Suppressing the Opposition: Gaddafi, Machiavelli,

Quest for Virtú

and the

INTRODUCTION
For forty-two years, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi has enjoyed the title of Brother Leader
and Guide of the Revolution—the King of Kings, almost immovably resting atop a throne of a
modern so-called People’s Republic. He ruled Libya with one goal: to secure the stability of his
regime. To that end, Gaddafi engaged in morally questionable acts, substituting cruelty for mercy,
meanness for generosity, and fear for love. The politics of Muammar al-Gaddafi beg this question
be answered: would Niccolò Machiavelli, whose acute realism sparks many ethical controversies,
approve of Gaddafi, his rule, and his tactics?—and to what extent?

In this paper, I will argue that while Machiavelli would have approved of Gaddafi’s rise to
and consolidation of power, he would reject Gaddafi’s later tactics and attribute them to his
demise. To summarize what Machiavelli would have said of Gaddafi, one must first classify the
nature of the Libyan state, identify the permissible means of virtú-ous leaders, and identify the
virtú-ous ends of virtú-ous leaders. Only if the ends of Gaddafi’s regime are virtú-ous can his
means and tactics be accepted by Machiavelli; and then only if those means themselves are virtú-
ous. To that end, this paper will attempt to establish a strong understanding of Machiavelli’s virtú,
and distinguish between the acceptable and the unacceptable, in terms of cruelty and tactics.

LIBYA AS A PRINCIPALITY
In Discourses and The Prince, Machiavelli proposes different attitudes by the sovereign
towards the state for ‘Republics’ and ‘Principalities’. Therefore, it is important to understand how
Machiavelli would have understood Libya as a state. While Gaddafi’s Libya, constitutionally, is a
Jamahiriya—an Arabic term for a People’s Republic—it holds many features that make it a
principality according to Machiavelli. First of all, Republics in Machiavelli’s sense were small
city-states, modeled after the Florentine Republic, in contrast with the large Libyan state
[CITATION Mac95 \p 111-2 \y \l 1033 ]. In addition, while the modern conception of Republic
distinguishes it from a monarchy as being non-hereditary, for Machiavelli, a Republic is
distinguished from a principality on the basis of freedom, particularly participation in governance.

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In both these senses, Libya—to Niccolò Machiavelli—is a principality, and the King of Kings,
Muammar al-Gaddafi, is its prince.

ENDS OF A GOVERNMENT TO MACHIAVELLI

For Machiavelli, who popularized the principle “the ends justify the means”, establishing
that a government and its prince have virtú-ous ends is the first requirement to have permissible
governance. One must take caution with simplifying Machiavelli’s arguments to “the ends justify
the means” for two reasons: first, because Machiavelli puts some restrictions on those means, and
second, because some means can deteriorate the status quo to go against those ends. As such, it is
crucial to understand the virtú-ous ends of a government according to Machiavelli, and remain
mindful of these as we discuss the means: If, at any time in Gaddafi’s rule, his tactics and
governance transformed the state of civil society into a state contrary to Machiavelli’s ends, then
those means are unjustifiable by the virtue of the fact that they themselves defeated their own
supposed ends.

To understand virtú-ous ends according to Machiavelli, one must be mindful of what he

deems as good and bad. In Chapter 3 of Discourses, we witness that Machiavelli thinks that human
nature is corrupt and the laws are good: “men never work any good unless through necessity, but
where choice abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of confusion and
disorder.” [CITATION Mac95 \p 13 \y \l 1033 ] In The Prince, he states that men are “are
ungrateful, fickle, feigners and dissemblers, avoiders of danger, eager for gain.” [CITATION
Mac88 \p 59 \y \l 1033 ] Additionally, Machiavelli’s views of the fragmented, unstable Italy in
The Prince support this [CITATION Mac88 \p 88 \y \l 1033 ]. Furthermore, in analyzing The
Prince, David Ingersoll stresses Machiavelli’s love for order; “[Machiavelli] is not merely
concerned with the particularities of Italian political conditions”, he argues, as “dozens of
examples […] are advanced, all pointing to the basic notion that stability is the prerequisite of any
other political action.” [CITATION Ing70 \p 262 \y \l 1033 ]

From this analysis, one can conclude that—to Machiavelli—instability and anarchy are the
worst possible things, due to the evils of human nature, and that stability and order are good. With
such views as our setting, Machiavelli argues that the virtú-ous ends “which everyone aims at,”—
both Princes and People—are “glory and riches” [CITATION Mac88 \p 85 \y \l 1033 ], meaning
the success of a state, and the maintenance of national interest, both of which require stability (but
are not identical with it).
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 One may also conclude that, to Machiavelli, oppression is better than anarchy, and any
oppressive state, granted its stability, is objectively better than one where the human nature of its
men rules each on his own. But also, when the means of a government promote anarchy, or a
constant state of fear, especially fear of one another, then the means of a government are bordering
on going against the virtú-ous ends of a government. These means, Machiavelli would argue, are
neither virtú-ous nor justifiable.

MEANS OF A PRINCE ACCORDING TO MACHIAVELLI

While Machiavelli approves of some vicious means, claiming those are justified by virtú-
ous ends; he puts some restrictions of what those means can be. Such restrictions are not at all
arbitrary, but represent restrictions that, if broken, would deny the ends they were meant to satisfy.

Therefore, virtú-ous means should be defined as those that can attain the virtú-ous ends,
given the circumstances. With such understanding of the concept, let us observe how Machiavelli
describes such means. To attain the ends, he argues, “men proceed in different ways”: some
“acting differently can achieve the same results”, and some acting similarly can see some succeed
and others fail. Machiavelli, therefore, describes the virtú-ous means: “I believe that we are
successful when our [means] are suited to the times and circumstances, and unsuccessful when
they are not.” [CITATION Mac88 \p 85-6 \y \l 1033 ]

GADDAFI’S RISE TO POWER: SUPPRESSING THE DISSIDENCE

Colonel Gaddafi entered the world stage as Libya’s statesman following the 1969 Libyan
coup d’état against King Idris of the United Kingdom of Libya. The coup was executed by young
military officers of the Libyan Free Officers Movement. The Free Officers Movement itself was
populist-socialist movement, and enjoyed popular support. While the coup itself was executed by
the officers and did not have popular involvement, the installation of Gaddafi as the leader of the
Libyan state can still be considered as falling within the category described in Machiavelli’s “Civil
Principality” of Chapter IX, that is, a leader rising to power through the masses.

Within a week, the Libyan Kingdom was transformed into a Republic controlled by the
military, with Gaddafi as the de facto head of state and commander-in-chief of the Army, and
little-to-no internal resistance. Through quick arrests, and negotiations with King Idris and other
pretenders to the throne, Gaddafi established legitimacy as the figurehead of the country.

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 However, Gaddafi’s violent and oppressive tactics to crush coup attempts and assert his
‘Princedom’ began in the 1970s. To assert his control, Gaddafi practiced strong oppression
towards his enemies, staying true to Machiavelli’s advice: “men should either be caressed or
crushed” [CITATION Mac88 \p 9 \y \l 1033 ], and indeed, revenge and retaliation against the
Prince were unheard of in Gaddafi’s new Libya.

Gaddafi furthermore restructured all social and political institutions and services, centered
them around the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)—Libya’s only political party, nationalized
newspapers, incorporated trade unions and civil services into the ASU, and in turn incorporated the
ASU into the government. Gaddafi removed all hierarchies from civil and governmental
institutions, making himself—and himself alone—the cornerstone of all such institutions and
services. There is no doubt, indeed, that Machiavelli would approve.

Gaddafi’s actions to assert control over Libya throughout the 1970s, as well as his swift
brutality against his opposition, ensured the stability of both Libya as a Principality and of
Gaddafi’s rule is its leader. Much of the 42-years of Libyan stability, and Gaddafi’s control, is in
many ways related to the Libyan leader’s tactics in establishing his rule. These actions were
justifiable at least, if not virtú-ous, according to Machiavelli; they ensured the stability of a state,
and while violent, never afflicted a continuous state of fear on the masses, or pushed Libya closer
to a state of anarchy.

CONTINUED TRIBAL DIVISIONS

Another tactic Gaddafi used to ensure the stability of his rule is the creation,
encouragement, and maintenance of tribal divisions. While maintaining the population divided will
indeed ensure the stability of the Prince, it would not necessarily ensure the stability of the
Principality; by creating many tribal divisions in a population, one is essentially dividing up the
organized civil societies into many smaller, hostile civil societies, each less and less governed by
the law, and more governed by human nature and animosity. Gaddafi essentially maintained a
population of citizens hostile to one another, where attacks, conflicts, and tensions were abundant
—essentially reverting the state of civil society into a state of war. While not in absolute anarchy,
one can argue that Gaddafi’s means in keeping the population divided along tribal lines did not
contribute to the stability of the principality, but instead to its instability. Indeed, Machiavelli’s
dislike for divisions is clear when he refers to divided Italy in Chapter XXVI.

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 As such, Gaddafi was not virtú-ous as a leader. While he maintained glory, the people and
the principality did not. Still, one might argue that Gaddafi appeared to have virtú, as he was not
associated widely with maintaining tribal divisions, and was perceived as the political leader who
held the country together in spite of tribal divisions. Gaddafi therefore introduces a paradox: he
made himself the unifying figure of Libya by actively seeking to keep the country divided. This is
not too different from the tactics of many autocratic leaders, who seek legitimacy.

Would Machiavelli approve of that? It is hard to tell. While Machiavelli would certainly
appreciate the skill through which Gaddafi kept himself in power, Machiavelli’s greatest fear is
human nature, and living in a constant state of fear. As Machiavelli’s beliefs are concerned, one
can establish that, in this case, Machiavelli would be impressed by the means as a political tool,
but would claim that the ends attained by Gaddafi are now corrupt, and not virtú-ous. While the
perception of virtú might still exist towards Gaddafi, the end has lost all virtú: at the end of the
day, though Gaddafi was the unifying figure, Libya was still divided.

MACHIAVELLI ON GADDAFI’S FEAR

Fear is an important tactic of Gaddafi, as it was for many leaders in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region before the revolutionary wave of 2011. Through strong censorship,
impeded expression, restrictions of political participation, and strict governance, the general
population of Libya, especially those sympathetic to the opposition, lived in fear. The population
also lived in fear and turbulence due to the tribal divisions discussed earlier.

Previously, we observed that subjugating the population to a state of fear is seldom a good
thing and is to be avoided. This might stand in contrast with the common understanding of
Machiavelli’s famous quote: “it is much safer to be feared than loved”. However, one must
understand the context of this statement. First, Machiavelli establishes that it is always desirable to
be both feared and loved, and choosing to be feared is only safer if a choice between the two has to
be made. Second, Machiavelli sets the concept of fear in a different context: the positive fear is the
fear of a government in being punished for committing transgressions against it and its stability,
not fear of other people, nor fear of persecution, nor fear of unjust punishment [CITATION Mac88
\p 59 \y \l 1033 ]. Machiavelli’s view of fear is the same as that possessed by a child towards a
parent—as supported by his recommendation that being both loved and feared at the same time is
preferable, as a child loves a parent, yet fears punishment if he does wrong.

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 Gaddafi created two fears. The first is very easy to criticize, and that is the fear flowing
from tribal divisions. This fear is neither a fear of the government nor a fear of the Prince, but is
still a fear instilled in the population. Such fear is not justifiable in the context of the ‘feared versus
loved’ tradeoff.

The second fear is the constant fear of persecution, in censorship and expression, in
political party laws, in labor rights, and in torture in prisons and security departments, all felt by
the general population. Most of these fears represent consequences of actions that are not
transgressions on the state in the formal sense. While Machiavelli encourages instilling fear in
specific groups of people, Gaddafi is instilling fear in the masses. And while Machiavelli
encourages instilling fear against doing wrong, Gaddafi is instilling a general state of fear. Such
fear is not virtú-ous and, as we will see, may have led to Gaddafi’s demise.

GADDAFI’S OPPRESSION
Gaddafi’s oppression of the masses, and instilling fear amongst them, I argue, led to the
2011 Libyan Uprising, and will possibly lead to Gaddafi’s demise. I argue that Gaddafi committed
two main mistakes in his oppression, both contrary to Machiavelli’s conditions and restrictions.

First, Colonel Gaddafi’s oppression was continuous and even throughout the last decades
of his rule. Prisoners were tortured, censorship was practiced, and rights were limited. Such
oppression stands in stark contrast with the oppression deemed by Machiavelli as permissible:
short, concentrated periods of lethal oppression on specific groups, as opposed to Gaddafi’s long
term, moderate oppression on the general population.

“ It should be observed here that men should either be caressed or crushed; because they can avenge
slight injuries, but not those that are very severe. Hence, any injury done to a man must be such that
there is no need to fear his revenge. — [CITATION Mac88 \p 9 \y \l 1033 ]

With mild oppression, those who hate Gaddafi could thrive together and eventually execute
their revenge. In addition, since any sort of oppression—when overt—can lead to hatred in the
targeted population towards the executor of such oppression, Gaddafi and his establishment
became despised by a growing section of the population, a section that was not restricted to a
certain political ideology, tribe, or side. Suddenly, Gaddafi’s “enemy” became the people.

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 Making an enemy out of the People is not a wise decision for Gaddafi, Machiavelli would
argue. Gaddafi came to power by a populist coup d’état, his rule was stabilized with promises of
glory to the people, and his installation came with popular approval. Such a ruler is a ruler of a
Civil Principality “through the favor of his fellow citizens”, as opposed to one who became a ruler
through the favor of a few nobles. A “man who becomes ruler through popular favor,” Machiavelli
says, must then “keep the people well disposed towards him”; by making himself hated, Gaddafi
lost the disposition of the people. Machiavelli furthermore makes it clear that keeping the people
disposed towards the ruler is “easy” “[…] since they want only not to be oppressed.” [CITATION
Mac88 \p 36 \y \l 1033 ] By breaking one of Machiavelli’s ‘easy-to-fulfill’ pieces of advice,
Gaddafi lost the wants of the people and became deserted.

And if we assume that Gaddafi gained power through the support of the nobles, by
supposing the Army Officers and the Revolutionary Command is a form of nobility, then the
situation is worse for Gaddafi, as he “must above all else try to win over the people” [CITATION
Mac88 \p 36 \y \l 1033 ].

Notwithstanding all of this, by making himself rich and the people poor, Gaddafi had
already committed enough oppression: an un-virtú-ous redistribution of wealth that only led him to
lose the trust of a nation. Machiavelli would not have been impressed.

Gaddafi’s second violation of Machiavelli’s advice is his failure to adapt to the new times.
As discussed in “MEANS OF A PRINCE”, the success of a prince is dependent upon his ability to
make sure his means are suited to the times and circumstances. This was not the case for Gaddafi;
as the circumstances changed, Gaddafi’s economic and social policies became too regressive for
their time, but were never reformed. Indeed, a quick examination of Gaddafi’s institutions reveals
to us that the Libyan leader largely views his Institution as static in time. This meant that, while
Gaddafi might have initially been heading towards a virtú-ous end, the changing times meant that
the means no longer worked to fulfill such ends.

VERDICT: IN CONCLUSION
Muammar al-Gaddafi was undoubtedly ‘Machiavellian’, but that does not indicate that
Machiavelli would approve. As Carl Roebuck states in analyzing Machiavelli’s Discourses, “The
word, ‘Machiavellian,’ has become generally synonymous with the lawless or unscrupulous
substitution of expediency for right in the attainment of ends. Some of us feel that such means

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would not ultimately insure the end, be it political stability or other good, even if they achieve it
for the moment.”[CITATION Roe52 \p 52 \y \l 1033 ]

While Gaddafi succeeded in creating a strong stable state, his tactics for much of the 42-
years would likely be condemned by Machiavelli. The longevity of Gaddafi’s regime can be
attributed to his successes in its establishment, including the modifications he performed on the
structure of civil and governmental institutions, despite his later actions. With regards to his later
actions, the last few decades of his rule all contributed to a build-up of dissidents against him,
culminating in the February 2011 uprising, when such opposition to Gaddafi finally broke the
activation energy required for revolution. Thus, Machiavelli’s views on the means taken by
Gaddafi correlate well with his successes and failures as a leader.

WORKS CITED
Ingersoll, David E. "Machiavelli and Madison: Perspectives on Political Stability." Political
Science Quarterly 85, no. 2 (June 1970): 259-280.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discources on Levy. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield, & Nathan Tarcov.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

—. The Prince. Edited by Quentin Skinner, & Russell Price. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988.

Roebuck, Carl. "A Search for Political Stability: Machiavelli's "Discourses on Livy"." Phoenix
(Classical Association of Canada) 6, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 52-65.

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