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REPROOUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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-~-.--~'~--- Authonity

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ftc» IF~ $.:~;iC~. T I


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. -46\

N vy I" ~11}O;f- ( 1)N.;\M. Date Iii


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COMMANDERS
.. .i '

<:lONFBRENOE
,
,,~

DATE;
PLACE~

. Al?ri.~ 2,.5:, .2p,


-s

&: 273 1950

CHAIRMAN s

Lie~lte:nruit

General r e H. Edwards

PRESENT;

1
.~

\
f

Mrt Thomas K. Finletter Gen. H. S. Va..'».denbe:t'g Gen. G. d. Ke:r,mey Lt. Gen..H. A. Ol'aig Lt. Gen ..B. Wa, Chidlaw j Lt. Gen~ K~ B. Wolf.e Lt. Gen. G. E. Sttatelneyer \! Lt. Gen. N~ F. 'nr:i,ning Lt. Gen. C. E. LeIvIp.y Lt. Gen. E. c. v1Jhitehead I Lt.· Gan" J. K. Oannon ! Ltt Gen. E. w. B,o.wlii'lg;s ~£tj:., Gen. s. El. Anderson ! , ~J1d,j• G:en. q.~ p" Saville

Maj.

M8.j~ Gell. Maj" Gen. Maj. Gen. Maj .. Gen~

Gen~ R. W~ Burns Maj. Geno O. R. Cook

Maj. Gen. L.

D.

C. B.
M.,

g"tio:a.s
i
"

"

'~J~ii;g;. {(en•. S~ Srru:bh:


Q

W. L. w. Johnson :Mo.;) • Gen. K. P. MONaughton Brig, Gen., O. .s, Picher ¥rig. G'3.1:1. R. Beron
Brig. Gen H. G. B~ikje;r BJ.':tg ..(jen. Or F. fJafn

SohlE);btel:' S,' Kute)7 E. Kepner

,MOiJ."

·Gen. R. ,E. Nugent .Maj. Gen. F. H.,. Sm.tth Mo.j. (Jan, W. E. Todd Cabell Ma.j. Gen. C. P.. Md5. G,en. F. S. Hong
Maj.

>

~O:d. Gen.

Gen. Bo

M~lj. Gen. .Jr.


Maj. Gren.

'1". <D.~ v¥hi·t.e

G.,
11"

Armstrong
Armstrong
:{iU;r'tp6r-

'Bl'Jig .•. (fen. W. C. SweEine¢:" . Brig.<t' , Gen. J.. B. M6he~bm~~l! Bt·ig-. Gen, 8. D. Gru']j:l.;)s
CQ1.

B.dg. GaIl. E,,· B~ That.olter B;'rig~ Gen. M~ ~,if~~ "., B.rig;, Gen , E. C. Lynch

c.

.;.

C:o~o

E.

w·..

Col. :n. F. Parrish

Cot~, D • D. Holo 0016 G. A. Blakey

H. C, Parks K. It", ;domptop,.

~- 1.

,., .. ,
~

-v

-, ,

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/
,I

e (mti:n:l!tea

. !fhisClocUmsnt
Copy No" _... _ _

L_..-"\ __~a_~-opies C
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\

OQnsists

Of ...

~CJ:.£;'Pages.

REPRODUCED ATHIE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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DECLASSIIDED

Authority N NP gr;;D:f ( ~Y

iIA NARA Date

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0~~

_."-~ ,~~ o. ~.'

rw" 'W U. .u ((]I TeV §~\C bL ~


PRESENT: (continued)

~ .' . o.~

"h' .
"

.. ."

~dditio~
Maj.

Personnel "CoL" Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. . Col. Ool. Col, H~ L., Waldron G. P ..Di~oSi.,ray E. Vandevanter J. D. S:tevenson S. B. Hack G. S. Brown G. E. Price L. \1. Stocking R. C, NcBride Lt. Col. W. A. Tope Lt. Col. E. J. illiite,
.,
'.'

Maj.

Brig. Brig. Brig. Brig. Col.


001.

Col. Col.
Col.

Gen. C. A •. Brandt Gen. D. L. Putt . Gen. W. D', Eckert .'., Gen. J. F. Carroll Gen. \~ G. Smith Gen. D. N. Yates C. P. Br01NIl R. vJ. Puryear T. J. Dayharsh J. E. Thomas W. T. Seawell

Jr.
f

Col. D. A. Bur ch.lna.L Lt.


W. T. Kemp Col. Re . H. l\'~rshall Col.

!
i
i

·r N .. D.E ~,,_.~----- X

....
Intelligence Estfrnate, (Mej Gen C. P. Oabl$lJ,J DisGussion • • • • ..•

Pa~~
•.. 0

.....

(~;ly.1950
• , .. • • •

...
.. .. .. • • 4' •
II .. •

..
• ,.

14 ' 1 16' J
..;

OFFTACKJ.;El(TOP, Sll!CRE~).:~ • • (Mcij Gen S. E. Anders9n) Discussion • . •


" •

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••

0,

:11

.,

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,.

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•.

"

':14

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f'

'.'

Air Defense .of the U. S. • •."• • • (MaJ Gen S. E. Anderson) Discussion ••••••• COVERPOINT ,(~OP SECRET) • •. •. (Maj Gen S. E. Anderson) Discussion • •.•.• ••••

. • • • • " • • . 37
fl , • ~ .. • .. • •

\\

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..

-(!

ill

....
• II • •

50

• • 56

e,

• • 72

{
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REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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--·-='~-"DEQLAss·IIDED··"-._,.,,-Authority N N r> is' 1)D*


(

~-..,..

....._. m;._.....,.,-.-

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~y J/ANARADate

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1'~C(»., 1P
IN

- - DE X -.- .....
,

s 1ECCll~U~T
(contfd)
"f".~ •••••• ~.

ComrnandPresentat1on, ConAC. (lot Gan E. Whitehead)

78 97
114

(Col G. S. Brown) Discussion~ • • • • •


,

..

..

,.

,til

Command

(Brig Oen Discnssion Corn~nd

Presentation, FEAF • (Lt Gen G. E. Stratemeyer)


0 '".

..
'" • 0 ... ,. ..

...
..

O. S, picher)
0 • .. .. ,

II

III

Presentation,

(Maj Gan ~. S, Kuter) Discussion."). •••

~ATS .
0 , ••

..
.
... '"

..

. 141
o

• 129

Command Pre aerrta tion, Alaska (Maj Oen F. Armstrong)


C011IG18n'ts
i' .. " '" ...

..
• ,

159
181 '186

..

.. ..

..-

"

(Lt Gen N. F. Twining)


0 • • • • • •

Discussion.
Command

PresentatIon, SAC • (Brig Gan J,' B. Montgomery) (Lt Gan C. E. LaMEly) Discl,18sion. • • • • • •

...
• .. • of" •

· 189
• 203

231 257

Command

(Lt Gen BoW, Chidlaw) (Maj Oen Co. B. Stone') (Maj 'Gan O. F.. COOk)
Discussion. •••••••

Presentat1bn; AMC••

, .. ,

..

..

'.,

._

" ..

"

..

• 291 296
314

Conversion and Equipping Program. (Maj Oen F. H. Smith)

,•••••

Flying

Hours and 'I'ra tritng Requirernents


Todd) ••
• .. • II ..

(Maj Gan W. E. Discussion. •

..
.. .. •

,.

..

. . 326
, 335

General Remarks . . • " • .


(General Vandenberg)

COmmDnd Presentation, APG. • • • • (Maj Gen W. E. Kepner) Discussion.


0 • " • • • • • •

.'

• . . 351

iii

REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHNES

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Authority

N N!?

9,.,,0;' (
Q.I 01 (Ob

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By ~

NARA Date)

,·<INDEX - ,- ...,._,,_-

(cont'd)

TO.aMical Training and Critical SSN IS, (,Maj Oen .. K. '1'. McNaughton) Discussion. ••••••.• Comptroller Activities' •. ', • '(Lt Cen E! W. Rawlings) Research and. Development • '(Maj Gen D. L. Putt) ;Discussion. • " '. , '. , AF Construction'Program .•.. (Brig Qen C. M. UJors) Discussion. • . . • • '. . AF Personnel Situotion • • • .•• (Maj Gen B. E. Nugent) Di~-cusS'ion. . .' .. • • • • • Survi
VOrB

·. ..

· . . 355
· • 373

• 382

406
422

• • . 426

. . ·• . · . . ..

• , 449

(Lt Col

Bene fi tAct ..•

•••••••• • . .. . .
0

W. A. TOIle)

Discussion. Closing
(Major

Comments • • •
Commander-a}.

· · · 506 · . 514
"
._
.,..

· · 456 · · • 475 · · 498

Closing of Conf'er-once, ~ • • (Lt Gen I. H, Edwards)

• .• ' ••

524

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-.1.0.:.-

.t' E 0
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cn E
....

DIN

G S.
_

"

("\lbereupon, on Tuesday, Conference convened, )

25

April

1950, at :)020 the


"

Gm~ m;;"~\J.l1X3:

Gentlemen,

cone to order pl.easa,

General' Vanclenbere; has a -rew y.ro~ds for us bef,0J?8we

G:J:l.J ~!\!:DllilB&'1G': V ;Iine i'li Ll.vbe

very 't:lh&ri";:. <ge~-hlemen..


that'Vi(3 can get (jut". ' rrere at the ,last, one
"

All I w~~ted to talk abmit 1ms the benefit' of this as rre did last year ,

'I'h(J~e'of you that


J .

rri.L; remember the question )erio,d and the di.scussd.ons the time, hair I thin~:, -- 1,'[eare a H in

and til:l.s ,is


_

"one

family here _:...t,v- let, --. ..


....

b*
in

down and' see rrhat. the pz-obl.ems are and see if rre can get

S'q:r.18

of

them so Lved, All of the staff


t:W88
1'[0

in :'J8.shington is intently
he:':'e end
Ire

-interestod

pr-o bl.oms,

'rIley are all


;";"0

I'dll

bake no'tes and what ,<

can t t fix up" 1181.'0

will

go back to rrashingt'on and t"ry to

i.-ork thea out. The main purpese , as you l.norr, is to Get al.f .of the people here "mel sec rrhab is g<:)ing on in every For tho first to come over here meoting.For
m0\3t-inG,

outfit. right

I thought tha,t it would be a.l ono kind of a formal and evening,

in um.rorm and make this

toni5i1:t and t.omorz-orr morrring

I s ... ..1gg'-'~<t

that We como in spor-t ciothos or, spor-b $hirts, bocaus« ,it is protty
hot around' hero, and just be i'as comfortable as :rroc;an.
1

• !jEPRODUCEI} ATTHE NATIONAL ARC81VES

DEQLASSIIDED

Auth~rity N ~Y

rIA N~Date
~) (ft,

N I> S, 1JD:f (

19.101
G.j-'-Y
t:.1:LS

(°"
'r)l~
Jl

---------.-----~
and 1)u11no punches.
an-;{i.1a.yso
1;0

n», U \!"JJ U

s» ,~\.\",l l!\':,. LL!J

ff"J "___' fo':iJ ';7

I hope

'.70

uB,]. al,l join ~n


anyt.hi.ng

discussion

:7e arc

don I thoro'

in 'Jashinct.on

but difficulties

he ro prepared

to continuo'

to hoar them.

',';0 -.roulcl like

t.o hoar tho

300d thinGS too.


,:1;: iiO.u~d.

'Li.ko to TIolc.omo you 'a.U horn-and

laM

glad

l,'e

have

such

a, :rel?rosontati vo Lang fr om all


-I~O

of tho Conmands

have the pl.caauro of having our notr SO,crotary of the T!;Lth us and, if you pcopl.o

Air"Forco, Ifr , Finlottcr,

havcn l t mot

periods

and

toll

him: i.ho ymi

<O'1'Q.

(}Bi! :;;:1'iL.DS : IntolliGonco Intolli,[;onco.


pr-osorrbatd.on

Tho first

i tom on our s chodu.l,o

is an of

by G01),oro1

CaboLl., the Director

Gono:.'e.l

Vandcnbc~'g, ie-, Chaf.rman, cover' tho


bomb,

and Gont.Lomorn The i'ollo":;il1:,.; discussion


im:)lica'i:,L;ns of tho SO'Jj_uli .pusscssf.on

',::l.ll

01' the atonn,c

,;it,ll

p2rticul..:r r-cfcronco to tho eccur l ty of the. United rror ld situ8.tion.Boc;_~1.:Sl... of 'I.;ho lim:U,Qd r'onar ks -,:ill be in 'Ch0 nature estimates. 'It
as ml.d fol101rs

Stuc",C,:s and tho

tim~ at qy df.sposnl , ;rf1J

of.' conc luai onc dra-"n from cur current

Ls- c:s:t.imc":''God' that. tho ?o,viot' o:to;w,c stocl9ilo


over ~jhc' nOJ:t.:'~?llr Y0?-X:s:
to

vri.Ll, bo

By mi.d 90;

19S0).

10

to 20; by

1951, 25· to }-f.5;' by l11id 1952,45

by mi.d

1953, '70 to 135,

and by;:! d

1954,

120 :1:.0 ,200.

,117:' mid-1950,. tl~o .soviet

Union 1iill

hB,VOD.bout 1.00 'I'U-4s;

.v

fjEPROOUCEO

AT THE NATIONAlARCHNES

---'-"-'-'-'DEGLASSIElED
Authority N NP By

46\

Sl1)O::f I NARA Date I g.l 0 1(Db

.
tho~'- ,.ill operation

1I~~Jl» §.IE CC'IR JE.1r


fo! operational use, and <?ircraft, tl'ainod crena, and bases of to doli VOl'; tho full stockpile of

vrhd.ch Le the .Soviet B-29 tY<Jeaircraft, have sufficient. t.o enable

thom ·to attempt

at.omac bombs the':!:' arc and

Inn

become available.

·Soviet agonts also

could assombl.o and dcbonat,o atomic' troapons br ought, by covert means


Lrrbo the United

states or carried by mcr'charrb :ships

or submar-lnos ,

Horrcver-, tho Soviets rrou'ld attempt

to db,livcrbut a ·feE bombs other ....

than by air. Successful delivory of 10 to 50 atomic bombs on solectod

targets in tho United Statos could:


'1. strategic in that doLay or' roduco i:latcrially tho soala of our ~)l3.nnod clements partiCipating

atomic, air oLen::dve; 2.

offensive by attacl-::s aGainst

cause g:coc~t clola~r in i.)rojocti!1g United Stutos ovcr scao , and, ir.1~)odo our lilobilizatian
f()l~ rrar for

forces

and i'lnr materials

3.

serio1.~rly

D.

consiclor.::.blc poriod, Doliv0ry 1. of 50 to 125' bombs on targets could rosul t in: of


Em

tho )rovmition

of' tho immodiatd launching

atomic airoffonsivo;
2.

sor-toue effocts to cori::.D.in vi tal oLoinon.ts of tho

WQI'

oconomy, and,

3.
full
0

an intensification

of tho) gcncra L de:!:,orring cf'f'oct.a on

r,1obiliz.q.tion for ~i"[l.r: Up 'GO 200 atomic bomb's on turgots could create conditions

,1r iEJ) II»


\,

s E (c lre.lET

.. 'vw~ j.Q:, ~
-(Th;i,cb,mi:;ht .
~ -",

be dcciS'i "Ie)'~~s ··t'O t~o .. caF:~·p~~i ,.Q;f the Ui'lited: Stat,cs ty ,I


• -:',,!". :'

,J.l.. ~,I1>',"1YI

~ Tf.~ .0
Lk.1,
r,_t" _:~

\s., tt'~,J;!;:A';. , ..
I .. ' ~ ••

IT)

f~ ..

[fr·.

to rrago o'l'fbnsi va ..111;r.


• -: :- .I~,_ I • .' .;

Fror&,'-i:.ho·forego:Lng_,. it i~ ~p~.rcl1t thu"i: the 'tcd::<21 .. p_P\"iC)r of


b~mbs, and, 'thatt.1:1C td.mo is fast D.l?pi."02.Cl:ting rrhon
" ' I " -.' ~ l ~ ".,. • '. ._ •

, L'

,'pos'sossibri:of'

;itom:Lc
• ' • .,

. ,::..,tho. :Sovio.tEl yJi11 .possess: th;o capgbil~ ty to attempt, a dovastatdng . ...


•~ .1

,'atomic

a'::'i.ack

'on the Unitod S·o~r(:,Gs •

.I-ie, of cour-se, 'cannot f:j.rm Sovio:t immediate, "; f,obl,I-Iith great


,

01..-PGct o have oxacf .: n~ollig_Gncoon t i in~or~:t.ions. But this vro do

01'

'ncar futuro

aaauranee i

Tho fundamon~al objoc.td.vo ·of·tyw' Soviet

Union is the dcminatd on of the rror'Ld, ,Ine,nn1.yzing thai;. objective', . '. _..a·clear oorrbor' conoIusd.on .stands out. Tho Unit.ed stat.os, as tho pr1n~ipal

of p01JOr in 'tho non-Sovio-~ vror Ld, and as ,tho bulrrar-l; of .:

OppbsiJGio~ to Soviot

oxpcnsf.on,

;i8

tho one natd on ;[hich must 'be is t.o achi.ovo

vanquished 'by' qny and all its ultimate. objective..

moans if tho Kremlin

PosS0ssion of atomic boraba,


0.

r·nd the

means tho

'to deliver

thom pr-ovado the Soviets 1[j.th and offecti vcly.


h;Lst.6ry

cal~D.bil;Lty tontto,ck

United Stutes dh:,Qctly timoin effective United States

This is. t,L1.of'irst boon sl~bjoc"j:.'tD direct· and, this


that it

11,28

att[',ck.· Tt must be oxpoc tcd that


, 'I "'. , .• "

c~pf'.bilJ_ty-rl'iil in pursuit of it!'?'

make the So'viot Urri.onmore fanatic

and ~ggrcssivo

on thoir

part.
'"t:"

, .'

'rhe·.object -of v.ar is dofined' by Clausovitz.·a.s. tldestruction ..J of.t.ho onomy+s Trill to resist.,II,
.1 .

..
~..

Althoi.1.gh.,from the Cominun~st point


,
\

of

·jfilQ) fi})

S IS CC ~ t r,",: ;
'J'
;,.. ... ~\ ,'~~ • "'., 0°,

;i

,i

( '.

viol1, tho So'vi.cts~vc

'.

-,

.__ 'J[ «J) ll~ '

not·yet

s 1& C[t

r-caor-tcd to overt

IE1r-.

'.

arned aggression;'

:'1

United ...>tatos and its 1111ios. its fundamentalobjoet;iv9,

In ordorto

'::in "I:,hi8 'r:ar and attain'

tho'Sq'Vi?t

Union' ~'-ill employno;t. ;;capon and'~nctic .force.' ail .Despito


',Thich

only CVG~y available

so-ca'Ll.od non-military

promises success,

bu:l:,'ulso coercive military

'contradictory propaganda confirm tho basic usc aggrossive unless

:by

Soviet leaders,

SoViot actions to

fact. tl:(atthc

S9viot Union 'will not hesitate


foi' the a.ttainmcnt of its

mi;tita~'Y action

objectives,

such usc jeopardiz~s

scr'Lous Ly tho major opcnatd.ona'l, base

of Communist, imperialism. 1-.ro, 'foo1 confident force is correct'despite


;: Agol1PY roport prosont

that this

concept of' the uso 'of'military

tho fact

that '~ recent. Corrtr'aL Into,lligo119C


,

od.u substantially
by

clifferent

vi.ou,

is now in process

of roviqion

the CIA and its

member Lrrto'Ll.Lgonce nov study l',ill


At prosonb,
NIT

..

This' report

'

agonc.ics and I nabhor ~xpcct ,that the resultant


conform to tho 'ViOT.1)o:jJ:1'!:,'I'ihi.Gh have just. I

oxprcssod..
botrrcon

houovcr , bhcrc o.+,ofundmnenta.l discrepancies and the.t, of CIA. ,'I'ho,CIA rcportasscrts hopes .t.o achaovo its .objcctdvo Dndrovolution
1

estim.ate

th",:t. tho Sov:i.et Union tlu 0ugh subversion


1

of wor-Ld donrinat.Lon oJocploi ting

rq,thor' {hc.n conquest,

in tho pr-ocess 'riars dormfu Ll,' of

botrroon 'thi:;. d' power-s ',rhiloimi


capitD.~ism.

tine for' tho inovi tabid identify

Th(..1S,,' CIA not only fails-to

corroctly'tho' toroalize

l,nilitary character that in tho.pres'ont

of

i;J.1.0

Soviot thront,

but also fails

by-polar,,1;orld,

Soviet oppor-turn.td.os to oxpolit

major
miSSD,S

rrar-s

t4c c~rp.il1iJ.L p'oiri~o't1i~t ',from t~o·. Soviot

viot:poirit~.

vcr

must of. .. ncco' .... .. bo bot'~:oon thoUnit:od sity . It c.lsomsconstruo·s po,>(or in dO$Cl'ibing

Stc~t6s and thc_So vriot Union.

tho',.fun:cti:oh'al:':id 'purpose of ·SQviot militcry ,

it

as a~, adjUnct' to iil'tc!l1D.tional


,:)_"CVO,

'..;ommunism. to tho reasons"

Rather , s1,1bvoi~si o and v .J> .armod fQrs:es h~;VQ dissented


• ~ 0

'lut" ionr'.l";y f orccs


,For

arc adjuncts

of

-t.ho~o:vtot 'Union..

'\iit~ -the;' ~epo;t:'t ,at?


.• , ~, 0"

havo':tho

those andothor ,
,

o'-bhor mili tD,ry Horrevor-, our i'or a.

il1t~>11igo1190 D.gol'lCicsanq.>t.~oD~partmcnt dissent

of'

stD.,to.

mo.intl:!ins that, tho SO:Vip,t Union -Ls norr preparing shor:-doTn1 y;i '011the Uni:ted State s •
b.

mili tary

ThC? S~viot Union 'has

l:},:C'gc;:carmed

fbrco
.

tl1<';~t s i

r'.:;quirod

for, its

dcf'onso ,

This ItJ,rgo.: mili t t:~ry catab Ll.shmont.,

"

t ogothe.r

-;rit.h
. boin~

lO.10i',11

f'or co deployments, indicntoa ,foroff'on.si',!?


x'ethor'

{,het -th~ armed forcbs· cro

mQint~j.nod

t'hah d~follSi YO.purpo sos •


furthoX'cmco it

. 'Th:;'1Jvo'.;or

.Ls ::o.ll'oudy, c. 'troBondr.:us

c6orci~o'"tI11'~~d~for the

of .sov'"iot ob joctd.vcs ; coup Lod ',',j,t:::1 tho g~o;Jing c'-Gomic capabllity,


bOCOI!lOS

a v[l.stl~l groc:!.'i:.e:l'three;"!:;.

Althotlgi-; tho Ui:litod States


,

poaaoasos
•• 0 ; ~ ."

tho groutos,'C ElilitD,j:':;rp?·t,ontj_o~ of 'allY sin;glo' nation


"_

in, phase:

:tho tror'Ld., .tho Sipviot. Union is 17inning vic:~brioa

in tho, present'

o!,' :~l:lU~rc.r through


,~

uggreosj_v9

oporations

euppor-tod This

by tho coorcivo

throat.. '" o.f .supor-Loi- ,military . .forcos .


,

in being. '.

is facilU,ntod'
and
th01'O continuos

particularly i.ntGn1~11~1cs 'b110Sovtot :;,,"

I?Y vil'tuQ of tho Soviot' gcographf,o 'poai tio~


of comrnur.t:l.c{:l.tionin
.

Eurasia:: , Thus;
8uhvorsioxi,

,c¥tmp8.igp "of infiU·r[~tiol1·,

anc, :lc{.:lr 3

tho lattor

6"

,. L
I
,t.....

.
110"\7
,.

grpatly
._

s:trcngt.hcneq.
0\,.·" .'}

V'fi"'1,.rri1.· illl.·' ,(R 1i': W~ .Ii. C:J.I ~


, ,

by the thl'out, iIJpliclt.


, ";Jcnpon,s. . .

e» nl..\~ ..i:li "'Jr' \k;I .u:a

in tho possession
• _..

biJtho . Soviot Uni~n<o'iat9mip .


--

In this

connoctd.on, .
C:-'!
'

if in.

tho event

of rn:u' th6Sovict
"

Union ahou. Id d.aaue an ultir.1o.tlLlu·to ,the' .. -.


,~

North Atlantic

Tr\1atv:coUntrios ~ :

of 'Europe dcmandfng .under ponD.lty ..

of atonD:-9~:l}t.::tck-,th£;.t :thoy subnrrt {,o. Sovict; occupation, tlrroD.tcnod natzi.ona ini~htr,acont;lidcrthoir ulignmonts.

tho

Tfit,h,r?spoc:t"",. to!:1umbors,q:f :t1.tomic iToapons"thp , ... ' ..1Statcs


,.

Uni.tod

no·,lcnjoYB: O.Td.dome.rgin of .supcrd.ortl ty ovcrthoSondt It woul.d be i~luBory to rO!lillin safo from atomic attack' '.;hon the SOv'iots of atomic bonbs as

Union; 'bu~ this' is '£l;'ytastingasl;>ci;.. conclude tho.t.thc'Unii!od Stetos Long as it maintains beliove uill

thiEl, numoa-Lea L s1..1pcriority.' quantity

they hnvo prOd1,.1COo. a sUfficiont crippling


'-

to be s~riously

or dccisiv{; D.[;:o.il1s-c. tho Uni:ted Sto.tC5 '""'-a.

nunbcr ',;hich .might be c'Jl1siclor~bly sl~1['.llcr the11 , th;:,t 1Ihich ~;o night, , .' .. consider
c •

to be ncqui.rod f'or-:dccisi vc [l.ction ;:>..go.ins-(:, Soviet Union the


D.
"f':1

tho danger of

Sovigt' surprise:
,

abt.ack aguinst .
.

the United States


.

'will

bo @,Teo.tlyLncrcnscd, ",,'ith corresponding superiority deterrent 't:.he past to


fC".I

. ':j11~"1,'tho Soviots

he va

0. t

to.incd this

nunbor-,

,dol:j.vory cc.pabilitios,

til? United Sip.teB no longer bo tho

in toto.ll1:urnbors of zrbonri,c bombs Ifill


TI.:1r

in t.he scno r'oLatd.vo degroc to -'-;hich it

has boon in

ycara,

It is most ~mportant th::-;!:.my csaoasttorrb of the risks t inherent in tho United BtE'.tes situo.tion of ~isp£1ri%!' of L1ilitE:.r:( military than

fore.os, as compcr-od to .. ho ~oviot Union, be nado ';jith·.tho t capabilitios

and the objcctivos ~

of tho Soviets

in ni.nd ruthor

7
~'. ,

"

)
\.

.r i.,'

• __

0._.....""".................

'. ' ' . •.. rfti, : -. ," n» ~/•• ~~~'.~TII fi"'J. ~~~~ Ti~'.,.u,'" -.;.~ ITr..·· ..~ .. ' 'iT',)) (.'if!' '.,' " ~,\~,:~~~, ',' the:i,r, imJ!!.edic1:~e in~}3rrti:?ns. ,T'h<iserisks ar.e'~·

i,

~.>

1.. .,:thel~eis -.cif'..p.g~r.,.'of delib~ra.te : ... "_ .....


,-

_',,'-.

'

,'.

'ifnr:

Launched b;y' tl~e

. .. . Soyiet,by,

t~ d,ns q.f', -a. ~~p~i::se: .attack

against

8i ther' '.fe.!'!tern

mi.ecalcul.atd.or, .of thf:! a~:t..i.cipa.t.ed reac·.t.l.dns ~byeft .. er 'side tD any . gi ven,. si;~uaM.o,n;
~. succeaaftrl;

piecemeal acts

of' ae;gression

by tJ.:~e S,oviet

Union may n1timate13T 06 'aii118d ;agaipstl of .the United})tates,tha.t :;req.ter risk the latter

'areas' :3'0 vital must, accept


of'. its

to the· security
OJ;'

1',ar

othervfise run' a
and

of Loering thr;in~eg-.city

fr'ee ,institut'iol1s

..

,~

mistrust

r:ogarding, Urri, ted.:.3t&'t8rs:::M.paoili Vj' and fitr1l18as of

t:?,r.ces, the:!:. ·their

GO V0

mmerrrs, ,ril"c. 'be:required

t.o seck a status


.' ..

of

:t,ller8 j,s. tHe :~)ossibilit,y thv.t the, Uni'~cclStates

may

under-bake negotd.atd ons 1,'d:cli the Soviot. Union and thereafter by 1)l.~b1.ic opinion
to

be forced

cOl'i~romiseUrdbed States Soviet

-bas.Lc

seciu.~ity •.

..' -'rho mos:t important


decision to initiate

ocnatderata.ons

,in making a e: surpr-Ise'


aboml,c

W2,r, pr'obab1;r TTDulclbe that

attack rroul.d cripple

seriously the :Unit.od states atoHic air offensive

'--,

." -.~. » .:ll}"QJ·;ll~,


. Sta;c,cs retalia,tor~ratb)~~
•" ", ", • ",~ ..', .'
0" ;, ••

&I).II:::J ~

,(Qj're:,;' fFJ

foJ, 'll4 ,'4, fE.l,G ~ J1~


1'1"i t11 a .

~ttaek.;Sov~e.t, inciu~'trial mobilization


T... 0 •

~d htigG'~rma~q~~G:" r8~¢r~~S:'~TO,~1~d ?~10V~dG' tho $avict Uni on


o. •
,".r

~ol'itin~ingof'fon13i vC-~El,pribility; and. that; ','goXlcl~a~lyspoaking,


e ,~.~:,'_~ ••••• "

>,' ';',~
:'

bho

trading

ofinitic.;L,:a"tQi"u.c ',. . ..
'" .:'.~

bl;OlTS,

Tiould. ,l(;av9

tho

Soviet -Un~on in a.

, 'I'hcprobability
• '. ".

pf
I."
,-

TJ~r·'is_, ...
, " ~'.'

·thol"ofol'o,

consio.craply
• _.

dependent
i: • _.
"

'.

upon Uni.tod-Sta,,;~s '~ilj_:~a:r-.fCD.pa9ilitios. , Ii' those cp.p~bil:i,ties


• 0

decrease, .tho 'probability of


1TQl'

of TIal' Trill inorcasq.

The prcib-abilit.y

will deer-case
:

if our' knorm dcf'cnai. VQ and offcnsi vo capabf.Id, t:Les

are .. dequate .. a
...

Our defonsive·· capabilit.ies


.• I •

_must be such: -that tho.


..'

Soviets

1"~ould bo

-unaJP>1q to make an effective

~·t1!'priSe: a:t~aclc, and and. .atomi,c


••••

thus orilJ)lo

t.ho United S:t.a.tos !i1obiiizp.tton pot~ntial


.

Our offensivo. Cal)abilitios


=, '. ~ .'

oust be. ,sufficient

to enable. us to dcstl~Oy solce"hod, atpfuiy ta.rget,s: in tho So'viet,


'.'

Union,· and; if need be) :t.osustain


Iicvcr -bcf'oro
I ," • •.•• ~ ..

that ator.U.c attack,. the Uni.t.od St~tcs boon

in: peacetime has


' .~

dircc~ly
• 0

i:

subjoct~d

~o suc~ s~rong and rolontlessly

in~idious

OPPOSition

as today~

Such a peace as ·thp,Unitc~ !3ta~cs is,

exporiol1cing is not a poace; it. is, in fact; a Yfar in YThich its


survival warfare
Sovi.ot,

is at stalco.Tho rrhonovcr- it suits military


.t

present

confliot

~an change to arued Union.

the purposes

and ends of the Soviet


'1'h9 first.,line

povcr is
' .,

off0!lSivo in charecbcr ,
o. ." ..... ~ .

of defense
.
e,

of" tho Un:i,. Stat?~ ~[\lst bo to 'rocognize ted


. ."'.: . ~'..

:C,b§,.t.-TfO: arc

at 17ar right
..

'no,; andth.:-.t 'r-nall-out

..':,

~.
~. .

';

..

natd.ona'l, effort
.~

_'

dcsd.gnod to ovqr tho

maintafu' 'pcrmc,l1ont'.nD.:l:!-.~ar:r pol:j,tical. .a~d


".

superiority

Soviet Union is l'·ccJ.tt:i,.rod.'

i..

.Ti,l;J.O

is,mrd
~ ,,'_,

11 (aH~ ~-IECC iR 1E "r ',,~

I,

Tro:c!dUi} .an favor qi' :i:hQ" Soviot,.D"ni0n •


• -. T

_.'.

.,'

• .:,"

The

"ratio

. . of .Soviet ·capabild;ty.: :'Go .Unitcd··.S-... tcs- capabili:ty, a


• • • ., ~ I ""•
4 •

in

the

of rrar- <l?lib,?ratoly Trith progrGssivq rulers,

:i_l"is~tigat;edy·th9_Soviot b

Uni.onvd.Ll, increase· Ls unccr-tadn if tho.

oq1.1Cli~zatton·-orthfs.l:'atd.o •. It

in. i;.l:J;e· Kr9mlinl;:b\1)1:~1c~~s.;i.dG~ 1951, 1952-, 1953, -or- sonic


3;S,

other .elate)'
deliberatoly its. a Ll.Los , a stockpile

an'

opport~d' mid advantageous t:imct9' initiato


tho Urri.bod Stat-es and Trill .havo

an a'l.L-oub of_fonsi ve against

Ho~:rovcr_,"9:7 ffi1..d-:1:952 tho Sovixrbs probably of noarly 100 -at.onu.c bOIDQEl.·


,

D~livery 'of a substantial' S~ates


"

number of tho8q hqii1bri011 so Leeted ..t~gp:ts ..in .tho .united .

mobilization

c::f:fo?:.tq.i

E.'~{v.:;i. to.1,o
9.9'

.0

19~~!?-n~!? 9~ ~Ghq ;"iCl,:-C .0 conomy •


by

.'l'hc rof'or-o , mid 1952.s11,0ulcl

CQlJ.sid~}.:'ocl.:.,,~~ ·::t~c. 'lo:~C:f,lt date

conncctd.onj

it Llust,oo:boJ;'no· :i,n:Jilitld' c.ontdnual.Iy.

that

tdmc-iri.so ,
lTO-c"tlq

tho surprise list. ·ofarcilat.iYoly. offoct{vo than tho expected

smcLl, number' of bombs

be mro

uso.of, a-much ''l:c:.rgor numbor ,


vroul.d like

Now, for the: next fi va mi.mrboaT overall ip-tolligcnce First


'-'.

to revim.

tho

score shoot trom the point of vioi-;of -.ot. ~ll, lot me so:y that
ITO

collection

and pr-cductd.on , better

arc Lmmcaaurub'ly

off ',in .D.11 Trays, not . ,only as. compar-ed. l:ith .. ~


~"

our. prc-rrar

stD:GUS,

but as compared iriL tlJ- 'tho .. .' knor y!hatTfc:nccd,


. ",• <-

~ and-rro

si.' tu<:.tion . '.o~;:-. iT~'-o.or ~.

throe

year-s ago... lio


it.•

bo.LLovo Y!o·.lQ0DT{ ho~'~ go about gettipg t.o-

10

§IEC~·E:t·
.
'

Tho undorstandi~g
",".

P!.:,~f19;1 ~11;:.}1;;t}1ulQd"th0 IlT/hat,H


-". v ,." ~... • ,

."

ot' iritclli:~onco:

is

,.

csubfrttmtially organizations

broa40r
. l~ ,

than 'tho befor-e, not only rdthi):1iirt.olligonco


" ".. " '

th8m~clvosc hat ·I~i.thin:tho lrlr Force as a 1[h010. .Tn .

, ,il1Crdasingl~ra:r:ar,must fulfill

of

tho fundrunel1tal and vital

Tolo that

intol1tgonco

if our military

'p'Lans andp:t'opar~:ti(~nS arc. to .bo

Launched on q !'ob..li's~:LObe.sis. , 11:ir Forco intcllitoncc other has 0110' oally r sor'Lous pr-ob'Iom Ueither'
,
OlJ.r-

in

common lTithall

go'VornmonM.l' 'r;ili salvo

orgDnizations~
,',

so Ivoa uor vanyono

olso
,

-(,his 1)rob1om ovorrri.glrt r

Tho

problem is tho esto.bl1Shmon:t. of cdcquatc, sat.isfacf,ory, sourcos of . informa td.on . on tIlo Savioi:; t]lliol1 ano, its Sato tos 11i Although 170 arc
."

scm:'ching·for,' crQatine,: and oxpl.o.L tin;~ every opening in the iron


i...

. curtain
Tho lack

tho.'b 1rO can '~hinl~

at,

•.

our .succo'ssos

Leave much 'to 'bo' desired.


I 0.$

of adcquato ·.:l.nfbrmo.t:Lon is nor.hor-o so grcD.t

in ,tho ,

fiold' of £dr'- tochri cal sbicntific"


"

into

~iigonco.

teGhilJ.Go,~.dovolol)ntOnts in the f'LoLd of C).erona:c:tics'

Our ihi'ormc:tiol} on Soviet'

nnd' rolated fiolds ~~ sorious to tho point ,must; bo overcome.


'tho"-r.lo[!.ns

'

of

being' alarming and


in

At this momentr,
,

\TO

arc scr'LouaLy doficient· ..minimums'on


to collect

··the necosscry
,

~-: .

intelligenco

G:kisting DoDd potontio.i


ct:'.pnbilitics,

80vio'~' ~,ir offc~si

y~'. nd a

defonsi vo . ,

·';·0

and, tho." iIll)10diato :Lntontions of their tho:go.ps,in··o~ir'l:aw'.'lledgc,

['.ir ,forces.

To fill

'vro cr'c"usiilg many'

diffo:c cnf mqthods c.ncl"'s our-cos '71:t,hih the Air Forco and in other'

organizo.tians.

no

dopont upon our air a+bachoa, air 11

tochnicp.l

. 1: (Q) IF

s~(C I?~JE 1r

,. ....:,

-.------------~" ....

liD.isonofficoX's, 'il1"~Ql1~gcnca ,photo activit.ios.


"

.,c'Oli,tr~ct 'in'tG!_ligonco

,1rlJ.®. ,n» ,~IE (C fit lE rr


S01J.l~COS,

commmi.catd.ons into lligol1cO


C<~Ol~C~CS
~ ....

~~1(\:0'i~c'tr~t1ic reconna'Lssnnco ,the


' .'.', j:' •

b:i.'thc' 'Q~cr~~,:::,s:GPDlil.::!11d8, and govcrnmcrrta),

o'bhcr'

'tho,n, the.: ,l\i.r Force..

'YhJ:,~opcin~'~9c.vilyupon" i~hci'Contr.:J..l I1~tollil$cnce Lll':c'sup::!_"sod i;ro -t:.p,lmu~: vrhcro 01ll"'S Leave off" has,

l~gcncy"nhos(;
By this,

sources

.r rO,f'or, to
'.

i;oho:,rOSp()l~sibili:ty uhich 'th<:1t orgenizo.tion racans ,

for 'i:iho co'Llcctd.on -of into}J~ig~l1qc .QY covort . . , Tho Aj,r.F'or:co'Security .rrhi.ch poasosaoa
in tho but it
C\

Service

is, anot.hor orgal1iZo.t~?n Hot only is this. true


on a corrbanuous basil?"

troraol')dqus lwi:iontiD.l.

co Ll.cc'td.on ofin't,olligoncc

il1fornllJ.tioll specific tasks

1":i11 hc?ve as ono" o1',its

t.ho dovelopment

of

cquntry or'its intelligonce.

allies..

_By' tl);:!-s, of cour so , I rO!~l" to:, conemnf.cetd.ons


."
,

.."

Anothol.';
'(,0

80111',09,.

?t
'-.

i~f,ol'nmt.ioi11;hichis.
't ••

of. r;rci.:tll['.luo to
YDU

us is projoct:,miEG;'Zt_
r

'~his
..'

progrQ;n~ y;hicl1'1;as. ~oscribcd


'0 ... , ~ ~ :' .....

i
~ .. ;

.'. ...

',

commandurs norc- than -a ;yv~r ,D.gO, provides' foi'; t'hi:; systematic


'" '_.

~ntolligol1ce 'C}qJloi to.=\:'iol1of rcturnod


..~

".

' ....

~~

J'.

Go'i,ina;ri 'add' 'J ':':;)0.11080 prLs oncrs

;,

"'.

:,.~ ....

of

';;[.':\1'.

1"1:. is beginning' '~o produce -a vroa Lbh of,ll1,'1torio.l Y:hich is


'Je.rticulorl",,,
1.:
r)

significD.l1. t to air intolli[)'onco, .. 0...

f'or: usc tln Objcctd, vc

Foldors. and

Thi~ is

our, .>lost: roinul1~rc.tivc' t:'..ir in'tclligonco project,


QlIT

'\[ish to express

deepest, apprcci['.tion

to Gonor~l Cannon

D.!-1dGeneral, St:rD:t.Cl1loyc:r:for :tho'ir support

and .spl.ondi.d cooperation

).11. making projoct


Tho bost

TiIIINq,m q succoss ,
opon on-the-spot
0" •

colloctors'

of intellit;ohce

1 1[» ((j)
.
'.

12

'S. ill: c~lE 1r .

-.'

., , , :'" :11 ....

·:i'.:·~ ,',: ......

;..')

._ ... ~
'.~

o_._·
'. :.,

,,~. __ ~ .... __

-'
~ ,': '.:' -. t .

:.

.', \.;~:~!

~~'.~' .. II';'f./J ..u:


• ". ..,

'. ~
,..,

.·~:.l~.rc:~·:·~··Tq··~
.lk1.~'o ~ •••
I \,... '"

:_ ~ •

,K-:a.

'.11
..'

infox:rn~tilJn have been', our o.ir attaches


. ;

belrind the iron····~urta.in.


• '.

'F01~reasons

of' e cono'~1y -trh?attach~

. -:....:.'f -

"j",

,,;"

i"

sysbem~i'of

all 'th~ serv~qes

have re~~n'~lY'~~~n··:i~~~~o,ed.'., 1:h..i.s ':~~ii'on'


the collection because .post.s

'4'ict',rio~ app;eC~~blY ,aff.~ct of: ai:r;. intell:Lgenee:j..nfori'~~tioh on the Soviet Emp:LJ?6


to. 'make the
btllk of our reductd.ons "in, the imp0l'tanc:e': oubsdde .the Sovi~t Orhit.. HQwevei"',:w:.re: ,

we rrer-e able

oit

"

least

are' n017 being se~iou;ly Satellite

:a;E'fect,ecl bi the S<r.yiet ":i:tlflqence 'on the thad to 'c~t.ain·the Bulga:da has' forced" nD;ssion.
.'

nati9n~ in requiring attaches.

activities

o:r our accredited the del?al·ture


,

of the entd.re lJnerican


'''.

The: btho'r Satell-i tes

. have applied pressure.


.

by:
,

sevel'a~'

means,

usual Iy by' 'clle ·expedient or l~ei'using t.o ' .'

",

I.

of refusing

t.o r-enew,a ~sa

when it, ex;pires.,

permit r-ep'l.aceraent-s

to, be m~.de for attactIes Whose :t,ot1rS are' oven, that if the Soviets this so desi.re,

Tie must, acce.,'t the fact


~, • ' ..::':' ':.. 0: <,

·:arl.d tRore
within the

is

every indicat~on

that' theydo,
,."

withdraT[ all armed forces foreseeable firtur-e , As each source

Government· may be forced .to

attaches

train the Sateliites


-.»:
I'! ."

is donf.edcus , othors l11USt· deve'Loped, bo

The problem o.r 'adequate .coI'lectd.onti.s difficult, become ner-o so, but Tie do 110t bOlieve that
• .;".. .. ~ • 0 ~ ~

...

·BJ.ld·likcly to Lnsuparab Le,


C1!1d no

it.

is

'All

.f

'.

rl).elit~lS. .

~f iJ:?tolligGl1ce: col Loctd.on must booxploitoq.,


.,

.,".

..

effort

rausf .bo spar-ed in our efforts

to

)uncrt.rate tho 'bUL'l"ibrS

rrhi.ch have been and arc beip.r:;·usod .[IGainst us .. It is clam.;, o:r gathering
hOTJOVer,

-that, tho no.n;; reductions

in means

inJcolligcnceby

roasonab'ly open rac bhods, omphas'i.zo

our

13.

~
.. ,

trhc q'l1.Osti·on

. -my- op:!.nio.n, ~.~::L$ . riot: sp.tie·facto~i'J:i rccogm.t.Lon of tho :onOi'?lity of" CIAls

·~~·bactY.:·, n spite. I

of my full has

problem,

I f'oo'L t.hat. it

ll?t yct,drar.'l1.
on' somow~at ,..

tn. enough

merr.of s tc.tu;roDnd
~. .. .

thl:i.t it is still its .sights


sot
D.:!.'O

ot: ~.. c01.1;."'ltr~,_bcro basis'lTith s .. ....

'GOO low.

Il?-c:1.dontally, ::?o.ssib~y.l'ro in. ",Ur :iJ'orcQ' Irrtcl.Ll.genco to the sane criticism


.'
.\

3ubj~ct

as to inadequacy' of concept.

If.

such is the case,

I. ehcu Ld corta"inly expect, to 'have th2.t pointod

out to me at this
NO-\T, just A;Lr Force

conrcronco and o'thorvri.so,


one'word about, SGc'li.rity of inforJ!1E.tion. :looked' upon by tho other eorvtces 'rhorc Tho

is genoral1y

as being

·more of a socur-t ty risl;: th,-:m thQ o thor-a,


• I"

a:cemany oxtcnuatdng The fact


~nd

c.Lr-cums bances-jrhd.ch T shall

rtot;,··t,.nlw 'tiInO'to discuss.


too

rom~;i.ns,~h1J.t..tl1:e criticisms·m';o

6i;tOIi 'J:l1stified,

the'
but

prob'lom La.

~10t-gf)ing

to,bo· sol vcd by anY' sor'Lcs of rogulations,


a groat mcroaso in socuri ty consciousness To C'lcco.mplish th2.t, the energetic

pr'Lnc Ipa'l.Iy through

'pli

the part
".

o~ cv:oryono.
.','

assistance

of every '..

c omnander ·is rcqu:j.red. . Thank you.


- GEI:EDYflillDS: qonorul

Cabell, . fro;!! the Intelligence to· this

viO'\'lpoint,

have you roached {lny concIusf.onawf, th respect

inclico.ti,on of.t~9- Russidn.TTill;i.ngnoss


'~.:r:.

to

,\.

participato

in an incident

that

",;,~',~;,.~t·.~,.:,._ 't

~lig~t- 100<;1. YlO:1'? .t.o :


.\.1 •••• 1. .... .: .

..~ ..

~.

'

ccnc'luet.onaus 'Soviets 'of'

t::::l liheih6r or not the recent. shooting

donn 'by tJio '

tho 'Priv~t'ooi'"

:,ias,'1n 'i:ndic'2:t,ion of tho T!i'!.lingnoss


:
'

to res ort to 'uar?


Ho think

Ji,S"rpS' -:S 00 1 t

.. . ..

n:01! it Vms cortain ly a probing. , /2: pi~obin;g to 130.0

i t TI~S:i:>~ob~bl~"0.(Jlibora:t,~lY 'dono C,S

uhnt. our roa,ct:ton "liGulci: bc , qicl not .risk n ."jar b.yv:~rtu.o df their' shooting dorm thnt -,c;irqraft.

-,

comment. ali, ,that '~r add anyt:tiid_~ to' it?


Gild:! CiHlNOU:

I 'have hothinr'
• "':I

l.-!

-bo coranorrb obho.r th<:lh What


'

General

OabG.ll,has

clrc,:-..dy s~id.

The 'Russii.:'.l1s'aro:,'going

to keep ,'I

it' uo and tho-" nro,', ,"oint'!: to go as £:ar as they_ can, ')'ii tn" it. , • '. ,.3 u _ am very strong all of th~ "opinion

that, the only 1';o.y to, 'quaahrbhom cit at· b,H vri.LLloc,d to other

is to ,bo firm,

Ani p'assifico:tion"

acbs ; thGt;

oi:d01~;ic,''q:b govcfilll~on:t,nl,lov61.'
'tho' airplane
0

..From .'.:hero 1':0' sit. ,


'

ovor -enore.; it o;nponrs' that


, :•

1'(0.8

shot donn :i;h open of .. thD.t; tho t.Lmo

vratcr , ' Alt.hough ire do.not .Iiavo it.bsolut.o proof


.,.',

. . '.
;

Intelligenoo thd
,,'

in~~rmD.·biDn is 'coming in. mcro 'and more all 'of tho [',ircrnft,::;pf

indi~o.tos tJ1£'.t.,·The ~Our80


:;.

counso , :::-0

knorr but fran


'

'n

timo 'ana. space fnctor'" it coul.d ha vc boon Li.bau,

,.

That po.rticuk:.I' mi.ssd.on \ms 'not scheduled .:for .thc:t. cli?J('l.:mco, '.rho scmo o.i:rplano lwno.od onrbho dc.::" pr'ovi cuu'ly day on rrhf.ch 1.t ~-:<..l.B t .sho
:' • I,.. .
•• : ,:" • 0

..

'.

".

U")

in thc;t aroa ,

Tho

cl01.11 "I,T.S 0.

shor-cc.r rri.as Lon end Lndf.cct.Lons

~aro thnt it 'l'lo.~·s!1ot',.clO,\,lIl 'slibr':t: ofthc:t,' p'l~'co~ ,

. ~ . . ....

.GEfi ED',r.AIillg':"In

tho. lo.af,. sc:vorql: m:Jllths,thoJoint

Chiefs

I~

11\ (Q)P"
,'_" ••

,.'.

s JE c Ire. rer
" ,'. • ~

15

••

','"

.'

.of 'Staff.h.:i.Vo

cit)P~~V0d :p,u .~Jut.},iriod Trcy. plan:}~~lo\;rics OFli'~ellCKL::'~ •

·.111(Q)JP:·SlE C ITt IE. ~rr

. p.:\!'ticulC.~

bPGrD.tiQn~\

·.piD:ns~·
.of Pl.ans and Operatio~s, .:
of OF:':l'ACKm. lir ..

. :GOl1Crc::~: ~~nctors.pn"·t1J_O' . Dirootor

is going: t.o.prcsql~~t'~:.~fQl1:t!l:L'S ,mo'X'l'iihg tho outdano GElJ,f.JJDEUJOU(.

:J:.t--~ 'Soc'rotary,

Gcnorn'L Vandonberg,

first.

triO years 0 f. "In, this

D.

Yr2.r bogtnrring
"

' ..

1 Docomber 1949.

p'lan,
'"

consd.doruta.on has boon given 'bo tho .


.

papnbilities

of

tho Dntted Stat.es; tho estimated· cD~p'2.bilities

of thO" Atlantic

Pact, AiliC:s, and the latost

il;rt.cl1if~enco·

estinw.tos :'of Soviet.captlb,ilitiCs.

~nlese.estimatos -havc boon

covered in' go.11or0.1 Gonor-aLCabell. by

this. plan,

ccnsadorut.Lon

"

rras given :to tho z-dconb atomic blast


-e , '.

-Ln

Russ i,a, the ::result,s of:,D. como'lobo anc.Lysf,s and eV:;;luc..tion ;arc

p'lan vri.Ll.:havo to ~
-

bochnpcod
stra.tegic

'accordingly
,.,

"

. .

. ' ';'rb:o overall

'COnCal)'t:·o£ 'OF:i'J.'J\ctLE

pi'o"Vidos' for

'~liG 'atta~b~mbrt' oJ

lHliOd ~b.'t,fo:nD.l objocti '\lOS'tbr01.1Gh Lho ·rrd.lito.r;r

, db:feat'

of

tho\ U8SR:'O:ro;lJ.ght.· ~bol.'/c. 'by a.' mQ.jor'offensi v6: offort'in

Ho"stern'Eurasic the Fnr ED.st_

nrid' (";].' ~'tratOgiG C1<:iiol1.SP, on en D.t1stcrj_t;y': basis,. in ,


-,

"Gortt:\-in b2.sid undor-bakl.ngs

for tho

Allios· have boon .~ . ./

."')

>'.':' ..'
" ,-

.~' '/,' -,~. . ~.' .-",.


... ~" 1

'~-':"
"."

-. .,
" ••

-,

....

-;~,
",

~
c., ,

'" ',-

"

':,

e.

::. ... :.. f,; ,t~<D):'IP,: -. Thc~ (J.~p4tlJ;Q. m<i$i);1um :tliD:t d:.hc A:L1;LCl?' ;IllUs:t:aCC 0~plisLl
.. _
.,0 ::.'~ ,,-, ~ ,_ ~,,' .. 0 "".: •• -.,

~iS:!c~lfi 1f"" c
".,,·i ~
0 ",

'.

:-'~~.+.~.
0

follous:
_;" "'".,~

df .frO'_.--',:i~sti,r,o:~b~o;,il).tcgfi,ty.,. .tho. -jo::rtcrn:HonU,sphd.ro", . ': ~ ~." .~ .._ .'


"

'

'

'and t4o ..Al;ticd' ,

.. TmniKlki~gC[tp~bili~l)i~~'~ '.
.
'

mai!i'S~~lj:0rt.areas;,
illLV;i.ilia.in,:

and' .tb', pro~.otQ '[uid.-d,?VO Lop their

2~To;socu.ro,;
, , I

and .dcf'ond .such-bascs , 111n9. fol:' tho

and sea D.ro['~s,' ru~c1 lj~ne~!' cDJmnul1i.cD.tion',~s ~ of· o.rorcq1::Lied 'oxccut.t.cn o+, tho concept .• 3. offensives,
,

"

..

'

TR sto.bili~d, po.r~icularly

as soon as practicable, D.gD.:i.l1~·'b arccs ,


"00

tho Soviot
0.11 air,

vi'to,l to the Allios;

nava'L, .'and ground forcos 1:r11ic11 can


"

spared. from athor essential

t.aska 1."lil'.i. be used f Q~

t~1is'purpoao

, date a

4.,

To, conduct 2,-1:; the oal'li(;'st pructd.cab'Ic

s·tr~.togic 8.ir offonsivo making: co.pnbility.


-, ., ,",

[\gCLi..'1st -t.ho-e Lomcnba of tho. Soviot ;';c.r-

5. . To .ini

..

the 'ArmodForcQs for tho


.;

t':\.uW-developmorit of .bho . offensive latur

po-,m):' .of

"fb.rsuch

oper-atd.ons c;s milY bo ncccasary

achi.ovomcnt, 0'£ the ovorc'Ll, 'i'hr objoctives •

''' ...

6. ',Toprov:Ldo. osson:ti:U of cfforts'con,;ri}:mtiIlC " ,.'

aid: be, QJ.D:. j~llios

in

SUP1)Ol,.,t
. --:-.1.:-

dir9ct)_y'\io

the implomontatioi1 of

tho ovoral.l. st.r£'.togic.col)copt •.

7. Tooxp16it;'

0:[:.

the; QQ,rliost 'prn.ctic~bl(; dabo , tho so.t,q).li·kJs


by

.ps;rchoJ:oGica.,l voclm'os~e~. of tho USSR,and its

inforlP.Q.,ti011.[l.cti v:itio:s mid by obhor spccf.e I,' operctd.ons ,

17

''i .: .,'
P ,"!
,

...._..)" .

. .,

....

..
. ,,'.',~'. ',\',~,IP.

;'1
\

dcvoloping'OF}f·J:.AC1~·LE, hopldn' ~f a~t:1t0n for, tho, . : t . ,,' . fWst;·, tHO yoars of War haabocn divided 'int'S! t;tteco' D.~)proximato . time

.,

pfiasos i;iitlr opGr.ations,' subscquorrt theroto

c:J,nsidercd

"~S

boing

Tho first Tho first

~Jho.seis -0ho ljOl'i.ddD"'P;;lytbrough, D-plus- 3 moritha, . ". il.l1ioQ ros-oul'!e'OS is, -t o provi4o for

char go ago.inst

to be mdol'ta.ken

on an il'Ulstori ty basis, nlldyd_ll :il1y:olvG the

acocpbcnco of ccnsadorub'Ic- ri51;:I3.

D.ss:\Jgncd. ,..Tho d$furrs:t vntasJx:cS' i1lcllw1C':' " '" " " ,Insl.1I'iriEvt110·:·'int?gl!ity: 'af thq-f'f?storn:

..
<.

H~IDisPh~!G by"

,Uesto:r:n' Hemisphere

n12t5.on5..

AIJ10ng those' moceures'

[1,1'0':

Tht? establishment

of

13. limited,

air

Y[lji'lting,

and cominurti"6D.tions linutcd

not ..\ 'I'ho- provision ,for defense Canadian for8os. lrrcidontt:.l1y,

of Canada- initiallY"!iitp

"bhi1'1'D,l:tghi'ittt· this,

prosoni/at;Ldn"

the ]JtUQ de:rds

11,(0). lF~SJi: c IRsr . ~ .


"

18

_0

.',

""

~ ~ '~·~1~;e ct~.. ~..,/.< -

~.;~~rt~q~~O'~T; .... rfl!.N,i'iT~~A~~~~~VES . fi....- .../;",",'- .."" ~ '_.. , , -, _",;


1_",',
I ""

-,·.·,-S~·~·· 'f'J~~:",-.~ ~~,i;"

-:

-~.i'; ';~I"!"C
1

J~~""

"t
.. _,.:-t--=-- -i--: ~

'~~\1~~.~~ ..<,: ,

~-~----------,I

DEQLASSIEIED

. Auth~rity hi ttY!> ~y ~
• • 0

9r?JQ:f-'{
'.' .

"!'.

NAMD:~.~,~!.~I~~,~~~'ill\.'
-'
-<;-" •.

~f~"";'

;'l.-<~

"I

;(. ~.:"."

,..

ili.¢liciltO>QStJ.li,\<-~:hod-B!;I~ti~hQ:qlillIJ611' aGiJ;~hforo el!l and ~h,e rrhi, 'bo cards " [

nunbcr

'0'£ U'. S'. c.ndGo.nnc,)_o.n fightor of cri tica.l

"

groups

and othor

air

defense

uni.t s fOl' tho <:'.ir .dof'onac

industrinl

Llr(..a,s of those,

countries.

vo

C2.11

soo ,tlmt

at .bho bottom?

.', GE1f ii~DERSON: (Cho.rt)


and provision

Yps,

sir. of . , ne.vo.l defonso of coastal croc.s

Tho,provision

for dofonse

D.gail'lst ,s~botD.gc and subvoi-sa.on,

rrho dofense

D'£' AID.skn Tfi~l' be based,

on tho concept,: of

concentrat.ing
area
i'j_ t4in

"tho for co's rtvatlable ,..111-. the Fc.irbnnks.-.AnchorQ.gc-KodiD.k ,

which nrc Located (Chart.)

the vito.l
,;..

itlv.sirc.n ,instalL:ltions~

..

Ail·

F01~CC

11o.,s.l Gncl"l/3f~ghtqr:groups;1 chart,


I ;illigh:t ~ add,
, 'i
j,

day ~n~Qrcopt,
c, ,',' :'

1 squadr-on, ....
,

dll.:..'uoc.ther. This 1 troop

on QFli'l'~\cin.E", inc(tic<1tos

co.rrier aquadron
to'

in 'place by n-tplus-3, months ,


-I .. • '.

H01;over,

,I

tho squadron fs D.ctuc.lly ..in l,lnco nt tho I;}0r.10nt and r,i 11 rono.;i.n there.
"

GEB ~\'imi:;:i;jdi!:
,

"

Opcrn ti ~ .. ns,t,l'l

tho Fer ED.st l;il1


. '.'
.;
"

be dcf'onai.vo

'

in ch~rD.cto'i~' f~r 'G~'1O' '~Jr:iin~ry purpose

of accurLng

J,'1~Jt,n,..tho, ~,Tll 'be: th~}so

R;y-ukyus,

dnd tho Phili::.)pinos.

The fC)rcos utilized

cho.rt.
.

__
~----=------I
Auth~rity N N!>

_,_.,,. .....- ~....,


I.

..

,'"

-~......

DEQLASSIBIED

SI ?"D:H

~y 46\N~Date

1~IOI(Ob_
'r T!rl.ght·\)o"il"lt: 4' dny
VI)
.

cor,
incitcD.tos

. ·T·-<O).TlF· '''~rmt;~-Il1r]f;
SiS-.;.i!iLb: 61i{

in

tho

FaI" Ec.st,

OFF:MCKLb.
.__..rll".

0: fightcr

.do.fcnao for

figl'ltox's,

1 0.11-::00,thor, group 1

. .. and under bho strc.tcgic


• T

o.ir 'offo11Si
)

is

shoim tho 6th fi{;hter

-i)"horoas ·the o.ctUC.l :,?l':)crnm in: tho Fo.r'EMt is 2 day intercepts, o.ll::.r..rcdthor fighter builds u:J c.t D-plus-) group , and 3 :figlYGor bonb , tol
.

The light
·1·;o.B

bomb

g1'ou).
£'1'01:1

'fhat t,:hirtl aqundr on tho regu~C1.r squcdrons

o1:'iginc\lly

scheduled to cone
Hotrcvcr ,

oquf.ppod

Td.tIl B-L61 s ,
r
j

"!inoy

ccnnof

be .suPPol't.cd in conbab and the


by .tho .Hr

third

squadron" Tft.Jt1k have -to:bu furrri.shcd


·GBi.1AI{JERSOH: . Defense of t,he

lio:tion.:'.l Guard.

Cax:ibbco.nar-oa, including m~ocJ ';;i11 bo )ro.vic1od

the Po.nama Co-nv,l and tho'Venezuolan


in coo.rdd.n.vtd.on

oil

Y;ith British,

Vonozuolo.n, and Dutch ,:\ut110rit.ios.

The c.iJ;.~'~~l1d 11;vo.l bases Trill. bQ:o'Dtb;bli~hocl on Icolnnc1, .and tho

ova'Iuatd.on of the fC'::'.sibility providos for two p['.N.troop


D.S

of the

'·oiy.;r~ti"n.,.·tho
Those .paratrDop,

plan

comparu.oa t~) ho D.ir... )_~.:;msported by t,ho t c onpenfcs

USAFto 1001['.11(:

soon c.s possible.

wi.Ll be !,01ievccl by 1,1:'.rino forces.


I'

Tho' noxb bask discussed Tho stratogic

is tho Str<.'.~egic Air Offensive ..

c.ir of'fena'i.VC·j.s tho only mccns 2.vaila.bio f:Jr


':-'co.inst

il:uaodiQto 1m' eo sccLo rot['.liation OF:i'I').CI~!Eprovides. rrcapone to be ini tinted

Rusai.a ,
mel convont.LcncL

u:tilizing

.itblJ~C

[It the. CQ1'liost

:,ossiblc

c1,0te subsequent

to of

tI1e -.·utbrcal·: of hosti1itios.

::Lt·vri.Ll,be hined .:'.t·tho

1lito~l eJenonts

20

priorities,

iiil1. bo under tho control _.

of tho J'jir~t01;.iof8 'of Staff.


0.8

For-ces f'or this

task l;i1:,l be dcp'Loyod ['.8 r2.piclly.

fL.(\siblo to

\."t

initiD.tcd

from these 'bD.sOS c,r\~l.fran


..

'.

bases in tho United States,


Bases In Eco'Land,
8 t~ . n g ~'G~'
<-.

staging

th1' 0'11[;11, ..:\lo.s1w anrl


A... i.cn, rr.

U10

IITortho,f.st nroc ,

Horth

1 f" ld'l "'~.K 'SO'(' f o l' anr: t110 !,";La G. Eas t 1'/"-\1.1 bo,.tL,' _,_.

"8 .... ';'8

tD.ctico.lly

dcst.rcbl,o m~~~' foc.siblc nil' of;fonsi vo ,

t:)

tncrcasc

'(1).o

affoctivcnoDs

'. of tho stratogj,c

Co.r1'ier f.)rces 'Ifill. ,~u~jplomQBtr support and nir offcns Lva t:; the OX~OlltpJ. their
avad.Labl.o ,

tho stro.togic

.'

cc.PGbi1iti6s

[~nCrlis they arc

Tho ovorul.L dc:rpL'yr,le;'lt of· fm.,ces .~. . . ~.: .


-'

f·.)~ tliis

"be.s1;:s as i

shotm on this
..

cho.rt.,

(Cho.rt)

-.
"

,
which ere
i

COL SEA',jELL:' I miGht point 'out.'tu:) fectors currcnt.Iy

under pro<?o:ss of buing rovi.aod in Joint' channo ls char t pa;rticulo.rl.y .ntD-plu.s- 3' and thereafter' infq~Gib1c. 'l'h~t is
'.ieI'G b0CC~U:30T:hon'

Ono
D,S'

is th[1. t this

dosf.gnod is initially
TTD.S D.

OFFT.WKLE· of

drmm up, tho mod i.un bono I'or-ccs

k.sod

on

'utilizG.tio'n
.'I'~·(cJoint

s bock pi.Lo of £.Pfn'o~~iJ:!Qtcl:r 11300. stcrocLB-29, s ,

Chiufs

stockpi Lo of B-2?I s ~;i11 bo phccod out in throe annua'L Lner'omorrt's ,

.'

I
I

21

'111 ~ . §IE C lP~IE, T' (Q)

dorm ].J11d~r·tro.togilc s

r,ocol)l1c,issm1Cc heavy, strategic'

rcconncd.ssanco

under -bhoso f'Lgurcs ,

GBU -'u:DERSOl;; . nr e not ro latcd

Tho t.hi rd ccbogory in -:iostorn

of· tc.slcs in OFF'I'~l.Cl~LE

t.o opcrct.Lons

Europa. and her

Tho soc.tU'it;{ of tho 'United Stat.es

Allies.

requires,

T[i"o11 respect, polidy

"0:1 c orrtdnont-a L ;Guropo)

the ptu"SU[\l1CO of D. contzlnu.lng nomont., -C·he CD.po.bility


prcforo.b'l::r

t>

develop,
0.

at the' our'Li.csf possiblo


covcni.ng
i70St

of holding no farther

line

tl~e -,;ostern

Eur6~)OD.ll c orlp'lox, Realizing

to t.nc

"(;'hd11 Ithirio, the

D.cconplish;,!ont of' this

punpo.sc is Lnrcasfbl.o rrirth tho forcos trlrl'ch


I

.
,

th.:rt. tho

,,;iIL bo c:v'::Lilc.hlo in tho period altern[ltivu,

1950-1951~ this

p'Lcn onvascgcs of n subatnrrtdrrl,

['.8

en

eithor

the; h,-:lcl.in:;;, iT possible,


81', if

bridgehead uo.rliost

in "::'OS'l:.O.,"11 EU1'upa

this

pr-cvcs ihfonsiblo,

tho

pructd.ccbl,o

return to ",;cstorn Eur-ope, in'orclor bo prcvorit


ar'oa Yiith rosufterrt
of the United

tho cxp'Lol.bat.Lon and cDrar.tunizD;t,ion of that


long-torn

ch.saat.r-oua- effects

06. the: natd.onc L intorosts

St2."tcs anc. her Allies.


1, study first nltcrno:i:.ivc, of the: for cos c.vnile,blo il1c'.icc.tos that
070n

tho

hl)lc~tnG ~~bridcohc.:,.d, cppocr s to bo beyond :)l'osGnt

.forcos,

tho scc::nclt.l-bcrndtivo

_- the cD.rli03t ~Jrncticc.blc

r-cturn to

tho Contincnt

-- ·,:ill pr-obab ly have to, be adopt.od,

22

5)~ClRE~.

~ :1, '__ .' -,"

<

,.'

_,

__ '

_','

.•

\ ~EPH9G~,tEDA1THE NA'r!ONA'L[AR~HiV~S: r: I"~ ' .' • ,<.' ,,:,ji""'ii" ~'~DaE§iC~L~A~S~S~IFIE~~D~:.-z.:. ~.'

'\ Auth~rity

BY7 NA~

!fiND 3/3D? 1
Date' /

~Z Lt/(1/p

f:;(Q),IF. ~~,lE·~.~,1E T
Accoi'dingly" :for ,O~Jo},'C.:~i?l~Sn i
p'l.an incl~dos. priority:
'·'t .

\[08'(,01'11

E1..tt'D.8iahis t
':o.~ ••

thof'o.11o;'ring

b,,~si'~'~~D.sltf~pin th,c folJ~o":r~ng ordor of


... ...

1.
to insuro military

Sccur-oibho
"

ihii"c.cd< Kingdch1 to bhcdogrco

nc ccasrrry of

it,S ,?,vn:lic:1)il:Lty as c. lip.jor bcso foi" .::':11typos opcratd.ons ,


". I

2. , 'Uc.:i,ntnin _I\.llicid c oncro L of tho ~'j'ostorl1 LIoditorranoD..nNorth Africc.n c;rc.v.~to includo on the Pyro~oos line, of such lossor
0.1'00.

Tunisia.

This ·,:;ill inv~lvo altornD.tivoly,

1101d·-

'if possiblo,
of tl'lO, Iborinn

Qr

tho retontion

Porrinau'La e.s 1Till secure tho

3.
j~lliod control support, forcos

The tl~ird ba si,c t[~sk in tllia of 'tho Gc.j.ro-Suoz


0.1'00.

D.1'OO.

is to maintain

in o rdor to fr~cilito;t.G

includinG

eir 8UPP;):):'t, of tho Turko and ot,hor fricad1y .. to 'f)CrE1it 'iihc Launclring of strc.togic
'.

in tho genera'; vicinity, "'-GD.instt~:cG(:ts


f1'OEl

o.ir c.tto.cks

bases

Ln tht.t ar-ea, c.nd ·~o

'1'oso1)rcos end cnC1JW rrcalrnosecs in tho ::,J1ddlc E[l.st~ During tho first
(\1'0 D.S

P~H:.[JO, pl.cnnod opord,i.bl1~, ~n Hostorn Euraai.a


.
",

fo 110T[a :

Initi'c:.lly, i~llicd occupat i.on forc'os'

il;l:'

Germany vri.Ll, be'

I'rithdrmm to the. linci ::of ,the, :lhino in accordr.nco i~·:i;t.l~ho o.;?-provcd t

Occupatd.on F:Jrcos.
tho Allied Cormandc'r

Fur-ther ,dofonsi vo c.ctL':l1 :';111.~;JL. df.rcc'bcd by ,c.s in Chief, ,'.;'os'!:.crn ZurDpc.,


li::;rccs in /Lustrin

23

:," ~'" >::'. :';


'~1

,'~'-""

",.~', '.,"' ..--~.


",

>,,--' ~ •.

;; ~EP~ODuCEIlATTHENATIONAJ:<.ARC~~}S;;:;,;;;;,:.;C"'" __

''':''-:;'_~:;"f'~:'..'V

_,,_~,,"~.-'-"'~'

;;,,,•.- ,.".".,~

,.
".-----~--I

-'

DECLASSIFIED

Auth~rity NARA Date',

ByiL

1VND t;13o 7.7'


'

..

~7 LI(lf/p
ItD.ly.
~~c.siQ

,To)~, §lECIftIE1.
dof'onsa, G f.losit.bns V The first in nor-thorn

iJI'iori ty

,b~~iG",··tc~sk 'Tic;st"orn 'i~~


throo.ts by air .:md tho

is

-[:,0

secure tho United


of tho United sea lines c.vv.ilc.blo
''[,0

Kil1gdom." ThenC'.jor attack

to '~ho security cutting of the

Kingdom arc

of communf.catd.on thereto. for moeting the air

~\s the

British

f'or'ccs U. S. .f'orcos ,

thlY;D.tS D.r0 ino.dcqu?-tc,


dcpl.oycd

tho

extent fensiole,

arc

to o.ssist

in accomplishing

tin s tusk. It fall should bo noted shor-t of t112t tho con'pined needed ..' forces D.vuilable are tho tho

considerably

tl1080

However,

they

maximum available,

considerinG

the necessity
tp.sks.

of mouting

~mini:tlUJil eeds n
for tho defense

of other- hiGh priority


of tho United

Forcos c.vD.ilnb Lo
shovm on the cher-t •

Kingdom arc

(Cho.rt)

.:
COL SEK;E:GL; ·,The' ,A,(l;'Forco, ~?cordi,r:g
t,L' OF:?I':~Gr:;:LE,

h2.3 s~hoduled'

for' dop Loyncnt, 2 da.y fiehto1"

gr-oups to leave

inunodic.tol~,r on D:...D0.Y bo in,.placo no Laber th.:.ulD-plus-l to build 't.o· up to

by' D-plus-3.

)I'hc light
This

bonb groups

.'11. 0
1

supposed to be be furnished
here by

in pl.aco by D,:"plus':'2. the "\ir i{:"t.ione;l Guc.rd.

group ,~iould have to

Troop carriers'
·£01'

as indicated of tho

(Indicating).

Tho Bri tis 11 f orcos tho British


['.i1"c1'2.ft. on D-do.y,

c.vat lc.;.:; 10
<:I'C

de foneo

United l~ingdo[1
as nunbor-s of

~\ir For6os-.Undcr- bonbor a, 16 ~ day fighters,


1101'0

inciico.-[:'ed on tll.is cher-t

tho number- is lLt4; ..~

1igh':':' bomber-s nvc.ilv.blo Jrro.nspo1"ts •

IGL~, D.~ld L~G niGht fiGhters.

,:m inelico.ted

-and some

hJ jJhoto

rcconnru.ascnco
,

o.il'cro.ft

...

- up [,t tlie present' tiLW?

G:GH C,,\BE~-_'L: .I"pon' t ansvrcr tho;~ qucatd build-up. COL SE':mLIJ:-

cn hero

under the

llcoordin~ t:J the inforc.o.ti,)ll


,0.

TiC

have

Gild I'lhioh p1D.11 by

trouI« be rct'oa-rod to in

1[ttC~1~ prosentc,ti;m,

tho British

1953 to
sys t.on,

li.D.VO

n:)pr')xlJ:1o.te1tr46~l.jet interceptor

[!.ircl'o'ft in their

GEE ~UDS:001;: .
Lncr'caso

Th£'.:G) Ibo1icvo,

is tho only Ilo'jor

in their
If,
0.8

<:~irf~)rco pLans ;::t '~llis 'I:,i);10.


tf1C;

Soviet

<'.i1'attack
t;'l'C

dcvoLops it

Ls dct"rnincd

·thct o.dditi 'ni-~l o.i1' dof'cnsc forc~s

xeq1..\irocl, forces

fron ,HQrtly;;ost

Kingd":'l::i even th:'ugh 'tl~is ·l.o.S1L,!::! u..... ...... '."11 _


''-',~.I, v! ..,~ u t

cctd.on j.1i[;;I-Lt jeopo.rdiZic, )Gl19 sucoess of other

"'-'0'" tc:J. L. .. , '_'

Tho. 80C,;1111 priority


0lJOrO,ti::>ilS

tc.sk in ""Qstern Eur'aaf.a rcqui:cos tho.t tho purpose


of E,o.iil't~ining Allied

be c onducbcd fjr

conbr-oL

of Lhc- '·,lostor,.} :iodi terrcmoo.n-iIorth

/.fric ::!1 bcsc arua ,


c.l~c.a inc Ludo:
')1'

The oporu ti:)11S' p1c,nned' in this

Hbltang on the P"Jrolloos lino if l)Ossiblo,

n Lessor- nrc['.

~Ioditorrcmo·o.l1end of NortIY,;ost :dricc. Tho "\Iliad

oasf cs Tunisio.. tho Ihorio.n

cour so a:': o.c:t.ion in r8gD.I'l:1 t

••

'

.'

1r (Q) W

",,,,2,. ',.. '

.S> IE C

~ 1£ II

,--, ..!:'

.,

~ ;~<~>6,
>:If

.:

~" ..

~ ~EP-~ODUCED,ATTHEl:lATJO~A~~~~~~Y,~cs,;:;.::., :"':'"-:...-:;...,:'~.'_:' """'»c ""'=-"'-' - '."" , ~':__;~"'e " ".·,:,/,_,.,~/_'''''''. DECLASSIFIED .. 11--

:"e,'_ •• ~~: '~.:_,'.,;_,-.\,._~ ~

tif{:;';,_;-.:' ..

......_,

Authority

'A/ND 31 3 (f7/
Date" ~

P calnsn 1 D.

kyL NARA }

7 ~Z'{J/p. . ,:

ru ',' & 'JE CC]R:IE T


~ " .. ~ ~.. ".J·.l·l ~ s:tn+u,<:l of SP... and

'

,\7l _; .L~T ,Y ,..' tOP, '11 DO' ",.,. [;01 ... ondorrt 0n 1.. bho

nus t bo sufficiontly r'cspccf •.

floxible

te· pz'ovi.dc for c.ny· cont.ingoncy in this

Tho forcQ's,i'ipt!ic'o:ijod 011 tho cher-t arc deployod f'vr the


~.cCD!i.1plishnollt of tho ovc:rQ.ll tcs!c in this crx.a , '

'Cp:s SEA',fBLL: To be in ~)lD,cC by B-plus-2

norrths tho Air

1 squadr-on

of D.ll-'ioo.thur

fiGhtors,

troop co.rriors

D.S

il'],c.:icatO'd' hoz-o ,

1 and 1/3 r;rou1.JS and 2 squadr-ons of to.ctico.lraconnc.isIJQ,nco.


:'l.!'l ......... ~J~'~'-U '2

knorr,
.J, ...I

Lri Eho

1'"OJ LJ"J

;;'.··'·· .... _. 1.;:I.r.....,1,.. '·l~,) ~~.!..j~..L

')-~'~g·-~", c. I'

-·l-11~~O·l'''' Ii ..,;..!.. 0

ono

-Gc-ctiqD,l roco:1nnissc.nco

squadr-on th:.t Ls presontly

in ·ell.::; Far Ecat.,

Eur.?sic.

is' to nc.int;:dn

c ontn-o L of tho Cc.ir(I-SuoZ

£'.ro[1..

~\t Incst

U. S. forcos during this the


0.1'0['.,

D.vnilo.blG do not, porrn.t phnso ,

dcp10yncnt bo tbis
nava'l

area in

fir st

Um.bod 8t[\ tos thL initicl

forces

opcrciinz

pi2rti?utc.rlYil1.

stngos,

-.;ill assist

the

Bl"itish

<';11~1 indigenous

forcos

in keoping open tho LIoclitbrr[!hccn Soviet

Li.no of CQ!;]],1t1i.1icc.tion c.ric1 in dolc.;y'il1gthu

cdvanco across

Allied arc
D,

op~rations

,\,'ill be tU1clertj['.lcol1 :fron tho Cniro-

Suez

-.:i th tho, objoct <'.8 possiblo,

of holdinG

tho onony cdvcnco


t:-:,

i::'.S

f<:~r'tn the portions of

l1Grthoc.s'(j

.::nd dOl1JrinG
D,S

tho 01:.8f.13"such

the iriddlo Eo.st oil

rODOt1rCOS

ccnnof be rota:'.nod for ,llliccl uso ,

10IT? s ~ (C IP?1EJr

26

l.,.:

.t

COL" sE:"Y~;r~J"L;: f'o' cppr-oxtnato'ly


100 fiGhtors,.
~110S()'

RP':i,p

·l~'l;.q.C~ D...;Day,. tho. British on. bonbora..


.8.8

have

16 light

and

0.

forr tr~\l1Bports,

end phct.c r'cccc , Australian-How, D-plus-6

nrc to; be .augnorrtod

soon hero plus

ZOD.ID.n<;l,:"South..:~frinD. D.;ircr~ft

to be in p Laco by

norrbhs ..

~. " T'!d :tJ.S~.\~~ thq"Tost9ra

Ol}:t~i~nc~ 1 to'

t.h9 . LIc::di~ol'rD.noan"
control of tho

thbbD.:3o qroQ.·il'l ,nol~~hvo$,t.Africo.J· .and :uuintn:in

.'

(~.iroction

f'r-ou the 11hin0, . .Austrj.,Q.n.~:m!1 Trics'~o , .


.

po:.siti:ms, rnd .
.'
,

. possibly frOG Itllly, GrOo~O.o.n~:T~rl~oy:.·

3.
'S'0D.goc1

To SUPllor\.strL'.toe;;ic

.o.ir

Opol',o.ti::>l1s Launched

froLl or

through

tho 1.lod:i,.te:r:ral1oun J:nx::D. 1J.1C~.t~)supp lcnorrb those ~ Soviet offensi vcs in

opcrctd.ons, this
CoX'Go.

end, fil~o.lly; To stnbilizo cs ear-Ly 0.9 possf.b.Io ,

Cor'bc.il1 otlll,:r,.:11l;ioc1 opcrntd.oua in tho lIoditorro.ncan Hill be conduc'bod. to tho extent


LIt'

pro.cticv.blc

o.nd

C "l1sist,ont

-di

tll

the roquircnon:t.s

tho prin~',ry objoctzi.vcs ,

'I'hoso oporo.tions,

not lis ted in order

of' il:lpc)r~L:l1ce,

..

£1.1"0:

'

1r-(Q)'IP

s1ECC~E

27

T .. .

~.-~'

. ," :"~;;:::4, ~~rb~ Th'1·iR~~.'ih Atliccl hontroi


mel tlw, 'Cairo-Snozo.rco.. To conduct, operntions

'oJ'

-~i" ~hC' ihtftorrC!.icc1itcrrnnoan

designod to J:1D;intb.:i;n th0

;)ricnto.tion

thoir Trill t.) resist.


c

To suppor-t , [1.8fOD.Gj.ble, indigenous

forces 'one;d~rccl in

dolnyinG Soviet cdvanccs 'blll'~]uGh .:~si<.! fhor and tho Biddle Eust, U

., nnd,.

cable in furthc.r11nco of tho ovcro.l1 tc.sk of returning Europe ,~t the earliest pr~ci;j.co.bletiI:io.

to ~jostorn

and tho IJoditerranonn

riill

principo.lly

bo ict.lploYc~·'ih

iJ.ccor.~plishing

tho tasl~s est.ablishod - for averD.Il oporati;~ns'


vrlri.ch I have; just nonte.onod, In addition,.

'in' ·tho j,iocIfto'ttrancD.n.


bhcso: fo1':c08 w6illd .

pr::rvido dil~ocit support t·_dofol1l3l.. situation


1:1.:'.k08

of tho United KingdDr:lif tho

blri.s c. ssontiD.1.

..nother \ of tho ossoutio.l


; [1lJ_ onab Lo us

tc,sli: -·i the first lines

pl10.S0

is

tj

l'.1o.int.::\in 'control

of COl:1J:1lU1icc:tion •

1'111s centro 1
-&:)

tJ utd.Li.zo full reaourcos ,

:1btc.in rail am: build urJ'or ccs

natc:riGls,
ovorsoo.s,

to ho Id basos , t.c clop by, nuintain,


.:'.n<..1 supior-t t:J
OtU'

211cl conduct

ofi'ol1si vo o:_)Ol'ntiOl1s at

points

of

choosinG. out by nonsur os rihich include:

This tD:sk ..,rill be; ca.rried

Doploy,:ront of ncval, fo'rccs t.:.' cont.efn or t!ostroy cl10ny naval forces


.:'.11c1

shi:)ping;

Ltj.t;L-subL1urino
,- •

-:r .,rfnre
c•

opcrntd.cns and nininz, .. :>.e;nil1s-G cmor.w forcos


D.

om: buses rrh.i.ch ?OSO

throat

tCI

tho li11.03 of c:nll:mnicatiOl1;

Lir.n tod ,figh;tcr

c.1~fonsos cIne. ,air


-(to, '~' .. "" ':,.

oD.rly TTnrning pcr td.ona attack.

of

t.hoao lines

of coi:u1unicntioi.1 Y.ithin < ~ ) i?


" -•• <

r'

ro.l1Go of' onony air

i:i th avad Labl,« f:JrcOS)~UF'~l~G tIl0 .first, f.~)h.c:sq.· This p'Lcn ..~'. recognizes . th0.t it
.
,-

is

inprQ.c~icq.l 'GO lo.y do-rm .. ._.

c. 11['.1"8. rust and

C,)UXSC

.of ac td.on
z.

for

tho .ovorc LL .<?~llC:uct of tho

,,0.1".

tho ovor-a l L plD.n of c.atioll thc/G ann be firr.1:Ly os:tnblj_shod •

0.

'consi<!oro.blo oxt.crrb upon, .:~ccnt.Lnuod OVL~luL'/Giol1of the

fo~loT;ing

1.

Tho r csu'It.s of .:tllGstro.to~ic

v.ir o ff'ona Lvc,


;;0.1'£1]2'0 cD.upnidn.

2.
3,;
,

Tho r-osurbs of bho c,nti-subn[l,rino

'.11othor tlw Soviets have or have not initic:c.ou ~ll s t~[~CS of t~io1;2.r r..s,noir onvi.eagod

of the co.npnie;ns i}l Lhc ini:0i::l


and ni th vrlK;-Ij
SUCCOSS.

4. :ihethcI'"
Peninsula.

·tllO

Soviets

Irrbcnd :t:' Lnvado 'Gll0IboriD.ll of effort


thuy r.ro ;?l'opc.rod to Go.!~G.

:;mcl, Lf s (), tho degree

5.

The nilit0ry

situ2.tion
r:

in tho I,riddle Eo.:st oil croa and

29

DEQLASSIIDED Auth;Uty -_;__----I

By ~N~DateliIO'IOb

N iN!? 91 'hOf{

'I------------------~
.

.'

. . ho Allied t

need far 1.I:idGloEnst oil;


Soviot
T;oC\lG1cSSOS

0.111..1)

lest,
.:'.ncl

:'.;llich havo dcvoIopod

cor.Ld be

qX)Jloitod~ No o.ttonptis.
['.s·o.

'hedo. in t:::tis IJlim t,,J ov;:"lt'tc.'to those; fo.ctors :.lliod. cour-se ()f,~ction

bo-sis 'for solectin~,:tl~c


"

'pllD.sO of' tho .uc.r..

"

Instead,

tho_ basf,c

strD.togy mel 'tc;sks

for t.ho socond


undor-tckon

for thos 0 OPoi"o.ticns c.m~i(:Ci"od nocnsscry

in ft1X"lihorc.nco"of tho

ovcral.l, concept in re.;e;c,rd.to .rcstorn Europe,

:
"'.

Contdnui.ng tho c~cfcnsi ve to.slm, ccu·t,inuillG the strc.tcGio . ..


[\i1"

;)ffollSivo,

o.11e: :'ntinuinc; c

o)crD.tiops

to [vlintc,in

security

of

. linos

i::f cOl:u:lUl1icntioh. Dur'Lng tho scccnd phase,


-.;0

nobf.Ld.zo nt naxf.nun speed end ·Gill. be doployed its sccuri,ty end to

novo forces

t) .',l·ostern Em'cain.

Grcuml forcos o.ruD. for

pril1cipo.lly· t. tho' NorthTrQErc .\fric~n undci-tckc ,'. lir.1itod objocti vc operations


""

in t.ho !Jodi tcrrail0an. t01'w.rd tho destruction o.ttainr.1Qnt of air chockinG th o SQviot

,Air end navat fOl;COS rri.Ll,~ 'direct ' -. of .thc overall ." 'superiority, advance,

offorts

Soviet. Tmr-,.r:1nl(ing cnpac1ty,

oveJ;'cor:lil1[~ si.l:~));1arinc,thrsat, tho in'tho linited

and pc.rticipatinC
2ls

objcct.i.vo operations o.n(~['.8

in .bho lJoditorro.no.::!.l1.
fDl~COS

.t.l.wsc .o}J0rD.tiol1s ~~~in succoss, A~'rica." thoro

build. up, in Berth lX1,.ttc;cntlut

8h:":u1<.: t: svri.ng to an be

offonsive

T;il1 c.ccolo;ro.to in th-:; t:1ITC. 1)11['.130. 30

I .~

'.

.p:nths ..
.ncrrths terns.

to

... . .'. ~ ':.: ';'I~~~~r(:;bl':g;Jl,..{~pur'Pl1"}"Jn~~o"frbn D-plUS-2;..l. ,~\t:~.:~1 ... 'I~\'~'} ~ ~L ' D'_'p~us"'2;4r'10l:~ibJi,S',!~I~g.Jf}.-; t~ th00-1f~t~i';~I{() ~'{c:~~;'\i~st' £c pr~~lolTtCd oven nor'o gOllor~l,
..c ':"~ ~.' .. ... ~\ ..

~:(tis:Ldcr -t:) bo fraf_l''',D-pllis..;,12


'h. ,~."
i.
J.

j.ll

"

'

Tho 0118);'::,,11' pl~~il ,d~,iile those phnacs .


,

iric1uc:os': t~sks 1 tho strc.togic

Contdrnri.ng tho ossontic.l '::ofcnsivo


.', ~, , I

_;.ir offensive,

n~c~ r.1D.itit~il1inG c~ntrQl

of.

'l:l11o"s of cormumcctd.on,
be continued Europe.

In addition',

opel~6'y'bi1S in Hcstc~n' Eurc.sio. i;ill fo~ tho c~'r1iost return

.to
'£hoS:e·

crcabo condi tiDns


......
"

to "Icabcm

'they incJul:o superiority

'Coi.uj.tol'-air

opcr'atd.ons to .::'..tJuo.in ovorn'Ll, nil.' over so Lcc-ocd arccs,


.of tr2.l1s)8rto:t.ian

'1
)

end 10,00.1 nil" eupronacy They include intcl'<.lictiOl1

systGq~

:t;,b

~
j

tho end _thc.t oar-Ly

the r.w.in SOv1.at Hoser·vas cannot

be br-ought ,to boer thocorrt.inuo.tiol1

I ,
l
I

in

tho Lnvaai.on pcr-i.od, mid thoyinc'lud.o

I
I

of 1")olitd.cc L, Psycfl_::; GicnI, 10

end unconvorrtd.onal, vrar·fo.l'o _8.gains·t - ,

tho ussn~ nor SC\to11itos and occup'Lcd [J.rcas·.,


coned, ti:.;ns

·,niOn f'avorub l,o

.1

h.wo boon crca ted c.n( Lho nccosscry fc;rcas" eOl1crD;t.od, . . rrhach tho plzm cstinatvs ct t~~·)r)rQ:KinD.toly -plus-2h norrbhs , . the D ~nlios rri.Ll, Lnvado Y;cste:cn E1ll'~)pe~ ·,ij.th control
tho sca

of the .':":.irend. c:isbcntecl,. tho'

zmd tho Soviet


.:1.

imlustF.{

::\j:,J(1 trc.nsportc.ti,";l1

p1;:\11 onvl.sagcs

condit.ion

sir.~lcT tr: th.:-.t of tho l·:.st d::,ys c.:'.\qp(.'.i~i1 (:C)OnC:D on

of' Gcrn.:::.nyin 1;:L6.


LlD.l1Y

Tho c '~l_l:':'so t.his of


unprod.i.ctzib'lo •.

c:)hditiol1s,

110-,[

Jl~.(Q)ITD E C ~ ~ ~1r ,8)

31

,l

Ir

,.
t.

$.'(Q)' '~")
,

.(~ll U, S. forces c.ve.~lc.blo for invasion


• 0

of ~icst,orn Eur-ope

.1

(Chc.rt) COL ~)L ELL: .L . Those forces" cs


;;l'JU

ccn soc,

c.re approxanato'Iy. airborne I"[J:th here

30 U.S. Amy Ini'o.ntrY Di.vi.ai ons plus .r .. 140' o.nti-o.ircro.ft 'o.~~o.noto.bly


U,

6. crmor-od nne:

.5

bnto.lliQns.

Tho Envy forces


['.1'0

as, indicv.tod

10 hov.y-.f' <:trt'iel's' Tthich c


j

of' the CV/OVB class. 21+do.y '~i~htcr: Groups; 10'

s.. '1.11'Fot-ccs

11 .1iSl~·~bonb gr oups

9' nll""",reb.thol' GJ;'01.tps;_ lQtactiCD.l

ruconnc'Ls senco erou)'s_;

troop

o[.).r1'ier g1")u)s,.

plus

15

2.ir' conbr oL c'l1d wD.rning

Ci"OU~1Si

G.!lj ,AH.cmS01f:

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cc.po.bili ty th.:::t. -;m Eur-ope QtD-plus-?J.~

holiefo
norrbhs,

T;O iriLl,

have for

In conc Iuai.on , it

1,1-".Y stzrbcd that bo

tho. succoas

and

offectiveness

of the

strc.tegic

o.ir offensivG

cnd thu success

of

our D.nti-subl:larinc

ccnp.u.gn ,

At. tho prc sorit tix1c tho f:JIIOT;ine;, r'o Latcd to OFJ.'TLOKLE,

nrc bcil1t; dovolopod: 1.


2. ii Joi'nt Logistics Plnn the dovc Lopnorrt of base 'c.rees." ~·:o.rfQ,rop'l.ans,
.,'

lToco~sD.ryguidance for Psych:'lo:;iMl

3.

(~nc:unconvcntd.onat

4.

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p'Lana,

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REPRODUCED ATTIlE NATIONAL ARcHives

DEQLASSIEIED
Authority By

ch2-1

Db . 4A NARA Date IAIOli---

NNf? St1JD:f{

li«J) JID
'berer
GEN EDWARDS:

E (C li~JE

r
is open for disof General Anderson's coming from to

Gentlemen,

-che conference

cussion?, or any questions presentation.


GEN KENNEY:

in clarification

Where is the air strength

support the holding of the Rhine? GEN ANDERSON: in England) duratLon General, unless we have fighter support

there probably will be none in 1950 or even for the As we say} holding We even during

of this plan in the next two' years.


J

of the Rhine

as enviSioned

in this plan, is infeasible. in western Europe is infeasible

think holding a bridgehead the period of this plan. GEN EDWARDS: menta on supporting

General Cannon, you might have some com-

the ground army over there. There are not adequate air forces in Europe time. There 1s

(]EN CANNON:

to support a dBfense of the Rhine at the yresent no use in sending additional

air forces to Europe unless they are for bases

based west of the Rhine, which would create the necessity on French aof L, What air forces we have currently are improperly

located in Europe

disposed and would have to displace to the west of the At best they could There are

Rhine iDnneo.iately in the event of an emergency. perform only one mission fram presently

occupied bases.

only three or four airfields ing modern combat aircraft.

in France which are capable of Bupport-

GEN EDWARDS: , General Anderson, plans


vTS

would you comment on what

have or thoughts we have with the view to establishing

ch2-2

,v

ti: (Q) h» §~:CC t~lR 'If


half of the Continent?' has been conmonths the Air'Staf~

base areas on the North African'w8stern GEN ANDERS9N:For so~ Bidering the establishing

of a ,base area in Northwest Africa.


I••

In

January of' thil3' y,ear we sent a ,survey te,am to Northwest Africa with really thre,e objects The first ,i:q v;iew. was to f:1,ndout whether or not the French would

welcome us; the second wa,s to find out whether. there was an area in whioh we could now,;:p.re-a~o,c1l; ..e~ntral acting as 'safekeallex:s ;;:and supplies ·with tlie Frenohmen

third", to pf ck a ba se area in which to


.
\
"

"

dave 10J;l a ir.fie Ids. ,

.~

We have . n,ow.processed a ,report .' ~ .


",". .'

based~..upon that ~

survey

trip.

'Certain actions, have beeri approved by the Chief of Staff. .


"

Amongthose actions
,/ J

are the stockpiling


I:!

of central

equipment in the to under-bake

Casablanca area now and

.dir~et~ve to the Air Staff

..

the dovelopm(1:ntof three medium bomber airfields ,Afr Lean 'area. . ' ... 'This act,u?ll.~d.eyelopmentwill,
8J;lQ.

in the Northwest
"

.~. .

of course,

ab Hng: legislation

'P~en apPX:0p;t'iations .

~.

depend. upon en:.


"

. ~..
"

"

GENEDyJABDS,: .. 'XQ:U might ~bring everybody here up to date . .


,

on the status

of oUr

V~E.:'
~. •

aird:rOlliOsat the present


0

time. to ~rral1ge the


~

GENAWDERf}O;N 1 ,Al?o for some time we have tried


I t _. '.

for the.,building

<?f>:fou:r:,airf,ields in the'midlanda
'r' " '

ar~aof

United.'Elingdoru::.for·, :1'-~r th~ .:F.ofoe.'s use. arrangements


':

Very recEi:dtly"all of these '" . havebeen o~ml?le,te~and I believe the ac'bua L construe..

tion worK will

begin.within

six weeks.

Howabout that,

General

.",

REP~ODUCEO I\T THE~NATI()NALARCHIVES

DEGLASSIEIED

ch2"3

Authority

NNP SI1JD~{

~Y 4A_NARADate

Ia.lol~b
CCIII k: "if
At the 'present

Johnson?

JI~;\D)It» .: §IE
GEN JOHNSON:

.Tha~ is about correct. of'av'iation engineers.

time three battalions

GEN Al'l'DERSON:We are sonding· over to assist with those battalion, engineers. Quite recently the English, have asked if of those fighter

those engineers can assist thom in the lengthening fields. GEN JOHNSON:

We are going to need that J incidentally,

us we. won1t

ask for anything eia9 at the present time.

There are

no fighter f'Lo'Ldaover 6) 000 feet be s.lde Woodbridge a which they had during the war.

and Carnaby

Those fields have no facilities o~copt runways, so our present plan is to put fighters on the 6) ODD-foot runways; but if thoy have an escort mission.we. have to put them over the bomber bases to top them off. There 1s no other plan at the present timo.

I am quite concerned, about the defenso of the U.K. airdr-oms because the British do not have a set-up for the defense of a their airdromes. surprise attack. General Cabell says thore is a possibility The British of a

donlt feol that there is the pos80,

sibility of war in the next year or

so they will not go into

defensive meas~res until they feel the situation is quite a bit more critioal than it is at the present time .•

REPRODUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES


J _, ~.' .,0 ,,.,._~~~ ;.,_.:\~' __B·,

<-z.-;;"'::,,

·b< •

.....r~ .... -~.._,_ ...

---

----- -,---'---- DEGLASSIFIED


Authority N

ch2-4

IN (> S, ?;D:f I

By

-<l&\ NARA Date


--

liJn1ta-"

---

1r CCD rfD
aIDN EDWARDS: now. air

§ill: C IKJ2 if

Are 'bhe any o'thar comments, 'gentlomen? re

GHJNANNON: have one other commentthat I might make' C I If wo want the hold on the Pyrenee s you 'will Have to have _.

support in Spain •. You canlt do it on fresh air and sunshine, I think it is most important terms ~ith 'the:Spariish
.R," ••

of which they have an abundance. that

our Government get on more friendly

Government. I realize that tha~ .goes into high Govermoontal levels


1" .:

but we :in Europe' think

it

is mostim:pori;;ant. I would like to just make some comments


"

GEN - VANDENBERG:

off the ro cord. (Discussion off the record.) GEN EDWARDS: order that we llli'1y In approximate somewhat our schedule we will termtnate discussion on OFFTACKLE the" at .:

present time and General Anderson will of our air Continental

continue with a presentation

defense program with plans for the defonso of' the United States and Alaska. General Vandenberg and defense is a ma+tcr of

GEN ANDERSON: -, Finletter, Mr

, gerrtlomon although our present meager air , gravoconcern, air


.

the necessity

to attain

and maintain an opera td onsL

defense system for the United Statos and Alaska stems princi,

pally from'c,onsidol;'ation,of

the air

offensive -which -the SoviGt


.f

Union''will -be .capabIo, ,of. mounting by 1 July 1952.


, • 1 ~

. 'The dilte,!'l,'July 1952 is selected .. -. .. .. o· tion because of, tb,ecri tical threat

for particular

consldera-

which the Soviet capabilities

ch2-5

pose at that time, and a Lso dt is the, earliest an operational manner. Present intelligence establishes

date by wh,ich
.,

nir dofense system can ba attained

in an o~derly

the' following factors

in connection w~th Soviet capabilities States: First, there will be li ttlo

to attack'thGJ United or no warning of an enemy a wajor

air attack; portion

second, the enemywill attempt to deliver

of his stockpile

of atomic bombs in a minimum, ~eriod third, effec~ive

of time in order to achievo maximum shock effect; a~tacks may be conducted Under 'conditions darkness,

of adver sc w~~ther or

The Soviet TU-4 mediumbomber is the only aircraft in the Soviet long-range air :force which could be used currently in an atomic atta..ok against: .the UnitEid: Stat.os, f'ac'bor-s it is anticipat~d , prinCipal that' Qonsidering all" still be the

an 'lmprovo9.,TU-4 will

vehicle for Soviot long-range operations

as late as

1953.
,Estimatod Soviet at6IDic bomb stockpile ablo are as shown on this (Chart ahown }' , COL DAYHA.'RSH: based ar.ens: at:. Velknl and Al?kurtti From Soviet TU-4s have the com~k·tradduses. shown. :y these arcs p ins). With one refueling
"

and Tu-4s 8va11,

chart.

...

(indicat~"
:
J

'bhey can ottain: this .lino


t. I,

(in.dicating)
'0 :.

,.0.

and with two r~fu01ings the'y' have this


..
,".:

capa1?ility,./indic-?ting),
'"

.~ ,',

... ~
,.

..~

. ",

and

... .

'~

with

£1

ona-way miSsion thOjThavo ·4500 compatra~8i.~.~

REPRODUCED AT ~HE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DEGLASSIEIED Authority N

ch2-6

~Y

-4£i\ NARA Date JJJ-01{1>P


-~
--',

NP g, '?D:t- (

:~..

'

GEN ANJ)ER~ON:
,,'

It is estimated ~hatby
..

~ '.'.

.,';

.~

the middle of this

yoar tho So~iots w~ll havo ~rom ten to twenty utomic bombs availablo a:r:dw~ll force.
h~V0

415 TU-4s oPElra:ti~na~ their ,tn

long-rango:

~.~r:

It is alsO estimeted ~hat by_mid-l952,the Soviets will and, 120.0TU -4s opera-

have from 45 to 90 atomic bO~bs available

'.

tiona1 in their @nceestimates

long-range air force. indicate

Further,

.,.

.:

the ·latest
,.'

inte.1li..~ '",
'.'

'

that the estimate of atomic bombavailability' . .


~"

for tho Soviets may be ,mater~al~y revised upward based upon the Fuchs leaks. The

Tu-4

has performance char~oteristics

roughly oomparccmbrrt

able to the U.S. B-29. radius.

:we;

have ahovn their

range and their

Wehave also shownan estimate d Soviet stockp;ile of from in

45 to 90 abcmto bombs in 1952. Fifty of thos.s 'bombson targets


;' 0 " ~

the United States


• 0 • 0

could produce nearly ,2,mill~on Amorican casualties.


.' ~. •• r '

Thoy could destroy Governmental machinery in 1-TBahingtonnd. very a


t'"

soriously

dis~u:pt our entire Such destruction

co~unicntions could, of itself,

,coID:ple:x. ~?riou8Iy hamp~r our

effor~,s t? mobilize ouriarmed forces and indus:try and, yet, the foregoing is but a smn~l veroentage of the damagethat could be·
.'0

indicatod by fif:t,y bombs on target, could destroy nlarge

for,

in add~tion, these bombs capacity re-

J)6rcentugo of the' industrinl

q_uirettto put anna into tho hands of the Uni~cd Statos armed forces after they oro mobilized. If sOlc?tively p1oced, 50 bamb~ industry

could simultaneiously

destroy 70 per cent of United States pLans to produce tanks,

a.esignatod in our mobilization

artillery

REPRODUCED ATHIE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

.'

DEGLASSIIDED Authority N IN!>

ch7

By

. 4A NARA Date 1iJ.t11/bb ----

Sr;;O:f {

1r ((j) IF
and.jsma arms. Ll, industry,
85 per cont of facil~tie8

§IE CC i~lE

1f
forgings industry, and

The;ycould completely destroy our atomic energy steel

30 :per cerrt of our special

to produce marine boilers •

. Bea communications wIll determir..Bwhether' ve can sustain 0.11198overseas} and 'wlJ.etherwa can a.e;ploy',andmaintain our own forces overseas. A-bombattacks on our major ports, the Navy's

mothball f'Lee and major Navy yards coul~ oonceivabIy deny us this t ability. destruction The foregOing are but a few examp le s of the simultaneous

50 bombs on selected target8

could cause.

There is no question but that the Soviets have sufficient in~elligenoe gets. of U.S. industry to enable thom to select these tar-

Further,

there +s no question but that the Soviets know the

location

of those targets. United States bombs on Soviet targots .couLd certainly

cripplo their

wp.reffort

in the'; 'samemanner' t1i~~. Soviet bombs

could cri:pp~e our own. Without quostion,

tho Soviet~ realizo Soviet efforts

this to

an?

it is our 'opipion that the :present intensive

nttnin effect

an adequate air defense system are designed to minimize tho of a U.S. counter-attack with atomic bombs. Certainly
• 0·' 'L
I" ;

then,

the Soviets would like to' 'kiil, ;' t its a to'·countorattack. tion'of against

source Jour

copability

Our intolligenco

believes

a likoly Soviet a110co.-',o :

A-bombs in 1952 will

includo 20 to 25 Atomic bombs used

tpo bases on whioh our atomic bamb-carrying planes are locatod. Ji,J;l .short, 50 bombs on target might make it imposE!ible for Thoy might make

the United States

ever to mobilize and fight back.

I~~:~:~~;;~:~~~' -;,
DEGLASSIRIED Authority N~!>
~'Jii~",i1o,ti!~1:b~U&'t£ilil:,';.1;~",~£'~_,;~(~:~=~,,, .•:"~:.!:L~»·j~":'" '.....' ,.... :

'7;'f:i,~:."~~m,=,, :T'",.~~.,_..,-~, ... ,__. .. "

chS

By

4A NARA Date

SJ'bC>:f I

111101 {Db

it ~lpossible "WOo.ponB.

for us to utilize

our own stockpile

of atomic

I emphasize that avadIab Ie ':intelligence ." ..


,

i~dicotEls the

Soviets Will have the c[lpllbi~ity for such an at.ta ck by I J'l1;ly 1952. Henceforth, this date is treated
D.S

critical. air

It is the t:ime defense system

by which we must have an 'effective in being. Our present air

operational

defense system is ,very ,small.,

(Chart shown.) GEN k\NDERSON: This chart shows air deployed. Twenty-four fighter squadrons, deft;msGunits as now

sevon oorrtr o'l corrtor a and Aluska,

and 28 basic radars Fighter nir'i'ields drons .units

are stationod. in the' United States

are generally

deployed as 'groups on Gov:errnnent-ownecl positioning by aqua-

bocause of lack of funds for better

If we had the noceaea.ry funds, we would deploY,tf.'1em as shown on this chnrt.

(Chart shown.)
·GEN ANDERSON: This chart ndds'
OLlO

squac.r?n for defense


L08

of tho Chioo€?ooren, ,~ne squadron' for the defense qf ,the


• .1 .' ':{"; 'r
'

Angeles area and spreads out our 'defenses'. .. Such


5

D.

lii::tle ,1;>1 ~" . '. undefende d such

deployment would stili


,,'

"105YEL

:major tor,gets. e:s our iron ore 'system 'in tho Duluth aroa , tho .. , . 'industrial,complexes in the Missidsippi River valley, and n
·",1'
\ ':-: " 0

ori tipal

number of the bases of ourretnlintory

for.ees,

Howover J

...
0 .. . _ ~ __ 0'__

-,'

DECLASSIFIED

oh9

Authority N Nf>

gt '?O:f ( ~Y -46\ NARA Date I 9.1 Ol~"

this

doployYilEJnt would givQ greater air

defense capEtbll1ty than

now exists. The 'presently aircraft


Aluslm
00

progrEtmmed Joint

Chiefs of Staff~npproved and as

control oonsfnts

and warning system in tho Unitocl States

otLeleven pont!,'ol centers 'and 85 basic radars

dODited on this 'char-t , (Chart sh(JWn.) GEN ANDERSON: This system was plo.miedto casted Eussian CEtpability in 1953 of sporadic, agairist our resources. in which certain
Wl;fS

meet a foreattacks

dispersed

It did not include a coverage of areas of Our retaliatory force are located and

units

intended only us the basic "framework for an ultirllDte mrcraft and warning system.. This/bo.sie °frnD16work will be completed

control
o

and opera tIom 1 by 1 July 1952.


The exposed condi i;ion of cortain bases

of our Strntegic
!

Air

ComtoonSl becomo a matter of groat concern in View of the probahas bility


0.

that the RUSsians will have a stockpile

of 45 to 90 atoJYIic of their

o.bombs,ond'"thEy capability
ohoos'mg

of ~laOing them on targets,

by 1952. Two courses of action oppear to us to be open. authorized


0

They are:

To move our bases inside

the presently

warning system,
'0

- or to oxtend the warning systen to incluc10 these bns8!=fJ Our studies have revealed that

it would cosf appro.xi-

LIDtely $100,000,000 to movo the bnses within the warni~g syste~. On this baSis alone we would have docided in favor of-extending the

syatem,
cision: fndustries

However J there namely,

was an addi tional'renson

'

for

'such

11

de-

to proVide additional

'r'adG~ cover6.g~ au'bhor-i zod system. control

of'

itlportant

oU'ceide of the presently Our re'corro:nendedaircraft

and warning of exposed

system inStretegio

oludos

oleven

additional

radars

for

ooverage ohart.

Air Cor1Q8ndbas6s[lS

shown on this

GEN VANDENBERG: olonel; C char-t up there


s'o we'

wou Ld you put that' 6thor

can

compare them?
. ,.!.

(Whereupon," the 'Thst two charts

were c1isplciyed simul-

tnneauSly.)
GEN EDWARDS: You said eleven more, didn't'you?

GENANDERSON: Yes, s'i:t; e Ieven additional. GEN EDWARDS: Did I GEN/ANDERSON:' Yes. for
WtJ

'se'e'

109 and 851


nc.dea :'specifically adCled, which

Thore nrc 'eleven There are

cover-age of SAC bases,


will mention.
, Bo ceueo

sit.

Others

sone of the

basen

are'

10E8

exposed Strategic

than

others,

we

have divided't'll'is

coverage

of bases

of·the

Air

C01waud into

two priorities.

In ·the first

priority

eight radars
in the

immeClidtely' esseD:tiitll.1re 'shbwn in red second 'priori ty .throe . r'ndrl"i-s 'are' shown

(inc.!cating);

in

green

(:i~~icatin~): southen~t~rn ooa~t

Five" a(1~1i'ibna'l: basic:'· radDr;s :posi:ti6necY on the t WQuld,cf[clcl' n~eded 'W'arhing for Two of 'these~ar~"in :ihland tarB~ts for,'i~diQte

and c~rabrit 'units. c~:6~truotion;

':b:h::it' pri6tit'y

three

~_".~.~_,_._...J;.:....I'

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'.!.

DEGLASSIIO:ED
Authority NN()

chll

SJ'?JD~I ~Y 46\ NARA Date I fl.1 0 I~"

are in second priority. Selective outwara. extension of warning is desirable in light of increasing enany capabilities. For areas adjacent to

our northeastern border, the ~lanned Cannad1an aircraft control


[mel

warning system will prc-v:ide additional eurly warning if the

present expeoted C01npletiOIi date

or

1957 is changed to 1952 •

. n the Duluth and Vancouver areas eight additional I baSic radars on Oanadian territory are required.to provide similar extension of warning. This Canadion system would provide additional

early warning for the Northeast, for the Great Lakes area and the PaCific Northwest. this program. The total rqquirement for additional radars is twenty-' four for a total of 109"basic rudar-s, Both our eastern and western coasts have vital targets googra:ph1cally exposed to attacks from seuwar'dwith
ndrnraum
,.

The Canadians are being urged to accomplish

- '. ,!" '~

,0.

varnfng,

A study of selective extension of the land-baseq warning systeos seaward by picket ships has revealed
Q

requirement for ten pickctPhf.Lade Lphdu , .. orN


" c"

ship stotionsj"two stations each off New Yo~~, folk, San FranCiSCO, and Seattle.

We believe this augmented aircrqft control and.wyrping • • ,0 sy'stdm to be technically feit.sible, and in consonance ~"~i?hi?P?
' • ,r. '..~, • ..- .-' 1_,•
• ••

proseht"stote and rate of tec}mologicnl.c1evelopLnnt •. Its ipple" " ." -' I .~, ~.."/. ~.

nentatibn would not involvo exooaatvo oxpendf turo for nar.dwqrQ


-

.'.

....

.,

~.'.
.

which is prosently available.

Further, this systen a~~oars tp


.'. f'" ,~ ..

".! .

"

present

propor balance b~"!;ween the aircraft

portion of an

=. defense

control and warning'

in, being,. and the rS's61lrch and developof the syste:6.


'"I

ment program necessary t? im:p~ove the capability

It af:rords an [iir?rn,ft control and wmming coverage ,for o'ur no'fit important industr;l.ol, for our retaliatory Goverlll1entol,' and population complexos, and',

forces. Qnd integrated We squa-

Combatunits must be properly positioned

with t:Pis .conbr o.l and warning system to provide any defense. have calculated drons. I would like to explain briefly in this calculation. Since.we are unable to forecast
;"
" "

t~e re:g,uirernent in terras of all-weather

fighter

the reasoning involved


"

accurately

the oxact

targot

comp loxe s

tpe USSR

:wauIe> ..se,lect to attack,

W<3 are forced'

to include in our n~r qefenso covorage all to mobilization for war , and our retaliatory

of the resources vita.l forces.

Placement of 25 atomic bombs in 1952 on our atomic force with sinultnneou8 . delivery . of as many as 65 additional .. . . .
" ~..

bombs on' facili-

political ties

ond po~ulatio~~cGnters and selected

industrial

is t~e sco~e, we believe, and the pattern

of attonptod

atonic attack with~ which ~ our air ~ COpe.


'_.

defense systom must be pre:pi:u!ed to on a

Mass attacks by large nunbers of oneny'airplanes . .. ,.


ro_,

linitoc\ area .WQulc1 Less pro(1.uctivGthan aoIe ctdvo atrtaclcc by," be


.,<:. •

sma lIar
".

separate forces on targets


• 0 '. ". ',." •

such as I have just nentnone d povror as the .

when vrd are using wonpona:Wit:!}; ~~ch destructive

REPRODUCED ATTHt: NATIONAL ARCHIVES


........- ..... ...;_,;,'_.:. • "~. ;*"'_
~'~I'
J.J~ •

.1 "."_"'_".',..;!

......;l..iI-,.~

-,v_'!. ......:.:.,;, ""~r

DEOLASSIIDED

Authority N

ch13

By

. 4A. N~RA Date. Jglnl{ob ~ _-

{kiP St 1)0* (

atomic bomb • . Webelieve our fighter units should be


80

pOsitioned any do-

tbnt, ~ minimumof one squadron will be available tectecl attack. States A fighter de,ployrnSnton this

against

basis

in the Unitocl

and Alaska generates a requiromentfor located on

67 fighter

squacrons,

all-w~a~hor in capability, chart. (Chart shown.)

53

bases as shown on this

GEN ANDERSON: this On

chert the blue circle

indicates a twodeploy-

a one-squadron deployment, the green square indicates squadron· deployment, and the rod triangle mont, for a total deplo~ent

a three-squadron

of 67 squadrons on 53 bases.

Anti-aircraft n11
9,.~~

weapons are an essential

defense' system.' "The,.results .

..
,

part of any OV8r~

"

'

that night be obtained by narked and .ono of the 8urfaco-"

ncceloration to-air

of the ungutded- rocket project

,guided Iilissi1es projeets


in the low-altitude

~re so,potentia.l:).;y valuable, bnnd, that, this ucceIorn't.Lon is

partioulnrly ossential.

Because of the potential guided missiles, coobut units} battalions


We

capabi~~ty, of rockots 'and


, ;

have employed, in, th~B 1952 dO}J1oymont -bf"·" ~cQPonanG ninoteen ,gun' The provision of ',the-se:units

only seventoen autonatic

in 21 LocaL defense, areus ,

is within the presently

programmedcapabilities,

of tho 'Arr:lY~''

Cer ta In other types of uriits must be ac1c'.s.ct to the,,'Qver'-all air defense capabf.Ltty. .RadiO intercept units offer tho moat 'likely

REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DEGLASSIFIED

ch14

Authority N ttY!'>

91 'i2D:t (
111101{Ob

~Y 46\NARADate

vll1«JJ !? §~<C ~~ ~ 'll~,


possibility the nobLIe appropriato of obtaining clews:o~enemy intention.
r'a

Augmentation of

ddo aquadz-onsof the USAF Security Service to an and their, proper positioning,is intelligence on the location, being expedited cnpabilitie8,

strength,

to provide additional Gndthe intentions

of tho Soviet Air Force. squadrons for for us to

The Air Force now has avad InbLe 24 fighter doploJrr1ontfor oir defense. have 27 squadrons ovailable of Our presont prog~an calls by 1 July 1952.

This leaves a def-fcit

40

squadrons. Studies. of .the , OFFTACKDI: c1eploynent lee1us to believe that

four Marine and eight Na'vysquadrons" which are nob aChedulecl "for C1.eploynent until defense role., D.-pIus-one'month, :might be available However, amee we 'have been talking for,; the air this plan over

"

with the Navy, they indicate' that they nave other use for those squadrons, and we still have a deficit"of

40.

Wehave considered the llossibleem1l1oynmt of the' Air National Guard to I'10et partially in being. prior to D-Day , r'equt.rerssrrb , Weare conafder Ing their .uae. in the post':'D-Dayperiod in " air-ground om}air transport not on D-Izry. training, operations, but not in Qir,~ defense and the r~qulreI1ent for nir defense Guard cannot meet this

The Air'Nntional

After federalization

81'1c1 short per Led of refresher D. of conbat pro'.

they can attain

and 11ElintainQ high stote

ficioncy dnd To8adinessfor post,.;D-Dny oporations. The ;requirernents st,:r.ted are those existing prior to the

.,,~~,""DEcLAssiiiED' .", ,
Authority N~!)

ch15

.~Y

4A NARA Date
""" ~

Sr?;O~{
I Q.I 0\

(Db

~ll:~); '~ ~ fFJ '"'US. ;f"'1 ~!l. ill- @ 1i2~~ ") ~


17':,

o.ttack. capability

The peak effort

of all

forces :possessing an uir air atrtccks , ueI:u'.Dcl. Durall' on

de'fense In event .
(leien~os,

Dust be used to courrtor initial is probable that the greatest


and quantitativoly,

of 'Ymr it ?

both q~[Ilitatively
D-Day.

will be I:lD.de· on 'H ..llour of aurpr'Lao a+back thnt


now inoludes not

It is this

probability dangers,

of an initial

poses the greatest losing tho fir£)t cities

for our s~curity

oQ!:lJlaign of the war ,

,It Lnc ludea not having our

c1estroyed and our population firstcompaign. tional

deoi::::u:tted in the prQoess' 'Of

winning our

Theuadi

-coatis to the DG];lnrment of Dofens(j" of" our

:proposed alr defense tially,

systsL1ore:. o£'!t;lJ:;lntf)dto be $187) 000, 000' ini-

with $1, 0~7 , 000 s 000 annua L re cu.-rIlling cost .: . The Air Forco rocoJ::ilI1enc1ec1 to i:!ho Joint Chiefs
l

0.:13 :StD.ff
••••• 0,

that

11.

cOL1r!1ittee be established

to determine each 'sd'rv'ico"s con-

tribution

to tho Sy?t0r:l,to cost it nore accurately· than we and to recormend actions ,noCoJ3sa:ry, tb' secure ':i:ts .: ..

hod ostlwtect,

effective ioplo~eritntion by 1 July 1952.


Tho Joint Chiefs of Steff' directed the Joint give 'their Stro.t~·Bic· .
reCOr:l1'j8n...

'

Plans Co~mttee to nake such cormorrbs anclto dations •. On 21 April tho ~oint Strategic tho Plans Coomittoe, sentially a,

P'lnns Group reported. to their report, os-

which bas now considorod

the £ollowing: Tho pro sont; nir dofenso of the Unitocl Stutes and Alaska

is ino.cto-qun;;e.

b.

Thero should bo in being by .. July 1952 an olloro.tiolll.l.l 1,

REPRODUCED AT TIi!' NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~"";::;;--bEa'LAs'-~iiIiD" Authority ~y

,<

ch16

46\ NARA Date 19..lotlob

NI]"JP

2r",0*(

air dofense system for the Unitocl States rtotorring or effectively systom should contain . (1)
0.8

and .Ala,sknoapabIe of
This

'countering enemy air' attaclts. a L1ininun~

]'r OL1 the "Oil!o d St~tEls Amy: t

51 anti-aircraft L1iesile units. stated (2)

gun battalions,

. or substituted

gu:i.tled in cur

This is a l5:"bat'tal1on increase

requirenent,

as stated

in this

:p1a~ •.

FroIl the U. S. Navy: 25 radar p:icket ships


J

for ten stations'.

(3)

From the tJ~ S. Air Force: 101 basic radar stations recoTImended;l~ control
1'0 cO:r:JC1onded; a radio

as opposed to the 109 we centers, tho saro that we systcu;

intercept
D.

67 fighter
study .

int~rceptor tIny indicate furnished

squcdr ona with that


aone

proviso tl1nt further

of those squadrons can De

from lli1its of the Regular 'or Reserve Navy

.or Marin~' Oorps.

Tho Joint Stratogic


ro'quir81;10ntsto bo
D.

Plans Group stated our 1 July 1952


to' the optillUtl.

sound approach, ,il?- principle,'

air dofenso syston required.

That concludes the prescntatfon,


GEN EIW.ARDS(

gentlenen•
break

We will

t~kE/;" ten-minute
b'roak'.

and' discuss
'"

General Anderson's pr6s~~tcitioi1 'after 'the

("Thereupon, a short r8dci'~svia's taken.)

REPROOUCED

ATHIE r1ATIONAL ARCHIVES

O""~"'~DEOLASsimED'
Authority
By

ch17

4A N~RA Date

NNP Sl?;D:'f(

1111 0\ (Ob

GEl'1 EDWARIS:The conference

is now open for a disCUE!sion defense. General

of Genoro.l Andersonfs prosentation


GEN .cABELL:

on air

I would like .tio make one, point.


,

Anderson referred
'

to the :fact that

the estimate

of the atomic be-

bombc8pab111tiea. was 8ubJectto cause of the Fuchs leaks.' reconsidera.t10n latest study . . hat upward reVision T Upper brackets o~ the stockpile.

materially

upward revision

Since that

considera.tion

has' been made)'

has been given) and that

is not borne out by the

is only a alight

one and only in the

GEN EDWARDS: General Kuter. GEN KUTER: I understand that the use of the air bases '. in NeWfoundlandand Labrador is essential certainly be essential as of 1 July 1952;. or 1n OFFTACKLE would and

I would like to ask General Anderson what the status consideration of air dafenae is of those baae a ;. : .'

GEN ANDERSON; have been dil;lCu8sing the air We

defense

of the labrador-Newfoundland bases with the Cana'dians•.. We, come " up against aoottar of n(:itional pride there.
e

They do not want the. oountry; mos+

United States particularly

to provide air

defense for their

do they not want us to put it

in in peaoetime; and to get the air

the.y.,.<have udgetary troUbles. b

I spoke of trying

Canadians to move forward the completion date of the little

defense we showed here from a completion date of 1957 to 1952. There is little expectation that they will be able to afford that.

REPRODUCED ATT~E I'IATIONAl ARCl-IlVES


.•.• ,,~'_H.·r.

DEGLASSIElED

Authority

ch18

By

46\ NARA Iii O\(~ Date ~~ ~


~ If'in\\ -:;) , .~~" i:;,l
. .ll ~
I

b! IN!> 9)1;0* (

II

.cd)

LLa ~

,f"L"-" 'iT~ I.,)J l!,,,,, I....:l

~-ll"'l

As times grow. more tense,

:E beli've we will be able to

place defenses for our bases 'in Newfou;ndla.;nd Labrador. and.

NOW, you also:spoke, of.Greenland, .didn!t you~


GEN KUrER:
I would like

to hear about it.

G'EN ANDERSON:

We.haven 't done a thing about that.

GEN VANDENBERG:think pernapa I can throw a little I light on the Canadian situation.· .The Chief of the Canao.ianAir Force is as worried about' .. ' that ;problem as we are, and he has come downto !fie several t:'bmeS

to see if I could, when tb,ese people come c:town ere 1 Bell them h on tho necessity for this air. warning system in Canada: he is faced with budgotary that we are faced with in They apparently' got

As General Anderson said, troubles, this and also tho same troubles

country with this balanced forCe idoa.

it from us, arid:they are having a great deal of trouble. Howevor, tho Minister Fielcl in 'this little last joint
J

Mr. Claxton, was d?v~ at Eglin

orientation

course, and I got in a After seeing some

worle'W:lthhim,

as

did Mr. Symington. '. '

of the destructive

effect

of tbe bombs dropped from the E-36 and


1

some of the firepower of tho· fighters little wiser man. Whether or not that

he went home, I think,

is going to.have any effect

or not,

I donIt know, but I dokriow toot .baf'ore we. can expeob to get any

material future

assistance

from Canada, ,it i'Till bo some time in the or four years;


80

__ in the neighborhood of two, three,

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

O"H':':;:;;~EQLASsiIDED' Authority N N P S' 1)0* {


oh19
~Y 4J\NARADate

lilO~

I think

we are going,t"o -havo t6plan

on 's·hfp:pin:g;mobile stations up there


1

up :cl:iore 'and deploying (1.0it .


in ]enoetim.e

our, fighters

:l;iecErL\Se :we can r t ;

unle'as'"';;o get' our Government t. 'end 'our Defense . . problem and p\lshoUl:" G0ie:rnment . , " '. ,General' Ane.ers,on, ..

Deportment to understan"d'tl,lis against


tho irs

to soe if wo can It do this.

GENEDWARIS : to give a brief pioture

It" might be worth"ihiie of' what we are actmilly of sites:;

(Laing ·with rO'speot of ccn+rac+a,

to exporidf.ture o:f funi1.sJ selection and so on and so forth,


On

lottIng,

this

radc.r s"ystem,

GEGN ANDERSON: Do you mind if I ask" Genera L Myers to


give that, sir?
0.,.

GEN 'EU-lABIS TlID. will : t

be fine. Zone of Irrte r for)


·in- the"'

GENM'YEBS:'" he 24 site s in"the T first phase, w·ill all be advertised,

contracts

awarded tftis"f;tsc:ia1

YGar, with a completion'- da'teof ! struction, which, of courao , will

the first

of July 195'r ;,dn the cen-

give·Q year·:to the:·fii'at' of"


0" •

July 1952 to gl3t thoro in op,eration. The socond phase;

61 Sites, in

'the Zone ·of.,the"Iriterior, soon, with 1951:ft.ihas


"

are under design now, and will for tho constrruotdon ,'

be £\clvertised

.,
'.

Tho e Lovon in Alaska, somo of 'them, and othors date' on the construction

bids have a Lroady rbeon opened' on:,:

'.:.1:' '. :.

are to be opened -acon,: with a' oomp.lo t.Lon of the first of December of 1951-.'. dollars'

We hove a requiremont more thaD the 85.5 now available

f'or'approXiDlD.toly 39 inillion ,to actuo'lly

complete the AlaQkan

REPROllUCED

AT TIiE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

--"':=::-';'riicLAsSIiIED'Authority N NP ch20 ~Y

rIA N~RA Date alO~


II
(Q) Ii»

Sr?,O* ( .

and SACportions

of thebasio

s IEJC ~ IEII .
aircraft

oont;ol ~nd"l'i~~ning:system
-

of 85 basic radars and a request Defense with the request that

is going to the Secretary


,

of
"

it be transmitted

to tilo Burenuof money. only be

tho Budgot and the Congress for this additional

Without "that money, it is estimated that we will able to complete sone 60-0<1d of the

85

sites.

GEN ANDERSON: am not sure that that money buafne aa is I absolutely bill straight to everybody here. Wehad an atrbhor Lza'td.on of the that

which authorized

85.5 million dollars for oonstruction


We have hLld no appropriation last

wa~ning and control net. authorization. to reallocate other priority get started

against

We were given pennission

year, and we did,

50 million
projectS'. on this.

dollars

which had boen appropriated for ~. ~ Wetook it army from them and used it to
" ;

NOW, we are currently


-,

attempting

to get" the 35.5 million Wee'stimatecl that system

dollars

which remains of the 8S.5 au'bhor-Lze , d

we will roqua.re

39 mf.Ll.Lon beyond that

if

we complete this

on the date General Myers namod. That increase ing the work. GEN MYERS:Yes)sir.

is due to nccolorat~

GEN ANDERSON! Almost orrtLroLy, isn't i't? GEN MYERS:Nine million work; another nine-nillion-odd doLlzrrs of it i:3 o.cclorating

is for tmprovod bar-racke and the we also forgot ana. airf1elcls

balance Ls just for GElt:ir:J.atingnd for facilities a ccmnunfcatfona facilities

in the Zone of the Interior

REPRODUCED ATTtt£ flATJONAl ARCHIVES

,.~,~,,.J~~ DEOLASSIEIED

Authority N IN P
~y

4A. N~'RADate lQ) O~


~I'~Jr» '_ Cj) r,i·{r'J FD fi ll'\\.U If, " .!b,J' \S? il~ o!..L:J
(('l
,

S' 1)0* (

ch21

t'$ll'

and cfomfuUnlcatibns in Ala/ska due', t6 change in t;heir


,

sites. this comploCon-

GEN VANDENBERG:

Thon, is it not true that


upon our getting

tion dntG of 1952 is contingent

money this

GEN MYERS: 10s, sir; I feel it definitely is.


..,_

GEN VANDENBERG:Thore seems to be very little

chance of

that, doesn't there,

General White?
of: the 85.5 I think we are going
As to any additional

Gt!:N WHITE: The balance to get. zation

IvIr. Vinson is working on that: I am doubtful.

authori-

' ". derierarAirdersonJ the program that


No •

GEN RAWLINGS:
La stiil not inc1uc1ec1in
GEN ANmBSON: GEN RAWLINGS:
! : :

then,

tho

86C011(1

phase

he has just

outlined?

The odcU tional 24? N9.


was an estiIJ'1.ate of

GEN ANDEBSON:

GENRAWLINGS: As I recall, thore

about 70 million
"

dollars.
You see) ayatora. I tried to make the point one (inclicat-

GEN ANDERSON! No ,
that we have a JCB aut.hordzod

That is this

ing); that is tho one we originally estimated would cost 85.5 m:tll1on (10l10.rs.
Now, th6' other ono is what wo havo presenter, to the

JOint Chiefs as an aaditional requiro~cnt, in light of Soviet a'toraf,o 'cu:pabili ties) '·Thich has' not yot boon appr-oved by the Joint

Chiefs.

REPRODUCED AT T!<E NATIONAL ARCHIVES

eh22

GENRAWLINGS:That amounts to how many d.ollars, Seventy, as I recall. GEN ANDERSON: eventy for the ad.dit~onal aircraft S and warning points. GENRA1.-TLINGS: Right. GENANDERSON: e s • Y GEN RAWLINGS:I would like to ~s~ a Question, Anderson. Obv1ously~ the early ~arni~g ~as a great for def'enae ,

roughly?

control

General

deal to do

with our capability

You montn.oned that we WElretryin that direction. Could you

ing to pick up more intelligence elaborate on that a little? .

GENANDERSON: would l;lke Genera~ .Cabell to, I will. GENCABELL: Our efforts tbrough tho Air ]'oree Security clang that line

if he

pro principally facili~io8.

SerVice,

expansion of its

(]ENRAWLINGS:Is it odeQuato1 . GEN. CABELL~W~ think we havo


0.

good chance of accompLlehwarning through tho proposed .• is thj.s:

ine early warning "- that is,

oarly-early

augmerrtsrt Lon of the facili tio s which wo have already GEN ANDERSON: hat you were asking, W Does this

I beliove

plan provide an adequate QugmontatiQll,of tho service?

I think the answer, in General CabeLl.Ls opinion to that, is Yes. Is thnt right? GENCABELL: YeB • GENVANDENBERG: . ...1
,_
",.

Is that the money. for the Brooks Field. .~

ins.~"tlf~,f ~'~~ " 1:"" ,: 6E:N~BAWLING$::' That is "a part of ;it, sir. is tho ccnter

GEN CABELL: ,The Brooks Field installation

qi it"
field.

General V8ndcnberg,,'but

the main I)ugmontl),tion 1s in the

GElN EDWARDS: (lon't like to curtuil I

this

discul3sion,

gentlemen, but we are little behind schedule, 'so I will ask


General Anderson to continue with his pre aerrtatdon of our capabilities plon now known as VERDANCY. is an application It ahows our best estimate to

OFFTACKLE which actually

to(luy as to
• ~o

what we can do and what will happen to our Air Force on D-plusthree] und so forth.
,

GEN ANDERSON: Gentlemen, this unc1ertook to determine Of 48 groups to fight 1953.


0.

is roally

a stucly we
• 00,

the capabilities

of an Air Force compoeo d begilU1ing 1 July

weI" agQinst Russin,

It will a Lao indicate

the cD.pnbili ties of an Air Force of

58 and 77 groups.
An eatiIacte been presented. ' The notable difference betwoen pre aorrt and 1953 capabilities In 1953 it aircreft is tho greatly incroasoc. Soviet atomic potential. 1200 B-29-type atomic to at" present Russian capab Ll.f ties has already

is ostimated the "SOViets wil1°havo

in their

long-range bomber forco and on estimated It is currontly-impossible

stockpile' of 75 to 135 bo~bs. prodict the extent

to which the military assistance

now starting

to bo
sivo

provided potentinl1ty
-

ourEuro:peQnAlf~,os by 1953.
"

IDy have enhe.n~~d, their

defen-

It

cannot fron

be assumed, accomplishing

hoW~ver, that their Ground..

such aid will offensivos

prevent

the Soviots

in Europe. The strategic

coriccpt and basic

undertalcings

of this

stuc1y are vic.o for

identical
Il

to those

of OFFTACKLE ~-which, and

in sUI:Il::l11ry, ];>roQ

onjor

of'foris Lve in Western Eurasin

strategic

def'ense

in the Fur East. (Chart

shown.)
The- four tasks shown on this chart air are of-

GEN ANDER$ON.: the


same as those

shown in OFFTACKLE: De fana Lve tasks, in Western EUrnsia,anc1 control

f'ens Ivo , o:perations, communications.. -_

of essential

The _concep~ of operations c_evelo:pod in four phase tine phases,

ane the

plan

of nction thro~

have beon nonths, to

which moo D-Day plus months, phase

1; D-plus-threEl._,to·D-plus-18 phase

2,; D-plus-18 phase

D~plus-36,

3j

and D-plus-36

to the ond of the war, on D-Day is


[IS

4.

The ccnposf tioD. of the Air Force on this char t. (Chart ahcwn , )

shown

I'

.'

GEN ANDERSON: groups; two strategic grQuP,

Four he'a.vy bcnb gr'oups; re ccnnaf.asance

11 Il8c1iULl. bomb one strntegic _.,

gr oups , heavy;

reconnaissnncE) one light one tactical

::tJ.ediur::r;: iWOw6uthor interceptors; troop carrier,

re conna Laccnco groups;


• r.. •

bopb;: 12 fighter recon; four

(hght

fiGhter'

bombers; carrier,

heavy; -two troop

REPROOOCED AT Tl'IE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~n>'_~riE~{~SS;~D
Authority

NNP Sr~();-{

ch25

~y

$\ N~RA Date J Q.I O~

medium, for 48 group~.

' 1r (Q) lP §rz C IR,JE/Jr.


. '.

Then, in the Nat1?-Onl Guard wo would ha~e 27 fighter groups; 1~~/3,

or

a light bo~b group in the Reserve; ond 6-2/3 of


'.
,

tho troop carrier in,the Reserve. The nission of the National Guard was assumed to be that

prioorily of tnctical nvintion and suppor-t to ground forcos, ano secondarily :partioipation in air c_ofens8 after D-Day. The defensive tasks ~dertaken D-to-D~plus-three-months during the first phase

-- will be on an austerity basis, and

will involve considerable risk. The Air eJ'ontroland Worning' System for the air defense of the United States will be the presently pla?lled75 basic radars
and

ten control centors.

To fully man this system for' continuous

oPEiration will require 13} 000 technically qualifiecl men to be provided over and above the regular 48-group progren, as we nowe ]mow it. These additional troops will be obtained fran Air ~atio~al
.,

Gunrd AC&W groups by D-plus-one nonth.

As

result, the operation

of tho control radars in the systen will be oonsiderably leas than satisfactory during tho most criticnl period of the first
phase of war.

The fighter interceptor forcos Qvailable withiuoa 48Broup Air Force ore deploysQ within the control area of the AC&W system, or will be 8-2/3 groups, (Chart shown.)

REP~OQlJCED AT mE N~'nONAl ARC0JV1,S_

,:0,n<-i-:'-:;';;~DEGLASSlmED

Authority ch26

MNP

S,1:204(
I~IO~

~y 46\NARADate

.
G]!NANDERSON That .is 26- aquadnona ~ : Although stD,t~8,including units sometioe alJ_ 'other Navyun~ts, after fighter will

,-

.,

'

units

within

theUni'te-cl

." '. fighter fighters

be

used to augment these 'air defenso

D-Day, the

only available

roady forcomb~t

operations

on R-Hour of D-Day will

be tho' 26 regu-

Lar USAF squadrons. Forces for oafenes of arens other than the United to those indi90tes' States,

as shown on this

char-t, e ro essGntially
is that

similar this study

In- OFFone

TACKLE. The mnjor Qifference fiGhter Br~u~.,noi'{ stationed Stqtes

in the Far East

should

be :returned de-

to

the United fensos.

sometime before

D-Day to augment U.S'. 'air

The first D-Day, the ,U.S. to ini tiqto


,8

phase task, indicatec. air

Strntegic on this

Air Offensive:' chart will

On'

forcos

be avaf.Iab.le,

strategic shown.)

offensive.

(Chart

COL, E.I\WELL:Those forces S

are

four heavy boob groups'

ana in tho medium field


or Nort4west,Africu.

building

up to

six deployed to the U.K.

GENANDERSON:A rensoncbie the Soviet offensive effort units ngoinst is a

'estinate

of t1:ie effect strntegic nir

of

the United States

30 per cent redu'ction

of effoctivenoss. subversive

This

j:e,rcontngo .tno.luces action and sabotage


,

,the ~stirlllt0d as wall


I

daraage cnuecd,'by

as by ntonio
I

bombardment. intorcontinental bombing

During tho :period of this

plan)

REPRODUCED AT TiolE NATIONAL ARCHIVES


-, ':;" ,~"_,;,:,,,!~~~..,:...';},' ~:1.;.l_+~'

,:~S~O"-~.

T";, ••

2:.~-"'~

,"""'-~=DEGLASSI1JIEil

ch27

Authority N iN

r> g\ ?:2D* { ~Y rIA NARA Date I if (Ob

0'

!r.f;iI

11 J ~,v !J

:t(')\0

i5)

~ (f.~> F» I7J ·v.nlil· t'-iU!b ~-<> 4~'~

will be limited.

Thero fore } planning mu'st' continue for the

c.ovoloprnontof overseas bases essential orrenaivo-,

for the initial

atonic

U.S. -:British planning is being ca1'1'ioc1 out for .tho

deveLopmerrtand u~e of bases in tho United Kihgdom. It. oust be recognizee: that the United Kingclombases roy be' deniod to us shortly after.tho outbrenk of hostilities. It is requisite tbatbQsas in tho

Azores, ]'r~nch Morocco, Labrador, Tripoli, Cleve lopoclto the minimumessential

and. the Midd,;Le East be

for the conduct- 'of' strategiC ·war. base

air:' operations for the fir.st

three months ofth6

The estiIl]l1ted cost to develop these additional facilities is approximately $108,000,000.'


In 19,53, t.ho. task of the strategic - .. ;.:.
~. o· • ·i'

air units will,

in

:gohero.l} be of. a three-fold inclustriul resources;

nature:
i ',',.,,_

Firgt ~"attack on Russit:ln of the Russian ~T.ourla

second} retardation
'.'

_",

,.

of'fonad, o ; and, third, v

counter o.tonicattacks. attacks

..

Tho plan of dolivory is to nispatch tho first from tho Western Bomis:phcre} utilizinG bonbcr-s; tho lnttor, refueling

both heavy and me0.ium Hea~y bombers Dr Fair-

on route to target.
......

would depart bases such as Limestone, Rapid City):Spokano,


,

field-Suisun;

];lerhaps utilize

Eielson,"'Al~akQJ>as an en routo stag-

.
r

ine; 'bnso; use Dhahran and Okinawa as post; -et:dltc·' staging 'buaes
~.'

i:inct' roturn to the United Stutes as soon


conduct of fur:t:p.or operations.

0:6'

ptactic£lble

for the

J'~,

The mQdi~s wil1'dopart

Goose Bay-and

Barmen, use :gostoperations

strike

staging base e <mel. as semb ' in 'the U.K'~ for further Ie

REPRODUCED

AT TflE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

"""'"~-'W'<"DioLASSlIITED Authority

ch28

~Y

4ANARADatealo~

N INP

S, ?;():f

until

such time os these

bo.SOB ore

denied

to us.

,In this

event,

'baaes in the Azores ana. F.ronch Morocco will


bombors for COUp19t1on of the'ntomic attack.

be uso d by lie-aium-

The ner.iun 'bonb group in Okf.nawa will i'· . in tho zrt orrl c of'fenstl va but will tiona as reQuirod, First first will prose includ,ing

n.ot pftrticipate

co'rry out conventional

ope ra-

roning.
in Western Eurasia: Allied in the During the in Europe

phasQ, operations

oJ.lerntio~~'1n

Western Eurasia, positions

forces
..

be w.ithctrawn to

defensiife

same manner- as , against +he

indicated U,K., air


a Lr

in OFFTACKLE To cope with the air ... will have a well organized,

effort

the British

but very l:lmited 4?O jet interceptor

defense

syst~m,

including

approxlllli~teiy

craf'b ,
No USAF forces will be n';~ilable to augoorrt British

defenses

during

this

periocl ...that Spb.in will have become a member of have beon'

Wo hove aaeuned tho North Atlontio negligible, Pact}

but uiliMry against

aid to Spain will the Iber~an forces

Tho SOifiet advance

Pe:niI1;suln will successfully can be .. "

bo opposod by Spanish forces


withdrawn

ana thoso Allie&

fl'om Western EurOlJ8," No ac1c~itionQl forces (luring tliis control period. of the Cairo-Suez arec will

nade available

Alliec. rosponsibility

be,a

British

as in OFFTACKlJ±:~ this

A su:rrn::JB,ry groups deployed. and tho so in suppor-t for of task arc shown on this
i,

chart.

I1EPRODUCEO AT TfiE NATIONAl1\RCHIVES

..,~,,,,~"= ... DEGLASSIUntD

~-::-r.-~.z:~_..:t..~',:,~S:~~~_:·tb~;,.J; .. .

Authority ~

ch29

~y

iIA NARA Date 1~ I0' (Ob

IN!>

s\ Z,b:f (

(Chnrt

shown.) are bused on the best uva Ll,-

GENANDERSON: Those ficuros able in f'ormn t ion, inclucdnC thO ana lyst
UBO

of reports, from our operations Group. Doponcl1nc on tho

and tho Weapons Systens Evaluo.tion


WID hOVEl

nccuracy of the factors


situation

been Given Gnd havo used,

the flotual
here. :,

could, be betto~, or :it cou Id bo worse .bhan depicted


COL SEAWELL:

As we' have o.lroaC',y'co:vored, thrOU@lOut tho

various ~a8ks, w.e shall have deployod, for the, first-phase


the four heavy bonber-a which medium bombers, inoluding two heavy strateGiC The weather This lisht East. operrrte from'the :Unitoc1 States;

oIlerations, seven tho

the one in Okinawa

in,the Far East; the

roconnaf.ssance

g'I'OUpS; mid

ono'modiur.1.

{3l'ou.ps will'DO c..e.ployo('~, a worlc1-wic... basis. on .o doployed to tho Far l2J ~ill be deployoQ ane Alaska. anci.

bomb b~OUP is tho ono presently totalling

The flGhtGr~intorcoptor8,

two in tho Far East and ton for the United Statos Tho fiGhter 'bonb Inc.ludo the throe

in the Far East

tho two for osoort Llission with S.AC. We 0.100 havo'B.ssutlOc1. tha,t~ tho tW(/j.n 'booupation
',' .. i;'GElN

in Europe i'Till be rondered inoffootivQ 'Inasmuch as the 'Soviot

•..

ANDERSON:

zrbomf,oc[!PQbilit~: to,: ,:" ,. "'

my be of (leci8ivo proportions

in 1953, it has boon necessary

rmko an eva luzrtdon of tho comp ton of the .exchenge of I1toIJi,O lot blows; This evaluation. It iE believed indicate-a .:the follow:inc,:probabl~ rosults:

thnt the Soviets will,attack ,

our population

"

"

ch30

centors and accept incidental installations •

destruction

to specific

industriol ,

. In add.lt Ion, Soviet attacl<; on 'our retaliatory


conaf.do rs d as nan'datory in order to thwart,

forcos is

reduce) or delay.G.U!'

own'atonic attack. Tho effectiveness


. . L

of our strategic

striking

force will be

reduced oPl?roxirnte ly 30 per cent.

other armed forces in beIng wi;Ll

.~.".

not bo tho·pr:i.rlary targf.jts of atomic attack but, my suffer cidental losaes clue to :pr.oximi~yto p:r:io!ity targets.

in-

The 0st:1natec1number'of boobs Clis}?atchedagainst U.S. manpowar'uno. industrial resources my result in caauaLtrloa on economywoul~

the ordor of three to six million. be seriously

Our·industrial '

reduced but would ~ot,collap8e.

'It 'c<:lll o o.xpe b c'ted that

atonic a+back would cause hya+er-La.,


[IS

in tho Ilrensirmed.iately Unitod. Statos will retain

nffo_ctocl. HowcvoJ r

a nation,

tho

the will to c0ntinuo the war.

, The Unitoc1.States abomic of'f'enafvo Soviet innustrial

nny

'c'oilopse the of'fortsJ this


..
"

economy. With udoqua'te policing

'

collnpoo could possibly

continue for,G nUfJborof ~oars.

Stockpiles

of supplies and the lirlited courrtz-Loe 'Would, in that Dost Dilitnry

capacItdo s of satelli +oa and occupied ,

case , be the only aour co of re -supply for

resources • .. 'In those cirdunstnilces,


,

the Rur,sion copabilitios

to

wago effective

1-lI:1ri;rewoulcl ?8 seriously
.,

roducod, 'Even with the the Ruealnn ·coobntant

use of atoilic weapons on tactical .

.tnrgets,

RePRODUCED AT 71-IENATIONAL ARCHIVES

._".·-=-~~EQLASSiFiiD·
Authority ~N{)

Sl."o*L· -

oh3J.

~Y4AN~RADate

1a.IO~.

~orces) both ground" ane ti1r, will. probably continue to bo nunerically supor-ror to those

of

the. Allies.

However, the Soviet


in their

field

forcos.Day have boon Wostern Europe.

soriouslyretardod

nqvance across

ShouH~. ho tact1~nl ouployrnnt t l1njorroc1uction tho Allies

of atonic bOrlbF.!nako
QIT.lOC

in tho offO:ctivenesc of the RUssian

f'or ces , Eur-ope

!:light ho.l.d, in 1953, some territory but the ability

inWostern

at D-plus-threo~Iilonth8;

to s;l(;ploit any enemy

weakneases 'iTOuld be soverely tacticnl air Qnu inpUfficiont

curtnilac:. because of insufficient grOUllG forces. and .tacticnl cir will

The Soviet submar-Ino CDt1}J£lign

procludo securing and developing base arons in the Scandinavian


Peninsula .
By tho end of the first

:phns~J the United. KingclOL1 will oir operations.


.! .::.~ •

probnbly not be a usable air base for strategic

The Soviot aubmar me oampa ign nny well rk1ko thG support ' .

of lcirge overse~s operations prohibitive in cost oven if the


forcos and logistic !nthe suppor-uwure nVliilable. operations non-sustained of both Allies and

Far E~st, air


Q

Soviet£: will be of

linitorl)

nq ture as a result
d.ifficulties. At the

of pro occupatdon in EUrlJ.Giaand. bo ccuso of logistic

Tho second phaso, D-plus-3 to D~plu8-18 months: end of tho first three norrths of o:po:l:'ntionr:;, tho
TJ.08t

c i@1ificant

force will have boon roduccd to the oquivalent


r:10CUlli.1,

of ono heavy, one

and 2/3 reconne.taccnce

groups.

On tho baois of tho oVQluntion at the end of the first


phaao , only lini to (1 unc1ortnkin@for aecond=phase operations

fran

D-plus-3 to D-plulJ-18 norrbha are opon•. Those linited ore":' To recuperate at-the fastest f'rootho Soviot -Atonic offensive rater

operations and mobilize oon-

practicable

continue the dofensive tasks; air offensive) seoure

t1nue the very-greatly

reduced strategio

the UniteLLKingdon~ aecure Spa·in against r.:taintain Allied British forces; control

inv£'. Lon j con~Inue to S


011(1

of the Cairo-Suez area with local of essential lines pf

nnd maintain-control

oonrrrrunications. We can begin to deyloy sone forces for counter air tiona in "Hestern Eurasia,.ns (Chart shown.) COL SEA"iELL:As General Anderson previously eluring phase 1 no forces ).other pointed out, indicated on this chart. opera-

than tt:\ctical pro -occupation force The force ceployment that c10pending
(10-

will be prosent to operate in EuroDe.


i

can be made to the United Kingo.pm.sndNorthwest Africa, on circumstances, ploy four fighter will

occur at D~:plus-4, at which time we can

bomb groups"

At D-:plus... we can have in place two' :f1c1ltcr iJ?-teroeptor 6, croups. Those foroos woulSlbuile, up GssentfIJ.11yas incl~c?-~G~1 ~eret' intQj~co~~orJ

so that by the end of tho :phase we wou.Ld ' haveI'i'lo four fighter
.".

bomb, one tao re con., two':;and-'two-thircls troop carrier

i~~i!~jif(!;?!!"!l!f;!~~;j;l~Wf"'O'~l~i1!'~~C'"",, ?""I
Authority N IJ4P

ch33

~y

4A N~

iSl 1)0*

~1'·",~~~~~~~Jt.:Qt\lW'%.il1'i'-'''_~~~~\I1~

Date

111 O~

erOUJ?S.

GEN ANDERSON:

I would like to o~phnsize, that that

is the total available for..oth the Unito(l Kingc.oT.l Northwost b and Africa.
GEN EDWARDS: Doe a

that include any Nntional Guard (JI'OUps 7 That is where wo get those, "sir

GmN

ANDERSON:

Yes.

from tho National Guard -- that have beon feceralized"and havo come in. Tho third phcso, D-plus-18 to D-plus-36 months: During

the third phaae of oparat tone from D-plus-18 to D~1?lus-36 norrbhs , the general 1I11io(1strategy and tasks to be under-taken will be to: Continuo tho defensive tasks as required, conQuct operations in Western Eurasia which have as their operation the reduction of effoctiveness of Soviot forces and the craa+Lon of com'li ions t that will pormit tho earliest practicablo roturn in forco of the Allies to Wostorn Eurasia. Beginning at approxinately D-plus-24 months, a build-up of doployod st!otegic air units cnn be modo. COL SEAWELL: Thnt builc1-UP,beginning on nppro:x:imately fivo heavy bomb, 13 mOGiuo

D-plus-24, ohould roach npprox~~tely

boob, throe hoavy strnt recon, and fivo DQdiun strnt recon by tho ond of the third year. GEN ANDERSON: Wo have nasuraed toot eluring the second
o " , ••• ::

'1: .

phase we will have [~inod onough parity in the cir to per.mit us to


,.

~.

use tho United Kingdon in this phase as n base orca • Therefore,


.'.;'
"

'.'

01134

tho U.K.- _ will 15e'--

,.
,oli'politically,
,"i_ ( .,: :-.,;.

If' the Unito

a, :Kiricc:'or::t

lias

bo ccco urrbenab.Ie area

PhYSicaliiY

tho Northwest

African

will be utilizE)Q
,

as

an

alternate, base aroa ,


should. be ava f.Iab.le to the Allies.
,

Northwost Africa

Cor-

tain of the f()r.co's·:T.1~hilj;zecl f6r':"th&'Jl>er-~'ntfff"'iJ:f'droe<'int'o'~Eiirolici'r:


will bo doployed to the North African base area dependlng on the situation in the U.K. Tho air effort coLJ,IiMteair 'superiority, of Soviet Europe. '·':,:·'.As, tlie·e-ffeict's"-6.f those operutions be ccme' opparent;"ond will bo directed toward attainment of

and toward reducing tho effectiveness porticulariy'

f'or ccs in oooupded t'8rritories,

in Hostern

as -A-llietl; forces' aro buitt up) thor'e ahouLd bo' a an offensive _"pcitter~ ofo:perntionkwhich
,

gratltinl
,

swing to

will permit the creation in' forco . into Haste'rn: sheen on thi's' char-t

of 'conclition~ Europa.

fnvbrablo-l:to: Allio(i- re-entry

Forcos"'c1E/pldyed"'-~:urinG

phe,se"3 "nr~ as

( inc1.icati'J:113 ) • Cbt

'SEAWEti,::

'I 'havEfcovere d 'most of'

tho-' deployments
the

I1l:t'omly' ·,the 'f:r~rl1t'egic un'its'~ 6'nf: on this' chart; C1nclicatinG) ..... bui let -up: level

i-n 'We Ste rn ;:B:urOJ?d

'[~'-:;rerl~rlbe rinfi a 11"'tho"' tina. that 'the

of f'cr-cee in the ]'or

Eo:!.f.f-:',br(/ sU1?':po~6 i:6' ;6:r.1Qin

tho sa~.

and final

phase, D-plus -36 to tho end of ethc war J will 1)0 a continuastrategy developed. in phase 3. Sllocifico.lly,

tion of the offensive

REPRODUCED AT lHE NATIONAL ARCHNES

~-"~;:;;riEciLAssiEIED'·_·m"
Authority N N

ch35

~Y

4A N~RA D~te 'I,g.,! O~

P S) 1JO:f- ( "

.,~n?(Q) fi?:) ~E
this action requfras
D.

(C ~

lE'r
over the defeated

Te-entry in force into Europe J de;fent,


of oontrol

.of tho US!3RJ nd the establishing a

oneoy. Our studios deploy forces only toD-plus-36. to spe'eifie Th~rofore, oportrbf.ona ,

in this phase, forces are not allocated

Now, we have seen that with this

48-Croup Air ]'orce in

tho phase of D-plus-4 to D-plus-2l menths, we have one heavy and one ne~ium bomb group for an offensive
, ,

effort.

If tho strength

of the Air Force is Lncreased from 48 to' 58 or 77 groups, the strategic ooncojrt, basic unc1ertakinge:~'and general tasks will tho' s~~"as
'

rennin essentially

those' prevlou'sly discussocl.


,

The D-Day comllosition of the 58-Group Air Force is ,


"

il1dicatocl on thi; tho saw;

c~rt\ :("i~did~'tiriGY~" The bomber streng"bh rena Ina


o • .'. •

heavy recorlli.:li~,'sance· rot1~in:s the same., We havo'added one nedium rGoorinnissance unit;
" ,

we have

0. d:ctod, siX

fighter -interce,ptor
\

groups, two fi[!;htor bmbor' groups)

and one tactical

r'eoonriafaance group -- an increase, of ten Groups. one fiGhtor~interceptor inst~llntions air

On the theory .thnt at least squadron should be.in position


ih tho Unitec1.States

~o defend essential

LlI3Hinstenemy attaok,

tho available

dofenso forces

in this

58-sroup Air Force would still

bo 19 squn-

drons short of tho oaloulatod rGquiro~~nt of 67 fighter-interceptor squadrons for tho dofense of This caLcu'Latod requfrenarrt risk tho Unitoc1States

thO

United States entails

one Alasko.

still

tho naxfmum

cnn afford to take.

REPROOUCED ATfHE NATIONALARCHtVES

~'''~-'~~EOLAssiiiED''
,4 -~.,,"

Authority
By
...

4A N~RA: Date .......-~

N lNf>

Sr?:2c>:f I
I 111 O~

",.'

','_""

areas

wou~c~cause ,gr;eo.}:;!3r: ·attrition i~terfor~.

on onomy attackers

and, would

-: otherwis~' ably the

wi·th his 'operations·

so as. to .ro{\uco comdder-

of'fo cb Lvenoas of his


Oonaf.de rub.ly Le sa

otto.cks.
and

.IJhysic.::l.1dostruction
This,

fower porwoule reQuiro

sonnel

casualties

would bo the rosult.

in turn,

n shorter recovery it 1'1us.tbe. b0r1'lein

period and allo~

n ~ore rupid

nobi11zo.tion, but
·.the :mEtgni tude

n~ind' trot· with Edr de fenseof 'interfe,ronoo,

conto1)1pl8.ted, ae rdoua
mobili~~tion

w,ill sti'Ll

'be mnc1ewith" our

offort.
The re connaf.aeanoe

requirements for .tho strategio


nir

offensive will not·be fulfilled by the provision


meddun !3tr8.tegic aeopo .photogrll},lhy forces

one udditi9nnl

-reCOIll1ttissance group, but tho' .anourrt of radar


now. sc1:loc1ulcc1to be (~ono by the conbrrt -bomber

i-lL~.1be rcduce

e,
to.cticnl

The aclditi9nnl three

air groups :will

enab Le

us .tio L'k'lke some ini tio.l contribution tho' Buaaaan tion

to tho task of retarding

advance

other

than

that

which can be .:n:p,c1e ocoupa by

forcos in· Goruqny. A sm.~ary of doployr~nt capability is inQicntec_o~ this

chart. (Chert shown , )

COL SEAWELL:

As you will

noto

tho factors

we uae d aoras 0,(1-

and which were exp.lndne d by the GenorCll, wauIe:' in(,itctte vance in the buihl-up of stratogic units resulting

from the

DEOLASSIFIED Authority N IN!?

01137

is 11)0 l ( By 4fA NARA Date I a.1 0\ ~Ob . __ -

incrOD.socl eferiaf.vo of'fort avndIab Ie for tho Unlto(!.Sto.too d and Alaska.


GEN ANDERSON: :
"

GontlcrlOn, thilJ study has boon undor teken si~oJ it is

in tho full

realization

thnt if it is on tho pessiDistic We have shown this t.o all o.ppro.isol of it.

no Cloo(T our purposes. for Staff and had thoir

of tho Air ;Choydo not

vory critioal

bolieve that it is'pessinistio. In sono reape cta -- tl?t is, in the capab Ll.Ity' of industry
I am

to equip unit's --, they think it may 'be optiLlistic. .. now of the part of the' study I am copling to.

thinking

The study has ·fnClic8ted that the mininUL1 Air Force we should have in being to successfully fight a war begi~ing in

1953 is 77 groups.
no xt ohart.

That' Air Force is ccmposec... as inClicatee. on the .,

(Chart shown . )
HEN ANDERSON:

.,

Therearo

six

heuvy

borabrrrdnorrt

groupo,

sixteen Y.1EJcliun bonbar dnont. GTOUPS;

three strateGic

ro oonnaf.aeence
bonb;
j

groups, hoavy ; throe 1:1.OdiUL1; weather; still two 24 fighter-interceptor; four troop carrier, total of 77 groups.
12 fighter

ono light

borabar

two tac ro connaf.seenco

hoavy; four troop cnrrio~7 DBdiup ~- for a

Wo cstinoto
oapabilities: The full

that'thoso

Groups would have the following

fighteI'-intorcoptor

er0U.pn;l:nililum requirenent

for Thoso·

air defense of the Unite-d ·Stotos and; Alnskn could be provided.

,>",l-""~'~

DECLASSIFIED

;~

Authority oh38

NlNP gl1JO"f (

. ~".

~"'.''"-,---

..---~~--

...... ,----,

~y 4J\NARADate

19,IO~

ccnba't

units,

with a unit

oquipnent

of

75
alert

aircraft

and

levol 'with and sYfJton

of 2.8 crows par a Lr cr'af't 24 r[\ctar installations

for '24-hour

Stdt~J.[i., tocether app'rO,fo'clprogram,

above the' presently 24-hour alert

a oonninG Lovo L 1)01"'01 ttinB

status fer

tho radar

cou Id pro so r-vo tho United. statos'

ability to fight in tho faco of capability.

the ostunteQ USSR 1953 ntamic


By D-plus-3

.montha,

consd.derub.l.e be released.

number's of fiGhter-

interce:ptors could Unitod Statos


for

prob~bly
[

from air c~of8nse of the tho United Kin5doll


,. ,

doployment to help socure Those groups,


imnee1iate

'

or Northwost Africa.
units ava LLab Le for

together ~"ith fightorbonbor


to tho 'Uni to a. Klngclom
'

deployment air

or Northwest Africa vida enough air niUtnry


I

for

counter

dOlllojlTOOtlt:, probably
these

cou Ld }?rofutUro

clefense to retain

'two

urbas for

0Ilorations.
Wo could probab Ly retain

our Gs'fen'sivo' position

in tho

Far East.
A strateGic air offensive on tho lJonl~"of toot celiverea. tho in:'

cicoteG f9r
natcly

the 48-~TOUp Air Forco could'be


Moro trapor terrt , throughout

in npproxi-

33 (!nys.
"

·secone:' hose 'of p for


sua-, boobs

oporations,

tho Air Forcocould. air

retain
J

a capability

tninoe1 strategic

oporo tifons

utilizinG

conventional

and atordc _weapons as available. The. ability


a short period, sustain

to delivor a oujor
with

tOBothor

strntoBic air offonsive . . tho retention of an ~bility to


air units, and, thorefore,

in

both strategio

and tactioal

REPRODUCED AT tHE NATIOflAL ARCHIVES


-,..._"

.."v-~_~'

'DEGLASSIRIED
',.~'::""-.i;;'!~;:;';.,.-';' •

.-~~,:'~~:1!Y.'-·.•,____!,

..... ~-

"_-

Auth~rity NNP

ch39

St1Jblf . ~Y 46-\ NARA Date 19"O~

JF-@ JF .. s~~~~1f, ~
exploit conditions croatod by tho initial atonic offonsiv?:~ Llight wall onablo tho /,l11es to "eten tho RuaadzmadVance end to ,retain,
Q

pooition

on tho Europoan Contin0nt. Tho doplo;ynont capubili ty of thif3 77 -croup Air Forco io

indicated

on this

n~xt chart.

(Chart ehownv ) GEN ANDERSON: Colonel Sonwell, for cOIJJ,)l1rative purpoeon, will you show the doployoent capability (Charts shown.) GEN ANDERSON: Ohart.5 indicates we nre warranted in taking un.Ioas it the ability this is n risk you doubt; of tho three forces?

is nbsolutel;y: f'or'cod upon us __

to have two borabe gro:up£.l or our totV:l of;fensive effort r f


'. 0 •

of D-plus-3 m.onths until


GEN VANDENBERG:

about D-J?lus-24 morrtha, What are scao of the factors, that you

usod in arrivinG

at those two Grou~s?


I

GEN ANDERSON: Factors


1

of nttri tion of force in beinG, of tho qttri tion, th0 fact to serve

Inck of stored aircra'ft that


vTO

to l'eplace all

musf bring sOli:lo units

back to tho Unitec",States industry}

as a riobi11zation baso , and the fact that ouch n 8nall base,

f.Jtart~l1g fran into tho.

could. not beGin t.o put now aircraft until

f'or co to L18et conbat attrition

G,t.loapt D7plus-18 morrths.

GEN EDWARDS: Genoral Wolfe, wo?lc: you like to enlarGe on tho.t subjo c't of tho capacity of inc.ustry?

#3

GEN WOLFE: In

this

stuc}y ,it was assUClec'_ that wo were ,in the ratio,


I boli,ove,

Buffering danago to tho, industry

of·about

~~~~~~~~~~t~*E~~~)b'~~+f~t~~;;\"_"i~;i;~~~~~~~~~"
DEQLASSIEIED
------,._,......~--l

Auth;rity

NN~ Sl~Q;"(
"

By 4t\ N~¥Date

Jilo.'lob_.:. .... .
" I .'

.IL-----~_-:c.__

__c-~--~-~

'

,
\

K-3

30.p\3i' cent .ao , therefore,_' ·ju0.u;e the affect cut across originally all ni thin

j_t."I"Tas

~ery dif;ficul-tt

for us to -really

the, ail"craft in.dustry

so .vre had to bake a t.hv.t ste»

of 'the counocb.td.es

and ·that. 'wa:;;the rate

used TJith that


;

in OF:JTA9~~L+:: was dec Larcd by all Til~ii.ch

to be too o~)titi1ist:LO so rre cut tha:~ bacl: and app'Lf.ed to it a 30 per cent industry f1f.~tor and :;::ecovery factor.
Y01.1.

nJ~E EU:i..nD$: \

think that

is realistic?

GEr'; K£:;rri:l~Y:, DiSl 'you assume -that

anyone ,

cd,ty

Li.Ite

Cl,evoland may be knocked .oub COl;l~)J_eteiL;Y'? .'

G~r ;lD17E:
a.lumlnum industry

\'ie woultl have to' tal~e the ,highly conoerrcrsrted whic{r 'would be essontial to

and 8:?pl:;{ the loss

basic .industry. GBI-!. i31mEY: G:!:.; iO)~7E: thing"'fe potential on curr-ent;


acce lerat.i
h

I lias surpr i.sed tl1~-t you recovered It


was

that , too.

an ussumptd.on and' a guess • The' other


avaf.Lab'le rJobiliz,a;tion' industry based

had' to apply rras. the 8ma~~ present which


Tie

have bui.Lt i11to .bhe aircraft '1:fe can only


011

furids.

bui Ld in

a cer:tain

amount of
The

on) 'P8.rt~cl.ilarlY,
is
just.
\"

the heavy and '~he nedt.uns ,

.r-adar industry interceptors

into being pe_rticuJ..arly for the , .' . -- a V01~!/ sensa ti v» and hiZ;111y dcf'Lnod industry.
coning

You

k101T, rre have been struggling'sine'e,

!L~9 to get

sODo;·distributiol1

of .bhe ind.ust.ry and; p~l~ticula:::'lY S011Siti vo right. nOT~is. the r:a.dar .

-,7J ~~: CO>


I
0 _.

iF
,.

s E C'li~m:,"ffi.

o~~l~~~~~yC'~~~~~"E:f1t;~~~~~~~~~~~~i;{~~~~~;j::~j~rii(i,~;j~o~'~>'J""'i~
"' DEQLASSlIDED
0

li,-I

--,

--..-.

--:-...,.....~

Auth~ty
By

I/A N~

!-U.j I? S, .",0=1- (
Date
-- .

IiI0\ (QfJ_
You wouLd havo to aS8Uf.10

. ,·that

thcy would h2.VO that 'kl1~jHled~;o and 'T,"o'rfou1daccort

considerablo

Los scs •.

(I~lf ~:.bi1r:CY:HOT;' Long Tio'uld it bi~;, presses at Boeing and I~indolborgor Gl:;" ~/,T,1':;;: in tyro rrays , Troll, the quostion

tako to ro)luco

those

if they ',:o'X'oo 'sabotaged?

is

roaFy

ansrror'ab'Lo

Based on tho danago


that

sustained

on !10EtYY qufpmorrt o condition

in the Gorman 'bonbtng, in very short ardor.

oqud.pmorrb W[l.Sput back into

The main damage sustained to sabotage,

rras nof on 'I:,ho

heavy equipment. differont factor

Talon you turn

you hu, ve all,13:q.tirely to sabo bago and get Ln those itEJli1S, you arc

to apply_

"Onceyou rosort

the main cylinders roally in '\:,rouble.

and tho heavy structore

GEO ".IOL1'E:

ne

[lade

80r.lO

estimatos

just

rcccnt.Iyj

: botaroen

12 and W norrths ,
·mEl'; AHDEI~SmT: , :',

Oent Icmori, this


10<170

comp'Icto s bhe prosontation. Leo Land cut? You talked

'GE1'J :~Er·mEY: .,lliy did 'you

about tho Azores andNor-th Africa. GEU AHDERSOlk " PrinariIy .corrtojnp'Lebo any major
,

~Jhyodid you. leave EceLand- out? because our' p'Lans do. not They corrtcup lrvbo l;mjor

oporatd.cns fr01;l bhcro ,

opcra td'ons fran the other ar-eas in tho event U.K. is not available.
TIg raado this
2.8

roalisticas

lT6

c oul.d -~ aciuo.l·o~leratl.rie

pl.ans ,

GEif lillrll'JEY:
,,'·.. oul.d r

I vras wohd.oring if you' fir,u.rod ··tho Russians


<::>' .. i ~

got it first.
~..

.,.'"

'.""$'-'

'
t"; ~ ~:

~~ h";.:

'.

GEE ilJ:J:)EHSOH~ ':LeMa.y's calculations.

I don't

boliovo' that, entored

into

Goncra L

I J:light let 11i1'.1 C817l1:10nt JGhat. on hear


G01101'2.1

GEHLcEAY: I didn't
Ghll :J::EljEY:

:~cinnoyls question., Icoland out

117as 1';ondering":rhy you left

of the picture.

It'

you

got chased out of' Bngi~l1d, did you figlU'O

on naldrig uso of Iceland .. GEiJ Lo:iA:r: ,\'{e thin!: .Africa is e,bott~r Tho airdromo areas iroul.d have; it but ar c. 119t dove Loped; '.rhaT'o:is area than Ie.oland. only fmc thoro. 1:10

to

refuel.

·.To, ould pOSl?ib1:;r make lL'Jitcd usc out of c opportuni

1"."0 havcmcro

t:r

in tho 1\;frio£1n D,Na,

'' '8

C-E:i'! STIlNf.'KIEll'ER: that nero givon to th9 HAF?


GELI ANDERSOli:

Do ''You ~)lan any usa out of tho B 29 ...

:'[0 havon+b

in thi$

~)1D.11

counted on that

vury heavily.

Thoy ",:'ou14 hr.vo 70 airPlanos


IE!-

-bub they are; 'not tal~:ing "to thoi1' Di1'octor

equippod to carz-y tho of Opcrat.Lons last

borri,c bonb,

'I

·ilD.S

Saturday. ,

They don I t quite. knov h01': tho:T arc

going to usc ;thom as yet.

GEH JOHHSON: Tho Chiof of Air Staff, 810880r, statod,


bhaf thoy
';01'0

not, to bo

USG.~

111 tho land battlo

at tho last

j;).cotine 1'tl th bho ',Tostcl"'n Union- Chiofs.

They 1'611 be used in t<'J,ctica;L

GEE :_-:;;P'iH!.R:Ifo s,eid England rroul.d h2.\O


organizcd

0.

very -1';-011-

.,j

defense but 110 fightQra G:r:;;;;1\i:DERSOl-J:

to usc in

Do

control, syst.cn,
,
"

Thoyactuc\11y

ha vc those i')rogrnLlIicd
I (

to bo in urri.t s by 1953 - ... h60.

GEEIC£P;';ER: I hoard fran your dis'cussion not adoquat.o and on the thine;. thr:.t control
-concopt in
",;0

v.oul.dnI t be able to
. ,.,

that

that rras
,

[01. vo

then any assistance to fit. into

-/Aro.our fighters
sys tca
as

in any ymy, prepared

it

Tins

in tho last rr.nr in our trD.inin;:; Dud


dO)l,o;yr:10n!c, in

tho possibj_li'~Y of an cnorgoncy

thD;t

diroction? ·G:GlJ lUrD:rr:TISON: doploy2 bases ~Tith the kG-GrOll;_) for,c~,


ire iTOU,lc1il1:1-tiully

F-1J4-E groups to the Unitod KingdoD


and for 08001't o:f. ~oT.lb c2rriors

.ror protection
until

of they get

.-- Cl.t Loasb,

mm.y f1'or.1 13J:'it1s11torritory. joint trcd..ning tho British.

HOil,

'\TO

do have a plan to start,


lri. th

and to sto.i'·t operational s'tcmda:""dization :.Io p'l.an ,to rotate


0.

squadron

of tho 31st Fighter


",;0

GraUl) to tho Unitcd:t~ingdom bogi.nrring next AUGUSt.

can't

do

it et1.r.lic.:r bccauso ~/o don rt have "-iing tip enough iring tip replace tanks t.J fly tria
~TOU:)S

tanks.
OVOl'

ne 1Till have

to Gcrraany to
Beccuso

tho trro Grou~)s General this rotation

Cannon until

nOH

has ,

of that,

rre can' tstnrt then and


-';0

next August but rro do plan it

~)l;:;,n to l'otate

the 31st and thon tho 27th and then a Air Oomaand ,

Ul1i not yot so Loctod fran Continental t

I told

hi.n no r.o.ro going to be

OVL:I'

there

in August or Sop-r,onbor air defense ncncuvcr t,hn-G

and sugr.catod that

ho tiC) in thD.:t 'nith his


tir,lC~

he is :._Jlanning to Use cbout thut until


-;;0

He sa'id he ,'tTould doLay it

got

over 'c,he:pa so vrc c01:-..1d get our procodur os tiod in


'1;0

t ogothor'

so

ircul.d

k.. r101.' '\That each

'IiilS

doilig.

;,

conversation

\';"i,th fho 13l':Ltish/lir

it the Assist1:'.nt Ohio! o;f, Statf, £:or Opero.tiol1s -- Guo~t, l;;:,st . .' ~
,Snt1.,u"chy,
U)

1.Iarshc.l, ':"-;-' think I


.o,-r

'bhoy call
••

and : iha"!:; tro hoped


:
,,~

..

'.,

to do., .:!ll(: '\';ho. t


'.
'.'

T~O . '.-c.ro

going

to

bl~ing

v.t tIns

noctdng , ,i~ t.o so.nd· a toam headed by Gcnor'al, Porrcrs,


SQUO

and at Lcas't o.not11cl~ :.ft+["1m9~'i,fr;Pl~1,:~ACj?oT.Jofr,oJ:1 ,CODlC, and l


f'r-on
QUI'
."

HoadquD.l~tp.r'$~- to,BI':t.:tnin
. ~l~··r"-·'··'·~'

'very shortly ~o start


".
,-

rror-k on

stnndnrclizD.tion"
.
"
'

If rrc
'.

arc

0.1' 'oporQ.;t,ion?-.f . .
.....'''~'
,{

,,_.

P!o_co1-UJ:'esiilsofar
..
i •

as thoy can. dofanso


f •

going

to

oPQ:rnto ,partiG1J,l/\rly ';,i th their


'J-

sys'tons

we h:.'..w, t.o r;et somo stundaI'dizo.tiQl1. other


procoduro~

than hc rdrrar-e

on operational

GSH EIJ\i.'l.JlDS:
(Ho 1'05)On80) GJ;!J.\{ ED,UillDS:

Aro there

any furtho,r

cormorrbs ?

Thunl: you,
.-('0

GOl1orv.l Andorson.
011

l Io r:ill
is tho
COLll:1Cnd

proceed

-tho noxt -subject


of Continental M.r

tho [(~ondi). rhich T

Presentation

COl.ll:Jccl1d.

Iir , ChairlaQll,

L'.110.

Gont.Icnorn

Our p:c'oscmt[l.tion

-i.ill

be. qt~i',jc'briof.

I do not considor t.his a. proper occasd.on to c~iscuss nany docunorrts


1';11ich
1:0

no v~ 112.110 in Air :t:orco has sene vcr;;'

H~Cldqu~~~crs

for act.Icn,

Continontal

Air COl:1r.l<:"nd

ere20':: pr-ob Lons incident

to 'bhe Ail~ Defonse factual.

of tho United statos.

Our rca(].l'::s ,Jill bccon:Jlotcly

They -;rill sunnar.Lzo jrur. inabilit.y


Beforo "the prcsont"'-{'ion,.

to cr::.rry: out our I.tj_ssion. ~ should liL:cto roitor,ato


one