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Statement Of Work Task Order #A25
Emw-2000-Co-0247
I. PURPOSE:
The purpose of this statement of work (SOW) is to obtain enhanced disaster response planning i
technical support, specifically research and analytical support,.to assist the staff with the task of
enhancing Federal Response Planning activities by focusing on specific catastrophic disasters:
those disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm the existing disaster response
capabilities of local, state, and federal governments.
An initial area of focus will be New Orleans, Louisiana. The goal of this project is to improve
Federal, State, local-government, and private-sector ability to respond to a worst-case
catastrophic hurricane in the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area in order to prevent loss of
life; minimize the number of injuries; house, feed, and protect up to a million survivors and
evacuees; and begin long-term recovery in the affected area. Contractor planning and technical
expertise is needed to research and analyze operational scenarios, concepts and issues to
support the decision-making process of the Federal, state, and local emergency management
community. The contractor will also be required to develop decision support aids or tools that
may take the form of issue papers, information papers, and research and,analytical reports.
@ Work completed by the contractor under this SOW should support the eventual development of
an introductory general plan and a set of sub-plans that would constitute a comprehensive plan
titled "New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Plan." The proposed plan will be
designed so that parts of the plan can be revised, updated, and distributed periodically without
requiring revision of the whole plan. Each part of the plan will clearly identify the organization or
agency responsible for maintaining that part.
2. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE:
August 22,2001--to- .-
April-
1, 2002.
- (Actual
-
work starts September
- .-.--.-. --
17,2001 )
--- .--- -.- .- .....-.--- --. .---
. . ..... - .......-.- -, ...-. -.
. - .-
.-. .-
3. BACKGROUND:
FEMA is responsible for the coordination and implementation of programs within the full range
of Federal emergency response and recovery activities. These programs are implemented
under various Federal mandates including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and .
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.). The Stafford Act provides the authority
for the Federal Government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide
assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property. 'The Federal Response
Plan (FRP) implements the Stafford Act and is designed to address the consequences of any
disaster or emergency situation for which there is a need for Federal assistance and
coordination. The FRP describes the basic mechanisms and structures by which the Federal
Government'will mobilize resources and conduct activities to augment State and local response
and recovery efforts in major disasters and emergencies regardless of cause. The FRP with its
associated processes and standard operating procedures has proven to be an effective
mechanism for delivering Federal assistance in most disaster scenarios.
However, in conformance with current FEMA policy and priorities, it is now necessary to either
broaden the scope and application of the FRP, or to create response planning mechanisms
independent of the FRP, to ensure efficient, consistent, coordinated operations throughout all
phases of a catastro~hicdisaster or emergency: an incident that by definition will immediately
overwhelm the existing disaster response capabilities of local, state, and federal governments.
Therefore, FEMA will address the needs created by a catastrophic disaster or emergency by
providing leadership in coordinating--with other departments and agencies, states, and
localities-the full integration of Federal, State, local, and private sector interagency response
and recovery activities.
Over 1 million people would evacuate from New Orleans. Evacuees would crowd
shelters throughout Louisiana and adjacent states.
Hurricane surge would block highways and trap 300,000 to 350,000 persons in flooded
.- --.- -- --.a ~ e a s , ~ ~ u r f l e 0 f o v e r 1 8 f e & - ~ ~ - 8 v e r f l o ~ - f k , ~ - p ~ ~ t e s t i o ~ - I
Pontchartrain side of New Orleans. Storm surge combined with heavy rain could leave
much of New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of water. More than 200 square miles of
urban areas would be flooded.
It could take weeks to 'de-water" (drain) New Orleans: Inundated pumping stations and
damaged pump motors would not be working. Flood-protection levees would prevent
drainage of floodwater. Breaching the levees would be a complicated and politically
sensitive problem: The Corps of Engineers may have to use barges or helicopters to
haul earthmoving equipment to open several hundred feet of levee. To further
complicate the situation. the flood would probably disable the New Orleans District of the
Corps of Engineers.
Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would be reachable only
by helicopters and boats.
Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup generators would
run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere.
= The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable water, medicine,
or transportation for an extended time period
Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous materials.
Standing water and disease could threaten public health.
There would be severe economic repercussionsfor the whole state and region.
Outside responders and resources, including the Federal response personnel and
materials, would have difficulty entering and working in the affected area.
,
4. TASKS
Hurricane studieslplans
SLOSH studies
Flood-control studies
Geographic and demographic information
Meteorological information
Current federal, state, and local hurricane-response plans, evacuation plans, and other
plans that could have bearing on the hurricane-response problem
Critical facilities
Availability of geographic information systems and digital data
Organization and division of responsibilities of government organizations
Other necessary background information and data
Based on the information collected, the contractor shall develop a scenario describing the
potential effects of a catastrophic hurricane in the Greater New Orleans MetropolitanArea, to
include map products, loss-estimation models, description of the affected population, effects on
critical facilities (e-g., transportation systemslevacuation routes, hazardous materials facilities,
shelters, energy and power supply, water supply, health and medical services, government
facilities), and potential Federal, State andlor local resource requirements. Contractor should
also examine the effects on the ability of the State and parishes' emergency management
oficeslstaff to manage the event based on the anticipated impacts to their facilities. Other
priority areas of analysis include:
- --. -- - - - - -.- -- - - - -- - - ---- -- -- -- - .- - - -- -- --
1. Evacuation
ldentify the number and location of potential evacuees.
Assess existing evacuation plans.
The analyses, materials, and scenario developed by the Contractor will be utilized in a joint
Federal, State, and locai government meeting to provide emergency management and other
9 government organizations with a clear picture of the disaster response challenges that would be
created by a catastrophic hurricane in the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area. This
meeting is scheduled to take place in early 2002,date TBD.
Based on the analysis completed to date, the contractor shall develop a work plan-to include
the continued efforts of the New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Steering
Committee and Planning Work Groups, as well as other recommended activities-to support the
development of an introductory general plan and a set of sub-plans that would constitute a
comprehensive 'New Orleans MetropolitanArea Catastrophic Hurricane Plan." In developing
~ n ; - i h e C ~ n t r a c t ~ o ~ t . l i g h e s t p n o n ~ o a ~ ~ ~ m poliowing
l ~ i n g -t h -e f -
planning tasks-which are of the highest priority to Louisiana Office of Emergency
Preparedness:
1. Plan for rescue and re-location of stranded citizens, and for rescue and relocation of
hospital patients and other.special populations.
2. Plan for short-term shelter and long-term emergency housing of evacuated people.
3. Plan for removing floodwater from City of New Orleans ('de-watering").
The work plan shall include proposed tasks, necessary participants, anticipated outcomes, and
suggested due dates for each task.
5. . DELIVERY SCHEDULE
April 1, 2001: Complete work plan for further activities in support of the development of
comprehensive "New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane
Plan."
A copy of final reports, analyses and deliverables will be sent to the Project Officer. The
Contractor shall obtain permission from the Project Monitor prior to discussing progress on or '
the results of any aspect of this Task Order with any persons or agency outside FEMA and LlRS
Corporation.
6. COORDINATION
Project Monitor: Jason McNamara, HQ, 202-646-3430
Technical Monitors: Fred Sharrocks, HQ, 202-646-2796
John Gambel, HQ, 202-646-2724
Chris Doyle, HQ, 202-646-3035
Contract Ofticer: Carrie Hamilton, HQ, 202-646-2609
EXHIBIT 2
B
B
B
D
D
D
D
D
D
D Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
D
D
Hurricane Planning Workshops
D
D Scenario and Consequences Summary
D
D
D
D
D
D
B
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
B
September 7,2005
Prepared By
IEM, Inc.
Four United Plaza
8555 United Plaza Blvd., Suite 100
Baton Rougk, LA 70809
Prepared For
FEMA HQ
500 C Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20472
Phone: (800) 62 1-FEMA
Prepared Under
FEMA BPA HSFEHQ-04-A-0288, Task Order 00 1
This page intentionally left blank.
TABLE O F CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
POINT OF CONTACT
Introduction
Louisiana, like the entire Gulf Coast, is extremely vulnerable to hurricanes. Historically,
Louisiana has been spared fiom truly catastrophic hurricanes; however, in anticipation of
such an event, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) proposed a series of
catastrophic hurricane planning workshops for the State of Louisiana-specifically
southeast Louisiana and the City of New Orleans-in 2004. The purpose of these
workshops was to develop a response plan for a major hurricane that floods New Orleans
and the surrounding parishes and to identify any issues that cannot be resolved in the
scope of the scenario based on current capabilities.
FEMA tasked IEM, Inc. to provide support to the workshops, including consequence
estimation, scenario development, workshop facilitation, and workshop documentation.
The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops (also referred to as
"Hurricane Pam" after the scenario on which they were based) were conducted in Baton
Rouge and New Orleans. The Baton Rouge workshop was conducted from July 16-23,
2004, with more than 350 participants. Three workshops followed in New Orleans. The
first was conducted from November 29 to December 1,2004, with more than 100
participants, and the second was held July 2529,2005, also with more than 100
participants. The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Humcane Temporary Medical Care
Supplementary Planning Workshop was held August 23-24,2005.
All of these workshops were scenario-based planning workshops. Prior to the workshops,
IEM gathered existing plans, models, studies, and data relevant to workshop topics. This
information was not only u s e l l for developing the scenario and associated consequences,
but it also ensured that workshop participants had a starting point for their work. By
doing this, participants did not have to lose valuable workshop time by performing
research or generating information that already existed. A copy of all historical data was
provided electronically to each participant.
The Workshop Design Working Group was responsible for developing the scenario. The
scenario was intended to be realistic and detailed enough to help participants achieve
their workshop objectives, yet not so specific as to allow participants to get "lost" in the
details.
IEM developed consequences based on the workshop scenario. After initial development
of the consequences, both the Workshop Design group and critical stakeholders reviewed
and approved them to ensure concurrence with results prior to the workshops.
This document provides an overview of the Hurricane Pam scenario as well as the
associated estimated consequences.
72 Hour Pretlpltatlol
n 0.01
3.50- 4.00
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4.00 5.00
5.00- 6.00
:::::::::
11.00- 12.00
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16.00- 16.00
18.00- 10.00
20.00 - 25.00
* 15.00
0No Data
- - -
O v e r v i e w of S t o r m Consequences
This section provides a summary of the storm consequence estimates generated by the
IEM team for these planning workshops.
Review and approval by both the Workshop Design group and critical stakeholders was
obtained to ensure concurrence with results prior to the workshops. Like the rest of the
scenario, the consequence estimates were intended to be realistic and detailed enough to
help participants achieve their workshop objectives, yet not so specific as to allow
participants to get lost in the details.
Population
The following maps and table show the population density in the affected area, as well as
the portion of the population that has been displaced.
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E v a c u a t i o n a n d Sheltering
The following maps and table show the proportion of people who evacuated by parish, as
well as the number of people sheltering in each parish.
Public
Sheltering
by Parish
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Page 26 IEM, Inc. 2005
NOTE
The weather scenario described i n this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The storm consequences described i n this
document were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
Inundation
The following series of maps show the height of water above ground in the affected area.
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Scenario and Consequences Summary
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IEM, Inc. 20 5 Page 41
NOTE
The w ather scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The storm consequences described in this
docume were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
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Scenario and Consequences Summary
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NOTE
scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The stonn consequences described in this
developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
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Southeas Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario n d Conseguences Summary
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critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
Page 47
NOTE
scenarlo described In this document was developed by the National Weather Sewice. The storm consequences described in this
developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
Soufheast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
Impact o n T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Resources •
The following maps show the impact on transportation resources, such as highways, •
railroads, bridges, and ports. •
a
H'urricane Pam 2004
Inundated
Transportation
Resources
Landfall
9/28/04, 01:OO CDT
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LEGEND
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- 48
Page
NOTE
IEM, Inc. 2005 •-
The weather scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. (I
The storm consequences described in this document were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and
consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and critical 4
stakeholders prior to workshop use.
a
Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
Hurricane Pan
Impacted
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IEM, Inc. 20 5 Page 49
NOTE
Thew ather scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The storm consequences described in this
docume were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
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IEM, Inc. 20 5 Page 53
NOTE
The w ather scenario described In this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The storm consequences described in this
docume t were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
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Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
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NOTE
scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. The storm consequences described in this
developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and
critical stakeholders prior to workshop use.
Southeast Louisiana CatastrophicHum-canePlanning Workshops
Scenario and Consequences Summary
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P O I N T O F CONTACT
The IEM point of contact for this document is Ted Lemcke. He may be reached
at:
IEM
8555 United Plaza Blvd., Suite 100
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 952-8191 6
(225) 952-8122 (fix)
--
The alternate point of contact is Wayne Thomas. Hey may be reached at:
IEM, Inc.
275 1 Buford Highway, Suite 204 Druid Pointe
Atlmta, GA 30324
(404) 214-0330
(404) 214-0337 (fax)
Page 58
NOTE
IEM, lnc. 2005 •
The weather scenario described in this document was developed by the National Weather Service. a
1
The storm consequences described in this document were developed by IEM, Inc. All scenario and
consequence information was reviewed and approved by the Workshop Design group and critical •
stakeholdem prior to workshop use.
a
EXHIBIT 3
PROPOSAL
FOR A
NEW ORLEANS METROPOLITAN AREA
CATASTROPHIC HURRICANE PLAN
Worst-case Hurricane
A catastrophic hurricane could result iii significant numbers of deaths and injuries, trap
hundreds of thousands of people in flooded areas, and leave up to one million people
homeless. The aeocrraphic situation of Southern Louisiana---.and the denselyjqulated
--- New
Orleans area would complicate response problems and could quickly overwhelm the State's
resources. Some anticipated problems are listed below:
Page 1 of 7
Potential Effects of a Worst-Case Hurricane ... (Continued)
It could take weeks to "de-water" (drain) New Orleans: Inundated pumping
stations and damaged pump motors would not be working. Flood-protection
levees would prevent drainage of floodwater. Breaching the levees wodd be
a complicated and politically sensitive problem: The Corps of Engineers may
have to use barges or helicopters to haul earthmoving equipment to open
several hundred feet of levee. To further complicate the situation, the flood
would probably disable the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers.
Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would be reach-
able only by helicopters and boats.
Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup generators
would run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere.
The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable water,
medicine, or transportation.
Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous materials.
Standing water and disease could threaten public health.
There would be severe economic repercussions for the whole state and region.
Outside responders and resources, including the Federal Emergency Response
Team, would have difficulty entering and working in the affected area.
There would be unforeseen life-threatening problems.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES
1. Plan for direction and control of coordinated federal-state-local government response.
. . -.
2. Plan
--- for maximizing evacuation of threatened
-. -......
area. -
3. Plan for transporting people, supplies, and equipment.
* 4. Plan for rescue and re-location of stranded citizens.
* 5. Plan for rescue and relocation of hospital patients and other special populations.
6. Plan for maintenance of public safety and security in affected area.
* 7. Plan for draining floodwater from City of New Orleans ("de-watering").
8. Plan for maintenance of public health.
* 9. Plan for short-term shelter and long-term emergency housing of evacuated people.
10. Plan for restoration and re-building of damaged infrastructure.
11. Plan for restoration of economy in New Orleans area.
12. Determine if there are any practical measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of a
catastrophic storm.
Page 2 of 7
PLANNING PRIORITIES
Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness suggests that the highest-priority and most
urgent objectives of the planning effort are, in this order:
I . Plan for rescue and re-location o'f stranded citizens, and plan for rescue and
relocation of hospital patients and other special populations.
2. Plan for short-term shelter and long-term emergency housing of evacuated people.
3. Plan for removing floodwater from City of New Orleans ("de-watering").
Page 3 of 7
PROPOSED SCOPE OF WORK FOR CONTRACTOR
General:
Contractor should develop an introductory general plan and a set of sub-plans that
would constitute a comprehensive plan titled "New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan." The plan should be designed so that parts of the plan can be revised,
updated, and distributed periodically without requiring revision of the whole plan. Each part
of the plan should clearly identify the organization or agency responsible for maintaining that
Part-
Planning Priorities:
I . Plan for rescue and re-location of stranded citizens, and for rescue and
relocation of hospital patients and other special populations.'
2. Plan for short-term shelter and long-term emergency housing of evacuated
people.
3. Plan for removing floodwater from City of New drleans ("de-wateringtt).
Page 4 of 7
Direction and Control, Development of Coordinated Response ...(Continued)
- Plan for time-phased deployment of resources.
- Plan for continued maintenance and update of plans.
Evacuation
- Develop a plan for removing floodwater from New Orleans metropolitan area.
- Plan for inspection, restoration, temporary repair, and operation of flood-control
systems and pumping stations.
- Coordinate with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and local governments to plan for
opening levees where necessary.
- Plan for removing debris that prevents access or obstructs flood control and drainage
structures.
Page 5 of 7
Security
- Identify and arrange transportation for people who would be needed to provide
security for hospitals and shelters.
- Identi@ and arrange transportation for public safety officers to sc;c;arireurban areas. :
Shelters
- Assess the ability of each medical facility to operate after storm hits.
- Determine immediate staffing needs.whilestorm approaches and after storm hits.
- Set priorities for staffing and supplying hospitals and other medical facilities in the
affected area.
- Identify transportation needs for staff and supplies. '
- Review the current US Army Corps of Engineers plan for infrastructure restoration
after a major flood.
.. ...
.-. --- ---~ a ~ 1 - f o r - ~ e ~ l w a l ~ d ~ f + 8 ~ u M i . c d ~ p r o p e ~ .y..- .~.. .
- Plan for restoration of transportation systems.
- Plan for restoration of utilities (power, water, sewer, gas).
- Plan for restoration of public facilities (schools, fire stations, government buildings).
- Plan for restoration of commerce and general economic recovery.
Page 6 of 7
Prevention & Mitigation . .
- Recommend long-term measures that could be taken to prevent or lessen the effects
of hurricane storm surge and flooding.
- Recommend expedient measures that could be 'den to preverit or lessen the esects
of hurricane storm surge and flooding.
Phase I:
Phase I1
Phase I11
ESTIMATED COSTS:
Page 7 of 7
EXHIBIT 4
PLANNING & READINESS UPDATE for'2001 NEMA Conference
Interagency and Catastrophic Planning Section
Catastrophic Disaster Planning (Southern California, New Orleans, South Florida, New
Madrid):
At present, FEMA is in the process of contemplating events that may fall beyond the
scope and planning assumptions of the FRP, an initiative we've entitled "Catastrophic
Disaster and Emergency Response Planning." We are keenly aware of the limitations of
the current Federal response system, and with the cooperation of our Federal, State, and
local partners, we are seeking to ensure that the Nation can respond to any disaster or
emergency. . .
The initiative will examine-in cooperation with affected state and local governments-
loss estimates for such incidents, current disaster response capabilities, anticipated
response shortfalls, and comprehensive planning strategies for addressing such shortfalls,
perhaps including new legislative or executive actions.
The results of this project will include incident-specific response plans for pre-selected
geographic regions, based upon loss estimating models and capability inventories of
affected local, state and federal responders. Additional outcomes could include: (1) a
planning template for all catastrophic incidents, anticipating response contingencies
beyond the Federal Response Plan; (2) conduct of incident-specific exercises; and (3)
proposed legislation and/or executive action to facilitate catastrophic disaster response.
We have already initiated this process in California for a large magnitude earthquake (7.5
or above) in the Los Angeles Basin:
(1) A kick-off meetiilg withthe CDRG and State and local stakeholders took
place on July 10-1 1, describing in detail the potential impacts of a large
magnitude EQ in Southern CA;
(2) We are forming "functional planning task forces" with Federal, State and local
participants that will examine specific response issues such as (a) Debris
Management and Disposal; (b) Business and Economic Recovery; and (c) - - -
Shelter, Housing, and Mass Care and,
(3) We intend to develop a draft intergovernmental response plan by April 2002.
EXHIBIT 5
GUIDANCE
CATASTROPHIC DISASTER PLANNING
REGIONAL BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS
A. Purpose
B. Backeround
A catastrophic disaster could strike the U.S. anywhere, any time. It would have nationwide
consequences and could even jeopardize national security. The emergency management
community i s well prepared to deal with ordinary, day-to-day disasters. However, we do not
know how adequate existing processes and mechanisms would be in responding to a truly
catastrophic disaster - one leaving unprecedented levels of damage, casualties, dislocation,
and disruption in its wake.
Over the years, various efforts have been undertaken to address catastrophic disaster
readiness. Most recently, site-specific planning has begun'for a catastrophic New Orleans
hurricane and a Los Angeles basin earthquake. .Work is also underway in developing a
catastrophic housing strategy. These efforts, as well as lessons learned domestically and
internationally, provide a point of departure for,developing a comprehensive, all-hazard
national strategy for responding to and recovering from a catastrophic disaster. A national
strategy is crucial for ensuring an integrated local, State, Federal, private, and voluntary
sector response to such a disaster.
Catastrophic disaster considerations will be incorporated into the development of the new
National Response Plan (NRP) required under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. Regional brainstorming sessions will be an
important first step in identieing unique operational requirements associated with
catastrophic disasters.
I. Focus discussions on atleast two functional areas (e.g.. mass care. health and medical).
See attached list of tentative Regional selections.
2. Discuss actions that might betaken to address resource shortfalls. What are alternative
ways of meeting the mission?. Examine alternatives during different phases:
4. Develop objective criteria for prioritizing the use of resources if demand is greater than
supply (if State A and State B both need the same resource, what are some considerations
to ensure the resource is applied to the greater need and with maximum impact).
Please provide a detailed summary of your brainstorming session to Jeff Glick (HQ RS-PO-
PP) and Ron Sherman (R V FCO) within 10 days after the FUSC meeting, covering items in
the attached format for each functional area addressed. (Consider designating a recorder in
the brainstorming session so that all pertinent points are captured.) HQ will compile all input
and develop a report that will be provided to the Emergency Support Function Leaders Group
and Catastrophic Disaster Response Group. HQ will also forward each detailed summary to
the appropriate HQ ESF primary agency or lead program office for use in modifying1
developing their functional annexes to the NRP.
Use a scenario relevant to your Region that reasonably lays out catastrophic levels of d&age
and disruption or use the following generic scenario to set the scene. Do not dwell on
defining thedetails of "catastrophic."
Approximately 1,300,000 people live in the seven parishes of the New Orleans metropolitan area.
The topography of about 322 square miles in the seven parishes (256 square miles of which are
inhabited) is generally low-lying river delta. Some of the most densely populated areas are
actually below sea level-which makes the area highly susceptible to flooding. The most
dangerous potential hurricane would be a slow-moving Category 3,4, or 5 humcane making
landfall at the mouth of the Mississippi River, moving northwest of and parallel to the river, and
then crossing New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Anticipated problems include:
Over 1 million people would evacuate from New Orleans. Evacuees would crowd shelters
throughout Louisiana and adjacent states.
Hurricane surge would block the few highways leading out of the New Orleans area and trap
300,000 to 350,000 persons in flooded areas. Storm surge of over 18 feet would overflow
flood-protection levees on the Lake Pontchartrain side of New Orleans. Storm surge
combined with heavy rain could leave much of New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of water.
More than 200 square miles of urban areas would be flooded.
It could take weeks to "de-water" (drain) New Orleans. Inundated pumping stations and
damaged pump motors would not be working. Flood-protection levees would prevent
drainage of floodwater.
Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would be reachable only by
helicopters and boats.
Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Their backup generators would
run out of fuel or fail before patients could be moved elsewhere.
The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable water, medicine, or
transportation for an extended time period
Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous materials.
Standing water and disease could threaten public health.
There would be severe economic repercussions for the whole State and region.
Outside responders and resources, including the Federal response personnel and materials,
would have difficulty entering and working in the affected area.
E. Background Material
. White Paper: National Strategy for Addressing Catastrophic Disasters (118/03 draft)
[previously e-mailed]
FEMA Catastrophic Housing Strategy (6102 draft) [previously e-mailed]
Published Definitions - Catastrophic Disaster (3124103 draft) [attached]
. Functional Descriptions [attached]
CD: BrainstonGuidance.doc
4-9-03
RELATIONSHIP OF CATASTROPHIC HOUSING STRAWMAN TO'
STATE OF LOUISIANA CATASTROPHIC PLAN
CROSS-CUTTING EFFORTS
2 of 2 DOCUMENTS
BODY:
Bush administration officials acknowledged today that the Department of Homeland Security would need years to
organize itself filly and that the logistics involved in merging 22 agencies and nearly 170,000 government workers into
a giant new bureaucracy could threaten to divert the department from its central mission of safeguarding the American
public from terrorist attacks.
The man expected to lead the new department, Tom Ridge, who is now the White House domestic security
adviser, said in an interview today, "I may need to go to church every day" for guidance in the largest reorganization of
the government since the creation of the Defense Department in the 1940's.
"This is a day for the history books," Mr. Ridge said as the Senate voted overwhelmingly today, 90 to 9, to approve
the bill creating the security department, ending months of partisan wrangling over the legislation.
"But there are a lot of people who are wary of the pitfalls associated with such a massive undertaking," he said,
noting that he had recently consulted with current and former executives at Hewlett Packard and Lockheed Martin in
trying to understand how large conglomerates cany out mergers. "I would be foolish to ignore the reality of the logistics
of this. We're going to look for advice and counsel from a lot of folks."
Mr. Ridge, a former Pennsylvania governor, said he planned to have early meetings with leaders of the unions that
represent the agency's workers and that had bitterly protested provisions in the bill creating the department that will
severely restrict civil service protections.
"We need to engage the union leaders right off the bat," Mr. Ridge said. "They are an integral part of this team.
We've had our differences, but at the end of day, we want to work together."
Mr. Ridge, who has not disputed reports that he is President Bush's choice as the first homeland security secretary,
said the White House was already interviewing candidates for senior posts at the department.
He confirmed that Navy Secretary Gordon R. England was being discussed for a top job at the agency.
Administration officials have said that Mr. England may be in line to be the department's deputy secretary, or that he
Page 2
THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN; Establishing New Agency Is Expected to Take
Years and Could Divert It From Mission The New York Times November 20, 2002 Wednesday
may replace Mr. Ridge as the White House domestic security adviser. "He is one of the people we are talking to," Mr.
Ridge said.
The Department of Homeland Security will be the third-largest employer in the executive branch of the federal
government, after the Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Its budget is expected to be about
$35.5 billion for the 2003 fiscal year.
The department will incorporate agencies as diverse as the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Border Patrol and the
newly created Transportation Security Administration.
The department's proponents on Capitol Hill concede that bringing so many agencies under one roof will be a
management challenge without precedent in the government's modern history. They also acknowledged that the task
would be made far more difficult because it comes as the government is working to respond to intelligence suggesting
that new terrorist attacks against the United States may be imminent.
President Harry S. Truman announced his plan to combine the War and Navy Departments into a single Defense
Department in December 1945, three months after the American victory in World War 11, but the plan was not approved
by Congress for another two years.
"This is going to be difficult and it's going to take longer than anyone thinks," warned Senator Fred Thompson, the
Republican of Tennessee who was a leading sponsor of the Senate bill creating the Department of Homeland Security.
Comptroller General David M. Walker, who directs the General Accounting Office, the Congressional watchdog
agency, said today, "It's going to take years in order to get this department fully integrated -- you're talking about
bringing together 22 different entities, each with a longstanding tradition and its own culture."
He said that if the initial organization was handled badly and if the agencies that are being brought together in the
department resisted cooperation, the result could damage the government's counterterrorism program as it exists now.
"If this is not handled properly, we could be at increased risk," Mr. Walker said. "That's why you have to focus on a
short list of priorities, including making sure that key people are in contact with each other."
He added, "That's as basic as trying to make sure that things like voice mail and e-mail are linked up."
A key Congressional supporter of the department's creation, Representative Jane Harman, a Democrat of California
who is a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said that while "moving the boxes around will take awhile," she
was convinced that the new agency would be an improvement over the domestic counterterrorism programs that are
now scattered throughout the government.
"For this thing to even be born is heroic," Ms. Harman said. "The critical thing for Tom Ridge is to keep his eye on
the ball, and the ball is an integrated national strategy on terrorism."
The bill authorizing its creation provides the new department with what Congressional officials say is
unprecedented power for a federal agency to organize itself as it chooses, without Congressional oversight or
interference, an authority demanded by the Bush administration.
Lawmakers and officials from the F.B.I., the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies will be watching closely to see
how the Department of Homeland Security organizes its intelligence unit, known as the "information analysis and
infrastructure protection" division.
The law seems to restrict the unit largely to the analysis of information about domestic terrorism threats gathered
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and
Page 3
THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE REORGANIZATION PLAN; Establishing New Agency Is Expected to Take
Years and Could Divert It From Mission The New York Times November 20,2002 Wednesday
But the new department will be able to gather its own independent intelligence through the Customs Service, the
Secret Service, the immigration service, the Border Patrol and the other law enforcement agencies that it are being
brought under its control.
Administration officials acknowledge that the Department of Homeland Security could eventually emerge as a rival
to the F.B.I. as a domestic intelligence-gathering agency if the Bush administration decides that a new, independent
agency is needed.
"I think there are some nervous folks over at the bureau," a senior law enforcement official said today.
URL: http://www.nytimes.com
request, in millions: 15 1Estimated number of employees: 795 Critical Infrastructure Assurance OfficeDepartment or
agency they are now under: Commerce Dept.From President Bush's budget for the 2003 fiscal yearBudget request, in
millions: 27Estimated number of employees: 65 National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis CenterDepartment or
agency they are now under: Energy Dept.From President Bush's budget for the 2003 fiscal yearBudget request, in
millions: 20Estimated number of employees: 2 Federal Computer Incident Response CenterDepartment or agency they
are now under: General Services AdministrationFrom President Bush's budget for the 2003 fiscal yearBudget request, in
millions: 11Estimated number of employees: 23 Secret Service Secret Service, including presidential protection
unitsDepartment or agency they are now under: Treasury Dept.From President Bush's budget for the 2003 fiscal
yearBudget request, in millions: $1,248Estimated number of employees: 6,111 Coast Guard Coast GuaradDepartment
or agency they are now under: Transportation Dept.From President Bush's budget for the 2003 fiscal yearBudget
request, in millions: $7,274Estimated number of employees: 43,639 T0TAL:Budget request, in millions:
$35,527Estimated number of employees: 164,184 *Immigration services will be a separate bureau within the
department.+Classified.$SIncluded in FEMA budget request. (Source: The White House)
The current version of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation
is Revision 5, dated January 5, 2005. It was delivered to FEMA NQ, FEMA Region VI,
and the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP)
for review and comment. Revision 5 contains infom~ationdeveloped during Phase 1 (July
16-23, 2004) and Phase 1 A (November 29-December 3, 2004) of the Southeast Louisiana
Catastrophic Hurricane Planrling Workshop.
Thcse two sections were released as separate files to FEMA on August 27, 2005.
Following Phase lB, on August 23-24, 2005, the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Temporary Mcdical Care Supplementary Planning Workshop was held. As a
result, Temporary Medical Care (Section 14) was updated with notes taken at the
workshop. This section was submitted to FEMA on September 1,2005, as Update 1. It was
replaccd on September 3, 2005, as Update 2, incorporating additional appendices a l o n ~
with updates to the Concept o f Operations (CONOPS).
The Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project begun in 2004 was funded by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. The project is assisting the State of Louisiana, the southern most
13 Louisiana parishes (including the City of New Orleans) that will be most affected by a catastrophic
hurricane, appropriate federal regional personnel, and FEMA HQ representatives in conducting
catastrophic hurricane planning in Southeast Louisiana.
The plan i s not complete, but represents the immediate response needs as identified by the
State. Also per the State's request, the planning workshops were organized around planning topics,
not by ESFs. Participants collaborated with each other to develop plans that documented a response
process. The "Matrix o f Planning Topics and ESFs" crosswalks the workshop Planning Topics to
the 15 Emergency Support Functions contained in the National Response Plan. This document was
originally developed in late 2004 but was modified in August 2005 to add explanatory information
The planning process consisted of a series of week long planning workshops attended by response
operations personnel as listed above. The workshops were conducted in July 2004, November 2004,
July 2005, and August 2005.
"Temporary Medical Care" (draft) and "Appendices" (draft) which were produced during a
two-day workshop in August 23 & 24, 2005, after transcription by the contractor and
consultation and approval by the State. This document was forwarded to FEMA HQ on
September 3, 2005
The period of performance for the contract that funded development of these documents was
originally September 30, 2005. In early August 2005, FEMA Region VI requested an extension to
November 30, 2005, to give more time to the contractor to integrate sections of the document
developed in July and August 2005 (the July workshop was originally scheduled for April 2005).
The extension was agreed to by the COTR in conversation with the contractor but has not been
formalized in a memorandum to the Contracting Officer at FEMA HQ.
Initial points of contact for information, etc. are:
Sharon Blades
I
Innovative Emergency Management, Inc.
I
Melanie T. BJrtis
Emergency Planning SpecialisVCOTR Hazard Mitigatim Planner
FEMA. Response U~ision IEM, lnc.
500 C Street. SW 8555 United Plaza Blvd.
Wgqhinoton. DC
Suite 100
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
EXHIBIT 8
Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project
Plan Status Report
Accomplishments
IEM assisted FEMA in conducting a 350-participant (including Federal, State, and local)
Catastrophic Planning Exercise for Southeast Louisiana fiom July 16-23,2004 that
focused on the following planning areas:
o Debris
o Schools
o Search and Rescue
o Shelters
o Temporary Housing
o Temporary Medical Care
Furthermore, several "action rooms" produced plans. These include:
o Unwatering
o Hazardous Materials
o Billeting of Emergency Response Personnel
o Power, Water, and Ice Distribution
o Transport fiom Water to Shelter
o Volunteer and Donations Management
o Access Control and Re-Entry
The result of this Planning Exercise was a Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane
Plan. Each section listed above produced a plan that contained a Concept of Operations,
Objectives, Lead and Support Relationships, Logistics, and Communications.
IEM compiled and submitted this plan based on the results of the exercise.
E M assisted FEMA in conducting one follow-up workshop (Phase I-A) in New Orleans
(approximately 100 participants) to continue planning for Shelter, Temporary Medical
Care, and Temporary Housing. At the November 29 - December 3 workshop, the
Steering Committee (made up of representatives fiom FEMA Headquarters, FEMA
Region VI, and LOHSEP) completed a review of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Humcane Plan.
Future Activities
IEM will support FEMA in conducting the Phase 1-B Workshop in New Orleans on July
25-29.
o This workshop will focus on specific planning for Temporary Housing and
Transportation, Staging, and Distribution (TSD) of resources.
o The Steering Committee will also review the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan that was updated following Phase 1-A.
IEM will support FEMA in conducting a thorough review, compiiation, and completion
of all functional plans that were developed during the Catastrophic Humcane Planning
Workshops.
Objectives, Lead and Support Relationships, Logistics, and Communications.
IEM compiled and submitted this plan based on the results of the exercise.
IEM assisted FEMA in conducting one follow-up workshop (Phase 1-A) in New Orleans
(approximately 100 participants) to continue planning for Shelter, Temporary Medical
Care, and Temporary Housing. At the November 29 - December 3 workshop, the
Steering Committee (made up.of representatives from FEMA Headquarters, FEMA
Region VI, and LOHSEP) completed a review of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan.
Future Activities
IEM will support FEMA in conducting the Phase 1-B Workshop in New orleans on July
25-29.
o This workshop will focus on specifi~'~lannin~ for Temporary Housing and
Transportation, Staging, and Distribution (TSD) of resources.
o The Steering Committee will also review the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan that was updated following Phase 1-A.
E M will support FEMA in conducting a thorough review, compilation, and completion
of all functional plans that were developed during the Catastrophic Hurricane Planning
Workshops.
EXHIBIT 9
Hurricane Pam Planning Exercise
Weekly Status Report
TKIS IS THE FINAL REPORT
Recognizing that current Federal, State and local disaster response capabilities needed to be
enhanced to better address the anticipated effccts of truly catastrophic disasters, FEMA
cmbarked on a "Catastrophic Planni~~g" initiat~vein FY 2003. Tlle goal was to identify arcas
of the country that could be vulnerable to catastrophic disasters and, in cooperatloll w ~ t hthe
relevai~tState and local governments, to:
Examine projected danages and effects associated wit11 a catastrophic disaster
Confirm c~lrrentdisaster response capabilities
Identify anticipated response shorlfalls. and
Initiate comprel~ensiveplan~lingstrategies to address the sho~lfalls
Products developed u ~ ~ d the
e r "Catastrol>hic Planning" initiative were envisioned to i~~cli~cie
incident-specific response plans for pre-selected geographic regions and clisastel-s, planning
templates that could be applicd to other areas: and new response col7tingencies.
Thirteen southeastern Louisiana Parishes (includii~gthe City of New Orleans) were selected as
the initial geographic focus area for FEMA's "Catastrophic Plaru~ing"initiative because of
their vulnerability to h u r r i c a ~ ~disasters.
e The SorrtAeast Louisiatia Catastrophic Hi~rricune
Planrritrg Project docun~entsthe rcsults of this collaborative erfort.
Existing plans, strategies, policies, and capabilities kve1-e revlewed by LOI-ISEP before the first
workshop. As pre-plaiming for the first ~ o r k s h o pconducted
, in July 2004, LOI-ISEP and
Federal representatives identiiied a 11stof planning topics as the most urgent or con~l>les topics
needing discussion, including:
It became clear after the first workshop that a series of workshop cycles wo111d be necessary to
address the full range of complex response and recovery concerns associated with a
catastrophic event. Additional workshops were held in Novelnber 2004, July 2005, and
August 2005 to provide further input for topics. Topics selected for further discussion during
the subsequent workshops included the follo\ving:
The goal of the Soutlreast Louisinrra Crttastroplric Ifrirricnrre Pfrinrritzg Project is to begin
addressing immediate, intcmlcciiate, and long-term needs; create plans immediately usable by
planners and responders in the field; and seed the eventual development of a comprehensive
and systematic operational plan. The ultimate goal is for the concepts identified in the
Soutlieast Louisircrra Catastrophic Hitrricarte PIurtrririg Project to be integrated into a iinal
catastrophic plan. Thc project did not result in a catastrophic p l a n n i n ~document per se, but
rather a ka~neworkfor developing such a plan.
Although the catastrophic planning process has been interrupted by the impacts of Hursicanes
Katrina and Rita, the workshops and planning process - knowledge of inter--jurisdictional
relat~onshipsand capabilities, identificatio~lof issues, and rudimentary concepts for handling
the consequences - have been beneficial to hurricane response activities.
Appendix 3
July 27,2005
During the week of 25-29 July 2005, the Louisiana Catastrophic Planning Phase I-B
workshop identified the need to further integrate Parish, State, and Federal plans for the
distribution of commodities (water, ice, food, etc.) following a catastrophic event. The
desired outcome was to design a distribution plan that will help the State more effectively
assist you, the Parishes, and to serve the needs of your population.
The State of Louisiana and FEMA need to know the extent of your capabilities, and lack
thereof, in performing these tasks. Given the present situation-an extremely active
hurricane season and a global rise in terrorist activity-&e task of preparing for
catastrophic disasters is especially urgent. Based on yourh,:~~~~9hA Rerish"~current population, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) estimates thaPas18.many as distribution
points might be necessary in your Parish during a ca$fstro$?$$ ,,event (details regarding
a~ihf. ,*ld,c
the calculation of this estimate are enclosed f ~ r , ~ ~ s eyour ~ , , ~planning.)
n' Collaborative
,l,fd+ \*"fi&
contingency plans need to be in place for the State to assist you in8res.ponding 'ul~~Jl~ll~..,.,ll~
in a timely
manner and your provision of this informatiod4,$$l! hel;$lus to be bett?$prepared in these
.qli/t\Q ,f,i#li:>! ,IF
circumstances. '(I I hill
"1,
~nloh~,.
Louisiana National
a process, which
coordination, and
we need your help
example has been
provided.
For additional information and/or questions, please contact: Chris Walker, Project
Officer at #225-925-7500.
Enclosure 1
Site Identrfication
Provide an inventory of the sites that meet the minimum requirements for distribution
points within your parish. Please include a site identifier, relevant site details, digital
photographs, and latitudellongitude location, preferably in G1S-ready format.
Equipment Inventory
Provide an inventory of the required e
site.
1. Forklifts
2. Pallet jacks
3. Power light sets
4. Toilets
5. Tents
6. Dumpsters
7. Traffic cones
8. Two-way radios
P ~ ~ o r ~Inventory
nel
the parish can provide at each identified
chart for distribution point staffing
6. Law enforcement
7. Administrative staff
8. Community relations staff
9. Multi-lingual staff
r7xy
. Site Manager
,
.Community Relations
, Security .. ,
I I
1 of 1 DOCUMENT
HEADLINE: A Blast of Rain but Little Damage as Hurricane Hits South Florida
BYLINE: By JOSEPH B. TREASTER; Reporting for this article was contributed by Asra Jawaid, Neil Reisner, Kelli
Kennedy and Terry Aguayo.
BODY:
Hurricane Katrina pushed ashore north of here as darkness fell on Thursday, laden with heavy rain but not packing
much of a wallop.
Sustained winds of 80miles per hour with gusts up to 92 m.p.h. bent palm trees and rattled windows, but there
were no reports of heavy damage as the hurricane made landfall between North Miami Beach and Hallandale Beach
shortly before 7 p.m.
By late Thursday, as much as 12 inches of rain had fallen in some areas, according to estimates by the National
Weather Service. More than a million homes and businesses had lost power, The Associated Press reported.
Two deaths were reported by Miami television stations. One person was struck by a tree, the other was
electrocuted by a downed power line.
The storm turned to the southwest after making landfall, passing just northwest of Miami. Its winds were 75
m.p.h., just above minimal hurricane force, at 1 1 p.m. Thursday.
All of the four storms that hit Florida last year packed winds of well over 100 m.p.h., some gusting to well over
140 m.p.h. Several carried strong winds reaching more than 150 miles from the center.
By contrast, tropical force winds of about 40 m.p.h. to 70 m.p.h. extended about 80 miles from the Hurricane
Katrina's center, said Trisha Wallace, a meteorologist at the National Hurricane Center here.
Colin McAdie, another meteorologist at the center, said that once the storm moved over the gulf today, it was
expected to wheel north, pick up speed and hit the Florida Panhandle on Sunday.
As the storm approached South Florida, residents took the usual precautions of stocking up on flashlight batteries,
water and snacks, and as night fell few drivers were on the windswept streets.
For the most part, they seemed to be taking the hurricane in stride.
Page 2
A Blast of Rain but Little Damage as Hurricane Hits South Florida The New York Times August 26,2005 Friday
"I feel pretty comfortable that this is a minor event," said Mark Golden as he bought flashlights and water at a
Home Depot in Boca Raton, about 40 miles north of here. Mr. Golden said he was not even planning to cover his
windows with plywood.
"People tend to not take these types of storms very seriously because it's not a major hurricane," said Lt. j.g.
Jennifer Pralgo, a meteorologist at the hurricane center. "But they need to. We're urging people to stay home. Most of
South Florida is going to get a lot of rain."
Although there were no mandatory evacuations of low-lying areas, most businesses closed early, and Fort
Lauderdale International Airport was closed at 7 p.m.
Although major damage was not expected, Robert P. Hartwig, the chief economist of the Insurance Information
Institute, an insurance trade group, said the hurricane could still "produce hundreds of millions of dollars in damage."
The damage is expected to be light but widespread. Instead of hundreds of roofs being ripped off, Mr. Hartwig
said, it was more likely that tiles would be blown away, permitting rain to pour into homes. By comparison, the four
powerful hurricanes that hit Florida last year cost insurance companies $23 billion.
Strong winds from one of those storms brushed South Florida, but no major hurricane has hit the area since 1992,
when Hurricane Andrew pummeled vast residential areas on the southern flank of Miami and several towns south of
Miami, including Homestead. The damage from Hurricane Andrew came to about $22 billion in today's dollars.
Since Hurricane Andrew, Florida officials have imposed strict building codes intended to make homes and offices
more wind resistant.
In July, the state's first hurricane of the year, Dennis, hit the Florida Panhandle. It caused about $900 million in
damage in Florida, Alabama and Georgia.
Grocery stores, hardware stores and gasoline stations were busy on Thursday, but the pace was measured. Jugs of
water moved off the shelves in ones and twos rather than by the case, as often happens when hurricanes threaten.
A grocery bagger at a Publix grocery store in Hollywood, north of here, said, "There's no panicking, just
shopping."
URL: http://www.nytimes.com
GRAPHIC: Photo: Russell Crossey and his dog were soaked by spray from waves driven by Hurricane Katrina as they
walked on a jetty yesterday in Manalapan, Fla. (Photo by Nicholas R. Von StadenlSouth Florida Sun-Sentinel, via
Associated Press)Map of Florida highlighting path of Hurricane Katrina: The storm was expected to enter the Gulf of
Mexico this morning.
. ..
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: For those just
briefing .
..-,..
it's so far to the northwest of Key West.
. ,
The good
from the lower Keys here. The bad news is it's still
"
- County line. We had a good forecast of the landfall
-.-.. .
drove
..
their car into a downed tree on the side of the
road.
. -
The rainfall is the other big concern.
These are the storm totals at least up through this
- 2
about 1 0 inches of rain. And this is the s;uthern
-
- storm force winds, t h e most likely scenario is that
HIGH RISE OFFICE AND APARTMKN'I! BUTLDINGS WILL SWAY DANGEROUSLY.. .A FEW TO THE WLNT
OF TOTAL COLLAPSE. ALL WINWHS WILL BLOW OUT.
AIRBORNE DEBRIS WILL BE WIDESPREAD...AND MAY INCLUDE EIgAVY ITEMS SUCH AS HOUSEHOLD
APPLIANCES AND EVEN LIGHT VEHICLIIS. SPORT UTILITY VEBICLES AM) LIGEiT TRUCKS WILL BE
M .~ BLOWN DEBRIS WILL (~EATE ADDITION^ DESTRUCTION. PERSONS. . PETS. A ~ J D
O THE . ..
LIVESTOCK EXPOSKD M THE WINDS HILL FACE CERTAIN DEATH IF STRUCK.
POWEX OOTAaBS WILL LAST FOR WEEKS...AS MOST POWER POLES HI7iL BE DOWN AND
TRANSFORMERS DESTROYED. WATER SHORTAGES WILL MAKE EiDMAN SWPXRIN(3 INCREDIBLE BY
MODERN STANDARDS.
THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATIVE TRJ3ES WILL BE SNAPPED OR UPROOTED. ONLY THE IBARTIEST
WILL REMUM STANDING ...
BUT BE TOTALLY DEFOLIATED. 'FEHCROPS WILL REMAIN. LIVESTOCK
LEFT EXPOSED TO THE WINDS'V L L BE KILLED.
AN INLAND RURRICANG WLND WARWING IS ISSUED WHEN SUSTAINED WTNJlIS NEAR HURRICANE
.
FORCB ..OR FREQUENT GUSTS AT OR ABOVE HURRICANE FORCE. . .ARB CERTAIN WITHIN THE NEXT
12 TO 24 HOURS.
!
ONCE TROPICAL STORM AND FIURRICANE FORCE WINDS ONSET.. .DO NOT VENTURE OUTSIDE!
EXHIBIT 15
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington
September 7,2005
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington ("CREW") makes this request for
records, regardless of format, inediuin, or physical characteristics, and including electroi~ic
records and infonnation, pursuant. to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. $552,
et seq, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") regulations, 6 CFR Part 5.
This request is for any and all records relating to the DHS's response to llurricane
Katrina. Specifically, CREW seeks all memoranda, communications and records of any kind and
from any source, regardless of format, medium, or physical characteristics, from January 1,200 1
to the present, discussing or mentioning in any way:
1) what portion of the $3.1 billioil appropriated to DHS in fiscal year 2005 for emergency
preparedness to "support the Nation's ability to prepare for, mitigate against, respond to
and recover from natural and man nlaiunade disasters"' was spent to prepare for potential
hurricanes on the Gulf Coast of the United States and on potential flooding in New
Orleans;
2) the ainount of money diverted from emergency preparedness for and response to
natural disasters to emergency preparedness for and response to acts of terrorism and the
rationale behind any such diversion;
4) plans created regarding the federal government's response to any such scenarios;
5) the potential breaching of the levees that would lead to Lake Pontchartrain flooding
New Orleans and the response to such breaches; and
- -
-- -.
1 1 DuPont Circle, N.W., 2nd Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036 - 202-588-5565 (phone) - 202-588-5020 (fax) . rnsloan@citizensforethics.org -&
Disclosure Officer
September 7, 2005
Page Two
Orleans, the potential breaching of the levees and the consequences of such breaches, as
well as proposed repairs or other construction to the levees.
CREW further seeks all memoranda, communications and records of any kind and from
any source, regardless of format, medium, or physical characteristics, from August 26,2005
througl~to the present, discussing or ineiltioning in any way:
1) requests for einergency assistance from local government officials in Mississippi and
Louisiana in response to hurricane Katrina, including but not limited to Secretary Michael
Chertoff s coinmunications with such officials;
2) requests froin local government officials in Mississippi and Louisiana for assistance in
preparing for hui~icaneKatrina, including, but not limited to communications requesting
assistance in evacuating residents of Mississippi and Louisiana from the areas in the
hurricane's path;
3) communications between the White House and DHS regarding the preparation for and
the respoilse to the damage caused by hurricane Katrina;
9) communications between DHS and cabinet officials either before or after the hurricane
regarding the potential and actual devastation wrought by the hurricane and the federal
govenunent's response to the devastation;
Disclosure Officer
September 7,2005
Page Three
11) communications regarding the deployment of the National Guard to New Orleans to
assist in evacuation and relief efforts;
We seek records of any and all kind, including electronic records, audiotapes, videotapes,
and photographs. Our request includes any telephone messages, voice mail messages, daily
agenda and calendars, information about scheduled meetings and/or discussions, whether in-
person or over the telephone, agendas for those ineetings and/or discussions, participants
included in those meetings andlor discussions, minutes of any such meetings and/or discussions,
the topics discussed at those ineetings and/or discussions, e-mail regarding meetings and/or
discussions, e-mail or facsimiles sent as a result of those meetings and/or discussions, and
transcripts or notes of any such meetings and/or discussions.
If it is your position that any portion of the requested records is exempt from disclosure,
CREW requests that you provide it with an index of those documents as required under Vaughn
v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1972). As you are aware, a
Vaughn index must describe eacli document claimed as exempt with sufficient specificity "to
pennit a reasoned judgment as to whether the inaterial is actually exempt under FOIA."
Founding Church of Scientolonv v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Moreover, the
Vaughn index must "describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each
withholding it must discuss the consequences of supplying the sought-after information." Kinn
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210,223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). Further, "the
withholdiilg agency inust supply 'a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the
reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular
part of a withheld document to which they apply."' Id. at 224 (citing Mead Data Central v. U.S.
Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,251 (D.C. Cir. 1977). '
In the event that some portions of the requested records are properly exempt fiom
disclosure, please disclose any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the requested
Disclosure Officer
September 7, 2005
Page Four
records. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b). If it is your position that a document contains non-exempt
segments, but that those non-exempt segments are so dispersed throughout the document as to
make segregation impossible, please state what portion of the document is non-exempt, and how
the material is dispersed throughout the document. Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 261. Claims
of nonsegregability must be made with the same degree of detail as required for claims of
exemptions in a Vaunhn index. If a request is denied in whole, please state specifically that it is
not reasonable to segregate portions of the record for release.
As wit11 the Electronic Privacy Information Center and the ACLU, two organizations that
the courts have found satisfy the criteria necessary to qualify for e ~ p e d i t i o nCREW
,~ "'gathers
information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw
material into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience."' ACLU, 321 F.Supp2d.
at 30 n.5, quoting EPIC, 241 F.Supp.2d at 11.
There'is a particular urgency in informing the public about the circumstances s,urrounding
DHS's response to hurricane Katrina. Myriad news reports have concluded that DHS's reaction
to the hurricane was, and contii~uesto be, inadequate. The public, as well as the numerous
congressional committees that are considering this matter, have a need to know the true facts
underlyiilg the government's response to hurricane Katrina. Accordingly, CREW requests that
this request be expedited.
See ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 321 F.Supp.2d 24,30 (D.D.C. 2004); EPIC v. Dep't
of Defense, 24 1 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2003).
Disclosure Officer
September 7,2005
Page Five
Fee Waiver Request
Under these circumstances, CREW fully satisfied the criteria for a fee waiver.
If you have any questions about this request or foresee any problems in releasing fully the
requested records on an expedited basis, please call either Melanie Sloan or Anne Weismann at
(202) 588-5565. Also, if CREW'S request for a fee waiver is not granted in full, please coiltact
our office immediately upon making such determination. Please send the requested documents
to Melanie Sloal, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W.,
2" Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036.
Melanie Sloan
Executive Director
EXHIBIT 16
D Status of Catastrophic Planning Efforts, October 15, 2001
General Description
This initiative intends to enhance Federal Response Planning activities by focusing solely
on catastrophic disasters: those disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm
the existing disaster response capabilities of local, state, and federal governments. The
initiative will examine, in cooperation with affected state and local governments, loss
estimates for such incidents, current disaster response capabilities, anticipated response
shortfalls, and comprehensive planning strategies for addressing such shortfalls.
Current Federal disaster response capabilities are not robust enough to successfully
address the anticipated effects of catastrophic disasters. This initiative will ensure that
FEMA and its federal, state, and local partners are well prepared to effect an
appropriate, timely, and efficient response to such a catastrophic disaster, thereby
fulfilling FEMA's legislative and executive responsibilities to the Administtation and the
public.
----
Proposed Areas of Study
Budget
No work to date
No work to date
Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning
D Background
Catastrophic disaster response planning is being undertaken in three areas: 1) site-
specific development of response plans; 2) a generic planning document to guide
planning by other sites; and response planning by federal departments and agencies.
Site-Specific Planning: Four risk areas and corresponding catastrophic events have
been identified: Los Angeles metropolitan area (earthquake); New Orleans
(hurricane), LA; Miami, FL (hurricane) and the New Madrid area (earthquake).
o This will involve Region IX (Southern CA), Region VZ (New Orleans), Region IV .
(Miami) and Regions N,V and W (New Madrid area).
o The planning process is underway in Southern California and New Orleans.
o Coordination efforts should begin soon for the Miami and New Madrid risk areas.
o The New Madrid project has already received the support and will be coordinated
by the Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), a regional
consortium of eight states devoted to earthquake preparedness.
Generic Catastrophic Disaster Planning Guidance: As a direct result of the site-
specific planning efforts, generic planning guidance will be developed to assist other
state and local areas in their catastrophic planning.
In suppod of the site-specific planning efforts, Federal departments and agencies also
have to plan in a coordinated fashion for response to a catastrophic disaster. This
planning effort will be coordinated through the ESFLG.
Discussion
The first site-specific catastrophic planning began in California with a kick-off
D meeting in July 2001. The state and Region 9 have since revised their intial
planning process and will use the newly developed ERT-N model as a basic I
By Andrea Shalal-Esa
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States is better prepared to deal with a major disaster like Hurricane
Katrina, which devastated the Gulf region in 2005, but still lacks a formal structure for coordinating a national
response, the head of the U.S. Coast Guard said on Tuesday.
Adm. Thad Allen, appointed to oversee the federal response to Katrina a week after the hurricane, said the
Department of Homeland Security was reworking it's national response plan to incorporate the lessons of Katrina
and other incidents.
"Beyond that I think it's also necessary to take a look at a broad framework for how we can bring together the
different capabilities and competencies across all levels of government -- local, state and federal," Allen said in a
statement.
Allen said he had created a special Coast Guard unit to respond to disasters based on his experience with Katrina.
A similar group was needed at the national level, he said.
He cited some movement in this direction, noting that a group of U.S. officials flew to Lebanon last summer to help
coordinate the evacuation of U.S. citizens during the war between Israel and Hizbollah fighters.
"We're far better prepared than we ever have been before," he told reporters after a speech at the Brookings
Institution.
Allen said the federal government had no clear mandate to get involved from the start in Katrina, because current
protocols call for local and state officials to oversee the response to a natural disaster.
As the 2007 hurricane season nears, New Orleans officials are telling residents the city is better prepared than it
was before Katrina, which killed at least 1,300 people, but they still cannot assure their safety.
Forecasters predict the hurricane season, which starts on June I , will be busy, and the Gulf Coast could well be
hit.
Katrina flooded 80 percent of New Orleans when its storm surge swamped the surrounding levees in 2005. The
storm caused some $81 billion in damage, the most by a natural disaster in the United States.
0 Reuters 2006. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content, including by caching, framing or similar means, is expressly
prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reilters and the Reuters sphere logo are registered trademarks and trademarks of the
Reuters group of companies around the world.
Reuters journalists are subject to the Reuters Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclos~~re
of relevant interests.
EXHIBIT 18
Strategic Catastrophic Disaster Planning Work Group
November 21,2002
.
Kansas City, Region 7 Office
In Attendance:
Charlie Hess, HQ
Barbara Yagerman, HQ
Dan Bement, R5
Curt Musgrave, R7
Sue Evers, R7
Chuck Gregg, R6
Moises Dugan, R6
Dan Best, R7
Ginger Edwards, R4
Paul Fay, R4
Patrick Dardis, R7
Charlie Hess opened the work group session. He stated that the goal of this
session was to brainstorm ideas for a better process for catastrophic disaster
planning. Out of this meeting he wanted a course of action for catastrophic
planning.
Before leaving, Dick Hainje asked if the New Madrid Earthquake (NMEQ) was
predictable enough that FEMA could adequately plan for it? This question
generated discussions about the use of a "Super DFO," ERT-N, etc. Discussed
was the requirement by law of Presidential declarations to be made on a state-
by-state basis. It was discussed that there were many issues that haven't been
worked through yet, i.e. housing, rescue, command and control, massive injuries
and death.
1) Political catastrophe
2) State-wide catastrophe
3) Nation-wide catastrophe
This generated much discussion on what the NMEQ would be. It was determined
that this would include all of the types listed above.
Backqround Briefinq:
The Regional Earthquake Work Group (2001) came up with a goal and several
long- and short-term objectives. They are as follows:
Goal 1.0 Have in place a response strategy for the New Madrid Earthquake.
-
0
: Will have to deploy assets immediately.
-
0
: Focusing (depending) too much on CUSEC, instead of planning on our
own. CUSEC is not operational.
.0
: Should planning be catastrophic or earthquake focused? Consensus that
we are approaching generalized catastrophic planning rather than
developing individual catastrophic plans for each potential event. Any of
the four events may occur at any time, or a un-anticipated catastrophic
event may occur requiring us to be ready for any eventuality. Prefer to go
with one catastrophic plan.
-
0
: FCO's need to know what we're working on and get their buy-in, as well
as RD's and other stakeholders.
*: Must get information up front; that will affect our ability to respond and
prioritize. Early intelligence will make the'response and recovery
operation go smoother. . .
0
-: Where are we going? Need to identify homeless, etc. on a chronological
approach: what is needed the first 24 hours, 72 hours, 1'' week, and 1st.
month? This is a mapping approach that paces the decision maker
through information collection routines to achieve focus on time sensitive
issues. What information is needed for each specific area? Could it be
broken into time-from-event?
0
-: Should have the same work group evaluation and planning for the four
catastrophic disasters to be consistent.'Should have a common approach
. on all of the events. The way we go operational should be the same way
we plan.
.0
: Five things that we need immediately when a catastrophic event occurs:
1) Money in the pipeline
2) Lifesaving teams on the ground
3) Media messages
4) Congressional organization (legislative issue resolution)
5) Equal weight between response operations and recovery
operations
0
.: They created a planning template in Georgia for the counties. The
counties had to fill in the details and it made the plans consistent.
O How does all of this mesh? How will we de-conflict all of the different
levels of plans, Federal, State and local?
03 Start using the plan, show it to the states, collect issues and fix them.
0
.: Would like to have HQ guidance on issues, goals, etc; then we could all
focus on a common approach. What does HQ want from the Regions?
Need consistency as a strategy.
0
.: Maybe a need for an organizational structure similar to the EST at the field
level for catastrophic disasters. 'This raised considerable discussion as to
the need for a top driven approach for very large, complex disasters that
present high profile issues. This top driven structure could address issues
of resource allocation, legislative/policy/regulatory problem solving,
coordination of media messages.
*:* Charlie asked Dan Best to take the information discussed and put it into a
format for the NMEQ group. Dan agreed and Chuck Gregg will help him.
Due before Christmas. 2) Would like to make this work group a vehicle for
I
catastrophic planning (not just the NMEQ) and add Region 9
representation to the group; expand the group; make a presentation to the
ESFLG and CDRG on this concept (la quarter FY03).
0
.: Decision makers may need to have a menu of options available to them
when anticipated events occur, rather than expecting them to know the
one best approach to resolution.
03 What is being done with the Disaster Housing Group and other related
initiatives? Should be identified in issue paper. Also should get an idea
on current funding streams for catastrophic planning and related
initiatives.
0
.: Identify operational earthquake objectives in ElWPG and follow-up in .
review conferences.
0
.: Need to explore innovations to expedite the delivery of services in these
highly complex, high profile disaster operations.
Reqional Status Reports:
Fay (R4): Tennessee has done the most planning for the NMEQ. Region 4. has
done little on the RR side. For the RlSC in March, could possibly focus on EQ
planning. Very short staffed, but will assign someone to work on the work group.
Bement (R5): Illinois has done more EQ planning than the other states, but still
has a ways to go. EQ planning in R5 is mitigation driven, but RR is sitting in on
EQ conference calls and attending some EQ conferences. They also are short
staffed, but will assign someone to work on the work group.
Dugan (R6): They are trying to consolidate the different divisions on catastrophic
planning. They have been working on the'NMEQ plans with Arkansas, and on
catastrophic planning with the City of New Orleans. Sees CUSEC as a partner.
Would like to see a California catastrophic disaster-planning piece to workfrom.
Needs assessment tools on how to assess after a catastrophic disaster. Not a lot
of momentum in R6 for EQ planning.
Musgrave (R7): Annex to the Regional Response Plan is finished. DOE gave R7
a lot of material regarding power outages. Working on an exercise involving the
MSCA team. Has reorganized the RlSC on a structured basis, with a 3-year
strategic plan. Missouri has done well in preparing for a NMEQ. Would like to see
people in the local communities trained to do on-ground assessments to move
information quickly up the chain.
HQ Activities:
Charlie Hess has assigned a person from the Division to work with each
catastrophic disaster scenario. She will be working on the NMEQ. Can now see
that there needs to be an overall strategy. Has started on a statement of work,
i.e. task and estimate of cost. Will be more involved in the budget process.
. .
Barbara Yagerman will start to send out ESFLG minutes to the working group
members.
.
Also,
.
will forward the last few meeting minutes.
Discussion:
Action Planning: --
ACTION PLAN
ACTION ITEMS
DELIVERABLES
General Description
This initiative intends to enhance Federal Response Planning activities by focusing solely on
catastrophic disasters: those disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm the
existing disaster response capabilities of local, state, and federal governments. The initiative
will examine, in cooperation with affected state and local governments, loss estimates for
such incidents, current disaster response capabilities, anticipated response shottfalls, and
comprehensive planning strategies for addressing such shortfalls.
Current Federal disaster response capabilities are not robust enough to successfully address
the anticipated effects of catastrophic disasters. This initiative will ensure that FEMA and its
federal, state, and local partners are well prepared to effect an appropriate, timely, and
efficient response to such a catastrophic disaster, thereby fulfilling FEMA's legislative and
executive responsibilities to the Administration and the public.
Intended outcomes of this project include incident-specific response plans for preselected
geographic regions, based upon loss estimating models and capability inventories of affected
local, state, and federal responders. Additional outcomes will include: (1) a planning
ternplate for all catastrophic incidents, anticipating response contingencies beyond the
Federal Response Plan; (2) conduct of incident-specific exercises; and (3) proposed
legislation and/or executive action to facilitate catastrophic disaster response.
.,. , .,. ,., .. . , . . , .. Budget .. . ... .. . . .. . . . . .... . ... .. - . . ... .... . .- . --.- ..
NO work to date
No work to date
EXHIBIT 20
Attachment B- 1;Exhibit # 1
Operations Support DRF - Disaster Support Activity - Storage and Warehousing
ProgramdOrg - (4520-7400)
OPERATIONS
A. Title: Enhance the Operations of Federal Emergency Teams through Standardizing Federal response
operations and Developing and Maintaining a Professional Cadre of Operations personnel Trained and
Qualified to Serve on Emergency Teams.
B. ActiviW Description: This activity provides for (1) working group activities associated with the Emergency
Teams Steering Group and Operations POCs to develop standard operating procedures for all emergency teams,
to include the National and Regional Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), the Regional Support Teams, the
Emergency Support Team and specialized Federal tactical teams and service providers used in disaster
operations; (2) the identificationand procurement of critical equipment and supplies necessary to improve the
performance of Federal response officials on emergency teams; (3) . The objectives are:
To design and document processes to standardize National and Regional response operations within FEMA
and among the Federal response community that will improve the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability
and timliness of providing disaster services and commodities to those impacted by disasters or emergencies.
To develop tools used in training and in field operations to facilitate the performance of tasks on emergency
teams.
To facilitate an accrediation program that will increase the skills and capabilities of Federal response
operations personnel.
C. Program Results: To improve the standardization of Federal response operations throughout FEMA and its
Federal response partners by developing and disseminating documentation and tools. (Applicable Strategic
Goal ~ e a s ; r e 21i3; ~ ~ ~ l i c a~eiforrnance
ble Goalkleasure 414a).
D. Performance Indicators:
Attachment B- 1;Exhibit # 1
Operations Support DRF - Disaster Support Activity - Storage and Warehousing
ProgramlOrg - (4520-7400)
E. 2004 Propram: In 2003, Response and Recovery requested atotal of $1,560,000 and xx work years for this
activity. The following will be accomplished:
Conduct Working Groups sessions associated with the Emergency Teams Steering Group, Operations POC
group to review best practices from government and the private sector to design standard operating processes
and procedures to improve response operations and support associated with Federal emergency team
operations.
Develop requirements for essential personnel and asset protection equipment and supplies needed to protect
Federal emergency team responders who respond to WMD operations.
Procure equipment, supplies, and tools to enhance facilities used by Regional Support Teams, Emergency
Support Team and Emergency Response Teams.
EXHIBIT 21
I
State of Louisiana
MILITARY DEPARTMENT
d
OFFICE 1 F HOMELAND SECURITY 8 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
aa
- /M;G 03
._....-
DATE
llENNY.'l'r C. l,hNI)RL;N):AlJ
- FAX COVER SHEET MAJOH tiENElWL
THE ADJUTANTGENERAL
1)IREC'rOll
hlIClLACL L UHOWN
TO: ai& - $.& %+GV& cobonrL (LA)
I SECTION: w ,
ASISCANT DIRECTOR
I
PHOM:
FAX:
aoNn. nl pzpcs
--Im1
?~6#'?i2Gi (l~~clutll~ig
cnvrr pryt)
7667 I N D E P E ~ ~ E N CBLVD
E - BATON ROUGE,LOUISIANA 70806
TELE'YHONE:(225) 925-7500 PAX (225) 925-7501
The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness desires to obtain a working plan for the scarch
m d rescue, evacuation. sheltering, provisioning, and infrestructurc restoration for the greater New
Orlcans area in che event of a catastrophic cvent such as the impaa of a major hurricane which
could possibly cause extensive d,amageand flooding in rhe metropolitan arc3 of grcatcr Ncw
Orleans.
---
b No or lirni-d traditional access 10 all area
All.Pumping stations inoperable
Hospimls overcrowded with special needs patients and family mernbcrs
Hospitals have no or limited power
T b c plan mmt include dirccrion & cooool. search & rc..uc, cvacuarion, securiry, sheltering, health
& medical, transportation, and infrastructure restoration.
i
- Direerron & control: Assess the survivability of the State and Parish cmagency manugcmcnt
offices, staffing. and communications to manage tho event. The plan musl
I
I
Searck & Rescue: Assess thc clartnt search and rcscuc capabilities in the state and surrounding
stares. irhe plan must:
~ddresskey pick up points for movement of rescucd person fromthe aren and identification
- and namc.ofadditional resources to meet the demand,
1nclude.theprioritization of medical stdf and supplrcs for hospitals and other medical
fscilitics into the impact arca.
- Evocaarion: Assess the evacuation processes and piovidc plan with key pickup points for thc
highest dcgrcc of e v a c u a ~ f m l h e ~ ~ h m t l s t : - - ~ - - - -
-
--
-.-----
Include the identification and transportation for security staff for hospitals and shelters.
Slreltering:- Assess c m n t sheltering plan for Southeast Humcanc taskforcc. The plan must:
~valuetcexisting shclrers.
r Identify additional short and long-term housing.
Identie locations for building 1empora.ry.housingfacilities.
ldcntify locations for shcjtcring and care of recovery workers:
Identi6 support services for sheltm
HeoUlr & Medlcal: Assess current opmational plans for health and mcdica1 services in thc
impacted area. Tbc plan musL
Tbe plan must ensure tbc integrity of the direction and control system sllrcady established for
management of response &d tecovcry effons. These include the Federal Response Plan, tbe
Louisiana Emergency Opuations Plan,and the local Parish Emergency Operations Plan
- -
Assumptions
a) State EOC
b) Parish EOC
c) Joint Operations Ccntas (JOC)that may be ntnblishcd
d) F n l A
c) Federal Agencies
f) Statc Coordinatiag Oficer
2) Federal Coordinating Omccr
h) Disaster Field Office (DFO) -- -- ___
-
2. Stare EOC Operation
Whar manpower requirement will bc needed for the long-term staffkg of the Statc EOC?
who^ suppon scrviccs (food, water, med.cal, saniation, c k . ) will be rcquirzd for rhe
longtem stdfing o f the Sate EOC? ' --
c) Assess the survivability of the State EOC and its abili~yto function. T h i s includes powcr.
phones. communication systems, and support scrviccs.
, 03/2?/03 FRI 1 5 : d S FAX 225 $ 2 5 7 5 0 2 L.OEP
d ) Whar is thc contingency plan and the capability to relocate rhc State EOC,if requircd?
c) What additional communication resources would be required at thc State EOC?These
includc wirc and wireless strvices.
f) What ndditionnl transportation assels will bc requircd to l m p o r ( State EOC staff to and
frOm the event area?
a) What mllnp*tr requirement will be nccdcd for the long-term stofFg o f JOCs if
established?
b) Whar suppon services (food, water, medical, sanitation, ctc.) will be required for the
long-tcnn staffing of the JOC?
c) Wha additional communication resources would be required at the JOG? Thcsc include
wirc sad wircless services.
d) What additional transponauon assets will be required to muspor! EOC staff to and from
the 30C?
Communication Systems
5 . Wbar additional communication resources would be rquLcd for adequatc direction and
control cornrnunics~onsfor?
a) Search and rescue operations
b) Post event c~cuation
c) Medical operaTions
d) RiverTraffic
e) Supply distribution
f ) Airtrafficcontrol
6. U'hat is the ready a\.ailabiliryof those communicarionrcsourcts?
7. What communicatjon systcrn or systems must h e unploycd for joint coordination
communications b c t w m d~fferent functional groups?
8. What additional telcphone services would be required for citizen's communication in and out
of rhe affic~edarea? E-g., call family, insurarrcc company, etc.
Raeurce Allocation
1, Locd Wildlife Agents work wirh local sheriff offices. usually one and one.
2. Local Wildlifc Agcnn provide assessment for dispersal to LDWF rescue teams and Dive
team for search situations.
2 . T\vo man reams work 12-hour shifrs,with ~ W Oman backups on the boats.
4. ldentificarion of other penom thac are assigned to work with LDWF personnel.
5. If additional boats are commandeered who will help LDWF pay for them aficr thc mission is
over?
1. Identify fresh water, fbd. and supplies that must be vansported by small:boars into rht
impact area. Identify supplier and locations of these supplies,
2. Define d ~ best
c method of conamunitationsto bc used bctwccn h e rcscuc teams and
collection points.
3. Idcntij. supplier and location for body bags to bc U S C ~by the search and rcscue reams?
4. Identi* supplier and location of fucl and ourboard motor oil to Wildlife and Fishcries boats?
5. Who will supply food and watcr lo the Wildlife Enforcement Agents working the disasrer
a c a?
6. Idcnrify best location for sires for aircraft and helicopter Inndings?
7 ldcntify rhc poroions of elevated interstate or other clcvatcd sites that are a minimum of 3200
fcet in lcngzh that cnn hold maximum gross weight of 135,000 to 155.000 pounds m d
withstand rnomcntary impacts of 25,000 to 300,000 pounds?
8. Identify thc maximum width of the roadway, elevation or side walls above road surface, and
whal are rhe sign posts ma& of and how are they anchored a thc above sites?
9. List of sources for aircraft by ryp, location. capacity, maximum goss wdght, and required
cJte off and landing requirements.
10. Identify conmcts and at what poinr can rail synem, barges. operatc during the elevated watcr
conditions.
Priorities
The priority is to save human life. rescue, rclocation, provision< and mcdicsl dependants.
Other questions.
1 . Assignment of medical tcam to care for critically injurcd, wounded, ill or infants with
immediate need o f medical attention.
2. Injured, ill. u~oundrdor infanrs not in jmrnediatc nccd of medical anention.
-PA--
_ ---.-
-._ - - 3 M & + m M 4 e + i n ~ e d d i l l c -
4. Hospital patients, infants.
5 . Elderly persons. gersom in wata, debris, drifts, rooftops, trees, etc.
6. Pcrsons in need of mcdicarjon
7. Srranded pcrsons in nccd vf vansport u, slaging a r c s .
8. Providc rransportarion and logistics a s j e r request by other emergency workers whencvcr
possible.
UtI/ZZ/OJ FRI 15149 FAX 225 BZS 7502 L. OEP
9. What k ~ n d sof aids will be uscd to support night opuations and who will be rcsponslble for
supplying this equipment and whcn will it bc coming from.
10. What bridge will be m m e d immediately after rhe disaster, will they bc able lo operate
wirhout outsidc eltclrjcity?
1 1. What radio .system is supposed to be used by all orher agcncies and who will establish,
maintain, and provide the communioations equipment to all agencies involved
12. What types of boats will bc rcquired to suppon the operation?
13. How and where wilI landing zoncs be established?
14. How will Imding zoncs be supplied?
15. Who wlH dead be given to for processing?
16. Who will be in charge of river mnrincmffic?
17. How mnny and whur will landing zoncs be located and marked?
18. Will there cvcntually be J joint operations control sct up and whut will it be?
19. How will air uaffic control be handled and where will it be located?
20. Who will assigned to sort, transport and care for dl the diffcrcnt categories or cvacuees that
wcre taken our of New Orleans to whatever Jocation they arc landed or dropped off?
21. How will fedaal and other personnel iwcrfact with rescuc agencies drcady in the area?
22. Where will rhe t e o l p o q morgue be set up?
23. W h o will be responsible for Itnine wildlife and fisheries know wha~othcr rescuc personnel
will bc heading ,into the arca?
Assumptions
1 . Estimate 3 1,000 special needs patients in rhc greater Ncw OrIems arca
2. SpcciaJnccds p a t i c n ~will be relocated to hospitals and shelters prior to thc hurricane
3. Power outages will be widespread throughout the area
4. Badcup power generators may not bc available due flooding
- 5 . Hospitals and medical faciliries may become shelters for staff family mcmbcrs
Special h'ceds
local/scare/ resources?
5 , What is the shortfaII that urill need to be provided by the Fedeml govunment.
6. Which Regions will absorb these patients? What resource will they n e d to care for this
popularion?
7. How m y Special Nccds shelters will be needed?
8. How many are presently identified and what is their capacity? Wha~is the shortfnl]?
3. How will the special needs shclttrs will bc supplied and equipped? (beds, monitors, oxygcn,
ctc)
10. What spccial equiprncnt will bc,nccded?What is the sustainability of thc cquiprnem?
I 1. What Contingency plans for back-up resources are in-place? What needs to bc dcvcloped?
12. What are the Security force ~quircmentsand capabilities?
a) S w e y Nursing Homes:
1) Where arc they Iocalrd?
2) What is their census?
3) who is staying?
--
___----
4)
--_
W h o will be evacuated? , _ _ _ - - . ---
1. Dacrmine the discharge plans for each hospital based on an impending hurricane?
2. What is thc availability of bed spacc ixs a result of the discharge plan?
3. How can vacant bed space be utilized?
4. What is Jlc survivability and capacity of backup power gcncntion equipment?
n) What contingency plans and addirional emergency back-up sysrems arc ,n place7
5 . What is the assessment of cvrrent manpower?
. 08/22/05 FRI 1 5 : 5 0 F A X 225 925 7302 L.OEP
. -
Survey Hospitab Outsidc the Impacted..Area
1. Provide an assessment of current resources (manpower and quipmen0 in the LSU Medical
Systcm.
2 . What is thc ability of syslcrn to recJ v c transfers fmm the impacted area?
3. What is their ability to suppon Special Necds Shelter operations in immediate impact area
and outside thc impacted ilrea?
a. What woul'dthe hospitd rqfequircrncntsoutside of the impact arca?
5 . What arc thcir existing security force capabilities? What should thcy be?
I . h r e rhcre specific plans for mental hcallh ourpatients who have evacuated? If yes. whnr
facilities arc available outside of the impact area to
2. what are the plans for private agencies providing scrvices to ou1patirn1s7
3) ldentlb plans by specific servicc providers. --
h) Identify scrvicc providers needing plans.
3. Wbar are the plans for the city owned facilities?
a) Identify plans by specific service providers.
b) ldcntify service provide? needing plans
4. Should plans for outpatient differ &om in-paticnu?
5. What are thc security forde requircnrcnts and capabilities of rhc mental hcallh clinics in
impact area?
=COVERY PHASE
I . What public health issues cust in an area that may be alnrost entirely evacuated?
2. Conduct public hcalth conut ns nsstssmcnt (in conten of flooded envirclnmw-
-4rPridkmhe mon critical public hcalth needs to a d d r e d first.
4. Detcrminc the best disposal of dead animals
5 . Develop rescue a d relocation of= a n i d s from the impact area.
6 . Dererminc Sanitation ahd Wacr qudity issues.
7. Dclermine the H m d issues tlrat impact public hcalrh and safety in the irnpacl a r c s
--Mass Fa?a1i@Planning
1. no impact area Parish Coroner Offices have plans that mcct the needs for this level of mass
casualty?
2. Do the specifications for body bags ddined by the Parish Coroner offices in the impa& arca
conflict with each other? Docs the FEMA spcciiication for body bags meet rhe I.ocal
requirements? -
3. Wha~method of identification will bc bcsr suited for casualties in the impan area?
4. &fine collection point(s) for moycmenc and processing of mass casualtjcs.
Other Issues
1. Do the hospitals havc plans and facilities ro meet thc needs based on High incidcnt 0B and
irrunineat delivcrics?
2. Identify Crisis Lntwention Tcams/CISMfCn'ds Counseling for general population and
shelrers
3. Does the method of storage a d retrieval of Medial Records uxd by the hospirals, nursing
homcs, a d othcr mcdical facilities meet the requirements in thc evmt of a major disaqtcr in
*e impact area?
1 . Dercrminc the best locations in the city for pickup of cv3cuees without transpornation.
2. Determine Ihc transporntion assets that will bc needed to suppon the logistics ro ahd frola
the impact area.
3. Dcttnninc lbe best priorities and points of origin for search and rescue, medical, humat,
security. logislics. and media.
4. Determine the transsportadon ;rsserr rha~will be needed to pmvidc transporntion for search
and rescue teams, logistical supplics, donated goods management, and dcbris removal.
5. Deterrninc bcst locotion for m ~ ~ ~ ~ i e f s - ~ o ~ n u o l ~
England Air Park (Alexandria, Louisiana) has k e n designated the primary staging point for
logistical supplics.
--
I . Derenninc the survivability of h e facifhies st England Air Park based on thc scenario.
3. Determine the capabiliry of thc air tra.ffic conbol facility tosupport the projected level of.
aircraft landings.
4: Determine thc capabiliry of the logistical off-toad facilirics.
5. De~erminethc cnpabiliry of logistic transfer and shipment via ground transporution.
I . For this nudy. the emu don and l o n g 4 m shettming will have to be rcdefind. I
6. What supplies will k ~ c c d e din the sheltas upon opening and long-rem.
7. Assess shdter operations. overall management, staffing, fcediy, ctc. I
8 Identify usable shelters wewide with number of persons that can be houscd.
9. Identify travel tra~lcr,mobile home. and t n t city Iocations in the sate and surrounding states.
10.ldentify medical and educational nccds of sheltn occupants.
1 I . Evalua~euse of motels and apanments for crcluded short-tcnnshelrering.
12. Assess the transporntion nccds of shelter occupants. I
I LONG TERM
I. Identify locations for l q e , long-term tent cities.
2, ldcnrify location to build more permanent tempomy housing strucwrcs for sheltering.
3. Evaluate the use of facilities such as stare and federal mili~arybascd cmd other federal
fncilitics for long-term shcltcring.
4. Evaluatc thc use o f state and federal parks for Ions-lem shellering.
5 . Determine thc i n f m l n l e ~ esystunr need for long-term shelterin(:operations.
6. Evduatc the use of mobile home. travel trailer, apartments. and rental housing for long-rerm
sheltering.
7. Identify the mcdical and cduc3rional suppon needed in long-tenn shelter comrnuniuts.
8. ldentify thhsupplies need for long-rem shelicr communities.
9. Assess lonprcnn shcllcr opention management and stafing.
10. Evaluazc unique altcmntivc hau-iog such as ships. boas.
I I . Assess the transponation nccds of long-term shclrrr occupants.
12. I dcnrify long -term shcltcr facilitjcs for recovery workers.
13. IdcntiFy locations lo build permanent housing in thc event the decision is made nor to allow
rc-build nnd return KOthe impact area.
I
I DIEBRIS REMOVAL
I Quantity Estimate
-
1. Pre Event What volumc of debris is cstimatcd to rcsuh fiom the worst-case xcnario for thc
entire affected area by parish?
2. Posr Evcnr - What volume of dcbris is estima~edfollowing landfall?
I Clearance
I
1. Who is responsible for thc retnoval, reduction and disposal of debris?
2. Whet plans arc in place?
3. Who an the POCs?
4. Do plans address the following areas:
a Public property (land and waterway)
b. Private property
-
c. Scope a clear defmirion of what limits arc in place for removal of debris from privarc
P'OPcrry.
d. Thc p r og L vtof-'' ~
e. Pre-disaster identification of sitcs where debris can bc reduced andfor disposed.
f. What existing Idlls cxist and what arc their cllmnt capacity?
g. what new sites can be acquired for disposal?
h. Environmental baselille for new disposal sites.
i. Mcchod of obtaining environmental permitdwaivm for new silcs-
j. Legal considenrions for the sitcs to exsmine prior to thc disaster.
-
k. Problems associated with Chc rmovrrl, disposa1, and reduction of hazardous mtcrials?
1 Dcmolirion of unsafe buildinjis.
1. Determine the pre-event estimate of damage and reqidual capability of vansponation systcn
components to include:
a) Roads
b) Bridges
c) Railroads -
d) firpons
c) Pipelines
I) Waxerways (Navigable)
8 ) Port Facilities
h) Docks
i) Fcmes
2. Dctcnninc tbe responsible party for the restoration o f cach system? M l a plans
~ arc in place?
W h o arc rhc Poinls of contact?
3. What is the priority of restorlrtion witbin each category?
4. Provide a lining of available field clcvation databases woitld be compiled in a GIS f m n r
and provided to thc LAOEP.
UTILITIES
1 . What i s tbc prc-event cstimale of dnmage and residual c~pabilityof utility systems to
include:
a) El-cat . .
b) Watcr
c) Gas
d) Scweragc
I 2. Communications
3. Who is responsible lor the restoration of each system? What plans a ~ cin place? Who arc the
Point of contact?
4. What is the prioriry of restoration within tach category? Coordinnte with exisring "Utility
I
Coordination Council" for each affcctcd Parish or individual utilirits.
5. A Lirting of critics1 utility components and thcir locarion should be complicd and provided to
LAOEP.
-.
-
b?L(WATERING
-..
I . Identify and locate criticid facilities. Establish the priority of critical facilities rhat nccd 10 be
de-watered.
a) Pump stations In addition to data developed for pump stati~nsunder Flood Control
Systems,the following will be needed:
I ) Include all available design data
2) Describe kcy components of the pump station ro include pumps, motors, clcc~rical
cquipmenr, engincs, emergency gcncrators. flood prorcction elcv;ltions, and pump
w e s .
3) Include elevations of all kcy equipment and onticipatcd condition subsqucnr to being
unda warcr for 1-14 days.
4) Determine what stcps can be taken pre-event to minimizc damage to pumps and
equipment.
b) Graviry drainage - reference Flood Conuol Systnns
-
c Levccs, flood wall^ Vehicultlr & Navigable Gares referekc Flood Control Systems.
2. Dc-water to normal lake Ievd . . '
a) htcrminc cnviromentrrl impacts u, rccciving water body.
b) Determine prioriry and effectiveness of gatc openings, Adbess items such as method of
opening. who will opcn gates, ctc.
c) Dcteminc potenrial brccch locarions of Icvees/flaodwalls.
d) Detamioc procedures to utilize existing pumps as siphods
c) Dcicrminc fmibiliry of utilizing ponable pumps'dredges.
I Public Facilities
4 Pumping stations
a) In a CIS database for each protective loop, identify and locate all navigation pxojccrs.
both Fcdcral and Local.
b) Provide pump c w e s for normal operation and as a siphon.
C ) Dctcrrnine what is needed for siphon action to drain the interior. I
d) Determinc how long ?he station can function during an cvcnt. considcrjnp, sollrcc of
power. scruchual capability, and s a w of personnel,
e) For cach loop, describe thc drainage system and its abiliry to move w a t u by gravity from
station to nation or throujgh tbc proltdion levee.
f ) Determine who is responsible for upcrating the station, interim repairs and whether they
havc the capability to perform after the event.
-- -
Hazardous Materials
1. Develop a GIs databssc: identify and cakgorjze the potential sources of hawdous material.
Include typcs, volumes, pound elevations, type of storage f3cilitics. structural dcsim of
storage lac~lities,ctc. needed to deruminc survivability.
2. What i s I& pre-evcnt cstirnate of thc magnitude and location of hazardous marerial spills rhal
will take place base on thc worst-wc scenario?
. V V I L L C U J rnl 1 ~ ; 3 4 r M Y 2 3 813 7 5 0 2 L. OEP BOZO
3. Identify the residual capability of each industry, L A Statc Police, DEQ,USCG, and EPA lo
respond to this scenario. Tdentify conujcts hat are in place for response.
EXHIBIT 22
NDMS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Medical Response
Needs Assessment- support State efforts to rapidly assess medical response needs
by providing trained personnel for rapid needs assessments
Medical Care in Shelters- assist mass care providers with medical care for
evacuees
Special Needs Patients- assist with medical care for evacuated special needs
populations, including establishment of special needs shelters, if required
Patient Movement and Definitive Care- move patients from the affected area to
NDMS hospitals that can provide definitive care
Mental Health Services- provide mental health services for federal responders and
assessment/referral services for patients treated at NDMS field facilities.
Public Health
Health surveillance
22 August 2003
m c p~jf355~
Food and drug safety
Emergency worker health and safety
Mental health services for the affected population
Chemical, biological, and radiological hazards consultation
Public health information
Vector control
Potable water, waste water, and solid waste disposal technical assistance
22 August 2003
EXHIBIT 23
IEM Team to Develop Catastrophic Hurricane Disaster Plan for New Orleans & Southeas ... Page 1 of 2
0b o u t IEM
Presitlenl'b I~4eqgage
a What's New
P V ~ E~ S~ ~ I o u ~ s Q c ;
g;) Prvduclr B Services
Hemeland Sewniy
0Ca~eers
Hot Jobs
ORICE? Location3 'tdhllt Papkrb C2E !v! Wouk~rigC O I I ~ I ! I ~ I I ~
Exevuirve B~ographlcs Rolaand Cl~nks Infmta'l~on'Te~hmolqy IEM 01111~s
Glienfv Bonehts
1
8IEM.
I E M Team to Develop Catastrophic Hurricane Disaster Plan for New
Orleans & Southeast Louisiana
June 3, 2004
IEM, Inc., the Baton Rouge-based emergency management and homeland security
consultant, will lead the development of a catastrophic hurricane disaster plan for
Southeast Louisiana and the City of New Orleans under a more than half a million dollar
contract with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).
The IEM team will complete a functional exercise on a catastrophic hurricane strike in
Southeast Louisiana and use results t o develop a response and recovery plan. A
catastrophic event is one that can overwhelm State, local and private capabilities so
quickly that communities could be devastated without Federal assistance and multi-
agency planning and preparedness.
Thomas said that the greater New Orleans area is one of the nation's most vulnerable
locations for hurricane landfall.
"Given this area's vulnerability, unique geographic location and elevation, and troubled
escape routes, a plan that facilitates a rapid and effective hurricane response and
recovery is critical," he said. "The IEM team's approach to catastrophic planning meets
the challenges associated with integrating multi-jurisdictional needs and capabilities into
an effective plan for addressing catastrophic hurricane strikes, as well as man-made
catastrophic events."
IEM President and CEO Madhu Beriwal is the recipient of a s pecial merit award from the
Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association ( LEPA ) for her work in New Orleans
hurricane emergency preparedness.
IEM Team to Develop Catastrophic Hurricane Disaster Plan for New Orleans & Southeas... Page 2 of 2
IEM, Inc. was founded in 1985, and is one of the leading emergency management
corporations in the U.S. While some organizations include emergency management as
one of many business areas, helping to plan for and manage emergencies is IEM's core
business . IEM's clients include some of the foremost federal emergency and defense
organizations in the U.S., including the Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
www.ieminc. com
*James Lee Witt Associates was a member of the original team, but did not
participate in the project.
m ? m d . q m T dm .&+'$pT-l
Emergency Protective Measures In 2003, the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency (DCEMA) contracted IEM to Barbara Childs-Pair
Plan 8 Decision MaMx produce The National Capital Regmnal Decision Matn'x-a tool to facilitate multi-organizational
Cost: $496,750.00
IEM assisted Oregon's Oftice of Emergency Management and related Federal and local emergency
I
Chris B r o w
planning organizations in analyz~ngand improving Umahlla County's readiness to respond to
Date Completed May 2001 chemical emergencies. Exercise data was used to measure performance of response organi~ati~ns
against a set of IEMdeveloped performance measures; based on the assessment, IEM developed a
'roadmap' of actions to be completed to meet the performancegoals. Oregon is now lauded as an
Cost: $150,000 00 exemplary program by the Govemrnenrs auditors, the General Accounting Office.
Alabama Special Facility Planning As part of our ongoing FEMA project to provide emergency planning support to the communities in Joe Hening
the vlclnity of the chemlcal stockpile at Ann~ston,AL, IEM developed detailed, site-specific
emergency response plans for 150 speaal facll~tiesin Alabama (businesses, publldprivate schools,
Date to be Compbted. July 2004
mental health fac~l~t~es,retirement homes, etc.)
Cosl $2,974,274.00
Page 28
FEMA P.rogram:lntegatlon IEM has provided program integration support services to FEMA's Technological Services Division
since 1999. We have worked with many Federal, State, local, and Tribal stakeholders to coordinate
( Dan Civis
Date Completed: aclive through July FEMA's effort to provide communities with the capability to respond to an emergency at one of the
2004 nation's eight chemical stowile sites on the continental U.S. This work has included development
of programmatic performance measures, emergency planning and policy development, risk analysis
and hazard modeling, development and implementationof decision support tools, facilitation of
Cost: % 1OM workgroups and conferences, and public affairs suppot
CDC Blotenorism Exercises IEM is contracted with the CDC to provide exercise services to assist state public health agencies in
preparing for and responding to emergencies caused by terrorist acts and disasters. IEM has
I Chadie Ross
Date Completed: April 2004 faalitated public health exercises for the Kentucky Department of Public Health for the Hazard and
Paducah Emergency Management Areas. The Paducah exercise aimed at evaluating smallpox.
strategic national sto-ile, and biotemorism plans using a local smallpox outbreak scenario.
Cosl: $36.170.00
- - - - - - - - -
1:
Port of Lake Charles Vulnerability In 2002. the Port of Lake Charles contracted IEM to conduct a Port Vulnerability Assessment to Jim Robinson
and Assessment and Mitigatlon determine security enhancements to reduce threats from both natural and manmade hazards. IEM
Plan analyzed 67 possible threats using a quantitative analytical methodology, ranking the threats
amrding to likelihood and impact. IEM identified 33 security issues where the Port and community
experts could focus security planning efforts. These identified vulnerabilities, representing 81% of
Date February 2003 the total risks facing the Port, were addressed in a Seaport MitigationStrategy (SMS) report, which 1 '.,
..
detailed the means by which hazards could be mitigated and security enhanced at this strategic
cost: $200,000.00 port.
Louisiana Region 9 Emergency IEM is develop~ngthe Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Thomas Thiebaud
Operations Plan (LHSIEP) Region 9 Emergency Operations Plan. Region 9 indudes St. Helena, St. Tammany,
Page 29
- - .- - -
concept of operations and amgeneral p1anning"approach. IEM will deliver a &aft all-hazards
Cost: $54,220.00 Emergency Operations Plan and facilitate a tabletop exercise. After the exercise. IEM will update the
draft plan and deliver a final plan, along with a database of regional resources available for use in
response.
FEMA Scenario Based Orientation In 2002, IEM assisted the FEMA Office of National Preparedness (ONP) in developing event Craig Conklin
scenarios that would characterize the roles and response actions taken at Federal, state, regional.
Date Completed: 2002 and local levels for chemical, biological, and radiologicalemergencies. IEM's approach brought (202) 646-3030
together personnel h.om the Office of National Preparedness and the Response and Recovery
-
Division and allowed them to openly discuss and negotiate their roles. The resuH was a dear plcture craig.conklin@dhs.gov
Cost: This faskis funded under /EM3 of FEMA roles and responsibilities in a chemical stockpile accident or incident. The scenario-based
FEMA CSEPP Program Integration format allowed FEMA's Senior Staff to visualize the response and quickly recognize the impacts of
contract, currently valued at 810M particular activities. FEMA's Standard Operating Procedures for chemical emergency response are
currently being expanded to incorporate the results of the briefing.
Alabama Statewide Emergency Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) is charged with developing an enhanced, fully Bruce Baughrnan
Management Plan integrated emergency management program to help the State become more resilient to the effects
of natural and man-made hazards and to serve as a guide for State decision makers as they commit
Date Completed: September 2004 resources to reduce the effects of these hazards AEMA retained Deurrberry, in association with IEM,
Inc. and Tian Corporation, to perform the following services: Critical lnfrast~ctureSupport and
Analysis, State Homeland Security Capability Assessments, Exercise and Training Support.
Cost: 51,377,693.00 Evacuation Planning, Emergency Information and Crisis Communication Assessments. Debris
Needs Assessment and Management Plans and Coastal Damage Assessment Eligibility.
District of Columbia Emergency The District of Columbia is upgrading its Emergency Management Plan to improve its preparedness. Mark Brown
Management and Recovery response, recovery and mitigation capabilities. Dewberry is currently providing a wide range of
Planning Services emergency management evaluation and planning services to the District of Columbia Department of
Public Works in an effort to respond to FEMA and Department of Homeland Security initiatives. Our
services include: Emergency Support Function (ESF1C3) Planning, Debris Needs Assessment,
Date Completed: March 2004
Debris Management Plan, Structural Assessment Operation Plans, Emergency Water and Ice
Distribution Plans, State Homeland Security Capability Assessments, Exercise Development and
Cost: $680.784.00 Implementation, Debris Management Training, Hurricane Isabel ESF#3 AfterAction Report and
Other Emergency Management Planning Efforts.
Page 30
FEMA Publlc Asslstance
Program-Standby Technical
Asslstance
Since 1981, Dewberry has supported FEMA's Public Assistance Program on a wide array of
disaster response, recovery, and mitigation assignments, requiring the Fihn.tO mobilize resources
within 48 hours. In the wake of presidentialdisaster declarations, Dewbeny provides field
assessments of disaster damages; monifors design1construction; analyzes hasonable cost;
I Denise Yandle
Date Completed: May 2004 perfoms environmental studies, mitigation planning, project developrnenVassessment, appeals
review, training, and outreach related to the resforation of public infrastructure. To date, Dewberry
has respondedto 250 natural and technological disasters in 49 stafes and all US territories,
cost: $1 00,000,000.00 managing more than 900 disaster assistance tasks.
1-
-
Houston Disaster Debris Dewberry developed a comprehensive debris management plan induding an interactive GIs-based Chris Buckner
Management Plan and Ongolng prediction model delivering it within six months before the start of the 2001 hurricane season.
Support Following Tropical Storm Allison, Dewberry helped the cjty implement the plan leading to their
successful response and expeditious recovery from the disaster event. Dewberry continues to
Date Completed: Ongoing provide ongoing support to Ule city in the areas of trainlng and exercising, plan revisions and
prediction model refinement.
Cost: $500,000.00
Post-Isabel Assessment Following Hurricane Isabel. Dewberry was called on to evaluate the performance of utilities PEPCO James Lee W~tt
.
8 CONECTN in restoring power, minimizing detrimental health and safety effects, and returning to
Date December 2003 normal the economic and soaal aspects of the community as quickly as possible. Dewbeny
evaluated effects of the widespread power losses and evaluated the restoration schedule for t k
Cost: $1 05.500.00
I following areas:
Emergency services (public health, sewer, police. fire, and EOCs)
Critical infrastructure induding water, sewer, transportation, and communications.
Governmenfalleadership, schools, businesses, and individual families
i
Carne Ouellette
Hazard Mitigation Technical URS, as prime contractor leading the efforts of a multiple firm team that indudes both PBSBJ and
Assistance Program Dewberry, has been supporting FEMA's Mitigation Directorate with a broad range of post disaster
technical support for implementation of mitigation programs. URS has been h u e d more than 400
Task Orders under the contract and has provided support on nearly 100 disaster declarations in
Date Completed: May 2005
more than 40 states and within 5 U.S. Territories.
I-
Cost: $100,000.000.00
Page 31
Earthquake Loss Estimation Study URS performed comprehensive seismic risk assessment of South Carolina to evaluate potential John Knight, X E P D
for the State of South Carolina losses from four earthquake scenarios using the software HAZUS: a 1886 M 7.3 "Charleston-like"
earthquake, M 6 3 and M 5.3 Charleston events, and a 1111 5.0 earthquake in Columbia. Due to lack
Date Completed: October 2001 of strong motion data for the eastern US., region-speafrc mdc ground motions were computed
using the stochastic ground motion model. Site response units based on surtiual geology were
+
defined and amplificationfactors were computed. Ground shaking and liquefaction and earthquake-
Cost: $288,000.00 induced landslide hazards were quantified and input into HAZUS at a 2x2 km grid for the entire
State.
Florida Tabletop, Functional, and EGBG, a Division of URS, is assisting the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs (DCA). David Crisp
Full-Scale Exercises for Domestic Division of Emergency Management (DEM), with the design, development, conduct and evaluation
Security of a series of regional domestic security exercises. The State of Florida has developed seven
regional domestic security task forces (RDSTFs). DHSIODP has provided funding to conduct
Date Completed: June 2003 TabletoplFundional and Full-scale training exercises in each of the seven regions and one
Execut'we Level Table Top Exercise in accordance with the Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program guidelines.
w,
Multidisciplinary Planning Services URS Corporation has held three consecutive multidisciplinary planning services lDlQ contracts for Brett Herr
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), New Orleans District. URS is providing technical
Date Completed: 2005 assistance to the Corps of Engineers in the production of Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps
(DFIRM) for Orleans and Ascension Parish, Louisiana. Other tasks include flood control studies and
environmental assessments, feasibility study to evaluate non-structural flood damage abatement
measures, preliminary assessments, hydrologic modeling, and socioeconomic studies.
Hurricane Evacuation Study - The Louisiana Dept of Transportation and Development contracted URS to conduct a ~drridor Michelle Deshotel
Corridor Study to Connect Study evaluating new hurricane evacuation routes between relocated US 90 and LA 3127. URS
Relocated US 90 to LA 3127 developed the project purpose and need, catalogued existing environment features within the study
area, and evaluated potential alternative evacuation routes. Alternatives analyzed included the no-
I Dale Completed: February 2002
built option, transportation system management measures, and several build alternative corridors.
The project has used GIs to catalogue and display many of the environmental inventory attributes,
including historic sites, endangered s p e u e s l ~ ~ chabitat,
al wetland areas, population centers and
Cost.' $432.500.00 population densities, and roadway segment characteristics.
Page 32
Callfornla State University System James Lee W~ttAssociates (JLWA) has assisted universities and university systems in both pre- Charlene Minnick,
and postdisaster situations. The California State University System engaged JLWA from to work
Date Completed: July 2003 with fwe campuses to minimize the risk associated with earthquakes, fires, floods, and terrorism
Pepco Holdings, Inc. JLWA was hired by Pepco Holdings, Inc. (PHI) to review all aspects of the utility company's William T. Torgerson,
response to Humcane Isabel. The JLWA project team examined PHI'Sinternal and external Vice Chairman and
Date Completed: April 2004 procedures, evaluated its strengths and weaknesses, and aided the company in communicating to General Counsel
the public how they will improve procedures and systems in times of crisis or disaster.
Appmx. Cost: $1,800,000.00
New York Power Authority AT the request of Gov. Pataki. JLWA provided a comprehensive, independent review of emergency Edward F. Jacoby, Jr.,
preparedness for the areas within the Emergency Planning Zone for the Indian Point nudear power Director of New York
pbnt and those NY jurisdictions near Connecticut's Millstone pbnt, in association with IEM, Inc. The State Emergency
Date Completed: March 2003 Management
effort reviewed exercise results and public information efforts, radiologicalemergency response
plans, evacuation time estimates, alert and notification systems, offsite accident impact analysis,
Appmx. Cost: $980,000.00 and communicationcapabilities. The revlew was designed to determine whether the jurisdictions
were prepared to ensure the safety of NY residents in the event of an incident at one of these
plants.
Page 33
EXHIBIT 25
Hurricane P a m Exercise Roster - Addresses
Mike Abbiatli Don Baggett Madhu Beriwal
Associate Comissioner IndividualAssistance CEOlPresident
LA b a l d of Regents -
F E W Region VI IEM
1201 North 3rd Street 800 North Loop 288 8555 United Plaza Bhrd.
-
Cblbome Bug Suite 6200 Denton. TX 762093698 Sule 100
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
Jlm Ballow
Dexter Accardo Operations Ofker Dr. Matty Best
St. Tammany Parish LOHSEP EMAC
7667 Independence Bbd. Emergency Mgt Divkion
Baton Rouge, LA 70806 State Of Washinglon
Buildinbg 20
Student lntem Camp Murray, WA 98430
Louisiana State University Mr. Gary D. Barras
1796 Fountain Avenue Program Consunant
Baton Rouge, LA 70810 D i i o n of School Standards; Brenda Black
Accounting 8 Assistance Division Director
LA Department of Education ARP Division
Carol Ann Adamclk 5320 Alpaca Drive -
FEMA Region Vl
Attorney Mamro. LA 70072 B00 North Loop 288
ORice of General Counsel Denton. TX 76209
FEW Ha - Cdetta C. Barrett RN
500 C Street. SW
Vice President Sharon L. Bladea
Washington, DC 20472
p0ri Program Speddi
LA Hospital Assodation Response D i m
Jlm Alken MD
M e d i i l Diredor for EmergenW
9521 Brodtline Drive -
F E W HQ
Baton Rouge, LA 70809 500 C Street. SW
Prepandness
Room 714
~ a a t tScience
t~ Center, Sedion of
Emergency Mediine Washington, DC 20742
Louisiana State University Hazard MiUgation Spea'alst
81 Yosemita Drive IEM SOT Chris S. Bodet
New Orkans. LA 70131 8555 United Plaza Bbd. Evacuation C o w d i t a
S u b 100 LA State Police
Baton Rouge. LA 70809 2101 1-10 b d
Mike Anderson
Kenner. LA 70065
Joe E. Bearden ..
Pat ArnouM
Sr. Emergency Management Specialist BO Boehringer
Director
Operations ranch Press Smetary
Governor's ORice
Louisiana Department of lndi?nAflaim
-
FEMA Region W Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
. . 800 North Loop 288 Fisheries
PO Box 94004
Denton. TX 762093698 3750 SO. Harris
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
Baton Rouge, LA 70816
Mike Beeman
COL David AyCOCk
ExternalAffairs Officer EMPS Bill Boone
JDOMS
-
F E W Region II Emergency Management Program
LA National Guard
-
26 Federal Plaza Room 1307 Specialist
New York, NY 10278-0001 Public Assistan=
Ms. Adele Babin -
FEMA Region VI
Research Associate II 800 North Loop 288
Eafth Scan Lab. Coastal Stud= Denton. TX 76209 .... -5 .
Louisiana Stete University ---
- - -
3rd Floor HmveRus~ell
Coastal Studies Institute
Baton Rouge. LA 70803
Saturday, ~ q t e m b e 04,2004
r Page 1 oJ15
Shelly E. Bossom Marsha C. Brewer Ron Burger
Field Representative Supervisor OPS Senior ResponseCoordinator
Disaster Recovery Operations Branch DHHSICDC
LOHSEP -
FEMA Region VI 4770 Buford Highway
7667 IndependenceBhrd. '
800 North Loop 288 Mail Stop F38
Baton Rouge, LA Denton, TX 762093698 Atlanta. GA 30281
Page 4 of 1 5
Saturdq, September 04,2004
Scott Erickson H. Duane Fontenot
Robble Duthu
D i i Ops ResponselRlSC Information Techmbgy Director
Louisiana Department of W i l d l i f e and
Fisheries Response and Recovery Louisiana Social Services
2000 Quail Drive -
FEMA Region I 755 3rd Street
PO BOX 9 a w 99 Hgh Sbeet Baton Rouge, LA 70821
6th floor
Baton Rouge, LA 70898-9000
Boston, MA 02110
Sean Fontenot
Ryan E. Dyer Planning DivisionChief
Don Falrley LOHSEP
Volunteer
~nvir&rnentalLiason 7667 Independera Blvd.
-
,
Louisiana State Uniwnity '
Ginger Edwards
-
FEMA Region VI
Rlck Foster
800 North Loop 288
Emergency Management Program Task Force Lead
Denton, TX 76209-3698
Specialist Louisiana SheltelingTask F o r c e
Response and Recovery Operatiinns
FEMA - Region N Brand1Fakourl
Mlckey Fountain
402 South Pinetree Bhrd.
D i i s t e r Program Manager
Thomasville. GA 31792 Danlel J. Falanga Oflice o f HomelandSecurity
SHMO USACE
CPT Uda 0. Uchenauer LOHSEP ' 67 Cmnston DriveWest
pubk m i
rsofticar 7667 Independence B M . Richmond Hill. GA 31324
PublicAffairs Baton Rouge, LA
LA Army National Guard
Al Franco
Bldg 35 Gerald Falgoust Critical lnfrastrudureProtection
Jackson Barracks Director Program Manager
New Orleans, LA 70146 Office of Emergency Preparedness US Marine Corps Reserves
St. James Parish US Department of Defense
Epl Elicondo POBOX106
Convent. LA 70723 Dr. Bobby J. Franklin
Mr. Ronald C. Uler Director
USACE LNO to Nathwm Matt Farlaw Oftice of Managwnent 8 Fina nace
USACE LOHSEP Louisiana Department of Educatimn
8312 Old Exchange Drive 7667 Independence Blvd. PO Box 94064
Colorado Springs. CO 80920 Baton Rouge, LA Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9064
George L. Gele
-
F E W Region Vl FEMA
800 North Loop 288 3517 West DutdwtanCirde
DOTD EOC Coordinator Denton, TX 76209 Bellevue NE
LA Department of rans sport at ion and
Development
1201 Capitol access Road Jimmy Guldly MD Rodney Hart
Baton Rouge, LA 70804 Medical Director St. Tammany Pamh
Louisiana Department of Health 8
Hospitals
Juan Gil COL David D. Haught
1201 Capitol Access
Emergency Management program Defense Coordina(ing Officer
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Spedalist US Department of Defense
IndividualMistance Bldg 5030
-
F E W RegionVI John J. Gullbeau
Deputy Underseaetary
Hatch Road
800 North Loop 288 Attn: C o l HaugM
Denton, TX 762093698 Education F t Sill, OK 735056700
LA Department of Education
PO BOX94064
Kathy L. Gllmore Mr. Roderick K. M n s
Baton Rouge. LA 708069064
Deputy Diredor Deputy p= w r y
Office of Emergency Preparedness LA Governoh Offiea
St. John Parish Fred Gwln State Capital
1801 West Airline Hwy Chief of Operations 4th Floor
Laplace, LA 70068 lnvestiitions Baton Rouge. LA 70802
LA Attorney General
PO Box 2391
Jamie Glynn Carl Hebert
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-2391
IT Technical Support Specialist LOHSEP
Maintenance Diision 7667 IndependenceBhrd.
LA Department of c ran sport at ion and Ms. Hamlet L. Halkyard Baton Rouge, LA
Development Disaster Relief
POBox94245 American Red Cross
Kendall C. Hebert
1201 CapitolAccess Road 2700 B SW F r e e ~ a y
Manager of Public Relations
Baton Rouge, La 70804 Houston. TX
American Red Crass
10201 Mayfair Drive
Glnger Goudeau Edward B. Halton MD Baton Rouge, L A 70809
Student lntem Physician
Louisiana State University Emergency Dept.
Ms. Catherine S. Heitman
11754 Blackwater Road MLLNO
Baker. LA 70714 -
500 Lake Marina Drive 3223
Director
Communications
New Olreans, LA 70126
U n ~ e r s i t of
y Louisiana System
Jeff Grasehel 1201 North 3rd Sbwt
Senior HAS Forecaster R. Bruce Hammatt Suite 7-300
Lower Mississippi River Forecast Administrator Baton Rouge. LA 70802
Center Louisiana Department of
National Weather Service EnvironmentalQuality
New OrleansIBaton Rouge Forecast PO Box 4312 Kathlee M. Hennlgan
Office Baton Rouge. LA 708214312 Director
62300 Airport Road Louisiana Department of Insu rance
Slidell. LA 7046b5243 I 1702 North 3rd Sbwt
Baton Rouge, LA 70862
James Kaczoromki
Mlke Kadara Jim Laurent
HQlOG
New OrleanslBaton Rouge Forecast US Navy
FEW mi US Department of Defense
500 C Street, SW 62300 Airport Road
Room 256 Slldell, LA 70460-5243
Washington, DC 20742 Jen Lay
US Coast Guard
LTC John Kunkle
Rich Kaiser DCE Team Chief
Chief, Logistics Mgmt . US Department of Defense Jamle C. LeBoeuf
USACE Assistant Attomay General
167 North Main Consumer Proteclion
Lo* LaFon LA Department of Justice
Suite 611
R6 NP 1885 North 3rd Street
Memphis. TN 38103-1894
NF+C Baton Rouge, LA 70802
FEMA
Nlck Kanjemy 800 North Loop 288
US Coast Guard Denton, TX Scott Lee
US Department of Transportation -
DHS NDMS
Vicki Laird
Mr. Todd Keating Response Division Ted Lemcke
Assistant Diredor -
FEMA HQ Vice-President
Ofiica of Conservation 500 C Street, sw IEM
LA Depaltment of Natural Resources Washington, DC
13152 Joor Road Shaun B. Leonard
Baton Rouge. LA 70818 Fiscal Analyst
AdminstrationlFiance
LOHSEP
7667 Independence Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Page 10 of1 5
Ms. Elda P. Olsen Greg L Peters Rosanne B. PraUs
Coordinator Manager Director. Emergency Preparedness
~mergency'~anagement Documents Louisiana Deparbnentof Health 8
IEM Hospitals
Jefferson Parish
8555 United Plaza 1201 Capitol A a e s Road
1887 Ames Blvd.
Suite 100 Bin #2
Marrero, LA 70072
Baton Rouge, LA 70809 Baton Rouge, LA 70821
Paul J. Oncale
Mr. Robert E. Peters Keren G. Price
Diredor
Disaster Assistance Employee ES Supervisor
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Operations Branch Louisiana Depattment of
St. John Parish
1801 West Airline Hwy -
F E W Region VI
Environmental Qualty
Rex L. Thomas
Sbphen Stephanski Adm. Dir. Ill
Ms. Diane D. Smith US Representaw Chris John's Office Louisiana D e p W of Education
Assistant DivisionAdministrator PO B o x 94064
Coastal Resources MS. w E. Streva Baton Rouge. LA 70804-9064
LA Depaltrnent of Natural Resources Research Assodate
625 North 3rd Street CSPHlHl Hurricane Center Wayne C. Thonus
Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Louisiana State University Director Of Hornetand Security
413 a d e n Drive IEM
Melvin Smith Baton Rouge, LA 70806 2751 Buford Hlgtmay
State Exercise Office Suite 204, D ~ i Point0
d
LOHSEP Buddy Sbicker Atlanta. GA 30324
7667 Independence Bhrd. Asst. Diredor
Baton Rouge, LA 70806 Utilii BadT b
LA Public Service Commission Task Lead
Robert Wes Smyth 602 North 5th Street IEM
Command Center Floor 12 8555 United Plaza M.
US Coast Guard Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Suite 100
500 Poydras Street Rrn1626 Baton Rouge, LA 70809
New Orleans, LA 70130 Ronnie D. Stuckey
Director Eric Tolbert
Don Snow OPN PFOMQ Response Director
LA Army NationalGuard
#13 Jackson Barracks
Blll Spencer Marjorie K. T o m
New Olreans, LA 70117
LA Deparhent of Corrections Technical Writer IEditor
504 Mayflower Document
Room 221 Mr. George Donald Sullivan IEM
Baton Rouge, LA 70802 IT Geographic Speaalist 8555 United Phza B M .
OMR Suite 100
LA Department of Natural Resources Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Jesse J. S t Amant
14657 Kraft Lane
Diredor
Ponchatoula, LA 70454
HSIOEP Tab Troxler
Plaquemines Parish St. Charles parish
Woodlam Bldg Leslie P. Tassln
7163 Hwy 39 Safety Coordinator
Chief Terry Tulller
Suite 202 Louisiana Department of Agriculture 8
Forestry Director
Braithwaite, LA 70040
PO Box 631 W~ceof Emergency Preparedness
Baton Rouge, La 70821 Otieans Parish
1854 General Collins
1300 Perdido
r New Olreans. y\ 70114
Bob Wortman
Chapter Sou
l to
i ns Manager
Amen'can Red Cross
10201 Mayfair Drive
Baton Rouge. LA 70809
Jayne Wright
Chalr
Louisiana VOAD
3223 Baldwin Avenue
Alexandria. LA 71301
Lumumba Y a n w
Program Specialist
Recovery Division
-
FEMA HQ
500 C Street, SW
Washington. DC ZW72
Marlbelle A Yerby
Emergency Service Coordinator
American ReclCross
1898 Jackson S W
Alexandria. LA 71301
Billy E. Zellars
Readiness Unl Chief
Response Logistics
FEW
500 C Street. SW
FCPSW
Room 255
Washington, DC 20472
Craig Zingman
US Department of Energy
-
Author: Mike King, Plans Group Louisiana Project 7-2004
Page 4 o f 5
Created: June 28,2004
Last Modified: June 30,2004
I
If you have made reservation with the hotels, please contact them to cancel your
accommodations.
At this time, the Phase I-B workshop has not been rescheduled. You will be notified
when a new date has been established.
We thank you for your continuing interest in this most important project and sony for
any inconvenience this may have caused.
Sincerely,
Tony Robinson
Response and Recovery Division
Director
FEMA Region VI
EXHIBIT 28
Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project
Plan Status Report
Accomplishments
IEM assisted FEMA in conducting a 350-participant (including Federal, State, and local)
Catastrophic Planning Exercise for Southeast Louisiana fiom July 16-23,2004 that
focused on the following planning areas:
o Debris
o Schools
o Search and Rescue
o Shelters
o Temporary Housing
o Temporary Medical Care
Furthermore, several "action rooms" produced plans. These include:
o Unwatering
o Hazardous Materials
o Billeting of Emergency Response Personnel
o Power, Water, and Ice Distribution
o Transport fiom Water to Shelter
o Volunteer and Donations Management
o Access Control and Re-Entry
The result of this Planning Exercise was a Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Humcane
Plan. Each section listed above produced a plan that contained a Concept of Operations,
Objectives, Lead and Support Relationships, Logistics, and Communications.
IEM compiled and submitted this plan based on the results of the exercise.
IEM assisted FEMA in conducting one follow-up workshop (Phase 1-A) in New Orleans
(approximately 100 participants) to continue planning for Shelter, Temporary Medical
Care, and Temporary Housing. At the November 29 - December 3 workshop, the
Steering Committee (made up of representatives from FEMA Headquarters, FEMA
Region VI,and LOHSEP) completed a review of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan.
Future Activities
IEM will support FEMA in conducting the Phase 1-B Workshop in New Orleans on July
25-29.
o This workshop will focus on specific planning for Temporary Housing and
Transportation, Staging, and Distribution (TSD) of resources.
o The Steering Committee will also review the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan that was updated following Phase 1-A.
8 IEM will support FEMA in conducting a thorough review, compilation, and completion
of all hctional plans that were developed during the Catastrophic Hurricane Planning
Workshops.
Objectives, Lead and Support Relationships, Logistics, and Communications.
IEM compiled and submitted this plan based on the results of the exercise.
E M assisted FEMA in conducting one follow-up workshop (Phase l-A) in New Orleans
(approximately 100 participants) to continue planning for Shelter, Temporary Medical
Care, and Temporary Housing. At the November 29 - December 3 workshop, the
Steering Committee (made up of representatives fiom FEMA Headquarters, FEMA
Region VI, and LOHSEP) completed a review of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan.
Future Activities
E M will support FEMA in conducting the Phase 1-B Workshop in New Orleans on July
25-29.
o This workshop will focus on specific planning for Temporary Housing and
Transportation, Staging, and Distribution (TSD) of resources.
o The Steering Committee will also review the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
Hurricane Plan that was updated following Phase l-A.
E M will support FEMA in conducting a thorough review, compilation, and completion
of all functional plans that were developed during the Catastrophic Hurricane Planning
Workshops.
EXHIBIT 29
Exercise Pam
7 dx- 4 -
I.Conduct of Exercise Contract Perspective
1. Quality of
2. Quality of Personnel
Performance
Exercise Pam
2. Quality of
3.
g : 15-('oncc.(L.t ! CO@,'~W;
I d i f
Quality of Products q: ,g - tnwz s&& .
I P~QJ
&a D r lo - NoAe dkt, q;ur
C
~ + k
L W ~rnvt~.V\jt(
Exercise Pam
-1
Evaluation Items
Administration
-
q ~ w* ,m -B&W~.-- f dyj--w
2. Quality of Personnel
Performance
Exercise Pam
-
I.Conduct of Exercise Contract Perspective
Quality of Personnel
Performance
Exercise Pam
Evaluation Items
Exercise Pam
EXHIBIT 30
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane is threatening southeast Louisiana.
b. Assumptions
i. Resources and support may be needed to 'respond to another event occurring
in United States territory.
ii. Resources identified will be available for the State of Louisiana.
iii. The State of Louisiana has identified a shortage in resources required to
evacuate and support shelters, including the special needs population.
c. Organization
i. Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
ii. DHSIFEMA Region VI
iii. DHSIFEMA Headquarters
2. Mission
a. The joint mission is to conduct the necessary pre-landfall activities that will help
save lives, minimize injuries, and position assets in the numbers and locations that
will sustain immediate response activities for 72 hours.
b. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
mission is to take necessary actions to provide Parish leadership with the
necessary information so they can make timely evacuation and preparedness
decisions; give the media the necessary messages that will guide the citizens
during pre-landfall; and provide DHSIFEMA Region VI with an updated resource
request no later than 72 hours before the initial effects of the storm reach the
coastal Parishes.
c. The DHSIFEMA Region VI mission is to take the necessary actions to increase
the regional Federal preparedness; coordinate with DHSIFEMA Headquarters to
provide the teams and resources identified by Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness; and have resources in place 24 hours prior
to tropical storm force winds affecting staging areas.
d. The DHSIFEMA Headquarters mission is to facilitate the development and
dissemination of common operational information between agencies within DHS,
applicable DHSIFEMA regions, and coastal states; support the regional and local
pre-landfall media strategy; and develop and execute a resourcelteam distribution
plan that will equitably support the applicable coastal states and move assets
appropriately to increase levels at specific mobilization centers once the storm is
confirmed to enter the Gulf.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. Joint Concept of Operations
1) When the National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center
forecasts indicate a hurricane may strike Louisiana, DHSIFEMA and the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness will
A p p e n d i x B: S t a t e o f L o u i s i a n a H u r r i c a n e C h e c k l i s t
LEVEL IV ACTIVATION
B. CAT opens and partially staffs the State Emergency Operations center (EOC).
D. CAT initiates event and operational log, using both automated and written
means.
F. In concert with AD and the Operations Officer (OPSO), the CAT LOGS and
maintains communications with risk Parish EOCs and the following State,
Federal, and volunteer agencies as required by the AD:
1. FEMA Region VI (940) 898-5280
2. Mississippi State EOC (601) 352-9100
3. Arkansas State EOC(501) 730-9750
4. Texas State EOC (5 1 2) 424-2 138
5. LSU Earth Scan Labs (225) 388-2952
The following represents a list of State, Federal, and Volunteer Agencies LNOs normally
contacted for EOC staffing, but by no means represents all who can report if required (refer to
contact list in SOP):
G. OPS staff initiates and LOGS contact with risk Parishes and test all
communications means, (800MHZ, Satellite, RACES, CONFERENCE CALL
PROCEDURES).
H. OPS staff requests that DOTD clear any evacuation route obstructions on an
emergency basis.
I. OPS staff request that DOTD provide GIs data and traffic counts for
situational awareness on evacuation routes and number of vehicles leaving the
State. DOTD reports count every eight hours to EOC.
J. OPS staff requests that DHHIDSS establish special needs shelters, order
contract generators, and place LANG on standby for security and cots.
K. OPS staff through the Shelter Task Force, issues a standby alert to host
Parishes to review their shelter status and prepare to host evacuees.
L. OPS staff requests National Guard place Parish LNO's on standby alert.
U. OPS staff provides LANG Security Team with EOC access roster.
Based on status reports and predictive modeling, LOHSEP staff conducts an analysis of the
situation and recommends to the D/AD the need to place selected F E M assets on alert. Special
considerations given to the following:
BB. DSS/American Red Cross (ARC)/DHH coordinate health and sanitary needs of
shelters.
LEVEL I1 ACTIVATION
A. LOHSEP increases the State EOC staffing at the level directed by the
ADIOPSO, increased staffing will include as a minimum the Levels I and I1
staffing as noted on the attached EOC Organization chart. Selected State
Agencies may augment the EOC staff as required by the AD.
I. OPS staff request Evacuation Route Status Report from DOTD and LA State
Police.
K. OPS staff request additional kitchen support as needed from Dept. of Public
Safety (DPS).
N. OPS staff requests Parish EOC activation status report from risk Parishes.
Reminds activated Parish EOC officials of daily report requirement.
LEVEL I ACTIVATION
A. At the direction of the DIAD, OPSO increase the level of EOC activity to
Level I, full activation of the EOC. All State, Federal, and Volunteer
organizations will report to the EOC as required.
B. OPS staff notifies following agencies of EOC activation with date and time,
remaining State, Federal, and Volunteer agencies are notified of their
requirement to locate in the EOC:
Affected Parishes
State Agencies
FEMA Region VI (940) 898-5280
Mississippi State EOC (601) 352-91 00
Texas State EOC (512) 465-2138
Arkansas State EOC (501) 930-9750
Alabama State EOC (205) 280-2200
Tennessee State EOC (6 15) 741 -4330
C. LOHSEP executes:
Evacuation Shelter Plan
Transportation Plan
F. Louisiana Nursing Home Association EOC Liaison calls all nursing homes and
other custodial care organizations in the risk areas to ensure that they are
prepared to evacuate their residents.
L. DSS, ARC, DHH, DOTD, and LSP staff keeps EAS evacuation and shelter
information updated on a two-hour basis, or more frequently if information is
available on a more timely basis.
M. DSS, ARC, DHH, DOTD, LSP, and JIC keeps news media informed and
updated on evacuation and shelter information.
N. DSS request risk and host Parishes send evacuation and shelter status reports to
State EOC twice daily.
P. LSP and DOTD staffs keep neighboring States informed of status and traffic
control decisions.
T. DSS, ARC, DHH, DOTD, LSP, JIC staff keeps EAS evacuation and shelter
information updated on a two-hour basis, or more frequently if information is
available on a more timely basis.
U. JIC keeps news media informed and updated on evacuation and shelter
information.
V. DOTD and LSP staffs keep neighboring States informed of status and traffic
control decisions.
Z. LSP and DOTD staffs keep neighboring States informed of status and traffic
control decisions.
AA. DSS, ARC, DHH, DOTD, LSP, and JIC staff keeps EAS evacuation and
shelter information updated on a two-hour basis, or more frequently if
information is available on a timelier basis.
BB. JIC keeps news media informed and updated on evacuation and shelter
information. (RECURRING)
CC. DOTDILSP mobilizes State evacuation traffic control active and passive
resources and people. Position barriers and people where they can take up their
duties within an hour of being ordered to do so.
DD. JIC advises news media of preparations for orderly evacuation, traffic control,
and hosting operations.
AT LANDFALL42:OO HOURS
FF. DOTDLSP alerts risk Parishes and State traffic control posts of the time that
evacuation routes will be closed.
GG. OPS staff alerts EAS (refer to map) and news media so that people still in the
risk area can seek last resort refuge.
HH. LOHSEP executive coordinates with Parishes the opening of last resort refuge
buildings to people still in the risk area.
11. OPS staff /Recovery Division prepares for damage assessment and post
disaster recovery activities and requests DSS, DOTD, DHH, DNR, State
Police, and OTM be prepared to report on food, water, electric, telephone,
shelter, road and special needs status as early as possible after the storm makes
landfall.
KK. Reentry into the disaster area will be coordinated by LOHSEP and will be
authorized only after local Parish elected officials certify to LOHSEP their
ability to provide essential services to Parish citizens:
Food
Water
Utilities
Medical Support
.2 . 0 -
Unwatering P - -
1. Situation
a. General
i. Because of the topography, New Orleans proper exists as a bowl, higher on
the edges and tapering lower nearer the center. That bowl is surrounded by
several other similar areas that are also enclosed and protected by systems of
levees and floodgates. The entire Metropolitan IVew Orleans Area is
dramatically affected by a catastrophic hurricane depositing a great deal of
water, which is trapped within these bowls, flooding the city and surrounding
areas.
b. Assumptions
i. Greater New Orleans is inundated with at least 10 feet of water in the levee
systems.
ii. Due to the magnitude of the event and the loss of local and State resources in
a catastrophic hurricane, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will receive a
mission assignment from DHSIFEMA to unwater.
iii. Because much response and recovery activity depends on the successful
unwatering of bowls (at least to the +2 foot elevation), the Unified Command
will place a very high priority on transportation, equipment, and personnel
needed to support the unwatering mission.
iv. There will be surviving residual knowledge of the levee system and the pump
stations after hurricane passage.
v. Due to the magnitude of the contamination of water during an event of this
size, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will grant variances on water
quality standards. However, sampling will be required to determine the types
of material released for follow-up work, such as maintaining worker safety
and monitoring of long-term impacts.
vi. Local aerial reconnaissance assets will be assigned to other tasks and will not
be available for surveying levees.
vii. For the purpose of this plan it is assumed there are no levee breeches.
c. Organizations
i. Local
1) Levee Boards
2) Parish Directors
3) Public Works
ii. State of Louisiana
1) Department of Environmental Quality
2) Department of Transportation and Development
3) Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
4) National Guard (subject to National Defense Deployments)
5) Public Works
iii. Federal
1) Department of the Army (normally as a last resort)
2) Environmental Protection Agency
3) DHSIFEMA
2. Mission
a. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will work with DHSIFEMA, State, and local
governments to unwater the water entrapped by the levee system in the Greater
New Orleans area as a result of a catastrophic hurricane; repair 80% of pumping
stations within 60 days of start of work; and initiate repair of hurricane protection
systems.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. General
1) Unwatering efforts of the Greater New Orleans area through opening gates
and breaching levees will result in the lowering of the water level to +2
feet within approximately one week of the start of work. This timeline is
highly speculative due to the number of preconditions needed to complete
work (e.g., transportation of equipment and personnel, access to the work
area, and access to necessary material).
2) Details of unwatering operations are found in the U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers Unwatering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans,
Louisiana of August 18,2000. At the +2 feet level, about one quarter of
the city of New Orleans, closest to the Lake Pontchartrain, will remain
under water. Additional efforts at unwatering will be delayed until pumps
are dried and repaired and associated generators for non-standard voltages
and 25-cycle equipment are available. Due to the capacity required, use of
pumps shipped in from other areas will have minimum impact on
unwatering except for localized areas. Similarly, access and drainage
realities prevent the use of stationary dredges as an unwatering resource.
As a result, the installed pumps will remain the primary method of
unwatering. Large areas of standing water will remain for at least 30 days.
ii. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will conduct assessments to:
1) Determine the status of the levee protection system. Aerial or satellite
surveillance will be the primary method of initial assessment. All local
capability to assess the levee status will be used.
2) Determine availability of workforce, including skilled and unskilled labor
and specialized skills needed for pump and levee system available
resources at local, State, and Federal levels.
3) Determine availability of necessary heavy equipment such as earthmovers
for breaching levees.
4) Determine availability of additional material needed for unwatering and
pump repair (e.g., drying fans and generators).
iii. As required, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will take expedient actions to
lower water levels by opening gates and breaching levees in a prioritized
manner (as outlined in the tasks below). As soon as water levels are reduced
viii. ESF-3 will coordinate with U.S. Coast Guard to issue a notification and take
other measures to prevent endangerment of personnel due to water flow from
breeches.
ix. ESF-3 will repair breeched levees to prevent flooding from a second event and
to facilitate remaining pump out.
x. ESF-3 will coordinate with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for the
handling of debris removed from channels at pump intakes.
xi. ESF-3 will rehabilitate pumps.
c. Coordinating Instructions
i. Due to the probable evacuation of local U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
personnel and the need for such personnel to take care of their families, the
Memphis District U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will most likely be tasked to
carry out the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers functions in this plan.
ii. If appropriate, the Interagency Levee Task Force will be implemented.
iii, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will conduct sampling of water
throughout the process.
d) Marsh boats
4) Pumps
a) Temporary power
b) Temporary pumps
c) Drying equipment
d) Parts for both pumps and associated generators (see the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Unwatering Plan)
e) Fuel and transport
..
11. Sources for the critical resources are not in place and are highly situation
dependent. Much will be obtained through U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
contracting.
c. Personnel
i. TBD
3 . 0 H a z a.-*-- r d o u s M a t e r i a l s P
1. Situation
a. General
i. Specific actions must to be undertaken to prepare for and mitigate hazardous
materials emergencies created by a catastrophic hurricane striking southeast
Louisiana; describe the limitations on response activities during and
immediately following the event; delineate post-hurricane response and
recovery activities through the short-term; and generally describe potential
long-term, on-going hazardous materials actions.
b. Assumptions
i. A catastrophic hurricane has caused thousands of fatalities, significant
regional flooding problems (especially in and near the New Orleans area), and
substantial hazardous materials have been released into the environment,
potentially endangering life and public and private property.
ii. Many households in the affected area have released household hazardous
waste into the still-rising floodwaters.
iii. Floating coffins appear sporadically in flooded areas.
iv. Some subsurface tanks, possibly containing fuel, have buckled or breached the
pavement. Many water surfaces (especially water in flooded areas) have a
visible sheen due to chemicals that are lighter in weight than water. Some of
these chemicals are petroleum-based and are flammable.
v. Chemical, biological, and radiological hazards may be mixed together
throughout the affected area.
vi. The Louisiana State Police and Department of Environmental Quality will not
able to respond to such a large disaster without significant external support.
vii. Hazardous materials response will be delayed until dangerous hurricane
conditions have subsided.
viii. Burgeoning life-safety issues and search and rescue efforts will take
precedence over hazardous materials activities.
iv. Both State and Presidential Major Disaster declarations (expedited) will be
sought and approved.
x. The Louisiana State Emergency Operations Plan, Annex H, Hazardous
Materials, and the National Response Plan will help guide the Hazardous
Materials Action Plan.
xi. The large scale of the disaster may change certain functional responsibilities
outlined in those plans.
xii. Overall, the National Incident Management System will be implemented for
all hazardous materials-related actions.
xiii. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact and all appropriate mutual
intrastate and interstate mutual aid agreements will be implemented as
necessary.
xiv. Some Federal, State, and local resources will be positioned prior to the
hurricane to help deal with hazardous materials emergency situations, among
other operations.
xv. Other Federal, State, and local hazardous materials-related resources will be
made available over time, as circumstances permit.
xvi. Non-traditional approaches to hazardous materials response may be required
to be successful (e.g., transportation by boat will be required to access many
areas).
c. Organizations
i. The Louisiana State Emergency Operations Plan, Annex H, Hazardous
Materials (direct quotes noted in this plan by italics) describes functional
responsibilities for responding to hazardous materials emergencies as listed
below:
"A. The owner of the substances that are creating the problem has the
primary responsibility for dealing with the consequences of a HazMat
release, whether by mobilizing internal response resources, hiring a
private contractor, or reimbursing Federal, State and local authorities
for their response activities.
B. The Louisiana State Police (LSP) have the primary responsibility at
the state level for HazMat incidents. The Superintendent of the
Louisiana State Police shall implement, administer, and coordinate the
services, programs, and resources required under this function.
C. The Emergency Coordinator designated by the Superintendent shall
be responsible for the liaison and coordination of all response efforts
and emergency services provided under this Annex.
D. State agencies supporting the LSP in this function are identiJied in
the Emergency Function and Responsibility Chart. "'
' State of Louisiana, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Operations Plan. March 2001.
Agency Supl,ort l o
Louisiana Stale Police
State of Louisiana, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Operations Plan. March 2001.
hurricane, the State of Louisiana and the United States Government will
exercise appropriate discretion in the application and assignment of liability
and responsibility toward public and private entities involved in hazardous
materials releases experienced as a result of the disaster.
2. Mission
a. The mission is to minimize the impact of hazardous materials released into the
environment as a result of a catastrophic hurricane on disaster response and
recovery personnel, members of the public, and public and private lands and
property.
3. Execution
a. Concept of the Operations
i. Phase I
1) No hazardous materials response activities will be possible during the
extremely unsafe conditions occurring during a catastrophic hurricane.
ii. Phase I1
1) Immediately following the hurricane's passage over the area, life safety
issues will likely take precedence over hazardous materials containment
and abatement response actions.
2) Hazardous materials operations-trained personnel will accompany search
and rescue personnel when seeking out survivors to provide subject matter
expertise and technical assistance should hazardous materials be
encountered.
3) Over time, more conventional hazardous materials response roles may be
anticipated.
b. Specific Tasks to Lead, Support, and Coordinate Agencies
i. State of Louisiana
1) Louisiana State Police (lead agency)
a) "When the State Police are noti3ed of a HazMat emergency that
requires their assistance, they will respond as soon as possible with
the resources required by the situation, using the Incident Command
System. When a situation arises that cannot be solved by immediately
available resources, the Louisiana State Police may notlb the LOEP
[Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness], which will alert the
appropriate State and Federal authorities, and put the State EOC
[Emergency Operations Center] into operational status. "
b) "All state agencies having a role in HazMat response and recovery
will provide support as required through their emergency coordinator
at the emergency operation center or directly to the on-site Louisiana
tj3
State Police incident commander, as circumstances may dictate.
2) Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (support agency)
a) The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality will be charged
with a variety of hazardous materials-related functions including
radiological (primary agency), and support functions including:
State of Louisiana, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Operations Plan. March 2001.
State of Louisiana, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Operations Plan. March 2001.
2. Mission
a. The mission is to provide billeting for all initial response and recovery personnel
who will be brought into Louisiana as a result of a catastrophic hurricane.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i . Phase I-~uarter-boats6 (see DHS/FEM 's Use of Corps' Quarter-Boats,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Emergency
Management)
1) Within five days of activation of the first phase, housing on quarter-boats
for up to 250 responders will be in place at the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Port Allen, Louisiana, facility.
2) Within 10 days, housing for an additional 250 (total limit of 500)
responders will be available.
ii. Phase 11-Base Camp Phase
1) Base camps can be set up and will provide as much housing as is needed
for up to 1,500 people per camp.
i. TBD
6. Contingency Plan
a. Possible alternate locations for quarter-boats include:
i. St. Francisville, Louisiana
ii. Old River Locks, Lettsworth, Louisiana
iii. Alexandria, Louisiana
5 . 0 P o w e r . Water. a n d I c e D i s t r i b u t i o n
1. Situation
a. General
i. Southeast Louisiana has been impacted by a catastrophic hurricane, causing a
need for emergency power, water, and ice for victims.
b. Assumptions
i. Thousands of victims lack power, water, and ice.
ii. In the core area affected by the disaster, it will require more effort to deliver
ice, water, and power than to evacuate the families to shelters. It will not be
possible to provide logistical support to such victims.
iii. In the core area, public health risks and the inability to provide logistical
support will be so great that the affected Parishes will issue a mandatory
evacuation order.
iv. Most personnel evacuated from the core area will have to be sheltered or
placed in temporary housing for a relatively long period.
v. Based on historical precedents, approximately 10% of the affected population
will be self-sustaining.
vi. Servicing shelters will be a major aspect of achieving the mission. Four-
hundred to 500 thousand victims (the estimate of the Sheltering Committee)
will need to be supplied in shelters. These shelters will not be in the core area.
Triage areas will be established for the core areas. 'These medical and triage
sites will need to be sustained.
vii. The per person absolute minimum amount will be 1 gallon of potable water
and 8 pounds of ice per day.
viii. General power restoration will be under the control of the Louisiana State
power companies, municipalities, and cooperatives.
ix. Since most emergency generators and associated switching and control
facilities throughout the area are installed at or below the ground level, these
generators will not be available for emergency power in the immediate
aftermath of flooding.
x. Disruption of transportation due to debris and road damage will be a major
limiting factor to initial distribution.
xi. Since power will be minimal in areas of distribution, availability of fuel will
be a limiting factor in determining distribution, including access of victims to
the distribution points.
xii. Competition for refrigerated space for mortuary use may be a limiting factor
for ice storage and distribution. Use of refrigerated space for things such as
mortuaries and the storage of drugs and food will reduce the capacity to
provide ice for disaster victims.
c. Organizations
i. Local
1) Parish Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
2) Parish Presidents
ii. State
1) Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
2. Mission
a. The mission is to provide water and ice to disaster victims and emergency power
generators at critical facilities.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. General
1) There will be three areas of concern.
a) There will be a core area (area I) where victims cannot be supported
on a sustained basis. Victims will need to be evacuated from this area.
For the mission to succeed, the evacuation of these victims must be
outside of the sustainable area (area 11) as described below. However,
the number of victims involved will be so great that ice and water (but
not power) distribution will remain a major issue. Since it will be a
considerable time before these victims may return to their homes,
sustainment will be required over a relatively'long term.
b) In the surrounding area-the sustainable area (area 11)-largely
affected by flooding, victims may be logistically sustained by Parish,
State, and Federal efforts. Due to transportation limitations, focus in
this area will be on the re-supply of shelters. Victims will be expected
to obtain water and ice at shelter distribution points.
c ) Beyond the sustainable area, wind damage will prevail. Once debris is
cleared and power restored, there will be only a limited demand for
water and ice and the area may be considered self-sustaining (area 111).
Power restoration in this area will be much quicker since outlets and
electrical boxes will not have to be cleaned and restored.
2) DHSIFEMA will stage water, ice, and generators. Planning and readiness
teams and installation teams will be staged based on commodity
requirements for the State.
3) Staging areas for water and ice wi II be determined by State officials. The
primary staging area will be Camp Beauregard, Pineville, Louisiana.
Distribution points will be selected by the Parishes.
4) Planning for distribution at the Parish level must be done based on the
situation using all available resources and priorities set by the Parish.
5) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers water contractor estimates the ability
to deliver 500,000 to 625,000 gallons of water within 24 hours, from 2
million gallons per day within 48 hours and daily thereafter.
6) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ice contractor estimates the ability to
deliver between 500,000 and 2 million pounds of ice within 24 hours.
Within 72 hours, the capability will increase to 3 to 4 million pounds per
day and daily thereafter.
ii. Emergency Power Restoration
1) Priorities for providing generators and power to critical facilities have
already been set by the State and will be used to determine initial
distribution. These priorities will be set based on Parish input.
Assessments should be maintained by each Parish and provided to the
State. The general priorities for restoration are as follows:
a) Hospitals
b) Nursing Homes
c) Police Stations1911 Centers1Communications Centers
d) Fire Stations
e) Water Treatment Plans
2) DHSIFEMA will stage generators at Camp Beauregard, Pineville,
Louisiana, before landfall. Distribution will depend on preliminary
assessments at the Parish level. Logistics readiness reports are provided
daily to reflect on-hand response resources.
3) Although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has done power assessments,
the assessments will have to be verified for an actual event. A critical
aspect of the verification will be having a point of contact at the facility
level to allow assessors access. This point of contact, along with facility
location, and other critical information will be passed to the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers via the State Emergency Operations Center.
4) Since generator installation and hookup by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers will be limited to 10 to 25 hookups each day under current
plans, DHSIFEMA Region VI will task the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
to issue additional contracts as necessary to meet the extra needs.
5) Federal controlled generators will be installed by U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers contractors.
6) Installation of emergency power will be accelerated where Parishes have
pre-identified critical facilities and assessed potential power requirements.
iii. Water and Ice Distribution
1) Water is contracted in liter bottles but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
contracts allow the government to specify bulk deliveries. Bulk delivery is
preferred for supplying shelters. Contracts are written to deliver a specific
amount on the first day growing over several days to a sustainable level.
2) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will task ESF-1 to provide certified
containers for bulk storage of water; the U.S. Environmental Protection
AgencyIESF-10 will certify these containers and test the water.
iii. Daily reports for status of water and ice consumption will be made by the
Parishes to the State Emergency Operations Center for passing to DHSIFEMA
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This figure should be available no
later than 1800 each evening to allow adjustments to be made for the
following day.
iii. Communications between ESF-3 and the points of contact will be critical, so
the Emergency Operations Center will attempt to provide multiple points of
contact.
Pur~ose:The intent of this document is to provide state and local entities an overview of things
to consider when designating sites for the staging and distribution of emergency supplies and
commodities to the public. This guide can be used to plan for disasters that the state can respond
to without help fiom the federal government, but the guide uses the frame of reference of
supplies and quantities provided by the Federal government in response to natural disasters or
other times of crisis, when it is beyond the capability of the state to meet all of the citizens
critical needs.
Overview: The type and quantity of supplies that the public will need in the aftermath of
disasters or other crisis will vary due to many factors, and no one event will be just like another.
Experience in emergency response over the years suggests some common needs that the public
will be supplied for health, safety, and lifesaving needs to be met for generally a short time, but
critical none the less. They include potable water (usually bottled), packaged ice, and other
FEMA supplies that are stored in bulk quantities at regional logistics centers in various locations.
These commodities and supplies are delivered in the over-the-road tractor trailer loads. Since
these type trucks are eighteen to thirty feet long, with a trailer that is forty-five to fifty-two feet
long, large open areas are required to accommodate the vehicles with their loads. Staging and
distribution sites must be areas that are paved, concrete, or gravel hard-stand that can withstand
loads that are at load limits of national roadways. In addition to the area needed for the trucks,
planning must include area for unloading, refueling refrigerated containers, some sort of covered
storage area, and ingress and egress for the distribution to the public.
General Facts:
Ice: a# (I bag) per person per day
40,000 # per Truck Load
20 Pallets per Truck, 2000# per Pallet, 250 - 8# bags per pallet, 5000 Bags per Truck
25 Trucks = 1 million #
Staping and Distribution Site Size: There are many areas in most counties that are ideal to fit
the need for staging and distribution. They include; School-bus loading and unloading areas
with adjacent parking, Athletic field parking areas, Civic Center Parking Areas, Vacant shopping
center parking areas, Fairground parking areas, etc. None of the areas listed above have the
same layout or areas suitable for parking in the same configuration. But, all can be adapted to
meet the critical needs of the public, and are well known sites that the public is familiar with.
Page 41
IEM, lnc. 2005
Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan
Site Security: The assumption must be made that distribution to the general public will not
occur late into the night, but deliveries to the site may be required at any time during the day or
night, thus 24-hour site security will be necessary. Also assume that the electricity will not be
available, thus the need for a minimum of two light-sets (generator powered with retractable
lights that extend up at least 12-15 feet). Traffic cones, plastic flagging, etc. will be required to
maintain traffic control. .
Federal S t a ~ i n ~ / M o b i l b a t l oCenter:
n Federal staging areas are usually located within a
militivy base. FEMA has various ageements with DOD to utilize existing Air force and Army
bases to store federa1 supplies to support state requests for assistance. Ice, water, generators and
other relief supplies are specifically positioned to be quickly mobilized to support emergency
requests. At the request of a Presidential declared state FEMA will task appropriate federal
agencies to move commodities to state staging areas or in some cases municipality distribution
points.
State Staging Areas : In mnnaging large scale emergency responses, states will provide several
staging areas serving numerous municipalities. The state areas may be supplied by FEMA, if
requested. Municipalities will pick up n k s a r y quantities at the state staging areas for
distribution to the general public at a municipality distribution point.
".' '
I -
No resources are Included for generato opRaUm3.
-
., . . ,. , .
.. .......... ...
[ w e40 Pallets
bib . A,*;:
.
,
a
'
.s.#,
GrWATERerr
pzzimgd ,q [aizgiiipllej
' . &' . ".. . .* ..
LOADING ZONE
.......-.... ......................................................................
-
275 FT +I- Duppster
cmmmEm.
Toilets
pq C
c
V) 40 Pa1ets+S10StdM~
GcmIEmm
A[ S t o c k * 40 Pallets {. Light Sets
......... ..,'mmmmC=l
....-..... .............-...-..............-.
Vehicles-45 per hour
a . . . ..,,., .
.. . m.mm m
Vehicles45 per hour Vehicles45 per hour
Event Templates
24 Hour Operations
b. Assumptions
-
,
/ --A ~.
'. \
.-,
/ ,'
i. The affected Parishes will issue/djjandatory evacuatio$,,o<der.
.. \
11. The initial actions of preventi6@.$itigati~n$preparedn~ss, response, and
recovery operations are conductedby'tli:i local government. Local
authorities will exhaust their resources,.and \ .,-,
then use mutual aid
agreements with v ~ l u ~ k e r . - ~ r othe u ~pr~yat,c$7iector,
s, andlor neighboring
Parishes. , 1 .. -. -....--.- :i
\
,, 1.- --._ c-
iii. The response capabilities,and,resourc~s~ofthe local jurisdiction (to
include mutual aid from b,&5;ndingjbrisdictions and response support
from the,,St;ite)\may
,/,,--
-\.
be inshfficient
1 \
and quickly overwhelmed. Local
emergqncy persdnnel who normally respond to incidents may be among
thQ&.?ffected add therefolefbnable to perform their duties.
iv. ~urin~'a,,$ta&rodhi&@ident, the State will take immediate and
\
/-appropride,,actipn to determine, direct, mobilize, and coordinate resource
A- iiee&i.'~heStat&?"ernment will suspend and cancel normal operations
/ / and rkd,iikct re&u'rces to saves lives, relieve human suffering, sustain
(4--.survivois,protect
% , \
'
4
property, and repair essential facilities.
\'\v.\\ State assistance will supplement local efforts and Federal assistance will
\:,i~'\.
supplement State and local efforts when it is clearly demonstrated that it
\.1s,h$6kd local and State capability to cope with the catastrophic incident.
vi. ~ d a t a s t r o ~ hmass
i c casualtylmass evacuation incident triggers a
Presidential disaster declaration, immediately or otherwise (National
Response Plan [NRP], Catastrophic Incident Annex, December 2004).
vii. Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives,
prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require
mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal
NRP protocols.
viii. A catastrophic incident has unique dimensionslcharacteristics requiring
that response planslstrategies be flexible enough to effectively address
emerging needs and requirements.
ix. Tens of thousands of victims may lack critical life-sustaining resources.
DRAFT
within the Parish boundaries and if the resources of one Parish are
required in a neighboring Parish.
xxvii. Parishes are responsible for independently establishing local
distribution points.
xxviii. A representative from each agency (Federal, State, and local) will
be available for decisions.
xxix. Local distribution points will be in place and operational within 72
hours (almost the full system).
c. Organizations
i. Federal
1) The Federal Department of Homeland SecuGty (DHS)/Emergency
Preparedness and ResponseEederal Emergelicy Management
Agency (FEMA), has the responsibility'for the coordination of
Federal emergencyidisaster operatjo6ganb-resources
Y~ I,.' in support of
State and local government capabilkies.
,A '.$
.-., - ,~
ServiceiFood and
Urban Development
of Labor
Office of Personnel Management
Corporation for National and Community Service
Xi /'
a) State government +r\- ,;F.. , agencies,iahd offices that
departm>ntlts,
\.
,\,'4"
-I
I /
\. \.,
.
'~\
The mission for transportation, staging, and distri$ition is to stage, trans$6i-t, and
distribute critical resources prior to and fol1owing.a catastrophic
- . --;..
hurricane in southeast
Louisiana. These resources include, but are d6t jii$ted,to,
- . generators, ice, water, food,
. .
response assets, and temporary housing. .., ,
,
\,
~
\~
C.%.
3. Execution
a. Concept of the Operations
i. Tirneline for Operations
> .
&-.\"\> b) ~ ~ ~ L j i 2Location
i'ry
\> \\
, ,
k$ Camp Beauregard, Rapides Parish
Alternate Locations
i) Camp Minden, Webster Parish
ii) NASJRB, New Orleans
Mobilization Centers
a) Lead Agency
i) DHSIFEMA
b) Primary Locations
i) Barksdale Air Force Base, CaddoIBossier Parish
ii) Fort Polk, Vernon Parish
3) State Regional Staging Areas (SRSA)
a) Lead Agency
i) LOHSEP
DRAFT
/;,' , , a) ~ , e $ ~ ~ e n c ~
'
,,: / '\ '
/
\
$3) Search and RescueILouisiana Department of Wildlife
I
d-'.', %'
,
\ %
\, ! and Fisheries
,'b) BOOs can hold 2,500 to 5,000 people at each location and
, up to five BOOS are needed. (Conflict: Up to 25,000 people
can be sent through a BOO, but it was previously stated
' that 75,000 people are to be sent through there. Victims are
to be kept at the BOO for only up to three hours.) Urban
Search and Rescue-10% will need medical attention, 10%
will be sent to Temporary Medical Operations Staging
Areas (TMOSAs), and 10% will be sent to refugee points
or shelters.
c) Locations to be determined by Search and Rescue.
7) Initial Refugee Collection Points
a) Lead Agency
i) ESF-6
DRAFT
J
'\.\e) ,AmTrak;-Hammond, Tangipahoa Parish
,/',7
-..
I
/--'.----
', i)..,~?rth St. Tammany Parish
, g) ~ o i t f iwashington
' Parish
/.;? 1l ) ~ o & a~iktribution
l Points-Each staging area will require 15 local
'..
+
'. distribution
I , points for day 1 and 84 by day 3.
\ /:,
a) Lead Agency
>/"
\,
'
\ \J,:/.~' i) Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness
b) See Appendix 2: Potential Louisiana Parish Distribution
Points
c) Site Criteria (Minimum Requirements)
i) Number of sites needed
ii) Types of sites needed and numbers needed of each
iii) Elevation data
iv) Population densitylgeographic area impacts on site
selection
v) Digital photos, latitudellongitude
DRAFT
i) Commodities .I
\ ,,, '
,./;"\ \.-.
ii) Population ~",.,
\,, -\,
\~
,-, \
\. ... ,, .
\ '\
b)Clothing
c)Decontamination kits
d)Pumps (water)
e)Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT)
supplies (e.g., body bags, refrigerated trucks)
f) Insect repellant
g) Family living kits (for travel trailerlmotor home)
3) The timing and distribution of critical resources will be largely
dependent upon context (size of storm, local needs, local resources,
and the impact). Timelines are most effective for Federal and State
planning (upstream), but flexibility and general timelines are more
,,
useful for local and Parish planning. ,./. .- . :,,
iv. Transportation \
',. ',
%.
\\
responsible for compiling, submitting, and updating
\ , information for inclusion in the ESF-1 prioritized
'. shipments.
:,,iic) Military transportation will be provided in accordance with
/
' iv) Priority for debris removal and repair is given to all
\
. /i
critical routes.
, '2 C) Rail
I /
d./ i) Post assessments are conducted by private rail
companies.
d) Air
i) Post assessment is conducted by the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development
through the State Aviation Department.
e) Water
i) The New Orleans District Army Corps of Engineers
will provide support in the emergency operation and
restoration of inland waterways, ports, and harbors
DRAFT
1. ~ . ~ : : F 6 ' r e s t ~ ~ e r v i c e , ,.
2. U:S.\Army Corps of ~ n ~ i n e e r s
c) Working throuEh'~S,F-1 ;$d&dinate the acquisition,
movement, and distribution of DHS-owned resources to the
> ~
.. _information,( i.
I-
in~ include:
\*, \, -----/I. Louisiana Department of Transportation and
--\ \ \,.\
,\
Development
,,\ ',\<\, \,?\\\/?* ,/' 2. Local Transit Authorities
': .k) Cltar interstate highways, State highways, and bridges of
1 ; debris that obstructs traffic flow.
, 3) U;;S. Army Corps of Engineers will perform the following tasks:
a) Provide ice, water, tarps, and operational emergency power
at shelters.
b) Be represented at the Regional Response Coordination
Center (RRCC) and the Emergency Response Team-
Advance Element (ERT-As)
c) Provide generators for critical facilities.
4) U.S. General Services Administration will perform the following
tasks:
a) Contracting and leasing facilities
5) U.S. Forest Service will perform the following- tasks:
a) Provide logistical guidance, support, and accountability of
commodities at mobilization centers.
DRAFT
,
, '
,--1 \
- , ~'),'~ssist
'." community health personnel subject to staff
,
\, aya~lability.
'
,A;/
d-, \.
\.,
\ '\d) ~.iAvideemergency first aid, supportive counseling, and
1
; ; health care for minor illnesses and injuries to incident
/
\ \\ , victims in mass care shelters, selected incident cleanup
\.
.,' .,+'
\~\, 11,*'
areas, and other sites deemed necessary by the primary
/" agency.
2'9) National VOAD (e.g., Salvation Army, United Way, Second
Harvest) will perform the following tasks:
a) Perform work for the individual agencies.
b) United Way will play a financial role.
c) Support distribution sites under United Way by supplying
commodities and volunteers.
d) Second Harvest will provide warehousing and food items.
10) Adventist Community Services will perform the following tasks:
a) Warehouse and assist in distribution.
DRAFT
,,
//---\ 4\.\
Louisiana State Police
'\. \
//\
/'
6, ~
:, '\----..6?
/ 5.':;/
'~ZuisianaDepartment of Public Safety
Louisiana Department of Agriculture and
\\, '.,.': /
\, ., --- ----i Forestry
number of local distribution points per Parish
'\
'., a) ~$"iide a potential manpower supply.
11)'~e'~artment of Wildlife and Fisheries will perform the following
8) ' ~ h k r i f f s ~ Gperform
> ,
l1 the following tasks:
', \ ; ,la) Provide security and/or escorts.
I
iii. It is critical that requests for resources flow properly through the proper
chain of command. /
' \ \
>+
I) Parish to State EOC \\// '\,
-..
/,
Response Team. -\-,-- \%'
\,y. C/,1
- A
,'\\
,.
\.,.
v) MHE ci\. (
-,
".
vi) Fuel ,,/'.,/--> 1' .
\ \ \.
> \\,\ \. c9
vii) Sunlrain shelters
/i 9 '.,, ./ '
viii) Maintenance contractsk, ,y'
p-'X, \,
ix) Security \ ,,-,,,,.,,
x) Personnel \~
~
,,' ' '\:,
xi) Dumpsters with serulcc,,,.
xii) ~h,o;-way.radios '.
i ~,,-., .
xiii) ~ r a f\ fkon~~lharrisadk<
\,
\
\,\~ i ''..\iv);;one-ton pick-up trucks with hitches
%,\
,/
J-.. .', i . \, A) Tractors
\
vi) Golf cartslgators
'\
-\. \% ' '
j: vii) Security
d) BUS staging points
i) Fuel
I: ii) Food
iii) Portable toilets with service
iv) Sunlrain Shelters
v) Comfort stationlshelter
e) Initial Refugee Collection Points
i) See Search and Rescue.Plan and Transport to Water to
Shelter Plan
f) Shuttle StagingIReception Sites
i) Site dependent necessities
b. Special Assistance
DRAFT
i. General
1) Agencies will be competing for resources, which will require
Parishes to call for more resources. Primary sources are routinely
utilized, but in the event of additional needs, the group has
identified a number of sources for labor and equipment at the local,
State, and Federal levels.
2) The State and Parish EOCs should coordinate regularly regarding
site needs and expectations. Once sites have been identified, they
should be prioritized in terms of location and event characteristics.
..
11. Existing Resource Conflicts
I ) BOOS .-.
,' \\
i) Aviation .
..
,
.
, \
j.. I
iii) Ground
,.' <' T\
(<;,
,,.-'\.. ?A. *\\, .,
,,,,
I,/'
-
,
,h
N Q T ~EiiTpty-air'iraft
, en route to the impact area to pick-up
<'<>Surviuok \.will
,T carry foodlwater to lower priority victims, as
'i;p(ioriti?ze$,tjy air crew.
2) ''l.!~iiialRefugee Collection Points
8 I
! a) Water vessels
; 'b) Air transportation
Rotary winglchinook (injured)
4" i) Aviation
ii) Water craft
iii) Ground
d) Ground transportation (uninjured)
i) Buses
ii) High water vehicles
e) Support commodities for responders and victims
i) Water
ii) MREs
iii) Tentsltarps
DRAFT
i) Aviation \ ,#.
,
-/ ',
i) Water "
,~~ -..;\ ,,,. -.:..
' /
\\.\
'
ii) Food -.., \
\
organic re-supply
-.'
i) Buses
i) Water
ii) Ice
iii) Food
iv) Cots
v) Blankets
vi) Comfort kits
vii) Special needs (infant supplies)
d) Il'/network communications
e) Security
5) FOSA
a) Air transportation
i) Rotary wing or fixed wing
DRAFT
b) Fuel
i) Aviation
ii) Water craft
iii) Ground
c) Ground transportationlsupport equipment
i) 53' trailers
ii) Tractors
iii) MHE
iv) Golf cartslgators
v) Light towers
vi) ITInetwork communications ,,
,
,/ ;
d) IRR Shortages / :.
,(',. ,
i) Water .
,/ ,. / .,'
\ \ ~
...
ii) MREs and items +.,for . infants'(e.g::-baby
'; food, baby
formula) I/-- .:,
\. \.
~, '*
a)
Ground transportation
b)
Food
c)
Bedding
d)
Shelter (e.g., warehouses, tents)
e)
Water
f)
Shower
g)
Laundry trailers
Locationlproximity to other sites
h)
i)
Incident Management Teams (U.S. Forest Service-tied
into LA Department of Transportation and Development)
j) Power generation equipment ,-,
/'
k) Medical support ,/,/ - -. .
!
-,
8) DMORT ./.;, , %x
a) Refrigerated trucks .
-
~
i ,.
c) ~ a r t h - m ~ v - i n .
g.e ~ ~ i p m'i,e,,/" nt
d) Security '(:""'--.. -.__ --...9 Y
',
', , ,,',.*yx.
,
.\
--,
,
,,'
,
,
" /
, . </
c. Personnel .
/---, \
i. stagingareas '~. ,\ , \%
..
11. The State Communicat~ops~ o k d i n a t ~ , w lcanvass ll State, Federal, and
\.
local communicators to ensurkiktal~-~Ammunications and information
\//
processing-media have been restoredto normal operations.
%
"" '\.
1) ,~61nm~1111cation fl~!!~:Local Distribution Point Site Manager to
... /
;
-
,
/the lot$
',,.
$ 0 (via ~ ~ + t e & nwhen available) to the State to FEMA
111. ~omm~n~cations-are-establi'ghed and maintained with ESF-5 (Emergency
'\ ;,-
~ a n a ~ e ' m e r itot )report-and receive assessments and status information,
- / k i t h > ~ ~ ~ - 7 . . ( d k Support),
s ~ u r ~ e the National Response Coordination
, . R - C 2 ~ t e r . ~ e ~ i o \ n a l ' , ~ & ~ oCoordination
nse Center, or Joint Field Office.
&<&'~,iv. ~ ~ ~ k ' : i n t ~ r n a l j 6 b m m tracking
o d i ~ logs are required and used for
', \ trackingicommodities received and shipped from FOSA sites. With the
"'.\$Fry&d
\-?id of t d e ' ~S. . Forest Service, this information is gathered upon both
departure of trucks to the FOSA. The information included in
this,tracking log includes the positive control number assigned to the
//
truck, the date, time, driver's name, contact number (cell), tractor
number, trailer number, and commodity being hauling (see Appendix 8:
Commodities Tracking Logs).
Appendix 1
Appendix 1: Transportation, Staging, and Distribution Execution
Timeline
a FOSAs
Team, equipment, commodities start arriving (l50+ trucks)
a SRSA-Pre-Deployment Activities (per staging area)
Order Federal resources
* Shuttle drivers-25+ (if additional are needed, make request)
* Empty boxes-25+ (if additional are needed, make request)
* MHE (e.g., forklifts, pallet jacks, ramps)--10 sets (predicted
upon breakdown requirement)
* Personnel-requirements unknown at this time
Pre-
Landfall
(H-48)
* * Light Towers-8 to 12 sets
* Security
Fuel and life support requirements for entire staging area team to
include contractors, truck drivers, etc.
* Fuel-1 to 5,000 gallon tank (diesel) MOgas (501gallon
per truck) 2417 refueling is desirable at the SRSA
* Food-base camp supplies (contract kitchens)
* Bathroom facilities-1 porta potty per -25
* Contractors (truck drivers, truck support personnel)-
power team-] 00 people
* Shuttle drivers-25 drivers
*
Pre- tropical storm winds. Includes areas on the East Bank of the
Mississippi River in the New Orleans Metropolitan Area which are
Landfall
within the levee protection system but remain vulnerable to a slow-
(H-30) moving Category 3 or any Category 4 or 5 storm. During Phase III,
certain routes will be directed and the Contrajlow Plan implemented.
Pre-
Landfall
(H-24)
* Pre-deployment activities continued
Finalize transfer of ownership procedures (upon receipt at
SRSAs).
Government to Government rocedures communication
between Parish, State, and Federal Government)
4 Operational period (24 hrslday daylnight shift)
Identify shortages.
Identify Communications shortage (e.g., walkie-talkies,
radios, cell phones, laptops).
Federal partners arrive (StatelFederal Coordinators)
" 2 per shift per staging area
1 State SRSA teams arrive (H-24 to H+24)
190+ people per staging area (working #'s)
Receiving-] Slshift-30 total
Shipping-25lshift-50 total
Transload-Solshift-1 00 total
Security-51shift-10 total
Life Support (Medical, Safety, etc.)-TBD
Commodities/Equipment arrive
Backfi11lSustainment
Tractor-trailers (commercial assets controlled by
Landfall DOTIFEMAIGSA)
(H-Hour)
4- Buses (commercial assets controlled by DOTIFEMAIGSA)
Rail (commercial assets controlled by DOTIFEMAIGSA)
Air (commercial assets controlled by DOTIFEMAIGSA)
SRSAs
SRSA teams arrive at staging areas
Post-
MHE arrives
Landfall 4- Empty trailerslshuttle drivers arrive
(H+24)
Commodities start to arrive (H+12 to H+36)
Commodities distributed (H+24 continuing)
2. Mission
a. The mission is to manage the flow of victims from Search and Rescue Operating
Bases (at the water-land interface), through Temporary Medical Operations
Staging Areas, to shelters, thence to temporary housing, in the aftermath of a
catastrophic hurricane in Louisiana.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. General
1) Given the number of expected victims rescued by search and rescue
operations and those self-rescued, a major limiting factor in executing this
plan will be the shortage of transportation facilities. The Louisiana
National Guard will be tasked to numerous missions and may not be able
to meet the need for transportation of victims. Sufficient transport to move
personnel to Temporary Medical Operations Staging Areas may not be
available for 48 to 72 hours.
2) It will take hundreds of buses per day to transport victims to Temporary
Medical Operations Staging Areas from Search and Rescue Operations
Bases or the land-water interface. The number of victims to be transported
is expected to wane after 72 hours. The following table illustrates an
example of the number of victims transported daily.
7 . 0 V o l u n t e e r a n d D o n a t i o n s M a n a g- .e m e n t
ET
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane has made landfall in southeast Louisiana resulting in
heavy structural damage due to high winds, a significant storm surge that
overtopped levees, and riverine flooding as a result of heavy rainfall. This
event will create a need to coordinate donated goods and volunteer services.
b. Assumptions
i. Unprecedented heavy casualties have been reported.
ii. This plan addresses unsolicited donations only.
iii. Donations
I) Catastrophic disasters will create a need to coordinate donated goods and
volunteer services. It is assumed that not every disaster incident will
generate donated goods and services. However, when circumstances
warrant, a united and cooperative effort by Federal, State, and local
governments, volunteer organizations, the private sector, and donor
community is necessary for successful management.
2) It is not the State's intent to alter, divert, or otherwise impede the normal
operation or flow of goods or services through volunteer organizations,
but to help coordinate offers of donated goods and services. Many
volunteer organizations have operational networks set up to receive,
process, and deliver needed goods and services to disaster victims. The
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
through its Donations Coordination Team and its Volunteer Coordination
Team, will work closely with volunteer organizations that have agreed to
operate in accordance with this plan. The Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness will look to those organizations to
provide a means to implement the donations management system and
coordination of emergent volunteers.
3) The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
has entered into a Statement of Understanding with Adventist Community
Services, wherein Adventist Community Services is designated by the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to
perform management and distribution of donated goods and services.
4) The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
and the State of Louisiana assume immunity from liability as described in
Section S735, Paragraph A of the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and
Disaster Act of 1993.
5) The Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness is responsible for maintaining this plan. The plan
will be reviewed, exercised, and updated periodically according to the
basic plan. The volunteer agencies shall integrate their planning efforts in
the development, maintenance, implementation, and testing of this plan
and its procedures.
iv. Local Needs
1) Local needs for donated goods and volunteers will be coordinated through
the State Emergency Operations Center using established procedures.
v. Reception PointsICongestion
1 ) The Donations Coordination Team will coordinate with the Department of
Transportation and Development to allow authorized shipments of donated
goods for processing. Requested donations will proceed to pre-designated
areas.
2) The screening process for receiving donated goods utilized by the
Department of Transportation and Development will be implemented.
Donated materials without approved destinations will be routed to the
nearest donation warehouse locations to be processed.
3) Donation warehouse locations will be located near primary interstate entry
points in the State, in conjunction with weigh stations serving as
Department of Transportation checkpoints.
vi. Warehouses
1) The preliminary processing warehouses will be located near points of
entry-the Department of Transportation and Development weigh
stations.
2) Preliminary inventory sorting will be conducted at these locations. Usable
donations will be transported to centralized donation centers, or to
appropriate areas for distribution.
3) Warehouse locations will be coordinated with the Donations Coordination
Team and the Office of Economic Development.
4) Processing at weigh stations will be conducted by the Department of
Transportation and Development.
5) Security will be provided by local law enforcement.
vii. Volunteers
1) Volunteers will be a valuable resource in executing this plan.
2) Spontaneous volunteers who are not assigned or attached to any agency,
church, religious organization, medical organization, first responders, or
skilled and non-skilled labor will respond from outside the affected area.
3) The influx of unsolicited first responders and other highly skilled
volunteers will likely be ongoing and unpredictable.
4) Many times, disaster victims will be volunteers.
5) Volunteers fall under human resource compliance and will be given the
same benefits as employees of the organization.
6) Unsolicited volunteers will be responsible for their own feeding, lodging,
and maintenance. However, the Volunteer Coordination Team will work
actively with member agencies to assign unsolicited volunteers.
7) Requests for local resources and volunteers will be directed to the State
Emergency Operations Center and routed to the Donations Coordination
TeamIVolunteer Coordination Team using established procedures.
8) The Volunteer Coordination Team will be working with its member
agencies to assign unsolicited volunteers.
c. Organization
2. Mission
a. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, in
coordination with voluntary agencies, will provide victims of disasters with as
much support as possible by effectively and efficiently channeling unsolicited
donations from individuals or from public and private sector organizations and
emergent volunteers.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. In accordance with the Louisiana Emergency and Disaster Act of 1993, the
Governor is responsible for meeting the dangers to the State and people
presented by emergencies or disasters. The law designates the Adjutant
General as Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness. The Governor, through the Louisiana Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness shall determine
requirements of the State and its political subdivisions for food, clothing,
shelter, and any other necessities, including procurement and pre-positioning
of supplies, medicines, materials, and equipment. 'This donations plan and its
implementing procedures will be activated when any significant event causes
spontaneous flow of or a major need for donated resources within the State of
Louisiana.
ii. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness will
establish a Volunteer Coordination Team to coordinate volunteer
organizations, including Louisiana Voluntary Organizations Active in
Disaster, and other partner agencies--organizations in the management,
credentialing, and assignment of unsolicited volunteers.
b. Specific Tasks to Lead, Support, and Coordinate Agencies
i. The Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, will assign a State Donations Coordinating Officer and other
staff as necessary to work with representatives from Louisiana Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster, thus comprising the principal Donations
Coordination Team. The State's role will be to support local government.
.11.. The Director of the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness will activate the Donations Management plan and Volunteer
Coordination procedures when a significant event causes a spontaneous flow
of, or a major need for, donated resources.
iii. Voluntary agency representatives in the Donations Coordination Center will
retain supervision of their agency personnel. The Donations Coordination
Team will work together in a collaborative effort to manage donated goods.
iv. Volunteer agencies will provide a liaison to the Volunteer Coordination Team
and Volunteer Registration Center.
v. The Volunteer Coordination Team will coordinate registration andlor referral
of emergent volunteers with government and voluntary agencies.
vi. First responders include the emergency medical service, emergency medical
technicians, volunteer firefighters, urban search and rescue, law enforcement,
dog teams, and community emergency response teams.
1) Spontaneous first responder volunteers will be strongly encouraged to
register with the call center.
2) The Donations Coordination Team Public Information Officer will
coordinate with the Joint Information Center to inform unsolicited first
responders and other skilled volunteers of registration procedures through
the Joint Information System.
3) Spontaneous first responder volunteers, registered through the call center,
will be referred to the appropriate emergency support function group for
assignment.
vii. Volunteers will furnish contact information and other pertinent information to
the Volunteer Coordination Team in order to provide an effective
communication process.
viii. The Donations Coordination Team and the Volunteer Coordination Team
will recommend activation of a call center within 24 to 48 hours after impact
to document offers of volunteer services.
ix. The call center will be established at a location where electric power and
telephone service will be unlikely to be interrupted.
x. The call center team needs to identify and designate (in writing) workspaces
with telephones and computer capabilities.
xi. Daily reports will be required to provide volunteer resources to other agencies
and organizations to meet needs.
xii. Based on volume, the Donations Coordination Team and the Volunteer
Coordination Team will evaluate the need to either increase or decrease call
center capacities.
xiii. Call center setup, operational procedures, and scripts are identified in the
DHSIFEMA Donations Toolkit.
c. Coordinating Instructions
i. Donations Management staff will operate from a Donations Coordination
Center as part of the State Emergency Operations Center. The State Donations
Coordinating Officer will be seated in the State Emergency Operations
Center, and will stay in close contact with the Donations Coordination Team.
Liaison personnel from participating organizations will be in all other
donations operations facilities (e.g., staging areas and distribution centers).
ii. Because it is extremely important that only carefully stated, factual
information be disseminated, a joint media management and coordination
system will be established. All media information will be coordinated through
the Donations Center Coordinator, the Operations Chief, and Public
Information Officer utilizing the Joint Information SystemIJoint Information
Center. Local, State, and Federal government news releases will be
2. Mission
a. The mission is to provide phased entry procedures to manage the return of
residents to areas evacuated after the impact of a catastrophic hurricane.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. Re-entry will be operated in phases, highlighting the need for first responders
and other recovery personnel to return before the general public.
1) Phase I (First Response Phase): This phase will provide for the immediate
entry of first responders, damage assessors, and other organizations or
personnel to assist with search and rescue, damage assessment, and
hazardous materials identification. During this phase, the identification
and establishment of safe zones will be completed.
a) Rapid needs assessment of damaged areas to establish safe zones will
be conducted by:
i) Responding Agencies (First Responders)
1. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
a. Unwatering
b. Debris assessment
c. Clearance
4. U.S. Army Reserve
ii) Internal Parish Assessment Teams
iii) Local search and rescue personnel
b) National critical and strategic assets should be assessed/restored
beginning in Phase I.
c ) The following tasks must be completed before moving on to Phase 11:
i) Usable roads, waterways, railways, and airfields (along with
capacity for runways) have been identified.
ii) Dry zones have been identified.
iii) Potentially dangerous wildlife has been contained.
iv) Safe zones have been established and hot zones (both land and
water) have been secured.
v) Search and rescue will continue into Phase 11.
2) Phase I1 (Critical Infrastructure Response): During this phase, critical
infrastructure such as public utilities, public safety communications, and
hospitals will be established. By the end of this phase, enough of the
9.0 Debris
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane has impacted southeast Louisiana, resulting in
millions of cubic yards of debris, including household hazardous waste and
toxic waste.
b. Assumptions
i. For the purpose of example, it is assumed that 30 million total cubic yards of
debris has been generated. Of this total amount of debris, 237,000 total cubic
yards are hazardous household waste and an unknown amount is hazardous
toxic waste.
ii. It is assumed that over 600,000 residential structures were impacted, of which
77% were destroyed.
iii. It is assumed that over 6,000 commercial structures were impacted, of which
67% were destroyed.
iv. The New Orleans metropolitan area is currently under water.
v. Emergency debris clearance will begin in the outlying areas and structure
demolition will be needed on a large-scale basis.
vi. Presidential declaration for Category A and B has been made requesting full
funding authority.
vii. Human remains are not part of the debris mission; however, human remains
will alter the debris mission.
viii. Empty coffins will be treated as debris.
ix. In the affected area, the typical debris will be construction and demolition at
70%, with vegetative debris at 30%.
x. Direct Federal assistance will be requested to supplement long-term local
debris removal efforts.
xi. Demolition of damaged structures will be required.
xii. Local resources will be used for initial emergency road clearance.
xiii. The limited land space, landfill capacity, and wet, saturated soil conditions
will limit burial as a disposal option.
xiv. Natural Resources Conservation Services will perform debris removal from
non-navigable waterways as resources allow.
xv. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will survey and certify depths and
obstructions on navigable waterways.
xvi. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will handle debris removal from
navigable waterways, and, if mission assigned, clear non-navigable
waterways.
xvii. The U.S. Coast Guard, while conducting over-flights for search and rescue,
will aid in the identification of major obstructions on navigable waters. The
U.S. Coast Guard will verify and replace navigational aids to reopen
navigable waters.
xviii. All livestock carcasses will be handled by Louisiana Department of
Agriculture and Forestry with requested cooperation from the U.S.
2. Mission
a. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness will
coordinate operations involved to clear, remove, and dispose of debris from areas
impacted by a catastrophic hurricane so that resp,onse and recovery operations can
be accomplished in a timely manner, while minimizing public health impacts and
delays in economic recovery.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. All Federal, State, and local response agencies will operate under the National
Incident Management System. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness will activate a Debris Task Force that is
composed of appointed members from the Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness; the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality; the Louisiana Department of Culture, Recreation, and
Tourism; the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals; the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development; the Louisiana Department of
Agriculture and Forestry; and Federal agencies (DHSEEMA, the U.S. Army
Corps of EngineersIESF-3, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
IESF-10). The designee of the Adjutant General will co-chair the Debris Task
Force with the DHSEEMA Deputy Public Assistance Officer for Debris. The
Debris Task Force may be composed of multiple working groups as
appropriate. For a catastrophic hurricane, there will be working groups for
inundated and non-inundated areas. The operation will be divided into phases:
1) Phase I: Clearance (Day 1-5)
a) Phase Ia: Inundated Area-As water recedes in each area
b) Phase Ib: Non-inundated Area-Estimates of 5.7 million cubic yards
of debris: 3 days
2) Phase 11: Removal/Reduction/Disposal
a) Phase IIa: Inundated Area-When water recedes
b) Phase IIb: Non-inundated Area-As soon as sites are identified
ii. State and local resources will perform emergency debris clearance.
iii. Federal, State, and local resources will aid in removal, reduction, and disposal.
iv. Reduction will be accomplished by recycling, incineration, grinding, and other
approved methods.
v. Disposal options for debris include on-site treatment, disposal, andlor
landfills. Various types of landfills will be utilized including permitted
hazardous waste, construction and demolition, or solid waste. In addition,
emergency non-permitted disposal sites may be authorized by the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality. On-site treatment of hazardous waste
may include use of thermal desorption units. On-site disposal may include the
use of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act vaults. The collection and
disposal of hazardous household waste will be tasked to ESF-10.
c. Personnel
i. The following personnel template may be used as a guide. Numbers are
provided for example only.
1) Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
Deputy Debris Officer, Debris Task Force Coordinator
a) Phase I
i) Inundated Area: Deputy Debris Ops Officer and 10 Project
Officers
ii) Un-inundated: Deputy Debris Ops Officer and Project Officers
b) Phase I1
i) Inundated Area: Deputy Debris Ops Officer and 30 Project
Officers
ii) Un-inundated: Deputy Debris Ops Officer and 30 Project Officers
2) DHSJFEMA Public Assistance (to include Permanent Full Time, Stafford
Act Employees, and Technical Assistance Contractors)
a) Phase I
i) Inundated (Clearance: 8 staff members): Infrastructure Branch
Chief, Public Assistance Officer, Deputy Public Assistance Officer
for Debris, Deputy Public Assistance Officer for Operations,
Debris Advisor, and Debris Specialists.
ii) Un-inundated (Clearance: 15 staff members): Debris Advisors, and
Debris Specialists.
b) Phase I1
i) Inundated (Removing/Reduction/Disposal:50 staff members):
Debris Advisors and Debris Specialists, Debris Monitors, Public
Assistance Coordinators, Project Officers, and Technical
Specialists.
ii) Un-inundated (Removing/Reduction/Disposal:350 staff members):
Debris Advisors and Debris Specialists, Debris Monitors, Public
Assistance Coordinators, Project Officers, and Technical
Specialists.
3) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
a) Phase I
i) Inundated (Clearance: 15 staff members): Environmental
Protection Agency On-Scene Coordinators, Superfund Technical
Assessment Response Team, and Emergency Rapid Response
Services
ii) Un-inundated (Clearance: 3 staff members): Environmental
Protection Agency On-Scene Coordinators, Superfund Technical
Assessment Response Team, and Emergency Rapid Response
Services
b) Phase I1
i) Inundated (Removing/Reduction/Disposal: 500 staff members,
includes hazardous materials activities): Environmental Protection
Agency On-scene Coordinator, Environmental Protection Agency
10.0 Schools
P
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane has made landfall in southeast Louisiana. Its arrival
resulted in heavy structural damage due to high winds, a significant storm
surge that overtopped levees, and riverine flooding as a result of heavy
rainfall. Damage to schools and thousands of relocated children create a need
for emergency educational services.
b. Assumptions
i. Extensive damage was done to schools in many of the Parishes affected by the
hurricane. In many cases the damage is severe enough that it will take an
extended period of time to repair or rebuild the schools.
ii. Families in many Parishes will be displaced from their homes for an extended
period of time due to home damage, even after floodwaters subside. These
families will be living in shelters, temporary housing, or alternate housing in
areas outside their home Parish for an extended period.
iii. In some cases, school records for children in affected Parishes will be
permanently lost because of a catastrophic hurricane. For others, a backup of
those records exists, but it will take an extended period to access them.
iv. The combination of riverine flooding due to heavy rainfall and storm surge
from the hurricane will result in flooding of many roads, limiting access to
schools for assessment and repair in many areas until floodwaters subside.
v. Much of Orleans, Jefferson, and Plaquemines Parishes and parts of St.
Bernard Parish will only be accessible by water until levees are breached
when floodwaters have receded to normal levels.
vi. Large quantities of hazardous waste, both industrial and household, will be
released as a result of hurricane wind and flooding, resulting in potential
contamination of land surrounding schools, as well as potential contamination
of structures and contents coming in contact with flood waters.
vii. Since students and faculty are dispersed, an evaluation must be conducted to
match student location and human and material resources in a safe location.
viii. Education services will be provided by local education agencies.
ix. Existing schools in host Parishes may not be able to handle the influx of
displaced students (both public and non-public), and will therefore need
additional resources.
x. Temporary sheltering and temporary housing patterns will impact the
schooling needs and should be looked at together.
xi. Laws and rules, such as the examples listed below, may impact educational
services and, therefore, be suspended temporarily or revised as a result of the
disaster.
1 ) Teacher certification
2) Attendance
3) Testing
4) School accountability
5) Federal and State funding
6) Purchasing processes
7) Court order desegregation consent decrees
8) Data collection/records
xii. Crisis counseling will be needed statewide to help children deal with the
disaster.
xiii. Some school systems may exist in name only.
xiv. Media, phone banks, and web sites may be used to disperse information to
the public regarding recovery of the educational system. This is to include
coordination between various agencies (e.g., local education agencies, local
Offices of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the Louisiana
Department of Education, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness, and DHSIFEMA).
xv. The money to execute this plan will be available.
xvi. The Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center will be formed in a
disaster.
c. Organization
i. Federal
I ) Lead Agency
a) Department of Education
2) Support Agencies
a) Department of Agriculture
b) Department of Commerce
c) Department of Defense
d) Department of Health and Human Services
e) Department of Homeland Security
f) Department of Housing and Urban Development
g) Department of Labor
h) Department of the Interior
i) Department of Veterans Affairs
j) Environmental Protection Agency
k) General Services Administration
1) Tennessee Valley Authority
ii. State of Louisiana
I) Lead Agency
a) Department of Education
2) Support Agencies
a) American Red Cross
b) Board of Regents
c) Department of Health and Hospitals
d) Department of Social Services
e) Division of Administration
f) Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
g) Louisiana State Police
iii. Parish
1) Lead Agency
a) Public local education agencies
2) Support Agencies
a) Catholic Diocese
b) Nonpublic local education agencies
c) Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
iv. Volunteer
1) Louisiana Volunteer Organization Active in Disasters
2. Mission
a. The mission is to restore delivery of educational services to children whose
schooling was disrupted following landfall of a catastrophic hurricane in southeast
Louisiana.
3. Execution
a. Concept of the Operations
i. The restoration of educational services for the displaced population will occur
in four phases: Pre-Disaster, Initial Assessment, Response and Stabilization,
and Long-term Recovery.
1) Phase I: Pre-Disaster
a) All local education agencies must have a disaster recovery plan, which
includes a line of authority.
b) A critical educational records maintenance procedure must be
established by the local education agencies, in coordination with the
Louisiana Department of Education.
c) All local education agencies will be required to establish a procedure
for securing and retrieving appropriate educational records as a part of
a disaster recovery plan.
d) Local education agencies must initiate a communication plan that
includes contact information for key personnel.
e) The Louisiana Department of Education, the Board of Regents, and
local education agencies will assess as much as possible the areas that
could be used as educational facilities.
2) Phase 11: Initial Assessment
a) The Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center will be
activated.
i) The Louisiana Department of Education and Board of Regents will
establish the Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center
to coordinate the re-establishment of educational services for the
displaced population. (Potential sites include Baton Rouge,
Shreveport, and Monroe.)
b) Initial damage information will be gathered through normal processes
from the Parish Emergency Operations Center to the Louisiana
Educational Emergency Operation Center. Additional information wi II
be requested as needed from local education agencies.
c) Procedures for contacting staff:
i) Local education agencies
ii) School district administrations
and Emergency
Preparedness Operations Center
ii. The local education agency will provide the Louisiana Educational
Emergency Operation Center with their shortfalls, which will assist in filling
those needs with State and Federal support (e.g., teachers, books, facilities,
support staff, food services, fuel, and transportation).
iii. The media will be used to disseminate information regarding the
establishment and delivery of educational services.
iv. ESF-2 will provide support in the priority and restoration of communication
services. For example, call centers can be developed or expanded.
b. Special Assistance
i. Medical
1) Immunization
2) Additional school nurses
3) School-based health clinics for routine medical care
4) Grief and trauma training for staff
ii. Students with Disabilities
1) Individual Disabilities Education Act and Americans with Disabilities Act
compliancy
2) Wheelchairs, medical beds, special transportation, trained
paraprofessionals, auditory and vision assistance, and assistive learning
devices
3) English Language Acquisition certified staff
iii. Equipment and Supplies
I ) Specialty books (e.g., auditory transcript, Braille, and large print books)
c. Personnel
i. Educational personnel will be required based on a 20: 1 student-to-teacher
.. ratio. This includes certified support staff.
11. Teacher personnel will come from displaced teachers, former teachers, retired
teachers, emergency certified teachers, pre-service teachers, and other
displaced college graduates who can obtain temporary certification.
iii. Non-certified support staff will come from displaced paraprofessionals,
displaced support staff, and members of the general population.
iv. Many existing rules and regulations may be waived, but it is not the intention
of this plan to waive criminal background checks or drug tests for school staff.
v. The Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center will be staffed by the
Louisiana Department of Education and the Board of Regents, allowing
consideration for a 24-hour operation.
ii. Local education agencies directly impacted will perform the following tasks:
1) Execute a disaster and recovery plan.
2) Collect and secure records.
3) Reestablish school leadership and safe location.
4) Assess the initial damage.
5) Report damage assessment to the emergency management agency.
6) Continue to assess and maintain communications.
7) Upon request, provide student records to requesting local education
agency.
iii. Once notified by the Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center of
potential student impact, the local education agencies indirectly impacted will
perform the following tasks:
1) Assess available student capacity.
2) Assess available resources and instructional materials.
3) Assess transportation.
4) Assess staff and funding resources
5) Prepare for increase in student enrollment.
6) Notify shelters and temporary housing of enrollment procedures.
7) Enroll additional students.
8) Request student records through the Louisiana Educational Emergency
Operation Center.
9) Evaluate capability based on current situation and determine the course of
action for the delivery of educational services.
10) Identify shortfalls to local emergency operation center.
11) Maintain ongoing execution between local education agencies and the
Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center.
12) Deliver educational services.
iv. The Louisiana Department of Education will serve as the lead agency in
providing coordinated support services to local education agencies.
Supporting agencies may include, but are not limited to, local emergency
management agencies, local education agencies, the Board of Regents, the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
DHSIFEMA, and the U.S. Department of Education.
v. The Board of Regents will serve as the lead agency in providing the facilities
needed for the Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center.
Supporting agencies may include, but are not limited to, Parish Offices of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, local education agencies,
the Louisiana Department of Education, the Louisiana Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness, DHSIFEMA, and the Louisiana
Division of Administration.
vi. Local emergency management agencies will serve as the lead agency in filling
local needs and coordinating requests for needs that could not be provided at
the local level. Supporting agencies may include, but are not limited to, local
education agencies, the Louisiana Department of Education, the Board of
Regents, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, and DHSIFEMA.
vii. The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness will
serve as the lead agency in filling State and unmet local needs and for
coordinating requests for needs that could not be provided at the State level.
Supporting agencies may include, but are not limited to, Parish Offices of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, local education agencies,
the Louisiana Department of Education, the Board of Regents, and
DHSREMA.
viii. DHSIFEMA will serve as the lead agency in filling State requested unmet
needs. Supporting agencies may include, but are not limited to, all Federal
agencies through the emergency support function (ESF) structure.
b. Communications Requirements
i. The Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center will serve as the
focal point of communication. The following tools will be the main means of
communication in the areas indicated:
1) Computers via the World Wide Web will be the primary means of
communication for data and official requests.
2) Telephones (both landline and wireless) will be the primary means of
voice communication.
3) The Louisiana Educational Emergency Operation Center hotline will be
the primary means of receiving and collecting information from the
educational certified staff.
4) Backup means for data and official requests will be by fax.
5) Backup means for voice communication will be amateur radio operators.
6) The U.S. Postal Service may be used for identification of address changes.
7) The media will be used to disseminate information from the Louisiana
Educational Emergency Operation Center on the location and recruitment
of educational staff and to provide general information to the public.
8) Louisiana public information officers will be used to coordinate and
disseminate information in conjunction with the joint information center.
9) The Louisiana Public Broadcast System (open broadcast, closed circuit)
will be used to disseminate information.
10) Shelters and temporary housing will be used as points to disseminate
information, particularly when to register, and for identification of
educational staff.
I 1 . O S e a r c h a-* n d R e s- c u e
I. Situation
a. General
i. Southeast Louisiana has been impacted by a catastrophic hurricane, causing a
need for the rescue of thousands of victims.
b. Assumptions
i. A substantial portion of the public did not successfully evacuate from the
disaster area prior to the onset of tropical storm force winds. As a result, many
residents are trapped in or on top of water bound and/or collapsed structures.
Access to these people for rescue will vary depending on the nature of the
structure and where it is located.
ii. Parish resources in the most severely impacted areas will not be available for
several weeks or even months, as they were not removed from the area prior
to the storm.
iii. The combination of riverine flooding due to heavy rainfall and storm surge
from the hurricane resulted in flooding of many roads, limiting access into
many areas until flood waters subside.
iv. Certain large tracts of land enclosed by levee systems have been flooded due
to storm surge overtopping levee walls beyond the capacity of pumping
systems. Most if not all pumping systems have been rendered inoperable by
the flooding. These areas will only be accessible by water or air until levees
are breached once floodwaters have receded to normal levels.
v. Large quantities of hazardous waste, both industrial and household, have been
released because of hurricane wind and flooding, resulting in some level of
airborne and waterborne contamination present in varying degrees throughout
the affected area.
vi. All resources and supplies as described below are for search and rescue
operations personnel only.
c. Organizations
i. Federal
1) Lead Agency
a) DHSJFEMA
2) Supporting Agencies
a) Agency for International Development
b) Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service)
c) Department of Defense
d) Department of Health and Human Services
e) Department of Justice
f) Department of Labor
g) National Aeronautics and Space Administration
h) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
i) Bureau of Indian Affairs
j) Department of Energy
k) Department of Transportation
1) Environmental Protection Agency
2. Mission
a. After initial assessment, timely execution of search and rescue operations in order
to minimize loss of life to persons unable to reach safe shelter outside of the
affected area prior to landfall of a catastrophic hurricane.
3. Execution
a. Concept of the Operations
i. The commitment of State, Federal, and local resources under a unified
command structure utilizing the National Incident Management System in a
unified effort to rescue the highest number of human victims in the shortest
length of time. Search and rescue will include all air, ground, and waterborne
searches for lost or missing persons and the rescue of endangered, sick, or
injured persons. The lead State agency is the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries. The lead Federal agency is the U.S. Coast Guard for water rescue
and ESF-9 for urban search and rescue. The Search and Rescue Command is
comprised of these agencies. The Parish Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness Director will coordinate requests for assistance with
the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
operations personnel for mission response.
ii. Search and rescue resources of all types (including urban search and rescue,
helicopter-aquatic, and swift-water) will be needed for response DHSIFEMA,
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the Louisiana Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, and the Search and Rescue
Command will establish resources necessary to effectively and efficiently
deploy and support their mission.
iii. Search and rescue operations will utilize time-phasing concepts in deploying
teams and resources into all affected areas based on situational requirements.
iv. Levees will be established launching points for search and rescue operations
for a catastrophic hurricane.
v. Phase I: Pre-Landfall. Search and Rescue Command will perform the
following tasks:
1) Identify all available internal and external resources for search and rescue
operations (all levels).
2) Maintain situational awareness (all levels).
3) Stage initial search and rescue response resources where applicable (all
levels).
4) Develop an action plan that is specific to the event.
5) Evaluate resource capabilities.
6) Identify shortfalls and request additional resources.
vi. Phase 11: Landfall. Search and Rescue Command will perform the following
tasks:
I) Continue to maintain situational awareness.
2) Continue to evaluate resource capabilities.
3) Identify shortfalls and request additional resources.
vii. Phase 111: Post-Landfall. Search and Rescue Command will perform the
following tasks:
1) Assess and evaluate search area using:
a) High-resolution overflight
b) Initial water-based assessment
2) Plan to deploy resources.
a) Evaluate search area.
i) Identify bases of operations.
1. Appropriate number of bases of operations will be established.
2. Bases of operations will be mobileldynamic.
ii) Sectors will be defined by search area.
b) Decide to deploy resources to specific areas.
3) Continuously evaluate safety of rescue area (for search and rescue
operations personnel).
4) Inbound rescue platforms will attempt to deliver supplies to non-emergent
victims.
5) Identify and deploy resources and volunteers.
6) Continue to evaluate resource capabilities.
7) Identify shortfalls and request additional resources.
8) Coordinate and evacuate rescued persons.
9) Follow chain of custody of rescuees as determined by Unified Command.
viii. Phase IV: Transition from Rescue to Recovery shall be approved by the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness when
all rescue sectors have been cleared of apparent survivors.
b. Specific Tasks to Lead, Support, and Coordinate Agencies
i The appropriate representative for each Parish will be responsible for
coordinating local resources to accomplish search and rescue operations.
..
11. Given the severity of the hurricane, a State of Emergency has been declared,
and all local resources for search and rescue may be exhausted.
iii. The lead agencies will prepare for and respond to people in need of rescue.
iv. The specific tasks they will follow are below:
1) Respond, identify shortfalls, and plan to fill those shortfalls.
2) Identify and establish geographical locations of control (Bases of
Operations) and populate those sectors with personnel and supplies to
rescue stranded persons.
3) At the end of each day, measure activities, plan, and reprioritize for the
following day.
v. Support agencies will supply resources for the rescue effort.
vi. Coordinating agencies will assist the lead agencies with command and control
of overall operation and assist the support agencies with the distribution of
scarce resources.
1) Coordinating State Agency: Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness
a) Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
2) Coordinating Federal Agency: DHSJFEMA
a) ESF-8 (Medical)
b) ESF-6 (Mass Care)
c. Coordinating Instructions
i Coordination of instructions and reports will be accomplished utilizing the
National Incident Management System as approved by the Unified Command.
Strategy for implementing the action plan and specific missions by supporting
agencies will be communicated and coordinated as specified in the Incident
Action Plan.
ii. In order to meet continued operational requirements, status reports shall be
submitted to the Unified Command at the end of each operational period as
specified in the Incident Action Plan.
iii. The map in Search and Rescue Appendix A from the Office of State Police
may serve as a baseline for the geographic divisions of the Bases of
Operations.
iv. Individual Parishes or segments of Parishes may be used to delineate actual
bases of operations according to need.
initial assessment indicates that the Parish is severely damaged and is not
capable of requesting assistance. The relief will be obtained through mutual
aid from unaffected Parishes, State, and Federal assistance. Resources, such as
personnel, assets, fuel, food, water, and spare operational equipment, will be
coordinated through the Unified Command. Support identified shall be for the
use of response personnel and initial care of victims. Bases of Operations will
be determined by situational environment and established in specific
geographic sectors. Identified needs for the Bases of Operations in each sector
are described in Search and Rescue Appendix B.
b. Special Assistance
i. Medical Support Required
1) Primary medical assistance will be required at each base of operations.
2) The first responders will provide limited first aid, which will require
resupply at the bases of operations.
3) Rotary wing assets with medical assistance will be required to support
search and rescue operations.
ii. ShelterITransportation Coordination for Victims
1) ESF-6 will provide a shelter coordinator for rescued victims.
2) ESF-1 will provide transportation of rescued victims.
iii. Tactical Air Traffic Control
1) ESF-I will provide Tactical Air Traffic Control
c. Personnel
i. See Search and Rescue Appendix B.
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane made landfall in southeast Louisiana, resulting in
thousands of victims requiring public shelter.
b. Assumptions
i. For the purpose of this plan, a total of 57,896 people are assumed to require
public shelter prior to landfall. The assumed number of evacuees seeking
public shelter outside the affected area prior to landfall is summarized by
sector below:
ii. Additional people who do not initially evacuate but survive the storm will be
seeking public shelter because their homes have been destroyed or will require
extensive repair to be made livable. Some number of persons rescued from
water-bound areas will require shelter. Residents who evacuated to
Mississippi will seek to return to shelters in Louisiana at some point. Some
number of residents who evacuated prior to landfall, but whose homes have
been destroyed, or will require extensive repair, will seek public shelter at
some point for a period of time. For the purposes of this plan the total number
of people requiring shelter post-landfall is estimated at 500,000.
iii. Evacuation is complete.
iv. The Shelter Task Force Plan is activated and working.
v. The purpose of emergency shelter is to get people away from the impact of the
disaster.
vi. Special populations shelter operations will be conducted in accordance with
the Louisiana Hurricane Shelter Operations Plan, Annex X, Special Needs
Plan. The plan is adequate to address a catastrophic scenario.
vii. The Governor's order will be required to ensure all Parish and State resources
are made available to meet the emergency needs of people for a minimum of
12 months.
viii. A total of 40,000 people will be needed to assist with the sheltering of
500,000 people, dispensing of 1 million meals, and the distributing of life-
sustaining supplies.
ix. The 500,000 post-landfall shelter population will include people that were
sheltered in hotels or with families pre-landfall. Some Parishes within sector
D will open shelters during the pre-landfall phase. Some of these, although
Mission
a. Provide shelter to members of the public forced from their homes by a
catastrophic hurricane until they are able to return to their homes, find alternate
housing, or can be provided with temporary housing arrangements.
Execution
a. Concept of the Operations
i. General
1) A method to identify, segregate, and decontaminate potentially
contaminated shelterees will be developed.
2) A method to conduct sampling at shelter sites will be developed.
3) Shelterees rescued from the affected area will pass first through one of the
Temporary Medical Operations Staging Areas. They will be grouped by
area of origin before being transported to shelters, in order to facilitate
return assistance once they can return home.
4) Emergency shelter will not be reconstituted in impact areas until
temporary housing is established.
5) Temporary housing will be reconstituted in or near the impact areas as
soon as possible.
6) Resources and support will be available from the Louisiana Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness through the guidelines in
the Emergency Operations Plan.
7) All shelter-related public service messages will be communicated by the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
through the Emergency Alert System. Parish Offices of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness can use the Emergency Alert
System in accordance with existing procedures.
8) Some shelters will be closed and others opened as the situation warrants.
Some facilities in inundated areas will be closed and the population
relocated in a safer area. Some will be closed as people are shifted closer
to their homes.
2) State of Louisiana
a) The Louisiana Hurricane Shelter Task Force will perform the
following task:
i) Coordinate with Parish operation of existing shelters and
identification of potential locations for new shelters.
b) The Department of Health and Hospitals will perform the following
tasks:
i) Provide medical personnel staffing for special needs shelters.
ii) Providelcoordinate medical support for general population shelters
based on medical needs at the time.
1. Forward additional health care requests to ESF-6 for
coordination.
iii) Provide medical screening of all rescued persons post-landfall
before assignment to shelters.
c) Louisiana Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters will perform
the following task:
i) Coordinate volunteer personnel, activities, and donations.
d) Office of Indian Affairs will perform the following tasks:
i) Identify reservation needs and coordinate State support with tribal
governments.
ii) Coordinates donations and volunteer designated for non-
reservation Indian populations.
e) Department of Agriculture and Forestry will perform the following
task:
i) Provides available commodities for mass feeding.
f) Department of Corrections will perform the following task:
i) Supplements shelter feeding effort when requested.
g) National Guard will perform the following task:
i) Provides assistance in shelter operations as requested through the
Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (reference the Louisiana State Emergency Plan).
h) Department of Environmental Quality will perform the following
tasks:
i) Assist with decontamination and air and water quality monitoring
in shelters.
ii) Ensure that no hazardous materials are near shelter facilities.
i) For the purposes of this plan, State and local level chapters of the
American Red Cross are included as providing support to shelters at
the Federal level.
3) Local support
a) Parish President will perform the following task:
i) Authorize and direct use of Parish government personnel and other
resources to direct andlor assist with the sheltering operations.
b) Parish Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
will perform the following task:
The Personnel Data Tracking System would greatly facilitate the shelters' efforts to track people, as well
as better achieve other objectives like family reunification and education.
'O The agency authority for individual shelters must coordinate with the local school administration (e.g.,
principal and superintendent) to determine the viability of utilizing the school as an on-going shelter while
continuing student education.
8
@ Print this Folder Coov this Folder Ju'mp down to: Attachments Assianments 51856
Folder
Folder I D 51856
From* 8 ( <Landrieu,
, Mary L. El Po
p
J
To/Owner* LA
I
DHS Workflow # 145662 ,Landrieu Project #
Keyword 107100
Summary PLEASE EXPEDITE1 2/24 sent to Sharon Blades
for response.
Mail Type Regular Mail
Folder Types Congressional
S
J
9 Members of Senate
Date Signed
Keyword
Summary
Cont.
Created By Hawkins. Christo~her 02/ 14/ 2005
Modified By Presslev. Beverlv A, 02/24/2005
Dates
Date Sent* 02/14/2005 g j J
Date 02/14/2005
Received*
Either C o m ~ u t eNow or the system will auti
Date Due 02/28/2005 7 -01 23 left blank.
Date Closed
Attachments
created
Details Download Description Type Classification Owner Modified
-- - -
Feasibility
PesPonse
Image FEMA
02/14/2005
Fund~ng Dlvision 02/14/2005
(Grouo)
Request
Assignments
Assigned Assigned ihlork Date
Letzils kctior, D a l e Due Ci:
TO BY Status SequeRce Assig!iec(
For Pre~arednessHawkins
@ ~nformation Christopher Closed 02/14/2005 0 2 / 2 8 / 2 0 0 5 02/15
[Grou~)
Ms.Pamela Tumer
Adsistant Secretary for Legislative m rs
U.S.Departmeat of Homeland S d t y
Washhgkm, D.C.20528
ThanLyou in advance for your attention to this matter. Should you have any questions.
please contact mc or my Projats Asshn5 JdeLammkr, at 202-224-5824.
With kindcstregards, I am
..
Wjbl
Enclosure _ _ - . . - -.- . - -- ..- -.
.- ..
EXHIBIT 48
-J¶O/2004 18:12 FAX 1045657742 NAYWS OWIC8 OPICR
i -
-*-
Unbd6ab~
n r I k r ~ ~ ~
W
- D.C. m10
EXHIBIT 49
Feasibility Studv for New Orleans
Grant Funding: The State of Louisiana has one open disaster, FEMA-I 548-DR-
LA, Hurricane Ivan that provided Hazard Mitigation Grant (HMGP) h d i n g
available for Orleans and Jefferson parishes. The other open disaster for the State .
is FEMA- 152 1-DR-LA; this declaration did not include these parishes under
HMGP eligibility and the State has already identified 'HMGP projects under the
disaster. Even if there was HMGP grant funding available, it would not be
enough to cover the project. (HMGP funding for a feasibility study is only an
eligible expense if the actual retrofit is part of the grant). The cost for the
feasibility study would most likely need to be a Congressio~ial"earmark".
Past Studies
See Attachment
~ecommendedFeasibilitv Study
Superdome: State owned facility but City of New Orleans has contract to operate.
The primary tenant is the New Orleans Saints who is negotiating $200-million in
renovations for larger box seats, etc.). Recent study indicated that Superdome
could function as a refuge for up to 100,000 on 3 levels for a period of 24 hours.
The Sport Arena next door was also identified as a refuge area for up to 20,000.
*Renovation plans should be considered in the feasibility study. Renovations
would benefit the community, so it would be essential to confirm that the retrofit
funding only applies to the shelter or last resort and not help pay for renovations.
Building additional bridges for mass evacuation fiom the City. Currently, there
-.---- .one over I- to Mississippi and the other to 1-1 0 to Texas. This
are two bridges,
appears to be insuffihent for the population of New Orleans.
Upgrade water and sewer lines to perfom independently from the city in order to
continue functionality during and immediately following event.
Other Considersation:
-The concept of evacuating New Orleans during an event has been approached before
several times but all efforts and have uncoordinated.
1. Situation
a. General
i. A catastrophic hurricane has hit southeast Louisiana causing heavy structural
damage, including many homes, due to high winds and flooding. Thousands
of families will be displaced for an extended period of time and will require
temporary housing while their homes are being rebuilt or until they find new
permanent housing.
b. Assumptions
i. See Temporary Housing Appendix A
ii. For this purposes of this plan, it is assumed that 457,000 households will be
displaced, with an estimated 200,000 or less requiring long-term housing.
iii. It will take over one year to re-enter areas most heavily impacted.
iv. Temporary housing will last longer than normal, depending on utilities and
structure areas.
v. Those displaced will move the minimum possible distance and return at the
earliest possible time.
vi. Housing will require supporting infrastructure to include water, power,
sanitation, access-medical, security, schools, and community services.
vii. Multiple group sites will be in multiple Parishes.
viii. Available rental unity will be minimal.
ix. Housing solutions for New Orleans metro areas will differ from those for the
other Parishes.
x. Parishes will have little or nothing to offer by way of resources.
xi. Each identified group housing site will have to be evaluated and possibly
tested for hazardous materials advisories sent out.
xii. There will be an accelerated environmental assessment for group sites.
xiii. Decisions about where to locate temporary housing in the short term will
impact longer-term decisions regarding locations where permanent rebuilding
can take place.
xiv. Parish resources in the most severely impacted areas will not be available for
several weeks or even months, as they were not removed from the area prior
to the storm.
xv. Certain large tracts of land enclosed by levee systems will have been flooded
due to storm surge overtopping levee walls beyond the capacity of pumping
systems. Most, if not all, pumping systems will have been rendered inoperable
by the flooding. These areas will only be accessible by water until levees are
breached after floodwaters have receded to normal levels. This means much of
Orleans, Jefferson, and parts of St. Bernard Parish will not be suitable
locations for temporary housing.
c. Organizations
i. Federal
1) Lead Agency
a) DHSIFEMA
2) Supporting Agencies
a) Department of Agriculture
b) Department of Commerce
c) Department of Defense
d) Department of Energy
e) Department of Health and Human Services
f) Department of Housing and Urban Development
g) Department of Labor
h) Department of Transportation
i) Department of the Treasury
j) Department of Veterans Affairs
k) American Red Cross
1) Tennessee Valley Authority
m) U.S. Postal Service
n) Small Business Administration
o) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
p) Forest Service
q) General Services Administration
ii. State of Louisiana
1) Lead Agency
a) Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
2) Supporting Agencies
a) Department of Insurance
b) Department of Health and Hospitals
c) Department of Revenue
d) Department of Public Safety
e) Department of Economic Development
f ) Department of Transportation and Development
g) Department of Corrections
h) Planning and Development Commission
i) Public Service Commission
j) Louisiana National Guard
iii. Local
1) Lead Agency
a) Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
2) Supporting Agencies
a) Sheriffs Office
b) Fire Departments
c) Department of Public Works
d) Levee Board
e) Local Planning and Zoning Commissions
2. Mission
a. The mission is to provide temporary housing to members of the public in
southeast Louisiana whose homes sustained major damage as a result of a
catastrophic hurricane and will not be able to return to their homes until
permanent alternate housing is obtained or their home is restored to habitability.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. Pre-disaster group site identification and selection process:
1) The identification of sites by the State and local officials is essential to the
timely implementation of the temporary housing program. Site
identification should be accomplished before hurricane season and
reviewedlupdated annually (see Temporary Housing Appendix E: Group
Site Data Collection Sheet Draft).
a) Partner with the State of Mississippi and Native American Tribes
within the State of Louisiana to identify sites using the Group Site
Data Collection Sheet (Temporary Housing Appendix E: Group Site
Data Collection Sheet Draft) for temporary housing.
b) Request neighboring states to identify any closed military installations
that can possibly be used for temporary housing.
.. 2) Site selection will be completed by DHSIFEMA.
1 1 . Coordinate with the Individual Assistance Strike Team (Task Force) to assess
any unmet housing needs (wholesale), act as liaisons to locals, and coordinate
with local community relations teams, mobile home teams (retail), and
potential sites.
iii. Execute a multi-faceted phased temporary housing strategy to move people
from emergency shelter to temporary housing on to permanent housing as
quickly as possible. Priorities of effort will go to emergency shelter residence,
giving priority to those individuals from the most heavily impacted areas that
will require long-term temporary housing. Concurrent strategies are as follows
(see Temporary Housing Appendix B: Phases of Housing Requirements and
Programmatic Approaches):
1) Strategy 1: Enable use of existing resources.
2) Strategy 2: Conversion of existing resources and construction of
emergency group sites.
3) Strategy 3: Development of temporary housing sites.
b. Specific Tasks to Lead, Support, and Coordinate Agencies
i. Strategy 1: Enable use of existing resources
1) Intermediate housing will encompass all alternatives that provide a
minimum family living environment that can be executed quickly,
including local and regional relocation. Possible alternatives will include
college campuses, barracks, hotels and motels, personal travel trailers and
recreational vehicles, adopt-a-family, rental rooms in private homes,
vacation homes, camp facilities (e.g., church, BoyIGirl Scouts, and 4-H),
cruise ships, and all available rental units. This strategy will also include
assistance to survivors moving in with family or friends andlor relocating
to areas outside of the State, and negotiating with hotel chains in and out
of the State. Lump sum payments may be an option.
2) ESF- 1 will perform the following tasks:
a) Provide transportation assets to support interim housing transition.
b) Establish a mass transit plan.
Travel Trailers:
Individual Sites 400 600 1000 2500
(Assume 4500)
Mobile HomesrTravel
Trailers:
Existing Sub- - 200 500 1000 800 500
divisions/Commercial
c. Personnel
i. The following table is an,example of the personnel requirements distributed
over time. These estimates do not include administrative support staff.
I
f
I \ f
I \ f
I \ f
I \
Administration ' ; Logistics Planning/Info Operations
\ 1 \ 1 \
,
/ \ 1
b. Communications Requirements
i. Travel trailerlmobile home delivery
1) The Department of Transportation will be required to adjudicate road
access issues for movement of mobile homes from production facilities to
the disaster area.
..
11. Sweep teams
1) See Temporary Housing Appendix D.
iii. Site selection
1) The site selection process will require coordination between DHSIFEMA,
the State and Parish governments, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
vii. Search and rescue missions will need to be supported by medical personnel to
do screeningltriage on rescuees prior to transport to shelters or release to
families.
viii. Large quantities of hazardous waste, both industrial and household, will have
been released because of hurricane wind and flooding, resulting in potential
airborne and waterborne contamination, and possible combustible/flammable
conditions.
ix. Many families seeking shelter will have not brought needed over-the-counter
and prescription medicines with them.
x. Certain large tracts of land enclosed by levee systems will have been flooded
due to storm surge overtopping levee walls beyond the capacity of pumping
systems. This will include the majority of Orleans Parish, much of Jefferson
Parish, and parts of St. Bernard Parish.
xi. All 40 medical treatment facilities in the impacted area are affected by the
high-water levels, loss of electricity, loss of communications, and storm-force
winds, rendering them isolated and useless. At best, they will shelter-in-place
whatever patients they were not able to discharge prior to landfall. In addition,
refugees (non-injured or ill individuals) will come to those treatment facilities
for sheltering. All patients, staff, family members, and refugees will require
evacuation from nonfunctional facilities. These treatment facilities may
require restoration of power, as well as medical, water, and food re-supply,
until evacuation is complete.
xii. Some nursing homes will have already been evacuated, per emergency plans,
as required by the State. However, some residents will not be able to evacuate
pre-incident and will require medical evacuation.
xiii. The standard acceptable level of care will not be possible in an extreme
emergency situation.
xiv. Concern about inpatient care will be much greater than concern for outpatient
care.
xv. The State will request Federal support and the President will declare a major
disaster. ESF-8 will be activated, including the National Disaster Medical
System (Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team, Disaster Medical
Assistance Team, and Veterinary Medical Assistance Team).
xvi. Search and rescue will be activated to conduct aerial assessments to
determine Search and Rescue Bases of Operation.
xvii. The Strategic National Stockpile will be activated and the Technical
Assistance Response Unit will be deployed.
xviii. Based on estimates from search and rescue, approximately 75,000 persons
will be transported to medical facilities daily for four days. If a conservative
estimate of 10% requiring medical treatment is applied, receiving 7,500
patients per day in need of medical care will be anticipated.
xix. The State will establish nine triage lines and special needs shelters.
xx. The Strategic Medical Assistance and Response Team (SMART) and mobile
hospital system will be activated.
c. Organization
i. Federal
1) Lead Agency
a) Department of Health and Human Services
2) Support Agencies
a) DHSmational Disaster Medical System
b) Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service)
c) Department of Defense
c) Department of Energy
d) Department of Justice
f ) Department of Transportation
2. Mission
a. The mission is to plan for medical transportation, temporary public health and
medical care, emergency medical care, normal outpatient care (e.g., doctors,
dentists, laboratory, radiology, dialysis clinics, and home nursing), and definitive
hospital care to the population of southeast Louisiana. The mission is also to plan
for identification, storage, and assistance with final disposition of remains and to
plan for minimal support of animal care as needed. These services will be
provided until customary medical facilities and services are returned to
operational status in the areas impacted by the catastrophic hurricane.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations
i. Search and Rescue Base of Operations
1) The Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals will coordinate with
search and rescue efforts to provide decontamination andlor medical care
at each Search and Rescue Base of Operations. Search and rescue will
transport victims requiring medical attention to the Bases of Operations or
to acute treatment facilities as dictated by the patient's medical condition.
2) It is recommended that Search and Rescue Bases of Operations be located
next to or very near selected rail lines and viable ground transportation
routes.
3) The Search and Rescue Bases of Operations will be staffed by local
emergency service and public safety providers (e.g., emergency medical
service and fire departments), as well as Disaster Medical Assistance
Team members. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, organized into
medical strike teams, will be located at each Search and Rescue Base of
Operations.
4) From the Search and Rescue Bases of Operations, refugees in need of
medical care will be transported to one of three Temporary Medical
Operations Staging Areas or more definitive care facilities as determined
by patient condition through a combination of the following assets:
emergency medical service, State resources (including publiclprivate
ambulances and helicopters), Emergency Management Assistance
Compact resources, National Mutual Aid and Resource Management
Initiatives resources, Federal assets to be determined by DHSIFEMA, and
other pre-event open-ended-agreement procured modes of transportation.
5) Refugees not in need of medical care will be transported via various
means of transportation from the Search and Rescue Bases of Operations
to nearby shelters in Baton Rouge, Thibodaux, and Hammond.
6) Within five days of rescue operations, search and rescue assets will switch
from rescue efforts to evacuation of hospitals in the affected area. Hospital
evacuation must be a priority, due to the lack of electricity, number of
patients, and the influx of refugees into the stranded healthcare facilities
overwhelming available resources. Patients will be moved to Temporary
Medical Operations Staging Areas, directly to designated hospitals outside
of the affected area, or out of the State. Refugees will be transported to
temporary shelters.
7) Hospitals in the affected areas will be re-supplied with critical supplies
within one to seven days.
8) Patients and refugees will be decontaminated at the Search and Rescue
Bases of Operations as needed prior to forward movement to the
Temporary Medical Operations Staging Areas.
..
11. Temporary Medical Operations Staging Areas
1) The State Department of Health and Hospitals has designated Temporary
Medical Operations Staging Areas in the following locations: Southeastern
Louisiana University (Hammond, Louisiana), Nicholls State University
iii. The General Services Administration will provide four T1 lines via mobile
satellite unit and any additional resources necessary to re-establish hospital
communications.
iv. Interoperability and communications between multiple users is an ongoing
issue. Communications need to be coordinated to ensure effective tracking
and response at the unified command centers.
v. Tracking of medical personnel responding to the area, medical supplies, and
patients will all be coordinated by the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals.
Appendix B: A l t e r n a t e M e d i c a l Treatment F a c i l i t i e s
All the medical treatment facilities in the area affected by the high-water levels will be virtually
useless. At best, they will shelter in place whatever patients they were not able to discharge prior
to landfall.
In addition, refugees (non-injured or ill individuals) will come to treatment facilities for
sheltering. The Louisiana Hospital Association has provided estimates for the numbers of
population at risk (patients by categories, staff, family members, and refugees) (see Appendix
A). 'The Nursing Homes Association needs to address their population at risk, specifically those
that have residents with special needs.
Several treatment facilities owned by the State and the Department of Veterans Affairs were
identified in the immediate area (and two Veterans Affairs Medical Centers in Alexandria and
Shreveport) that could provide surge alternate facilities. These facilities are the St. Gabriel
Women's Correctional Facility, St. Gabriel, Louisiana; Jetson Youth Correctio~ialFacility,
Scotlandville, Louisiana; Veterans Affairs Nursing ~omc.\~linto~i,.~ouisiana; and Carville
Hospital, Carville, Louisiana. The Louisiana Hospital Association will identify other facilities
around the State with surge capacity.
HURRICANE
KATRI N A
LESSONS LEARNED
FEBRUARY 2 0 0 6
Regional Liaison Officer to Baton Rouge "to assist, coordinate. and monitor any requests for assistance that may
develop as evac~tationsbegin."90
As State and local governnients were preparing their response and initiating evacuations, the Federal government
was continuing preparations to support State and local responders. On tlie morning of August 27, forty-eight hours
before Hurricane Katrina's second landfall. FEMA headquarters coni~nencedLevel I operations, requiring fill1
staffing on a round-the-clock, seven-days-a-week basis."' FEMA was now at its highest alert. FEMA's regional
headquarters for Regions IV (Atlanta, Georgia) and V1 (Denton. Texas) went to Level 1 activation at Noon FDT and
11:OO A M CDr respectively.q2 At this point, all fifteen National Response Plan (NRP) Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) had been activated as we11."~
With the regional and national headquarters at full alert, FEMA held another daily video teleconference at 12:00 PM
FDT. "FEMA Region VI announced that its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachment was en route
to Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, to provide communications and operational and logistical support. It also
announced that it had requested the deployment of the Denver MERS unit to Region VI headquarters in Denton to
serve as a backup."'"n addition, Region VI had staged at Canip Beauregard 270,000 liters of water, 680.000
pounds of ice, 15,120 tarps, and 328,320 Meals Ready to Eat (MRE).'~ By 5:00 PM EDT,the quant~tyof water stored
at Canip Beauregard had doubled to 540,000 liters.q6 b ore commodities were pre-staged elsewhere in Region VI.
The FEMA Logistics Representative reported that 102 trailers were "uploaded with water and MREs" at tlie FEMA
Logistics Center in Ft. Worth, ex as.'^ Also at Noon tliat day, the ERT-N Blue Teani was activated arid deployed to
Baton ~ o u g e . ~The
' ERT-A Blue Team is one of the Nation's three standing ERT-N teanis. One ol'three teanis-
code-named Red, White, and Blue-is on call evely ~nonth.'"he ERT-N teanis are the scalable principal inter-
agency units that staff the JFO "for large-scale, high-impact events."
FEMA was working to pre-stage supplies in Region IV, too. At 1 :I5 I'M 1-0.1, FEMA issued its tirst Mission
Assignment to USNORTHCOM "to provide NAS Meridian [Mississippi] as a FEMA operational Staging Base for
pre-staging of FEMA supplies prior to USNORTHCOM granted this request later that afternoon.
releasing an Execute Order making Naval Air Station Meridian available to FEMA.'"
Additionally, FEMA began activating the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams (DMATs), and Urban Search and Rescue (USgiR) teams"" 'The DMATs are mobile self-contained medical
teams with equipment and medical professionals trained and cel-titied to provide emergency medical care to disaster
victims. These teanis are conlprised of professionals from around the country organized and deployed by FEMA to
support disaster response activities. The Urban Search and Rescue teams are similarly structured. but comprised of
emergency responders, firetighters, and law enforcement personnel from around the country.
That evening, President Bush signed a Federal emergency declaration for tlie State of Louisiana. following a request
from Governor Blanco earlier that day. President Bush issued additional emergency declarations for Mississippi and
Alabama the following day, after requests from the governors of those ~tates."" These declarations authorized
Federal expenditures to assist State and local governnients by providing resources and making other preparations to
save lives and property from Hurricane Katrina's irnniinent inipact."" These decisions were particularly important
as they allowed delivery of pre-deployed Federal assistance. The issuance of a Presidential emergency declaration
before landfall is extremely rare, and indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly
devastating. Since 1990. only one such incident, Hurricane Floyd in 1999, resulted in declarations before landfall.""
By declaring emergencies in these three States. the President directed the Federal government to provide its full
assistance to the area to save lives and property from Hurricane Katrina's imminent
On the evening of August 27, William Lokey, the ERT-N team leader, arrived in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and was
appointed Federal Coordinating Ofticer (FCO). As the senior Federal ofticial in charge of supporting tlie State of
Louisiana, lie immediately began coordinating efforts with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness.ln7
Hurricane Katrina's growing intensity on Saturday led NHC Director Mayfield to make personal calls to State and
local officials in tlie region that evening to e~npliasizethe threat posed by the storni. He warned Jefferson Parish
officials that this could be the "big one." That evening. Director Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco, Governor
-27-
EXHIBIT 55
T H E FEDERAL RESPONSE T O
HURRICANE
KATRINA
LESSONS LEARNED
FEBRUARY 2 0 0 6
F E M A does not, for instance, provide Inass care o r transportation after a disaster. Instead, pursuant to the NRP
structure, F E M A tasks tlie Depart~nentso f Iiealth and Fluman Services, Defense, and Transportation, as well as tlic
American Red Cross, to perform these operations. Generally, State and local officials and first responders identiiy
necessary missions and required coni~nodities which FEMA-through its organizational structure, coordination
practices, and administrative support-will assign to a Federal department or secure from tlic private sector. The
organization exists primarily to coordinate other Federal agencies and departments during enicrgency response and
recovery-acting as an honest broker between departments and agencies. providing a command structure, arid
serving as the single point ofentry for State and local ofticials into tlie Federal government. It does not have its own
critical response assets, such as buses, trucks, and a~nbulances.
The operational teams tliat F E M A is responsible for administering, such as tlie Urban Search and Rescue (USgiR)
teams, are State and local first responders from around tlie country tliat volunteer to be activated, deployed, and
reimbursed by F E M A for tlieir help during response activities. F E M A enforces standards, certifications, and
qualifications for participation in such programs and provides funding for equipment and training.
T o handle national needs, F E M A operates ten regional offices and two area offices tliat work directly with States i n
planning for disasters, developing niitigation progralns, and meeting needs wlien disasters occur (see Figure 2 . 1 ) ~ ~
Each o f the offices maintains full-time staff who work with Federal. State, and local partners year-round.
Additionally, each office call draw upon civilian reservist personnel to support the response wlien a Presidential
ma-lor disaster or emergency declaratio~iis issued.'" When State governnients request Federal assistance, F E M A
deploys personnel to tlie appropriate regional office and the incident area. Also, tlie regional office controls tlie
RRCC, from which F E M A coordinates its assistance." Because Hurricane Katrina was advancing toward I,ouisia~~a
(Region VI), and Florida, Mississippi. and Alabama (Region IV), both F E M A rcgions conducted response arid
recovery operation^.^'
Under the Stafford Act, requests for major disaster declarations must be niade by the Governor o f tlie affected State.
'The Governor's request niust be based on "a finding that the disaster is o f such severity arid magnitude tliat effective
response is beyond the capabilities o f the State and the affected local goverlinients and that Federal assistance is
necessary."07 Emergency declarations can be made i r i the same manlier or, in liniited circu~nstances,can be made by
the President unilaterally.""
The systeln for providing Stafford Act assistance, set fort11 in the N R P and F E M A regulations, reflects the American
systeln o f federalism, allocating roles arid responsibilities between levels o f governlnent by utilizing a layered
system that requires local governments to first request assistance from their State. States, in turn, niust use their own
resources, if available, before requesting Federal assistance. As a prerequisite to major disaster assistance under the
Stafford Act, a requesting Governor must "take appropriate response action under State law and direct execution o f
the State's eniergency plan."" Siniilarly, State emergency operations plans are based on this layered system. For
example, the State o f Louisiana Eniergericy Operations Plan states that "[t]lie initial actions . . . are conducted by
local government. Local authorities w i l l exhaust tlieir resources, and then use n i u t i ~ aaid
l agreements with volunteer
groups, the private sector andlor neighboring parishes."7"~lien local and State governnients require additional
resources, they generally call upon neighboring jurisdictions and other States through ~ n u t u aassistance
l agreements
and through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), a Congressionally ratified agreement7' that
provides for111and structure to interstatc niutual aid, and tlirough which States make available to each other in time
o f crisis tlieir emergency response assets, such as National Guard troops.72
Traditionally, it is only after local, State, and mutual assistance resources are depleted, or prove insufficient, tliat the
Federal government is requested to help. 'The Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan further explains tliat, "State
assistance w i l l supple~nentlocal efforts and federal assista~icew i l l suppleriient State arid local cfforts wlien it is
clearly demonstrated that it is beyond local and State capability to cope with thc e ~ n c r g e n c ~ l d i s a s t e rShould
.~
State and affected local govern~nentsbecome overwhel~ned,tlie President niay declare either a major disaster or
emergency through his authorities under tlic Stal'ford Act.
- 17-
EXHIBIT 56
T H E FEDERAL R E S P O N S E T O
HURRICANE
KATRINA
LESSONS LEARNED
FEBRUARY 2006
On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical storm off the coast of the Ballamas. Over the next
seven days, the tropical storm grew into a catastrophic hurricane that made landfall first in Florida and then along
the Gulf Coast in Mississippi. Louisiana, and Alabama, leaving a trail of heartbreaking devastation and human
suffering. Katrina wreaked staggering physical destruction along its path, flooded the historic city of New Orleans,
ultimately killed over 1,300 people, and became the most destructive natural disaster in American history.
Awakening to reports of Katrina's landfall on the Gulf Coast the morning of Monday, August 29. American citizens
watched events unfold with an initial curiosity that soon turned to concern and sorrow. The awe that viewers held
for the sheer ferocity of nature was soon matched with disappointment and frustration at the seeming inability of the
"governmentm-local, State, and Federal-to respond effectively to the crisis. Hurricane Katrina and the si~bseqilent
sustained flooding of New Orleans exposed significant flaws in Federal, State, and local preparedness for
catastrophic events and our capacity to respond to them. Emergency plans at all levels of government, from small
town plans to the 600-page National Response Plan-the Federal government's plan to coordinate all its
departments and agencies and integrate then1 with State, local, and private sector partners--were put to the ultimate
test, and came up short. Millions of Americans were reminded of the need to protect then~selvesand their families.
Even as parts ot'ldew Orleans were still under water, President Bush spoke to the Nation froni the city's historic
Jacltson Square. He stated unequivocally, that "[flour years after the frightening experience of September the 1 I th,
Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency. When the federal
government fails to meet such an obligation, 1, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for the solution."
In his address, the President ordered a comprehensive review of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina so we as
a Nation could make the necessary changes to be "better prepared for any challenge of nature or act of evil Inen that
could threaten our people."2 The President's charge has resulted in the material and conclusions of this Report-
The Federal Respon.se to Hzrr-ricane kirtri17a:Lessons Learned.
WI-IATWENT WRONG
In general terms, the challenges to our collective response to Hurricane Katrina are not difficult to identill.
Hurricane Katrina, its 115-130 mph winds, and the acco~npanyingstorm surge it created as high as 27 feet along a
stretch of the Northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama, to New Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 square miles of
our Nation-roughly an area the size of Great Britain. The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or even one
State. Lndividual local and State plans, as well as relatively new plans created by the Federal government since the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 200 1, failed to adequately account for widespread or si~nultaneouscatastrophes.
We were confronted by the pictures of destroyed towns and cities, each with their own needs. Smaller cities like
Waveland, Mississippi. were co~npletelydevastated by Hu~ricaneKatrina and required smaller scale yet immediate
search and rescue efforts as well as large volunies of life saving and sustaining commodities. New Orleans, the
largest al'fected city-which dominated mirch of what Americans saw on their televisions-suffered first from the
initial impact of Katrina and then from the subsequent flood caused by breaches in its 350 mile levee system. Over
-1-
before. So we learned some lessons about how to respond, and we're going to change. But some of the lessons
shouldn't change, and that is the decency and character of the American people."
Hurricane Katrina prompted an extraordinary national response that included all levels of government-Federal,
State, and local-the private sector, faith-based and charitable organizations. foreign countries, and individual
citizens. People and resources rushed to the Gulf Coast region to aid the emergency response and meet victims'
needs. Their actions saved lives and provided critical assistance to Hurricane Katrina survivors. Despite these
efforts, the response to Hurricane Katrina fell far short of the sealnless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned
by President Bush when he ordered the creation of a National Response Plan in Febri~ary2003.'
Yet Katrina creates an oppol-tunity-indeed an imperative-for a national dialogue about true national preparedness,
especially as it pertains to catastrophic events. We are not as prepared as we need to be at all levels within the
country: Federal, State, local, and individual. Hurricane Katrina obligates us to re-examine how we are organized
and resourced to address the full range of catastrophic events-both natural and man-made. The storm and its
afternlath provide us with the mandate to design and build such a system.
We hope that this Report marks the beginning of a truly transforlnational state of preparedness throughout all levels
of our Nation. Hurricane Katrina will undoubtedly be regarded by history as one of the most destructive, costly, and
tragic events our Nation has ever endured. Yet with collective determination, unity of effort, and effective
organizational change. the true legacy of Katriria can be that of a catalyst that triggered a real and lasting
improvement to our national preparedness.
. ..
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: For those just
briefing.
hurricane force.,
out here in Key West
. - *... - -- drove their car into a downed tree on the side of the
,
road.
. -
The rainfall is the other big concern.
These are the storm totals at least up through this
-
- storm force winds, the most likely scenario is that
(inaudible).
being here.
, - *- a -. .
MR. BILL REED: Okay. Thanks. Max, and I'm
. -
glad to be here because, if I'm here, it means they
don't think it's going there.
-
- here yesterday.
The good news for the Keys is that it all
runs off fairly quick, so we're looking at street
you.
(No response.)
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: Hearing- none.
here.
--.
-.
-- because of the rain forecast. we recognize that i f i t
(missing).
(No response.)
-- posture .
FLORIDA: (Missing) -- Florida area, is that
what we're talking about. the second approach?
...,.....- *.-, .
s.-,
BILL LOKEY: Yes.
later today
(Missing.)
at 3 : 0 0 o'clock.
(Missing.) . ..
declaration. and
- 14
DRCs. That's all we have right now.
MIKE.LOWDER: Any questions?
.-- - -. . . .. . -. ..
(Missing.)
Counties.
. .
our staffing and all ready to go. Thank you.
. .
(Missing.)
is definitely a shortfall.
, - *._. -- .
MIKE LOWDER: Any questions for ~ogistics?
(No response.)
(No response.)
7
Anybody out there have an;thing else-to add
(No response.)
CERTIFICATION
PHYLLIS P . YOUNG
EXHIBIT 59
R<X?. From: Lowder, Michael
Sent: Sunday, August 28,2005 2:06 PM
To: Brown, Michael D; Rhode, Patrick; Heath, Mlchael; Cralg, Danlel; Garratt, Davld; Buikema,
Edward; Fay. Paul; Jones, Gary; Robinson, Tony; Lokey. Wllllam; Carwile. William; Mlller. Mary
Lynne; Moore, GaryE; Hutchins, Charles
Importance: High
HIGH RISE OFFICB AND APARTKKNT BWXIDINGS WILL SWAY DARQEROUSLY ...A FEW TO THE POINT
OF TOTAL COLLAPSE. ALL WINDOWS WILL BLOW OUT.
AIRBORNE DEBRIS WILL BE WIDESPREAD.. .AND MAY INCLUDE tlgAVY ITEMS SUCX AS HOUSEHOLD .
APPLIANCES AND EVEN LIGHT VEHICLES. SPORT UTILITY VEHICLES AM) LIGHT TRUCKS WILL BE
MOVED. TEE B L O W DBBRIS WILL CR-EATE ADDITIONAL DESTRUCTION. PERSONS PETS ...AND ... %
LIVESTOCK EXPOSED TO TBE WINDS WILL F A m CERTAIN DEATH IF STRUCK,
POWEX OUTAGBS WILL LAST FOR WEEKS. ..AS MOST P O W W POLES WILL BE DOWN AND
TRANSPOFMERS DESTROYED. WATER SHORTAGES WILL MAKE B[IMRN SUFPXRINO INCREDIBLE BY
MODERN STANDARDS.
THE VAST MAJORITY 0P.NATIVETREES WILL BE SNAPPED OR UPROOTED. ONLY THE BEARTIEST
WILL REM2iIW STAbTDING...BUT BE TOTALLY DEFOLIATED. 'FEW CROPS WILL REMAIN. LIVESTOCK
LEFT EXPOSED TO THE WINDS'FLL BE K I L W .
AN INLAND HURRICANE WR?JJ WARNING IS ISSUED WHEN WSTARSGD WINDS NBAR HURRICANE
FORW. . .OR FREQUENT C;USTS AT OR ABOVE HURRICANB FOR-. . .ARB CETtTAIN WITHIN THE NEXT
12 TO 24 HOURS.
>
ONCE TROPICAL STORM AND HURFCCCANE FORCE WINDS ONSET ...DO NOT VENTURX OUTSIDE!
EXHIBIT 60
AUGUST 27, 2005
might think when you see that that means we have more
side of the storm, get the high surge and the high
- 2
days. So. that's the storm total be're looki-ng for
gradually diminishing.
- We have a second axis of precipitation along
evacuation processes.
-- NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: This concludes
- 5
headed. you're at the worst possible locations for
(No response.)
over to you.
,. - 4.- ,
, this hurricane to impact Texas. Now as we're
watching.. we
- must ask the question again, what's the
winds --
diminishing.
(No response.
reports.
first
Louisiana?
-,.-.. .
TEXAS: This is the State of Texas. - At 4:00
preparing
. .
to send an LNO to the Louisiana State EOC.
resources.
(No response.)
Patrick,
(No response.)
- ...-, -. - .
' Let's go to the State of Alabama. .
(No response.)
Florida.
for questions
(No response.)
Let's go to Georgia.
14
-
monitor. We did receive a notice- yesterday;*Texas
continuing to monitor.
go to Region 6 .
We've coordinated
-. .. . with ,our backup.regions.
,
-
Regions 10 and 1 , and have made staff requests to have
to move westward
-
LOGISTICS: Just a correction there. Tony.
-
indicated, we have ERD-As in Mississippi and Alabama.
Mississippi
( No response.)
Camp Beauregard?
(No response.)
Operations.
Sunday
. -
their staging areas for Atlanta and Birmingham over
(No response.)
(No response.)
(No response )
Secretary.
-- seriously.
22
that means is that I want you guys to lean forward as
can do it
MR. HAGAN:
- . Comlng to you from Crawford.
say that I appreciate all the support that Joe and the
PHYLLIS P . YOUNG
EXHIBIT 61
From: Craig, Daniel
.. Sent: Thursday, September 01,2005 12:32 PM
) To: Rhode. Patrick; Altshuler,Brooks
Subject: FW: Federal Government Wasn't Ready For Katrina, Disaster Experts Say (Knight Ridder)
Importance: High
- - - - -Original Message-----
From: Jones, Berl [mailto:Berl.Jonesadhs.gov]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 12:20 PM
To: 'daniel.craig@dhs.govl
Subject: Pw: Federal Government Wasn't Ready For ~atrina, is aster Experts Say (Knight
Ridder)
Importance: High
- - - - -Original Message-----
From: McKeeby. David <David.McKeebySfe m .gov>
To: Hirsch, Michael cMichael.Hirsch@fema.gov>; Jones, Berl cBerl.Jones@fema.gov>;
Schuback, Jack cJack.Schuback@ferna.gov>; McCarthy, Fran cFran.McCarthpfema.gov>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 11:54:26 2005
Subject: Federal Government Wasn't Ready For Katrina, Disaster Qxperts Say (Knight Ridder)
Federal Government Wasn't Ready For Katrina, Disaster Experts Say (KRT)
By Seth Borenstein
In interviews on Wednesday, several men and women who've led relief efforts for,dozensof
1
killer hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes over the years chastised current disaster
leaders for forgetting the simple Boy Scout
motto: Be Prepared.
Bush administration officials said they're proud of their efforts. Their first efforts
emphasized rooftop rescues over providing food and water for already safe victims.
"We are extremely pleased with the response of every element of the federal government
(and) all oE our federal partners have made to this terrible tragedy," Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said during a news conference Wednesday in Washington.
The agency has more than 1,700 truckloads of water, meals, tents, generators and other
supplies ready to go in, Chertoff said. Federal health officials have started setting up
at least 40 medical shelters. The Coast Guard reports rescuing more than 1,200 people.
But residents, especially in Biloxi, Miss., said they aren't seeing the promised help, and
Knight Ridder reporters along the Gulf Coast said they saw little visible federal relief
efforts, other than search-and-rescue teams. Some help started arriving Wednesday by the
truckloads, but not everywhere.
"We'renot getting-any help yet," said Biloxi Fire Department Battalion Chief Joe Boney.
"We need water. We need ice. I've been told it's coming, but we've got people in shelters
who haven't had a drink since the storm."
The slow response to ~atrinaand poor federal leadership is a replay of 1992's mishandling
of Hurricane Andrew, said former FEMA chief of staff Jane Bullock, a 22-year veteran of
the agency.
Bullock blamed inexperienced federal leadership. She noted that chertoff and FEMA ~irector
Michael Brown hadno disaster experience before they were appointed to their jobs.
The slowness i s all too familiar to ate Hale. As ~iaii'sdisaster chief during Hurricane
Andrew, Hale asked: "Where the hell's the cavalry?"
ItI'm looking at people who are begging for ice and water and (a) presence,"
Hale said Wednesday. 8vI'mseeing the same sort of thing that horrified us after Hurricane
hdrew. ... I realize they've got a huge job. Nobody understands better than I do what
they're trying to respond to, but ..."
+st year, FEMA spent $250,000 to conduct an eight-day hurricane drill for a mock killer
stomhitting New.Orleans. Some 250 emergency officials attended. Many of .the scenarios
now playing out, including a helicopter evacuation of the Superdome, were discussed in
that drill for a fictional storm named Pam.
This year, the group was to design a plan to fix such unresolved problems as evacuating
sick and injured people from the Superdome and housing tens of thousands of stranded
citizens.
-*
Funding for that planning was cut, said Tolbert, the former . F E W disaster response
director.
"A lot of aood was done, but it just wasn't finished," said Tolbert, who was the disaster-
chief for the state of North Carolina. "I.donttknow.if it would have saved more lives. It.
would have made the response faster. You.might say it would have saved lives."
FEMA wasn't alone in cutting hurricane spending in New Orleans and the surrounding area.
- Federal flood control spending for southeastern Louisiana has been chopped from $69
million in 2001 to $36.5 million in 2005, according to budget documents. Federal hurricane
protection for the Lake Pontchartrain vicinity in the Army Corps of Engineers' budget
dropped from $14.25 million in 2002 to $5.7 million this year. Louisiana Democratic Sen.
Mary Landrieu requested
$27 million this year.
-':. Both the New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper and a local business magazine reported that
. i
2
the effecta of the budget cuts at the Army Corpa of Engineers were severe.
In 2004, the Corps essentially stopped major workon the now-breached levee system that
had protected New Orleans from flooding. It was the first such stoppage i n 3 7 years, the
Times-Picayune reported.
) 'It appears that the money has been moved in the president's budget to handle homeland
security and the war in Iraq, and I suppose that's the price we pay," Jefferson Parish
emergency management chief Walter Maestri told the newspaper. "Nobody locally is happy
that the levees can't be finished, and we are doing everything we can to make the case
that this is a security issue for us."
The Aroly Corps1 New Orleans office, facing a $71 million cut, also eliminated funds to pay
for a study on how to protect the Crescent City from a Category 5 storm, New Orleans City
Business reported in June.
Being prepared for a disaster is basic emergency management, disaster experts say-
For example, in the 1990s, in planning for a New Orleans nightmare scenario, the federal
government figured it would pre-deploy nearby ships with pumps to remove water from the
below-sea-level city and have hospital ships nearby, said James Lee Witt, who was FEMA
director under President Clinton.
."Thesethings need to be planned and prepared for; it just doesn't look like it was," said
Witt, a former Arkansas disaster chief who won bipartisan praiseon capitol c ill during
his tenure.
The agency had 18 search-and-rescueteams and 39 disaster medical teams positioned outside
storm areas and moved them in when the hurricane died down.
Nonetheless, victims of this week's hurricane should have gotten.more, said John
Copenhaver, a former southeastern regional FEMA director.
. .
' .
"I would have difficulty explaining whythere has not been a visible presence of ice,
water, tarps - the kind of stuff that typically get delivered to hurricane areas,"
Copenhaver said.
A FEMA spokesnan, James McIntyre, blamed the devastation in the region for slowing down
relief .efforts..
Roads were washed out and relief trucks were stopped by state police trying to keep people
out of hazardous areas, he said.
That explanation didn't satiafy Joe Myers, Florida's former emergency management chief. %
"1 would.think that yesterday they could have flown in, said Myers.
"Everyone was flying in. Put it this way, FOX and CNN are there. If they can get there
...4
FEMA mved quick1y with its search-and-rescueteams, which took precedence'over delivering
water and .ice,McIntyre said.
"We're trying to save lives," McIntyre said. "The rescue teams are FEMA people. The
medical assistance are FEW people. Right now, getting people off roofs and keeping people
from drowning are a pri~rity.~'
Further complicating the relief effort in Louisiana is scandal within the state agency.
Recently, three top officials of Louisiana's emergency management office were indicted in
an investigation into the misuse of hurricane funds from last year's Ivan.
! "We're lost," said Steve Loper of Pascagoula, Miss. "We have no direction, no leadership.
3
People are in bad trouble."
Alison Young, Ron ~utchesona& ~ i s hWells of the Knight Ridder Newspapers Washington
Bureau, Pete Carey.of the San Jose Mercury News and Scott Dodd of t h e Charlotte Observer
contributed to this report.
EXHIBIT 62
Salon.com News I Anatomy of an unnatural disaster Page 1 of 4
To print this page, select "Print" from the File menu of your browser
Anatomy of an unnatural
disaster
With FEMA gutted for Homeland Security and
flood projects delayed for lack of funding, the
New Orleans nightmare should surprise no one.
Left: Sheila Dixon weeps as she clutches her 18-monlh-old daughter
Emily, after being airlifted out of New Orleans on Wednesday.
------------
By Michael Scherer
"FEMA had to compete and had to help finance the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,"
Tolbert, who now works for PBS&J, a private contractor, said Thursday morning. "They were taking
chunks of money out of the budget. We always referred to it as taxes."
Last summer, for instance, Tolbert said FEMA staged a "tabletop exercise" in Baton Rouge, La., to
gauge how well it would respond if a Category 3 hurricane hit New Orleans. Officials learned a lot from
the role-play, says Tolbert, and then returned to their offices to create a new plan to respond to an actual
Salon.com News 1 Anatomy of an unnatural disaster Page 2 of 4
disaster in the region. "Unfortunately, we were not able to finish the plan," Tolbert said. The funding for
it ran out.
FEMA is not the only agency that found itself bled of required funding by White House decisions after
the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. Shortly after the attacks, the Army Corps of Engineers found itself
facing deep cuts in funding for the largest flood control and drainage program in the New Orleans area.
In the first full budget year after the attacks, the Bush administration funded the Southeast Louisiana
Urban Flood Control Project, or SELA, at only 20 percent of the Corps' request of $100 million. In fiscal
year 2004, the White House funding came in at 17 percent of the request.
For each of these years, Congress, with the support of the Louisiana delegation, appropriated more
money, but funding still came in far below the requirements. Work was delayed. Contractors worked
without pay. Whole projects were put off. Local project managers complained that New Orleans was
competing with the war in Iraq for funding. "It appears that the money has been moved in the president's
budget to handle Homeland Security and the war in Iraq," Walter Maestri, the emergency management
chief for Jefferson Parish, told the Times-Picayune in 2004. Of the $500 million requested for levees,
pumping stations and new drainage canals between 200 1 and 2005, only $249 million passed out of
Congress. As recently as March, the Corps warned in a briefing memo that the funding shortfalls "will
significantly increase the cost of the project, delay project completion and delay project benefits."
"If the Army Corps capabilities for the SELA program had been fully funded, there is no question that
Jefferson Parish and New Orleans would be in a much better position to remove the water on the streets
once the pumps start working," says Hunter Johnston, a lobbyist for Johnston and Associates who
worked to secure the money.
It is too early to tell, however, whether the additional funding would have prevented the levee breaches
and overruns that have flooded New Orleans. Scientists, journalists and public officials have been
warning for decades that New Orleans could not withstand a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. Even SELA,
which was started in the mid-1990s after flooding caused billions in damage, was designed to protect
against smaller storms, though planners said it would reduce damages of "larger events."
"If you had engineered everything in America for a Category 5 hurricane, you could not have built
anything," said Jimmy Hayes, a former Republican congressman from Louisiana, who now lobbies for
federal funding. "There is never enough money."
According to Michael Zumstein, a Corps official working to drain New Orleans, both of the major levee
breaches in New Orleans were caused by more water than the Corps' current plans, even if funded, could
handle. "It's just the law of physics, that's all," he said, noting that the system was designed to withhold a
slow-moving Category 2 or a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. Katrina was a Category 4 storm when it
hit land Monday morning. He said an unexpected break at the 17th Street Canal occurred 700 feet south
of a bridge where the Corps recently completed a troubled construction project.
Flooding also occurred on the east side of New Orleans, in the St. Bernard Parish, an area that
environmentalists have long warned would be susceptible to flooding because of a poorly designed
canal built in the 1960s that joins the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico. Since 1998, local
politicians have been demanding that the so-called Mississippi River Gulf Outlet be closed, in part
because it was allowing saltwater to destroy marshland, increasing the danger of a storm surge. Both the
Clinton and the Bush administrations have been slow to respond to those demands, and earlier this
week, the storm surge topped levees, flooding the parish, said Zumstein.
Salon.com News 1 Anatomy of an unnatural disaster Page 3 of 4
The same concerns have been voiced to justify more spending to restore Louisiana's coastline, which has
been sinking into the Gulf of Mexico at the rate of one football field every half hour. "Something needed
to be done to protect the Louisiana coast for an eventuality not unlike this," says Chris Paolino, a
spokesman for Rep. Bobby Jindal, R-La. "For the most part, it has been an unheeded cry by Louisiana."
As recently as June, the Bush administration told the Senate that it opposed a provision in the energy bill
that gave Gulf states about $1 billion to shore up their coastal protections, including possible levee and
pump work. Despite the objections, Congress kept the provision in the final bill, but the money won't
begin to arrive in states like Louisiana and Mississippi until 2008.
The scale of such funding is almost laughable now, considering the scope of the devastation in southern
Louisiana and Mississippi. Politicians and lobbyists are just beginning to turn their attention to the
massive cleanup and reconstruction bill, which will likely take years and cost tens of billions of dollars.
But observers like Tolbert hope that the nation's leaders learn some lessons from the experience.
The blame, he says, lies not with the local and federal officials who warned for decades of the coming
disaster. It lies with those elected officials who refused to sign the checks. "The country deserves better
than that," he says.
Sound Off
Send us a Letter to the Editor
Related stories
Shortcllallgin!:
.......... ................... .................................. the Gu.!.:!~.st.~~e.s
Less than two months before Katrina,
the White House opposed funding for
Gulf Coast protection.
By Michael Scherer
0910 1105
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The Border and Transportation Security division, which i s the largest division of DHS, includes the
Transportation Security Administration, the B u ~ a of u lmmigrationonddCuUs_toms Enforcement, and the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protectha. The Emergency Preparedness and Response division, which
includes the federal_Em_egency-Managemen~~t~Agency and the Strategic-National-Stockpile and the National
Disaster Medical System. oversees disaster preparedness training and coordinates the government response
t o disasters. The Science and Technology division, including the Environmental Measu~ements-Labo~atory,i s
charged with researching and organizing scientific, engineering, and technological resources t o protect the
homeland, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division analyzes intelligence and
information involving threats t o homeland security and evaluates vulnerabilities in the national
infrastructure. In addition t o these divisions, DHS also includes the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, and the
Bureau -.of
. C!tize_nship and Imm~gra&jonServices.
.
DHS was created by the Department of Homeland_S_ecurity_Actof 2002, and is an outgrowth of the Office of
Homeland Security established by President George W. Bush after Sept. 11, 2001. Strong congressional
support for a new federal department that would unify diverse and overlapping security functions of the
federal government led t o a White-H.o_use proposal for the DHS in June, 2002, and the legislation was passed
late the same year. Twenty-two agencies that were formerly i n the Depts. of Agriculture, Commerce,
Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury or i n independent bodies
were combined and reorganized in the new department. (Among the agencies with functions relating t o
homeland security that were not included i n DHS were the Federal_Bur_ea~~ofInve~tigation, Cearal
Intelligence-Agency, and Nati~_nal_~ecucity-Agency.) The creation of DHS involved the largest restructuring of
the executive branch of the federal government since the Defense Dept. was established (1947-49). Tom
Ridge, who had been appointed (0-ct., 2001) t o head the Office of Homeland Security, became the first
-
secretary of the department on Jan. 24, 2003. The affected agencies were transferred t o the new
department beginning in Mar., 2003. DHS i s the third largest executive department in the federal
government.
Intelligence Encyclopedia
http://www.answers.com/topic/homeland-security
EXHIBIT 64
Page 1 of 2
Scott..:
Dick Keen
District Manager
Congrusman Mark Folcy (FL - 16)
18500 Murdock Circle Suite 536
Port Charlotte, Florida 33950
Telephone: 0
D- {
Fax:
"This is not soIely a response to the tragedy in the Gull?but rather it is the result o f the increasing
evidence that FEMA should not be hindered by a top-heavy bureaucracy when they are needed to act
swiftly to save lives," said Foley. "Aftersufferingthrough three direct hits from hurricbes last summer
and watching my friends in the Gulf weather Katrina, I am dso asking for a top-to-bottom review of
FEMA's operations down the road so that we can turn that agency into the rapid-response and long-term
response disaster agency that FEMA wants to be."
'i
Page 2 of 2
.
' Foley originally called for the separation of FEMA from DHS in April of 2004. In an article in the Palm
Beach Post on April 28'4 2004, Foley said, "FEMA may be stuck and trapped in the bureaucracy,"
Foley said. "That may not be helpful if we get a natural disaster."
EXHIBIT 65
Ridge Tells FEMA Critics T o Stop Whining ...
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Ridge~Tells~FEMA~Critics
TERRA DAILY GPS DAILY ENERGY DAILY SPACE WARSPACE DAILY MARS DAILY SPACE MART
NO ANNUAL FEE
,
,
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
of users plan
Ridge Tells FEMA Critics TO Stop to coniact
businessest
Whining rn u
Washington (UPI) Dec 08, 2005
Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom superpages.coi
Ridge says critics o f t h e Federal
lnternet Explorer 7
Emergency Management Agency's Customized by Google. Enhanced security feature!
Hurricane Katrina response should "quit Download today!
w.google.corn/toolbar/ie7/
whining."
Want Faster Internet?
Ridge's outspoken comments are the first time Fight to Make A Faster Internet A Reality - Join the
he has responded in public to criticisms of the Movement
w.SpeedMatters.orglSpeedTest
way FEMA was incorporated into his new Tom Ridge
department in 2003.
Qwest DSL from $26.991mo
Keep this price for life! AZ CO IA ID MN MT ND NE
"They ought to quit whining about what happened in the past -- that OR SD UT WA WY
had absolutely nothing to do with what happened in Katrina," he toldw~Qwest.cOrn
United Press International.
Nonetheless, David Marin, staff director for Virginia GOP Rep. Tom
Davis' special congressional panel probing the nation's flawed
response to Katrina, told UP1 that the discussion about whether
FEMA should be restored to its independent status is "a debate
worth having."
"It went from being a stand-alone agency which clearly had clout
within the federal government, which had the ear of the president
and which was run by professionals, to a second- or third-tier
organization which was buried in the bureaucracy of the
Department of Homeland Security," he said.
The result, Sabo said, was "a whittling away of the roles and
responsibilities" of the agency, as its grant-making functions were
transferred to what the department called its "one-stop shop" for
state and local government funding.
Former FEMA officials add that the agency's clout with state and
local officials depended on its ability to disburse funds for training
and preparedness. "Take that away, and they lost their ability to
cajole state and local officials into action," said one.
Ridge says that every agency and element put into the department
had to chip in. "Everybody gave up some resources in order to build
1 the platform upon which they would work," said Ridge.
with it" and that he had "enormous regard for the men and women
of FEMA."
With three inquiries, Davis' in the House, the one being conducted
by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee, and that being overseen by Francis Townsend at the
White House, the issue is likely to remain the subject of discussion
for some time.
Related Links
FEMA
SpaceDaily
Search SpaceDaily
Subscribe To SpaceDaily Express
DISASTER MANAGEMENT
UN Ready To Feed Pakistani Quake Survivors
EXHIBIT 66
Page 1
l of 3 DOCUMENTS
CNN
TRANSCRIPT: 02 1001CN.V54
HEADLINE: Former FEMA Director Michael Brown Testifies Before Senate Homeland Security Committee
BYLINE: Daryn Kagan, Jeanne Meserve, Suzanne Malveaux, Sanjay Gupta, Sibila Vargas
HIGHLIGHT:
Former FEMA Director Michael Brown testifies before a Senate committee about the government's response to
Hurricane Katrina.
BODY:
DARYN KAGAN, CNN ANCHOR: The U.S. Commerce Department says the $725 billion deficit was driven by a
record imports of oil, food, cars and other consumer goods. It also marked a 17 percent increase over the 2004 deficit
which set a record of its own.
Let's go live to Capitol Hill and listen to former FEMA Director Michael Brown, who was just sworn in before the
Senate Homeland Security Committee. Let's listen in.
(JOINED IN PROGRESS)
MICHAEL BROWN, FORMER FEMA DIRECTOR: ... 1989 a congressman wrote a letter to "The Washington
Times" and that letter said that there's a fatal flaw if we separate preparedness from response. That congressman's name
was Tom Ridge. We reached that fatal flaw in 2003 when FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland
Security.
1 would encourage the committee to look at a 1978 study done by the National Governor's Association in which,
and 1'11 quote very briefly, "as the task of the projects were pursued, it became evident that the major finding of this
study is that many state emergency operations are fragmented.
This is not only because uncoordinated federal programs encourage state fragmentation, but because the strong
relationship of long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters must be tied to preparedness and response for more
Page 2
Former FEMA Director Michael Brown Testifies Before Senate Homeland Security Committee CNN February 10,
2006 Friday
Madam Chairman, I tell you that what occurred after FEMA was folded into the Department of Homeland Security,
there was a cultural clash which didn't recognize the absolute inherent science of preparing for disaster, responding to it,
mitigating against future disasters and recovering from disasters.
And any time that you break that cycle of preparing, responding, recovering and mitigating, you're doomed to
failure. And the policies and the decisions that were implemented by DHS put FEMA on a path to failure. And I think
the evidence that we'll have before you today will show the actions that were taken that caused that failure -- and I beg
this committee to take corrective action to fix that so these disasters don't occur in the future. Thank you.
PATRICK RHODE, FORMER FEMA CHIEF OF STAFF: Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman,
senators. I would like to make just a very brief opening statement if I could.
My name is Patrick Rhode. I serve as chief of staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, part of the
Department of Homeland Security, from April 2003 until January of 2006. I served under both former Director Brown
and the current acting director, David Paulison.
I'm happy to be appearing before you today voluntarily as you continue your important work in reviewing the
collective governmental response to Hurricane Katrina and assessing possible changes in emergency management.
At the outset, I would like to observe, if I could, that Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic event. It was an
American tragedy on numerous levels. The magnitude of the disaster was unlike anything we had previously faced as a
nation. The storm compromised 90,000 square miles of the United States Gulf Coast, an area almost the size of Great
Britain.
On the professional level of emergency management, it was unprecedented. On the personal level, my heart went
out to those who were suffering and indeed my heart still goes out to those who continue to deal with the aftermath of
Katrina.
Many people in the emergency management community, including myself, tried to do the very best they could
under very difficult circumstances. The dedicated public servants working on this issue at the federal, state and local
level were doing their very best to help as many people as they could under the existing framework for emergency
management.
As in all things, there are lessons to be learned from this experience. I hope that these hearings will produce just
such learning and lead to the creation of new legislation that can improve on the current system of disaster management.
If we can apply those lessons to make things better for the next emergency situation, I want to do all that I can to
contribute appropriately to that effort.
As you know, in addition to appearing here today voluntarily, I have fully cooperated with your staffs by
participating willingly in several interviews with them.
In addition, I would like respectfully to note that any statements I offer today in response to questions about how to
improve the emergency management system are the opinions of one private citizen. As I sit before you today, I'm no
longer a government employee but have returned to private life with my wife and six-month- old daughter.
I do not and cannot speak for FEMA. Anything I have to offer is my own personal opinion for whatever the
committee may deem it to be worth. And I want to take care to be clear that it does not reflect the official views of the
agency or the federal government. In short, I applaud the committee for taking on the challenges of assessing what kind
EXHIBIT 67
Page 1 of 2
-
WASHINGTON Government disaster officials had an'action plan if a major humcane hit New Orleans. They simply didn't
execute it when Hurricane Katrina struck.
Thirteen months before Katrina hit New Orleans, local, state and federal officials held a simulated hunicane drill that Ronald
Castleman, then the regional director for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, called "a very good exercise."
More than a million residents were "evacuated" in the table-top scenario as 120-mile-an-hour winds and 20 inches of rain
caused widespread flooding that supposedly happed 300,000 people in the city.
"It was very much an eyeipener," said Castleman, a Republican appointee of President Bush who left FEMA in December
for the private sector; "A number of t h i s were identified that we had to deal with, not all of them were solved"
Still Castleman found it hard to square the lessons he and others learned from the exercise with the frustratingly slow
response to the disaster that has unfolded in the wake of Kahina. From the Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans to the
Mississippi and Alabama communities along the Gulf Coast, hurricane survivors have decried the lack of water, food or
security and the slowness of the federal relief efforts.
"It's hard for everyone to nnderstand why buttons weren't pushed earlier on," Castleman said of the federal response.
As the first National Guard truck caravans of water and food arrived in New Orleans Friday, former FEMA officials and
other disaster experts were at a loss to explain why the federat government's lead agency for responding to major
emergencies had failed to meet the urgent needs of hundreds of thousands of Americans in the most dire of circumstances in
a more timely fashion
But many suspected that FEMA's apparent problems in getting life-sustaining supplies to survivors and buses to evacuate
them h m New Odeans, delays even President Bush called "not acceptable," stemmed partly from changes at the agency
during the Bush years. Experts have long warned that the moves would weaken the agencys ability to effectively respond to
natural disasters.
FEMA's chief has been demoted From a near-cabinet-level position; political appointees with little, if any, emergency-
management experience have been placed in senior FEMA positions; and the small, 2,500-pcrson agency was dropped into
the midst of the1 80,000employee Homeland Security Department that is more oriented to combating terrorism than natural
disasters. All this has led to a brain drain as experienced but demoralized employees have left h e agency, former and current
FEMA staff members say.
The result is that an agency that got high marks during much of the 1990s for its effectiveness is being harshly criticized for
apparently mismanaging the response to the aftermath of Hunicane Katrina.
The growing anger and frustration at FEMA's response sparked the Republican-controlled Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee to announce Friday tha~it bas scheduled a hearing for Wednesday to try to uncover what
went wrong.
Meanwhile, Sen Mary Landrieu (D-La.) called on Resident Bush to immediately appoint a Cabinet-level official to direct
the national response.
Page 2 of 2
'%ere was a time when FEMA understood thnt the c o m t approach to a crisis was to deploy to the affccted area as many
, resources as possible as fast as possible." Landrieu said. "Unfortunately, that no longer seems to be their approach."
/
J
John Capeohaver, a former FEMA regional director during the Clinton administration who led the response to Hurricane
Floyd in 1999, said he was bewildered by the slow FEMA response.
It had been standard practicc for FEMA to position supplies ahead of time, and the agency did p-position drinking water
and tarps to cover damaged roofs near where they would be needed. In addition, FEMA has coordinated its plans with state
and local officials and let the Defense Department know beforehand what type of military assistance would be needed.
T m a Little confused as to why it took so long to get the military presence running convoys into downtown New Orleans,"
Copenhaver said
And there isn't an experienced disaster-response expert at the top of the agency as there was when James Lee Witt ran the
agency during the 1990s. Before Michael Brown, the current head, joined the agency as its legat counsel, he headed the
International Arabian Horse Association.
PeterPantuso, president and chief executive of the American Bus Association, said, "I have a hard time believing there is any
game plan in place when it cornes tocoordinating or pulling together this volume of business," referring to FEMA's effort to
obtain hundreds of buses to move tens of thousands of evacuees h m New Orleans. "And what happens in two or three
weeks down the road when all of these people are moved again?"
When FEMA became part of the Homeland Security D e p m n t , it was stripped of some of its functions, suck as some of its
a
ability to make preparedness grants to states, former officialssaid. Those functions were placed elsewhere in the larger
agency.
"After Sept. 11 they got 60 focused on terrorism they effectively marginalized the capability of FEMA.. .," said George
, Haddow, a former FEMA official during the Clinton administration. "It's no surprise that they're not capable of managing the
federal govea-nrnent's response to this kind of disaster."
. . .
Pleasant Mann, former head of the union for FEMA en~~loyces, who has b m with theagency since 1988, said a change
.. . . . .. . made
.
by agency higber-ups last year added a bureaucratic laya that likely delayed FEM+'s. response
.
to:Katrk , ,
. . , , ..<: :. :
.. Befox the change, a.FEMAemployee an site at-adisaster could request that an ixpeiiehvdemployee:he knew had the right
. .. . ,
,
'
: ': . . skilk be dispatchedto help him.But now. thatrequested worker is first made to travel to a location hundreds'of mda from
the disaster site to be "processed," placed in a pool fiom which he is dispatched, sometimes to a place different from wherc
he thought he was headed
. . ' I , . . . ' .
. .
: Pleasant..saidheh e w of a case where.&worker 6orn Washington State wasmade to f&t t&l to Orlandd before he could
(
. ,.
. .. . . .
go to.Louisiana, losing at least a day. What's more, thatworker was told he might be sent10 Alabama, not Louisiana, after all.
'
EXHIBIT 68
Climate Prediction Center - Atlantic Hurricane Outlook Page 1 of 6
N.Oe&PfRE.Ss.RELEASE
About Us
Our Mission
w h o We Are NOAA: 2007 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook
Contact Us Issued: 22 May 2007
CPC Information
CPC Web Team
Realtime monitorinq of tropical Atlantic conditions
Realtime monitoring of tropical East Pacific conditions
SUMMARY
NOAA's 2007 Atlantic hurricane season outlook indicates a very high 75%
chance of an above-normal hurricane season, a 20% chance of a near-normal
season, and only a 5% chance of a below-normal season. This outlook is
produced by scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Climate Prediction Center (CPC), National Hurricane
Center (NHC), Hurricane Research Division (HRD), and Hydrometeorological
Prediction Center (HPC). See NOAA definitions of above-, near-, and below-
normal seasons.
DISCUSSION
Climate Prediction Center - Atlantic Hurricane Outlook Page 2 of 6
For the 2007 Atlantic hurricane season, the ACE index is expected to be in the
range of 125% to 210% of the median. The upper portion of this range is
above the 175% baseline that Goldenberg et al. (2001) used to define a
hyperactive season. Based on this predicted ACE range, and on the 75%
probability of an above-normal season, we expect a likely range of 13-17
named storms, 7-10 hurricanes, and 3-5 major hurricanes [categories 3-4-5
on the Saffir-Simpson scale]. This predicted ACE range can be satisfied even
if the numbers of named storms, hurricanes, or major hurricanes fall outside
their expected ranges.
The vast majority of tropical storms and hurricanes are expected to form
during August-October over the tropical Atlantic Ocean, which is typical for
above-normal seasons. These systems generally track westward toward the
Caribbean Sea and/or United States as they strengthen. Historically, above-
normal seasons have averaged 2-4 hurricane strikes in the continental United
States and 2-3 hurricanes in the region around the Caribbean Sea. However,
it is currently not possible to confidently predict at these extended ranges the
number or intensity of landfalling hurricanes, or whether a given locality will
be impacted by a hurricane this season.
the median. NOAA classifies nine of the last twelve hurricane seasons a!
above normal, with seven being hyperactive. Only three seasons since 199'
have not been above normal. These are the El Nifio years of 1997, 2002, anc
2006.
The second key predictor for the 2007 hurricane season is the stron(
likelihood of either ENSO-neutral or La Nifia conditions. The Climate Predictior
Center is currently indicating that La Nifia conditions could develop within thf
next 1-3 months. As discussed by Gray (1984), La Nifia favors more Atlantic
hurricanes and El Nifio favors fewer hurricanes.
The somewhat broad predicted ACE range for the 2007 Atlantic hurricane
season largely reflects three inter-related sources of uncertainty: 1) the
probability of ENSO-neutral versus La N i i a conditions during August-October,
2) the likelihood of a La Niiia-like pattern of tropical convection, even in the
absence of La Nifia oceanic conditions, and 3) the likely strength of La Niiia if
indeed such an event develops. These uncertainties reflect the considerable
uncertainty in forecasts from the available ENS0 prediction models, along
with the exceptionally low predictive skill that all ENS0 model forecasts have
historically exhibited at this time of the year.
While NOAA does not make an official seasonal hurricane landfall forecast, the
historical probability for multiple hurricane strikes in the United States
increases sharply for hyperactive seasons. For the U.S., all hyperactive
seasons since 1950 have had at least one hurricane strike, 92% have had at
least 2 hurricane strikes, and 58% have had a t least 3 hurricane strikes. For
the eastern seaboard of the United States, 92% of hyperactive seasons have
had at least one hurricane strike, and 42% have had at least two hurricane
strikes. For the Gulf Coast region of the United States., 83% of hyperactive
seasons have had at least one hurricane strike, and 58% have had at least
two hurricane strikes.
NOAA scientists will closely monitor the rapidly evolving climate conditions.
NOAA's updated Atlantic hurricane outlook will be issued in early August,
which begins the peak (August-October) of the hurricane season.
CAUTIONARY NOTES
Climate Prediction Center - Atlantic Hurricane Outlook Page 5 of 6
2) Far more damage can be done by one major hurricane hitting a heavily
populated area than by several hurricanes hitting sparsely populated areas.
Therefore, hurricane-spawned disasters can occur even in years with near-
normal or below-normal levels of activity. Examples of years with near-
normal activity that featured extensive hurricane damage and numerous
fatalities include 1960 (Hurricane Donna), 1979 (Hurricanes David and
Frederic), and 1985 (Hurricanes Elena, Gloria and Juan). Moreover, the
nation's second most damaging hurricane, Andrew in 1992, occurred during a
season with otherwise below normal activity.
NOAA FORECASTERS
Climate
- - Prediction Center
Dr. Gerald Bell, Meteorologist; Gerry.BeII@noaa.qov
Dr. Kingste Mo, Meteorologist; K.!_n_gste.Mo~@~oaa.~qgv
National-Hurricane Center
Eric Blake, Hurricane Specialist; Eric,S.-Blake-@coaa .qov
Dr. Christopher Landsea, Meteorologist; Chris.Landsea@noaa.qov
Dr. Richard Pasch, Hurricane Specialist; Richard.J.Pasch@noaa.qov
Hurricane-
.-
.- Research Division
Stanley Goldenberg, Meteorologist; Stanle~.Goldenberq..@-noaa.qov
REFERENCES
Bell, G. D., and M. Chelliah, 2006: Leading tropical modes associated with
interannual and multi-decadal fluctuations in North Atlantic hurricane activity.
J. Climate. 19, 590-612.
Bell, G. D., and Co-authors 2004: The 2003 Atlantic Hurricane Season: A
Climate Perspective. State of the Climate in 2003. A. M. Waple and J. H.
Lawrimore, Eds. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 85, S1-S68.
Bell, G. D., and Co-authors 2005: The 2004 Atlantic Hurricane Season: A
Climate Perspective. State of the Climate in 2004. A. M. Waple and J. H.
Lawrimore, Eds. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 86, S1-S68.
Bell, G. D., and Co-authors 2006: The 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season: A
Climate Perspective. State of the Climate in 2005. A. M. Waple and J. H.
Lawrimore, Eds. Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 87, S1-S78.
Bell, G. D., and Co-authors 2007: The 2006 Atlantic Hurricane Season: A
Climate Prediction Center - Atlantic Hurricane Outlook Page 6 of 6
Gray, W. M., 1984: Atlantic seasonal hurricane frequency: Part I:El Nifio and
30-mb quasi-bienniel oscillation influences. Mon. Wea. Rev., 112, 1649-
1668.
Probably headed t o LA tomorrow. I wish a certain governor was from Louisiana ...and his
emergency manager1
-----original Message-.----
From :
To: Michael D Brown cHichael.D.Brown@dhs.gov>
Sent: 6at Aug 2 7 15:45:14 2 0 0 5
Subject.: Mutual Aid
Let m e know if we can help if w e are spared the second l a n d f a l l . Sometimes s t a t e s don't
ask f o r help through EMAC u n t i l l a t e i n the, game.
craig
, --------------------------
Craig Pugate, Director
Florida Division of Fhergency Management
EXHIBIT 70
From: Cable, Kathryn
Sent: Sunday, August 28,2005 6.1 4 AM
To: 'Adukaitis. Steven'; 'Altshuler, Brooks'; Andrews. Nicol 0 - Public Affairs; 'Armes, Karen';
'Bahamonde, Marty'; 'Beeman, Mike'; Biggs, Charlie; Blandford. Teresa; 'Boone, Morris';
Brezany, Eugene; 'Brock, Robed'; 'Brown, Michael'; Brown, Michael D; 'Buckley, Mike'; .
Buehring, Hugo; 'Buikerna. Edward'; 'Bums,Ken'; Cable. Kathryn; Cameron, Carole;
'Campbell; Paulinee;Carver. Jennifer; Cash, Danisha; Cavanaugh, Maxine; Chesnutt, Jim;
Clark, Phil; 'Conklin. Craig'; Conley. Ed; Connor, Edward; Cote, Peter, Craig. Daniel; Dannels,
Donna; Earman. Margie; Edge, Elizabeth; Edmonston. Maurice; Edwards. Niki: Ellis,
Barhaml; E v a . Sue; Face. Ron; FEMA-NPSC-Coardination-Tm;FEMA-RO5-RRCC-DIR;
Fetter. Robert; Fields. KBthy; Freeman, Arthur: Fried, Jordan; Fukutomi, David; Fullerton,
-- Gordon; Furr. Alex; Garratt. David; Gore, Doug; Greatorex, Susan; Greff, Stacle; Heath,
Michael; Hedor-Hams, Carol; Henderson, Charles; Hirsch, Michael; Holden, Sydney; Horak,
Kenneth; Howard, Mike; Hudak, Mary; Jacks. Don; Jackson, Marianne; Jacobik, Barbara;
James Mclntyre (Mclntyre, James); Jamieson, Gil; 'Joanna Gonzalezl; Karl, Michael; Keathg,
Lynne; Kepner, Rita; Kessee, Gladys; ffinberg, Harrietfe; Kinemey, Eugene; K i b , Cheryl;
Leikin, Howard; Lernly, James; Lewis. Chandra; Long, Casey, Lopezde-Victoria, Mayra; Lyle,
Mary Anne; Mattlcks, John; Maurstad. David; Mclntyre, James; McLachlan, Mark; McQuillan,
Thomas; Miller. Mary Lynne; Miller, Matt- Monette, Ted; Moore, Christina; Nelson, Barbara;
NORTHCOM; Oberg. Ronald; Odeshoo, Janet Oliver, Stephen; Olshanskl. Thomas; Onieal,
Denis; Passey. David; Pasb-ana, Johanna; 'Paulison, R. Oavid '; Petterson, Jeanine; Picclano,
Joe; Plaxlco, Charles; PrHchard, Josie; Prusch, Bill; 'Rhade, Patrick'; Rukeyser, William; Rule,
Natalie; Russell, Louise; Sanders, Marshall; 'Sanders, Marshall'; Satar. Abdul; Schumann.
t James; Sharrocks, Frederick; Shebl, James; Skarosi, David; Skinner, R; Soto, Nury; Sredl.
Joseph; Shhlschmidt, Patricia; Suchocki, Carl; Taylor, Cindy; Taylor, Jackie; Trissell, David';
Trujillo, Linda; Vorel, Maria; Vrern, Mary Jo; Watrel, William; Webb, Susie; Wemdorf, Mary;
Wells, Tod; West, Bany. West&, Lynda; Widomskf, Michael; Williams, Alicia; Wilson, Betty,
'
Wing. Deborah; Wingo, Craig; Worthy, Sharon; Wright, V-Ann; 'Alyson Price'; Barnes.
Richard; 'Beverly Pheto'; 'Brian Besanceney. ';'Cynthia Bergman'; 'Daniel Bartlett'; Davis,
Matvin; 'Drenan Dudle)r; Eaker, Jay; 'Frank Lepore'; Hutchings. Bettina; Hyder, Sarah; Jerger,
Nicole; 'Katy Montgomev; Kelley, Elizabeth; Kilbride, Shannon; Kinsey, Dawn; Koplik
William; Manion, Richard; Marine, Frances; 'Majorie Duske'; McOow. Molk 'Michelle
Mrdeza'; Miller, Raymond; Monis, Scott; 'Rebecca Davies'; 'Robert Bonnet; Solomona, Slna;
Sarlcrewski, Karen; Tom Mdemore'; 'US Michael Brown'; Verde, Veronica; Wells, Richard
MI: FEMA clips for 08-28-05
Attachments: FR-FEMA 08-28-05.d0~ %
R-I=844
rzsos.da(548 KI
weekend news c l i p s 0 8 2 8 0 5 Sunday'
PREPARED BYTHE FEDERAL EMERGENCY ~ N A G E N E N AGENCY
T OF PUBLIC
DIVISION &FAIRS
Attachments: 08290S.doc
Kathryn Cable
Public Affsim Speclakt
W / aMwidwlng and AnaQsk
Fed& Emergency Management Agency
Deparhenf of Homeland Secunly
202446400
kathryn.cable@dhs.gov
I BY THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
PFEP~RED OF PUBIIC AFFAIRS
MANAGEMENT AGENCY DIVISION
MONDAY,
AUGUST29,2005,6:00 AM EDT
Main FEMA News: Schools, Businesses Close Monday (Hattiesburg
HURRICANE KATRINA: American - MS) ........................................................ 28
Katrina Rises To Category 5 (Network Television Navarre Beach Evacuation Under Way (Pensacola News
Coverage) .................................................................... 3 Journal - FL) ............................................................2 8
Katrina-New Orleans (CBS) .............................................. 5 Katrina Now A 57 In Flux
Katrina-New Orleans (NBC)............................................... 7 Chronicle) .................................................................. 29
Bush Urges Safety From Katrina (AP) ............................. 10 Hurricane Katrina: path to region
New Orleans Braces For Monster Humcane (CNN) ....... 11 (Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal - MS) ............ 29
New Orleans Empties As Katrina Draws Near (AP) ....... 12 PensacO1aFinds It Hard Calm (Orlando
In Slot Machines' Silence, A Storm's Economic Cost Sentinel - FL) ..................................................... ; . . 3 1
(New York Times) ................................................... 14 Braces For Katrina's Punch (PascagOula
With Hurricane Bearing Down on New Orleans, Mississippi Press - MS) ............................................ 32
Orientation Turns to Evacuation (Chronicle of Some Party As Menace Grows (Jackson Clarion Ledger -
Higher Education) ..................................................... 15 MS) .............................:............................................. 34
There Won't Be Help For Those Who Stay, Officials Take Steps To Prepare For Katrina (Hattiesburg
Warn (Jackson Clarion Ledger - MS)...................... 16 American - MS) ........................................................ 35
Category 5 Hurricane Will Effect Tri-state (WCPO-TV - Hoosiers Headed South To.Help Hurricane victims
OH) ........................................................................... 17 (WISH-TV - IN) ...................................................... 3 6
Katrina May Be 'Our Asian Tsunami' (CNN) .................. 17 Braces For (Natchez Democrat -
Schools Called Off Due To Katrina (Selma,Times- MS) ............................................................................ 37
Journal - AL) ............................................................ 18 States Prepare For Hurricane's Onslaught ................ 38
Katrina Opens Assault On Gulf Coast (Washington Galveston Tide Levels Predicted At 1 To 2 Feet Above
Times/UPl) ................................................................19 Normal (KHOU-TV - TX) ....................................... 38
Katrina Passes Georgia By, But Rain Is Coming (Atlanta ~vacuationsUnder Way On Alabama Coast In ~ d v a n c e
Journal Constitution)............................................... 19 Of Katrina (AP) .........................................................38
Mississippi Braces For Major Hit From Katrina (USA All Lanes Of I-55,I-59 Made To Run North From Coast
Today/AP) ................................................................20 . (Jackson Chamel.com - MS) ...................................40
Local Volunteer Group Prepares For Katrina (WGAL Montgomery County Team Prepared for Hurricane
Channe1.com - PA) ................................................. 2 1 Deployment (AP)...................................................... . 41
Big Easy Could Become A Cess Pool (AP) ..................... 22 I" The Superdome, Thousands Without The Means To
Coastal Big Bend Bracing For Storm Surge (Tallahassee Leave (St. Petersburg Times - FL) ........................... 41
Democrat)................................................................23 In Katrina Mind Devastating
Major Traffic Delays Reponed On 1-10, U.S. 90 On Gulf Hurricane Camille (Grand Forks Herald - ND) .......42
Coast (AP) .............................................................. 24 UPDATE: Emergency Aid Authorized for Hurricane
Riley Starts Process To Help Six Counties In Katrina Katrina Emergency Response in Louisiana
Cleanup (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer - GA) ........... 24 (Insurance Journal) ................................................... 4 3
Katrina, Still Cat 5, Stalks Coast (WDM-TV - Ms)..,.. 24 IS FEMA Ready for Katrina? ( P ~ X ~ e w s . c o-mAZ) ...... 43
FEMA Prepared for Katrina's Worst ................................25 Direct Hit Produce Nightmare Scenario
Scott County, Forest Schools, ECCC Closed Monday As (Hawaii Channel.com) ..........................................4 4
Category 5 Hurricane Katrina Approaches; Morton FEMA Supply Site In Selma For Katrina Response
Nat. Guard Unit Activated (Scott County Times - (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer - GA) .......................... 45
MS) ............................................................................ 25 Flood Policy Essential For Rising Water (Miami Herald -
Forecasters Fear Levees Won't Hold Katrina (The Daily FL) ............................................................................ .45
Advertiser - LA) ...................................................... 26 Perry Authorizes Deployment Of Texas Task Force One
Residents Asked To Stay Home As Hurricane. To Louisiana (KHOTJ.com - TX) ............................. 46
Approaches (Hattiesburg American - MS) ............a. 27 Lessons Learned (South Florida Sun-Sentinel) ............... 47
spent long hours trying to escape on highways in which Category 5 Hurricanes ABC World News
all lanes lead out of town. Where are you guys Tonight (8128, story 2, :20, Harris) reported, "Only
headed?' Unidentified motorist: "Baton Rouge." three other Category 5 storms have ever hit the United
Kofman: "Jeffrey McElveen in crowding 17 people States since record-keeping began. There was
into two cars, and bound for Texas." McElveen: Hurricane Andrew in the summer of 1992, which was
"We're just trying to get as far away from here as the costliest hurricane on record; Camille back in 1969;
possible. My family's safety: Bam, that's it." Kofman: and an unnamed storm in the Florida Keys known as
"It is easy to see why New Orleans is considered the the Labor Day Hurricane of 1935."
most vulnerable city in America. Most of it sits below Kdm-New Orleans ABC World News Tonight
sea level." Unidentified police officer: "If you want (8128, story 3, 1:25, Harris) reported, "A short while
to get just an idea, you see the level of the lake and look ago, I spoke with Max Mayfield at the National
at the houses. The lake is above the houses." Kofman: Hurricane Center. I asked him what a category 5 storm
'The city is surrounded by water on all sides: Lake is capable of doing to a city as vulnerable as New
Pontchartrain to the north, the Mississippi River below. Orleans." Mayfield: 'The damage will be catastrophic
Holding the water back is a ring of levees build to if it comes in as a category 5 humcane. I'm not just
withstand a 15-foot storm surge. Katrina, a category 5 talking about the wind and the tornadoes. There is
hurricane. is expected to surge 20 feet or more. Once potential for large loss of life, I want to be very clear
the water is in, it has no way of getting out, submerging about this, is from the storm surge. That's the rise in
the city like cereal in a bowl. The last time New water. We would have storm surge valleys of 20 and
Orleans was hit was in the 1960s. Hurricanes Betsy 15 feet, possibly up to 25 feet, to the east of where the
and Camille pummeled the coast, leaving much of New center crosses the coastline." Harris: "It's been
Orleans under water. Betsy killed 79 people here. predicted before that even a smaller storm than the one
Now, there is an elaborate system of drainage pumps. we're looking at right now, could create a situation,
But no one believes these can keep up with a major where, I'm quoting here, 'New Orleans could no longer
breach of the levee system. Bobby Brouillette knows exist.' To your ears, does that sound like an
the system as well as anyone. He maintains the levee overstatement? Or is that a real potential?Mayfield:
pumps. Katrina has him cowering." Brouillette: "It's "Southeastern Louisiana has been our greatest concern,
never happened yet, but it looks like this is gonna be anywhere in the Gulf of Mexico. You know, this has
the one." Kofman: "You really are frightened?" been talked about for decades. Looks like it's going to
Brouillette: "Yes, I'm scared to death." Kofman: come to pass here tonight and tomorrow. This is a
"Bobby Sanchez and her sister have no way to get out 1 large hunicane. This is larger than Andrew. It's the
of town. They are waiting for a bus to take them to ' stronger storm than Andrew, but much larger. So,
safety. Tens of thousands of New Orleans are like her, wherever it hits, there's going to be a big, big impact
too sick or too poor to leave. The city has opened the over a large area. If it weakens some, it's the difference
Superdome as a shelter of last resort. As people waited of being run over by an 18-wheeler or a freight train."
to be processed, tension was in the air." Unidentified Oil Platforms Evacuated ABC World News
woman: "We've been out here since 9:00. They need Tonight (8128, story 4, 1:55, Harris) reported, "This
to organize this crowd much better than it is. The storm could cause problems not only for people in its
children are exhausted. And I am, too." Kofman: path, but for anyone worried about high gas prices. The
"And this is just the beginning. If Hunicane Katrina Gulf of Mexico is home to those oil rigs that produce
doesn't lose some steam overnight, by this time almost one-third of the oil used in this country and 25%
tomorrow, the people who have fled may have no of the natural gas. As ABC's Bob Jamieson reports, in
homes to return to. The forecasters have been the times of soaring prices, the hurricane could cause
remarkably accurate over the last couple of years. And even more pain at the pump." ABC (Jamieson) added,
the models, the compute models, continue to say this "By this afternoon, almost all of the offshore oil
hurricane is headed straight for New Orleans. We platforms in the Gulf had been evacuated. 80% of
know at times these things do have a character of their crude oil production is shut down. Fear alone of the
own. They do wobble. They do change. But as the approaching storm pushed prices Friday briefly past
hours count town and the hurricane continues to head $68 a barrel. Analysts are now bracing for tomorrow."
right here, it's more and more likely this is its Peter BeuteI, Cameron Hanover: 'The fact that this
destination." I happens at a time when the markets are as tight as they
EXHIBIT 72
Fmm: Cable. Kathryn
Serif: -Monday.August 29,2005 652 AM
Attachments: 082905.doc
HZlthlyn Cable
Pub1;c AthIrs Speclalist
Medla Mwilbrlng and h a & &
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Departhenf of Hameland Security
202-6464aO
kathryn.cable@dhs.gov
PREPAREDBY THEFEDERAL EMERGENCY
~ ~ A G E M E N
AGENCY
T DIVISION O F P U R I I C AFFAMS
MONDAY,AUGUST
29,2005,6:00 AM EDT
Main FEMA News: Schools, Businesses Close Monday (Hattiesburg
HURRICANE KATRINA: American - MS) ........................................................ 28
Katrina Rises To Category 5 (Network Television Navarre Beach Evacuation Under Way (Pensacola News
Coverage) .................................................................... 3 Journal - FL) ......................................................... 28
Katrina-New Orleans (CBS) .............................................. 5 Katrina Now A 59 In FIux (Houston
Katrina-New Orleans (NBC)............................................... 7 Chronicle) ................................................................. 29
Bush Urges Safety From Katrina (AP) ............................. 10 Hurricane Katrina: eyes path region
New Orleans Braces For Monster Hunicane (CNN) ....... 11 (Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal - MS) ............ 29
New Orleans Empties As Katrina Draws Near (AP) ....... 12 PensacO1aFinds It Hard Remain (Orlando
In Slot Machines' Silence, A Storm's Economic Cost Sentinel - FL) ............................................................ 31
(New York Times) ................................................. 14 Braces For Katrina's Punch (PascagOula
With Hurricane Bearing Down on New Orleans, Mississippi Press - MS) ............................................ 32
Orientation Turns to Evacuation (Chronicle of Some Party As Menace Grows (Jackson Clarion Ledger -
Higher Education) .................................................... 15 MS) .............................:.............................................. 34
There Won't Be Help For Those Who Stay, Officials Take Steps To Prepare For Katrina (Hattiesburg
Warn (Jackson Clarion Ledger - MS)...................... 16 American - MS) ...................................................... 35
Category 5 Hurricane Will Effect Tri-state w c P 0 - T - ~ Hoosiers Headed South TOHelp ~urricanevictims
OH). ........................................................................... 17 (WISH-TV - IN)....................................................... 36
Kabina May Be 'Our Asian Tsunami' (CNN) .................. 17 Miss-L0u Braces For Hurricane (NatchezDemocrat-
Schools Called Off Due To Katrina (Selma Times- MS) ............................................................................ 37
Journal - AL,)............................................................ 18 States Hurricane's Onslaught (AP) ................ 38
Katrina Opens Assault On Gulf Coast (Washington Galveston Tide Levels Predicted At 1 To 2 Feet Above
T i m e s U I ) ............................................................. 19 Normal (KHOU-TV - TX) ....................................... 38
Kabina Passes Georgia By, But Rain Is Coming (Atlanta Evacuations Under Way On Alabama Coast In Advance
Journal Constitution)............................................... 19 Of Katrina (AP) ......................................................... 38
Mississippi Braces For Major Hit From Katrina (USA All Lanes Of I-55,I-59 Made To Run North From Coast
TodayIAP) ................................................................ 20 %
(Jackson Chamel.com - MS) ................................... 40
Local Volunteer Group Prepares For Katrina (WGAL Montgomery County Team Prepared for Humcane
Channel.com - PA) ................................................... 2 1 Deployment (AP)....................................................... 41
Big Easy Could Become A Cess Pool (AP) ..................... 22 I" The Superd0me, Thousands Without The Means To
Coastal Big Bend Bracing For Storm Surge (Tallahassee Leave (St. Petersburg Times - FL) ........................... 41
Democrat)................................................................23 In Mississippi, Katrina Calls To Mind Devastating
Major Traffic Delays Reported On 1-10, U.S. 90 On Gulf Hurricane Camille (Grand Forks Herald - ND) .......42
Coast (AP) ................................................................. 24 UPDATE: Emergency Aid Authorized for Hurricane
Riley Starts Process To Help Six Counties In Katrina Katrina Emergency Response in Louisiana
Cleanup (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer - GA) ........... 24 (Insurance Journal) .................................................... 43
Katrina, Still Cat 5, Stalks Coast (WDAM-TV - MS)..... 24 IS F E W Ready for Katrina7 (PHXNews.com - AZ). .....43
FEMA Prepared for Katrina's Worst ................................ 25 Direct Hit Produce Nightmare Scenario
Scott County, Forest Schools, ECCC Closed Monday As (Hawaii ChanneLcom) ..............................................4.4
Category 5 Hurricane Katrina Approaches; Morton Supply Site Selma For Katrina Response
Nat. Guard Unit Activated (Scott County Times - (Columbus Ledger-Enquirer - GA) .......................... 45
MS) ............................................................................25 Flood Policy Essential For Rising Water (Miami Herald -
Forecasters Fear Levees Won't Hold Katrina (The Daily FL) ............................................................................. 45
Advertiser - LA) ....................................................... 26 Perry Authorizes Deployment Of Texas Task Force One
Residents Asked To Stay Home As Hurricane To Louisiana (KHO1J.com- TX) ............................. 46
Approaches (Hattiesburg American - MS) .............. 27 Lessons Learned (South Florida Sun-Sentinel) ............... 47
Joe Moffett, 34, of Gulfport. Nearby, a group - - of I Medical assistants and urban search and rescue
children frolicked in the chippy sea, enjbying some last teams are pre-staged. "You try to anticipate the
moments in the warm Gulf before Monday's expected consequences of these events. Fatalities and casualties
onslaught. are in that equation. So are severe injuries. We have to
In the meantime, emergency workers moved into be poised for that and be ready for that," Davison said.
place near trouble spots. FEMA has to be ready because not all Gulf Coast
"We're ready and waiting. This looks like it will residents could evacuate. "Clearly it's better in a shelter
be pretty serious," said Lt. Col. Tim Powell of the than being stuck on the road trying to evacuate too late.
Mississippi National Guard. We hope for the best for those people in the shelters."
He said National Guard troops were stationed in After the first 72 hours FEMA's focus will be
Camp Shelby and that military police units had been longer term. There exists the possibility of a huge
dispersed to coastal counties to help in search and housing shortage, massive debris removal and
rescue missions. sustaining survivors. 'This is a Category 5 humcane
Gov. Haley Barbour made a last-minute appeal for hitting a major population center. It's our worst case
evacuations at a Sunday afternoon news conference in scenario. We've exercised for this. We've planned for
Jackson. He said all available resources were in place it. We're as ready as we can possibly be."
to deal with the storm's aftermath. The Center will be operational 24 hours a day for
"This storm is going to have a statewide effect. several days. FEMA anticipates Katrina will impact
This is not a coastal storm," Barbour said. He added Tennessee as well as Kentucky as it makes landfall and
that coastal residents should leave because "we are I moves inland.
talking about a 30 foot wall of water. Take this
seriousl~.~
And people along the coast were taking heed.
1 Scott County, Forest Schools, ECCC
Closed Monday As Category Hurricane 5
Many of them compared Katrina to Camille. Katrina Approaches; Morton Nat. Guard
"I was here for Camille and I'm leaving," said Unit Activated (Scott County Times - MS)
Lany Anderson, 48, of Harrison County. "I was here By CHRTS ALLEN BAKER, Times News Editor
and I remember it well. I don't want to be here for
August 28,2005
another one."
Humcane Katrina, a strong category 5, is
FEMA Prepared for Katrina's Worst projected to make a path through Mississippi on
Reported By: Kay Flowers Monday with Scott County being one of the areas in its
Web Editor: Steve Dixon expected sights.
812812005 FOREST - School officials for the Scott County
The Federal Emergency Management Agency is School District and the Forest Municipal School
closely watching Katrina's path. Once the storm hits, District have cancelled classes for Monday.
FEMA workers from the southeast regional The joint decision between the districts are part of
headquarters will be sent out to help victims in Florida, advance preparation as Humcane Katrina, a giant
Alabama and Mississippi. category 5 storm, approaches New Orleans with
Those manning the FEMA regional headquarters expectations of also a direct hit on Mississippi.
are anticipating the worst. The agency learned last year Scott County is directly in the projected path of
during Hurricane Ivan that major bridges can be the worst hurricane to hit the state since Camille in
damaged. They are prepared to airlift teams of people 1969, also a category 5 hurricane.
and supplies once Katrina reveals her damage. Skip Lathem, superintendent of Forest schools,
The agency prepares for catastrophe one step at a said Sunday afternoon that the decision to cancel
time. classes was in the best interests of the students and
"You anticipate the worst in terms of critical employees. He and Scott County Schools
facilities: damages to hospitals, police stations, and Superintendent Frank McCurdy made the joint
power stations. These are things that do need to decision.
function after an event that might fail," said Response "Based on advice from state emergency officials
Center Director Todd Davison. we made the joint decision to cancel classes," Lathem
said. "We will continue to watch as conditions develop
EXHIBIT 73
SEPTEMBER 2, 2 0 0 5 -- . .-
. ._
COL. JEFF SMITH: -- we don't know what kind
1
-
PATRICK RHODE: I know you guys have an
.-
. .
, awful lot operationally going an right now. Does
__ _____ _- . - _ -______-__-.___ -_
anyone have any other specific questions for the State
I
of Louisiana.
-.
(No response.)
Jeff. thank you. sir. Bill, thank you very
- .
Conduct Lifesavin~Operations
Obtain fuel supply to support Search and Rescue (OPS)
' o Move US&R assets closer
\
\
Establish good communications with field teams (OPS)
Determine need for additional medical, mortuary and veterinary assets
WMS)
o EstabIish 2 additional T-MOSAs (5 total)
o Establish a total of 18 DMATs
&om:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
. .
-
-
~ a r t i n e z - ~ ~ nAlt s: ,
Thursday. ~eptember01,20053:55 PM
. .---
. --
. .*
... -. .. .
All.
Chuck Powers,.iDirector of Water Resources, at Flowserve has contacted me with an offeffor help. Flowserve is
the largest pump company in the world, according to Chuck, based in Dallas. They are the people that sold and
installed over 50% of the pumping capacity in New Orleans. They have a field officeiservice center in Baton
Rouge with over 200 people ready to go in and repair the pumps in NO once the Jeveeshave been repaired.
They have many pumps and spare part on ha%d to help with other jobs. He wants to help but needs direction.
-kt--
Could someone reach out to him at. - or 410 756-3267 office.
My office, the Private Sector Office at DHS, has been helping FEMA by gathering contributions and items for sale
to be used in the Katrina disaster recovery. The information id being gathered at www.swem.com . After
spending a goad part of the morning at FEMA HQ, we realize we need to make some contacts in the field with
bath FEMA and state aythorities. , I would appreciate it if one of you could contact me at the numbers below to
dlscuss how we can be of service. As of a couple of hours ago we had over 1500 offers.
Thank you,
Al .
RECOVERY
-
Subject: FW: Press Release DOING BUSINESS WITH FEMA DURING M E HURRICANE KATRINA
p
All.
Joanna Gonzalcz
Assistant Prcsr Sccrctary and Hupanic Spokerpecson
U.S.D c p a r h c n t of Homeland Security
202-282-8010 Press Office
-.
202-282-8149Direct Line
r
-( Cellular Phone
-
Can you plkase call me when you have a minute (unfortunately, your number is not listed in the DHS
eDiredoryj?
Totally understand Bill - we are trying'to improve your corn situation and know all that.
can be done is being done.
P
Patrick:
I am on a call with the representatives we have in the counties and Bob Fenton or
operations section chief. commodities are flowing to ~arrisonand Hancock counties.
Unfortunately, they are not coming in to.theState of MS in to meet requirements.
To exascerbate situation, we have been unable to equip all key personnel with sat phones
to coordinate overall efforts.
Everyone here working hard to address the requirements but they exceed resources.
kill try to ensure the State gets the county to get commodities down to Bay St. Louis
Bill
a . d
Bill
- - - - - Original Message-----
From: Brown, Michael D
TO: Altshuler, Brooks; 'patrick.rhode@dhs.gov4; Lowder, Michael; Carwile, William
EXHIBIT 78
SEPTEMBER 2. 2005 -
'. -.
CXIL. JEFF SMITH: -- we don't know what kind
of planes are coming in. In order to plan this thing.
a
to cover today
update?
- 1
in the distribution and staging, power, rapid needs
Go ahead, Tony.
staging area.
- - - - - Original Message-----
From: Rhode, Patrick cPatrick.Rhode@ferna.gov>
To: Lowder, Michael cMichael.LowderBfema.gov>
CC: 'Ken.Burris@dhs.gov* cKen.Burris@dhs.gov>
Sent: Fri Sep 02 08:33 :21 2005
Subject: Re: Planned Shipments against Requirements through Operating Period S ept 02
Ken is working a mission assignment in next 15 mins to have dod take over log distribution
this am - just spoke with mike and honore and they are on board - let's push this ma
Thx
----- Original ~essage-----
From: Lowder, Michael c~ichael.Lowde.r@fema.gov>
To:. Rhode, Patrick cPatrick.Rhode@fema.gov>
Sent: Fri.Sep 02 08:21:37 2005 '
Unfortunately, I ' m afraid that you are correct. I don't have a good excuse. I've been
offered several reasons why this happened, but I still can't explain why. I have give
instruction to do what ever it takes to move every possible truck of water, MRE8s, and ice
straight to Camp Shelby, as fast as physically possible.
With 'that said, 155 trucks of MRE (3.5million MRE's) should be arriving on Saturday
evening. I have instnicted the logistics staff to do everything humanly possibleto
expedite this shipment.
f have asked them'to find water where ever they can to get it to you.
Turns out this report is true. B o b just got off a call with Rudy and there seems to be no
way we will get cornnodities in amounts beyond those indicated below. And it turns out
these shortfalls were known much earlier in the day and we were not informed.
Will need big time law enforcement reinforcements tomorrow. All our good will here in MS
will be very seriously impacted by noon tomorrow. Have been holding it together as it is.
Can no longer afford to rely on LRC. Fully intend to take independent measures to address
huge shortfalls.
The report say's 60 ice 26 water tomorrow, this will cause significant issues or
requirements is 450 water 450 ice.
I hope this report is in error, we ordered 450 water and 450 ice per day, two day's ago
which was suppose to start tomorrow. Prior to that on August 28th we ordered 255 water and
255 ice per day to start on August 30th. We have not yet met any of our requirements even
with two day's notice. If we get the quantities in your report tomorrow we will have
serious riots.
Bill Hall will .moderace this agenda item tonight. Rudy will follow up with addendurns
tomorrow. operational period ending 8/31,was submitted so you can note thechanges.
Thanks,
Steve
EXHIBIT 81
SEPTEMBER 1 , 2005
.. .
COL. WHITEHORN: -- patrol cars down there.
resources.
- -a
thousand people that we had rescued. None of them had
food and water. And I was delivering water to some of
Importance:
-
Thursday, September 01.2005 10:50 PM
Brown, Michael D .
MREs
High
,
. .
. .
. . , .
Sir, . .
Checked with ESF folks and iog folks have. five trucks.of MRES and .5 of water
to go in to the Convention,Center and theSuperDome. Each truck,has about 21K MREs, .so
re&y ;
. -obviously enough t o do what needs to be done..' I am.told.they are ready. to move .whenever
necessary, but as you,heard,from LTG Honore, h e is working the security piece. , A 1 Jones '
and Iare,standing by to assist you and'your staff on any other- issues astheyarise. '.
. .
Just a note - if,you desire, we can travel.with you' when you believe.it is a goo&,'idea. . .
Both of us have satellite .conuns capability we catl bring:along.-and can provide other'
immediate.staff support when you are away from the DFO. Obviously believe we.;shouldkeep .
,at.least'.one of us at the DFO. Just want to make sure'you understand we have.no problem
, with accompanying,you and providing support as needed. . .
. .
. .
v/r
. . Jo.hn Jordan
COL-, us .Army. . ' . .. . .
EXHIBIT 83
SEPTEMBER 4, 2005
LOUISIANA-BILL KING:
operations continuing efforts.
--
-
search and rescue
There has been some
progress re-gridding the system, and we're working
Jackson is -on.
(No response.1
I guess not.
EXHIBIT 84
SEPTEMBER 4 , 2005
.. *.
inundated.
3
EXHIBIT 85
FEMA: Edward G. Buikema Page 1 of 2
Edward G. Buikema
Regional Administrator - Region V
Edward G. Buikema was appointed Regional Administrator of
FEMA Region V in November 2001. He coordinates FEMA
mitigation, preparedness, and disaster rand recovery activities in
six states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,Minnesota, Ohio and
Wisconsin.
From February 2005 through October 2005, Mr. Buikema served as the acting administrator of
FEMA's Response Division in Washington, D.C. He was responsible for leadership and
administration of Response Division programs, including the National Disaster Medical System, the
Urban Search and Rescue System, the Mobile Emergency Response Detachments, the Territorial
Logistics Centers, the National Response Coordination Center, and the temporary disaster workforce.
Prior to his FEMA position, Mr. Buikema was commander of the Emergency Management Division
of the Michigan State Police. In that position, he was responsible for leadership and coordination of
the state's emergency management program and served as the state coordinating officer and
governor's authorized representative for nine presidential disaster declarations. Mr. Buikema also
served as chair of the Michigan Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Commission,
the Michigan Hazard Mitigation Coordinating Council, and Michigan's Anti-Terrorism Task Force.
He was an officer with the Michigan State Police for more than 26 years, serving in the Emergency
Management Division for 19 of those years and has been active in a number of national and state
associations and organizations.
Mr. Buikema is a member of the executive committee of the Chicago Federal Executive Board, the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 1600) technical committee, the executive board of the
Chicago Joint Terrorism Task Force, and past chair of the Emergency Management Accreditation
Program Commission.
A native of Grand Rapids, Michigan, Mr. Buikema holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in political
science from Calvin College in Grand Rapids. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy in
Quantico, Virginia.
EXHIBIT 86
From: Rhode, Patrick
Sent: Tuesday, September 06,2005 8:55 PM
To: Buikema, Edward; Craig, Daniel; Lowder, Michael; Moore. GaryE
Cc: Bums, Ken
Subject: Re: MRE's to Red Cross
Thank you Ed
-----C r i g i n a l Message-----
From: Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buikema@fema.gov>
To: Rhode, P a t r i c k <Patrick.Rhode@ferna.gov>; C r a i g , D a n i e l <Daniel.Craig@fema.gov>;
Lowder, M i c h a e l <Michael.Lowder@fema.gov>; Moore, GaryE <GaryE.Moore@fema.gov>
CC: B u r r i s , Ken <Ken.Burris@fema.gov>
S e n t : Tue Sep 06 20-:52:02 2005
S u b j e c t : RE: MRE's t o Red C r o s s
Patrick,
We a r e t r y i n g t o r u n t h i s t h i n g t o ground, o n c e a n d f o r a l l . It i s n o t necessarily a
c h e e r y p i c t u r e . Admiral Moss, t h e h e a d o f l o g i s t i c s f o r Northcom, c a l l e d Gary Moore
t o n i g h t and t o l d him t h a t we were c u t t i n g i n t o t h e s u p p l y o f MRE's f o r t h e i r war f i g h t i n g
e f f o r t and t h a t t h e y would n o t s u p p l y t h e Red C r o s s . Gary t h e n c a l l e d A l l e n McCurry o f
t h e Red C r o s s t o b r e a k t h e news.
;
So much f o r m i s s i o n a s s i g n i n g DOD t h e l o g i s t i c s s u p p o r t m i s s i o n .
1
contractor support f o r t h a t e f f o r t .
From: Rhode, P a t r i c k
S e n t : Tuesday, September 06, 2005 6:57 PM
To: Buikema, Edward; C r a i g , D a n i e l ; Lowder, Michael; Moore, GaryE
Cc: B u r r i s , Ken
S u b j e c t : MRE's t o Red C r o s s
Importance: High
-
.
I ' m t o l d b y A l l e n McCurry o f Red C r o s s and Marty Evans t h a t o u r p r o m i s e s o f b1RE1s h a s n o t
come t r u e - s t i l l .
Thanks,
Patrick
EXHIBIT 87
Southeast Louisiana
Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project
Appendix 5 -
June 7,2005
1. Purpose: The purpose of this document is to provide state, local and tribal agencies guidance
when planning for distribution of emergency supplies and commodities to the public. This
guidance centers on local distribution points where the commodities are placed into the victims'
hands.
3. Overview: The type and quantity of supplies that the public will need in the aftermath of
disasters or other crises will vary due to many factors and no one event will be just like another.
Experience in emergency response over the years suggests some common necessities that the
public will require to meet health, safety, and lifesaving needs. They include potable water
(usually bottled), packaged ice, Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and other supplies. In small scale
disasters and in the initial hours of larger disasters, these commodities are often supplied by state
and local governments, donations from industry, and volunteer agencies. When the need for
commodities exceeds the state's capability, under a Presidential Declaration, the state can request
that FEMA provide the additional requirements. FEMA will provide commodities stored in bulk
quantities at regional logistics centers in various locations and, if needed, task ESF#3 (USACE)
to purchase additional quantities of ice and water. The FEMAIUSACE provided commodities
are delivered from the federal staging areas to state logistical staging areas where the state in-
turn supplies the local distribution points. These commodities and supplies are most often
delivered in over-the-road tractor trailer loads. Since these types of trucks (eighteen wheelers)
are eighteen to thirty feet long, with a trailer that is forty-five to fifty-two feet long, large open
areas are required to accommodate the vehicles with their loads. Distribution points must be
areas that are paved, concrete, or gravel hard-stand that can withstand loads that are at load limits
of national roadways. In addition to the area needed for the trucks, planning must include area
for unloading, dumpsters, proper traffic flow, stockpiles, and ingress and egress for the
distribution to the public. Figure 1 below shows the general flow of commodities from Federal
to State to local distribution points.
4. Key Background Information: We live in a ''just in time" world. The vendors that supply
bottled drinking water, packaged ice and other commodities are geared to supply their normal
business clients. They minimize storage costs and personnel costs by keeping production in line
with demand. In large response efforts, packaged ice and water are provided from all over the
US and Canada in order to meet the immediate demand. The same is true with the trucking
Federal Staglng
1
Figure 1
industry. Large, over-the-road trucks are seldom idle and are in business to serve clients. This is
especially true of refrigerated vans which are in high demand. When disaster strikes, the
commercial world has to change their normal business structure to provide support to the effort.
Vendors have to continue to support their normal customer base and gear up operations to
support disaster requirements. 'This process, by rule of thumb for large orders, takes 48 hours
during the weekday to deliver up to 50 loads and 72 hours to deliver up to 50 loads if initiated on
a Friday after 12:OO noon. Because of these factors, the pre-positioning of commodities for a
pending event is crucial.
4.1 In past responses, the industry has been impacted by large orders being cancelled and then
re-ordered the next day. You can imagine the whiplash to their additional personnel, bottle
suppliers, delivery schedules, trucking assets, and existing customers, that this can cause,
especially on a weekend when they normally are not working. We will never eliminate this type
of situation, but we as responders need to understand the repercussions to our business partners.
Another re-occurring impact is to the trucking industry. When large numbers of trucks sit for 4
or 5 days at a staging or distribution site without being off-loaded, there is a huge impact on re-
supply, costs, and can result in trucking companies refusing to participate in future efforts. Our
planning efforts must include ways to off-load trucks quickly to free up this limited resource.
It's a lot better for the victims of a disaster to have a little ice melt at a distribution point
than to hold the refrigerated truck and keep it from delivering another load.
4.2 Another key aspect of commodities planning is the understanding of the "pipeline effect."
The need for commodities is directly proportional to commercial power. If the power is out the
need is there. When the power returns (with the exception of a contaminated water supply) the
need is gone. During response operations the power restoration process must be closely
monitored and commodity supplies adjusted. The pipeline is defined as all the commodities
purchased but not yet delivered and all the supply trucks that are in route between the supplier
and the distribution points. In large operations this number can be in the hundreds and if the
power grid suddenly comes on line, then the trucks and commodities in the pipeline will
represent excess stockage. The pipeline effect will most always happen, but we as managers
must reduce the effect as much as possible through planning, communications, and coordination.
4.3 Distribution points provide a great place to communicate to the public by means of
informational handouts. Community relations personnel are included in the distribution resource
plan. The key is to have the information packaged in a handout format to prevent people from
exiting their vehicles. Maximum vehicle flow is crucial to reaching as many people as possible.
5. Planning Factors: The following are general information and common planning factors that,
if used by all, will help in coordinating and communicating during the planning and response
process.
Shelters will require a mixed load of commodities consisting of 3 pallets water, 1 pallet ice, 1
pallet MREs per 500 person facility.
Mobile kitchens require 2 trailers water and 1 trailer ice per 10,000 meals per day per site.
5.3 Distribution Point Planning: The following are assumptions used for distribution planning:
- Victims will drive through a distribution point and be served without leaving their vehicles.
- Each car represents an average family of 3.
- Each vehicle passing through a distribution point will receive the following:
2 or 3 bags of ice
1 case of water (9-1 2 liters)
6 MREs
1 tarp
EXHIBIT 88
AUGUST 2 7 , 2 0 0 5
. .
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER: This is the
might think when you see that that means we have more
-
- confidence in it. M$ experience has been tha-t there's
not always that good correlation. I wouldn't give up
side of the storm, get the high surge and the high
- 1
Beauregard as well.
We've coordinated
- .- with our backup.regions.
- Regions 10 and 1. and have made staff requests to have
to move westward
you all are doing for us, and all I would ask is that
,
-- just to what capability and extent, if that is the
The GIWW,.
. ... . the
. Gulf , Coast ~ntercoastal
Thank you.
..
MR. BUIKEMA: Thank you, sir. Any
-
questions for ESF-3?
(No response. )
43
to deliver them. Are they not getting into 'where --
delivered to? I
-
ESF-3: Sir, I don't have that level of
. .. . . . . : : . ,. .
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Quantity:
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c 3 wh . 4 ~edltim'
Delivery Site Lacation:
vfi~2oaU&WS
Estimated Completion Date:
i W @A.
Cost Estimate:
'
V. Action Taken (Operations Section Only)
1 Accepted Rejected Accountabk Property
Disposition: Coord~natedwith APO ,
noughts?
MI.
Iheard Mike Brown earlier today say he knew water, food, supplies were on the way - he just didn't know where
they were. That may be an overstatement. but maybe not. I'm not aware of any stood-up cross-agency logistics
platform, at FEMA or elsewhere in the government, ssit makes sense.
Ihad a conversatbn late this moming with Grace Mastalli in InformationSharing about another project and it -
occurred to both of us that what Brown - and the states and the cities - need(s) is a transpwtation4ogistics
-
visibility system, and hekhey need(s) it fast as the relief supplies - and the relief demands are m i n g at them
from all over.
Iwant to offer to provide just that. using the FDfdio software we use for the DODlGlobal Trader platform (TMS is
what it was really designed far). We could stand it up for either (1) moss agency transdons (eg. supplies, etc
m i n g from DOD. FEMA. other government); or (2) to coordinate private relief shipments and public sector
distribution -or both. Thesystem was built for privqte sector use, but as you know was diverted to the homeland
I
security issue at DOD first, then FDA, TSA, etc. This is very powerful operational software. We run over half a
I mllllon complex transactions an hour for risk assessment and forensics, so this is not a blg deal.
We would waive Ule software license for the demo. We just need enough to cover set-up, data integration. etc-
under $200K Iwould guess for the first pass. We could set it up literally overnight. either for a city, a state, for
federal use. While the system takes data any way it comes (EDI, flat files, web interface, etc)we would probably
initially have to have it faxed or entered via web since it takes time to integrate electronic feeds. All you'd need is
a small office. 1-8 PC's, phones, and a fax with rollover.
I
We could do it at any level you wanted. but might want to do it in Houston, initially, where they've got a bunch of
people, and could get Rice and University of Houston students to do the data entry on a volunteer basis (Iknow
from my daughter at Rice that they're looking for something to do). For that matter, we could use refugees to do
it, too - which might be a big PR boon and an interesting educatianal challenge. It would take only about 2 weeks
to know whelher i t was worth it and wrth replicating across the system.
lf would almost immediately give leadenhip and people on the ground the ability to (I)
get supplies into the
system. (2) show where It Is. who it came from. for whom it is destined. etc, and (3) allow managers to redeploy
because they would be able to see what was out Ulere. It can manage an awful lot of other things. too, as you
know - induding provide a forensics platform, intel, etc. But this was the purpose for which it was designed. We
can turn it on ASAP -we just need the data. We'd be happy to work with some partners. too.
NO ONE else could do this as quickly. We will take the risk as'longas out of pocket is paid for.
J" ;~,"g~",~"""
ht then hit h e mad. My number at home -hat my summer house on
Regards,
Rob Quartel
CEO and Chairman
FreightDesk Technologies
7925 Jones Branch Drive. St. 5300
Mclean. Va 22102
EXHIBIT 93
Page 1 of 2
I(
Sent: Friday, September 02.2005 6:08 PM
Subject: Crltical Commodltles Release
. .
Press Release .''
. . .
I
Critical Commodities Continue Into Disaster Areas While Government Responds to Challenges of
Most Catastrophic Disaster in U.S. History
Washington - FEMA,along with its federal partners, state govenunents and voluntary agencies, are all
working to keep meals ready to eat (MREs), food,water, ice, medical supplies, generators, and other
critical commodities flowing into hurricane-hit areas, said Michael D. Brown, Deparhnent of Homeland
Security's Principal Federal Officer for Hurricane K a t ~ response
a and head of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
"This is a disaster of catastrophic magnitude like none we've seen before," said Brown. "It has created
challenges that we are working around the clock to address and fix. In the meantime, we continue life-
saving and sustaining efforts and directing resources to those with the most urgent needs."
I
15,000 evacuations have been made fiom the New Orleans Superdome to the Astrodome in
Houston and are continuing today to San Antonio for housing at Kelly Air Force Base. Evacuations will
continue fiom Louisiana to Reunion Arena in Dallas, and Lackland AFB, Tex.
2,000 patients have been evacuated fiom the New Orleans airport. Seven National Disaster
Medical Service Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (Dh4ATs) and 3 strike teams are supporting New
Orleans medical facilities and hospitals not fully operational and setting up MASH-style tents. Five
DMATs and 5 strike teams are working in medical facilities and hospitals in Gulfport, Biloxi and other
areas of Mississippi.
. 200 Border Patrol agents, 200 additional law enforcementofficers &om other Louisiana
jurisdictions and 2,000 officers b m neighboring states are assisting in restoring order in the streets of
New Orleans.
Nearly 500 U.S.Corps of Engineers civilians and soldiers are working on the New Orleans
levee breach and coordinatingthe transport of ice and water.
A Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) is opening today in Bayou La Batre, Ala, and another
tomorrow in Chatom, Ala
FEMA is setting up a Joint Housing Solutions Center to bring together public, private and
voluntary agency stakeholdersto develop innovative W i g and streamlined operational partnerships to
address the short and long-term housing needs of disaster victims.
More than 7,000 people have been.rescued- Urban Search and Rescue task forces have made. . . . . . . . , ' ,
. .
. .
.. . . ...
'
- :-.:rn0rethan2~000 rescues and U.S. Coast G h d ships;
. . .
boats $daircra'fi:hitve be& used. to. .rescue' .
. . .. . . . . . . .
. .
:
,
. : (: approkimately'5,000 people. . . .
..... . . .. . . .' . .. .. . . . . . .
. .
. . ..
/ .
'I
..
'I.
. . .
! : . '
. . .
-8Mectedihdividualsin declared counties can register &line for disaster assistance at &.femagov or
'
;
call FEMA's toll-fiee registration line 1-800-621-FEMA (3362) - 'ITY 800-462-7585, hours. Victims
. .
are encouraged to register on-line due to the possibility of highcal.,volume.If registering by phone,,
. . . . ..,
i.
. . . . -,owne&,o'f commercial properties qnd residents withonly minor losses are.urgd.to wait a feu! days' . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
. before ca1ling:soxftose whose homes were destroyed or heavily damaged can be.sewed f
. ..': '.
" ' d. ehone lines' ' -
.. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .:&,open 24-hours, 7 days a.week.'
. %.
).
. . '1,
,
FEMA prepares the nation for all hazards and manages federal response.and recovery efforts following
any national incident. FEMA also initiates mitigationactivities,trains,first.responders, works with state ,
. . .
. . : l l o ~ d ' Program
i and,local emergency managers, and.manages the ~ ~ t i ' o n; a~ ~ ~the t ire . .
~ n s ' and '
. !
.
,.. j. . < . :. Administration. EEMA became pari of the U.S.Departrnmt'.ofHomeland Secuiityon Mai-ch 1,2003.
. . . . .
' ' .
. L
### . .
. .
.. . . . . . . .
. . . .
EXHIBIT 94
Page 1 of I
-
Please fix h e commodity portion of this they still list how much expected - and how much received -if anything
it should just be h o w ~ u c his, there - not how much is anticipated - looks like we failed and isn't necessary and
leads to too many questions for all the readers...........
thanks
---- -.-.------. ---- -
From: Pawlowski, Michel
Sent: Monday, August 29,2005 7:39 AM
To: Altshuler, Brooks; Boone, Morris; &likema, Edward; Bums, Ken; Craig, Danlel; Dyson, Nicole; EST-
DEPUPI@dhs.gov; EST-DIR; Fay, Paul; FEMA-NRCC; Gair, Brad; Garratt, David; Gmy, Richard; Heath, Michael;
Hepler, Megs; HSOC FEMA Desk; Hutchins, Charles; joe.sredl@dhs.gov; Jones, Gary; Long, Casey; Maurstad,
David; Miller, Mary Lynne; Moore, Garyt; Nelson, Jason; Nieuwejaar, Sonja; Pawlawski, Michel; Rhode, Patrick;
Robinson, Tony; Rule, Natalie; Schumann, James; Wells, Tod; Wing, Deborah
CG \
Subject: VIP Briefing #S Hurricane Katrina
Importance: High
Unfortunately, I'm afraid that .youare correct. I don't have a good excuse. I've been
offered several reasons why this happened, but I stili can't explain why. 1 have give
instruction to do what ever.it takes to move every possible truck of water, MRE's, and ice
straight to Camp Shelby, as fast as physically possible.
With that said, 155 trucks of MRE (3.5million MRBts) should be arriving on Saturday
evening. I have instructed the logistics staff to do everything humanly possible to
expedite this shipment.
I have asked them to find water where ever they can to get it to you.
Turns out this report is true. Bob just got off a call with Rudy and there seems to be no
way we will get commodities in amounts beyond those indicated below. And it turns out
these shortEalls were known much earlier in the day ard we were not informed.
Will need. big time law enforcement reinforcements tomorrow. All our good will here in MS
will be very seriously impacted by noon tomorrow. Have been holding it together as it is.
Can no longer afford to rely on LRC. Fully intend to take independent measures to address
huge shortfalls.
Subject: FW: Planned Shipments against Requirements through Cperating Period S ept 02
The report say's 60 ice 26 water tomorrow, this will cause oignificant issues or
requirements is 450 water 450 ice.
Bill Hall will moderate this agenda item tonight. Rudy will follow up with addendum6
tomorrow.' Operational'period ending 8/31 was submitted so you can note the changes.
Thanks,
Steve
EXHIBIT 96
I From: Rhode, Patrick
I
sent: Wednesday. August 31.2005 7 5 5 PM6
To: 'Marc Larnpkin'
Cc: David Lugar'
Subject: RE: Cell Phones
'One of our clients, Verizon Wireless is desperately trying to get someone at FEMA to help them get proper
dearance to bring their portable cell tower operations down into the areas most affected by the hurricane. They
have a moblle operation that will allow cell users in Mississippiand Louisiana to be up and runningby using
generators to operate their emergency services teams.
Evidentb and very understandably given all that is occurring in the region, they are having a hard time getting
approval to get their trucks into position. Is there any way for you to contact the local FEMA personnel down in the
region to say that this makes sense or at least provide a contact for the Verizon local teams to call? Hopefully by
getting additional cell capacity up and running, it will help to offload some of the congestion currently being
experienced in the region.
Feel free to buzz me on my cell-if you should have questions and thanks. in advance for any assistance
or guidance you might be able to provide.
Good luck In the coming days as I am sure it will be a very diffiult period for aH of those trying to help the
residents of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Please let me.know if I can be of assistance to you;
Marc.
EXHIBIT 97
AUGUST 30, 2005
I
.- get as close as we-can to.Gu1.fpor't.But we've got
-
resources already moving that way and can push more
search and rescue, and if we got there with our
- EMAC .
MISSISSIPPI: That's great. A s you can see.
help.
she1ters .
deployment on arrival
,. . 4.- - -. ,
We have two CH-47 cargo aircraft en route
request
..,..,. -*.-. ..
-... . . ,
31
EXHIBIT 98
-
.
-
Page Io f 2
FYI - Justln case this gets raised &I the next VTC -we've given diredion on how OSLGCP can engagelenroll
law enforcement resources.
Christy.
Thanks. When you speak with Sheriff Bouchard awin relay to him that he needs to get Ule Jefferson Parish
Sherlff to contact the State EOC to make this request for help too. The process is for a locality to request help
from the State, then the state makes the request through EMAC for other States. Jeffeson Parish has to make
their needs known to the State in order for the State to request or deploy the resources needed. Jefferson Parish
may have already done this, but this is be process that will be able to get the needed resources on the ground.
Tod
Tad. FYI
W.Mayeaux. Sheriff Bouchard from Michigan and Sheriff Hale from Alabama are at the Louisiana border right
now at the request of Shenff Lee of Jefferson Pamsh who is desperate for law enforcement assistance. The
S h e i i s cannot get an okay to help because their EOC of Michigan and Alabama say there has been no request
from La. EOC for assistance. We cannot reach you by phone. It is absolutely imperative that the state request go
to those state E X . :These sheriffs have been there all day.
Someone had to pay to remove 3,000 dead trees in New Orleans. The trees, insisted the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, couldn't have been killed by Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters
because they weren't toppled to a certain angle. New Orleans would have to pay.
Nonsense, city administrators argued. Brackish water swamped the city for weeks, killing the trees
where they stood. Only after months of delay did FEMA relent, adding the trees' removal to the toll
of the catastrophe.
Through hundreds of such disputes large and small, the most costly disaster in U.S. history is fast
becoming its most contentious, with appeals and disputes worth nearly a billion dollars bogging
down repairs of critical public systems and delaying the return of residents.
Current and former officials at all levels blame FEMA workers' inexperience with eligibility rules,
weaknesses in U.S. disaster laws and inconsistent treatment by Congress for much of the
wrangling. The huge scale of the storm and honest disagreement over whether federal or local
taxpayers should pay the tab add to the conflict.
"Disasters should be difficult to declare. . . . But once you get them, FEMA should not worry about
cutting costs," said Daniel A. Craig, who stepped down in October as head of FEMA's recovery
division and is now consulting for New Orleans. "Public entities are eligible for everything they
have lost due to the disaster. It is not up to FEMA to cut corners or makes sure money is saved."
Gil H. Jamieson, FEMA's deputy director for Gulf Coast recovery, agreed that "we're in this to
rebuild the city" and added: "We are not in it to delay for the sake of delay. Are there folks who
sometimes hose it up? Absolutely. But I think we're doing a good job of helping it recover."
The disputes come as the costliest part of the recovery begins: restoring water, power, roads,
bridges, schools and other public facilities along the Gulf Coast. Agency veterans said the spending
will have more impact on the physical rebuilding of the Gulf area than anything else FEMA does
over the next decade, possibly eclipsing its role in aiding individual victims of the storm.
The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, for instance, sustained $446 million in storm
losses, said Executive Director Marcia St. Martin. But FEMA has committed just $1 13 million so
far.
FEMA notes that New Orleans promised U.S. environmental regulators $640 million in repairs
First the Flood, Now the Fight Page 2 of 4
before Katrina, and that the antiquated system is too big for the Crescent City's reduced population.
"That's what makes a city -- if you don't have water, sewer and drainage, you don't have a city,"
lamented Robert Jackson, spokesman for the sewer board. "The money so far only scratches the
surface of the devastation. In some cases you've got underground devastation that you haven't seen
even in a year's time."
Jamieson acknowledged that "one of the toughest issues is: How do we not buy any city a
completely new water and sewer system but in fact try to attribute how much it was damaged
before the storm?"
"We want to give them what they deserve but . . . make sure they are not getting more than they
deserve, at some other community's expense," Jamieson said.
In St. Tammany Parish, officials were told last year that to obtain FEMA reimbursement, they
needed to prove that each tree stump was the work of Katrina before it could be removed. Cleanup
waited for months while the parish photographed and obtained global positioning satellite data on
each one.
When the evidence was presented to a new FEMA crew, they asked, "Why did y'all GPS all these
things?" the parish president, Kevin Davis, said in an account first reported by National Journal.
FEMA's Jamieson said that inconsistent interpretation of rules has been a daunting problem and
that FEMA is trying to keep senior officials in place. He also cited successes, such as the scheduled
Sept. 25 reopening of the state-owned Louisiana Superdome, a $94 million FEMA project.
Still, Jamieson said, "the time is right" to hold the nation's disaster law "to the light of day."
"We need to take a look at how well the legislation has served us."
Under the law, known as the Stafford Act, FEMA exerts its greatest long-term influence over
rebuilding communities by deciding which projects are eligible for funding and by negotiating
reimbursement of most state and local governments' costs. Generally, the federal government will
pay only to restore facilities to pre-disaster conditions, not upgrade them, as a way of protecting
taxpayers. But several former federal and state officials said the rules are open to broad
interpretation and congressional intervention.
In the wake of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA appears to be taking a harder line, several current
and former officials said.
So far, FEMA has approved about 34,000 aid applications from state and local agencies, 16,000 of
them from Louisiana. It has rejected 1,015 requests, 95 percent of them from Louisiana. The state is
appealing 200 decisions. Art Jones, the state's deputy coordinating officer, said he expects state
appeals to grow at least sevenfold over eight to 15 years, topping 1,000.
"It's . . . a process designed to wear you down until you finally give up," said Richard A. Andrews,
former California homeland security adviser.
First the Flood, Now the Fight Page 3 of 4
State and federal disaster experts said they are hindered by burdensome rules and a shortage of
expertise.
In New Orleans, city officials have received only 30 percent of $394 million requested and expect
their requests to roughly triple over the next three years as work goes on. The city's deputy chief
administrative officer, Cary Grant, said FEMA is underestimating the value of buildings and
presuming wrongly that the city will be able to recover $500,000 in insurance for each of 394
damaged city facilities.
Elsewhere, local officials say a parade of new FEMA officials -- the overstretched agency rotates
workers every 90 days or so and relies on temporary employees as well -- leads to constantly
changing decisions on project approvals and paperwork.
One reason for mistakes is that FEMA has suffered a "brain drain" of top officials familiar with the
complex rules to retirements and agency upheaval in recent years, said David Fukutomi, a FEMA
consultant who is serving as a spokesman. But Fukutomi, who left FEMA this spring to become
director of response and recovery for contractor EG&G, noted that experience shows that local
officials spend more freely when they expect the federal government to pay their bills.
The state of Louisiana had only 14 disaster recovery employees before the storm and is relying on
173 contract workers provided by James Lee Witt Associates, the firm headed by the Clinton
administration FEMA director, to help it manage the process, Jones said. FEMA has more than 700
people in the Gulf states working on the program, about 90 percent of them interim or contract
workers, Fukutomi said.
After the Northridge earthquake in 1994, for example, U.S. and California authorities struggled
with engineers to reach consensus on the price tag of repairing costly structures such as the UCLA
Medical Center. FEMA rejected a state attempt to repair older buildings to meet newer building
safety codes, for example.
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, however, Congress directly gave the city and state of New York
$20 billion -- but said no more would be forthcoming -- and directed FEMA to interpret the law
liberally. FEMA approved $2.8 billion to repair and improve Lower Manhattan's transit system and
waived a $680 million local match requirement, both counter to its normal practice. The state
reported appealing none of its 1,900 aid requests to FEMA.
So far FEMA has allotted more than $7.9 billion to reimburse states for hurricanes Katrina, Rita
and Wilma, and expects that number to grow significantly. Louisiana emergency managers say they
expect the toll of facilities repair, as well as emergency expenses -- currently at $3.3 billion -- to
exceed $25 billion. In Mississippi, emergency managers say they expect their costs -- now at $1.6
billion -- to total about $2 billion.
Jones said that at $3.3 billion so far, Louisiana is only 10 percent into what he expects will be a
final tab of $25 billion to $50 billion.
In comparison, FEMA's Public Assistance program paid $8.8 billion to help New York's recovery
First the Flood, Now the Fight Page 4 of 4
after the 2001 terrorist attacks, $7 billion to repair damage after the Northridge earthquake, and
$1.8 billion to rebuild after Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992.
Andrews and other officials proposed that Congress rely more on block grants as it did for New
York, allow arbitration of appeals and reduce paperwork, and give FEMA field coordinators more
authority.
Craig, the New Orleans consultant, said costs will escalate as crews uncover hidden damage and
the enormous reconstruction effort sends building prices soaring. He said he expects federal costs
to climb by as much as $75 billion. The federal government has committed about $123 billion to
the recovery so far.
"It's going to be a $200 billion disaster," he said. "The real, permanent reconstruction hasn't started
yet. They're still cleaning up debris."
Source URL:
http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/2 1697.
-
EXHIBIT 100
From: Craig. Daniel
Sent: Thursday, September 01,2005 2: 19 PM
"; To: Atshuler. Brooks; Rhode, Patrick
,.: Subject: FW: DOT heading to LA and M S
Why is DHS pulling people off of spots that I already have them in place for
David is doing our in£rastructure stuff across the states
- - - - -Original Message-----
Prom: Fukutomi, David [mailto: avid. ~ukutomi@dhs
.gov]
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 2:12 PM
To: 'daniel.craig@dhs.govq
Subject: Re: DOT heading to LA and MS
Brian Bessanceny. Designation notification is being prepared.
David Fukutomi '
- - - - - Original Message-----
From: Craig, Daniel <Daniel.craig@dhs .gov>
To: 'Fukutomi, David1 cDavid.Fukutmi@dhs.gov>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 14:01:50 2005
Subject: RE: DOT heading to LA and MS
Who redirected you?
- - - - - Original Message-----
From: Fukutomi, David [mailto:~avid.Fukutomi@dhs.gov~
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2005 1:56 PM
To: Garratt, David; 'Edward.J.Hecker@hqO2.usace.army.mil';
'david,garratt@dhs.govq; 'daniel.craig@dhs.govf
Cc: qj~hn.connolly@dhs.gov'
Subject: Re: DOT heading to LA and MS
Correct cell i a I-J but I was redirected as ESP 15. John Comolly is now 1s.
David Fukutomi
Federal Coordinating Officer DHS/FEMA
-------------------------- bb
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
-----Original Message-----
; 'david.garratt@dhs.gov'
ovl <daniel.craig@dhs.gov>
CC: Fukutomi, David <David.Rrkutomi@fema.gov>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 13:50:29 2005
Subject: Re: DOT heading to LA and MS
Davidqs cell is:
EXHIBIT 101
Federal Times Page 1 of 2
Hike,
Check out below -
- --
(Brooks, I thought the three of us might commiserate)
-----Original Message-----
Prom: Altshuler, Brooks [mailto:Brooks.Altshuler@dhe.gov]
Sent: Sunday, August 28, 2005 8:28 PM
To: lPatrick.Rhode@dha.gov'
Subject: Fw: I I M C )
Importance: High
Thie-ie 86C pushing this. Thie is the job of the long term recovery esf in the nrp and
fema is the lead- Let them play their raindeer games as long as they are not t u d n g
around and tasking-UBwith their stupid questions.
None of them have a clue about emergency rnanagement[or,econdc impacts for that mqttef
--------------------------
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Iiandheld
-----Original Message-----
From: Lowder, Michael ~Hichael.Lowderb)fema.gov>
To: Rhode, Patrick <Patrick.Rhode@fema.gov>; Heath, ~ichaelcMichael.Heath@fema.gov>;
Altshuler, Brooks <Brooke.Altehuler@fema.gov~; Buikema, Edward <Edward.Buik8ma@fema.gov>;
Burrie, Ken <Ken.Burris@fema.gw>
CC: Sharro, Stephen <Stephen.Sham~fema.gov>
Sent: Sun Aug 28 19:48:21 2005
Subject : IIMG
Patrick,
He said that he wanted to let you b o w , that it waa not to 'get into our knickersn.
EXHIBIT 103
AUGUST 3 1. 2 00 5..
~ --- . -. . -.
. . - . . .
. - - -~ . ..
FLORIDA: In addition.
. .
we have 400 law
REGION 6: Gary?
- 16
cloverleaf, and that mission was-.assigned -to the
information?
confusing
. .-
ED BUIKEMA: ~ h a n k s ,Louisiana.
of Louisiana?
(No response.)
HURRICANE
KATRINA
LESSONS LEARNED
FEBRUARY 2 0 0 6
8"
Office of the Governor of Alabama, "Governor Riley Briefed on State's Hurricane Preparations.:' news release,
August 27, 2005; State of Alabama: Office of the Governor, "Governor Riley Says Supplies Ready to Assist
Hurricane Victims," news release, August 28, 2005.
90
State of Texas, State Operations Center, "Situation Report #8," August 27, 2005.
" Level I operations began at 7:00 A M EDT. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS
SITREP # 4," August 27,2005, 1 I.
"93
Hurricane Katrina DHS Situation Report #4, 27 Aug 05, 1800 hrs.
See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Eniergency Managenient Agency, National Response
Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16.
94
See U.S. Departnient of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Managenient Agency, National Response
Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, I6 - 17.
" See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response
Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005, 16- 18. The figures fbr liters of water, pounds of ice,
and nuniber of MREs and tarps were converted using FEMA conversion factors of 18,000 liters of water, 40,000
pounds of ice, 2,520 tarps, and 21,888 MREs per truckload. FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs, Hurricane Katrina
Response Fact Sheet.
96
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP # 4," August 27, 2005.
97
See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response
Coordination Center, video teleconference, August 27, 2005,22.
" Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, testimony at hearing on the Hurricane Katrina Response in Louisiana, on December 14, 2005, before
the House Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109'" Congress, 2nd
session. See also transcript of August 27,2005, NRCC Video Teleconference. The Emergency Response Team-
National is a national "on-call" team that is ready to deploy to large disasters such as Category 3 or 4 hurricanes.
See also, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SlTREP # 4," August 27, 2005. For
definition of ERT-N, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Managenient Agency. See
also FEMA National Situation Update, August 28, 2005: http://www.fema.gov/e1nanagers/2005/nat082805.shtm.
"Glossary," http://training.fema.gov/EMI WebIlSlis I4/glossary.ht1n#E.
99
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, h'ationcil Re.sponse Plan (Washington, DC, December 2004), 40.
See also Dan Bement, "FEMA Operations," prepared for the U.S. Departnient of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, http://www.fiwa.dot.gov/~nodiv/fe~na.ht~n.
100
U.S. Department of Defense, "Hurricane Katrina Timeline," August 29, 2005..
101
U.S. Departnient of Defense, "Hurricane Katrina Timeline," August 29, 2005.
"'101' See U.S. Departnient of Homeland Security, "Hurricane Katrina DHS SITREP #4," August 27, 2005.
The emergency declaration for Mississippi was requested by Governor Barbour on Saturday, August, 27,2005;
the emergency declaration for Alabama was requested by Governor Riley on Sunday, August 28, 2005. Presidential
states of emergency were declared for both States on August 28. 70 Fed. Reg. 53239 (Aug. 28, 2005) (Mississippi);
70 Fed. Reg. 5406 1-62 (Aug. 28.2005) (Alabama).
104
President Bush authorized FEMA ". . . to identify, mobilize, and provide at its discretion, equipment and
resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency" for the parishes of Allen, Avoyelles, Beauregard,
Bienville, Bossier, Caddo, Caldwell, Claiborne, Catahoula, Concordia, De Soto, East Baton Rouge, East Carroll,
East Feliciana. Evangeline. Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lincoln, Livingston, Madison, Morehouse,
Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Ouachita, Rapides, Red River. Richland, Sabine, St. Helena, St. Landry, Tensas,
Union, Vernon, Webster, West Carroll, West Feliciana, and Winn. The White House, "Statement on Emergency
Assistance for Louisiana." news release, August 27. 2005. See also, Robert 1: S/aflord Di.sas/er Relief and
L,'mergency i3ssisiarice Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended ["S/qford.~I~:t"], 5 502(a)(b).
'05 Data on pre-landfall disaster declarations compiled from: Departnlent of Homeland Security, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, "Federally Declared Disasters by Calendar Year," Library,
http://www.fenia.gov/library/drcys.shtm. Hurricane Floyd did not make landfall until 6:30 AM on September 16,
1999, but the storm caused significant coastal damage as it passed offshore Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas; as a
result, President Clinton issued emergency declarations for Florida and Georgia on September 14. He did the same
for the Carolinas the following day. For more information, see: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, "Emergency Aid Ordered For Florida Hurricane Response," news release,
September 14, 1999>11ttp://www.fema.gov/news/11ewsrelease.fe1na?id=8554; U.S. Department of Homeland
Dan,
t
We are getting a lot of questions at high levels about our plans for this event.
I know you are pushing this, but know that you are authorized to do what you have to do to
get this kick started fast.
Thanks -
Patrick
EXHIBIT 107
f * *
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I. Who is Requesting Assistance? (Completed by Reqaeator) . . I?.. .. ;.I' . . .. . . . .. . .
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Requestor Name/TitIe/State:
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This is an issue that is being worked by many in the PEMA Recovery shop - we need to ask
all the Governors and Mayors for their patience as we are trying to make a decision on how
best to be consistant with the approach.
We are working this at the same time that we are still doing evacuations and massive
search and rescue - but no doubt, this interim housing issue is being worked right now as
well -
ae well as FEMA presence at these locations.
Dan - please join in.. ... ... . .
thanks
-----Original Message-----
Prom: Boudreaux, Chad [mailto:Chad.Boudreaux@dhs.govl
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 5:30 PM
To : HSOC .FEMA
Cc: McKennis, Amy; Wood, John (COS); Rhode, Patrick
Subject: FW: Cong. DeLay requests related to Houston
I just spoke with John Murray about this in the HSOC. These requests need to be
considered and addressed quickly. If there are some requests that cannot be met, or some
that give us considerable heartburn, please let me know as soon as possible. I need
someone to keep my updated on this as we sort through it.
Thanks.
Chad.Boudreaw
Deputy Chief. of Staff
Department of Homeland Security
4 "
- - - - -Original Message-----
From: McKennis, Amy
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 12-31 PM
TO: Wood, John ( C O S ) ; 'Matt.MayerBdhs.gavs; Filler, Joshua; Boudreaw, Chad; Stephan, Bob
Subject: Fw: Cong. DeLay requests related to Houston
Guys-
Wanted to pass this on...can you guys help me develop a response for each of these that I
can either call or email back as soon as possible.
Thank you !
-a
You can reach me on cell if need be---
-
----- Original Messaae-----
From: James, David -- d -
..
COL. JEFF SMITH: -- we don't know what kind
of planes are coming in. In order to plan this thing.
I
that.
8/30/2005 Russia Minister Sergey Shoygu, One 11-76 airplane with two light OIA in process of drafting thank you
First Deputy Minister Yuriy Vorobiev, helicopters (Bo-105 and Bk-115), a letter
and Deputy Minister Brazhnikov Land Rover Rescue vehicle, two
Alexey Avdeev, EMERCOM, helicopter crews, 5 rescuers and 2
avdeevBmchs.gov.ru fax number is dogs onboard is ready to leave for
t 7 095 445 50 46, e-mail: the USA at a short notice to support
avdeevB mchs.gov.ru. your search and rescue efforts in the
affected region.
8/30/2005 Japan Tsuyoshi Kurokawa Providing necessary resources, such OIA drafted letter to Kurokawa
First Secretary, Economic Section, as tents, blankets, generators, and thanking him. Keeping offer on hand. I
Embassy of Japan so on, if they are needed. Can fax
2520 Massachusetts Avenue, NW the list of available resources from
Washington. DC 20008 their Florida storehouse
TEL:(202)238-6717
FAX:(202)265-9473
E-mail:tkurokawaBembjapan.org
(Main)
tsuyoshi.kurokawaBmofa.go.jp
8/29/2005 Canada Keith Dejaegher London Search And Rescue (LSAR) Emailed a thank you. Will keep offer
London Search And Rescue out of London, Ontario, Canada, on hand.
E-mail: offers 35 members to pull from of
fully trained, uniformed, professional
and certified members in search and
Superintendent, Henry Klausnitzer, 1- rescue team, with specifically aimed
(519)-951-0578. Call-Out training geared for urban searches.
Coordinator is Kyle MacKay, 1-(519)- Access to equipment and resources.
668-7691. Our "duty cell phone" at 1- Overseen and governed by the
(519)-668-4319. Also, the main London-Middlesex Corps. of the St.
group of contact if calling for our John Ambulance Brigade, a similar
assistance would be the council of organization to Red Cross, who also .
.
8/29/2005 France French via the US Embassy in Paris. Offers fire brigade and two NGOs to Sent letter of thanks to French. Will
help Louisiana keep offer on hand
812912005 Honduras David Hernandez at the Honduran Offered assistance in response to Expressed appreciation but said that
Embassy in Washington, DC called the hurricane. there were no outstanding needs
on behalf of the President of that were not being met at this point.
- Honduras and the Ambassador of
-- -- Honduras. 2021966-9750 or the
Ambassador can be reached at
2021966-2604,
813012005 NATOIEADRCC lstvan Erdos, 01 1-322-707-2674; The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Advised that we will keep the offer
official request would be delivered Coordination Center at NATO has on hand and will provide updates as
via DHSIFEMAINATO offered to identify potential countries expected through normal NATO Civil
that might have any outstanding Emergency Planning channels.
resource requirements that FEMA
has for the response and recovery to
Katrina. 1
813012005 Canada Jim & Joyce Crouch at the Inn on Offer room and board to six Sent letter of appreciation and to the
Frederick in St. Andrews NB. 1-877- individuals for at least one month at donation desk.
895-4400 or email: no cost to the victim.
reservations8 innonfrederick.ca
--
813012005 Canada Frank Smith and Barry Downing at Offer bed, blankets, general medical Sent letter of appreciation, response
the Canadian National Emergency supplies (bandages, tapes, etc), to HHS.
Stockpile System. Email addresses: mobile hospital or mini clinics,
Frank-Smith@ hc-sc.gc.ca and trauma kits, water pill purifiers, etc.
Barrie-Downing 8 phac-aspc.gc.ca.
Mr. Smith's v, Mobile
Mr. Downing's
0-! Mobile
. .
813012005 Canada -r
Paul, Canadian who wishes to help with Emailed a thank you. Putting into
temporary housing for those with no Donations Desk
place to go I may be in a position to
find several families willing to offer
temporary homes here in Sudbury
Ontario Canada.
813112005 Venezuala POC: Anna Gabriela Ruiz, 58-416- Venezuela National Direction of Civil Called and lefl message. Will follow
712-5708 Protection and Disaster Management up when address is provided.
would like to offer help in response to
the hurricanes. Would like a briefing
on the situation.
813112005 Canada DCM John Dickson in Ottawa DCM John Dickson in Ottawaon the '~usnitz,Len
DepPM McLellan Canadian offer.
Ontario Premier McGinty DepPM McLellan has called
Secretary Chertoff offering
assistance and Ontario Premier
McGinty (at his initiative) will be
speaking with Amb Wilkins at 12:15
today on the same subject. --
McGuinty called and issued a press
release at the same time. His offer:
hydro (electricity) crews ready to go
at any time. Mobile hospital ready to
go. -- Air Canada CEO called Amb
offering free transport for people and I
supplies to Houston, Atlanta, Dallas.
They also would make their cargo
facilities in those cities available.
813112005 Germany Christopher Buck, Poloff, AMEMB KB lmpuls Service GmbH offers
Berlin 01 1-49-30-8305-0 containerized emergency cell phone
and internet satellite network
communications suite with two
techinicians to assist with relief
operations. Company's CEO is
Detlef Drews - 01 1-49-172-378-4870
or 01 1-49-373-814-3200
8/3112005 Venezuala Civil Protection and Disaster Offers assistance Venezuela National Direction of Civil
Management, POC: Anna Gabriela Protection and Disaster
Ruiz, 58-416-712-5708 Management would like to offer help
in response to the hurricanes.
Would like a briefing on the
situation. POC: Anna Gabriela Ruiz,
584&7l2~5708 -
8/30/2005 Venezuela Office of the President They wanted to offer assistance State informed the desk, also gave
directly to Louisiana Governor contact number for Louisiana
Blanco Governor to the President's Office
8/31/2005 Jamaica Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted Jamaica has limited resources but Cliff Tighe
US Embassy in Kingston could provide bottled water, canned Charge
goods, or whatever else is Embassy Kingston and
appropriate Sanders, Robert P
8/3112005 Netherlands Geert Visser, Consul, Houston, Wants to know if Dutch companies
Texas, 713-622-8023 can assist local aufhor~ties
8/31I2005 Belgium Bart Hendrix, 202-333-6900 Unofficial call from interested citizen
Flemish Section at Belgian Embassy passing on info on the Belgian
expertise in pumping systems. If can
-- help, Belgians need request from
-- USG
813 112005 Org of American Call from Dan Sento from Amb. Dan Sento from Amb.
States (OAS) Masto's Office at State Dept. Masto's Office at State, the
Needed guidance on how OAS can Permanent Rep to Org of
-
give $25,000 as symbolic American States (OAS)
contribution.
9/1/2005 Israel Shlomi Kofman Israeli govt offers all and any took Call- Thanked - will follow up
Director of Amb Office assistance. Just need clarification on with letter
202-364-5591 what resources. E.g. Field Hospitals,
etc I
202-364-5560 (fax)
Israeli Embassy
91112005 Australia Matthew Smith and Trevor Jenner, Matthew Smith and Trevor Jenner,
Australian Emergency Mgmt Agency. Australian Emergency Mgmt Agency,
Their Ops Center number is: 01 1-61-with offer of assistance ref Hurricane
2-62564644 and email is Katrina. NRCC advised that yours
ema.nemccQ ema.gov.au would be the appropriate office to
respond. Their Ops Center number
is: 01 1-61-2-62564644 and email is
ema.nemcc8ema.gov.au
I )<now you're swamped, but wanted you to be aware of an effort that has been undertaken by A1 Martinez-Forits
-
(through the Private Sector Office) and HSIN-CI (Homeland Security Information Nebork Critical InfraStrU~ture)
to Get support from the private sector in the relief effort. Close to 150 companies have already responded (list '
attached) to a request to list resources they can provide; and the number of companies grows by the hour.
At this point, they need coordination from FEMA andlor the Red Cross to assign the resources. you, Or
someone on your staff, could identify someone that could work with the CI National Program Office, training
could be set up on .the use of the HSIN-CI Network.
-
Please let me know if I can help set this up.
. .
Candv
.. -. ..... .. .. . .. -
From:
Sent:
~artinez-~onts,
Al
~hursday,September 01, 2005 3 5 5 PM
2.
'-
To:
Cc: Musgrave, Curt;
Molly
'
Lokey. William; Harrington, Richard
- --
,raig, Daniel; Plehal, James; Doan, Douglas; Walsh,
Chuck P~wers,~Director of Water Resources, at Flowserve has contacted me with an offerfor help. Flowserve is
the largest pump company in the world, according to Chuck, based in Dallas. They are the people that sold and
installed over 50% of the pumping capacity in New Orleans. They have a field officelservice center in Baton
Rouge with over 200 people ready to go in and repair the pumps in NO once the levees have been repaired.
They have many pumps and spare part on han! to help with other jobs. He wants to help but needs direction.
,
.. &--.-
Could someonereach out to him at 4-Ir: a i 410 756-3267 office.
My office, the Private Sector Office at DHS, has been helping FEMA by gathering contributions and items for 'sale
to be used in the Katrina disaster recovery. The information id being gathered at www.swern.com . Affer
spending a good part of the morning at FEMA HQ, we realize we need to make some contacts in the field with
both FEMA and state avthotities. I would appreciate it ifone of you could contact me at the numbers below to
dlscuss how we can be of service. As of a couple of hours ago we had over 1500 offers.
Thank you,
Al.
From: Martinez-Fonts, Al [-
Sent: Thursday. September 01,2005 6:08 PM
To: , ,Rhode. Patrick; Altshuler, Brooks; Craig. Daniel; Michael Hirsch .
Cc: Satar, Abdul; Plehal. James; Doan, Douglas; Walsh. Molly; Riordan, Tara; Rudd, Janey; Gonzalez,
Joanna
Subject: FW: Press Release - DOING BUSINESS WITH FEMA DURING M E HURRICANE KATRINA
RECOVERY P
We have just received the attitched press release. Iam extrbrnely disappointed that after spending 2 hours this
.morningon www.swern.aov as a tool t o assisl FEMA that there was no mention of it in this press release.
3
Cc: arti ink-hn&, Al +
Subject: RE: Press Release - DOING BUSINESS W'IlH FEMA DURING M E HURRICANE KATRINA RECOVERY
Joanna Gooralcz
Assistant P ~ s Sccrctary
s and Hispanic Spokesperson
U S. Dcpacttncnt of Homeland Security
202-282-8010 Pcrss Office
202-282-8169Direct Line
'7- Cellular Phone
Can you please call me when you have a minute (unfortunately, your number is not listed in the DHS
eDirectory)?
-- --
From: Gonzalez, Joanna
Sent: Thursday, September 01,2005 5:35 PM
To: Martinez-fonts, Al; Riordan, Tara
-
Subject: W: Press Release DOING BUSINESS WITH FEMA DURING M E HURRICANE KATRINA RECOVERY
EXHIBIT 114
CDC - CCHIS - Daily Update on CDC's Response to Hurricane Katrina - September 6 , 2 ... Page 1 of 4
medical resupply to affected evacuation centers is a priority. CDC is helping with mosquito H-qw to Get HH_~
states from the Strategic control strategies.
National Stockpile, and health
Note: Information
assessments. National Public Health Emergency Situation Update dispatch is time SI
CDC's public health experts information is evo
deployed to states are Persons i n Evacuation Centers: 229,000 people Prepared by the (
reporting cases of acute across IIstates Disease Control E
gastroenteritis among Lives saved b y USCG: 22,800 Prevention's Eme
persons being housed in Citizens evacuated: 273,000 Communication S
evacuation centers, including Relief supplies: 8.5 million MREs, 15 million liters of Comments to:
Noro virus. Noro virus causes water, 100 tons first aid supplies ECSKATUPDATE
diarrheal disease, which may Damage assessments: .98 million (1.25 million without .............................
include nausea and vomiting. power 915)
lnfection control includes Official death numbers: AL 2, FL 11, MS 162, LA X.
vigorous and consistent hand Total: 175
washing.
CDC is working with local and state public health officials and
clinicians in shelters to conduct rapid disease detection and
ongoing disease surveillance.
CDC Response
Today's Snapshot
CDC has sent 3,500 beds and critical medications including for
conditions such as diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure,
pain, anxiety, and diarrhea to the affected areas. Many of the basic
pharmaceuticals were in place within hours of the hurricane's
passage.
CDC Grant Funds: CDC has posted guidance to its State Health
Department grantees about use of CDC grant funds in response to
hurricane Katrina.
w.bt.cdc.qov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/~df/
grantuse.~df
1
News Release
I, -* . -...
~ o m e i a n dSecurity Activates Business Donation Site for Katrina Victims
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, today, activated its National
Emergency Resource Registry through the Federal Emergency Managembt Agency. The activation is
in response to the outpouring of support offered by generous businesses nationwide.
'Welre e~~ @Xed at the number of businesses which have called, written, emailed and '
even visited offering their support and equipma" said Michael D. Brown, Under Secretary of
Homeland S&ty for EH1agency Preparedness and Response and head of the Fedaal Emergency
Management Agency. 'l3ui we deed to coordinateall of these donations so we can get @em to the
people who need them most"
The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) mes as the nation's nerve center for info~snation
sharing and domestic incident managqenL At the reqnest of tfie HSOC - the Nationai Emergency
&source Registry (NERR) has been activated
The NERR stands ready to assist the coordination efforts between fhe resources that are needed and the
resources that may be available h r n the private and public sectors. If you or your organization /
agency 1corporation have resqurces that may be made available to the response agencies,please list
them in this Resource Registry.
For more infbwtion or to register your product or service, visit b@s~/www.fmqov/and click on
''Help The Victims of Hurricane Rgtrina - Register Your Business To Provide Relief.".
PEMA p r q m s the nation for all hazards and manages federal response and recovery efforts following any
national incident FEMA also initiates mitigation activities, trains first responders, works with state and local
emergency managers, and manages the National Flmd bisminc~Program and the U.S. Fire A d m i n i ~ o n .
FEMA be- part of the U.S.Department of Homeland S d t y on March 1,2003.
EXHIBIT 116
uttcrcrs 01qulpmenr ana servlces Page 1 of 2
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Critz, Mark .I-
-
Wednesday. September 07,2005 5:27 Plbl
.'~rown,Michael D'
'Bud Mertz
Subject: RE: Offerers or equipment and se'rvices
w
A-
*-.>
f.$35.,.,+
X?
Thank you for your response and any help we can offer is at the ready. Take care.
Mark S. Critz
Office of Congressman John P. Murtha
P.O. BOX780 : :
-- --
--
Johnstown, PA 15907
(814) 535-2642
(814) 539-6229 fax -
Mark and Bud, thanks for this info. I am copying this email to my Deputy PFO here and some folks at HQ
to see if we can plug these people into the various missions here. Thanks for bringing thisto5myattention.
Guys, please look this list overand see ifwe can utilize any ofthese services/facilities. Please::letine ': ' ;. :
know. . ., ! . : .
<
MB'
We've.received a multitude of offers of help for the Katrina victims and they are frustrated at every turn. On
the advice of PA DHS, I am sendingyou some of the more significant items along and copying PA DHS on
thisnote.
HOUSING:
Purchased and is developing the Waynesburg State Correctional Institution in Greene County in SW
Pennsylvania. It is currently vacant and available for up to 400 people. Some dorm style and bungalow
Offerers of equipment and services
-
housing for large families if necessary.
Casey Harper.
/
6 . -
- .
- .
.-
Page 2 of 2
-
Owns and operates Casey's RV Center with approx. 110 campers and RVs available immediately for
. .
temporary housing i f needed.
CLEAN UP:
- 6
Joseph Eori.
BIG'STrucking has 19 roll-off trucks, 100 forty & fifty cubic yard boxes, tri-axle dump trucks and misc.
equipment available. He also has 4 barges with cranes. He also is in possession of several campers for
temporary housing if needed. His information was sent to the US Army Corps but oas not heard anything.
- -
Janet ~(lijan
4
Turjan Constr. was the general contractor that supervised cleanup here in Johnstown during our 1977
.. --
flood. Many of those employees/supervisors are still part of the team and may bring some expertise to the
situation. Are registered with CCR and registered online at the FEMA website.
These four stood out as items that could be very helpful to the cause and are ready immediately for ,.
deployment. Thank you.
Mark S. Critz
Office of Congressman John P. ~ u r t h a
.. . ..
'P.0. BO,X780 . .,
:...... . . '. ..
. .
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,
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'..',.. .:.z, : <<
(814)539-6229 fax
c.7 . . . .. . . . . . . . ..
. ,
.
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........
r 131
1% '.
bi
.-
that means is that I want you guys to lean forward as
it's going to. And I know all of you can do it, and I
can do it .
23
-
EXHIBIT 117
AUGUST 27, 2005
.. ..
might think when you see that that means we have more
-
- confidence in it. M? experience has been tha.t there's
side of the storm, get the high surge and the high
Max Stier, president of the Partnership for Public Service, said these rankir
provide measuring tools for agencies. He said the government needs to
understand what employees think about their work environments. Employ(
A plocc tn sl~nrc,rlchalc, discuss satisfaction is a main element of attracting and retaining talent.
The purpose of the data is to help managers understand what factors they
focus on t o make their employees more committed, Stier said.
"I'm very pleased that NASA ranks number one in the first-ever federal
employee rankings of the best places t o work in the federal government," :
NASA Administrator Sean OIKeefe.
Federal Daily > Young Feds > New Site Ranks Agency Satisfaction With Agencies Page 2 of 2
I n 2002, the federal government, the nation's largest employer, hired over
143,000 new employees. Over 80 percent of federal jobs are outside of
Washington.
The Department of Homeland Security was not included in the survey beca
it was not yet in place.
Home ( Subscriber Sign I n I Catalog I Financial Planning & Retirement I l o b s &Careers I Labor & Management ( Pay & Benefits ( Polic~es&
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Copyright O 2007 by Federal Employees News Digest, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or m e d ~ u mwithout expressed written permission
by Federal Employees News Digest, Inc. is prohibited.
EXHIBIT 119
Page 1 of 2
chatterbox
Low Morale at Homeland Security
Only the Small Business Administration has unhappier employees.
By Timothy Noah
Posted Wednesday, Sept. 14,2005, at 5:34 PM ET
The Partnership for Public Service, a nonpartisan nonprofit group that monitors the federal workforce,
has released a survey ranking government agencies according to employee satisfaction. Guess where the
Department of Homeland Security ranks? It's number 29 out of 30. These are the people who are
supposed to prevent the next 911 1 and who botched the New Orleans flood. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is folded into Homeland Security, and many people attribute its decline
to that fact (though it's worth noting that in a similar survey conducted just before Homeland Security
swallowed it up, FEMA ranked dead last). The only agency of the federal government with a more
demoralized workforce than Homeland Security is the Small Business Administration, a notorious
turkey farm that should have been abolished years ago.
Employee satisfaction isn't the be-all and end-all of excellence. If it were, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, which nearly blew up the last space shuttle because of the same proble~nivith
ii~sulatingfoam that blew up the previous one, wouldn't have placed sixth. But if not sufJicient to
guarantee excellence, decent morale would seem at least necessary as a precondition to success for any
enterprise dependent on skilled labor. Yet Homeland Security isn't even as much f i n to work for as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the government agency that insures your bank deposits up to
$100,000.
Homeland Security ranked 29th in the matching of employee skills to the agency mission, in
"teamwork," and in "effective leadership." The only areas in which it did not rank 29th were "training
and development" (26th) and "family-friendly culture and benefits" (28'4. It gets even more depressing
when you look at the raw data for the survey, which was collected by the Office of Personnel
Management (the federal government's "human resources" shop). Protecting citizens of the United
States against acts of terrorism and natural disasters ought to make you feel pretty good about yourself,
no? Yet only 20percent of Homeland Security respondents strongly agreed with the statement, "My
work gives me a feeling of personal accomplishment." That's against 29 percent at the Department of
Energy, another federal agency with no particular reason for existing, and 27 percent at the
Environmental Protection Agency, which routinely gets bossed around these days by political hacks in
the White House.
"Overall, how good a job do you feel is being done by your immediate supervisor/team leader?" At
Homeland Security, fully 6 percent ranked their bosses "very poor." Compare that to 4 percent at the
General Services Administration, the most boring agency in the federal government (basically, it's the
office-supplies and real estate shop).
"How would you rate the overall quality of work done by your workgroup?" At Homeland Security, 29
percent said "very good," compared to 39 percent at the Commerce department, where, excepting the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, it doesn't much matter whether the overall quality of
work is good or bad. At the Department of Housing and Urban Development, perpetually one of the
worst-managed federal agencies, 34 percent of all employees rate the quality of their workgroup "very
good." Indeed, no agency of the federal government scored fewer "very goods" than Homeland Security
Print Page 2 of 2
on this question. Even the Small Business Administration scored a comparatively respectable 38
percent.
You want to know the most depressing thing of all? None of this is news! So many newspaper articles
have been written about disorganization and incompetence at the Department of Homeland Security that
a IP~rshing/onPosl sto~j!on the rankings (page A29) made the White House budget office, which placed
first, the story's lead. Homeland Security wasn't mentioned until the story's penultimate paragraph. The
people tasked with saving your life hate their jobs? Well, duh!
I never got one - I think Brown got my copy - did you get one?
EXHIBIT 121
From: Rhode, Patrick
, Sent: Thursday. September 01.2005 9:21 AM
i To: 'SC&.Morris@dhs.gov'; 'Edward.Buikerna&dhs.gov'; 'Michael.Lowder@dhs.goV
. Cc: 'Ken.Bums@dhs.gov; 'Michael-FCO.Hall@dhs.govl; 'BrooksAltshuler@dhs.gov';
'Michael.Heath1@dhs.goV
Subject: Re: Deployments.
This is bs - either folks step up now or they will be dissasociated with fema -
-----Original Message-----
From: Morris, Scott <Scott.Morris@dhs.gw>
To: Buikema, Edward cEdward.Buikema@dhs.gov>; Lowder, Michael cMichael-Lowder@dhs.gov>
CC: Burris, Ken <Ken.Burrismlhs.govs; 'Michael-FCO.Hall@dhs.gov' <Michael-
FCO.Hall@dhs.gov>; Altshuler, Brooks < B r o o k s . A l t s h u l e ~ d h s . g o v > ; lMichael.Heathl@dhs.g~~'
<Michael.Heathl@dhs.gov>
Sent: Thu Sep 0 1 0Yr15:09 2005
Subject: Deployments.
to date we have only rec'd in Orlando and in - processed 299 dae's. To
date we have only recld requests fr field for 79 bodies ( 5 6 Ms, 19 la and 4
Al) And all of these have been deployed to requested destinations.
We need to start identifying pockets of bodies and seniiing them through Orlando so we Can
get them in field upon requests.