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Mr,Morten Smith,
Dear Morten:
Mr Aid en was feind enough to let m©
read the first of your Dialogues en Aesthetics. It
was very pleasant reading, desrlte the feet tb^t I am
unacquainted with the literature of that field.
But the reading ~-f the paper leaves me with
certain questions as to your exact intent. I am not
a logician, and »jc the problems that rose in my mind
are no^ technical or literary, but pratical. I hope
tha you do not mind my writing to you about them.
course I heartily Subscribe to the idea *hst
a symbol of unknown or undetermined relationships
cannot have any waning! It is merely an isolated
" x" - it mi^ht mean anything. No* have I any objection
to your attack on a system -which is based (if you
are correct) on the identity of the symbol and the
things -^bolisted.(The reason that I wonder whether
you are corr -ct is "ha" symbolistic writers are apt
to speak only suggestively, even when defining their own
positions I ).
But please do not feel offended at my first impres-
sion from the brief perusal: that you have tried to ratio-
nalize an instinctive antipathy to sentimentalism and
to symbolism in Literattr e, by extending yourself on the
wider - and more indefensible - front which conflicts
^ith all "kinds o^ symbolism. Possibly I ha^Te misread
your concept. I hope»by this letter,to entice you to
assure me on that point.
Surelv, symbolism a^ such is both real and usual,
not to say useful, indispensible. Symbols must have
existed before words, anr1 words became symbols of all
the experiences - cental and physical - a^d the emotions
that, attach themselves to these words. Language, then,
be in;? symbolic, t ies to su^ est the associations; an^ in
worr?R anrl phrases a?^ in «Bt«T»«9?ft4 references to objects
and situations th^t recall these moods, It rebuilds the
of the exr>«rience into a "meaning1*.
The fact that symbols have a m an ing only for those
who f!spea!c the same language11, i.e.,for those who ar'
held in the same bonds of Sympathy or of common experi-
ence, does not make that "meaning8 any the less real
- for them; even though/ it may differ with each one.
So much for symbolism: it certainly expresses ideas
in language* Pis*, ^he fact th** a wron? idea can be
expressed in language, only Calces i the mare difficult
•"or one to see that, any Idea reust be wrong if it cannot
be expressed in language. If you had said that such an
inexpressible idea was vague,partial,incompletely per-
ceived, - th~n I would a^ree at once. B6t ^wronr-" is
a severe word, especially as you ser^ to hint that every-
thing beyond our little sphere of consciousness is "non-
exis^ent" J (Or don't- ym*when you spealc of 'sub-conscious
desires* as non-exl^^ent ?)
n the whole i* sounds in places as if you
entirely too *»iich. If you only meant thqt no idea
worthy of the name if it could not "be plainly stated, -
I would acraln agree, from common sense, and even cite
doctrine for it I But if you only re«ant that - why so
learned an attach on symbolistic
You can hardly d-ubt that there are cur-e^te of
life - call them instincts or recapitulations or physi-
cal processes or what-not -* that arg subconscious, yet
later realized? just 33 hidden ocean currents *nay
dra^ a ship off course. I suppose ••h^.t you, in less
severely logical ^o^er;ts,at least, reeo-rni^e that there are
hidden "desires" -^r predispositions in tVe ^nind which are
remnants of so*^e racial inheritance or the forgotten scars
of experiences covered over "by later thinking: which yet
exert an infuence on the "meaning" of a symbol, or upon the
choice of memries that it
I am lost wh«n -ou say tbatffa relationship which
could not be expressed,could not exist11. Such a statement
seems to wie contradictory even to the elementar^y logic
of science, which - I understand - fror? principle never
assumes a broad ne™^tive. Experimental proof that a thing
does not exist, 1 s illogical unless confined to an area
of experience. But is not the fact that BO relationship
can be fully expressed, especially in words; and th^t is
(incidentally) the ^ery reason for "symbolism11, is it not T
Your argument moves cautioaly and calmly on. But
I would sny that our lives are too short to convey every-
thing to our attention by lo^ic. '"e f^ed our ^Ind also by
ey^Vols; and wh*»t I wonder when I read your pap^r is whether
Phllonous still reserves a place for the wider phenomena
of life: for the fact ths t iMRffltBij! wisdom as well as
is covered by mpmlamAiBgi symbolism?
*MF J«"»
Rev. H. L. Odhner.
I did not, however, mean to attack all symbolism* The word "symbol"
is variously understood, and my immediate object, though perhaps I lost
have been held, and this especially by the apologists of romantic poetry,
while remaining distinct from the thing symbolized, is yet in some mys-
root of his doctrine separating the fancy from the imagination. Foe's
That the arguments used in the attack apply equally to all romantic theory,
case is over; it might prejudice the judges. The arguments do not apply
to any symbolism which does not confuse the symbol and the object. This
I tried to make clear at the end of the essay (pp. 28 - 32), but I ara
home my point without seeming to prove too much, especially since this
Now recall may mean 1. call back the actual moods. 2. occasion similar
ones. 3, arouse memories of the moods, memories which are themselves not
III.
shall seem not to be reading the book, but to be undergoing the ex-
perience which is the subject of the book; the third does not require that
"to create a particular mood", and all those which purport to give the
reader "the joy of discovering the thought as if it were his own" are
literature has scarcely been known in English, though Pope has shown the
and powerfully stated (but his poem has a few lamentable lapses into "poetry").
The object of my essay was to provide (with those that followed it)
For this purpose, a formalistic criticism was necessary, that is, it was
that the symbol, in brief, was separate and distinct from the thing symbolized.
(If you would see what I am opposing, read Yeats1 essays on symbolism in
"Ideas of Good and Evil".) I took the statement, "any idea that cannot be
venient thema&o unify the attack. Substitute for "wrong", if you like,
The chief direction of the attack was thus against the metaphysical,
and this direction was the more nearly inevitable because I was endeavoring
analysis, are. It was necessary to cle^r away all extranaeous theories and
to see the simple facts. For the facts, I believe, are simple, A sensation
cussed separately, its color can never be removed from it and leave it the
those declare that there are parts of experience which we do not experience*(;)
as we know it, is a mere symbol of truth as we do not know it. But truth
true, what is? Nor is any one truth truer that nay other; truth is an
another is equal to the statement tha^in one thing the truth is known, and
in another thing it is known, too, but not known so much). Unknown things
are inferred to exist, and their nature is hypothecated, by analogy from
known things; intact, when the existence of the unknown is contended for,
the real object of the contention is something unknown except for the fact
that it is like -the things we know in existing and so in being able to
affect them as they affect each other. "Existence" is, for us, (and we
cannot imagine what it is for someone else) a quality of known things, Ihe
in parables.
(You question particularly the statements that sub-conscious desires
do not exist and that the cause is not known in the effect; So long as
there is a dualism of "mind" and "matter" I do not believe in the existence
the same as a desire, and it seems good to me not to confuse them. If there
be a monism of "mind" subconscious desires are, of course, quite possible.
(I do not believe that the cause is known in the effect. Some cause
may be, according to our previous knowledge, inferred from the effect,
but this is by no means thesame as being known in it. "A sunset", you say,
"does suggest the cause, the earth's rotation, etc.,to every intelligent
VI.
man." In that event ment have been Intelligent only for the past 400 years -
Copernicus died, I think, about 1540. By saying that the effect is "the
potential symbol" of the cause, don't you mean that it is not the symbol -
yetS But it might be nrgued:"Though the cause is not known in the effect*
a cause may be, and Kant has declared it impossible to have an experience
the experience." But the statement that a cause, but no particular one, is
unknown, 'that is: nothing which is known;is the cause, the c^use, so far
as anyone knows» is nothing. As for Imraanuel Kant, it is true that the mind,
cause and effect, but to say that it arranges the elements of experience in
this wav is to suppose that there are elements of expereince, that they
the cause are still pertinent questions, Ksnt was mistaken. His mistake
.knowledge. I am quite sure that the stars and my garters remain much the
and my coexisting interest in all occult and out of the way knowledge.
language does not express, but suggests, will be one of the subjects of
an answer, or rather a non obstat, but it would take much too long to ex-
plain, and this letter is much too long already. I should, perhaps, apologize
for sending you such a small essay on the first provocation, but the diffi-
apoloey, I could not do less than finish it, though it should require
apologies in its turn, I hope, however, that I have not worn out your
patience, or the welcome of my letters (I assure you they are not all like
this and I hope that you will try another and see for yourself). But now
my letter is ended and the night is almost ended, too. Away in the distance
the sky is growing purple, and here beside me the radiator is growing warm.
morrow I must put away my essay and set to work on an honors thesis,
then, perhaos, I may return to the essay, more nearly impartially. In the