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MISSION NO. 232-238-245 FLOWN 26-29 JUNE 2ULY 45 COPY NO. 75 HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMMAND APO 224 GON CURED ire aaah DECLASSIFIED ¥\ ? a 2 2 zy s 2 iL PK wana Date 5 | his neyort covers the first 9 missions of the 315¢h Boabardnent Ting, (We Boaber Oormand Msstous Nov 232, 238, and 205 )— seree Mastens Minder 233, 239, ad 2h were Wining Missions end will be tho subject of a Tactical Mission Report which received only Limited distributions iseions Number 254 and 237 will be covered in one Tactical iisaion Feparty fas will lasions Humber 240 through 2h3e le g A ae. NNPHS Aathoriy Nara Date 5/M/ LL. 8 SECREL deapWaRTERS 2OT BOER COUMLAND ABO 23), ‘ ‘TACTICAL MISSTON REPORT Pleld Gnder Nose 90,92 and Sh Missions Me 2324230 and 245 Targetst Utoube River Oil Refinery (90-20-1684), Nippon Ctl Company (90432672), and the Meruzen O11 Company, Shinotou, (90625-1 26, 29 Sune ant 2 July 945 ‘Table of Gontenta Tactical thrrative + sees se oeeeeceee Annex A= Operations + sss eee eee ees serene 7 Part I~ Navigation Track Charts see eo ev 6 10 Part It - Flight Engineering Chart +e ee + sll Fart IIT - Radar and Rader Photos. «e+ e+e +12 Part T= Gumerys soe eeeeeeecsceee ll Part V = Air-Sea Rescue Charts se eee eee eo 18 ® Amex B- Weathers sees esac cece Part I ~ Teather Sumary, donox C - Communications ss eeesscecees cece e 3 Tart I~ Radar Oointer Neasur 5 Pact Ii = fulloy c's esa ae ee amex D- Intelligence so ee eeees cers cerns e Fart I = Bneny Air Opposition, » ee eee ee + 0 27 Part II ~ Rony Antiairoraft. Part IIT ~ Damage Assesousnt see ee ee ee eo Annex E - Consolidated Statistical Summary esses see 6 0 danex F - XX Boaber Goumand Field Order s+ eeeeeee 0h? dmnex G - Distributions +e eee eee seer eee ee eS? Prepared Byt 4c2 Section ‘4X1 Bomber Command SEORED g g = Q 2 2 er segeransrrenatessened: 1 SECRET : By dauthe of the O.Ge# + X01 Bonber Command + 12 Ta AS x 2 hate initials + eapgmarrens oo BOE caunLND 220 23h eae SUBIECT: Ropett of Initial Operations, 915th Bouberdnent Ting, 26 Tunes 29 Jun, and 2 July 19156 70 + Commanding General, Twentieth Air Foreo, ‘“ashington 25, D.Ce 1, SPSCIL DILOMGENT OF 415th BOBARDMENT JING \TRORWT: as Originally, St wae planned to assign targets to the 315th Bombardment ing én the sane basis ap those assignal to the other | Sage Gath, 73m, 313th, and 3Lith) of this Command» However, after ‘thorough consideration of the 315th tings’ operational sapabilitis nnd limitations, this errangemant was found to be umatisfactory. be The aircraft of the 315th Ting had been stripped of al) defensive aruanont bit the teil turtot on the theory that a B29 flying Ge an altitote nf 25,000 fant or higher cloud not be successfully Gttacked by fighters except fren the rear. Tse other important Operational difference of this ‘ling froa the other h Wings as the {astallation of aP0-7 airborne radar in this Ving's aireraft instead Of the P2-19 which is carried ty aircraft of the other ‘lingse The ‘SPq7 vas dooigned primarily for bocbing, having exoollont definition Dut only 60 degreen of swoop. whereas the APG-13 wae designed primarily as a navigational aid, having 360 degrees of sweep but relatively poor definitions ce The 315th Ting could, and was trained to boub from extrenely high’ altitudes in daylight. Houever, shen this Ting arrived fh tho thoatra, a study of the experiences of the other Tings revealed the alvisebility of operating at night fron medium altitudes rathor ‘than during daylight houre from higher altitudes. This plan was expocted #0 reault in greater operational efficiency of the airoraft {n addition to the carrying of bomb lcads greater than those carried dy she other 4 Wingss, Furthermore, it vas decided that in onder to pequire cn ootimate cf the eapahilities of the APQn7, which was being ised for the first time in B-29 conbat, the 315th Ting chould be assigned its om targstse 4. Coincident with this decision, intelligence iniionted ‘that the importance of oil refining and oil storage targats was Incroasings Thode targote wore all relatively larce. ifcreasing their rader-visibility, ami were located on or near the coast, a condition hich had deen feund to be alliost ossontial for attack by =PI-7 Squipped aircraft bocause of the limited capability of this set for {inland navigation. .It was decided, therefore, that the first sorics of attacks of the 9isth ding would be confined to strikes against oil Pofineries and ofl storage inetallationss 2e. IDBNBTETOMTION og uIISSIONS: as Field Orders Munbor 90, %2y and Sy, Hoedquarters 20 Bomber Comana, dated 25 Juno, 28 June, ad 2 July respoctivelyy Qireciel the 75th Bocbardnont ‘ling to participate in medium altitude night attacks against 3 011 refineries on Honshu in XU Bomber Comant Misgions Mamber 232, 238) and 2l56 -.- SECRET Nara Date 5A4/ LL DECLASSIFIED Authority UVP H Se i SECRET "3 292 Utube River Oi1 Refinery (90420-1684) 96 aircraft 298 Mippon Gi 0, Kudanateu Plant (90452672) 96 atreratt 25 ——Marugon Of1 Refinery, Shimotau (90.25-1764) 36 airerart (2) No other targots wore specified. + STRATEGY ND PLANS Ge GPERATLONS+ as Stratey! The prinary purpose of these attacks, the first to be conducted by the 315th Ting against the Japanese osialand, was to determine the accuracy against precision targets that oouid be expected by the employmont of a Tader gynenroncus Doubling Leclulyue with tho APQ-7 radar oquimment. Because of tho Timitoa armanent (315th ing air- craft are equipped with tail guns only), it was planned that the attacks FOuld be made at nicht whon littlo, if any, oncuy aircraft opposition would bo oncountered. though those night attacks would necessitate bombing by individual aireraft, it was considered that this would not influence bonbing accuracy singo 4 radar aynouroucus comming proceaure was to bo usod by cach aireraft participating on the missions. be Importance of the Taraets: (2) Mission 232: The Utoubo River Oil Refinery is located apprexinately 2 niles aoutnoast of the tom of Yokkstch on tao north aldo of the mouth of the Utube Alvar, Originally on a par with the oi? proluction centers of Tokuyana ait Otaka, tide tanget now ranks first a3 f center of aviation ges production in Japan proper. Those installations include tectlities for eyathotic oi) refining (estinatal at 37 por cont of Japanese aynthetie préduction), natural of) refining (very important but output is not know), production of tétra-otiy] lead (estimated at 25 por cent of total Japanese production),and extensive oil storages (2) Mission 238! The Kulanatau Plant of the Nippon 0i1 Company is located southrest of the city of Kudamateu which is apprex- imately § miles southwost of Tokuyana on tho Inland Sea, This plant is considered to be tho fourth langoat cil refinery in tho"Japanoso 1mcr zone and haa an estinated annus] refining oapacity of 2,500,000 barrels and a cracking tapacity of 666,000 barrels. It has an estimated storage capacity of 200,000 barrels. (3) Mission 2h5+ The Uaruzon O11 Refinery, Shimotsu, is Located noar the south ontrance to Osaka Bay, 4} milos southest of Kainan and 3 miles northeast of Minoshimi, in important refinery ana oil storage conter for the Japdnese Mawy; this target 1s crodited with tho production of aviation gas, lubo ofl, gascline, and fuel oll and hag facilities for storazo of both crudo oil ani refined products. 4 unit of this plant may be engaced in the manufacture of steel druns. es Details o na~~Operational! (2) Boubing Plenss (a) Datemination of Barb Lond: J, For use against’ the Utsube River Oil Refinery (iission 232) and the Maruzon 011 Refinery, Shimotau (iMesion 245), all -25 BORE? ig SaoRzET aireraft vore to be loaded with 500=pound gonoral-purpose boube fused +025-aecond delay nose ant nonedelay tulle The 500-pound bonb: was Selected since these installations are of both refinery and storage typo and aro woll digporsed within tho aroas cf the targets. Tho larser q number of boub hits which would be inflicted by the use of this sizo bomb | ‘was oxpocted to remult in maximun damage to both mamifacturing and storage facilities. Since the .0l-socond doley fuze vas not available, the .025- ‘second delay fuzo vas solocted as an allerualy nosy uring. 1 wso delioved that this delay would givo bomb burst just above flocr level \ and should be very offoctive against tho rofincry ani shop installations. ‘Tho non-dolay tail fuzo was solected in order that ground-level burst would be given to nesr mise boabs by which maximum blast and fracmen- tation offoct vould bo obtainod against the refinery installations which vonstivited the major facililivs in uack target, Since the majority of storage tanks in oach target aroa vero saall, it vas believed that impact initiation of the nondolay fuse would result in sufficient fore to dostrey tho tanks recoiving direst kite, For this rosson, delay fuainey which would allow penctration, was considered unnceessarys 25 For uge uit the Kadamtsu Plant of the Mippon O11 Company (Mission 238), all aircraft were to be loaded with 500-pound genoral-purposo bombs fuzod -lesecond delay nose and .01- ‘econ delay tail, Tais bord vas solocted for use on this target for ‘tho sane ronson aa that givon for tho other 2 targets. Tho .0l-second” delay tail fuze was edlocted ag it would alloy penetration of the donb, Venoien the Tank cont, Uo st MAffivival dupL tv aoowe detenabion bolew tho eontonts level, resulting in maximum damayo to the installations ‘Tho «l-second delay nose fuse vas solocted as an assurance fuze only (>) Bombing Data: Boubing altitudes, axes of attack, initial pointe, anticipated drift, asd othor pertinent bonbing data for those 3 missions wore to be as follows Miosion 272 Minion 238 © Mtsston 245 Bombing iltitude 15,000 fect (15,000 to 1,000 foot) cis of attack 320 dogroos 35 dogross 42 ogres Initial Point — 943490N19710008 39340191268 —_935000N-19444308 Dritt 10 dogress right 6 degrees right 6 degrees right Tine of Fun 6 minutes 7 mimtos 6 mamitos Length of Run 2h miles 31 miles 28 miles 4 (2) Mavigation: Tho folowing routes yore to be enploysd on these missions! (a) Moston 232: Route Beasons for Soloction Base to Two Jima Tactical Doctrine +e .3490%-13701008 Trako Seki Point at the entrance to Nagoya Baye ‘Initial Point) Zasily tdentifiod for landfall and initial to point Target Utsubo River Oil Rofinerys «i loft turn aaa to to bo made off the target avolding flak areas Ivo Jina to Baso Tactical Doctrinoe DECLASSIFIED NMP H S095, Atha SEQRED (e) Misaton 238+ Route Reasons for Selection Bago to Ivo Jina Tactical Doctrine to 3255K-190052 in onstly Montified landfall paint on the to castarn const of Kush 39341 31268 point just left of Usa. Easily identiiea Gaitiel Point) for tho boat radar spprosch to the target. to Target Kadenatsu Plant of the Nippon O11 Gompany. to 3301001306008 Jo avoid flak aroase to Fro Jina to Baso Tactical Doctrines (c) Mission ahs Route Reasons for Solastion Base to Ivo Jine Tactical Doctrine to 3322N134038 Ianifall at loft of Marote Point making a ceraight appreaeh to the tazgst through to the initial point. 335000%%13444508 ‘The jutting point of land at tho ontranco to (inition Foint) Osaka Bay taking the boat approach to the to targets 3 Tarot Yaruzoh Oil Rofinory, Shinotsie to ‘gg35y “135578 Lands ont. to Base to Tyo Tima Tactical Doctrines (3) Elight Eneinooring: : (a) Exeept for the boubing run ani coupression of the force, all aircraft on these missions vero to fly at speeds and altitudes wich vould allow naximim range and safety. Spoeds wore to be aprox imately 5 miles por hour highor than those rocomended by the XM Boaber Comnd Tactical Doctrine, No assemblies were to be effected. (>) It was estinated that aircraft on these missions vould require a fucl load ‘of full wing and center wing tanks. Tho boab Joad vas estimated at 18,000 pounds. (4) Radars (a) Maaion 292+ ‘The Utsubo River OL1 Refinery is Jocated on tho coast of Nagoya Bay on a grouontory south of Yolikaichi. Tris aroa ves considered an excellent ono for radar navigation sm targot idontifieation bocauso of tho prosinonos of tho bay vith ite outstanding coastal foaturos and tho radar roturn of lagoya, Gricinally, Seve bellowed thas long dowmelad axis vould be bust ybut das to the defonses of Osaka and tho Lack of gool radar initial points to tho west fn axia to tho southoast maa chosen. Tite approach to tho targot 18 trea water to land ant shotld allow fer an exoollent radar noturns DECLASSIFIED horky IVP H $095 BK para Date 5M) L SECRED (>) Mission 298: It was bolioved that sadar navization would be vory good on this mission because of th exeelloat coastline Sheckpointe of Hyusm and Shikoku, Ianifail vould bo made at a distinc» Five Point on tho southwestern tip of Shikoku. Sinoo the terrain at laml- fail point is rathor ruggot, all oporators should have no difficulty in Mdontitying it in tine to miko tho initial wind runs (ec) Wisaion 2h§: Om this mission an aprreach was Plannod which would allow the bost omploynont of the PQ? radar oquip- Rants Tho roauiretionts set up for tho optimm use of this equipacht vores a lov drift factor, a good landfall point for'tho initial wind funy a Gefinite rater initial point, ani if possible, a small turn at tho initial Point. Based on those roquireionts, a route was ahawin which approxinatod 8 straight line trom landfall through tho initial point to the target. It Was expoctod that landfall point vould be oasily identified in tine te Gllow for an initial wind ming Tho initial point, a distinetive ponia= Sula 45 milos from landfall, was expected to bo vithin easy ranje after making the turn at landfall, Tho targot itaolf (Maruzen 011 Rofinery) is on tho coast mith a river runing alone its northern aidlo ani vas empectod to show up on the PQ7 radar seopo as an exoollont returns ) BGUr Because tho 315th Wing was not equipped with RAI Qguipaont, search and jamsing could not be conducted on those missions. 3 vas planned that rope bo carriod in each airerart to bo disponsede (6), simedoa Rasouat (Soe annex a, Fart V, for Air-Soa Rescue Chart), The Navy was furnished with Gotails of tho missions and Provided tho following air-sea rescue facilities! For Wissiéa 250, subaarinos; |, Dusbos; and 3 surface vessels; for Mission 298, 5 submarines; 4 Dumbos; ani 3 surface vossels; for Mission 2u5+ h gubmarines, 5 Duubos, and 3 surface vessols. In addition ta thoso Factlitios the Navy designed orash boats in tho vieiaity of the Cacmnd basco for take-off and landings. oo pp Etslttox Encort: Sinco those mission ware to be flown ‘at night, no fighter escort was planods Detail of Plannine-tntoliiceneo! (2) nau Fichtor Reaction! (a) Mission 2321 It uas ostimated that 25 to 95 enoay. fighters could oppose this strika, offering nogligible to week oprevitiogs (>) Mission 299: Atthough an estimated 30 to ko oncay fiuhtora wore lecated in this area, it vas bolicved thst only 15 to 50 of ‘these aircraft (not more than 5 of which vould be night fihtore) cloud oppose thi strékoy (c) Misoion 245+ It was ostinnted that 20 to 25 fighters micht intoreept on this mission, offering negligible to weak oppositions (2), Soy antiairerart: (a) Mission 232: It was ostinatea that thore were only 2 heavy guna in the Yokkaichi arcay at tho planned al titude of attack (5,000 geet), only vory meager and inaccurate fire was expected, wtin airoraft opposition prosonted no problem in planning with the exeopticn & route to ani fron the target to avoid other flak aroase Sm iL NP HS 225 DECLASSIFIED Author SEORED (>) Mission 238! Tho defenses at Kudemateu consisted of 15 heavy guns and 9 searchlights, Thie was considero’ a vory méacor Acfonse acminst night attack at tho pinnned altitude of attack (15,000 to 16,000 fect), The route to tho target vould brin(; the aireratt barely within rango of the Oita defenses (19 heavy cans), but only noagor and inaccurate flak vas oxposted thoros It was planned that the aprroach bo from the“southiost in order to avoid tho defenses at Toluyan (33 lweavy guns), imodi ately northwest of Kudanteu. .. broakavay to the Southeast avoiding the Shikoku defenses was plannede (c) Mission 245: In tho past, moauef and inaccurate fire had been enounterod in tho akéyana aroae Fovever, sines thore were | Ro adequate photographs of the aron, those roports could not bo confirmeds Tt was considered tat flak would bo of minor inpertanco at the planned | altitude of attack of 15000 to 16,000 fect. The routo vas plannod to avoid all known dofonsods ur me : 8% Take-off! Tako-off for each mission vas accomplished as follower ae 8 2607002 2607342 298 % 2907302 2908112 25 40 |, 0207302 0208332 be Bo + a Mission 232, 3 alreratt doviated fren the To the target becauso of navigational error. Ono of those 3 aircraft failoa to boub the primary target due to a combination of Ravigntion error and engine troublo. On Missions 238 md 2h5, all aircraft flow the briefed routo without incidonte oe Guar Parmott Q) Zeimary Zorpbte! For ali'nissions, targot aroa Aavigation, wind detornination, and bonbing, more sesonplished by rotor, 4. total of 10h aireratt boabed the Drinary targote vith $00 ound “genorai-purpose bonbs aa follows Miverart Tonnage Tine of Roloaso ine Dro} Latest 292 33 2248 2629952 2615052 15,000 to 16,000 foot 298 3220845 2mISOZ 2915972 154400 to 16,875 foot 2453929647 © 0215082 0216072 —1$,000 to 16,000 foot (2) Derzota of itu! wo aircraft benbod tarcote of opportunitys On Mission 232, 1 8-29 "dropped 667 tons of 500-pound gencral=purpose bonba on Kagata fron 154400 foots On Mission 245, 1 ‘8-29 dvoppod 8 tons of 00-pound general-purpose bonbs on Sakinchana from 9000 fects (3) Ramnintor of Force! Thoro wore § non-effective air ereft on thoso mlaaions, NVPHSo%s SEORE Roturn to base on 411 missions was flown as brictoa, “iresteirerste lonied at Je Sins Gon lesion 232 aml 2 on Mission 245)s ce Landing! Mroraft landed at hone bases as follows: Mission Hirst Janine Jagt Landing 232 2oa0yee 2621302 258 292045 2923052 25; 220302 222302 fs Loanag! Mo aizeraft woro lost on those missions. c+ Seorntional Samar: (2) Maviaationt (Soo dinnex , Part I, for details). Navigation for 11 missions was considered excellent. leather conditions ‘wero considered axeoptionally favorable and mich colestial work vas accomplished. .WN-9 Loren vas oxtensively ussle (2) Boubing: Mo sorious difficulty was encountered on any of theso missions. no aircraft on Mission 215 roported a bonb bay door malfunction (3) Bisht Sinooring! (Soo .itnox A, Fart II, for chart, and Consolidated Statistical Summary, anox 2, for details). (e) Marmative of the Missiona as Flom‘ As Route Out! Clinds word nade icmodiatoly atter tekowofts to cruising altitudes (5000 to 10,000 foot), Altitudes and airapocds aiffored in ondor to attain eonprossibility of tho striking forces. Clinbs to boubing altitudoa voro nade just off tho coast of Tapane ‘ 2» Bomb Bun! Boabiny waa conducted betwoon 15,000 and 17,000 foot at spooda of apprarinatoly 230 milos por hour (ealiteatod alz speod)s ae 1 Returns to baso were nado by descents to approximately 10,000 feot and cruising at that altitude until a gradual descont to base could be accomplisheds (b) Sommanta: A+ Spoats flown wore approximately § miles por hour highor than thoso Tecoazondod for a normally armed airplane. 2» Duo to lact of inforantion on tho eapabili~ ties of 315th Ting aircraft, boab loads voro low and fucl reserves wore highs Howevor, a groator bonb load ani a lover fuol roservo is antici~ pated for futuro operations of thia Ving. (y)_ Radar: (Soo dnnex i, Part ITZ, for dotaile and Radar- Scope Photos), Two aircraft of the 10i, aircraft bonbing the primary ‘targots bombed visually. (5) Gunnar? (Soa annox .i, Part IV, for Gunnory Roport)« (6) AipsSoq Raseug! There wore no aitchings or bailouts fon those missionse ee SECRET a g a = Q 2 2 nara Date 5/4/LL SEQREL hy Hoathor! (Soo inno B fer details). Woathor on all Rissions was approxiutoly as forvcast with the oxcoption of woathor Over the target on mission 232, which wae loss favorable. te Communications: (2) BQH (S00 innox 6, Port I, for dctatie)s Soareh and juming was not confucted on theso missions since the 315th Ting wns not equippod with tho nocossary ROM gear, (2) Radi: (Soe snnox C, Part 1%, for dotaile). Socurity and Gisoipline vere oxcollont during those siselons. Abtellicence Sumary: (1) Bron Aix Onoition: (Soo amex D, Fart I, for Gotails), Bnecy air opposition was reported as nil on these missions (2) Snowy sttiniraratt: (Sco annex Dy Fart II, for Getails), On Mission 232, oneny anticireraft opposition over the termt aroa vas doseribod ‘as monger, inaecutatey hoawy, and cone Rinuously pointed. On Missions 236'ant 245, cpposition vas nil Skcopt for 2 cncountor of moager, inaccurate, heavy flak at lmd~ fall ou Mlasion 2le (3) Damaco dssessuont: (Soo dnnex D, Part ITZ, for details), (2) Mission 2321 Damge assosmmont for this mission will bo found in Danago ssossaant Report Minber ijl which will. bo jgeludod in tho Tactical Mission Report for Missions Minor 257 through 261. (>) Mission 298: vas not availeblo at the tine of Ameluded iam lator reports Danavo assossuont for this mission ‘the writing of this roport and will be (e), Wsaien 2bss as a rosult of this aisston ancunts t er cont of tho total roof arcane Danege to tho Maruzon O11 Rofinory © 544225 squaro foot or 10, Bevis € 2 tony Seti. ae saser ene ae SEORED Fort I = Mavigation Track Chart Part IL = Flight Enginooring Charts Part IIT = Radar and Redar Photos Part IV = Gunnery Fart V~ ireSoa Resouo Chart 26/29 Juno ani 2 July 1.945 ap SECRET APRIL 1948, PART-LNAVIGATION TRACK CHART seonet Bo" ee as = 232-238 MISSION NO_8.245_ DATE 268.22une=2.t4s | XX1 BOMCOM. 315th. Wing 307 wo ima Lost Massion 2322610282 2611032 Mission 238— 2a1l032 aalleie Masion 245—O3ll21z O2IoIr? I DECLASSIFIED ‘sarpan Tama Tei EOE. tannins lat Lost iat, Let tuaon 332 secRooretitian alta Sthor ESR SHR EEOCROEARORUE SUEOSEETEDEE SECRET TTRAGK CHART XI BONGER CONIAND ten REPRODUCED SSP TU, | Flight Envieuct eg Bona ag000 : PITITODE (en) 20,204 14004 Mgooel - J i i [Peed Je Sala oe einai | [Weseeve | ee i a on ra : 5 er é LS meno Sitl J si New Se Bool 5 Zaid Lee Girth ' 400 + [ ee F000] fete : de j 4 oo Pin | lore | Cos, ees eee eet ae | SEQREL ERE LEE = Ruan 1s Radar Rosine, Al/APG67+ a. MNunbor of sots operative on take-off! 106, be Of a0 vonbing ~ muntor of acts operative over tarot! 1004 es Nusbor of sots operative on Lanting: 1026 4. verage maximum range of radar boscon rocoption! 80 Ni at 15,000 ft, altitudes + verage naximun rence of radar targots+ 109 MK at 5000 = 10,000 ft, altitudes 79 MK at 10,000 ~ 25,000 ft. altitudes f, average maxim rango of Japanoso coxst: 53 1 2+ Bquipnont failures: Se 2. Lopany aN/iPN9 4 intennas are ali fixed, Verimin rangot Ground vavest 570M Sey uaves! 1500 be Sot inoporativer 6 3. TER, SoR=695+ 2 Thoro was 1 equiment failures ig be Bquipuent turned on, checked, turnod off as 5.0.Ps he Ronarks: a» Thore wore 88 individual radar direct synchronous releases andes be Two atreraft made visual roloasess e+ Tyo aircraft mado radar direst fixed angle rolcasos. @s Ono airoraft mato a D/R releases e+ Lanifall and initial points wore all easily idontifiody £4 In all cases idoatification of aiming points was good 5 ' to tes lo 13 ks re ME MISSION 232 TARGET 1684 ' ‘MISSION 232 TARGET 1684 : UG g Cy faa hy dv i SECRET EAL IV = cumeny Yo, of /0 Firings 0 2 Lvarage tall turrst Iecds 1485, 3, No, of rounds fired tn conbat: ons. 1, No, of rounds usod for test firing: 7695, average per gun 23, 5, Guns Loaded: Cola, 6, Malfunctions + % GEC.: Dynonotor out, defective beck out circust, Slevation limit sriteh out and 6AiPOWIS nolfunctione, % Gi seo: Bolt sm, reversed, 7, Equipment operation (Tots) percentage operative): oe a, OPO1 99.68 % Gil, 601LG1 99,575 8, Renarker 8, APG-16 oquinment melfunctions ate axtsenoly high, rie NMP H S25. NARA Date DECLASSIFIED. hot DECLASSIFIED Nara Date 5/6/ UL oe iss0z aszooe vo esse iso fenena ‘ = ees lf BE rT = j20*. | = camaro] | | sueMaRne J sunrace. vesse ; A- Navy DuMB0 ie A— surer_ouns0 4 > |eereasteere a got 1350 eee cere ond tnd. ua igs ED 1 W VPA S095 BK wars pine 57/1 bso n poisesz To 207002 2916102 To 201i kes foment ama 4 @- some A— Navy ounso A~ sven _ounso O- surrace vesser Submarings_ wore 10 ramon fon station forthe entire mis Soha ieee Meee: NBER COMMAND SecneT Grosh boot on station vice fete Rel las od Tonding Nara Date 5M) = Q 2 2 ig pa 1948 oz \siez 0215162 Tpozirisz Mission No_245_| pare .2 JULY 45 XX BOMCOM. AIR-SEA RESCUE fre } 204 & 11302 TO O218002 . ep return of atte. AC ann o2s0# To ceisoo a ee 20] fe ww sine fo @- svemanine O- surrsce vesse A- vv puneo A — suer_ounso Fae Tee etre msion =e on eh 30" ioe yor gas TARE HART 9H BOMBER GONNND were Taal RFPROOIEEDSERPTO \ 3 iy 2 2 . 4 BAK ware dare 57/ LL cae SONEIRENTIAL le fe Batent Takasstts Five-tentns to 6/10 lov cloulsy base 1800 foots “scattered Light showera, by Houte Ostaoingt a) 4 Fourstonths to 6/10 16y olowlay base 2000 foot, top 4000 to B00 foot; 2/10 high elouds at 25,000 foot Scattered light shoverss . (2) Bron 29 Doproos Noxth to cog Northt Zichtatonths dow clouts, top 8400 to 124000 fect} 10/10 middie clots in layers betiweon 9000 and 22,000 fect; 10/10 hich clouds at 25,000 foot; uodorate Fimo icing, hoavy rain reducing visibility to zoroe (3) roa 33 Dommoce North to Tarsnt! ‘rcosténths lotr elouts, top 5000 toot; 7/10 midéle clouds, base 20,000 fect, top 22,000 foots ee Jf Trbatenthis’low clouds, top 5000 foots 10/10 middle Gouda, base 20,000 fect, top 22,000 foots viaiBliity § to 10 miles in Ment hanes luis ul

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