On Certainty Essay 1

In the following essay I shall be trying to analyzing four passages from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.

This book was the last to be written by Wittgenstein, with the last entry being written two days

before his death, it comprises of all what Wittgenstein wrote in relation to G.E Moore’s A Defence

of Common Sense, in which Moore tries to dismiss skepticism by claiming that there are certain

things in the world which we know for certain and what Wittgenstein thought on certainty and

knowledge. While Wittgenstein is trying to defeat the skeptical argument just like Moore is, who

believed that the skeptical doubt was a practical doubt which needing a practical answer, he

thought that the skeptics would not be satisfied with Moore response because there is still a further

doubt beneath the practical one (OC §19).

‘But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I
am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true
and false.’ (OC §94)’

In the first passage Wittgenstein talks about how we formulate our world-view or Weltbild, he states

that we do not formulate our view with facts that we have proven to be true or even facts that we

have be shown to be true but instead our world-view is made out of the experiences that we

receive and information that we receive from other people. This world-view that we attain is not

something we actively create but instead is inherited from our parents or other authoritative adults,

and it is this picture of the world which we ultimately use it to differentiate between what is true and

false. It is only in this world-view can we assert and doubt things for example I can think of a way in

which I can test whether or not there oxygen on the moon, but the only reason I can assert or

doubt whether there is or not is because I already assumed lots of other propositions first; what the

moon was, whether the machine that tests for oxygen works, and so on.

‘The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like
that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.’
(OC §95)’

In the second passage Wittgenstein describes this world-picture as ‘a kind of mythology’.

Now Wittgenstein uses the term mythology to represent statements that the earlier

Wittgenstein would have labeled as nonsense, but he no longer sees them as that due to
the fact that this ‘mythology’ refers to everyday activities rather than unknowable

transcendence. He also points out that the mythology is not permanent fixed by the logic of

language but instead can change over time.1 The second part of the passage refers to this

mythology like a game which people ‘play’ by communicating, and it mentions the fact that

people can learn the rules to this game purely practically without learning any explicit

rules. This means that we learn most of our survival, coping skills and rules of language

without being taught specific rules but rather, we watch, we copy and then we are

rewarded and so we conform to those rules without truly understanding them, for example

when a child first begins to talk they do not know all the rules of the language but they

learn how to communicate by repeating what their parents and other people say in certain

circumstances.

‘It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and
functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation
altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. (OC §96)’

In this passage Wittgenstein is suggesting that certain propositions are like foundations on

which the rest of our propositions rely on in order to make sense of the world. Without

these ‘hard’ propositions our language-games could not work, they are like the hinges on a

door, in so far as the hinges on a door must be secure in place for the door to open or

close, and this is the same for language-games, certain propositions must be held to be

certain in order for the rest to be work. But this does not mean that these propositions are

certain and cannot be doubted, for example the question ‘do I have a hand?’, would be

nonsense in Wittgenstein’s eyes in normal conditions, I.e. when a you are in a room where

you can clearly see and feel your hand, because in order to doubt whether or not you have

a hand you would have to doubt so much which you take for granted it would nearly

getting rid of you entire world-view. Although if someone were to be in an accident and

woke up afterward and couldn’t feel his hands, the question ‘do I have a hand?’ begins to

1 J.F. Dienstag, Wittgenstein among the Savages: Language, Action and Political Theory, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 4
(Summer, 1998), p591
make sense. The question ‘do I have a hand?’ does not change itself but the way in which

we see the question changes, for Wittgenstein its seems that while there are things that

should not be doubted normally, it is all about the context of how you apply the

propositions. (PI II xii) Wittgenstein’s examples are perfect to show this due to the fact that

now we don’t ‘hold fast’ the hinge propositions which Wittgenstein held; ’I was born’ with

technology today we can recreate baby’s in test tubes. This adds verisimilitude to

Wittgenstein’s theory that ‘hinge’ or ‘hardened’ propositions, which a group of people who

all use a certain language game accept, can soften or soften and disappear over time.

‘The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish
between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a
sharp division of the one from the other. (OC §97)’

In this passage Wittgenstein compares the propositions talked about in §96 to that of a

riverbed, the hardened propositions are like the riverbed, which must stay in place for the

river to flow, and must remain in order for language to work and continue. He goes on to

mention that there is a distinction between hardened propositions, the riverbed, and fluid

propositions, the waters of the river, but he points out that the distinction while not ‘sharp’

mustn’t be ignored, we should not think of empirical and logical propositions as the same

thing. One reason why this is a good analogy to the way in which we conceptualize our

world-view, is the fact that a river is constantly moving, and unlike a metaphor of a house

with foundations, the once ‘hardened’ or ‘hinge’ propositions can become fluid and the

river can keep flowing while a structure build upon foundations, which are later shown to

not be certain, would be unstable and collapse when attempting to build upon it.

Now that I have outlined what I believe Wittgenstein was trying to say in those four

passages I will now discuss the implications that his view have on the skeptical argument

and if he has succeed where he believed Moore failed. The main argument that the

skeptics use is the fact that the only thing we can know for certain is Descartes’ ‘I think

therefore I am’, and Moore replied with saying that we can know a number of things e.g.

’Here is one hand, and here is another.’ ’The earth existed for a long time before my birth’
and ’I have never been far from the earth’s surface’. Now I believe that Wittgenstein’s

response to these claims, by stating that the skeptics are misusing language and doubting

things which cannot be doubted in our world-view is correct. It can be said that he is

applied a skeptical attitude to skepticism2 by claiming that there is doubt in the question of

doubt, by saying that you couldn’t prove or disprove skeptical questions about things which

we hold to be true without calling into question most of our world-view which would include

the ’hinge’ propositions which allow language-games to work in the first place. This

criticism which Wittgenstein deals to the skeptic he also deals to Moore in his response to

the skeptic, he claims that when Moore states he’s knows something he should in fact

states in ‘stands fast’ for me due to the fact that while we all hold what Moore claims to

know to be certain, this certainty is not a certainty which we can claim to know but it fact

believe because of our world-view, and to claim to know them is to speak nonsense.

Wittgenstein here is drawing a distinction between knowledge and certainty and stating

that things we hold to be certain are not necessarily things which we can claim to know.

A criticism of Wittgenstein approach to skepticism comes from John W. Cook in his paper

‘Notes on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty’ in which he claims Wittgenstein has wrongly

criticized Moore and his has not thought his examples out thoroughly enough and if he had

he would have realized that they don’t work as examples of what Wittgenstein was trying

to say. Cook gives (OC §464) as an example of this, which claiming that saying ’Good

Morning’ in the middle of a conversion would be meaningless, as in you wouldn’t

understand what the person meant if they did that. Now Cook goes on to say that

Wittgenstein has not gave us enough of a hypothetical situation do illustrate his point, due

to the fact that Cooke can think of at least two example where if someone did say Good

Morning in the middle of a conversion it wouldn’t be meaningless. The first is if two

business men meet in a corridor of their office and without notice start to talk business and

2 Michael Kober, ‘Certainties of a world-picture: The epistemological investigations of On Certainty’ , The Cambridge
Companion Guide to Wittgenstein (2006), p410-441
then after five minutes one realizes they haven’t said Good Morning yet and say it to the

other, the another example is if someone is hypnotized and commanded to say Good

Morning on a certain cue, the person is then awoken and does not remember what has

happened to them. They then begin to talk to somebody and the signal to cause them to

say Good Morning goes off and they say Good Morning in the middle of the conversion.3

Now Cooke claims that because you can think of a situation where certain phrase are not

meaningless this means that Wittgenstein theory of certainty can not be true. Another

claim that Cook makes about Wittgenstein is that he implies that he still holds the

propositional view, which claims that any well formed sentence said to another who speaks

the same language can be seen as a proposition which can be tested against the world to

see if its true.

‘I think, support the claim that Wittgenstein remained throughout a tireless opponent of the propositional view. They
cannot support such a claim because the evidence is overwhelmingly against it.’4

A response to Cook criticism comes from Wittgenstein friend Normal Malcolm in his paper

‘Misunderstanding Wittgenstein’ which he points that On Certainty was a collection of

Wittgenstein’s notes which he did not think were going to be published and if Wittgenstein

would have wanted he could have supplied Cook with a suitable example. He also rejects

Cook’s claim that Wittgenstein held the propositional view but stating that ever since

‘Philosophical Investigations’ Wittgenstein abandoned the proposition view which he held

in the ‘Tractatus’.5

When Wittgenstein’s views in ‘On Certainty’ are looked at, one can see striking

resemblance to W.V Quine views in Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in which he see or

knowledge and belief as a man-made fabric which only at the edges combines with

experience.6 This is very similar to Wittgenstein world-picture view but the two differ when

it comes to foundational propositions, Wittgenstein holds the view that there are some

3 John Cooke, Notes on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty’ Philosophical Investigations 3, no. 4 (Fall 1980) p17
4 Ibid p16
5 Norman Malcolm, ‘Misunderstanding Wittgenstein‘ Philosophical Investigations 4 (2) (1981)
6 W.V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ in From a Logical Point of View, New York, 1961 p42
propositions which form hinge propositions on which language is built upon, while Quine

believes that because of the indeterminacy of translation talk of propositions was

meaningless and propositions should be replaced with sentences.

One way in which Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ seems to be the more appealing theory is

the fact that he believes there are logical and rational reasons to choose ones world-view or fabric

of reality through the scientific method or through logic. While Wittgenstein doesn’t belief we can

choose our world-view as we inherit it from the language games we play.

To conclude with I believe that Wittgenstein’s view of certainty is correct, there are

propositions that we hold to be certain and we don’t hold these certainties because we

have proved them or seen them be proved, but because we need them in order for

language to flow and operate in the world. These certainties do not have the attributes of

certainty that die hard skeptics need but as Wittgenstein points out these skeptics are

misusing the language-game and asking questions which don’t conform to our world-view,

and just because we cannot say we know something it doesn’t mean we cannot say

certain things are certain for us.

 Bibliography

Wittgenstein, L, ‘On Certainty‘. Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von

Wright, trans. G. E. M.Anscombe and D. Paul. Oxford: Basil
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‘Philosophical Investigations. Eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and R.

Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953;
2nd ed.,1953; 3rd ed., (1973)

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C. K. Ogden. London:

Routledge, 1922. Trans. D. F. Pears and B. McGuinness.
London: Routledge, (1961)

The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958; 2nd

,(1960).

Malcolm N, ‘Misunderstanding Wittgenstein‘ Philosophical Investigations 4 (2)

(1981)

Cooke, J ‘Notes on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty’ Philosophical Investigations 3,

no. 4 (Fall 1980)

Dienstag, J.F. ‘Wittgenstein among the Savages: Language, Action and Political

Theory‘, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Summer, 1998), 15-37

Kober, M ‘Certainties of a world-picture: The epistemological

investigations of On Certainty’ , The Cambridge Companion

Guide to Wittgenstein (2006), p410-441