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Country Profile of
Conventional and Renewable Energies:

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Last updated on 29/09/06

Prepared by

Maria-Evangelia Kaninia
Intern from August to …, 2006

For the

Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Statistics Division
Energy Statistics Section
United Nations, New York
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1 Executive summary
Afghanistan scores among the last in every development index rating. With a population
of approximately 30 million (rough estimate), the energy sector is hardly able to cover the growing
demand (which is currently very low). A particularity about the country is the dearth of exact data.
The government and the various development agencies that are active in the country have
commissioned various reports within the context of rebuilding the entire economy, but even
recent ones are often contradicting each other.
Currently a large percentage of the population relies on non-commercialized resources
(especially wood fuel, estimated to cover more than 75% of the final energy needs) to cover their
energy needs. Inland production of coal and hydrocarbons has severely declined since its peak in
the eighties. However there are prospects to develop these resources and especially the gas
fields. The supply of petroleum products through importations does not suffice to cover the
demand and is largely unregulated.
The electricity sector depends largely on the abundant hydro resources. The actual
capacity has severely declined and will need (as is scheduled) to be fortified with new hydro and
thermal plants. There are numerous options for the construction of further hydro plants. The
thermal ones will be fueled with gas and will therefore be located between the gas fields and the
major urban load centers.
Since an expansion of the electrical grid to cover the entire country is out of the question
for the medium term (because of the terrain of the country and the distribution of load centers),
small-scale renewable energy projects will be developed to power isolated communities.
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2 Introduction and Overview

2.1 Brief Country Facts
2.1.1 Geographical data

Figure 1 Map of Afghanistan, [CIA]

- Location: Southern Central Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran
- Surface area: 647,500 sq km (according to [CIA]), 652,100 sq km (according to [EIU])
- Terrain / topography: land-locked; mostly mountainous; plains in north and southwest
- Climate: large parts of the country are dry; limited fresh water supply; continental climate,
hot summers and cold winters

2.1.2 Population
- Total population: 31,1m in July 2006 according to [CIA]; 28,5m in July 2004 according to
the State Department ([STA]); 23,8m according to [EIU], which quotes the (Asian
Development Bank, Basic Statistics 2006)1; the [UNCDB] figure agrees with the latter, as
well as the [IMF]; the Central Statistics Office of the country, relying on a 2002 census
gives an estimate of 21,8m for 2002 ([CSO1])
- Growth rate: 2,7%

2.1.3 Political situation ([CIA], [STA], [EIU])

Afghanistan was unified as a country in the 18th century. During the 19th century, which
was marred by the two Anglo-Afghan wars, Afghanistan served as a buffer between the British
and Russian empires. Through these wars were demarcated the present-day borders and was

1
Wikipedia mentions that no systematic census has been held in the country in decades.
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established a British domination over the country’s foreign affairs; independence was won from
notional British control in 1919.
The most peaceful period in Afghanistan’s history lasted until 1973, to be followed by a
military coup. Trying to exploit the mounting disaffection of the population for the regime that was
established with the 1973 coup the People’s Democratic Party seeked Moscow’s support and
initiated a second coup in 1978. The Marxist-style regime and its reform program met with strong
resistance from the Afghan people, since it clashed with their traditions and religious identity.
Conservative rural tribesmen, backed by Pakistan and the US, each for different reasons,
rebelled.
Despite ruthless repression, the Soviet Union could not defeat the mujahideen, but
disunity among the various groups prevented the successful formation of an alternative
government-in-waiting. The Soviet contingents, after having suffered severe losses, were led out
in 1989, while the communist regime collapsed in 1992.
In the game of power between clans and factions that ensued rose the Taliban (hard-line
Islamists), which had arisen to power in the mid nineties. Many Taliban had been educated in
religious institutions in Pakistan and were largely from rural southern Pashtun backgrounds. In
1994, the Taliban developed enough strength to progressively capture large parts of the country,
occupying about 90% of the country by the end of 1998 and imposing a theocratic regime.
Following accusations of providing refuge to terrorist groups, a military campaign was
launched in 2001 by the US and their allies against the Taliban, whose fall was a matter of
months.
After an interim period, the first presidential elections were held in 2004, followed by
elections for the National Assembly in 2005. Despite this progress, the country is far from having
achieved the kind of stability that would attract foreign investors or allow for a rehabilitation of its
infrastructure.

2.1.4 Economical situation ([EIU])2

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries of the world as a result of its tumultuous
history and the fact that it had never developed extended infrastructure but remained relied on
traditional agriculture. The foreign aid trickling into the country is not yet sufficient to reverse the
situation, all the more because the situation is still hazardous.
The main challenge in agriculture, which constitutes the primary sector of the economy,
occupying 80% of the population, is the restriction of poppy cultivation, which currently is
estimated to account for 80% of the world production. The laundering of drug money, for example
through trade in vehicles, distorts other sectors of the nascent economy.
Growth has been high since the fall of the Taliban regime, albeit from a low base and is
projected to increase remain at a rate of above 10% per year for the next years.

2.1.4.1 Vital statistics (see 2)

- GDP (PPP): $21,5b ([CIA] estimation for 2004); of which the foreign aid accounts for a
large percentage; the estimate of the [IMF] for the same year is $27,4b; another IMF
estimate (see [IMFa], section ‘Selected Economic Indicators’) excludes opium-related
activities from the $5,9 figure it provides for 2004/05 (PPP not taken into consideration)
- GDP growth rate: 8% for 2004, 14% for 2005 (estimation provided by the [IMF])
- GDP (PPP) per capita: $800 ([CIA] estimation for 2004); $1158 ([IMF])
- Inflation rate (consumer prices): 16,3% ([CIA] estimation for 2005)
- Main exports: opium, agricultural and artisanal products, gems, mainly to US (26%),
Pakistan (21.5%), India (19%) ([CIA] estimation for 2005)

2
[EIU] stresses the dearth of statistical data and of a standard procedure to record
economic activity. It particularly mentions that official statistics are non-existent since the fall of
the communist regime in 1992.
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- Main imports: the country is not self-sufficient in any sector apart from agricultural
products and has therefore to import everything else, mainly from Pakistan (23.7%), US
(11.7%), India (7.9%), Germany (6.8%), Turkmenistan, Russia, Kenya, Turkey ([CIA]
estimation for 2005)

2.2 Overview of the Energy Sector3

Currently, Afghanistan is trying to reconstruct its energy infrastructure, albeit starting from
a low base. It is estimated that approximately 85% ([EIA]) of the energy needs are covered
through the use of traditional, non-commercial fuels such as wood (75%) or animal dung. There
are resources of hydrocarbons (particularly natural gas), coal and hydropower. Currently the
country has to import all petroleum products it needs, which account for 50% of the commercial
energy, as well as electricity with which it supplements the inland production.

2.2.1 Sector Organisation

[ADBa] explains the structure of the energy sector administration. However, this
information dates from 2003 and it refers to the transitional government that was then in place.
According to this source:
Institutional responsibility for the energy sector is spread over several entities, largely
owned and operated through centralized ministries, with some operational functions delegated to
government enterprises. The ministries with specific responsibilities are the Ministry of Water and
Power (MOWP; electricity supply), Ministry of Mines and Industries (MMI; oil exploration, gas,
coal, and mining), and Ministry of Commerce (oil imports and distribution). The Government acts
as owner, regulator, and policy maker.
Reforms: In December 2004, the newly elected Government created the Ministry of
Energy and Water (MEW) by merging the responsibilities of the Ministry of Water and Power and
some responsibilities of the Ministry of Mines and Industry. MEW is responsible for power, gas,
petroleum, and water resources. In the power sector, MEW controls the operation of several
state-owned enterprises, among which the Afghanistan Electricity Authority (DABM), responsible
for power generation, transmission, and distribution and several “satellite” units or agencies
(responsible for construction or consultancy and closely related to the DABM).
[AISA] (presentation prepared within a state agency in 2006 and therefore expected to be
accurate), mentions that the management of state energy resources –with the exception of hydro
resources- is shared between the following agencies, without specifying the capacities of each:
o Afghan Gas Enterprise
o Northern Coal Department
o Afghanistan Geological Survey
o Oil and Gas Exploration Unit
The clarification of the jurisdiction of the various related ministries and state agencies is
among the priorities of the government. In this context, the regulatory functions have to be
separated from the operative ones, “consistently to international best practice” ([RA04], page 68).
Private sector participation will be encouraged through the development of appropriate legal and
regulatory framework.
Within the context of an inclusive programme towards reviving the entire economy
(“Securing Afghanistan’s future”, described in the Afghan government portal
http://www.af/recosting/index.html), a series of studies concerning the energy sector in particular
has been developed. [R04] (drawn from this source) details a series of modest investments in the
energy sector that the government is progressively bound to undertake (the horizon of the report
is until 2015). The investments pertain to the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure and
equipment, exploration and development of hydrocarbon fields, and construction of pipelines and

3
The most important source of information concerning the energy sector in Afghanistan
is the EIA. It provides a country brief ([EIA]) and detailed time series of data ([EIAa]).
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storage facilities to make the domestically produced as well as the imported commodities
accessible to the population.

2.2.2 Production, trade and consumption of commercial energy

The following table is a compilation of the figures quoted from various sources.
crude oil
2004 (ktoe) coal oil products gas hydro combustible renewable and wastes electricity
indigenous
4 5 6 7 8
production 147.0 0.1 0.0 200.0 195.0 234.0 0.0
9 10
imports 0.0 0.0 224.0 na 0.0 0.0 8.9
exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TPES 147.0 0.1 224.0 200.0 195.0 234.0 8.9
11
electricity plants na 0.0 na -20.0 -195.0 0.0 65.0
12
TFC 147.0 0.1 224.0 200.0 0.0 234.0 73.9
Industry na na na 133.3 0.0 na na
Transport 0.0 na na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other na na na 46.7 0.0 na na
Non-energy use 0.0 na na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 1 Energy Balance Table, draft

2.2.2.1 Solids / Coal

[ADBa] mentions that “the coal reserves are estimated to be 125 million tons, with nine
proven deposits, of which four mines have been harnessed for production”. [AISA], available from
an Afghan state agency, estimate the coal reserves at 130 million tons (2006). On the other hand,
[EIAa] indicates a figure of only 73 million tons in the 2004 International Energy Annual. Either
way the amount is not significant in international scale. The deposits are located between Herat
and Badashkan in the northern part of the country (see Figure 3). [PRIa] also estimates the
reserves at 73 million tons, but it mentions in addition the discovery of additional13 coal
mines/deposits.
The government controls coal production through a state agency, North Coal Enterprise
(NCE). This agency is being forwarded for privatisation, with the support of USAID. The
respective information page provides listings of the existing mines and their condition (see
[PRIa]). According to this source the output in 2004 reached 32,000 tons (the coal mining industry
peaked in 1987 at 165,000 tons, more than five times the current production, and declined
afterwards). However, not all coal deposits are controlled by the government. [USGS] estimates
the total14 current production is 220,000 tons (report published in 2005), which would mean that

4
[USGS]
5
[R04]
6
[R04]
7
assuming 1:3 efficiency (thermal equivalent)
8
according to [WRI]; includes only wood fuel
9
[EIAa]; 960ktoe according to [R04]
10
[ADBc]
11
[EIAa]
12
The actual consumption should be 30% lower in order to adjust for system losses.
13
According to [USGS], the U.S. Geological Survey is conducting a cooperative coal
resource assessment of Afghanistan with the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Industries (MMI). It
characterizes the resources as potentially “abundant”.
14
[USGS] clarifies the distinction between the mines that are controlled by the
government, through the North Coal Enterprise and “small private artisanal mines, often without
government sanction”.
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only 15% of the total production originates in government mines, operated by the NCE or
associated agencies.
Consumption: 34% (11,000 tons) (according to [PRIa]) of the total government-controlled
production in 2004 was consumed by a state-owned industrial customer (cement industry). The
rest of the production is used domestically, either for residential use (both raw and briquette
forms) or other state-owned enterprises. [USGS] mentions that it has also occasionally been used
for electricity production in plants that under normal circumstances burn natural gas.

Figure 2 Coal production timeline (source: [EIA])15

15
The data provided by the EIA collides with [PRIa], since the latter reports exact figures
about a substantial production in 2004. EIA is however the only source that provides time series
of data, showing the decline in output in every energy sector after 2002.
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Figure 3 Locations of coal resources, retrieved from [USGS]

2.2.2.2 Oil16
Much of the crude oil and natural gas resource potential, and all of the known reserves
are in northern Afghanistan, located in parts of two major petroliferous geologic provinces, the
Amu Darya Basin in the western part and the Afghan-Tajik Basin in the eastern part. The area of
the two basins combined encompasses approximately 515,000 square kilometers (200,000
square miles), which means that the exploration undertaken mainly by the USGS will be a long
project.
[EIA] quotes Soviet estimates from the late 1970s that placed Afghanistan's proven and
probable oil and condensate reserves at 95 million barrels (which amounts to less than 10-5 of the
global reserves) of medium quality (102 million barrels according to [AISA]). Oil production has
always been secondary in importance in comparison to natural gas. Minimal quantities (less than
300bbl/d) were produced by local militia in the early nineties. The USGS estimate the resources
at 87 million barrels, while the summary table of the oil fields presented in [RE04], page 7, at 94
million bbl.
The size and quality of the deposits, however, make it questionable whether it is feasible
to establish an oil refinery and use the residual heavy oil for power production ([RE04]).
According to [R04], the current production of oil is a mere 400bbl/d, less than 10% of the
quantity that was consumed in 2004 according to [EIAa].
Petroleum products are imported, mainly from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, with limited
volumes from Turkmenistan and Iran serving regional markets close to the respective borders.

16
The two major petroliferous geologic provinces are the Amu Darya Basin in the
western part and the Afghan-Tajik Basin in the eastern part. The current exploration underway,
which takes place with the collaboration of the US geological institute focuses on these areas.
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Turkmenistan also has a petroleum product storage and distribution facility near the Afghan
border, which supplies northwestern Afghanistan. However, there are restrictions in the supply
system, which is unregulated. This results in the imported oil products being of poor quality.
[EIAa] provides a timeline for domestic oil products consumption (for 2004 it amounted to
4,500 bbl/d or 224,000t for the entire year). [CIA] gives an estimate of 5,000bbl/d for 2003. In
comparison, a quantity of approximately 6400bbl/d is delivered to the US military contingents in
Afghanistan alone (see [DLA], page 6). [R04] (page 20) reports a yearly consumption for 2004 at
960,000t or 19,000bbl/d (more than the quadruple of the [EIAa] estimate)17.
Fuel & Liquid Gas Enterprise (see [PRIb]) (state-owned) operates fuel storage facilities
and over 200 petrol stations around the country. It is not clear whether it controls the monopoly.
However, [R04] reports that “local private sector entrepreneurs supply petroleum products with
minimum government control, monitoring or management”.

oil consumption (source: [EIA])

16.0
14.0

12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0

0.0
80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
oil consumption (000 bbl/d)

Figure 4 Oil consumption timeline, source: [EIAa]

2.2.2.3 Gas
Natural gas is the most important hydrocarbon resource in Afghanistan. The total
reserves are estimated at 1,750Tcf by Oil and Gas and at 3,500Tcf by Cedigaz as of January
2006 (both sources are quoted in [EIAa]). The Afghan state agency for Investment Support (see
[AISA] places the estimate at 4,2Tcf (2006). The [EIA] report mentions that the northern part of
the country alone (North Afghan Platform; southern extension of the rich Amu-Darya Basin) has
5Tcf of reserves (including probable reserves).
Gas fields were first developed by the Soviets in the area surrounding Sheberghan in
northern Afghanistan, close to the border with Turkmenistan. The largest (about 2Tcf) gas field of
Afghanistan, the Khodzha-Gugerdag field, was discovered in 1961 (see [USGSa], page 14).
Other areas of the country have not been extensively explored, but are believed to be limited.
A summary of the gas fields is presented in Table 2, according to which the proved
reserves are about 2Tcf. Further exploration for hydrocarbons will be progressively undertaken,
mainly with the support of US agencies.

17
According to the questionnaire submitted to the UNSTATS ([Q]), the consumption
(equal to the imports) of oil products amounted to 190,000t in 2004, or 3,800bbl/d, which is rather
off-mark.
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Table 2 Gas fields, summary, from [RE04]

[EIAa] provides a timeline for natural gas production since 1980 (see Figure 6). According
to the report published at [EIA] the peak of gas production was reached in 1978 at 140bcf. The
steep decline after the soviet pullout the subsequent Afghan civil war is due to technical problems
which led to wells being shut and the lack of an export market in the former Soviet Union which
absorbed till then the largest part of the production. According to [R04], current (2004) production
is at 7,7bcf, which is less than 10% of the capability of the fields. [Q] provides a 4,4bcf estimate of
the yearly production. In any case, it is much lower than the peak achieved in the eighties. This is
due to “lack of infrastructure facilities for production and transportation of natural gas”, according
to [R04].
The projects to refurbish the existing gas system are closely related to the uses the gas
will be put to. For example, [RE04] mentions that the Asian Development Bank has approved a
loan on $26m for the refurbishment of the existing the gas system near the city of Sheberghan.
The project was to be finalized by mid 2006 so as to ensure the supply of 7bcf per year to a
thermal plant built close to the field (see 2.2.2.4).
Since Afghanistan is located on the route from Central Asian and Iranian supply centers
to Indian and Pakistani markets (see map available at [MD]), several pipeline projects have been
discussed. However, their implementation is dependent upon the security situation in the country.
Centgas (detailed in [EIAb]) is one of these projects, consisting of a pipeline linking Daulatabad
(Turkmenistan) via Herat (Afghanistan) to Multan (Pakistan) with a throughput of 700 Bcf/year at
a cost of $2b. A memorandum of understanding had been signed by Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan in 1997. The project was revived in 2003 (see [ADBb]) without any
significant progress so far.
There are international gas pipelines linking Uzbekistan to Bagram and Turkmenistan to
Shindand, but it is unclear whether they are operational or who controls them. However [EIAa]
data suggest that no gas is currently imported.
Consumption: According to [EIA], the entire quantity of gas that is currently produced is
domestically consumed. Gas is piped to Mazar-i-Sharif through the only (as of June 2004)
operating pipeline or to industries located around the production sites. About 50% of the quantity
produced is consumed at the fertilizer plant, which also includes a 48MW electricity generation
plant (of which 16MW are intended for own use; see footnote 20). The rest is consumed locally
for various uses (see Figure 5; the data from this report does not take into account the losses
which are bound to incur; it is mentioned that there are severe leakages which reach –together
with theft- even 30%). The consumption for residential use, 23% of the total, corresponds to an
estimated 7,8% of the households of the country.
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gas consumption (bcf, 2004) (source: [R04])

residential, 1.79,
plant fertiliser,
23%
3.83, 50%
Other, 5.11, 67%

other industrial,
pow er generation,
1.28, 17%
0.77, 10%

Figure 5 Gas consumption, source:[R04]

As a whole, domestic utilization of gas is low because of lack of infrastructure to transport
it from the production sites to the demand centers. Thus it is restricted to the areas in the north
close to the production sites. The construction of a gas pipeline from Sheberghan to Kabul by the
public sector ($300 million estimated cost) is a priority for the government (see [R04]). The
government has set ambitious targets for the connection of households to the gas network (23%
by 2010 and 42% by 2015, as reported in [R04]).
Sector organisation: [PRIc] (a government agency itself) mentions that “…natural gas
reserves are controlled by the state-owned Afghan Gas Enterprise…” [AISA] mentions that the
“commercialization” of the enterprise will begin in 2007 with the support of the Asian Development
Bank. No further information concerning this enterprise has been found.

gas data ([EIAa])

120.0

100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

20.0

0.0
80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

gas production (bcf) gas consumption (bcf) gas production, [R04]

Figure 6 Gas data, source: [EIAa]

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2.2.2.4 Electricity18
Supposing that the data provided by [EIAa] are reasonably accurate (see Figure 7),
Afghan citizens consume approximately 30kWh per capita per year19, which is extremely low
even adjusting for the percentage of those who actually do have access to electricity. However,
electricity consumption, especially by residential consumers, cannot be precisely calculated
because of electricity theft (illegal connections to the network) and the dilapidated state of the
distribution network that result in significant losses. ([RP04] reports that only 55% of the energy
generated is billed, leading to a very low cost recovery percentage). The current supply does not
meet the demand, a situation which is dealt with through frequent load shedding.
Electricity is imported from neighbouring countries to satisfy local demand at bordering
areas, although the bilateral annual power purchase agreements are described in [RE04] as
being slightly unreliable. [ADBc] provides some figures concerning imports of electricity for 2004
(Table 3). The sum total of the imported quantities is, however, more than 20 times the quantity
reported by [EIAa].
source country destination province electricity imported in 2004 (GWh)
Uzbekistan Balkh, Hairatan 76
Turkmenistan Herat 18,5
Tajikistan Kunduz and other northern provinces 12,3
Total 106,8
Table 3 Imports of electricity ([ADBc])

electricity generation and consumption ([EIAa])

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80
generation (b kWh)
electricity consumption (b kWh)"
0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00
80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

Figure 7 Electricity generation and consumption ([EIAa])

Plant Capacity Description
(installed)

18
[RP04] contains a full enumeration by region of the electricity infrastructure of the
country as of 2003, including listings of power plants, transmission and major distribution stations,
as well as information on the grid.
19
[RA04] places the estimate for yearly per capita consumption at an even lower 12kWh.
 Page 13 of 23

Kajaki Dam 2x16,5MW Located in Helmand province near Kandahar;

transmission lines to Kandahar repaired in early 2002,
after being damaged by air strikes in November 2001.
Upgrading and expansion program is underway. [R04]
reports that it is “in critical condition””
Mahipar Dam 66MW near Kabul; operational only two to three months per
year; severely affected by water shortages
Naghlu Dam 100MW Operational. Provides most of the electricity used in
Kabul.
Darunta Dam 11MW Operational. In Nangarhar province near Jalalabad.
Sarobi Dam 22MW Supplies Kabul
Dahla Dam na Kandahar province. Operational.
Kabul Thermal Plant 45MW Gas fired-plant close to Kabul; recently refurbished by
ABB
Mazar-i-Sharif Power 30MW Small natural gas-fired power plant near Mazar-i-Sharif,
Plant20 partially operational at less than 30 MW. According to
[R04], page 12, not more than 5-10MW are actually
available for exportation to the grid.
Table 4 Major electricity generation plants21, source: [EIA]
According to Table 4, Kabul is supplied from three hydroelectric power dams: the 100MW
Naghlu dam (the only source of power that is reliable all year long), the 66MW Mahipar dam, and
the 22MW Sarobi dam, with the latter two facilities slated to be rehabilitated, possibly by 2005,
under a $16.9 million contract let to Voith Siemens in early 2004 ([EIA])22. The dams are located
about 50 miles from Kabul and are linked by 110kV transmission lines. (Apart from technical
problems, the area surrounding the lines is also mine-affected). Prior to the early 1990s, Kabul
also had two gas-fired power plants located on the outskirts of the city. ABB recently refurbished
one of the plants, which has a 45-MW capacity. It is anticipated to be used to meet peaking
demand for the foreseeable future. The other plant, with a 44-MW capacity, was partly destroyed
in the early 1990s.
Data from [EIAa] indicate a share of about 80% for hydropower capacity and 20% for
thermal capacity, out of a total of approximately 320MW. However, there is an uncertainty as to
which plants are actually operating at which capacity. Characteristically, [ADBc] mentions that the
three hydro plants (see Table 4) supplying Kabul have a total nominal capacity of 188MW, but
their actual combined output is 80MW.
The series of data provided by the questionnaire [Q] contradict the other sources of
information (including the government ones published in Annex 6, [RP04]), as becomes clear
through the following graph:

20
The plant is actually part of the North Fertilizer and Power Enterprise, an industrial unit
producing urea from natural gas. When excess electricity is available, it is exported to the network
surrounding Mazar-i-Sharif.
21
Other minor plants are omitted (but listed in detail in [RP04], annex 3).
22
The plants were constructed by the same company in 1956 and 1966, respectively.
Their combined output after the rehabilitation will be 77MW (see link).
 Page 14 of 23

Total electricity generation capacity, by source of information (MW)

600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
[EIAa] [Q] (questionnaire)

Figure 8 Contradicting data regarding electricity generation capacity

[Q] reports a total capacity of 577MW (80% more than the 323MW capacity reported by
the [EIAa]), of which about 4% would be thermal and the rest hydro23, and of which 35% would
belong to auto-producers, with the rest belonging to the public utility. [RP04]’s estimate (page 45)
of an actual capacity at 240MW is in all probability closest to the real situation.

electricity generation capacity (MW)

600

500

400

hydro (MW)
300

200

100 thermal (MW)

0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Figure 9 Electricity generation capacity by type (source: [EIAa])

23
Obviously the government agency reported the total nominal capacity of the existing
plants, regardless of their condition.
 Page 15 of 23

electricity generation by type

([EIA])

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80 thermal (b kWh)

0.60 hydro (b kWh)

0.40

0.20

0.00
80

82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
Figure 10 Electricity generation by type ([EIAa])
Regardless of the exact figures for active capacity, Afghanistan will need to multiply its
generation capacity by at least five or six times to reach other developing countries standards.
Sector organisation: “Da Afghanistan Brishna Moassesa” (DABM) is the state-owned
power utility responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity, created in
1966. In 1986, the Government enacted the "Afghanistan's Usage of Electricity Act", making the
Ministry of Water and Power (MWP) responsible for the Power sector in Afghanistan (source:
[RE04]). Since the reform in December 2004, the DABM manages about 80% of the country’s
electricity production, while the ministries of mines and industry and of light industry share
management of the remaining 20%.
Ministry of Water & Power has grouped the projects to restore the electricity sector in
“Power Sector Master Plan”, described in detail in [MWP04]. These projects include generation,
transmission and distribution, but no small-scale distributed projects.
Some available data on the current prices are indicative of the malfunctioning of the
public electricity utility: Electricity that is imported is priced at $0,05-,09, depending on the
importer. The electricity that is produced within the country, mainly at hydro plants supplying the
major cities is significantly cheaper, at $0,02. This price does not reflect the cost of production
that the state has to bear. The electricity tariffs as of January 2004 are available in Annex 5,
[RP04]. Concerning the issue of tariffs, the government aims at creating a regulatory entity (page
47 in [RP04]). However, this should be ranked lower, in terms of priority, since even developed
economies need decades to introduce regulatory bodies for electricity and stabilize the respective
markets.
Projects: The entire sector of electricity requires extensive investment, including:
construction of new generating plants (exploiting the inland resources, namely hydropower and
natural gas) and rehabilitation of existing ones; import of electricity from Uzbekistan and Iran to
supplement the domestic capacity; extension of the grid for outreach to a greater percentage of
the population; small-scale generation for isolated communities. The total budget dedicated to the
sector amounts to $2,8b for a horizon until 2010.
As is extensively described in [RE04], alternative strategic options are under
consideration. The government has isolated three main strategies (import-based, thermal-based
and hydro-based) and leads an effort to produce a mixed solution to the electricity supply
problem. This major source of information includes lists of recommended projects, of which the
major thermal ones are described as follows, while the hydro ones are described in the RE
section (3.1.1.3):
 Page 16 of 23

o According to [RE04], the refurbishment of the gas fields (see also 2.2.2.3) will
provide in the immediate future fuel for a 2x50MW combined cycle plant which is
to be built close to the gas field near the city of Sheberghan. The fuel required
yearly will be 7bcf, meaning that the generators shall operate at an efficiency of
about 40%. The plant would be located between the city of Sheberghan and the
110 kV substation connecting Sheberghan with the Turkmenistan grid, which will
be connected to the network supplying Kabul from Uzbekistan ([RV04]).
o The North West Thermal Power Plant (see [RV04]), in the outskirts of Kabul, was
constructed 1984 and initially planned to be a combined cycle plant consisting of
2 gas turbines and one steam turbine with a total output of about 70 MW. The
construction works was stopped in mid 1984 due to war activities and today only
the two gas turbines are functional and use for peaking in the cold seasons. The
plant can operate on multiple fuels and will be refurbished to give an additional
output if 28,6MW to reach its initial nominal capacity.
o Major hydro-projects: See 3.1.1.3.
Key donors: Most of the projects vital to the power sector are financed by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the International Development Association/World Bank (IDA/WB),
Germany (through state agencies), and the US (through USAID). In addition, Iran has financed
transmission lines to interconnect the city of Herat, and India is financing the detailed design and
construction for the missing transmission link between Pul-e-Khumri and Kabul.
Each of these organisations imposes its own bureaucracy, which means that a large
capital of the available funds is depleted at the stage of preliminary feasibility studies. However,
the government is not in a position to support priority energy-related projects without external
help.

2.2.2.4.1 Household / commercial access to electricity

The percentage of population with access to electricity is remarkably low: estimated by
the World Resources Institute ([WRI]) at 2% as of 2000. The same estimate is provided by the
Afghan authorities ([CSO2]). [EIA] mentions only that “less than 10%” have access to electricity,
while the capital and other areas interconnected to the grid suffer of shortages. [RA04] lists the
following percentages for 2003 and the respective target marks until 2015:
% 2003 2010 2015
access to national grid, countrywide 6 24 33
urban access 27 77 89
Table 5 Access to electricity, government source ([RA04])
It should be mentioned that the [RA04] report mentions specifically access to the national
grid. It is reasonable to expect that the actual percentage is slightly higher (for example, privately
operated oil-fueled small-scaled generators might be in operation, undocumented). Access is
virtually limited to urban areas: 30% of the 234,000 connections are in Kabul. Other provinces
have less access, and rural areas are not served.
The basic axis of electricity transmission is the Northern Transmission Link which serves
the capital and the major northern cities. The isolated distribution (low voltage) systems are
stretched beyond their technical and economic lives because of inadequate maintenance and
overloading. A map of the existing grid can be found in [MWP04], page 19, along with
recommended extensions.
The ADB is promoting a project to construct or rehabilitate 206 kilometers of transmission
network, and rehabilitate the associated substations and distribution systems in 11 rural towns
and adjacent rural areas in the northern, eastern, and southern provinces. This project (see
[ADBc]) will allow an estimated 90,000 consumers-connections to connect to the grid. A map of
the considered links can be found in [ADBc]. Other similar projects are being promoted by various
donor agencies, including the Hairatan to Pul-e-Khumri (funding by ADB) and Pul-e-Khumri to
Kabul (funding under consideration by the US Agency for International Development ([USAID)
 Page 17 of 23

and the Government of India)24. These lines are included in the list of “major recommendations”
endorsed by the Power Sector Master Plan described in [R04].
Because of the mountainous terrain of the country, construction of an extended grid is not
a viable option. Rural electrification is only thought achievable through small-scale projects (with
emphasis on renewable electricity).

24
In parallel, international agents are trying to ensure a 150MW contract to supply Kabul
through the axis that is to be built (the current peak demand for the capital is at 140MW,
according to [ADBc], excluding the load that is shed during peak load) from Uzbekistan.
 Page 18 of 23

2.3 Overview of Renewable Energy

2.3.1 Overview of available RE resources
The primary resource is hydropower, which has already been used for electricity
generation and will be further exploited.
Options for the effective utilization of both solar and wind power in isolated rural areas
may also be profitable over the medium term.

2.3.2 Legislative and institutional structure

The reform after the election of the new government in 2004 led to the creation of the
“New and Renewable Energy Research and Development Centre”, responsible for the
development of renewable energy, under the Ministry of Energy and Water.
The environmental legal system in Afghanistan is still in its infancy. No overall
environmental law is yet in place.

2.3.3 RE targets and commitments

 Page 19 of 23

3 Analysis of Renewable Energy Sector

3.1 Analysis of Different Types of Renewable Energy
3.1.1 Hydro
3.1.1.1 Resource potential
Afghanistan is well-endowed with hydropower; [RA04] quotes estimates that place
hydropower potential at 25,000MW. The Amu/Panj river alone, which constitutes part of the
border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, is estimated at 20,000 MW in installed capacity.

3.1.1.2 Achievements
Hydro resources dominate the electricity sector. According to [RP04] (Annex 6), 60% of
the installed capacity (regardless of operating condition) comes from hydro plants, as well as 72%
(according to [EIAa]) of the generated electricity. The major hydro plants are listed in Table 4. A
map with their locations, along with detailed listing of the existing plants can be found in
[MWP04].

3.1.1.3 Current projects / dynamics of development

The underway power programme of development (described In [RA04]) places emphasis
on the power sector. Approximately half of the $2,8b earmarked for the entire electricity sector
(including transmission and distribution) is needed for development of power generation capacity,
which, on its turn, will largely comprise of hydroelectric plants. The sites for the development of
hydropower that are mentioned are Baghdara (280MW), Kajaki II (50MW) and possibly Sarobi II
(180MW) (to which [RV04] adds Kunar (366MW or 165MW according to the site selected),
Gulbahar, Olambagh, Kamal Khan, Khanabad (10,8MW), Kilagai, Upper Amu, Salma,
Bakhshabad). Baghdara and Sarobi II are interdependent, since they would both utilize resources
of the Kabul river. The figures concerning the capacity of each plant are found in [MWP04], where
detailed tables concerning the environmental implications for each can also be found (page 140).
Micro-hydro projects are also viable options to supply isolated communities. ACTED, a
developmental organisation, has installed small (in the range of 7 to 20 kW) generators in several
villages of the Takhar province, supplying each connected family with approximately 60W (see
[MHP1]). USAID also promotes micro-hydro projects ([MHP2]).

3.1.1.4 Major constraints

The major constraints for the further development of the hydro potential of the country are
financial. Funds are provided by international donors and aid agencies, and although a plan has
already been laid out, the funding is not sufficient. As to environmental and other constraints,
impact studies are being conducted according to [RV04].
The Baghdara reservoir, which is being considered as a site for future development of a
hydro plant will affect, when built, an estimated 10,000 inhabitants who will have to relocate
([RV04], E.7.2.1). Sarobi II will have far lesser impact (same source, E.7.2.2). The sites on Kunar
have a consider resettlement parameter to be considered, as well as the Gulbahar site, which
could accommodate 4x30MW generators. The Kajaki II site can be exploited to provide
2x16,5MW initially and up to 100MW subsequently, without considerable impact. The Olambagh
site is bound to power a 3x30MW installation, affecting local communities and agriculture. For
most of the above sites, development would require detailed studies, especially in the cases of
international rivers.
 Page 20 of 23

3.1.1.5 Summary
Owing to its hydro resources, Afghanistan could potentially reverse the current situation
and become an electricity exporter. Various sites for major plants are under consideration,
subject to the main problem of financing, which is mainly dependent on external donor and
agencies. Micro-hydro plants are also an option for secluded off-grid communities.

3.1.2 Solar
Afghanistan has considerable solar potential. Estimates ([ADBd]) indicate that solar
radiation in Afghanistan averages about 6,5kWh per square meter per day, and the skies are
sunny for about 300 days a year.
The ADB has announced a Technical Assistantship (of a budget less than $1m) to
develop solar power in remote communities of rural areas (see [ADBd]). An ADB specialist
considers the potential for solar energy development “huge”, not only generating electricity but
also for water pumping for water supply and small scale irrigation or provision of potable and hot
water. Satisfying these needs through solar energy would also alleviate the pressure on forests,
on which 80% of the population relies. This project would initially involve a pilot concerning
photovoltaic installations for electricity generation.

3.1.3 Geothermal
According to a recent (2004) report, Afghanistan has the potential to exploit geothermal
energy. The first stage would be direct non-electrical exploitation of heat for involve a wide variety
of end uses, such as chemical industry, greenhouse industry, food processing, and fish farming,
which is less capital-intensive. These uses are site-specific and could promote the development
of impoverished communities (providing energy for such activities as agriculture or wool
processing). At the same time they would substitute heat that now has to be produced through
burning of wood fuel.
The map that is included in [GEO] (page 9) shows that geothermal resources are present
especially in the central mountainous plateau where impoverished communities have little access
to other forms of energy.

3.1.4 Biomass & Waste

3.1.4.1 Fuelwood
Wood (mainly uncommercialised) has been used extensively as an energy source,
leading to a major deforestation issue. According to [CSO3], only 2% (down from 48%, which was
the original, before human overexploitation, coverage) of the land area is covered by low-density
forests.
 Page 21 of 23

Wood fuel production (000 cubic m) (source: [WRI])

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Figure 11 Wood fuel production ([WRI])25

According to this source, the energy content of the wood fuel consumed in 2004 was
234ktoe.

3.1.4.1.1 Biomass other than wood

Currently no data is available regarding commercialized biomass use, including
agricultural residues.
The major agricultural commodity in Afghanistan is opium poppy. Energy crops could be
a substitute only if they were competitive, especially since the majority of the rural population
depends on opium for a living.

3.2 Summary and Conclusion

Afghanistan is already planning to further develop its hydro resources, both in order to
supply the on-grid system and in order to power (through micro projects) off-grid communities.
Other types of RE (mainly solar and geothermal) are available for providing energy (not
necessarily through conversion to electricity) to isolated communities, since expanding the grid is
virtually unfeasible at this stage.

3.2.1 Summary and assessment of major constraints

The environmental and social concerns pertaining to major hydroelectrical projects are
being dealt with in the planning undertaken by the government.
Potential Achievements Current Incentives / Major Overall
projects Institutions constraints feasibility

Hydro Y 60% of both major international financial, Y

current and micro- donor funds resettlement
installed scale issues
nominal projects

25
At 0.3215toe per ton of fuelwood (average caloric content assumption adopted by the
WRI), and an assumed density of 0.5ton/cubic meter the quantities reported by [WRI] are
equivalent to 234ktoe for 2004.
 Page 22 of 23

electricity under
capacity consideration
Solar Y N micro- international financial Y
projects for donor funds
isolated
communities
Wind na na na na na na
Biomass
Waste na na na na na na
Geothermal Y N na na na

4 References / Sources
- [WRI] http://wri.org/, World Resources Information, Earthtrends, accessed on 25/09/06
- [GEO] Geothermal Energy in Afghanistan: Prospects and Potential, February 2004,
available online at www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/Geothermal.pdf
- [AISA] Energy Resources Presentation by the Ministry of Mines and Industries, May
2006, available online at http://www.aisa.org.af/documents/MaryLouiseVitell.ppt
- [WRI] World Resources Institute, Earthtrends, http://earthtrends.wri.org/, accessed on
03/10/06
- [Q] Questionnaire submitted to UNSTATS, 21/11/2005, period: 1999-2004
- [R04] Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward,
Oil and Gas Technical Annex, January 2004, accessed online on 28/09/06 at
http://www.af/recosting/, link
- [MWP04] Power Sector Master Plan, Final Report, October 2004, Ministry of Water and
Power, available at http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/, link
- [RA04] Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward,
March 2004, accessed online on 29/09/06 at http://www.af/recosting/, link
- [RE04] Power Sector Master Plan AFG/03170, Appendix D, Thermal Resources, Thermal
Power, Appendix E, Environmental and Social aspects, Ministry of Water & Power,
Afghanistan, October 2004, accessed online on 29/09/06 at http://www.ands.gov.af/, link
- [RV04] Power Sector Master Plan, Appendix E, Environmental and Social Aspects,
available online at http://www.ands.gov.af/, link
- [RP04] Power Sector Technical Annex, January 2004, accessed online on 02/10/06 at
http://www.ands.gov.af/, link
- Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan, http://www.cso.gov.af/
o [CSO1] Population, 2002, /Census/Census/102Population.pdf
o [CSO2] Energy use, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2003,
/dataSets/documents/environment/203Environ.pdf
o [CSO3] Deforestation and biodiversity, same as above, /202Environ.pdf
- [CIA] https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html, CIA World Factbook,
accessed on 25/08/06
- [EIU] http://www.eiu.com, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, updated on
10/08/06
- [UNCDB] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb, UN Common Database
- [DLA] Defense Logistics Agency, Fuel Line, Vol. 1, 2006,
http://www.desc.dla.mil/DCM/Files/Vol 1, 2006.pdf
- [STA] http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm, State Department, Background,
updated in May 2006, accessed on 25/09/06
- [MD] http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/IMG/artoff9650.jpg, map, November 2002
 Page 23 of 23

- [MHP1] ACTED Afghanistan Micro-Hydro Power, accessible online at

http://www.acted.org/article/articleview/1495/1/23/
- [MHP2] USAID/OTI Afghanistan Hot Topics, April 2004, link
- [USGS] Assessing the Coal Resources of Afghanistan, USGS and USAID, Fact Sheet
2005–3073, June 2005, available online at
www.earthscape.org/r1/ES16746/USGS_Afghanistan.pdf
- [USGSa] USGS, “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the Amu-Darya Basin,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Iran”, by Gregory F. Ulmishek, USGS
Bulletin 2201–H, available online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/H/pdf/B2201H_508.pdf
- [PRI] State-owned enterprise information center, accessible at
http://privatization.mof.gov.af/EN/, accessed on 26/09/06
o [PRIa] North Coal Enterprise, link
o [PRIb] Fuel & Liquid Gas Enterprise, link
o [PRIc] North Fertilizer and Power Enterprise, link
- [IMF] World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006 Edition, accessible online at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/index.htm
o [IMFa] press release relevant to a Poverty Reduction arrangement under the
PRGF scheme, Press Release No. 06/144, June 26, 2006, accessible at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06144.htm
- [EIA] Energy Information Administration, Afghanistan Fact Sheet , updated in June 2004,
available online at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/afghan.html
o [EIAa] http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energy.html, data page,
accessed on 26/09/06
o [EIAb] http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgase.html, Caspian Sea Region
report, July 2002
- ADB Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org/
o [ADBa] document TAR:AFG 36289, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR REVIEW AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT, March 2003, available at
/Documents/TARs/AFG/tar_afg_6289.pdf
o [ADBb] “Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural Gas Pipeline Project “,
/Documents/Articles/AFG/afg_2003001.asp, June 2003
o [ADBc] RRP: AFG 37078, Power Transmission and Distribution Project proposal,
March 2005, available at /Documents/RRPs/AFG/rrp-afg-37078.pdf
o [ADBd] “TA to Develop Solar Power in Remote Communities of Rural
Afghanistan”, 18/01/05, link