Kateřina Belešová

History of the Cold War

Short Seminar paper-7th session

Question:

Why did the Soviets intervene in Afghanistan in 1979?

In order to analyze the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan we need to have a closer look at their

mutual history which can be dated back to 1920's. At that time the Soviet Union struggled with

Great Britain over the influence in Afghanistan. In 1921 Afghanistan and the USSR signed a

Friendship treaty, neutrality and a mutual Non-Aggression Treaty. Afghani foreign policy was so-

called bi-tarafi, which meant a balanced relationships with the great powers. This was one of the

first events which shaped their mutual history.

The Soviet climax in the Afghan intervention originated when the Afghani King Zahir appointed his

cousin Mohammed Daoud as a prime minister to help him with modernizing and state-building.

However Daoud misused his power and appointed himself as a de-facto ruler. His main objectives

were to renegotiate the Durand line (borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan), to modernize the

country by centralizing the power and to fully support the nationalistic views of the Pashtuns. He

was aware that these objectives can be only made with the support from the outside and he also

knew that the communist ideology is incompatible with Islam, religion of the majority of the

Afghani people.

So, when the disputes over the Pakistan-Afghani borders arose (1953-1954) Daoud turned to the US

for help. However, the United States had no interest in Afghanistan, because it didn't posses that

much resources and didn't bear such strategic importance as the neighboring Iran and Pakistan.

The US rejection was taken as a very offensive action and it showed a clear support for the
Pakistani in this conflict. Therefore Daoud asked for help from the USSR which welcomed this

opportunity with its clear motives: to become a counterpart in the US policies of containment, to

prevent Afghanistan from the spread of anti-communistic ideologies and to introduce an example of

the USSR policy of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union also saw it as a chance to spread the

communistic ideology across the region. 1

The Soviet Union began to train the Afghan soldiers and civilians step by step gaining its influence

over Afghanistan. In 1963, when Daoud resigned the disputes over the Afghan-Pakistani border

escalated. The king Zahir introduced the so called “experiment with democracy” as a plan to

strengthen his position during his reign. This phase brought about three clusters in the Afghani

politics which played a very important role in the intervention by the USSR.

Firstly, the pro-Soviet fractions were Parchamis and Khaliq, where Parchamis were led by Barbak

Kamal who became a Soviet-installed president and Khaliq by Noor Mohammed Taraki with his

deputy officer Hafizullah Amin.

Secondly the Islamist forces who opposed the pro-Soviet fractions, were radical islamist

movements called Muslim Brotherhood. They felt threatened by the communist ideology and the

communist influence over the Afghani monarchy. Consequently they created the so-called Afghan

Islamic Movement under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Mahmoud.

Thirdly, there was an emergence of the Daouist network, with Daoud secretly leading this fraction

which was later on allied with the pro-Soviet Parchamis. This group wanted to undermine the kings

authority and while king Zahir went to visit Rome, Daoud enacted a coup, which secured the

friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Daoud led a violent campaign against the pro-islamist

movement with the help o Parchamis. In 1978, Noor Mohammed Taraki overthrew Daouds
1
Westad., Arne Odd. “The Global Cold War”.
government giving the power to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (shortly PDPA).

There were many uprisings and disputes between pro-soviet parties and Islamic radicals, their

ideologies and religious views. The Mujahadeens, Afghan-Islamist strongly opposed the PDPA.

The Soviet Union was asked several times to come to help the PDPAs to fight the Mujahadeens but

they hesitated because they saw that this was is difficult to win.

The change in the USSR view came when Amin arrested Taraki. Soviet Union didn't know whom to

trust an who is pro-soviet or not. There were two possibilities which could happen: either let the

PDPA government collapse and the pro-Islamis parties would emerge or the USSR would invade

the country and save the PDPA. So, in December 1979, the Soviet Union decided to invade

Afghanistan to introduce their control over Afghanistan and to protect their investment, which was

given to them since 1950's.

The US and Soviet relations were highlighted by suspicious acts. The USSR thought, and it was

later proved, that the US is supporting the Mujahadeens in order to stop the spread of communism

and the Soviet influence in that part of the World. Zbiginiev Brzezinski said: “According to the

official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujaheddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the

Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, Dec. 24, 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is

completely otherwise: Indeed, it On July 3, 1979 US President Carter signed the first directive for

secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul...We didn't push the Russians to

intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would. The day the Soviets officially

crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR

its Vietnam war...”2

This basically meant that the United States planned ahead, as a revenge for the Vietnam war, to give

2
Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998. "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,
President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser " <http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html >
the USSR a lesson and undermine their influence in this region by financially and militarily

supporting the Mujahadeens. The US was afraid that the USSR would use the Afghan uprisings to

gain its power further in the south to Pakistan or Iran (Southwest).

Moscow thought that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would be short and swift. It lasted nine

years and it brought within a large number of victims. The Soviet Union didn't follow its policy

with “détente”. It didn't ease up the tensions with the US, it reinforced them. The USSR forced

Afghanistan to implement communism and imposed relentlessly the international class struggle.

The USSR wanted the recognition as a superpower but the US policy of containment wanted to

“contain” Soviet rising ambitions in the middle east.

It's important to mention that both superpowers signed two agreements which were violated by the

intervention of Afghanistan. These were on crisis management and crisis prevention: the Basic

Principles Agreement (signed in 1972) and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War

(APNW-signed in 1973) “Together, these two agreements committed both superpowers to act with

restraint and to seek to settle any differences by peaceful means”3

The Afghan war was struggle for dominance in the middle east between the US and USSR. The

USSR had the capability to intervene by its expanded military forces. 4 and to gain and to increase

its influence and the US tried to contain the USSR not to gain influence at all. It can be concluded

that “by Winter of 1979 détente, was for most purposes, already dead”5, said the Russian

ambassador to the U.S. And he was right. The détente, easement of tensions between superpowers

wasn't at ease. The waters of international dispute were stirred up.

3
Bowker, Mike. “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations”.
4
Saikal, Amin. “Islamism, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” Cambridge University
Press. 2010.
5
Wested, Arne Odd. The Global Cold War. p.319.
Bibliography:

1. "Afghanistan War — Infoplease.com." Infoplease: Encyclopedia, Almanac, Atlas, Biographies,

Dictionary, Thesaurus. Free Online Reference, Research & Homework Help. — Infoplease.com.

Web. 31 May 2011. <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0802662.html>.

2. Saikal, Amin. “Islamism, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.”

Cambridge University Press. 2010.

3. Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 15-21 January 1998. "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,

President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser "

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html >

4. Westad., Arne Odd. “The Global Cold War”.

5. Wested, Arne Odd. The Global Cold War. p.319.