World Terrorism and Separatism in the Philippines

∗
Rizal G. Buendia

Introduction and Context

The aftermath of the 11 September 2001 simultaneous suicide

attacks on the United States’ twin towers of the World Trade Center
in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania
(the plane crashed before hitting its target) were viewed with mixed
reactions. Many condemned the shocking, horrifying, and
indiscriminate killing and maiming of thousands of innocent men,
women and children (cutting across about 80 nationalities). Some
rejoiced and supported the assault as a legitimate response to US
veiled backing of Israel’s policy against Palestine’s self-
determination struggle and military actions taken against known
Islamic states with strong anti-US stance (Iran, Iraq, and Libya
among others). Others saw it as an open challenge to America’s
hegemony, a retribution for its historical role in sanctioning
authoritarian regimes in countries that protect US economic and
political interests as well as in leading the path towards a global
free-market system that sharpened inequities amongst peoples and
widened the gap between rich and poor countries. This is apart from
those who think that it was simply a fulfillment of one of
Nostradamus’ (1503-1566) prophecies.1

Given varied standpoints and interpretations on such tragic event

and regardless of motives, it was generally seen as a “terrorist” act.
A day after, on 12 September, the United Nations’ Security Council
issued Resolution 1368 that condemns the attack and considered it
as an “act of international terrorism, a threat to international peace
and security.” Further, it stipulates that:

… all States to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators,

organizers, and sponsors of terrorist attacks and stresses that those
responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.
[And] expresses its [Security Council] readiness to take all
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September
2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations. ( italic from
the original).


Associate Professor, Political Science Department, De La Salle University-Manila.

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Thereafter, on 20 September, US President George W. Bush
addressed the Joint Session of the US Congress and identified
Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)-born
billionaire, as the prime suspect, recognized leader and financier of
Al-Qaeda, a collection of loosely-organized Islamic extremist groups,
behind the despicable strike. Bush cited “evidences” gathered by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that established the
linkage of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with other organizations and
“terrorists in more than 60 countries.” They are allegedly “brought
to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the
tactics of terror to plot evil and destruction” in their home country
as well as other countries of the world. Moreover, he insisted that
“every nation in every region” must decide: “either you are with us
(the United States) or you are with terrorists.” (Bush 2001).

On a similar vein, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo went

along Bush’s flawed logic when she made the same pronouncement
in February 2002, after her official visit to the US. This was
specifically intended to rally the people against the homegrown
Muslim extremist group, Abu Sayyaf, and counter opposition against
the conduct of joint US-RP military exercise (dubbed as Balikatan
[Shoulder-to-Shoulder] 02-1) in close proximity to Abu Sayyaf’s lairs.
Filipino “nationalists” believe that the exercise is a flimsy
justification in allowing foreign military forces to intervene into
Philippine domestic affairs, a conflict considered purely local, hence
conceived as an affront to Philippine sovereignty. While on one hand
both Bush and Arroyo oversimplified the complex issue by drawing
the line between “we” (anti-terrorists) and “them” (pro-terrorists),
when the more significant question is, “why such group emerged?”
the so-called “nationalists,” on the other hand, reduced it between
“us” and “they” when the query should be, “is it solely nation’s
affair?”

In the most recent development following US retaliation against its

perceived non-state enemy (Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda network) and
Afghanistan’s Taliban government (US’s former ally against Russian
invasion in late 1980s), accused of coddling the terrorists, the US
has only proven its military capability to suppress and demobilize its
adversaries, and perhaps those in the future. However, such military
might is neither an indication that the sole superpower of the world
was able to extirpate the roots of terrorism, nor a manifestation
that terrorist activities would be a less attractive option for people
who believe that their fundamental rights are restrained by world’s
current order.

In fact, US intensive bombings of known burrows and training camps

of Al Qaedas did not boost America’s confidence but reinforced its
own fear, short of being paranoid. Bush admitted in his State of the
Union Address on 29 January 2002 that his budget for the military –

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nearly $400 billion – is the “largest increase in defense spending in
two decades.” (Bush 2002). The amount is half of military spending
in the world! Ironically, America’s insecurity has swelled at the time
when its military power has become overwhelming.

As the chain of events unfold, the world is witnessing not the “clash
of civilization” as Huntington (1966) predicted or what Bush tried to
project as “civilization’s fight” for “pluralism, tolerance and
freedom,” (Bush 2001) but the re-emergence of “Cold War,”
perhaps colder than before, with terrorism replacing “communism.”
As a former colony and loyal ally of the US, the Philippines has
unequivocally placed its stake in the fight against terrorism in spite
of meager defense budget. However, this is to be fought in a
completely different political setting, context, and environment
responding to distinct causes and achieving purposes serving
interests on its own.

Against this backdrop, the paper attempts the explore the

significant issues, concerns, and questions behind the phenomena
of rising terrorist movements in the world as they interface with sub-
national, especially Islamic, groups seeking for an independent state
in the Philippines. Given the limitation of space, the exposition is not
aimed at resolving the complex and profound problem behind
world’s terrorism and separatism in the Philippines. Instead, this is
meant to contribute to the body of literature in comprehending and
understanding the dynamics of terrorism and it relates to the
continuing concern of the country in maintaining political stability
and legitimacy in the face of unabated struggle of Muslims for self-
determination.

A Question of Definition

“Terrorism” is a term that has yet to be defined. The broad and

divergent interpretations on what constitutes a terrorist act continue
to baffle social scientist And to date, no consensus has been arrived
at on the precise meaning of terrorism. As Jonathan White’s
Terrorism: An Introduction (1991) revealed, terrorism has a multiple
of definitions classified according to type:

• Simple - Violence or threatened violence intended to produce

fear or change.
• Legal - Criminal violence violating legal codes and punishable
by the state.
• Analytical - Specific political and social factors behind
individual terrorist acts.
• State-sponsored - Terrorist groups used by small states and
the Communist bloc to
attack western interests.

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 • State - Power of the government used to terrorize its people
into submission

In a survey of 100 scholars who defined “terrorism,” Alex Schmid’s

Political Terrorism (1983) concluded that it is an abstract and highly
subjective concept whose content and substance is dependent on
the view-and standpoint of a victim or target of a terrorist act. On
the part of a terrorist, Bruce Hoffman disclosed that he/she is
prepared to use and committed to employ force in the attainment of
his/her goals. Terrorists believe their cause to be altruistic and
serving for the betterment of society. (1998: 43). Moreover, in
letters hand-written in Arabic left behind by suicide hijackers in the
11 September 2001 tragedy, investigators analyzed that terrorists
see themselves as “fighting alongside their ancestors who
deliberately embrace death” as a consequence of their heroic act –
martyrdom in battle.2 For the Islamist terrorists, to kill (“slaughter”)
and be killed in battle brings one closer to Allah, a radical
interpretation of Jihad (“Holy War”) as ordered by the Prophet,
Mohammad. (Paz 2001, see also http://www.ict.org.il).

In the United States Code (2000), terrorism is defined in Section

2656f(d), Chapter 38 (Department of State), Title 22 (Foreign
Relations and Intercourse) as:

• Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated

against noncombatant3 targets subnational groups or
clandestine agents;
• “International terrorism” refers to terrorism involving citizens
or the territory of more than one country; and
• “Terrorist group” is any group practicing, or which has
significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

As far as the U.S. government is concerned, attacks on military

installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military
hostilities does not exist at the site such as bombings against US
bases in any part of the globe is an act of terrorism. For analytical
and statistical reasons, the government has utilized the aforecited
definition since 1983. (US Department of State 2000: 7).

The absence of a precise definition of terrorism that gained

universal acceptance makes it difficult to distinguish the difference
between a violent act victimizing civilians and noncombatants
directly conducted by the state and/or its instrumentalities against
its own people on one hand, and violence instigated by a non-state
and sub-national group affecting same group of people on the other
hand; between legitimate self-determination struggles and assertion
of state’s sovereign right; between violence brought about by
iniquitous socio-economic and political structures and violence that

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brings about instantaneous deaths and destruction to properties.
How different is the death of about 4,000 innocent people from the
World Trade Center in 11 September from more than 500,000
suspected communists who died during American-supported
Suharto’s regime in Indonesia in 1965? From 200,000 civilian
casualties in East Timor’s campaign for self-determination? From
10,000 noncombatant Acehnese killed by Indonesian military since
1976? From roughly 60,000 Muslims slaughtered at the height of
Marcos’ campaign against the separatist movement in early to mid-
1970s? How about hundreds of thousands of civilians who lost their
lives in America’s bombs in Vietnam, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan
among others? Or from 40,000 children who die everyday in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America due to poverty, malnutrition, and disease
because of state’s apathy, corruption, and poor governance? Are
these not acts of terrorism too?

How about acts of non-state actors, like multinational corporations

whereby 360 of them account for 40 per cent of world’s trade and
whose business operations have polluted the environment and
thrown indigenous peoples from their traditional homelands in the
interest of “development”? And how about the effects of globalizing
economy that perpetuated the yawning gap between rich and poor
where 358 dollar billionaires have as much wealth as the poorest 49
per cent of the world’s population estimated to be six billion people,
20 per cent of them (1.2 billion) are living in less than US$1 a day?
Are these horrifying conditions of world’s population different from
the sufferings of people who died from hijackings, bombings, gas
attacks, and bullets of terrorists?

The ambiguity in the term makes it hard to delineate the line that
separates a terrorist act from an act that advances lawful dissent
within the purview of defending democratic socio-economic, political
and cultural rights. The Peoples’ Republic of China and Russian
Federation, for instance, rode the crest of US anti-terrorist campaign
by justifying their military policies against separatist and
independence groups in Xinjiang Uighur and Chechnya. This
prompted US National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice to state in
late 2001 (prior to APEC’s [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]
meeting), that “President Bush intends to tell the leaders of Russia,
the Peoples’ Republic of China, and other Asian nations that he
supports their anti-terrorism effort at home but they must draw a
line between legitimate dissent and genuine terrorism and not
trample human rights.” (Sakamoto 2002: 3). However, when the
Arabs proposed in the United Nations to exclude national
determination and liberation movements from the concept of
terrorism, US and its Western European allies opposed it. (Sakamoto
2002: 4). Consequently, it stalled the sealing of a new anti-terrorist
treaty.

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In another case, the haziness of the term strained the long and
close relationship between the United States and Israel as the
former launched its diplomatic offensive to rally the world in its anti-
terrorist posture at the expense of the latter. Israel was infuriated
when Bush announced in October 2001 that US was not against the
creation of a Palestinian state in Israel’s occupied territories
inhabited by Palestine Arabs – West Bank and Gaza strip. Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon retorted that Israel’s policy against Palestinian
terrorists was no different from US’s against Afghan and Al-Qaeda
terrorists, insinuating US’s repressive and military approach against
self-determination struggles.

Obviously, the debate on the definition of terrorism and what

constitutes a terrorist act rages not only between states (both
contending and allied) and political forces but also among social
scientists. The arguable issue on the concept includes also activities
that are to be judged as either anti-state terrorism or state-
sponsored terrorism. Given its ambiguity, it is sufficient to avow at
this point that terrorism and anti-terrorism have to be defined in
terms of specific political contexts.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, Bruce Hoffman’s (1998)

definition is chosen to distinguish terrorists from other types of
criminals and terrorism from other forms of crime. In Hoffman’s
mind, terrorism is:

• Ineluctably political in aims and motives;

• Violent or threatens violence;
• Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the immediate victim of target;
• Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members
wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and
• Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.

While acceding that Hoffman’s definition is still debatable, it

nevertheless approximates the current context and perspective of
terrorism given the present situation and problem.

The Changing World and the Rise of Ethno-political and –

religious Terrorism

The end of the Cold War and greater integration of world’s economy
under the baton of neo-classical liberalism saw the relative decline
of what was traditionally considered as “ideological” terrorism that
gained prominence in 1968.4 The disintegration of USSR (Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics) and fall of totalitarian states in Eastern
Europe placed anti-capitalist, Marxist-oriented, and communist-

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motivated political terrorist organizations into quandary apart from
diminishing support and sympathy of the people on their cause.
Francis Fukuyama (1989) assessed the phenomenon as the “end of
history” signifying the triumph of liberal democracy over
authoritarianism.

Although some left-leaning organizations manage to survive the

ideological battle like the Italian Red Brigades and Anti-Imperialist
Territorial Nuclei, Japanese Red Army, Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero
Luminoso or SL) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA),
Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C),
Greece’s 17th November, and Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), among
others, these terrorists groups have been overshadowed by
religious, ethnic, or right-wing groups which are increasingly
motivated by campaigns of ethnic nationalism or religious
extremism. Oftentimes, these drives go together such as the
aspirations of fundamentalist Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which
seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt and Sikh militants for an
independent state of Khalistan. And terrorism has intermingled with
other political violence, as in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Chechnya.

The “depolarization” and democratization of the world in late 1980s

unfolded the deeply-rooted contradictions in society restrained and
suppressed by almost 50 years of authoritarian regimes and highly
centralized governance. Thomas Franck (1992: 46-91) views the
momentous developments stimulated and reinforced the
recognition of a right to democratic governance in international law.

In spite of the positive gains derived from the democratization of

state’s institutions and economic liberalization, it also shrunk the
social space where perceived new opportunities have produced a
narrower social base. The complex impacts brought about by
modernization effectively created new vulnerabilities and new
responses that fed into the rise of ethnic consciousness and new
ethnic assertions. The seeming economic growth with real spatial
shrinkage resulted in social conflicts between the “majority” and
“minority” peoples as they compete for scarce resources and
benefits. As Kothari says:

Developmentalism, as economism, has become a source of new

economic vulnerabilities, and new inequalities. In multi-ethnic
societies, where overlap has existed between religious and regional
identities and economic functions, issues of economic insecurity
and contradictions are very conveniently transformed by the elite
into issues of ethnic, caste and religious issues (1989:36).

Ted Gurr (1993: 123-138) adds that “global processes” involving the
growth of global economy and communications revolution enhance

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and facilitate the intensification of violence. The contagion of
conflict, moreover, is diffused when communal groups straddle
inter-state boundaries that consequently drag another state into the
conflict.

The sharpened conflicts was not between classes, as the Marxists

expected, but between ethnic groupings, i.e., one who holds political
and economic power on one hand, and those marginalized who
aspire to redeem their lost power, on the other hand. These are
reactions against the centralism of the state which tries to
homogenize the entire poly-ethnic society under a single dominant
culture held by the power-wielders in order to effectively respond to
the imperatives of world capitalism:

Ethnicity is a response – including reaction – to the excesses of the

modern project of shaping the whole humanity (and its natural
resource base), around the three pivots of world capitalism, the
State system and a ‘world culture’ based on modern technology, a
pervasive communications and information order and a
‘universalizing’ educational system. The project of modernity
entails a new mode of homogenizing and of straightjacketing the
whole world (Kothari 1989:16).

Hence, the homogenizing thrusts of capitalism, the nation-state, and

technology are endeavors to assimilate, culturally unify, and
integrate diverse social formations into a global marketplace under
the secular authority of the State. However, the process of
democratization where people are empowered or being empowered
either by the society’s institutions or sheer and conscious as well as
organized efforts to empower themselves emboldened political
movements to challenge the current political structures and
institutions of existing nation-state in particular and world’s liberal
market economy in general.

Viewed from a broader perspective, the vicissitudes on the practice

of democracy transpiring in the world today hinge on the evolving
configuration of political development. Whatever form it takes and
course it traverses, political development remains to affect and alter
society’s structure. A change that is either incremental or
dialectical, producing development or regression (decay), besides
periods of stagnation. When it happens in and to society, it is
subject to the principle of congruence.

The surge of “sub-nationalism” (Surendra 1989: 278) which has

taken kaleidoscopic forms – religious, cultural, secessionist,
irredentist, or even diasporic – in almost all states of the world is
generally hinged on the principle of “self-determination.” Often,
secessionist movements are further fueled when the state
institutionalizes policies of ethnocide, thus threatening the
continued survival of their identity and ethnic rights to determine
their own future as defined by their religion, culture, institutions,

8
and systems. In other words, when compromises between central
and indigenous systems of governance become unfeasible,
separatist movements arise. Only in such situation do:

More often than not, the use of force is utilized, i.e., acts of
revolutionary violence, to express rejection of the prevailing
political and social system and the determination to bring about
progressive changes by overthrowing the system (Lim and Vani
1985:32).

As Gurr observes, rebellion and violent protests have increased

almost fourfold (up to 360% from 1950-55 to 1985-89) with the
indigenous peoples and ethnonationalists experiencing the greatest
proportional increase in conflict magnitudes globally. (1993: 89-
122). Furthermore, in his 1994 study of 50 conflicts all over the
world, Gurr concludes that half followed as a result of power
transitions, with nine (9) that began within five (5) years after the
establishment of the state and 11 within three (3) years of
revolutionary seizures of power (including coups). While power-
transition conflicts declined after 1987, ethno-political conflicts in
post-1987 period were more intense. Ten power transition conflicts
after 1987 were responsible for twice as many deaths and refugees
as the 13 others. (See Table 1). On the other hand, Table 2 shows
that half of 50 conflicts started under autocratic regimes followed by
transitional regimes at 17 against eight (8) in democratic regimes,
confirming the causal relationship between democracy and ethnic
conflict. It is to be noted, moreover, that one-third of all serious
ethno-political conflicts started in transitional regimes.

Table 1. Conflicts Following Shifts in Political

Power
Number of Began Began
Issues Conflicts and Before After
Mean Magnitude 1987 1987
N and % 50 54% 46%
All Ethno-political Conflicts
Magnitude 2.85 2.59

Began Within 5 Years of N and % 9 44% 56%

Establishment of New State Magnitude 4.09 3.23

Began Within 3 Years of N and % 11 64% 36%

Revolutionary Power Shift Magnitude 2.08 3.66
N and % 25 60% 40%
Began Following any Power Shift
Magnitude 2.79 3.28
N and % 25 48% 52%
None
Magnitude 2.92 2.05

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 Source: Ted Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the
Changing World System,” Commentary (Issue 50), Canadian Security Intelligence
Service, Ottawa, Ontario.

Table 2. Conflicts by Type of Political Regime at

Their Onset

Number of Began Began

Issues Conflicts and Mean Before After
Magnitude 1987 1987
N and % 50 54% 46%
All Ethno-political Conflicts
Magnitude 2.85 2.59
N and % 25 64% 36%
Autocratic Regimes
Magnitude 3.43 2.91
N and % 8 63% 37%
Democratic Regimes
Magnitude 2.44 1.30
N and % 17 35% 65%
Transitional Regimes
Magnitude 1.67 2.67
Source: Ted Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the
Changing World System,” Commentary (Issue 50), Canadian Security Intelligence
Service, Ottawa, Ontario.

Apparently, the advancement of democracy and globalization

consequently created a structure of inequity and discrimination both
at the domestic and transnational levels. By the end of the 20th
century, irresistible interdependence was a leitmotif of every
political, economic, ecological, and technological event. Information
technology renders national boundaries increasingly meaningless
and Internet defies national regulation. As information is generated
and disseminated all over the world through cable and at a click of a
mouse, disadvantaged people become progressively more aware of
global inequities and inequalities. Thus, a growing number of the
marginalized sectors harbor resentment and bitterness as they
hear, read, and see before their eyes the affluence of the few. This
heightened ethnic and racial consciousness. As viewed by Sakamoto
(2002:8), America’s “global standard” has not only driven the
wedge further apart between rich and poor but also “eroded the
‘freedom to disagree’ with America in defense of one’s cultural
values.”

Far from being extinguished and melted down, ethnic identities

have ossified much to the chagrin of liberal and socialist scholars
alike who predicted that ethnic, racial, religious, and national ties

10
would gradually wither away as the world becomes increasingly
unified through the rising centrality of the state, international trade,
and mass communications. (Lijphart 1977: 48; Premdas et.al. 1990:
18). Ethnic identities, rather than dissolved have ossified and
persisted over class solidarity. Neither did ethnic loyalties concede
to the “greater” interest of the nation nor yield to the market forces.
What have withered away are the conditions under which diverse
identities can together share a social space.

Unsurprisingly, under a post-industrial and post-print age, groups

and nationalities organize themselves across geographical
boundaries, bringing diaspora together and fusing issue-oriented
groups and religions through the course of globalization. Ethnic
nationalism, separatism, and irredentism continue to be the
significant motivational factor in a number of terrorism campaigns.
Some of these have been long-standing like the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) in
Kashmir, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, and
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Palestine among others
while some are quite recent such as the Uighers in China, Chechens
in Russia, and Pattanis in Thailand.

Aside from ethno-nationalists, the emergence of religious extremist

groups is another outcome of the shrinking and integrating world.
This does not refer only to Muslim but Christian groups as well.
While on one hand, Islamic movements have provided Muslims with
a strong sense of identity that enabled them to resist the
indiscriminate cultural globalization promoted by the West and
opposed both Western corporate expansionism and US military
hegemony, Christian religious radicals like the Aryan Nations and
Militia Movement in North America and Jewish Defense League in
Israel and the Occupied Territories have afforded Christians and
Jews respectively a sense of “oneness” to redeem their “greatness
and glory” on the other hand. Unlike the ethno-nationalists who
aspire to re-create their homeland and establish a nation-state
within the geographical territory of an internationally recognized
sovereign state, militant Islamists, Christians, or Jews neither
envision to re-construct a nation-state of their own nor owe
allegiance to a particular homeland.

In the case of Islamic fundamentalists, they are devoted to Islam,

committed to Jihad (“Holy War”) and profoundly motivated to “free
the world from infidels.” Their souls yearn for the day where the
“other world” would reward their “sacrifices and heroism” in an
everlasting paradise. Their so-called fanaticism and zeal have their
own reasons that liberal rational thought or conceived market
interest will not succeed in fathoming.

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Although Muslim terrorists are divided between Sunni (Sunnite) and
Shi’a (Shi’ite or Shiite) sects5 – the schism does not deter them to
collaborate in certain activities. By and large, their difference also
follows their mode of carrying out their functions. The Sunnis
undertake their operations alone without any loyalty to any Muslim
organization. This makes it more difficult for anti-terrorist groups to
trace and identify them. On the other hand, Shi’as pursue their
goals in a more structured and collective manner. (CSIS 1999).

Without ignoring the dangers pose by Christian terrorists, Muslim

extremists are currently regarded as major threat not only to state’s
legitimacy but also world’s stability in terms of religious terrorism.
They are often Mujahideens (religious fighters) who have combat
experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. They are
educated in handling weapons, explosives, and communication
equipments and know the importance of the Internet, fax machines,
cellular telephones, and encryption. A computer literate terrorist can
alter computer files and change dates of airline tickets, hotels, etc.
Their ability to maintain a global network of small and self-sufficient
cells, whose members are blood-related or know each other
personally, which parallels digital global integration, makes it easy
for them to permeate geographic boundaries and state
sovereignties. All of which make tracking, infiltrating, and
countering them extremely difficult. Furthermore, access to
weapons and methods of increasing lethality, or methods targeting
digital information systems that attract wildly disproportionate
effects and publicity, will allow terrorists to be seen as “non-
affiliated” with larger, better financed subversive organizations or
state sponsors.

Inasmuch as globalism is a phenomenon that would be hard to

restrain as more states increasingly integrate their economies under
the framework of free market system, it also becomes inevitable
that countries with significant number of Muslim communities be
affected by the growing trend of Islamic extremism whose terrorist
attacks have ever more lethal over recent years. The Philippines for
one has about five million Muslims in southern Mindanao whose
quest for self-determination remains to be a continuing concern of
the government. Given the predicament of the country, it becomes
an inescapable task to join the world, as part of the community of
nations, not only in mitigating the effects of terrorism but also in
designing proactive policies that would extirpate the roots of
domestic terrorism. However, this can only be done after
comprehending the cause of Muslim separatism in the country. It is
in this light that the following section of the paper will be treated, in
spite of limited space.

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The Case of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines: A
Question of Nationality or Perception

The Moro national question has been a continuing concern of the

Philippines. The successful conclusion of the 1996 GRP-MNLF
(Government of the Republic of the Philippines-Moro National
Liberation Front) Peace Agreement under former President Fidel V.
Ramos was no guarantee of sustained peace simply because that
MNLF does not authoritatively hold as the sole spokesperson or
legitimate representative of 13 ethno-linguistic groups of Muslims in
the Philippines, not even representing three (3) major ethnic groups
(Tausug-Samal, Maguindanao, and Maranao), to say the least,6
despite OIC’s (Organization of Islamic Conference) acknowledgment.
The Muslims of southern Philippines remain to be deeply divided
along ethnic lines with their respective identities, histories,
languages, values, and world-views. Their parochialism and
primordial interests persisted, to a significant degree, attributable to
state’s overall failure in penetrating and affecting their socio-
economic, political, and cultural domains leading towards de-linking
their lives from the Philippine polity.

Contrary to the belief of many, including reputed scholars, (Phelan

1959; Majul 1973; Jocano 1975; George 1980; Gowing and McAmis
1979; Gowing 1979; Molloy 1988; Bauzon 1991; Che Man 1990; Tan
1993, among others), Moro identity or sense of “oneness” was not
shaped as a consequence of their historical struggles against
Spanish and American colonialism’s proselytization. Although Islam
was conceded as the overarching symbol of unity, Islamic
consciousness was neither deeply ingrained into the minds and
hearts of the people nor they were able to transcend their ethnic
loyalties in favor of a higher stature of unity – Islam. Though it may
be assumed that Islamic rhetoric and appeals were made to arouse,
mobilize, and organize opposition to Spanish colonization in
Mindanao and Sulu sultanates, there is meager historical proof to
link that resistance movements against aggressive Christianization
precipitated heightened Islamic consciousness and identity or
evidenced of a strong sense of “Moro-ness” among the Muslim
populace. (Buendia 2001; McKenna 1998; Warren 1981; Ileto 1971).
Contemporary Muslim nationalists and leaders of separatist
movements, supported by some historians and political analysts,
have clung to the myth of “Morohood” and uncritically accepted the
existence of distinctive Islamic culture and consolidated Moro
history for reasons of their own.

The difficulty among Muslim ethno-linguistic groups to come

together and unite into a single political force with definitive
strategic program for a self-ruling government is a concrete
manifestation that the Bangsa Moro7 (Moro Nation) is an imagined

13
community that is yet to be realized. Aside from the MNLF,
dominated by Muslim Tausug-Samal, and MILF (Moro Islamic
Liberation Front), predominantly Maguindanaoan Muslims, other
Muslim ethno-linguistic groups have not historically and seriously
challenged the legitimacy of the Philippine state. The terrorist Abu
Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword) Group or ASG, another Tausug-Samal
controlled armed organization that gained world’s recognition for its
notoriety in kidnapping foreign and local non-combatant nationals
for ransom as well as beheadings, both Muslims and Christians, had
not only embarrassed the Philippine government before the
international community but also drove the wedge further apart
between itself and Muslim masses on hand and the Moro
revolutionary organizations on the other hand. ASG’s activities and
extremist tendencies have offended the sensibilities of Christians
and Muslims alike who believe that even wars should be fought
“humanely and honorably” where civilians should be spared from
armed conflict between protagonists. In other words, the unification
of the Muslims of southern Philippines is far from being pulled off. It
has been saddled by internal centrifugal forces brought about by
differing ethnic loyalties, political agenda and interests, and modes
of achieving their objectives as one people and one Bangsa.

Despite the disunity among Muslims and inchoate concept of a

Bangsa Moro, the collective feeling and sentiment of the Moro
people as a separate people from the Filipinos have been
unrelenting. The perception of discrimination and alienation from
the Filipino people has not completely expired. The question
whether such perception of prejudice and feeling of estrangement
from the Christianized majority rest on valid grounds or not cannot
and will not be ascertained in this paper. What is certain, though, is
the emotional attachment that has wrapped the complexities of the
majority-minority relation in the country.

The country’s experiment on regional self-governance through the

creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the
Philippine unitary state for the past decade has not resulted in
meaningful self-rule among the Muslims as envisioned. Neither the
experience with the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD) nor programs and projects conceived and
implemented within the last few years under the said Council
contributed in substantial alleviation of peoples’ economic and
social development.

Even though Nur Misuari was unable to uplift the dire socio-
economic condition and political marginalization of Filipino-Muslims
during his five-year reign as ARMM Governor and SPCPD
Chairperson, he cannot be fully blamed for his inadequate
administrative skills and failure to check corruption and nepotism in
ARMM’s offices. Besides, graft and corruption is a plaguing problem

14
that had characterized not only ARMM but also the entire Philippine
bureaucracy since the country’s independence in 1946. Admittedly,
it is nearly impossible for Misuari to extirpate the deep and age-long
radix of Muslim socio-economic and political deprivation given the
limited time and under a political environment of structural
constraints.

In fact, the national government cannot be absolved from the

responsibility of a feeble regional government. Under a unitary
governmental set-up where powers of central government are
upheld over those of sub-national governmental levels, the fullest
commitment and actual rendition of administrative assistance,
technical aids, and financial support to ARMM are vital requisites for
political autonomy to materialize. Unfortunately, national assistance
was far from sufficient to fully answer the needs and demands of
Muslim empowerment and development. Corollary, Misuari’s
management style and absentee leadership in the region
contributed not only to the dismal performance of ARMM but also to
the frustrations and disappointments of his fellow Muslims.

Moreover, Misuari’s subsequent ouster as MNLF Chairperson by the

“Council of 15” in April 2001 and replacement as ARMM Governor
and SPCPD Chairperson by Dr. Parouk Hussin after the 26 November
2001 regional election sharpened the conflict between and among
Muslims. On that instance, the national government acted neither as
an arbiter in resolving conflict nor a disinterested party in the
contestation for regional power. It effectively used its power and
influence, presumably within allowable limits, to support the
candidature of Hussin and ditched Misuari (both Muslim-Tausug).
This was a clear manifestation of the government’s intervention into
the intra-ethnic discord rather than allowed the indigenous
mechanism of conflict resolution to operate in settling their political
differences.

Similarly, the filing of corruption and malversation of public fund

charges against Misuari and his subsequent incarceration in
Philippine jail after Malaysia facilitated his deportation was
interpreted by his supporters as a form of ethnic persecution and
not a legitimate case of breach public trust or treason. Misuari’s
renewed call for secession and subsequent hostage-taking of both
Muslim and Christian civilians in Sulu staged by Misuari’s followers,
largely MNLF integrees, only denoted two things. One, government’s
mishandling of inter-and intra-ethnic relation among Muslims and
two, unwavering general belief among Moros, despite their
differences, that they are a separate people, viewed as inferior, and
would never be able to gain appropriate respect and equal
treatment from by the Christianized majority people under the
current politico-administrative set-up of governance. These two
crucial factors, among others, made it convenient for any Muslim

15
leader (current or future, traditional or non-traditional) to use ethnic
issues and corresponding symbolisms to arouse, organize, and rally
the people against the state for claims that may neither necessarily
be politically legitimate nor essentially responding to their own
peoples’ interests.

Beyond objective economic and political grievances, the issue of

separatism is basically an issue of subjective feelings, of
perceptions, and of language exploited by leaders (traditional or
non-traditional) whose interests and agenda are not necessarily in
conformity with peoples’ desires, needs, and demands. And when
conflicts escalate, perceptions and languages are distorted within
the warring parties. The distortions are partly spontaneous and
partly organized to rally the people to engage in warfare, bear the
economic burdens, and face the human misery of war. Conceivably,
when war breaks out, truth is its first victim.

Therefore, making the Moros feel that they are part and foremost
stakeholder of the Philippine nation is the ultimate if not the most
challenging task of government.

Conclusion

As the paper argued, terrorism is a subjective concept and nebulous

term that is to be defined on a specific political context. Given its
ambiguity, the contesting forces of terrorism and counter-terrorism
are battles that are most effectively fought in one’s mindset. In spite
of its subjectivity, the rise of terrorism in the post-cold war era was
a product of objective oppressive political and social structures
emanating from homogenizing effects of liberal free market
economy and democratic notions that primarily benefited western
economies. The global dominance of global capital precipitated
global disparity and inequity between the rich and poor countries.
The resurgence of ethno-nationalist and religious extremist
movements asserting ethnic, political, economic, and cultural rights
manifested through terrorism, insurgency, and civil war against the
state and the world are therefore expressions of identities that need
to be recognized if indeed the principles of pluralism and democracy
have to thrive.

The world’s situation is no different in the case of the Philippines.

The country is similarly faced with serious Muslim separatist
movement searching for effective political autonomy within the
unitary set-up. However, far from being a national question, the self-
determination struggle of the Muslims is actually a matter of
perceived alienation from the Philippine nation-state. In other words,
the minorities in general and Muslims in particular have harbored a
profound feeling of segregation and do not consider themselves as

16
part of the Filipino nation as a consequence of state’s historical
flaws in managing majority-minority as well as inter- and intra-
ethnic relations. Thus, the option to secede from the Republic the
final alternative to redeem their traditional right to self-governance
and re-claim social justice that has been long denied is definitely
understandable.

Finally, the paper concludes that world terrorism can be addressed

in the long-term by sustained, organized, and systematic manner of
bringing the world back to the marginalized, destitute, neglected
people. And for the Philippines, it is time for the government to
make the people, especially the minorities, feel that they are part of
the Philippine homeland.

17
1

Endnotes

Few days after the 11 September 2001 attack in the US, e-mails circulated around the world citing
the
inevitability of the horrendous event as predicted by Nostradamus, an ancient astrologer. (see
Edgar Leoni
Nostradamus and his prophecies, 2000 and John Hogue, Nostradamus: the complete prophecies,
2000)
2
For the original copy of the letter as published by the FBI see:
www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/letter.htm
3
Apart from civilians, “noncombatant” includes military personnel who at the time of the
incident are
unarmed or not on duty.
4

In 1968, three (3) members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an
El Al
Boeing 707, en route from Rome to Tel Aviv, and flown to Algiers’ Dar al-Bada Airport. After
lengthy negotiations, 38 passengers and 10 crew as well as the aircraft and hijackers were
eventually released. The incident was widely acknowledged as the beginning of modern
international terrorism.
5
Sunni or Sunnite refers to the orthodox majority of the followers of Islam. The term refers
to the
Traditional Way (sunna) of the prophet Mohammad. While Shi’a or Shi’te or Shiite Muslims reject
the first
three caliphs and recognize Ali (Mohammad’s son-in-law) as the rightful successor of Mohammad.
6

The 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groupings in the Philippines are as follows: Maranao, Maguindanao,
Tausug,Samal, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawani, Molbog, and
Kalagan. Of
these three are major ones occupying identifiable territories: Maranao in Marawi; Maguindanao in
Cotabato; and Tausug-Samal, in Tawi-Tawi and Sulu.
7
The term “bangsa” or “bansa” is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes,
descent groups or
lines, races or estates. Milner (1982: xv) says that the term has a Sanskrit origin. On the contrary,
Dewey
(1962: 231) contends that the term has its Chinese derivation. Nonetheless, the former seems
more
plausible. The composite term “Bangsa Moro,” which sometimes appeared in MNLF and MILF
literature
as well as in a number of scholarly writings refer to it as “Moro Nation.” For the purpose of this
paper,
“Bangsa Moro” shall be used to mean the “Moro Nation” as imagined by Filipino Muslims and
“Bangsamoro” to refer to the “people” inhabiting the territorial jurisdiction of the autonomous
region of
Muslim Mindanao.

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