Volume 83, No.

1 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY March 2008

CHECKS AND BALANCES: THE WELCOMED TENSION BETWEEN

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Jamie Carlin Watson

Department of Philosophy, Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida 32306 USA
e-mail: jw05g@fsu.edu

Robert Arp
Ontology Research Group, New York State Center of Excellence in Bioinformatics & Life Sciences
Buffalo, New York 14203 USA
e-mail: rarp@buffalo.edu

keywords
tension, freedom, free will, intention, ecology, optimality, ethics, moral
philosophy, scientism, naturalism

abstract
There is a tension between science and philosophy, but this tension need not engender enmity or
derision. Scientists and philosophers can work together, and we argue that working together is
beneficial to both, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable. We offer examples of how philosophy can
autonomously and effectively inform scientific practice. Science and philosophy share certain method-
ological concerns and practices; therefore, scientists who disregard philosophy are vulnerable to critical
conceptual mistakes. If our arguments are correct, and if it can also be shown that science informs
philosophy, then, while it is possible for both disciplines to operate autonomously, each should welcome
the checks and balances that each provides for one another in the investigation and explanation of
reality.

A Tension Between Philosophy menides to reject the “world of common-

and Science sense” (Kirk 1961:110 –111). Conversely,

A TENSION EXISTS BETWEEN philos-

ophers and scientists in the Western
tradition that is as old as the disciplines of
philosophy and science themselves. Hera-
clitus derided empirical inquiry, claiming
that “thinking is the sacred disease, and
sight is deceptive,” and logic led Par-
the anonymous author of On Ancient Med-
icine (5th-century bce) rejects the method
of hypothesis formation, maintaining that
“if anyone were to speak and declare the
nature of these things [hypothesized], it
would not be clear to the speaker himself
or his audience whether what was said was

The Quarterly Review of Biology, March 2008, Vol. 83, No. 1

Copyright © 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0033-5770/2008/8301-0003$15.00

17
18 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
true or not, since there is no criterion to
which one should refer to obtain clear
knowledge” (Lloyd 1967:30).
Our contemporary climate shows little
improvement. Physicist Richard Feynman
once said that philosophers “say a great
deal about what is absolutely necessary for
science, and it is always, so far as one can
see, rather naive, and probably wrong”
(Feynman 1995:35, emphasis his). Take as
an example an exchange that one of us
witnessed at a recent philosophy collo-
quium. When presented with the explana-
tion, “Scientists tell us that X is just Y,” one
philosopher responded: “Yes, but scientists
don’t know what they’re talking about.”
Ironically, many explicit rejections of phi-
losophy are philosophically driven. Note
the philosophical underpinnings of biolo-
gist Richard Lewontin’s exasperating man-
ifesto:
We take the side of science in spite of the
patent absurdity of some of its constructs
. . . in spite of the tolerance of the scien-
tific community for unsubstantiated
just-so stories, because we have a prior
commitment, a commitment to material-
ism . . . [W]e are forced by our a priori
adherence to material causes to create an
apparatus of investigation and a set of
concepts that produce material explana-
tions, no matter how counterintuitive, no
matter how mystifying to the uninitiated
(1997:31).
Presuppositions such as these, as well as the
failure of certain philosophical projects, have
led some theorists to demand that philoso-
phy be subsumed by science, arguing that it
can have nothing to say apart from science.
We think that philosophy and science
can inform one another and that the inter-
action between them provides checks and
balances on their respective investigations
into reality. We will argue that philosophy
can autonomously inform science, inde-
pendent of any specific scientific result.
Whereas philosophy and science share cer-
tain methodological concerns and prac-
tices (viz., moderate reductionism, rational
investigation, healthy skepticism, and ex-
perimentation), scientists who ignore phi-
losophy are vulnerable to critical mistakes
Volume 83
(such as conceptual disregard, paradigm
stultification, ethical indifference, and sci-
entism), which can lead to theoretical dys-
function. We leave it to others to show how
science might inform philosophy, but if
there are analogous examples of that
kind— e.g., the nature and direction of
time (Oaklander and Smith 1994), the
General Theory of Relativity and the a pri-
ori (BonJour 1998), and neurobiology and
decision procedures (Weirich 2004)—then
one can conclude that it is mutually bene-
ficial for scientists and philosophers to in-
form one another, even if it is sometimes
uncomfortable.
Points of Agreement Between
Scientists and Philosophers
Traditionally, it has been held that phi-
losophy and science agree in at least four
methodological attitudes. These attitu-
des are supposed to constitute common
ground to which both philosophers and
scientists may return and appeal when dis-
agreements or confusions arise. Although
some of these attitudes have been and are
being challenged by experts in both fields,
their role in setting boundaries for the di-
alogue cannot be underestimated. If it
turns out that science encompasses philos-
ophy, these points of agreement will, of
course, be superfluous. However, if philos-
ophy autonomously informs science, these
points, or some suitable modification of
them, will be indispensable for informing
the dialogue.
First, philosophers and scientists agree
that a crucial criterion for choosing theo-
ries is a respect for standard theoretical vir-
tues, such as parsimony, explanatory power,
and consilience. Both groups seek the sim-
plest, most elegant unifying theory or ex-
planation. Elaborating on Ockham’s Razor
in one way or another, scientists and phi-
losophers revise theories so that they re-
flect the least amount of entities or causes
needed to explain a phenomenon or pro-
cess. For example, ellipses do a better ex-
planatory job than a multitude of concen-
tric circles, giving scientists the impetus to
choose a Keplerian interpretation of Co-
pernicus’s system over the Tychonic or
March 2008 “SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
Ptolemaic systems. Also, purely natural ex-
planations at work in the universe, rather
than natural and supernatural explana-
tions— e.g., through a designer God and
creation ex nihilo—account for why many
philosophers choose naturalistic models of
cosmological and biological evolution.
A second point of methodological agree-
ment shared by philosophers and scientists
is the posture of rational investigation. Sci-
entists do not divorce themselves from rea-
soning strategies and decision procedures
in evaluating data. It is true that certain
developments fly in the face of common-
sense assumptions (such as the twin-
paradox of special relativity), yet these con-
clusions are reached primarily on the basis
of careful reasoning guided by experimen-
tation. Likewise, philosophers proceed on
the basis of careful reasoning guided by
thought experiment and whatever empiri-
cal data proves relevant. Timothy William-
son (2007) puts it nicely: “The metaphysi-
cians who most disdain language are the
most likely to be its victims. . . . [T]hose
who neglect logic in order to deduce phil-
osophical results from natural science
make frequent logical errors in their de-
ductions” (p 55).
Third, philosophers and scientists take
an attitude of healthy skepticism toward in-
vestigation. Skepticism refers to the atti-
tude of doubt that accompanies ideas and
findings, empirical or nonempirical. In
contrast with radical skepticism, which
holds that all knowledge claims are sus-
pect, healthy skepticism merely qualifies
that no knowledge claim is sacrosanct and
welcomes contrary data, even if it means
the end of a pet theory. Both philosophy
and science have built-in methods of criti-
cism that, when respected, encourage
progress. Scholars in both fields of study
attempt to avoid personal presuppositions,
unwarranted assumptions, inconclusive ev-
idence, irrelevant variables, and hasty gen-
eralizations. In short, healthy skepticism
helps avoid theoretical extremes, profes-
sional arrogance, and faulty reasoning.
A fourth point of methodological agree-
ment shared by philosophers and scientists
is the concern for experimentation. Whereas
19
typical scientific problems are amenable to
empirical scrutiny, many philosophical
problems are not— e.g., the nature of at-
tribute agreement, realism versus antireal-
ism, freedom versus coercion. To address
these less empirical concerns, both disci-
plines employ thought experiments by way
of counter-example in order to analyze
theoretical concepts. Anglo-American phi-
losophers are continuously improving on
the precision of this procedure, and these
improvements are utilized by mathemati-
cians and scientists for especially hairy con-
ceptual obstacles. Although this method
has been roundly criticized, at least since
Quine (1969), thought experiments con-
tinue to play a significant role in guid-
ing fruitful philosophical and scientific
projects.
Philosophical Pitfalls for Scientists
It is critical to be clear about the dialec-
tic of our argument. We do not propose to
show merely that there are philosophical
questions about the nature and develop-
ment of science over and above the prob-
lems faced by working scientists. Surely we
could all acknowledge that philosophers
will continue to wrestle with fascinating
questions about, for example, scientific
revolutions, reductionism, and realism.
Rather, our concern is whether there are
any philosophical questions with which sci-
entists should be concerned. To demonstrate
this, it would not behoove philosophers to
offer arguments concerning the limita-
tions of science, the open-endedness of sci-
entific ontology, or the epistemic snafus of
empiricism. Scientists are typically not con-
cerned with classical philosophical topics.
Therefore, to apprise scientists of their
philosophical needs, we must provide con-
crete examples of how the work of philos-
ophy has clarified, concentrated, and ad-
vanced scientific projects. To this end we
offer four cases.
1. Conceptual Disregard
In the field of experimental psychology,
Benjamin Libet (1983) has received much
attention for his work on the neural origin
20 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
of action and its implications for free will.
However, Libet has been accused of ignor-
ing some relevant philosophical distinc-
tions. His experiments involve charting
electrical charges at the vertex of the scalp
in relation to “self-paced” voluntary ac-
tions. In the crucial experiment, sensors
are attached to subjects’ scalps, and they
are asked to watch a modified clock, where
a spot of light emitted from a cathode ray
oscilloscope revolves around the face like a
second hand, but 25 times faster. The
speed of the spot makes each “second”
mark on the clock equal to about 40 milli-
seconds. In these experiments, there are
four test groups that can be roughly di-
vided into those groups in which members
flick their right wrist or fingers voluntarily,
either at a predetermined time or sponta-
neously, and a group whose members are
told to prepare to flex at a particular time,
but, prior to that time (say 100 –200 ms),
are instructed to “veto” or forego the flick-
ing motion.
In all cases, the detected electrical
charges, which Libet calls “readiness po-
tentials” (RPs), undergo a ramplike pre-
event—that is, a significant increase— be-
fore each voluntary action. These ramping
charges begin about 550 ms prior to the
time when the subject could spontaneously
flick his or her wrist. In addition, the sub-
jects reported becoming aware of a desire
or urge to flick at about 200 ms prior to the
action. Correcting for a 50 ms degree of
error, this leaves about 400 ms prior to a
subject’s conscious awareness of the im-
pending act when the brain is uncon-
sciously preparing the body for a voluntary
motion.
Libet concludes from these experiments
that the initiation of voluntary actions is
beyond our conscious control, and that the
only role for the conscious will is to “select
and control” (Mele 2006:34) this process
by intervening sometime prior to the overt
bodily motion but after we have become
conscious of the impending act. This leaves
about 150 ms for us to veto an impending
bodily motion. Libet claims, then, that ac-
tions actually begin around 550 ms prior to
overt bodily motion, and he interchange-
Volume 83
ably calls this spike in RPs our “intention,”
“decision,” “wanting,” “wish,” and “urge” to
act. The implication he draws from this
analysis is that we are free to act, but in a
very limited sense. We do not choose which
actions to perform; we merely veto actions
already begun by our brains. Some psy-
chologists have claimed that Libet’s studies
are some of the most direct challenges to
traditional philosophical conceptions of
free will (Haggard et al. 1999).
Although Libet’s experiments produce
some interesting results, there is a certain
disparity between these results and the
conclusions that he draws from them. Phi-
losopher Alfred Mele has, on several occa-
sions (1997; 2003; 2006), criticized Libet’s
analysis and interpretation of the concepts
he employs in explaining his data. Mele
argues that Libet ignores the conceptual
distinction between “intending,” on the
one hand, and motivational states, such as
“wanting,” on the other (2006:44 – 45).
It might be the case that if Mele’s con-
ceptual challenges could be met, Libet’s
experiments would still pose problems for
some views of free will. However, we think
that Mele’s further scientific criticisms of
the construction of Libet’s experiment, es-
pecially concerning the reliability of pa-
tients to accurately record their clock-time
in milliseconds, rule this out for the time
being.
Libet uses the terms “intention” and
“wanting” interchangeably. But Mele shows
that these concepts come apart rather
readily upon proper analysis:
Wanting to do something is distinguishable
from intending to do it. One can want . . .
to A without being at all settled on A-ing.
Yesterday, I wanted to meet a friend at a
7:00 movie and I wanted to join another
friend at a 7:00 lecture. I knew that I could
do either but not both. . . . To intend to do
something is, at least in part, to be settled
(but not necessarily irrevocably) on doing
it. . . . Wanting to do something is compat-
ible with being unsettled about whether to
do it (2006:31; emphasis ours).
If “intentions” and “desires” are not the
same thing, then we must reconsider what
might be occurring at 550 ms prior to a
March 2008 “SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
bodily movement. Recall that in the “veto”
case, when group members are asked to
prepare to flick but then veto the move-
ment, subjects are instructed prior to the
experiment not to flick their wrist or fin-
gers. Therefore, compliant subjects in-
tended to comply with the request. “So
what is indicated by the RP? Presumably,
not the acquisition or presence of an inten-
tion to flex; for then, at some point in time,
the subjects would have both an intention
to flex at the prearranged time and an
intention not to flex at that time” (Mele
2006:34). If “intentions” really do entail
being settled on performing a certain ac-
tion, then we run into a problem with Li-
bet’s interpretation. Mele asks, “How can a
normal agent simultaneously be settled on
A-ing at t and settled on not A-ing at t?”
(2006:34).
But if the RPs do not pick out “inten-
tions,” what do they identify? RPs may be
correlated with “urges” or “desires” to flex,
which could result from wanting to comply
with the researchers’ instructions, and
which could be correlated with other brain
events that lead reliably to the production
of overt actions (Mele 2006:36). Another
possibility is suggested by the research of
psychiatrist Sean Spence and neuroscien-
tist C Frith (1999), who point out that the
brain activity associated with “imagining”
performing a bodily motion is very similar
to the brain activity associated with prepar-
ing to make a movement. And this activity
could be well underway prior to any con-
scious recognition of an urge to perform
an overt action.
Setting aside the obvious philosophical
implications of this reinterpretation of the
data for free will, Mele thinks that these
revisions would assist Libet in better char-
acterizing his own findings. He writes, “I
believe that if Libet himself were to distin-
guish between intending and wanting . . .
along the lines I have sketched, he might
find it more credible to associate the readi-
ness potentials with the latter than with the
former” (2006:33). Mele concludes that Li-
bet’s pronouncements concerning inten-
tionality and the conscious will as a veto
faculty are unwarranted once we make the
21
necessary conceptual distinctions. In addi-
tion, Libet’s experiments may result in an
increase in explanatory power if we allow
Mele’s distinctions to lead us to further,
more precise experimental designs. This is
the kind of work of which conceptual anal-
ysis is capable, and its introduction into
various scientific fields has proven useful.
2. Paradigm Stultification
Another philosophical difficulty for sci-
entists is clarifying the nature and implica-
tions of experimental conclusions. Certain
methods, while rife with useful results, pro-
duce data that fit a markedly determinate
pattern. On the one hand, this might indi-
cate that an instrument is operating exactly
as it should. On the other, it might indicate
that the instrument is structured to pro-
duce a certain kind of result rather than
accurately depicting a feature of reality.
Philosophers are particularly adept at ask-
ing the kinds of questions that lead to
changes in inadequate paradigms.
A major research tool for populaion ecol-
ogists is environmental modeling. There is
an old debate in this area that begins with a
problem about adaptationism and the struc-
ture of what are called “optimality” models.
Optimality models attempt to explain the
distribution of particular phenotypes within
a population by identifying those factors,
whether environmental or genetic, that cor-
relate with changes in that particular trait.
These models do not purport to show that
an organism or population optimizes its
traits, since changes in environment and ge-
netics occur regularly enough to rule this
out. Neither is a model supposed to show
which trait would be optimal for a popula-
tion, but merely whether one trait possesses
certain selective features in contrast with an-
other, given an environment and gene set at
a time.
Biologist Richard Lewontin (1977) criti-
cized optimality models as being more a
“test of ingenuity” than an inquiry into the
state of nature. Often, a model captures
part of an observable phenomenon but is
then contradicted, for example, by the the-
ory proposed, or by independent data. If a
model fails in this way, theorists typically
22 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
revise its parameters so that it accurately
depicts the phenomena without contradic-
tion. This solution appears too simplistic,
for it seems that any theory could be ade-
quately modified so that it always comes
out true. Lewontin writes: “By allowing the
theorist to postulate various combinations
of ‘problems’ to which manifest traits are
optimal ‘solutions,’ the adaptationist pro-
gramme makes of adaptation a metaphysi-
cal postulate, not only incapable of refuta-
tion, but necessarily confirmed by every
observation” (Maynard Smith 1994:99).
Biologist John Maynard Smith agreed
with Lewontin’s criticism, but argued that
a theorist can make two adjustments to
prevent unwarranted conclusions from op-
timality models. The first adjustment con-
cerns the complexity of the theory. If a
theory is too simple, Lewontin’s criticism is
successful, “particularly [for] a model that
assumes each organ or behavior to serve
only one function” (Maynard Smith 1994:
99). For each discrepancy, a modeler adds
assumptions to meet the challenge. But if
the model has had some measure of qual-
itative success, then there is no reason to
think that the modification renders the
theory or model unfalsifiable. Therefore,
increasing the specificity of the model will
reduce the possibility of constructing an
irrefutable theory. For example, it is easy to
say that male dung flies copulate to maxi-
mize their reproductive success. It is much
more difficult to explain “why they copu-
late for 35 minutes rather than 5 minutes or
2 hours” (Sober 2000:137; emphasis his).
Thus, if some relevant revisions make
the problem more specific, and therefore
more difficult, the model should still pro-
duce fruitful results, even if a few incon-
sistencies arise in individual cases.
The second adjustment is to restrict re-
vised theories from being read back onto
previous observation statements. If theo-
ries can be altered to fit the data after the
fact, then they can never be falsified. Aug-
mentation of theories is not controversial:
“Since all [these theories] have had quali-
tative success, it seems quite appropriate to
modify them” (Maynard Smith 1994:99).
But these modifications must be subjected
Volume 83
to further tests in order to ensure their
generalization across experiments. May-
nard Smith argued that we must resist
modifying the model “and at the same time
[claiming] that the model is confirmed by
observation” (1994:100). This restriction
reminds the theorist that explanations can-
not be revised for old data. New data must
be produced for each revision to prevent
models from becoming inwardly trivial
with respect to biased data sets.
Ecologists recognized early on that there
were problems with optimality models
(Mangel and Clark 1988:4), but few at-
tempts were made at moving beyond the
standard construction. Despite the fact
that these models were empirically useful
in sustaining ecological research, and also
that Maynard Smith’s adjustments coun-
tered Lewontin’s original criticisms, prob-
lems mounted. Insistence on this version
of optimality model is indicative of a resis-
tance to methodological change. Philo-
sophical challenges eventually pressed
ecologists to reject the standard program
(Mangel and Clark 1988:4), and the cur-
rent conception of modeling predomi-
nantly follows Colin Clark and Marc Man-
gel’s “dynamic state variable optimization”
formulas (1988; 2000). This example high-
lights how philosophical questions are par-
ticularly relevant to specific scientific
projects, and that philosophers are trained
to ask these kinds of questions.
3. Ethical Indifference
Although science remains the standard
by which to judge descriptive claims and
phenomena, few scientists have trod into
the realm of values. Normativity has tradi-
tionally been considered off-limits to sci-
ence, given that, as Hume noted, “is”
claims entail nothing concerning “ought”
claims, and science is an “is”-oriented
discipline (1739-1740/2000:293–302). But
ever greater advancements in technology
raise critical moral questions that loom
over scientific discussions, demanding ad-
equate treatment, e.g., our increasing need
for mood-altering pharmaceuticals, grow-
ing concern over human genetic engineer-
ing, and even some old concerns rekindled
March 2008 “SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
over the use of electroshock therapy
(United Press International 2007). Sci-
ence, however, seems ill-suited to answer
ethical questions. Some scientists even ap-
peal to philosophers for help solving
problems with normativity. In their 1980
publication, Human Inference: Strategies
and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, exper-
imental psychologists Richard Nisbett
and Lee Ross write:
[W]e have become increasingly aware of
the difficulty of defining what is “norma-
tive” when one moves beyond the relatively
simple question of how to solve correctly
some particular problem. “Normatively ap-
propriate” strategies for the solution of
some problems are extremely time con-
suming and expensive. . . . We have be-
come excited by such normative questions
and are pleased that our own book high-
lights them. We have not been able to
make much progress toward their solution,
however. . . . It is our hope that others,
particularly philosophers who are more
comfortable with such questions, will be
motivated to pursue them (quoted in
Bishop and Trout 2005:vii–viii).
This surprising, 27 year old request
should have compelled philosophers to
step up and join a discussion that they are
equipped to inform. But in the decades
following this request, the growing trend
in moral philosophy has been to push for
science to eclipse morality. A prime exam-
ple of this comes from Michael Ruse and E
O Wilson in “Moral Philosophy as Applied
Science” (1986). Ruse and Wilson offer
four lines of empirical data to support
their conclusion that, “Beliefs in extraso-
matic moral truths and in an absolute is/
ought barrier are wrong. Moral premises
relate only to our physical nature and are
the result of idiosyncratic genetic history”
(1986:173).
There are two questions concerning eth-
ics that should be distinguished for our
purposes. First, there is the question of the
origin of moral claims. Discussions in this
area can blur the line between philosophy
and science, and scientific efforts to ad-
dress ethical concerns include attempts to
explain moral intuitions in terms of pro-
23
jections of personal value or in terms of
selective and nonselective behavior. Phil-
osophical counterparts to these scientific
explanations are typically either reduc-
tionist or error theoretic.
The second kind of ethical question con-
cerns the nature of moral claims. Aside
from the processes by which our ethical
concepts developed, we want to know
whether there are any specifically moral
facts to be grasped, and whether they are
binding on our conduct. Questions about
the nature of ethical statements seem es-
sentially broader than the scope of scien-
tific inquiry. If there are good reasons for
believing that there are objective moral
facts and that they are binding, then it is
important that we know those facts and
that we alter our behavior accordingly, for
whatever reason the claims turn out to be
binding (whether for the greatest good,
overall happiness, or divine imperative). If
there are good reasons for believing that
there are no objective moral facts, or that
these facts are not binding, we want to
know that as well.
If our moral perceptions are products of
evolution, does this mean that we are not
tracking something objective when we sup-
posedly perceive value? Ruse and Wilson
argue that this is exactly the conclusion we
should draw. They provide evidence that
our concepts of “right” and “wrong” are
products of socialization, that the mind is
essentially biological, that epigenetic rules
found to govern behavioral responses to
color can be extended to moral behavior,
and that specific “moral” behaviors, such as
altruism and incest avoidance, are analo-
gous to selective behavior in certain animal
populations. From this evidence they con-
clude, “In short, ethical premises are the
peculiar products of genetic history . . . No
abstract moral principles exist outside the
particular nature of individual species”
(Ruse and Wilson 1986:186).
What is important for our purposes is
not Ruse and Wilson’s conclusion, but the
reasoning by which they arrive at it. They
attempt to derive a conclusion about the
nature of moral claims from empirical ev-
idence, but, at best, the evidence supports
24 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
conclusions about the origin of ethical
claims. Implicitly they have presupposed a
concept of value—perhaps that value is es-
sentially behavioral, or that the content of
value is expressed behaviorally—and then
provided empirical evidence that explains
behavior as grounding that concept. Prior
to presenting the evidence, they have en-
gaged in a philosophical project concern-
ing the nature of value. And, whereas they
assume empirical evidence informs their
morality, it turns out that a prior philo-
sophical framework is presupposed, which
then does the work in connecting the em-
pirical data to their conclusion.
Even if their conclusion could be sup-
ported on the basis of a developed moral
theory, it is evident that philosophical work
is necessary. Consider, alternatively, that
humans, as biological creatures in a mate-
rial world, discovered and developed the
use of logic and mathematics. The way we
learned to use these concepts is a function
of our socialization (e.g., times tables).
Our minds might have even been directed
by epigenetic rules to discover at least ru-
dimentary inductive reasoning strategies.
Finally, there may be evolutionary reasons
for us to avoid fallacies such as hasty gen-
eralizations and begging the question. De-
spite all this, most of us do not think that
true logical and mathematical propositions
are relative to “the particular nature of in-
dividual species.” The perception of logical
and ethical connections may, of course, be
relative to the set of rational beings, but in
neither the logic and math case nor the
ethical case do these developmental pro-
cesses show that there is anything objective
or mind-independent about the claims.
The result is that, whatever answer we give
to the question about the nature of ethical
claims, it will not be scientific.
But, in this regard, do philosophers make
any progress? Philosophers construct con-
ceptual frameworks for understanding the
options available for explaining and justify-
ing moral claims. Since moral facts, if they
exist, do not operate like natural laws (i.e.,
compelling assent), we must, at some point,
make a rational inference, seeking the moral
framework that best captures the totality of
Volume 83
our evidence, including our moral intui-
tions. These inferences map the possibilities
for plausible normative frameworks. This
may be unsatisfactory to some scientists, but
recall the request of Nisbett and Ross. They
ask that philosophers develop appropriate
normative strategies for interpreting and in-
forming empirical projects. Such strategies
may provide materials for hypothesis forma-
tion and experiment construction. This is
evidence that philosophers have something
to say to scientists concerning morality and
normativity.
4. Scientism and Methodological
Openness
Scientism is roughly the position that
philosophy should restrict its methods,
findings, and ontology to those of the nat-
ural sciences, going beyond them only lin-
guistically or theoretically to address espe-
cially pernicious terminological problems.
This means that, as used here, following
the example set by Paul Moser and David
Yandell, scientism has both metaphysical
and methodological elements. This is ad-
mittedly strong since scientism is typically
only associated with discussions of scien-
tific ontology.
In Moser and Yandell’s defense, any ap-
peal to science as exclusive and exhaustive
for human activity enforces restrictions on
methodology. In addition, any methodol-
ogy that restricts itself to science must also
provide an empirical basis for this restric-
tion. Therefore, the question of justifica-
tion becomes paramount for any constella-
tion of naturalistic theses. Of course, one
may reject naturalism as a thesis (see
Maddy 1997 for an example), but then one
faces further epistemic questions about the
truth-functional efficacy of pragmatism
and/or theoretical virtues. Although “sci-
entism” is typically used pejoratively, indi-
cating the reification of science, certain
naturalistically inclined philosophers have
adopted the term (Fodor 2002:30 –31).
The power and success of science has led
some to rather extreme views about its
viability. We may recall—with a certain
twinge—the earlier quotation from Rich-
ard Lewontin. Recently, philosophers Paul
March 2008 “SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
Moser and David Yandell (2000) have of-
fered several arguments showing the defi-
ciencies of scientism. If Moser and Yandell
are correct, the very formulation of “Core
Scientism” prevents the view from having
any explanatory force.
Moser and Yandell identify what they ar-
gue are the basic tenets of Core Scientism,
which they take to comprise the concept of
naturalism. They claim that scientism de-
pends on two theses, which may or may not
be independent:
Core Ontological Naturalism: every real entity
either consists of or is somehow ontically
grounded in the objects countenanced by
the hypothetically completed empirical sci-
ences (that is, in the objects of a natural
ontology).
Core Methodological Naturalism: every legiti-
mate method of acquiring knowledge con-
sists of or is grounded in the hypothetically
completed methods of the empirical sci-
ences (that is, in natural methods) (2000:
10).
They argue that these theses lead the nat-
uralist to a dilemma. “Either Core Scient-
ism is not itself a thesis included in or
warranted by the (hypothetically com-
pleted) empirical sciences or its warrant
depends on a special reformulation of the
‘proper understanding’ of empirical sci-
ence” (Moser and Yandell 2000:13). Since
it seems obvious that any special reformu-
lation of the understanding of science will
be a matter of “semantical fiat” that is, at
best, ad hoc, and, at worst, simply false,
they focus on the first half of the dilemma.
Moser and Yandell distinguish ontological
naturalism from methodological natural-
ism but direct their criticism at the con-
junction. Although our criticism is also di-
rected at that conjunction, we feel it is
applicable to the methodological compo-
nent independently of the ontological
component, and this motivates our sug-
gested alternative.
It would be convenient for naturalists if
Core Scientism could be formulated so
that it is entailed by a research program or
finding of the empirical sciences, whether
current or complete. But the monopolistic
character of the tenets of Core Scientism is
25
rather unscientific. “Core Scientism pro-
poses a universality of scope for the em-
pirical sciences that they themselves es-
chew. . . . [E]mpirical science as a whole is
marked out by its attempt to explain all
empirical data and thus by the range of all
empirical data” (Moser and Yandell 2000:
11). Therefore, any claim about every real
entity and every legitimate method of ob-
taining knowledge from a naturalistic per-
spective should be checked by the limita-
tions that empirical research imposes on
itself.
Now, it may be argued that, though sci-
entism may not be included in or entailed
by any empirical research program, sci-
ence operates predominantly by abductive
reasoning, which allows us to speak legiti-
mately beyond any direct finding of sci-
ence. Since this is the case, can we say that
empirical research provides a great deal of
epistemic warrant for scientism? Moser
and Yandell argue that this is insufficient
to justify scientism. They claim that this
move shifts the focus of the discussion to
questions about the principles of epistemic
warrant appropriate for reasoning within
the natural sciences:
Are any such principles of [epistemic] war-
rant required, logically or epistemically, by
the . . . empirical sciences themselves? No
such principles seem logically required, as
the . . . empirical sciences logically permit
that Core Scientism is not warranted.
Whether such principles are epistemically
required depends on the epistemic princi-
ples warranted by the . . . empirical sci-
ences, and the latter remains unsettled
(Moser and Yandell 2000:12).
Moser and Yandell argue that the onus is
on the naturalist to show exactly why em-
pirical science warrants Core Scientism.
We agree that Core Scientism fails epis-
temic warrant, and we think another argu-
ment can expand the scope of the criti-
cism. Perhaps a naturalist could claim that
her belief in Core Scientism is something
akin to a “properly basic belief,” needing
no strong justification (see Plantinga 1983
and 1993 on the specifics of basic and
properly basic beliefs). She could argue
that the conjunction of all of her com-
26 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
bined life experiences and understanding
of the operation and conceptual develop-
ment of science compel her to believe in
nothing but the legitimacy of “science
alone.” She could admit that her belief is
defeasible, and challenge anyone to de-
velop a better method of investigation than
science.
A central problem with defeasibility in
this case is that the belief could only be
defeated by a proposition of science, since
that is the limitation the naturalist has sub-
jectively placed on the evidence she is will-
ing to consider. Since scientific methods
are willing to follow the evidence wherever
it may lead, and, since the branches of
science possess an intrinsic ability to ac-
commodate new data, any alternative
mode of investigation justified by appeal to
science would itself become “scientific,” in
the necessary sense. But this means that
any project that could not appeal to sci-
ence for justification could never, by defi-
nition, be justified by science. It could be
rejected as “unscientific,” but this would
not speak to its epistemic legitimacy unless
one presupposed naturalism. In addition,
it is unclear how any scientific method or
finding could undermine the process of
science. Therefore, if science cannot be-
stow legitimacy on any epistemic method
outside of itself, and it could never defame
its own legitimacy, then belief in scientism
is not, in fact, defeasible.
The naturalist might object that, since
science accepts the legitimacy of infer-
ences to the best explanation (IBEs), and,
since the naturalist has already made use of
this method of argumentation, we could
say that her properly basic belief in scien-
tism is warranted on the basis of IBE and
defeasible because of the possibility of an
IBE with the conclusion that scientism is
false. The onus would then be on the non-
naturalist to provide a defeater, which
seems reasonable.
The interesting thing about accepting
scientism as a properly basic belief in this
sense is that it now has nothing to do with
a contemporary conception of science.
Even though IBEs are acceptable in scien-
tific practice, the IBE that would figure
Volume 83
into a defense of naturalism as proposed
would include content that is too subjec-
tive to be considered “scientific.” A war-
ranted, properly basic belief includes an
assemblage of the subject’s life experience,
which includes psychological states, educa-
tion, and beliefs acquired at an early age.
While these are certainly acceptable expe-
riences on which to form defeasible beliefs,
they are not experiences employed in the
best scientific research. It is still the case
that, even if held as a properly basic belief,
scientism is inconsistent with the nonmo-
nopolistic nature of science. Therefore, re-
stricting science a posteriori, but through a
method other than science, leaves scient-
ism unwarranted.
Where does this leave us? We suggest
that, consistent with the aims and content
of both science and philosophy, we apply
our entire arsenal—not merely our scien-
tific arsenal— of good reasoning tech-
niques to questions about reality. This will
sound, at first, rather anticlimactic, espe-
cially for those who suppose that the sci-
ences exhaust our reasoning capacities.
But let us briefly hint at something more
interesting. Following Michael Friedman’s
Presidential Address to the American Phil-
osophical Association, we can envision an
ineliminable relationship between philoso-
phy and science that does not presuppose
naturalism. Friedman advocates:
A dynamical system of beliefs, concepts,
and principles that can be analyzed, for
present purposes, into three main compo-
nents: an evolving system of empirical nat-
ural scientific concepts and principles, an
evolving system of mathematical concepts
and principles . . . and an evolving system
of philosophical concepts and principles.
(1997:19).
Friedman’s idea is that science, mathematics,
and philosophy operate autonomously,
though they inform one another, and the
conceptual (paradigmatic) revolutions that
take place within each field are independent
of information from the others. They are
mutually dependent, though none is supe-
rior, and none infallible.
Friedman defends this picture at length,
highlighting historical instances of interdis-
March 2008 “SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
ciplinary give and take (1997:13–18). Our
suggestion, then, is modest. Let us drop
the scientistic assumption, since even if it
can be formulated coherently, it adds no
virtue to our theories. Let us place the
compendium of our rational faculties in
the service of difficult philosophical, scien-
tific, and mathematical problems. Most of
us already use such a method— call it meth-
odological openness— even if we try to avoid it
or explicitly renounce it by calling our-
selves “naturalists.” But intellectual honesty
requires that we shed unproductive atti-
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