons. First,
unless the disputes are serious the men usually do not put pressure on the women to
follow. Second, women often socialize amongst themselves more then men, they assist
each other with numerous domestic tasks and thus establish bonds. In Zakhil, as
throughout the eastern provinces the point that brings women together and where they
often socialize is called a Gudar.

19
Gudar is a water-point (a kariz, a water spring, or stream) from where women carry
drinking water or do their laundry. In the morning when men are away working in the
fields, women and girls put their pitchers or laundry on their head and walk to the Gudar.
There they spend an hour or the whole day working and sitting with other women, talking,
doing the laundry together, helping others with theirs, asking for advice or simply sharing
their latest stories and news. The Gudar is also known as a place for young people to
watch for and attract suitors’ attention as they come and go. Interested young men make
sure they cross by somewhere between home and Gudar. Although chores at the Gudar
are hard work, in many villages, it is a popular place with women. Importantly in a
conservative culture where they spend their time inside the family compound rarely
venturing in to town, the Gudar is a space for women to get outside and socialize often.

Zakhil, like many such villages, had a Gudar for as long as the villagers the researchers
spoke with could remember. While over the years there were many village disputes these
did not affect Gudar. That is until the NSP came.

Given the divided state of the village, it is not surprising that the village reflected those
same divisions. While the CDC held many village meetings members could not come to
agreement on what they could do with the NSP money. For every project idea discussed
there were some who would benefit more than others and that was unacceptable for the
council as a whole. After many months of quarrels, two members of the CDC pushed for
a well in front of their home compounds. The rest of the villagers and their
representatives would accept it only if there was a well in front of every compound. The
agreement was finally settled for 18 wells, one for every compound in the village. These
18 wells were in addition to only one functioning well already in the village and three
wells not functioning due to lack of maintenance. Such an increase in the number of
wells, in a location known to have seasonal water shortages, and where wells already
have a history of not being maintained, should have raised questions about this village’s
project choice. Not only were the wells of questionable choice, the wells put an end to
Gudar – an important part of the village culture and social life.

“We incorporated women’s needs in our decisions – in fact we did the wells for women
because they don’t have to leave their house for drinking water and laundry” responded
Maeen Khan, chairman of the CDC. But when the researchers interviewed some of the
village women, they said they missed the Gudar and so did some male bachelors.

Notably, three kilometers to the north of Zakhil is Kan- a village of over 1,000 families.
According to the NSP facilitator the exact same thing happened in that village as well.

Case Study 4: Char Kabutarkhan Village, Herat Province

Char Kaburtarkhan is located in the District of Guzara in Herat Province. It is located 15

km to the south of Herat city and about 4 km off the main road. According to the NSP
village file, there are 735 families inhabiting the village. The village was located at the
front line during the Soviet presence and was heavily damaged during the war. After the
defeat of the Communist Regime in 1992, many of the village’s exiled residents returned

20
and rebuilt their homes. Many of the villagers are farmers. The village lies by a river ,
and has fertile land and is therefore very green. According to Abdul Wahab, the Chair of
Char Kabutar Khan, when NSP came to the village in the fall of 2003, “We already were
a united village but we did not have a structure and therefore could not take advantage of
our unity for development. What NSP did was to give us that needed structure through
the formation of CDC” Abdul Qudus a member of the village CDC and Said Shiragha a
villager agreed. “We did form Shuras off and on but only for dispute resolutions, we
never attempted or probably never thought of putting one together for development” Mr.
Qudus explained. “Our CDC now does both, the traditional dispute resolution and also its
tasks under NSP.”

Mr. Sher Agha also pointed out that after the NSP had arrived the incidence of disputes
had fallen. He believes that NSP probably strengthened unity amongst the villagers and
hence the fall in disputes. For their NSP entitlement (about $60,000) the village built a
school building, repaired the village’s public bath and also built a number of culverts.
“All these were the village’s priorities and we would not change them if they were to start
all over again,” Mr. Wahab said. “For example, our school did not have a building and
therefore it was not conducive for studying. The closest school with a building was some
7 km from here. That was too far for our children. So the school was our top priority.”

Now that the NSP projects are concluding in the village, what will happen to the CDC
and its status? The villagers were of the view that it would continue functioning. They
had already taken steps for the sustainability of the body. For example, the villagers have
agreed to use the NSP account as the village’s trust fund and have encouraged the
villagers to contribute donations to it. In addition, the CDC would act, as it already has on
numerous occasions, as the village’s representative body to inform the government,
NGOs and international organizations of their problems and to ask them for development
assistance.

The women of this village have their own CDC and are very active, which may be aided
by the already high female literacy rate in the village. The school the village built with
the NSP block grant was in fact pushed by the women. The women’s CDC also serves as
the focal group for other organizations that are interested in women-related issues. For
example, it meets regularly with the regional office of the Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to discuss women’s rights. The women’s CDC has
also received training from AIHRC and other organizations.

The villagers claimed that NSP so far has been the best government project they have
seen. “It delivered on what it promised [referring to block grants]. It created jobs for the
poor. Its money was also spent within the village. It produced projects that shape up the
future of our village,” Mr. Wahab explained. However, he added that it could further be
improved. For example NSP could pay the installments in a more timely manner. “Right
now there are delays that affect the continuity of our work” Mr. Qudus complained.
Another male villager contended that there could also be more emphasis on women
training that goes beyond NSP. “They need to know about their role, their options and
also their rights.”

21
7.4 Observations from case studies

Given the lack of normal preparation and rushed start-up of the NSP and its scale and
scope, it is not surprising that problems are arising in NSP villages. Our case studies
illustrate a number of areas where problems are occuing and improvements are needed.
To begin, there was a lack of CDC linkages with other CDCs in the areas where projects
might overlap (as in the Upper and Lower Nawach villages). There were questions of
genuine community participation and empowerment (as in Lower Nawach), in particular,
the lack of women’s meaningful participation was noted throughout (as in Zakhil village).
Indeed, researchers found that in only one of the case study villages (Char Kabutarkhan)
was there clear participation by women in decision making in the village’s NSP project.

Other observations include little to no NSP connection with other assistance programmes
or government ministries and almost no involvement of government people. In none of
the case study villages had the CDCs been linked up with other services. In this regard,
the NSP is not living up to its plan to link CDCs with local institutions, especially district
and provincial administrations which function now. These opportunities are being missed
and many district administrations perceive themselves as sidelined. The recently elected
provincial councils and the yet to be elected district councils, will be other important
links for CDCs. Moreover, the NSP is building capacities almost entirely in the FPs, and
nearly not at all in the local government institutions.

Capacity building at the village level was also observed as weak. None of the villages
visited had received training or resources needed to assist them for future village
development when the NSP ends. None had received training on group management,
drafting of bylaws, resource mobilization or participatory, inclusive approaches to
decision-making or linking with others. There was almost no evidence of planning ahead
for village financial resources beyond the NSP block grant.

The villages visited including those which became case studies, highlight concerns about
those who were elected into CDC leadership positions. Often those elected were the same
powerful, influential and relatively well-off people who have been in charge all along (eg.
school master, imam, landowner, elders, etc.). In the four case study villages, those
elected as CDC leaders include some traditional leaders, the members of the shura or
jirga. In some cases outright ‘elite capture’ of NSP projects occurred (as in the Lower
Nawach case study). Clearly, more attention appears to have been paid to the novel act
of elections than to whom got elected. While it may not be surprising in such first-ever
elections that the ‘usual suspects’ would be elected, such development programmes
require strong built-in plans to include and raise the voices of the poor, but in NSP such
empowerment is so far rhetoric. Such realities, or lack thereof, should raise many
questions about inclusivity, whose interests are represented by NSP village projects, CDC
sustainability (discussed below) and other issues.

In the villages visited, as indicated in the case studies, it was apparent that there is wide
variation in the level of skills of FPs and their social mobilisers. While relatively well
briefed on NSP requirements and logistics, social mobilisers often lack skills in

22
community participation, a likely cause of many of the problems faced within the NSP
projects.

Some village NSP projects raised questions of sustainability. Some projects chosen by
villages clearly could lead to problems (Lower Nawach’s micro-hydrel plant and whether
villagers could afford it and carry our operation and maintenance. What would happen to
Zakhil’s water supply with the sudden, large increase in wells?) Monitoring and
evaluation was late or non-existent. Had M&E been introduced in a timely fashion,
problems could have been caught before getting out of hand (such as wells at Zakhil and
a neighboring village).

Finally, there is some concern that the NSP projects could negatively impact social
capital (as in the Gudar at Zakhil) as well as the customs of hashar-where community
members voluntarily contribute labor and resources. Village NSP construction projects
pay villagers to do labor they would normally have given for free as a community
obligation. Community contributions to projects, required by the NSP, were often only
tokens. This problem did not start with the NSP, but it is important to be aware of the
long term negative impacts of any programme that undermines customs of self-help and
pooling community resources.

At the same time, there were a number of positive benefits that appear linked with NSP
projects, as shown in the case studies. Where unity already existed before the arrival of
the NSP, the NSP and the money and organizing it brings appears to compliment or even
increase such unity (as in Upper Nawach and Char Kabutarkhan). The downside was that
the same money and organizing coming from outside may exacerbate strife and dis-unity
where it already existed (as in Zakhil and Lower Nawach). Other benefits include
encouragement to villages to develop further skills and resources for further development,
and opportunities taken by some villages such as Char Kabutarkhan has taken to promote
women’s rights.

7.5 Risks and Constraints

As stated above, the NSP has implications for the future and for rural development as a
whole, hence peace-building as a whole in Afghanistan. For this purpose it is useful to
identify what may be the priority risks and constraints for the NSP, which may also be
the greatest challenges to the broader rural development. These include: the sustainability
of the CDCs, the lack of genuine women’s participation; the need for long term follow-up;
government capacity building and the financing to sustain all these needs.

Sustainablity of the present CDCs could be the biggest risk to community-based

development. Within the international aid community and MRRD there is high hope for
the CDCs but their futures depend on many complex realities. If these CDCs fail it will
take a very long time to build up trust for such efforts to work again. One key aspect of
the CDCs that is not being yet acknowledged and being engaged with to the extent
necessary are the local political contexts and the effects these have, and will have on the
future on the CDCs. Especially important are the realities of long-standing power

23
relations and traditional decision-making bodies which continue to dominate in each
village. Specifically, “given the current attention on building what are seen as more
democratic village organizations, as exemplified by the NSP, attention must be given to
the existing rules that structure social relations at the village level. The superimposition
of new organizations into a village does not mean that existing norms will necessarily
change” (Pain/AREU:2004:1). Based on lessons learned from other experience and
studies on similar issues inside and outside Afghanistan, such realities could have been
predicted and realistic plans to address them, but this is a process that takes many years,
time not included in the NSP as presently planned.

As stated above, as a general observation in the case study villages, those who were
elected as leaders tend to be the relatively well off, the powerful or influential. Perhaps
the biggest misunderstanding about electing leaders of CDCs was the assumption that
elections, especially by secret ballots would automatically lead to ‘freely’ chosen leaders.
Such a supposition is highly unlikely in traditional societies comprised of indelible
hierarchies based on inter-dependencies and patronages forged over decades or even
centuries between families, ethnic/tribal (qaum) groups. In many instances these alliances
were further strengthened during the years of war. In cases where the people have elected
the ‘usual suspects’, their decisions to do so could be out of respect, loyalty or fear of
individual or collective reprisals should they do otherwise, or simply from lack of
alternative candidates.

Sustainability of the CDCs will be heavily dependent on them directly addressing poverty
alleviation, a factor almost overlooked while more emphasis was put on having leaders
elected. Without motivation or skills to do otherwise, those elected are likely to continue
with the status quo, acting according to their own priorities, reverting to their own ‘trickle
down’ approach. If they do not address the top priority needs of the villagers, the vast
majority who are very poor, there will simply be amongst villagers no interest to support
or sustain the CDC. It will take years of follow-up and skills building, for the poor to
have the voice needed to get into the leadership, if they indeed can.

Sustainablity of the projects undertaken by CDCs will also a large part of the credibility
and life expectancy of a CDC. Although NSP guidelines require plans for operation and
maintenance, many factors make meeting these requirements questionable. If the project
falls apart, what happens to the CDC? For example, in the Herat village what will
villagers think of the CDC if the school they built is not operating? What problems are
likely to occur among people in Upper Nawach when they have a road that comes to a
dead end? Can the people in Lower Nawach afford the micro-hydrel plant and is it being
maintained? Will the disunity in Zakhil get worse if the poorly chosen wells dry up?
Failed projects can not only mean the end of the CDC, they can bring tension and more
mis-trust between the villages and others.

Women’s meaningful participation is another key concern. While the NSP is to

encourage community participation and women’s participation in the CDC is a condition
of NSP, in most places only half the community –the men- are participating. In most of
the 9,000 CDCs formed, it has been reported that women are part of the overall CDCs or

24
that they form separate women’s councils but in most villages their inclusion has been
observed as only nominal. Women’s participation beyond their inclusion in the CDCs,
has also been very low. Most of the projects are male-selected with little or no input from
women. For example, in Zakhil village the men argued that they did a service for women
in providing wells, while to the women the wells meant shrinking of their social space,
constraining and dis-empowering them. Realizing this problem, MRRD has set aside a
portion of the NSP block grants specifically for women’s groups (about $6000/village)
and are increasing efforts to ensure more women are mobilized.

To ensure women’s participation, better and longer term strategies are needed. These
strategies need to deal sensitively with several factors: cultural practices that separate
men and women; lack of female social mobilisers to work with the women, weak FP
capacities to recruit women as social mobilisers, better training and gender sensitization
of both men and women decision-makers, so they can then raise gender awareness with
social mobilisers who in turn raise the awareness and get results in the villages in
culturally sensitive and productive ways. More gender know-how and community
animation skills in general are needed.

Long-term follow-up will be necessary for the sustainability of CDCs. Over the last
decades NGOs in many countries have implemented their work by forming groups. From
such group formation experience, many lessons have been learned, most importantly for
this paper, is that it is common for groups to fold once the outside assistance or
leadership is withdrawn. For groups to survive, they require long-term follow-through
comprised of social mobilization and advocacy, while at the same time input to keep
building and renewing their own skills, resources and other capacities to deal with the
local power structures and more development. However, the NSP is presently planned to
end in 2006, meaning that villages will have received only a maximum of three years of
such outside contact and assistance. To date they have received little to no training on
how to manage their community organization and so far all financial emphasis has been
on spending the block grant, with no planning at all to set up the village’s own financial
resources (ie. savings, credit, revolving fund, etc.). These two factors, the short contact
time and villages that will still be left without their own financial resources, make it
highly questionable if any of the CDCs will last. It’s also doubtful if the NGOs can carry
this weight of villages forward on their own. Before the NSP, NGOs were operating in
only a small percentage of villages that the NSP is to reach. Post-NSP, it is unlikely
NGOs can maintain the NSP planned scale, due to funding and other limitations. .

Capacity building of local government, including approaches in bottom-up development,

is essential and may be almost urgent. But an important question, and a highly sensitive
one about sustainability is who should be responsible to assist in sustaining the CDCs?
Will NGOs, especially international NGOs, continue as the sole providers of services in
rural areas which has been the case for many years by default, or will central and local
government start playing at least some of these roles? While NGOs and their specialized
services and resources will likely be needed for many years to come, for state-building
purposes it appears necessary for government administrations and line agencies to start
taking their own development initiatives at the provincial, district and village levels. For

25
this to work, NGO and government roles need better delineation and extensive capacity
building is needed in government at the national, provincial and district levels. Several
projects for this capacity building are being planned by donors.

Financing is another of the main risks. The NSP puts a major obligation on the
government which it could have difficulty sustaining, both financially and from human
resource angles. Given that the NSP has been publicized nationally as going to every
village with money, another risk is that the NSP remains without guaranteed funding.
For the planned level of activity and funding, from the time the NSP began early in 2003,
not enough funding had been secured. Even by the end of May 2005, when about $207
million had been secured from World Bank and donor countries for the NSP, this is still a
long way from the amount estimated by MRRD as needed -$800 million –to carry the
programme to the whole country. Funds are allotted year-by-year by donors, instead of
put into a secured pot of money needed, which leaves the NSP vulnerable. Any major
national or international security event, or even simple changes in policy, could render
the NSP broke.

With such high expectations built around the country, any faltering of NSP funding can
have highly negative impacts on central government. As worrisome, when not nearly
enough funds are fully guaranteed even to implement the present programme (3 years in
each village) hope for the needed long term follow-through is questionable. A recent
report presenting an Exit Strategy for the Oversight Consultant, speculates about an ‘NSP
II’ (NSP: 2005/1), and planning is underway for a next phase, but it appears this would
not be an entirely new phase of the NSP. It would essentially be the time needed to
complete the project as already planned

7.6 Overall Analysis of the NSP

The following section draws largely on the authors’ knowledge of the NSP process as
long time observers, managers and consultants in Afghanistan aid programmes, including
those of the ministry responsible for the NSP. The analyses and conclusions are drawn
from formal and informal interviews with other actors involved in the NSP as well as
from observation of the unfolding of the process.

The NSP has made significant strides. Only a few years ago, such a programme would
have been impossible due to the political conditions. Now, in an attempt to engage rural
development on a scale hereto unprecedented in Afghanistan even in unsettled security
conditions, the NSP has so far reached 9,000 of the 15,000 qualifying villages or
approximately 164 of the 360 districts throughout the country, a major strength. This is
also significant in that it represents some sort of presence of the central government, or at
least MRRD, in many villages of Afghanistan. At the same time, having received wide
publicity in the media nationally, not surprisingly this has established new and
widespread expectations in the same and remaining rural areas.

Some earlier doubts have been dispelled, while others were confirmed. Concern was
expressed by some stakeholders at the beginning of the NSP about the public

26
acceptability of a standardized procedure for the establishment of CDCs by communities
throughout the country and, and specifically to what extent women’s participation would
be effectively addressed in the process. However, about the standardized procedures, FPs
and various other sources have reported that not only were communities willing to adopt
the prescribed election and secret-ballot voting procedures, to date these leadership
selection methods have generally been greeted with enthusiasm in villages. However,
women’s participation, compared to men’s, was typically low and continues to be a major
challenge. It will take much more time, resources and skills to build-up the voices and
participation of women and the poor to become part of the leadership.

Nonetheless, CDC elections served as the first-ever experience of local participation in

voting. On one hand, this was an unprecedented event for the majority of rural Afghan
women, where at least in theory they participated in decision-making on par with men.
Some observers have noted that experience gained by villagers through their own secret
ballot CDC elections may have contributed to the higher than expected voter turn-out of
both men and women in the presidential elections of October 2004.
The NSP may have also contributed to community participation in national development.
One example includes the first ever jirga or conference of village representatives held in
Kabul in July 2005, attended by the authors. This Jirga brought together 350 select CDC
representatives, a third of whom were women, from every province, where they were
addressed by President Karzai and several other officials and given prominence in the
national media. During the week’s proceedings, delegates were also asked to evaluate the
NSP and their village roles in it, discussion that produced results applicable to aid
agencies. Similar to the researchers own findings, delegates concluded that the NSP had
several strengths, especially that it was helping to build relations and trust between the
central government and the rural people and transferred responsibility and skills to
communities.

Importantly, the CDC representatives also identified areas in need of improvement.

Divided into twenty discussion groups, delegates identified weaknesses as: the low
involvement of women; the lack of a long term strategy; the undo influence of powerful
people in communities; lack of plan for sustainability; lack of formal links with district
administration; late arrival of block grants, and the occurrence of some weak projects. To
overcome these weaknesses delegates suggested legal recognition of the CDCs by the
central government; assistance in developing bylaws for the CDCs; linking CDCs to
district administrations where they could play advisory roles; improved financial
sustainability of the CDCs by creating financial resources and systems, training of CDCs,
continued technical and financial support to the CDCs; separate CDCs for men and
women as it is culturally preferable and so both can more freely express themselves;
training for both men and women on development and women’s rights, etc.(NSP:2005/2).

The villagers’ own overall analysis of the NSP indicates of the value of having them do it.
The opinions and observations expressed by villagers themselves are most important to
build on by the NSP and in rural development in general.

27
8. Conclusions and Recommendations:

8.1: General:

1. The status is not yet peace, it is an unsettled situation that despite the positive signs,
could still go either way: to gel into a permanent peace or slide back into anarchy.
2. Many factors could threaten or determine the country’s security and need addressing
simultaneously.
3. One of the most important challenges in peace-building and state building is for the
government to overcome the historic volatile mistrust of the rural people.
4. One of the most effective ways to build these relations is through participatory rural
development approaches and programmes.

8.2: For Rural Development as a whole:

The NSP is one of many programmes underway in rural areas, although it is by far the
largest. As it is the central government’s first such community-based development
programme, it has major implications for the future. Looking ahead, say five or ten years
from now, how will the NSP be viewed? How will it affect Afghanistan’s rural
development as a whole? Will it be mocked by villagers as a failure that brought more
unfulfilled promises and have left a trail of derelict projects? Or will it be seen as a
turning point in relations between the Afghan government and rural areas?

What Afghanistan’s history and the NSP have to teach about Afghanistan’s rural
development as a whole is the need to go back to the basics and to put into practice major
lessons already known in the development field. Following are some of these points:

Share Lessons Learned

1)Although almost a cliché in the development field by now, sharing of lessons learned is
not widely practiced in the Afghanistan aid and development community even though
over decades a wealth of experience has been built. Now it is all the more critical to take
such opportunities for critical analysis, identify best practices and use this information in
policy development, training and other capacity building for participatory rural
development.

Promote Afghan Ownership and Voice

2)Rural development needs to be owned and directed by Afghans. It needs to start with
the Afghan villagers’ values and priorities as they themselves choose and support Afghan
leadership at all levels.

3)Villagers need to be given a far greater voice in development. Recommendations made

by village representatives at the NSP CDC conference in Kabul in 2005 should be widely
publicized and used as guides for further development. Such national fora should be held
regularly and considered essential for evaluation, problem-solving, policy and planning
of rural development.

28
Develop Policy Specifically on Participatory Rural Development
4) Government resources, even where limited, can be maximized by using participatory,
partnership approaches with the villages. Governments own strengths can be built by
listening to the villages, relationships that can be further strengthen by the own policies to
do so.

5)Rural development policy should be developed through consultation and participation

from the grass roots up, to show the needs and aspirations of the villages.

6)Rural development policy is in the earliest stages of being re-written. As part of the
National Development Strategy and the MRRD’s Three Year Strategic Plan, both of
which are being drafted now, policy needs to be included to go beyond implying
community participation. It needs to be specific to ensure and guide bottom-up,
participatory rural development.

Build Capacities in Government

7)In the NSP, capacity building has been almost exclusively focused on the facilitating
partners which are NGOs and a UN agency, while little capacity has been built in
government. This needs to change. While NGOs will likely be needed for their expertise
and resources for a long time to come, it is counter productive to bypass government.

8)For participatory rural development to occur, awareness raising and know-how is

needed at all levels, in the ministries, departments, programmes, provincial and district
offices on line agencies, elected representatives, educational institutions, NGOs, civil
society, etc.

9)Common visions and approaches to rural development are needed. These can be
enhanced by staff of each ministry receiving the same basic training in rural
development, community participation, understanding communities, working with CDCs,
other cross-cutting issues, etc.

10)Several ministries besides MRRD have roles and responsibilities for rural
development but they are acting separately from each other. They should be encouraged
to co-ordinate their plans, policies, roles and programmes to provide participatory,
integrated rural development.

11)Salary stabilization between government and other sources is a necessary part of

Afghan government capacity building. If NGOs, donors and UN continue to out-pay the
government, trained Afghans will continue to abandon government for the foreign
agencies.

Build Capacities at Village Level:

12)Build on what the NSP has started. Long term follow through is needed with the
CDCs, to build skills in group management (including bylaws), agriculture, health,
livelihoods, education, etc. Helping villages build up their own financial resources

29
through savings, credit, revolving funds or other micro-finance instruments is a necessary
part of poverty alleviation.

13) Build CDC skills so they can most effectively work with government and be the
community center points for implementing integrated development, for example with the
ministries of agriculture, water/irrigation, health, education, etc.

14)More demand needs to be put on the villages to mobilize their own resources and
encourage attitudes of self-help and partnership with government, donors, NGOs, etc.
Discourage dependence on outside sources.

15)Build the organization, skills, resources and voice of the poor so they can lead
themselves.

16) Encourage co-operation between villages and their development.

17)The legal status of CDCs may be important to settle, but some confusion is happening
about the nature of this status, specifically about ‘government’ vs. ‘governance’. Some
sources refer to CDCs as ‘local governance’, while the lowest level of government in
Afghanistan is the district level. As the CDCs as elected bodies are a new category of
institution in Afghanistan, there needs to be clarification that the CDC is ‘only’ a village
development organization and is not a level of ‘government’, where government means
having power or authority such as taxation, laws, right of arrest, imprisonment, etc.

Support by Donors, International Community, NGOs

18)Improved leadership and co-ordination is needed of donors’ support for rural
development, especially in the planned capacity building.

19)Development takes time and there are no short cuts. Funding should be provided by
the international donors to complete the NSP as presently planned, then continue the
funding to support and strengthen rural development and community development into
the future.

20)Ways should be found to ensure donor pledges are made and paid, placing the money
in secure trust funds or other mechanisms that make longer-term planning possible.

21)Initiatives are needed by both NGOs and government on how to more effectively deal
with each other. How can NGOs best support government leadership? How can
government support the specialized services NGOs provide? Given that both government
and NGOs have distinct roles to play, what can be done to create the maximum mutual
benefit?

Ensure Inclusive, Balanced Development

22)Women’s participation in rural development needs special attention, including gender
sensitization in the ministries, administration, elected leaders, programmes and NGOs.
Recruiting women to carry out rural development roles at all levels is essential.

30
‘Women’s programmes’ as wells as gender programmes, where women and men are
included, are both important.

23)Government and donor programmes not only need to practice inclusive, balanced
development but make it widely known, by communicating this information around the
country through the media, local offices, etc. Government, donors, NGOs and
programmes need to be accountable to show this is happening.

Improve Security Arrangements:

24)Continued and improved funding is needed to continue capacity building of Afghans
military and security forces is important.

25) Clear separation needs to be made between military and development objectives and
activity. International military forces, including the PRTs, should restrict their roles to
security, providing protection and capacity building with the Afghan police, army and
related national security, helping them play their roles to most effectively contribute to
peace and security. Rural development, and all the specialized expertise it takes should be
left to government, NGOs, and the communities themselves.

Support Research, M&E and Co-ordination

26) Research, and Afghan skills in research, are needed on many subjects in rural
development.

27)In rural areas, the traditional forms of community leadership may still be predominant
and most enduring, hence very important but more needs to be known about them,
especially the ‘shura’, an identity which has become confused in the aid community.
Much more also needs to be known about the already powerful or influential traditional
leaders now becoming at least part of the elected leadership of CDCs. How will these
institutional and power dynamics operating at local levels, enable or constrain peace
building? More research is needed.

28)Participatory monitoring, evaluation (M&E) and impact assessment should be

introduced without delay.

29)What is aid’s role in unity or conflict? In villages where there is already unity, the
NSP may reinforce the unity, whereas, if tensions already exist the NSP may exacerbate
those tensions. If rural development programmes can contribute to harmonies at the
community level, could this be translated to peace-building at the national level? These
are critical issues to examine.

31
9. End Notes: Villages in WKOP study
Province District Village
1. Herat Guzana Mahalai Pusht
2. Herat Guzana Charkabutarkhan
3. Logar Baraki Barak Ahmadshah
4. Logar Moh’d Agha Babuki
5. Logar Moh’d Agha Zaqum Khil
6. Logar Moh’d Agha Rahmat Abad
7. Logar Moh’d Agha Qazi Village
8. Logar Moh’d Agha Kahi
9. Ningahar Achin Chelgazi
10. Ningahar Achin Pekha
11. Ningahar Achin District Bazaar
12. Ningahar Achin Kandi Bagh
13. Ningahar Chaprahan Charkala
14. Ningahar Chaprahan Hadiyakhil
15. Ningahar Chaprahan Sholana
16. Ningahar Chaprahan Kadi
17. Ningahar Rodat Zakhil
18. Ningahar Rodat Hesar Shahi
19. Ningahar Rodat Chaghari
20. Ningahar Rodat Chenar Kala
21. Ningahar Rodat Hikal
22. Parwan Bagram Skandi
23. Parwan Bagram Nawach Safla
(lower)
24. Parwan Bagram Nawach Bala (upper)
25. Parwan Salang Jawarsang
26. Parwan Salang Chakdara
27. Wardak Maidan Shahr Jami Khil
28. Warkdak Maidan Shahr Shater
29. Wardak Said Abad Sadudin

10. References:

Abirafeh, Lina, 2005. Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict

Afghanistan…Learned? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Division for International Co-operation
Department for Development Policy, Bonn.

ACBAR, 2003. Policy Brief: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Security Situation in
Afghanistan, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), Kabul.
[www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/Afghanistan]

ANHDR, 2004. Afghanistan National Human Development Report (ANHDR) Security

with a Human Face, UNDP, United Nations Development Programme.

32
AREU, 2003. “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan.” Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit (AREU). Issues Paper Series. [www.areu.org.af/].

AREU, 2004. “Sub National Administration: Assessment and Recommendations for

Action.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Issues Paper Series.
[www.areu.org.af/].

Atmar, Mohammad Haneef, Jonathan Goodhand. 2001. “Coherence or Cooption?

Politics, Aid and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan”. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 30
July 2001

Atmar, Haneef. Sultan Barakat and Arne Strand. 1998. “From Rhetoric to Reality. The
Role of Aid in Local Peace-building in Afghanistan.” Workshop Report. The University
of York, York.

Barak, Sultan and Margaret Chard. 2002. “Theories, Rhetoric and Practice: Recovering
the Capacities of War-torn Societies.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5).

Barakat, Sultan and Gareth Wardell. 2002. “Capitalizing on Capacities of Afghan

Women: Women’s Role in Afghanistan’s Reconstruction and development.” Focus
Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction. Working Paper 4, Geneva:
International Labor Office.

Barakat, Sultan. 2002. “Setting the scene for Afghanistan’s reconstruction: the
challenges and critical dilemmas.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 801–816.

Brinkerhoff, DW & AA Goldsmith. 1992. “Promoting the Sustainability of Development

Institutions: a Framework for Strategy.” World Development, 20(3): 369–383.

CARE / Center on International Cooperation. 2003. “Good Intentions Will Not Pave The
Road to Peace” Policy Brief. [www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/
afghanistan/09152003_afghanistanbrief.p]. May 2004.

CARE International Afghanistan. 2003. “A New Year’s resolution to keep: secure a

lasting peace in Afghanistan.” Policy Brief, [http://www.careinternational.org.uk/news/
what_do_care_think/afghanistan/afghanistan_policy_brief_jan_2003.pdf]. May 2004.

CARE International, 2002. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: A little less talk, a lot more action.”
Policy Brief. [h t t p : / / w w w. c a r e u s a . o r g / n e w s r o o m / s p e c i a l r e p o r t
s / a f g h a n i s t a n / 0 9 3 0 2 0 0 2 _ p o l i c y b r i e f . p d f]. May 2004.

Carlin, Anne. 2003. Rush to Reengagement in Afghanistan, the IFI’s Post-Conflict

Agenda with Special Emphasis on the National Solidarity Program, Bank Information
Centre, Washington.

33
Council on Foreign Relation. 2003. “Afghanistan, Are We Losing the Peace?" Report.
[http://www.asiasociety.org/policy_business/afghanistan061703.pdf]. May 2004.

Chambers, Robert. 1983. Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Longman, Harlow,
UK

Cramer, Christopher and Jonathan, Goodhand. 2002. “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better?
War, the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan.” Development and
Change, 33 (5): 885-909.

Donini, Antonio, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester. 2004. Nation-building

Unraveled? : Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. Bloomfield, CT, Kumarian Press.

Goodhand, Jonathan. 2002. “Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of

International Aid in Afghanistan.” Third World Quarterly, 23 (5): 837–859.

International Crisis Group. 2002. “Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More
International Action.” [www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm]. May 2004.

INASP, 2004: Rural Development Directory, International Network for the Availability of
Scientific Publications (INADP) from 435 international, regional and national networks and
organisations in rural development around the globe. Oxford, UK,
[http://www.inasp.info/pubs/rd/html/introd.htm]

Karim, Farahnaz and Gregory Hess. 2001. “Thinking about Aid Management and
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan”, Peacepath Consulting, Rome, Italy. 2001.

Korten, DC. 1980. “Community Organization and Rural Development: a Learning

Process Approach.” Public Administration Review, 40: 480–511.

Maley, William. 1998. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York
University Press.

Maloney, Sean M. 2004. ‘Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?’ US Army Professional

Writing Collection, US Army Home Page.
[www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/october_2004/10_04.html]

Mass, Citha D. 2005. National Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Review of the Conflict and
the First Initiatives of Peace-building’. Head of Electoral Unit, GTZ Rule of Law Project.

Marsden, Peter. 2003. “Afghanistan: the Reconstruction Process,” International Affairs,

79 (1): 91-105.

Mills, Margaret. (no date) “One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Addressing Diversity in the Needs
and Development Capacities of Afghan Women, Short and Long Term” .Social Science
Research Council. [www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mills.htm]

34
Minkler, Meredith. 2005. Community Organising and Community Building for Health, Rutgers
University Press.

MRRD, 2005. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Programme booklet,

May 2005.

Narayan, Deepa and Jennifer Rietbergen-McCracken. 1998. Participation and Social

Assessment, Tools and Techniques, World Bank.

NATO. Press Conference Report, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. 2004

New York Times, Reuters: April 4, 2005. Afghanistan Seeks to Become Master of Its
Own Aid.

NSP, 1383:Project Document for National Solidarity Program, Livelihoods and Social
Protection Program, 1383, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NSP, 2003: National Solidarity Program Operations Manual, March 1, 2003

NSP, 2005/1: National Solidarity Programme (NSP) After 2006: A Proposal for an Exit
Strategy for the Oversight Consultant, Working Draft, May 2005

NSP, 2005/2: results of the NSP CDC conference, Kabul, 2005. To be published in up-
coming NSP report.

Olcott, Martha and Marina Ottaway. 2002. “Afghanistan and Beyond: The Challenges of
Reconstruction.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.
[http://www.ceip.org/files/events/events.asp?EventID=442].

Ottaway, Marina and Anatol Lieven. 2002. “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus
Reality.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
[www.ceip.org.pubs]. May 2004.

Pain, Adam. 2004. ‘Understanding Village Institutions: Case Studies on Water

Management from Faryab and Saripul’. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU).

Pretty, Jules N. et al, 1995. Participatory Learning and Action: a Trainer’s Guide. International
Institute for Environment and Development, London

Barnett, Rubin. (no date) “Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security”. Social Science
Research Council. [www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/mills.htm]

Rubin, Barnett. 2000. “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan.” World
Development, 28 (10): 1795-1796.

35
Rubin, Barnett, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard, 2003. “Through the Fog of
Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.” Center on International
Cooperation, New York University, New York. .

Rubin, Barnett. 2002. “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse
in the International System”. Yale University Press.

Sedra, Mark, and Peter Middlebrook. 2004. “Afghanistan, the Problematic Path to Peace:
Lessons in State Building in Post September 11th Era”, Foreign Policy in Focus.
[http://www.fpif.org/indices/topics/terrorism/index.php]. May 2004.

Sedra, Mark. 2002. “Afghanistan: It Is Time for a Change in the Nation-Building

Strategy.” Global Affairs Commentary, Foreign Policy in Focus.
[http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/OUS0211afghanistan.pdf]. May 2004.

Suhrke, Astri; Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne Strand. 2004. Conflictual
Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn. Prepared for the Norweign Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Thomas, Jane. 1990. “Afghanistan, a Forgotten War, An Overview for Canadians.

Human Concern International, Ottawa”.

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. 2002. “National Development Framework”,

Kabul. [http://www.af.]. May 2004.

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. 2004. “Afghanistan’s National Priority

Programs – An Overview”. Kabul. [http://www.af.]. May 2004.

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. 2004. “Securing Afghanistan’s Future,” Kabul.

[http://www.af.]. May 2004.

United States Institute of Peace. 2003. “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: Warlordism,

Reconstruction and Ethnic Harmony.” Special Report 105. [http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/sr105.html]. May 2004.

William Durch, 2003. Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and
Force Options. Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.

World Bank. 2004. “Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in Afghanistan.”

(DRAFT).

Zakhilwal, Omar 2001. “The Afghan Economy, Past, Present and Future”, Institute for
Afghan Studies. [www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org]. May 2004.

Zakhilwal, Omar. 2002. “Reconstructing Peace in Afghanistan.” Human Rights Tribune,

8 (3). [http://www.hri.ca/tribune/viewArticle.asp?ID=2642]. May 2004. .

36
Zakhilwal, Omar. 2004 Extending Governance Structures Beyond Kabul: Progress and
Potential, Memo.

Zakhilwal, Omar. 2005 State Building in Afghanistan, a Civil Society Approach. Feature
Service Article. CIPE, Washington DC.

37