“Where measures are taken to minimise civilian harm, economic sanctions are ethically defensible”.

Discuss.

Introduction

The use of economic sanctions1 is articulated in Article 41 in the Charter of the UN2, presenting the
international community with a policy instrument that lies between a mere ‘diplomatic slap on the wrist’
and military measures3 to ensure compliance with international law. Although the 1990s represented
the “sanctions decade” – an era of increased resort to sanctions, both unilaterally and collectively, and
for a much broader range of international goals – sanctions have come under increasing fire from
several fronts, primarily for their negative humanitarian impact upon innocent populations4.

Unlike the case of clearly laid-out rules covering declared wars and wartime conduct, international law
places no legal limitations on coercive measures short of war. Thus, the constraints on the use of
economic sanctions are based on subjective perceptions, leaving room for debate on its ethical
defensibility.

By accepting that measures might be taken to allay the ethical concerns of civilian harm, we are
masking the fact that sanctions may be a wholly immoral tool of statecraft

Economic sanctions, by their very nature, knowingly result in the systematic deprivation of civilian
populations of resources5. Sanctions may be subjected to the same ethical objections as siege warfare,
especially in terms of the violation of the principle of distinction in jus in bello6. While siege warfare
involves the surrounding of civilian communities to restrict their access to food, water and other
necessities, economic sanctions essentially represents a modern equivalent by using international
pressure to prevent the production and importation of those goods. The direct consequence in both
cases is that mixed populations, including non-combatants, suffer due to the typical domestic policy
response of shifting scarce resources to the military or political leadership7. This represents the violation
of the principle of distinction in just war doctrine, which requires a distinction between non-combatants
and combatants. Furthermore, as families are forced to turn to the black market for necessities, it is
often the most vulnerable groups in society who take the largest blow – those who are least able to
defend themselves, who present the least military threat and who had the least input into policy
decisions8.

1
In light of the large variation in types of economic sanctions, this essay will assume the term ‘economic sanctions’ to mean its
most common form: restrictions on exports to, and the freezing of overseas assets belonging to target states. For example, the
US imposed trade sanctions on Iranian oil during the Tehran Hostage Crisis (Pape, R. p. 104).
2
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions…These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations” (Article 41, Charter of the United Nations)
3
Davis, L. & Engerman S., p.187
4
Bierstecker, T., p.1-2
5
Gordon, J., p.2
6
Jean-Marie, H. & Doswald-Beck, L., p.1
7
Gordon, J., p.3
8
Ibid.
Apart from the rare occasions9, in almost every case of the imposition of economic sanctions, explicit or
purported consent had not been obtained by the civilian population. Especially in authoritarian regimes,
civilians often have little or no input into political decisions made by the elites. Under a regime of
sanctions, the disparity between public opinion and elite decisions tends to grow even wider – this is
because state control of the media is likely to increase and non-state parties have less access to
disseminate information. This, added with the high costs of emigration, means that civilians are faced
with a situation of deprivation where they are being punished for policy decisions of which they had
little say in of the first place. Therefore, economic sanctions are ethically objectionable in light of the
fact that they represent the imposition of suffering upon the most vulnerable sectors of the innocent
population, against their will. Mitigation of such effects by humanitarian relief programs, and assertions
by policymakers to “ensure that the ordinary people suffer as little as possible”10 may not add to the
ethical justification of this form of modern siege warfare. To argue that sanctions are morally defensible
“as long as we minimise civilian harm” is to mask the important fact that sanctions do, by their nature,
significantly and primarily deprive innocent populations11.

Sanctions may be ethically defensible if the civilian harm is “worth the price”: Using the Utilitarian
calculus

The Principle of Proportionality offered by jus ad bellum posits that the widespread civilian harm caused
by economic sanctions may perhaps be morally defensible if the hardship of the targeted population
entails less human harm overall, compared with the military aggression, nuclear proliferation or
genocide the sanctions seek to prevent. In this case – as an ethical matter – it is necessary to investigate
if economic sanctions are indeed effective in influencing the political decisions of ‘rogue’ states12.
Expected harm inflicted Relief from measures Harm inflicted on the international
on civilians due to – <
taken to minimise community due to aggressive acts
economic sanctions civilian harm by the target state

Using a rational utilitarian calculus, if the above is true, then economic sanctions could be said to be
ethically defensible.

Assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions in obtaining policy change in target states

Although sanctions do achieve economic damage – measured in varying intensities of GDP loss in
targeted states – this rarely translates to political efficacy. A study by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott
estimated a success rate for sanctions of one-third in achieving desired ends, and this result is
considered optimistic by many scholars13. This failure may be accounted for by a number of reasons.

9
Such as in the case of South Africa, where active support for UN intervention was received by the black majority against
Apartheid (Gordon, J., p.7)
10
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeconaf/96/96i.pdf, p.21
11
According to Dennis Halliday, the UN coordinator of the oil-for-food program, “4000 to 5000 children (were) dying
unnecessarily every month due to the impact of sanctions (against Iraq) because of the breakdown of water and sanitation,
inadequate diet and the bad internal health situation”. He cited other negative effects of the comprehensive regime against
Iraq, including increased levels of crime and the departure overseas of millions of Iraqi professionals. (Bierstecker, T., p.3)
12
Gordon, J., p.135
13
Davis, L. & Engerman S., p.195
Firstly, far from undermining the political legitimacy of the target, sanctions often trigger a ‘rally-around-
the-flag’ response. Galtung discusses that unpopular elites often take advantage of domestic suffering to
invoke nationalist sentiments and to create an ‘us versus them’ perception against foreign intervention,
or shifting the blame on political dissidents to further consolidate their power14. In addition, states can
mitigate the economic damage by substituting to domestic production or searching for alternative
trading partners15. In most cases – whether applied unilaterally or sanctioned by the UN, whether during
the mercantilist period of the interwar years or during today’s integrated world economy – economic
sanctions have been revealed to be spectacularly ineffective in encouraging conformity to international
norms. According to Nossal, the fact that economic sanctions are an ineffective tool of statecraft has
almost become axiomatic16.

Therefore, economic sanctions have seemed to lose their utilitarian justification if the success of
sanctions is judged by the extent to which they alter political decisions in target states. On one hand,
there is a low probability of compliance by the target; on the other, there is a much higher likelihood (or
even inevitability) that civilian populations will suffer17. The net loss in utility to humanity violates the
Principle of Proportionality in just war theory.

Assessing the effectiveness and moral qualification of economic sanctions when imposed to achieve
alternative goals

The revisionist view, led by Baldwin, assert that the ‘effectiveness’ of sanctions should not be viewed as
a change in the behaviour of target states, but on a repertoire of objectives. Firstly, sanctions may be an
‘expressive’ activity intended to send signals of resolve to the domestic and/or international community.
Secondly, they are a means to punish an act of wrongdoing – a public expression of the community’s
moral disapproval of the act in order to deter future similar acts of aggression18.

However, if we accept the view that sanctions may be applied to achieve these alternative goals, then
further problems will arise to defend them on ethical grounds. Firstly, there is little moral legitimacy in
treating the lives of human beings merely as an instrument of communication, whether or not domestic
or foreign policy objectives are fulfilled. Kantian moral philosophy states that humanity should be
treated “always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”19. While sanctions aiming to
deter states from acts of aggression or genocide might be justified on utilitarian grounds, the same
cannot be said of sanctions which use humanity as merely a communicative means. Secondly, sanctions
with a punitive intent suggest that the sender state possesses the legitimate authority to distinguish
between moral rights and wrongs20. In an anarchical society where there are tendencies towards self-

14
Such a case was demonstrated during the economic sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Mussolini. The
sanctions were reported to increase patriotic fervour and support for his military project. (Gordon, J., p.134)
15
A classic example of such a case was the 1980 US embargo on grain exports to the USSR. The embargo did raise the price of
grain, but the Soviets were able to turn to other sources, and the price increases did not dissuade them from their Afghan
project. (Davis, L. & Engerman S., p. 194)
16
Nossal, K., p.301
17
Gordon, J., p.135
18
Nossal K., p.303
19
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT9
20
Nossal, K., p.307
interested pursuits, it is difficult to distinguish between genuine accusations of wrongdoing from self-
interested acts. Furthermore, even if we agree that certain acts are morally objectionable, “punishment”
is legitimate only if the wrongdoers (i.e. elites) are analogous to the ones who are punished (i.e.
civilians)21. As discussed, this is often not the case.

Thus, even if civilian harm was severely minimised, economic sanctions as expression and/or
punishment can never be ethically defensible on utilitarian and Kantian terms.

The possible implementation of ‘targeted financial sanctions’ as an ethically defensible form of

sanctions

The historical record for economic sanctions has demonstrated that current measures to minimise
civilian harm may not be sufficient to justify its use. Rather than settling for the outright rejection of
economic sanctions, there is much optimism in exploring a new form of ‘smart’ sanctions as discussed in
the Interlaken Process22. While blunt, comprehensive sanctions are ineffective and cause widespread
civilian suffering, targeted sanctions to freeze the overseas assets of specific elites would remove most
ethical concerns. If designed and implemented as hoped, only the architects of the reprehensive policies,
not innocent populations, would suffer the effects of the sanctions. To date, the Security Council has
never mandated such sanctions although pasts experiments have proven relatively successful23. The
financial assets of many elites of target states remain untouched by current sanction regimes, leaving
room for the potential of new measures to minimise civilian harm, and in turn, hope that economic
sanctions could be ethically defensible.

Conclusion

Judged by ethical theory, the current usage of economic sanctions presents a multitude of problems: As
the modern equivalent of siege warfare, sanctions are by nature inconsistent with the Principle of
Distinction in just war doctrine. They are unacceptable from a utilitarian perspective due to its poor
record of effectiveness, and are even more difficult to defend ethically if signals of intent and
punishment are accepted as legitimate goals. While some may argue that civilian harm caused by
economic sanctions may be “worth the price” if sufficient measures are taken to minimise civilian harm,
insofar as comprehensive sanctions continue to be applied in the way it is today, they represent a
“device of cruelty garbed in self righteousness”24.That said, there is room for the development of
targeted financial sanctions, which shift the primary target from civilians to ruling elites, in resolving
these ethical issues

---

21
Gordon, J., p.140
22
Bierstecker, T., p.4
23
Experiential knowledge of targeted financial sanctions were drawn from various cases – e.g. financial sanctions imposed on
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the EU, US and Switzerland in 1999. (Bierstecker, T., p.7)
24
Gordon, J., p.128
Bibliography

Bierstecker, T., ‘Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Primer’, Background Paper for the Targeted Financial
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Davis, L. & Engerman S., ‘History Lessons – Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace’, Journal of Economic
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Elliott, K. & Hufbauer, G., ‘Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990’s’, The American
Economic Review, Vol. 89, No.2 (May 1999), p. 403-408

Gordon, J., ‘A peaceful, silent, deadly remedy: the ethics of economic sanctions’, Ethics and International
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Lindsay, J., ‘Trade sanctions as policy instruments: a re-examination’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
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Pape, R., ‘Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work’, International Security, Vol. 22, No.2 (Autumn, 1997),
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Nossal, K., ‘International Sanctions as International Punishment’, International Organisation, Vol. 43, No.
2 (Spring, 1989), p. 301-322

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeconaf/96/96i.pdf

http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT9