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13 (2006) 175-184
There is so much darkness in the people of this land. Can it be that the light is too hard
for them, forcing each to retreat into himself? (88).1
ABSTRACT
The quote above, ostensibly from the pen of Estienne Barbier, the central narrator
and focalizer in André Brink’s 1993 novel On the Contrary, raises numerous questions
concerning South African identity. Who does Barbier, a Frenchman newly arrived at
the Cape Colony of the eighteenth century, regard as “the people of this land”? Why
does he see a problematic “darkness” in these people and what is the significance
of Barbier’s accreditation of the land with possession of its people (if “of” is read as
a possessive) when it is usually the other way around? Questions like these, which
pertain to the nature of and criteria for national identity, have burgeoned ever since
the franchise was secured for all citizens of South Africa in 1994.
are, in this case, marked not only by dispossession from place but dispossession
from power.3
In both cases, however, the concept of “memory” transcends that of the individual
and serves to legitimize the experiences and stories of groups that have functioned
as objects, never as subjects, in the official records of any country’s history. The con-
cept of “memory” that joins the concept of “diaspora” in this consideration is hereby
transformed into a politics of memory that sets itself up as the alternative to official
discourses of history. The flexible arrangement of memory allows it to work outside
the dominant discourse and use the discourse of the imagination, of stories, of mem-
ories and of the possible. It is this sense of “memories” as “unofficial histories” that
I will be engaging in my investigation of the imaginative reconstructions of South African
national identity evident in Brink’s novel.
into a communal identity, which seeks to maintain pretence at continuity, alters and
hybridizes that social makeup. At the same time, power relations complicate the process
of regaining cohesion, because the experience of displacement or dispossession is
always accompanied by the experience of disempowerment. Brink’s novel suggests
that it is the very nature of fictional accounts, that do not pretend to truthfulness, that
equips them to take on the role of a country’s biography that can re-establish the con-
tinuity of its discourse and exorcise the negative effects of a past which, unresolved,
is doomed to repeat itself. It is for this reason that the medium of “memory” as an
unofficial and flexible medium that opposes the dominant discourse is useful, since
it allows for an identity that is uninterrupted because it allows for change in experi-
ence. The narratives of memory can function as the story, or history, of a dispossessed
community and, in this sense, it can replace the dominant narrative that fails to describe
the experience of those that it disempowers. In this way narrative plays a central role
in (subconsciously) sustaining a sense of identity and in healing the rift between South
Africa’s past and present perceptions of its national character. Brink’s novel suggests
that such a rift may be repaired by means of the imaginative construction of histories
and memories that may not be strictly truthful but will forge a reality that is bearable
to all the members of its divergent community.
Brink’s narrator demonstrates the usefulness of the flexible nature of memory in
his own recollections. Barbier’s narrative appears, at first, to be too “unreliable” to be
employed in the construction of identity. He continuously fails to tell a consistent story
of how he got to be the way he is in On the Contrary. On narrating his arrival at the
Cape, Barbier variously refers to being welcomed by “No less a luminary than the gov-
ernor, …(because) I was a very important person, having been dispatched as their
personal representative by the Lords Seventeen” (5), and to being “a stowaway, crouch-
ing under the tarpaulin” (62) who was too “sick unto death” (77) even to be “aware of
our arrival in Table Bay” (57). On considering Barbier’s assertion that “only by allow-
ing the possibility of the lie … can (we) grope … towards what really happened, may
yet happen” (27), however, it can be argued that Barbier’s multiplicity of stories can
be read as an attempt to construct different identities for himself in order to help him
cope with the different roles and positions imposed on him by the dominant dis-
course. Because stories are strategies that help humans make sense of their world,
narratives form an important resource for structuring and comprehending experi-
ence. It can therefore be assumed that the study of narrative has a bearing on the
study of the cultural and social framework by which lived experience is interpreted.
The contradictory nature of Barbier’s stories needs explaining. According to Nicola
King, “the construction of the self is a provisional and continuous process,” which
makes it impossible for a single version of one’s life story to contain the truths of all
of one’s various experiences. In telling his life story, Barbier creates an identity perpet-
ually in the process of changing as he invests his experiences with meaning through
This perception of interdependence between people and land could be further devel-
oped to the idea that all identity is relational and that the extent to which one is con-
scious of one’s national identity is dependant on the position one inhabits in relation
to fellow nationals. This idea is not a foreign one to the South African culture. The
acknowledgement of the central implication of the lives of others in the telling of one’s
own life story corresponds to the fundamental African concept of ubuntu.
This concept was used in South Africa at the end of apartheid as a catchword
promising a new definition of South African identity. Ubuntu comes from the Nguni
language and refers to the shared experience of being human. The concept empha-
sizes the fact that an individual exists not by him- or herself but within a community.
Both the Xhosa (“Umuntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu”)8 and Sotho (“Motho ke motho
ka batho”)9 languages have equivalent expressions, which represent the belief
in the fact that ones humanity is caught up in everyone else’s humanity. This negates
the previous need for establishing and exercising dominance over the other because
the need for fixed hierarchies and social positions is usurped by a communal construc-
tion that allows for “diasporic” cross-influencing rather than impositions from above.
In Brink’s novel, narrating Frenchman Barbier eventually demonstrates his identifi-
cation with this concept in his determination to “read” the South African landscape
on its own terms and abandon his previous attempts to think in terms of classifica-
tions and solutions “as such” (351). To this end he endorses the validity of conflict-
ing versions of experience and, in rejecting the idea that the ability to “literally invent
(one)self through what (one chooses) to tell,” in any way helps one to gain “control
over (ones) destiny” (191), leads the reader to realize that the various versions of
his narrative do not hinder the search for the truth but, instead, facilitate it. Such an
endorsement of various versions of the truth is also reflected in the practices of
South Africa’s TRC, which treats “memory” as “history,” in that it allows each partic-
ipant to tell anew what was experienced under the apartheid regime, without placing
the authority of one story over that of the other. In this way, Brink’s work hints that it
is the ability to construct multiple memories that tell a coherent story of our life,
rather than the ability to recall the past as it really was, which constructs a stable and
effectual identity.
By the end of his narrative, Barbier transforms his frustrated yearning for posses-
sion of the South African landscape and dominance of its people into an acceptance of
the intractability of the land. Instead of answering his fear of the vast landscape with
the colonial language of violence, Barbier realizes that this response is inappropriate.
“Our error is not that we deny solutions, or attempt the wrong ones,” he speculates:
Our error is thinking in terms of solutions as such…the colonists are here, these natives
are here, the earth and dust and scrub and light are here. They are not problems to be
solved. They are here, that’s all. (351)
Ashcroft, Bill G. Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, eds. The Hall, Stuart. “Culture, Community, Nation.”
Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post- Cultural Studies. Volume 7 (1993): 349-63.
Colonial Literatures. London: Routledge, 1994.
King, Nicola. Memory, Narrative, Identity:
Attridge, Derek and Rosemary Jolly, eds. Writing Remembering the Self. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
South Africa: Literature, apartheid and democracy, Press, 2000.
1970-1995. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1998.
Krog, Antjie. Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow,
Brink, André. On the Contrary. London: Secker & and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South
Warburg, 1993. Africa. London: Jonathan Cape, 2000.
Chapman, Michael. “The Problem of Identity: South Nuttall, Sarah and Carli Coetzee, eds. Negotiating
Africa, Storytelling, and Literary History.” New the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa.
Literary History. Volume 29, Issue 1 (1998): 85-99. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Gordon, Edmund T. and Mark Anderson. “The Ward, Kerry and Nigel Warden. “Commemorating,
African Diaspora: Towards an Ethnography of Suppressing, and Invoking Cape Slavery.”
Diasporic Identification.” The Journal of American Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in
Folklore. Volume 112, Number 445 (1999): South Africa. 1998, 201-17.
282-96.
Notes
1. All page numbers in this chapter, unless 5. Discussed in Kerry Ward and Nigel Warden’s
stated otherwise, refer to André Brink. On the “Commemorating, suppressing, and invoking
Contrary. London: Secker & Warburg, 1993. Cape slavery” in Sarah Nuttal and Carli Coetzee
201-17.
2. For an historical overview of the various
transformations that the term “African Diaspora” 6. The term “Guguletu Seven” refers to the
underwent from the nineteen fifties onwards, see group of seven young men who were shot and
Edmund T. Gordon and Mark Anderson’s 1999 killed by South African policemen on 3 March
article in The Journal of American Folklore. 1986 in the township of Guguletu, near Cape
Volume 112, Number 445: 282-96. Town. Two subsequent inquests cleared the
police of all responsibility for their deaths. The
3. Although dispossession from one’s home names of the Guguletu Seven were: Zandisile
community and resettlement in a “foreign” Zenith Mjobo, Zola Alfred Swelani, Mandla Simon
location most definitely did occur under the Mxinwa, Godfrey Jabulani Miya, Themba Mlifi,
apartheid regime and its diasporic effects should Zabonke John Konile and Christopher Piet.
not be underestimated, struggles against
apartheid naturally focused first and foremost on 7. The interim constitution was drawn up in
the question of political franchise rather than on 1993 and the final constitution in 1996.
resettlement in original communities.
8. “a person is a person through other
4. Attridge and Jolly’s Writing South Africa makes persons.”
mention of this in their introduction, as does
Nuttall and Coetzee’s Negotiating the Past (both 9. “a human being is a human being with, by
published in 1998). and for other human beings.”