Excesses Are Not Permitted Getty

The Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review
"Excesses Are Not Permitted": Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s
Author(s): J. Arch Getty
Source: Russian Review, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 113-138
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"Excesses arenotpermitted":
Mass Terrorand Stalinist
Governancein theLate 1930s
J. ARCH GETTY
S talinist
"massoperations"
individuals.Lavrenty
wererepressive
Beria,whocertainly
actionsdirected
knewsomething
againstcategories
aboutsuchthings,
rather
than
characterized
themas "grouparrests orexileswithout approachtoeacharrested
a differentiated orexiled
person."'Oftencalled"extra-legal" (vnesudebnye),sentences inmassoperations weretypi-
callyimposedbytroikas, tribunals,police"conferences," or othernonjudicialbodies,for
realorpotential"offenses"notcoveredintheformal lawandoftenwithout theparticipation
orpresenceofprocurators, defenselawyers,oreventheaccused.2Appearing forthefirst
timeduring theCivilWarof1918-21,theywereusedwhentheregimefeltitselfconstrained
bytherequirements ofthejudicialsystemorunderthreat (duringwarscaresorafterassas-
sinations),
during transformationalcampaigns(collectivization orwhenthe
ofagriculture),
targetshadcommitted nochargeable crimebutwerenevertheless considereddangerous as a
category.
Frommid-1937to nearlytheendof 1938,theSovietsecretpolicecarriedouta mass
terroragainstordinary citizens. This "kulakoperation," as it was called,accountedfor
abouthalfofall executions duringthe"GreatPurges"of 1937-38. By thetimeitendedin
November1938,767,397personshadbeensentenced bysummary troikas;386,798ofthem
todeathandtheremainder totermsinGULAG camps.3Theprocesssawsystematic, physi-
cal tortures(approvedpersonallyby Stalin) of a savage natureand scale, fabricated
"'PrikazNo. 762: 0 poriadkeosushchestvleniia

postanovleniiaSNK SSSR i VKP(b) ot 17noiabria1938goda,"
26 November1938,Tsentral'nyi arkhivFederal'noisluzhbybezopasnostiRossiiiskoiFederatsii
(TsAFSB), f. 100.
op. 1,por.1,1.260.
2On theStalinist
judicialsystemsee PeterSolomon,SovietCriminalJusticeUnderStalin(New York,1996);
GdborTamdsRittersporn, Stalinist andSovietComplications:
Simplifications Social Tensionsand PoliticalCon-
flictsintheUSSR,1933-1953(NewYork,1991);andidem,"SovietOfficialdom andPoliticalEvolution:Judiciary
Apparatus andPenalPolicyinthe1930s,"Theoryand Society2 (1984). See also "O vnesudebnykh organakh,"
IzvestiiaTsKKPSS, no. 19 (1989): 80-82.
3TsAFSB collection ofdocuments, andpublished inA. I. Kokurin
andN. V.Petrov,
GULAG(Glavnoeupravlenie
lagerei),1917-1960(Moscow,2000),433. Although manypeoplewhowerenotkulaksfellvictim tothisoperation,
we shallhereretainthetitle"kulakoperation."Thiswasthecontemporary usageinparty andpolicedocuments and
servestodistinguishitfromothermassterror campaigns.Other"massoperations" in 1937-38targeted personsof
non-Sovietcitizenship or nationalheritageincludingPoles, Germans,Latvians,Koreans,Chinese,and others,
2002): 113-38
TheRussianReview61 (January
Copyright
2002 TheRussianReview
114 J.ArchGetty
conspiracies,falsecharges,andmassexecutions.4 As such,thekulakoperation of 1937-38

mustbe countedamongthemajormassacresofa bloodytwentieth century.
Scholarshiponthisoperation is onlybeginning; we didnotevenknowofitsexistence
until1992.Sincethen,a number ofscholarshavesoughtcluesinthearchivestothisremark-
ablycruelandbrutalevent.Atthismoment, thereis a roughconsensuson severalpoints.
All agree,withina narrow range,onthenumber ofvictims.Thereis also generalagreement
thatthevastmajority ofthemwereordinary people,ratherthanmembers oftheelite,and
thatmostofthemwereselectedbycategory orbackground ratherthanthrough denuncia-
tion,investigation,orbecauseof anyparticular acttheycommitted.The victimsseemto
havebeenpolitically orsociallymarginaltypesalreadysomehowstigmatized: common crimi-
nals,veteransoftheWhiteArmyintheCivilWar,kulaks,"hooligans," andvarious"socially
dangerous elements" as definedbytheregime.Finally,themassoperations seemso differ-
entfromotherelements ofthe1930sterror that"itmaybe thattheeventsthatwe label 'the
GreatPurges'maybestbe understood notas a singlephenomenon butas a number ofrelated
butdiscretephenomena, eachsusceptibleofspecifichistoricalexplanation."5
Beyondagree-
menton thesepoints,however,scholarsdiffer considerablyon thecauses,initiation,con-
duct,andmeaningofthekulakoperation.
Manyhistorians ofthe1930s,including
see theterror themassoperations, as centrally
directedandplanned.6Oleg V. Khlevniuk, theleadingRussianexperton theterror, calls it
"unquestionably an actiondirectedfromthe center,plannedand administered from
Moscow."7He sees theonsetofterror as a sharpbreakwiththepreceding1933-36period
accounting foran additional335,513sentences(including247,157executions).For space considerations, and

becausethese"nationaloperations" had differenttargets,causes,andprocedures, theyare nottreatedhere. For
information on themsee TerryMartin,"The OriginsofSovietEthnicCleansing,"JournalofModernHistory70
(December1998):22; A. E. Gur'ianov, ed.,Repressii protivpoliakovipol'skikh grazhdan(Moscow,1997),33; and
I. L. Shcherbakova, ed.,Nakazannyi narod:Repressiiprotivrossiiskikh nemtsev (Moscow,1999),44.
4In thecourseof thisresearch, we have locatedthefamous1939 Stalindirectiveon "physicalmethods"of
interrogation mentioned byKhrushchev in his 1956SecretSpeech(see I. V. Kurilov,N. N. Mikhailov, andV. P.
Naumov,eds.,Reabilitatsiia: Politicheskie protsessy 30-50-khgodov[Moscow,1991],40). It is inTsA FSB, f.
100.op. 1,por.6,11.1-2 (secondseries).Dated27 July1939(not10July, according toKhrushchev). itis a telegram
fromStalintopartysecretaries inall regions.Itrefers toa stillunfound 1937CentralCommittee directive authoriz-
ingphysicalmethods inexceptional circumstances. Interestingly,the1939telegram was written
afterN. I. Ezhov's
fall,andin a passagenotmentioned byKhrushchev itaccusesEzhov's menofexcessivetorture, "converting an
exception intoa rule."
5Sheila Fitzpatrick,ed.,Stalinism: NewDirections(London,2000),258. See J.ArchGetty, OriginsoftheGreat
Purges:theSovietCommunist PartyReconsidered, 1933-1938(NewYork,1985),202-3,fora similarobservation.
6ForexamplesofWesternstudiesthathaveemphasizeda Stalin-focused, planned,and centralized terrorsee
RobertConquest,TheGreatTerror:Stalin'sPurgeoftheThirties, rev.ed. (New York,1973); 0. V. Khlevniuk,
1937-i:Stalin,NKVD i sovetskoeobshchestvo (Moscow,1992); and David J.Nordlander, "Originsof a Gulag
capital:MagadanandStalinist controlin theearly1930s,"SlavicReview57 (Winter1998). Forviewsstressing
lack ofplanningand limitson centralcontrolsee J.ArchGettyand RobertaThompsonManning,eds.,Stalinist
Terror: NewPerspectives (NewYork,1993);RobertWeinberg, "PurgeandPoliticsinthePeriphery:Birobidzhan in
1937,"SlavicReview52 (Spring1993);Roberta T. Manning, "Government intheSovietCountryside intheStalinist
Thirties:The Case ofBelyiRaionin 1937,"Carl BeckPapers in Russianand East EuropeanStudies,301; and
RobertThurston, Lifeand Terror inStalin'sRussia,1934-1941(New Haven,1996).
70. Khlevniuk, "TheObjectivesoftheGreatTerror, 1937-1938,"inSovietHistory, 1917-53:EssaysinHonour
ofR. W Davies,ed. Julian Cooper,MaureenPerrie, andE. A. Rees (London,1995),165. See also 0. V. Khlevniuk,
"Les mechanismes de la 'GrandeTerreur':des annees1937-1938au Turkmenistan," CahiersduMondeRusse39,
no. 1-2 (1998).
Mass Terrorand StalinistGovernancein theLate 1930s 115
ofjudicialrelaxation andrelativeliberalism andfindsitsoriginsin Stalin'sgrowing fearof

a comingwar. Khlevniuksees a Stalineagerto preventa FifthColumnin his rearand
launching a planned,calculatedpreemptive strikeat anyonewhomightsomehowoppose
himorevenwaverduringa wartime crisis.As thenumber ofvictimsconstantly increased,
theoperation spunoutofcontrol.Khlevniuk believesthatStalinanticipated, evencounted
on, theexcessesof themass terror whichwereintegralpartsof his plan and systemof
governance.
PaulHagenlohandDavid Sheareralso see thekulakoperation as centrallydriven,but
interpretitas a continuation ofradicalattempts bytheregimetopolicesocietyinthe1930s,
rather thanas a sharpbreakwithpreviouspractice.8 Theydescribea kindofruralcrescendo
toa seriesofurbanpolicesweepsanddragnets inthe1930sthattargeted generally nonpo-
liticalcriminal andmarginal typestheregimewantedtodestroy: commoncriminals, specu-
lators,thieves,thugs,passportviolators, and a varietyofpeopletheregimelabelled"so-
ciallydangerous."
Otherhistorians emphasizenotplannedcalculationorintentional policybutfearand
panicon thepartof thetopleadership.RobertThurston, likeKhlevniuk, sees thekulak
operation as a sharpbreakwithprevious, relativelyliberalpenalpolicies,butconcludesthat
itwas notpartofanyplanbutrather a suddenexplosionoffearandmadnesson thepartof
theleadership.9 RobertaManningsimilarly emphasizes anxiety atdomestic economicdown-
turns ata timeofforeign threat.Spyscaresandfearsofdomestic militaryandpoliticalplots
createdanatmosphere inwhichthetopleadership panickedandinwhichlocalattitudes and
local partyofficialsplayedan important role in escalatinga hysterical terror.'0Gabor
Rittersporn has describedconflicts withintheleadershipabouthow to governand about
whomtoidentify as the"enemy," notingthewillingness of Stalinistleadersto acceptand
believeinconspiracies ofall kinds.11
In thisarticle, we shalllookatthe"kulakoperation" through newlyavailablepartyand
policearchivalsources.Theevidencepresented belowsuggests thatunderstanding thekulak
operationpurelyas plannedand centrally directedviolence,withouttakingintoaccount
powercontestsbetweencentralandregionalbodies,tellsonlyhalfthestory.This article
seeksneither tominimize Stalin'sclearroleas author oftheterror, nortoposita terror "from
below,"butrather tohighlight thecomplexities andcontraditions ofthestructure ofStalinist
politics.
Specifically, we shallsuggestthatthekulakoperation indeedrepresented a suddenand
sharp break with than
previouspractice-sharper usuallythought-and overturned policies
8PaulHagenloh,"'SociallyHarmful Elements'andtheGreatTerror," inStalinism:NewDirections,286-308;

DavidShearer, "CrimeandSocialDisorderinStalin'sRussia-A Reassessment oftheGreatRetreatandtheOrigins
ofMass Repression," Cahiersdu MondeRusse39, no. 1-2 (1998).
9Thurston, Lifeand Terror,62.
I RobertaT. Manning, "Massovaiaoperatsiiaprotiv'kulakovi prestupnykh'
elementov: ApogeiVelikoiChistki
naSmolenshchine," inStalinizrn
v rossiiskoiprovintsii:
Smolenskie arkhivnye
dokumenty vprochtenii
zarubezhnykh
i rossiiskikh ed.E. V.Kodin(Smolensk,1999),230-54;RobertaT.Manning,
istorikov, "TheGreatPurgesina Rural
District:BelyiRaion,"inStalinistTerror,168-97.
"Rittersporn,Stalinist idem,"TheOmnipresent
Simplifications; On SovietImagery
Conspiracy: ofPoliticsand
Social Relationsin the1930s,"in Stalinism:Its Natureand Afterimath-Essays in HonourofMosheLewin,ed.
NicholasLampert andG. T. Rittersporn
(London,1992).
116 J.ArchGetty
confirmed onlyweeksbefore.Although as a "massoperation" itresembled previouspolice

sweepsof socialmarginals, ithad itsownuniquepoliticalfeatures.It happenedat a time
whensuchmassoperations werebeingdiscouraged, andwereonthewane. Badlyplanned,
carelessly andabruptly implemented, itcameas a resultofdomesticfearsarisinginthefirst
halfof 1937.
Mostimportant, we shallsee thatlocal officialsplayeda partin thekulakoperation
thatgoesbeyondtheirpresumed rolesas mereservants, resisters,oroverfulfillersofcentral
plans. Local andregionalofficialshave oftenbeenseenas restraining forceson Stalin's
violentplans. Longago,MerleFainsodwrotethatlocalbureaucratic inefficienciesmadea
totalitariansystemmorebearable.Similarly, Oleg Khlevniuk hasrecently notedthatinter-
actionsbetweenadministrative and regionalinterests "allowedfora reduction of thede-
structiveconsequences" ofthesystem.Othershavecitedvariouscasesofovertresistance in
theregionalbureaucracy toStalinistterror.12Thepresent articleshows,however, thatlocal
officialsalsohelpedtoinstigate andshapethekulakoperation; theevidencesuggeststhatat
timestheywereactiveplayersintheprocess.Stalinandhislocal secretaries seemtohave
hadan implicit (andsometimes explicit)dialogueandnegotiation onthismatter, andStalin
maynothavebeentheone mosteagerto once againlauncha campaign-style operation.
Oncehedid,heattempted tosupervise theoperation inthesamewayhedidthepoliceterror
againsttheelite.LikeotherStalinist campaigns, theoperation was farfromcentralized and
quicklydegenerated intothekindofchaos,confusion, andcontradiction endemictoStalinist
campaignmode,butthereis littlereasontothinkthatStalinsoughtorexpectedthemesshe
created.
PeterSolomon,in his studyof Stalinistcriminal justice,combinedan emphasison
Stalin'sintentions withananalysisoftheenvironment andstructure inwhichhefunctioned.
He showedhowinthe1930sStalinwas working to consolidatea modernlegalorderwith
reliablecourts,respectforlaws,andpredictable punishments all intheinterestsofa strong
centralized state(andofhispersonalpower),butwas limited bytwothings: theinterference
oflocal politicians in thelegal systemandcourtsin theirterritories, andhisownresortto
military-stylecampaignsto carryoutspecificpolicies:industrialization, collectivization,
and massoperations beingexamples."3Withtheattendant mobilizations, combativeslo-
gans,"offensives" on various"fronts," local battlesandinitiatives, andwild,uneven,and
chaoticimplementation, operating in campaignmodefrustrated rationalcentralizationand
thecreationofa well-defined andclearlymappedpoliticalandsocialorder.
Although we frequently associateStalinistcampaignswithcentralized control andini-
tiative,theoppositewas true. Campaignswereunleashedratherthanadministered, and
becausetheywereheavy-handed andbluntinstruments, theyfrequently didas muchdamage
to rationalpolicyplanning(and to Stalin'spower)as theyaccomplished his goals. They
caughtupthe"innocent" (middlepeasants,forexample)as wellas the"guilty"(kulaks)and
'2MerleFainsod,SmolenskUnderSovietRule(Cambridge, MA, 1958),450; 0. Khlevniuk, "Stalinismandthe

StalinPeriodafterthe'ArchivalRevolution,"' Kritika2 (Spring2001): 325; A. V. Afanasev,
ed.,Onine molchali
(Moscow,1991);Solomon,Criminal Justice,chap.7.
'3SeeSolomon,CriminalJustice, esp. chaps.4 and5. Fora discussionof similarcentralizing trendsin many
fieldsthatalso came at theexpenseof local prerogativessee J.ArchGettyand Oleg V. Naumov,TheRoad to
Terror:Stalinand theSelf-Destruction
oftheBolsheviks, 1932-1939(New Haven,1999),pt. 1.
theiruncontrolled,militantpersecutions
tendedto alienatepotentialsupporters caughtup
in themayhem.Theyalso inevitably requireddelegationofpowerto local officials, who
carriedouttheactualcampaignson theground.For Stalin,operating in campaignmode
meantcedingcentralcontrol,inviting chaos,and trusting thefateand reputation of the
regimetofar-offlocalauthorities.
Whensufficient progresshadbeenmade,orwhenthings
hadgonetoofar,itwasnecessary orderandreigninthechaos,andmuchofprewar
torestore
is toldin theflowand ebb,thelaunchingand restraining
Stalinisthistory of campaigns.
Thus,forexample,cleaningup the"campaignjustice"of thecollectivization periodand
restoringcentralized
orderrequiredcheckingthepoweroflocalpoliticalofficials.14Stalin
neededthem;theyweretheregime'srepresentatives tomostofthepopulation andwerethe
onesto carryoutMoscow'spolicies. Butthestructure ofpowerin thesystemmeantthat
Stalin'spowerwas inversely proportionalto thatof thelocal partyleaders. Stalincould
onlycentralizeandstrengthen hisownhandbycurbing theirauthority.
The "GreatPurges"wereinfullswingbythemiddleof 1937. Twomajorshowtrialswere

followedby wave afterwave of arrestsin theSovietelite. Formeroppositionists, party
leaders,andeconomicadministrators werehardest hit,andinJunea widespread purgeofthe
militarybeganwiththearrests ofMarshalM. N. Tukhachevskii andmostofthehighcom-
mand. To thispoint,however,thebulkof thearrestswereof leadingcadresratherthan
ordinary citizens.The firstsignthatsomething differentwas inthewindcameearlyinJuly
1937,whenStalinsenta telegram to all provincial
andnationalrepublicpartycommittees
advisingthemthat"a largenumber offormer kulaksandcriminals" intheprovinces "arethe
chiefinstigatorsofall sortsofcrimes."He ordered provincial leaderstoidentify andarrest
the"mosthostile"amongthemforprocessing bytroikasandimmediate punishment. Later
thatmonth, thispartydecisionwas supplemented bya secretpolice(NKVD) directive, Op-
erationalOrderNo. 447, whichspecifiedprocedures forgrouping victimsintoCategory1
(72,950,to be shot)or Category2 (194,000,to be sentto laborcamps)and gave target
figuresineachcategory foreveryprovinceandrepublic. '5 OrderNo. 447 specified respon-
sibilities
andprocedures fortheconductoftheoperation downtothedutiesofsmall"opera-
tionalgroups"makingtheactualarrests, thekindsandflowofpaperwork to be produced,
thememberships ofthetroikas, thesignatures required,thedisposition offiles,timetables,
provisions formodifying thetargetfigures, andthebudgetary allocations.OrderNo. 447
thusseemstodemonstrate Politburooperational planning andconcernforcentralized con-
trolandmicromanagement.
Although massoperations werecommonin theStalinperiod,thekulakoperation of
1937nevertheless was notpartofa long-range planorprocess.Ifwe situateitinrelation to
Stalinistpenalpolicyin the1930s,we shallsee thatitwas insteada suddenreversalof a
five-yeartrendtoreduce,ifnotabolish,masspoliticaloperations. Moreover,confusion and
"The phrase"campaign justice"is fromSolomon,CriminalJustice,chap.3.

'5"Oboperatsiipo repressirovaniiu byvshikhkulakov,
ugolovnikovi drugikhantisovetskikh
elementov,"30 July
1937,TsA FSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.1,11.203-17. OrderNo. 447 andStalin'stelegram publishedinedited
werefirst
forminTrud,4 June1992. OrderNo. 447 recently hasbeenpublished inKokurinandPetrov, GULAG,96-104. A
appearsinGettyandNaumov,Road toTerror,
partialEnglishtranslation 473-80.
118 J.ArchGetty
improvization beforeand duringtheoperation suggestbotha lack of short-term planning

andan inability toefficientlycentralize
administration.
Duringthecollectivization ofagriculturein 1929-33,massrepression ofpeasantre-
sisters(oftenlabeled"kulaks")hadbeenthenorm,as sweepsofthecountryside resultedin
wholesale arrests, executions,andexilesto distant regions.This"campaignjustice"pre-
cludedanymeaningful legalityorindividualjudicialapproachtocriminality. Recallingthe
combativetimesoftheCivilWar,thesemobilizations againstcategoriesoftheparty'sen-
emieshadanundifferentiated, military
character.
ButStalinrealizedthatcampaignmethods carrieda price,whichwe todaywouldcall
collateraldamage.Theroot-and-branch approachofcollectivization tendedtoalienatepo-
tentialsupporters amongthepopulation becauseitcaughtup largenumbers ofbystanders
alongwiththeregime'stargets.Whentheregimeoperatedincampaignmode,theresulting
chaosimpededefforts by Stalinto regularizeand centralizeadministration. Whenithad
becomeclearthatthebattleforcollectivization was won,theStalinists thussoughttoabol-
ish mass operationsand to stopthepromiscuous use of punitivesanctionsby local and
nonjudicialbodies.As earlyas July1931thepartyordered thatall deathsentencesimposed
bythesecretpolice(OGPU) be confirmed by thePolitburo, and thefollowingspringre-
movedtheOGPU's right tojudgecriminal cases ofexiledpeasants,transferring themtothe
regular courts.
16InFebruary 1933thePolitburoestablished a commission thatrecommended
a substantial
decreaseinprisonpopulations tobe effectedbyearlyreleasesofmanyconvicts
andwholesalereleaseofthose"illegallyarrested."'7
Thesemeasureswereconsolidated andextendedinan important decreeof
party-state
8 May 1933,whichofficial spokesmen wouldrefer toofteninthenextfiveyears.Although
itis usuallycitedforitscall toreduceprisonpopulations byhalf,itsrealmessagewas the
endofmassoperations.SignedbyStalinandMolotov,thisdirective statedthat"themo-
menthas come... whenwe areno longerin needofmassrepression."Blaminglocal offi-
cialsforan "orgyofarrests," StalinandMolotovarguedthatmassviolencewas inefficient
andcounterproductive. Repressionwas notto be ended,butrather focusedand "stream-
lined":
Thesecomradesdo notunderstand thatthemethodofmass,disorderly arrests-if

thiscan be considereda method-represents,in lightof thenewsituation, only
liabilitieswhichdiminish
theauthorityofSovietpower.Theydo notunderstand
thatmakingarrests oughttobe limitedandcarriedoutunderthestrict controlof
appropriate organs.Theydo notunderstand thatarrestsmustbe directedsolely
againstactiveenemiesofSovietpower.... Theydo notunderstand thatifthiskind
ofactiontookon a massivecharacterto anyextent, itcouldnullify
theinfluence
ofourpartyinthecountryside.'
I6"VoprosyOGPU," 10July1931,Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyiarkhivsotsial'no-politicheskoi

istorii
(RGASPI),f.
17,op. 3, d. 840,1.9; A. I. Akulov,"Tsirkulia;,"
31 March1932,TsA FSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.1,1.88.
'7"Postanovlenie
PolitbiuroTsKVKP(b)ot8.111.33g.:O razgruzke
mestlisheniia 8 March1933,RGASPI,
svobody,"
f. 17,op. 162,d. 14,11.89-92.
l8"Instruktsiia
vsempartiino-sovetskim rabotnikam i vsemorganamOGPU i procuratury,"RGASPI,f.17,op. 3,
d. 922,11.50-55.
The day beforethe8 May 1933 decreewas published,thePolitburohad forbidden

secretpolice(OGPU) troikasfrompassinganymoredeathsentences atall,'9andaccording
to the8 May 1933 decree,policeagenciescouldmakearrestsonlywiththepreliminary
sanctionofa stateprocurator. Sucha rulewouldmakemassrepressive operationspracti-
callyimpossibleinsofaras itrequired
approvalofindividual
arrestsbyanindividual procu-
It was thesuddenabandonment
rator.20 ofthisprocuratorial
sanctionthatmadethekulak
operationpossible,anditwas itsrestoration
thatendedit.2'
Another passagein the8 May 1933decreerevealsa constituencybehindmassopera-
tions:
Demandsformassexpulsionsfromthecountryside andfortheuse ofharshforms

ofrepression tocomeinfroma number
continue ofprovinces(oblast').... Itlooks
as ifthesecomradesarewillingtoreplaceandarealreadyreplacingthepolitical
workconducted amongthemasses... withadministrative-chekist
"operations" of
organsoftheGPU andtheregularpolice.22
Manylocal officials mayhavebeenat leastas quickto turnto repression as theirboss in

Moscow.Itis notdifficult toimaginethatlater,in 1937,localpartyleaders,fearfulthatthey
might be accusedas "enemiesofthepeople"inthespiralling terror
ofthatyear,wouldhave
foundit convenient to launchrepressive campaignsagainstothersin orderto deflectthe
witchhunt'sheatawayfromthemselves. ButStalin'sMay 1933circularsuggeststhateven
before1936-38,localpartyleaderswerenotreluctant touseterror as a toolofgovernment,
evenwhentheirboss,forhis owntacticalreasons,was leaningawayfromit. Provincial
partysecretariesfacedthebrunt ofanti-Bolshevik resistanceon theground, whiletrying to
respondto unmeetable demandsfromMoscow on everything fromagricultural deliveries
andindustrial productiontoconstructionorthedissemination ofpropaganda.In thepoliti-
cal spacetheyinhabited,someofthemmayhavefounditeasiertocrushcategories ofpeople
with"administrative-chekist"methods thantoconvincethemwith"politicalwork,"regard-
lessofMoscow'scurrent policy.Forlocalleaderspersecution was "a toolofruraladminis-
In thestructure
tration."23 oftheStalinist
system, werenottimidorliberal
regionalofficials
11"Otroikakh OGPU," 7 May 1933,ibid.,1. 16.

20Throughout muchofthe1930s,A. Ia. Vyshinskii (who wouldbecomeProcurator of theUSSR) arguedfor
enforcement ofprocuratorialsanctionforarrests, partlyas a matter of his understanding
of law andpartlyas a
bureaucratic issueto strengthen theauthorityof his agency. His struggle forprocuratorialsanctionmadehim
effectivelyanopponent ofmassrepressive operations,butnotnecessarily ofrepressioninprinciple.On Vyshinskii
see Solomon,Criminal Justice,
chap.5; andThurston, LifeandTerror, chap.1. On differencesbetweenlagodaand
Vyshinskii see S. Davies, "TheCrimeof 'Anti-Soviet Agitation'in theSovietUnionin the1930's,"Cahiersdu
MondeRusse39,no. 1-2 (1998); andShearer, "CrimeandSocial Disorder."
2'In August1937,USSR Procurator Vyshinskiisuspendedprocuratorial approvalforarrests inthemassopera-
tions,makingthemlegallypossible(A. F. Stepanov, Rasstrelpolinitu:Iz istoriipoliticheskikh v TASSRv
repressii
gody"ezhovshchiny" [Kazan, 1999], 10). Restoration of thesanctionin November1938 effectively endedthe
operations ("O prokurature SSSR," Moskovskie novosti, 21 June1992).
22"Instruktsiiavsempartiino-sovetskimrabotnikarni vsemorganam OGPU i procuratury," 8 May 1933,RGASPI,
f. 17,op. 3, d. 922,11.50.
23Solomon, CriminalJustice,127.
120 J.ArchGetty
politicians,alwayswiththepopulation'sinterests at heart.24Nor do theyfittheheroic

mantlegiventhemin post-Stalin Soviettreatments, whichexaltedmanyof themsimply
becauseStalinlaterkilledorjailed them.
In July1933an all-unionUSSR Procuracy was established forthefirst timeto super-
vise "thelegalityandrightness of actionsundertaken bytheOGPU, bythepolice,bythe
department ofcriminal investigationandbycorrective-labor institutions."25The mostim-
portant institutional
changelimiting theabilityoflocal andnonjudicial bodiestoarrest, try,
and executewas theformation of an all-unionPeople's Commissariat of InternalAffairs
(NKVD SSSR). Takenin February1934 on Stalin'smotion,thisdecisionabolishedthe
former secretpolice (OGPU) and foldedsomeof itsfunctions intothenew NKVD, but
without anyjudicialpowers.According tothenewregulations, theNKVD didnothavethe
powertopassdeathsentences ortoinflictextralegal"administrative"punishments ofmore
thanfiveyears'exile.26As Stalin'slieutenant L. M. Kaganovichputit,"thereorganization
oftheOGPU meansthat,as we arenowin morenormaltimes,we canjudge through the
courtsandnotresort toextrajudicialrepressionas we haveuntilnow."27NewNKVD chief
G. G. lagoda,perhapswistfully, tolda secretpoliceconference thattheeraofmassrepres-
sionhad ended,andthatanycalls to renewit werenow an "enemytheory."28 In January
1935,Stalinwroteto A. Ia. Vyshinskii thatpolicingmeasuresshouldnow be "gradual,
without shocks"andshouldbe carriedout"without extraadministrative enthusiasm."29
Laterthatyear,therewas evena softening ofpolicytowardkulaks.In December1934
a circulartoall NKVD chiefsandprocurators allowedtheemployment ofexilesinorganiza-
tionsnothavinga defensecharacter, andtheirchildrenwerepermitted to enrollin educa-
tionalinstitutions.Local NKVD chiefswerespecifically orderedto inform theexilesof
theirnewrights.A Politburo decreeoneweeklaterabolishedall restrictions on admission
tohighereducational forpersonsheretofore
institutions excludedbecauseofsocialorigins
orpreviouselectoraldisenfranchisement.30
Despitethechangesin top-levelpolicy,certainkindsofmasscampaignscontinued,
albeitona localandsharply reducedscale;theregimecouldnotlivewithout them.Follow-
of in
ingtheassassination S. M. Kirov December1934, severalwaves of police action
24Lynne Viola,"The Campaignto EliminatetheKulakas a Class, Winter1929-1930:A Reevaluationofthe

Legislation,"SlavicReview45 (Fall 1986),wasthefirst todocument theinclinationoflocalleaderstouse forcein
thecountryside regardless ofMoscow'scurrent policy.
25"Obuchrezhdenii Procuratura SSSR" (Politburoresolution),
RGASPI,f. 17,op. 3, d. 925,1.47.
26"OborganizatsiiSoiuznogonarkomata vnutrennykh del"(Politburo ibid.,d.939,1.2. Stalinpartici-
resolution),
patedpersonally inthedrafting oftheseregulations
(Politburo of 1 April1934,ibid.,d. 943,1.10). The
resolution
decreewas publishedin Izvestiia,11 July1934. The powerto punishadministratively up to fiveyearswas, of
course,no smallthing.Between1935andtheendof 1938,112,000personswereso sentenced bytheNKVD's
SpecialBoard(Osoboe soveshchanie).See Gosudarstvennyi arkhivRossiiskoiFederatsii (GARF),f.9401,op. 1,
d. 4157,11.201-3, 205.
27RGASPI,f. 17,op. 165,d. 47, 1.3.
28TsAFSB, collectionofdocuments.
29Stalin's
notesonVyshinskii memo,RGASPI,f.558,op. 2, d. 155,1.66.
23 December1935,RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 974, 11.12, 108; "Postanovlenie
30"Tsirkuliar," Tsentral'nogo
Ispolnitel'nogo
Komiteta i SovetaNarodnykhKomissarov SSSR o priemev vysshieuchebnye zavedeniiai tekhnikumy,"
29 December1935,ibid.,1. 137.
Mass Terrorand StalinistGovernance in theLate 1930s 121
deported thousands fromLeningrad accordingtosocialcategory. In 1935-36,policetroikas

conducted sweepsagainstvariouscategories ofcriminals andviolators ofresidencerestric-
tions. In early1935 theUkrainianNKVD conducteda mass deportation of suspicious
populations fromborderregions.3'Nevertheless, theseoperations wereseenas exceptions
to thegeneralpolicy,andwhentheytookplace,centralpartyand stateofficials criticized
theirimplementation. The post-Kirov assassinationdeportations werelargelylimitedto
Leningradandtaperedoffrather quickly;alreadyin May 1935,Vyshinskii was writing to
Stalincomplaining abouthowtheirwholesalecharacter wasproducing a massofprocedural
complaints.32 TheApril1935borderdeportations inUkrainebrought a protest
fromUSSR
NKVD chiefJagoda,whocriticized hisUkrainiansubordinates fortheoperation.NKVD
UkrainechiefBalitskiidefendedhimselfby notingthattheoperationwas orderedby re-
gionalofficials,inthiscase theUkrainian partyCentralCommittee.
Local authorities haddifficulty adjustingto thenewsituation. In May 1936a special
commission oftheOrgburo complained aboutongoinglocalviolations ofindividuallegality
and procuratorial supervisionin whichprisoners werenotbeingreleasedwhenfreedby
procurators.Recallingthe8 May 1933 decreeagainstlocal mass repression, thereport
blastedlocal partycommittees whopushedthecourtsintomassrepression thatdiscredited
Sovietpower.33
Mass operations inthe1933-36periodwereona dramatically reducedscale,incompa-
rablewiththoseofthepreceding period.According to secretpolicedata,arrestsfor"coun-
terrevolutionary insurrection" (a commonchargein massoperations, including thesubse-
quent kulak operation) fellfrom in to in
135,000 1933 2,517 1936.34 Each year from 1933
to 1936,thenumber ofbothpoliticalandnonpolitical arrestsdeclined.In thisperiodthere
was a three-fold decreaseinarrests for"political,"
counterrevolutionary crimes(Article58
of thecriminalcode) from283,029in 1933 to 91,127 in 1936. Arrestsfornonpolitical
offenses fellfive-fold in thesameperiod,from222,227in 1933to 40,041in 1936.35De-
spitethecontinuation ofcertainrestrictedmassoperations, thetimeofmassNKVD arrests
was clearlyonthewane.
As recently as March1937,onlyfourmonthsbeforeStalin'sannouncement of the
masskulakoperation, NKVD chiefN. I. Ezhovhaddenouncedsuchoperations ina speech
totheCentralCommittee, notingthat"thepracticeofmassarrests... is nowharmful."He
notedthattheCentralCommittee hadcriticizedthemsince1933becausesuchmasssweeps
wereineffective atidentifying realenemies.36 Ata subsequent conference ofseniorNKVD
chiefson 19March1937,he againrecalledthedecreeof8 May 1933("You all knowabout
3"SeeMartin, "TheOriginsofSovietEthnicCleansing,"848-49; andRGASPI,f.558,op. 2, d. 155,11.66-67.

32Vyshinskii toStalinandMolotov,13 May 1935,RGASPI,f.82,op. 2, d. 886,11.29-31.
letter
33"Proektzakrytogopis'maTsKVKP(b)partiinym organizatsiiam
o rabote
sudebnykh,
prokurorskikh
i sledstvennykh
organov,"RGASPI,f.671,op. 1,d. 83,11.3-19.
35"Okolichestve osuzhdennykhpo delamorganovNKVD za 1930-1936gody,"GARF,f.9401,op. 1,d. 4157,11.
201-5. ForanalysisofthesedataseeJ.ArchGetty, GdborT. Rittersporn,
andV.N. Zemskov,"Victims oftheSoviet
PenalSystemin thePre-War Years:A FirstApproachon theBasis ofArchivalEvidence,"AmericanHistorical
Review98 (October1993). See also Thurston,Lifeand Terror,9-12.
36Ezhov'sspeechto theFebruary-March 1937 CentralCommittee Plenum,2 March1937,in Voprosy istorii,
1994,no. 10:15.
122 J.ArchGetty
it.") in whichtherewas "sharpcriticism" of massarrests.Ezhov complainedthatin the

precedingtwo years,80 percentof all NKVD arrestshad been of nonpolitical common
criminals: thieves,hooligans,andthelike. Criminalarrestswereto be theprovenance of
regularcourts.Iftheyhadtobe done,suchcriminal werethebusinessoftheregular
arrests
police(militsiia), notthepoliticalpolice(GUGB NKVD).37
Everything seemsto indicatethatStalinand his lieutenants workedto expandtheir
powerat theexpenseof local leaders,to centralizedecision-making power by reducing
localauthorities' use of repression, the
andtomodernize judicialsystem bymakingitmore
uniform, transparent, andpredictable.Theeruption ofmassrepression inthekulakorderof
mid-1937seemstherefore nottohavebeenpartofanylong-term planning orpolicy.Stalin
hadgoneoutofhiswaytoidentify himselfwiththosewhoopposedmassoperations; this
wouldhavebeenpoorstrategy indeedhad he plannedto launchone. How,then,did the
kulakoperation comeabout?
One reasonhad to do withlocal partyofficials'fearof "dangerous"politicalsenti-
mentsamongthepopulations oftheirterritories.
Partyandpolicehadworried thatthenew
1936StalinConstitution wouldstrengthen "enemyelements" byextending votingrightsto
personspreviously disenfranchised(former WhiteArmyofficers, tsaristofficials,
kulaks,
andothers).In 1935,NKVD chieflagodacomplainedaboutgivingvotingrights to "anti-
Sovietelements"orreleasingthemfromexile,38 andduringpublicdiscussionsofthenew
StalinConstitution thatyear,partyleaderswerealarmedbystatements likethatfromGrigorii
Gorbunov, a peasantfromUkraineanda former SocialistRevolutionary, whosaid"theCon-
stitution permits theorganization ofpartiesapartfromtheVKP(b). Accordingly, we are
organizing ourparty, ourpress,andwe willcarryoutourline."39
It was notuntil1937thatthematter becamea pressingconcernforregionalofficials,
becausethatwas theyearofthefirstrealelectionstothenationalSupremeSoviet. Those
electionswereto be contested(multiplecandidatesforeach seat) and by secretballot.40
Regionalpartybosses perhapshad fewillusionsabouttheSupremeSovietleadingto a
dangerous democratization oftheSovietsystem, andalthough theywouldcomplaintoStalin
of thedangerof hostilecandidatesbeingelectedlocally,it is impossibleto imaginethat
StalinandthePolitburo wouldhavetolerated theelectionofmanyanti-Soviet candidates.
Buttherightofpreviously bannedorganizations religiousones)toexist,
(particularly
restoring votingrights togroupshostiletotheregime,andallowingopencampaigning not
onlyinvited denunciations ofBolshevikpolicy.Itencouraged rumors abouteverything from
majorpolicychangesor warsto purported assassinationsand uprisings.We knowhow
sensitive andfearful theBolshevikswereaboutthespreadofhostilestories, songs,poems,
andconversations, andaboutthepossiblepoliticaleffects ofrumors.41Rumorscouldcause
37"DokladN. I. Ezhovaob itogakh PlenumaTsK VKP(b). Stenogramma aktivaGUGB NKVD SSSR,"

sobraniia
19 March1937(TsA FSB, uncatalogued folder,
11.40-42).
38GARF, f.9479,op. 1,d. 29,11.10-15. See also Shearer,
"CrimeandSocial Disorder,"136-37.
39GARF, f. 3316,op. 8, d. 222,1. 72, 73. Forotherexamplessee SarahDavies, PopularOpinionin Stalin's
Russia:Terror, Propaganda,and Dissent,1934-1941(New York,1997),chap.6.
40J.
ArchGetty, andElectionsin the1930s,"SlavicReview50
"Stateand SocietyUnderStalin:Constitutions
(Spring1991).
4'SeeJ.A. Getty, "AfraidofTheirShadows:TheBolshevikRecoursetoTerror, 1932-1938,"inStalinismnus
vor
demZweitenWeltkrieg NeueWegederForschung, ed.ManfredHildermeierandElisabeth
Mueller-Luckner(Munich,
troubleandcouldevenescalateintopoliticalmovements. Bolshevikofficials werechroni-

callyanxiousaboutpotentialpoliticaltroublein thecountryside and habitually attached
politicalmeanings toa variety ofevents.Onelocalrepresentative oftheCentralCommittee
RuralDepartment reported to Moscowon a collectivefarmer whohad murdered hischil-
dren,claimingthathe hadno meanstofeedthem.Whenan investigation showedthatthe
fatherdidindeedhavefood,theofficialconcludedthattheaffair hadantiregime "political
meaning."In another case,thesloppypoliceinvestigation ofa firethought tohavebeenset
bya collectivefarmer "didnotuncoverthepossiblecounterrevolutionary roleofreligious
believersandsectarians."42 Local partybossesfoundthepossibility ofa realelectoralcam-
paigndangerous to theircontrolofthepopulation, andtheymadethecase to Stalin.
The promiseof thenew StalinConstitution to restorecivilrightsto previously re-
pressedgroupswas takenbymanysuchvictimsas a kindofamnesty.In particular, kulaks
whohadbeenexiledtodistant regionsduringcollectivizationbegantoreturn totheirformer
homes,eitherattheexpiration oftheirsentenceorbysimplyescapingfromtheirplacesof
detention.In theearlymonthsof 1937,worriedlocal NKVD chiefsbeganreporting to
Moscowon thenumbers ofthesereturnees appearing intheirprovinces inconnection with
thenewConstitution. Theyaskedforguidanceonwhattodo withthemandinquired whether
previousNKVD regulations andrestrictions
on kulaksremained inforce.43 ThenewCon-
stitutionalso promisedreligiousfreedom, andheretofore persecuted believersandpriests
tookitas a signalpermitting somelevelofreligiousactivism.ThustheStalinConstitution,
certainlywithout itsauthors meaningforitto,causeda resurgence ofthetwoaspectsofthe
anti-Bolshevik nexusinthevillage:kulaksandreligion.
TheFebruary-March 1937CentralCommittee plenumhasrightly beenseenas an in-
tensificationof theterror.It saw thearraignment and arrestof N. I. Bukharinand A. I.
Rykov,andauthorized theNKVD to intensify thehuntfor"enemiesofthepeople."Since
thesummer of 1936-the timeofthefirst Moscowshowtrial-terror hadbeenon therise
buthadbeendirected againstformer oppositionistsandothermembers ofthepartyelite;it
did notyetinvolvemass arrestsamongthegeneralpopulation.Indeed,Ezhov's speech
criticizingmassoperations (andcitingthe8 May 1933decreeagainstthem),tookplace at
thesameFebruary-March plenumthatgave newimpulseto theweedingoutofelite"en-
emies."
However, seedsofthemasskulakoperation arefoundnotinEzhov'sorStalin'sspeeches
totheFebruary-March 1937plenum,butin a less famousone givenbyA. A. Zhdanovon
theupcoming partyelectionsofsummer 1937.44In linewiththenewsovietelectoralsystem,
Zhdanovcalledforconducting partycommitteeelectionsthesameway:contested votingby
secretballot. Although his speechdidnotfocuson thesituation outsidetheparty, histalk
ofelectionsingeneralraiseda sorepointwiththepartysecretaries in theaudience.
1998); and Sheila Fitzpatrick,

EverydayStalinisin:Ordinary Lifein Extraordinary Times.SovietRussia in the
1930s(NewYork,1999),chap.7. Onrumors inStalinist
societysee L. Viola,"ThePeasantNightmare-Visions of
ApocalypseintheSovietCountryside," JournalofModernHistory 62 (December1990);andFitzpatrick, Everyday
166-83.
Stalinism,
42Baulim letter
toA. Ia. Iakovlev,4 April1937,RGASPI,f. 17,op 123,d. 1,11.34-35.
43V.P.DanilovandRobertaT. Manning, eds.,Tragediiasovetskoi derevnii,vol.5, (Moscow,forthcoming 2002).
44"Doklad t.Zhdanova,"Voprosy istorii,1993,no.5:3-23.
124 J.ArchGetty
The partyand stateleadersofeverymajorregionandrepublicweremembers ofthe

CentralCommittee.Therefore, thecolloquyatthisplenumconstitutes a kindofritualized
dialoguebetweenregionalandcentralpartyleaders.Normally, attheconclusionofa main
reporttoa CentralCommittee plenum,speakerswouldregister withthepresidium tospeak
in the"discussion."Typically, thatdiscussionrepeatedthemainpointsof thereportand
praisedthespeakerforproposing "absolutelycorrect"solutions.ButtheFebruary-March
a
1937plenumwasnot normally scriptedperformance. Thingshadalreadygoneofftherails
inthefirstfourdaysofthemeeting whenBukharin andRykovhadfailedtoconfesstothe
accusationsagainstthem,andwhena specialplenumcommission hadspliton thequestion
oftheirpunishment. The ritualwas so damagedthatthepublishedversionoftheplenum
had to be doctoredto pretendthatthemeetinghad begunon 27 February(insteadof 23
February) in orderto disguisetheconfusion ofthefirst fourdays.45
WhenZhdanovfinished speakingabout"party democracy," nobodyregistered orrose
to speak! This had nothappenedin manyyears. A. A. Andreev, chairingthemeeting,
announcedin despair,"I don'thaveanyoneregistered.Somebodyhas to register."M. F.
Shkiriatovwryly noted,"Theorators havetoprepare themselves." RobertEikhe,ofWestern
Siberia,whined,"I can't;I'm notready.I willspeaktomorrow." Stalinpressedforsomeone
tosaysomething, "Weneed[atleast]a provisional conclusion."Finally,E. M. Iaroslavskii
spokeup,"I asktoberegistered." A delightedandrelieved "46
Stalinsaid,"There!Iaroslavskii!
Head oftheLeague oftheMilitantAtheists, Iaroslavskiithenheldforth on religion.
Zhdanov'sspeechhadmentioned theweaknessofantireligious propaganda onlyinpassing,
as a typicalfailureofpartywork.ButIaroslavskii'sremarks gave thepartysecretaries a
chancetocomplainabouttheirproblems inthecountryside andtowarnofthedangerofthe
newelectoralsystem, all inthecontext of"discussing" Zhdanov'sspeech(whichaccording
toacceptedformula theynevertheless praised).Partysecretaries hadforyearsblamedshort-
comingsin theirregionson "contamination" (zasorenie)by anti-Soviet elements.47 They
nowwarnedthatthenewelectoralsystemgave anti-Soviet elements"newpossibilities to
harmus" andwouldsee attempts byenemiesto "conductattacksagainstus,to organizea
struggleagainstus."48S. V. Kosiorcomplainedthatthousands ofreligiousbelieverswere
attendingreligious-political"events"tocynically praiseStalinfortheirnewrights.Kosior
wentontocomplainof"awfulwildness,conservatism ... fanaticalreligioussentimentsthat
feedundisguised hatredofSovietpower."49
Otherspeakersmademoredirectwarnings, usinglanguagethatwouldappearinOrder
No. 447. Onenotedthat"wehavea seriesoffactsthatharmful elements fromtheremnants
oftheformer kulaksandclergy, especiallymullahs,areconducting workamongremnant
groupsandpreparing fortheelections....Itis clearthatitis necessary tocarryouta decisive
45Compare thepublished version("Stenograficheskii otchet," RGASPI,f.17,op.2, d. 612,vols.1 and2), which

omitsthefirst
fourdaysofthemeeting, withthefuller versioninVoprosy istorii,1992,nos.2-12. Foranaccountof
thecommission splitsee GettyandNaumov,Road to Terror, 406-19.
46Voprosyistorii,1993,no. 5:14.
47SeeStevenMerritt, "TheGreatPurgesintheSovietFarEast,1937-1938"(Ph.D.diss.,University ofCalifornia,
Riverside,
2000).
48Voprosyistorii,1993,no.5:18 (Vareikis);ibid.,no.6:5, 6 (Eikhe).
49Ibid.,
no.6:8 (Kosior).
struggle againsttheseelements."50 Another observedthat"kulakelements, priests,sonsof

priests,sonsof [tsarist] policemen... accordingto thenewConstitution receivedelectoral
rights.Theycan vote. It seemsto me thatherewe haveto payparticular attention to the
changesarisinginthepopulation whichhavegoneon ineachprovince.""51
The Bolsheviks'fearof religionwas real. The 1930swerea timeof privation and
severesocial stress,and in suchtimespeopleoftengravitate to movements or ideas that
involvesalvation, improvement, release,andopposition tothestatusquo. Russianreligious
movements, bothOrthodoxand sectarian, promisedall these. Afterall, religionwas the
othermillenarian idea competing withcommunism fortheheartsandmindsofthepopula-
tion.Like communism, itwas theotherencompassing setofbeliefsthatsoughtto explain
theworldandthatpromisedsalvationinthelongrun.Despiterelentless persecution bythe
Bolsheviksthatincludedclosingchurchesand massarrestsof priests, religionwas stilla
potentforcein Sovietsocietyinthe1930s. Iaroslavskii hadreported thatthirty-nine thou-
sandreligious organizations werelegallyregisteredwithmorethana million"activists."He
notedthatdatafromtherecently completed1937 censuswas stillincomplete, butcited
severalprovinces where50-80percentofthepopulation were"believers."In someplaces,
Orthodox cantorswereelectedto collectivefarmchairmanships insteadofCommunists.52
In the 1937 census,soon to be denouncedand suppressed, 56 millionpeople (some 57
percentoftheadultpopulation)declaredthemselves tobe religiousbelievers.Worsestill,
of thosebetweentheages of 20 and 29-the postrevolutionary generation on whichthe
Bolshevikspinnedsuchhopes-45 percent declaredthemselves believers.53It is certainly
open to questionwhether Bolshevismcommandedas muchor as fervent supportin the
population, andBolsheviksworried thatthenewfreedom ofreligion promised intheconsti-
tution wouldprovidea coverforantiregime politicalorganizingandpropaganda.
M. I. Kalinin,chairman of theCentralExecutiveCommittee of Soviets(TsIK) was
ultimately responsible fororganizing thenewelections,andwhenhe roseto speakto the
February-March 1937plenum,thepartysecretaries gavehima hardtime.Evenbeforehe
spoke,somemembers hadrequested thatthecampaignperiodfortheelectionsbe extended
togivethemmoretimetopreparecompetitive partycandidates.54Kalininbeganbynoting
thatanelectorallawwouldsoonbe promulgated bythegovernment. Eikheinterrupted him,
"Butwe areaskingthatwe be brought intothisbusiness."OthersthenpliedKalininwith
technicalquestionsaboutthevotingand ridiculedhis answers. WhenKalininsaid the
system wouldresemble the"Frenchsystem ofelections,"P.P.Postyshev quipped,"Nowit's
all clear,we havea lotofFrenchmen here,"drawing bitter
laughter fromthepartysecretar-
ies. Severalofthemaskedthat,insteadofmerelyhavingtheelectorallaw confirmed atthe
TsIK session,itbe circulated inadvancefortheircomment andcorrections. Kalininagreed,
butshotbackatoneofhiscritics, "Eikhecamehereandwantedtooverthrow everything; [by
50Ibid.,23-24 (Mirzoian).
5'Ibid., 27 (Kabakov).
52Ibid.,
no.5:14-15.
53lurii
A. Poliakov,Vsesoiuznaia perepis'naseleniia 1937g. (Moscow,1991),106-15.
54Voprosiistorii,
1993,no.6:15 (Khataevich).
126 J.ArchGetty
saying]thereis no electorallaw.(Eikhe:Thisis pressure, MikhailIvanovich.)Kalinin:Of

courseI'm pressuring you. I thinkthatyouhaveeverypossibility forfullpreparations.""
Virtuallyeveryone whospokecritically attheplenumaboutthenewelectoralsystem in
thecountryside was a leadingterritorial partysecretary (Bogushevskii, Vareikis,Kosior,
Eikhe,Khataevich, Mirzoian,Kabakov,Postyshev).As thesewarnings andcriticalremarks
continued intotheevening, thechairofthemeeting (Andreev)finally puta stoptoit:"Com-
rades,beforegivingthefloortoanother comrade, I mustwarnthatseveraloftheorators are
speakingoffthesubject... thespeakersareignoring thequestionofdemocratization within
theparty;thisis wrong."56 Afterthis,speakersreturned to a moretraditional andnarrow
discussionofZhdanov'sspeech.
But theirfearsthattheelectionswouldaid and comfort "dangerous"forcesin the
countryside didnotabate.Overthenextfewmonths localpartyleadersdideverything they
couldwithinthelimitsofpartydiscipline(and sometimes outsideit)to stallorchangethe
elections.Theysentwarnings to thecenteraboutpriestsandfascistsbeingelected.They
draggedtheirfeetaboutorganizing electoraldistricts,
propaganda, meetings, andotherele-
mentsof theelectoralcampaign,deliberately avoidingtheirorderson thesubject.Their
resistancebrought rebukesandwarnings fromtheCentralCommittee, whichorderedlocal
partyleadersto workharderwith"politicalwork"to overcomeresistance peacefullyand
maketheelectionsa success.57On one occasion,Stalinpersonally wrotetoS. V. Kosiorin
Ukraine, reminding himthatall electionsweretobe bysecretballot.58
Stalinwas notyetwillingto retreat fromcontestedelections,and on 2 July1937,
Pravdano doubtdisappointed theregionalsecretaries bypublishing thefirstinstallment of
thenewelectoral rules,enacting andenforcing contested,universal, secretballotelections.59
ButStalinoffered a compromise.The verysamedaytheelectorallaw was published, the
Politburoapprovedthelaunchingof a mass operationagainstpreciselytheelementsthe
local leadershad complainedabout,andhourslaterStalinsenthis telegram to provincial
partyleadersordering thekulakoperation.60 Itis hardtoavoidtheconclusionthatinreturn
forforcing thelocalpartyleaderstoconductan election,Stalinchosetohelpthemwinitby
givingthemlicensetokillordeporthundreds ofthousands of"dangerous elements."
Contemporaries also saw a linkbetweentheelectionsandthemassoperations.Jail-
houseinformers in Tatariareported thatthosearrested in themassoperations thoughtthat
theBolshevikswereafraidoftheelectionsandhadlauncheda preemptive strike fromcon-
cernthatenemieswouldseizecontrol ofthevotinginthedistricts.6'NikolaiBukharin, who
was betterplacedtojudgesuchthings, praisedmassterror inhislastlettertoStalin,noting
thata generalpurgewasinpartconnected with"thetransition todemocracy."62 Threemonths
55Ibid.,16-17.
56Ibid.,
no.7:11(Andreev).
57SeeGetty,"StateandSociety,"18-36.
toKosior,20 March1937,RGASPI,f.558,op. 11,d. 56,1.31.
58Stalin
59Stalin
gaveup on contested electionsonlyintheautumn of 1937(Getty,"StateandSociety,"31-32).
60"Polozhenieo vyborakh VerkhovnyiSovetSSSR," Pravda,2 July1937;"Ob antisovetskikh Polit-
elementakh,"
buroresolutionof2 July1937,Trud,4 June1992.
61Stepanov,
Rasstrelpo limitu, 14.
62ForBukharin's letter
seeIstochnik,
1993/0,23-25; andanEnglishversioninGettyandNaurnov, RoadtoTerror,
556-60.
later,in October,speakersat a CentralCommitteeplenumwouldrespondto Molotov's

reporton electoralpreparationswithcomments on themass operations.FirstSecretary
Kontorin ofArkhangelsk said,"WeaskedandwillcontinuetoasktheCentralCommittee to
increaseourlimitsforthefirst
category[executions]
inconnectionwithpreparations
forthe
elections."63
Thereareothersignsofa localroleintheinstigation ofthekulakoperation.Fivedays
beforeStalin'sJulytelegram thePolitburo hadapprovedtheformation ofanad hoctroikain
Western Siberia"toapplythesupreme penalty toall activists
belonging tothisinsulaection-
aryorganization ofdeported kulaks."Thishadnothappenedinseveralyears,andthewords
"insurrectionary organizationofdeported kulaks"wouldcoincidewiththelanguageofStalin's
subsequent telegram a fewdayslater.In thepastsuchtroikashadbeenformed inresponse
tolocalrequests, anditis possiblethata requestfromWestern SiberiaFirstSecretary Rob-
ertEikhe(a leadingcriticofthenewelectoralscheme)provideda catalyst forStalin's3 July
1937telegram.64
The Julydecisionto launchthekulakoperationseemsto havebeentakensuddenly,
without muchforethought, preparation, or planning.A seriesof quickincremental steps
overa fewdays (Eikhe'stroikas,Stalin'stelegram, preliminary and finally
instructions,
OrderNo. 447), onefollowing andsometimes contradicting theother,resultedinthekulak
operation.Policymaking byimpromptu andimprovised processwasnotunusualforStalin's
leadership.ThePolitburo had,afterall,staggered stepbystepinthelate 1920sfromlimit-
ingthekulakstofullcollectivization in similarfashion.
Ifwe turnourattention totheimplementation ofthekulakmassoperation, we see signs
of contradiction and indecision,alongwithinterplay betweencenterand periphery that
hardly suggests simplecentralizationorone-wayflowofinfluence. As wehaveseen,Stalin's
telegram ordered toproposenumbers
localofficials ofpersonstobe shotorexiledtodistant
regionsandwasfollowedon31 JulybyEzhov'sformal NKVD OrderNo. 447 providing the
operationaldetails.Thefour-week interim betweenthemmight be attributed
tousualSoviet
buta closerlook at theeventsof theintervening
inefficiency, fourweekssuggestsother
factorsatwork.
In responsetoStalin'stelegram, mostprovinces andnationalrepublicssentinfigures,
whichthePolitburo approvedbetween5 and 11July.Theregionalleaderswereprepared to
submitprecisenumbers; theyalreadyknewexactlywhotheywantedto repress.Thusthe
ChuvashASSR quicklyaskedforpermission toshootprecisely86 kulaksand54 criminals
andto exile676 kulaksand201 criminals.Cheliabinsk proposedto shoot2,552andexile
5401. InMoscow,FirstSecretary NikitaKhrushchev knewthatheneededtorepress exactly
41,805kulaksandcriminals.Nearlyall of thesubmissions fromtheforty provincesand
republicsresponding toStalin'stelegram werein suchexactfigures.65
But suddenlyon 12 July, DeputyNKVD Commissar M. P. Frinovskiisentan urgent
telegram toall local policeagencies:"Do notbegintheoperation torepressformer kulaks.
63PlenumnTsK VKP(b) 11-12oktiabria 1937g.,stenogramma, RGASPI,f. 17,op. 2, d. 625,11.1-10,38,49,55,

63,70.
64"0 vskrytoi
v Zap.Sibirek.-r.povstanicheskoi
organizatsii sredivyslannykh
kulakov,"Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyi
arkhivnoveisheiistorii(RGANI),f.89,op. 43, d. 48, 1. 1. We havenotlocatedsucha requestinthearchives.
protocols(osobyepapki),RGASPI,f. 17,op. 162,d. 21, 11.94-99.
65Politburo
128 J.ArchGetty
I repeat,do notbegin." Frinovskii wenton to saythattheprecisedateforbeginning the

operation wouldbe communicated "later"bya "specialorderofthecommissar." Eventhe
"mostactiveandembittered" kulakswerenottobe senttothetroikas,sentenced, or shot
untilfurther ordersfromEzhov. Frinovskii orderedall provincialNKVD chiefsto attenda
seriesofconferences tobe heldinMoscow,thefirst tobeginonlythreedayslater.66 Thus,
twoweeksafterStalin'stelegram, procedures werenotin place fortheoperation, andthe
NKVD apparently fearedthatlocal authorities wouldstartshooting without them.
Theseoperational conferences tookplaceinMoscowon 16-18 July.We do nothave
recordsofwhathappenedthere,andsubsequent archivaldeclassifications maychangeour
viewradically, butfivesignificant differences betweenStalin'stelegram andOrderNo. 447
fourweekslaterappearedduring thetimeoftheconferences andmaysuggestsomekindof
interchange betweencentral andlocalofficials.First,Stalin'stelegram hadidentified kulaks
andcriminals whohad"returned homeatthecompletion oftheirsentences."Butafterthe
conferences withlocal leaders,OrderNo. 447 greatlyexpandedthelistto includepriests
andsectarians, members of"anti-Soviet" politicalparties, former
fascists, WhiteArmyof-
ficers,
tsarist-erabureaucrats (chinovniki) andpolicemen, spies,terrorists,
bandits,criminal
recidivists,andevenhorsethieves.Second,thelistwas no longerconfined tothosereturn-
inghomeaftertheirsentences, as Stalinhad specified.OrderNo. 447 targeted escapees,
criminal elements stillinexileandcamp,and"thosepreviously avoidingpunishment." Third,
althoughStalin'stelegram had suggestedexile for"less dangerouselements," OrderNo.
447 calledinsteadforthemtobe senttohardregimelaborcamps.
Fourth, thetarget numbers submitted previously bythelocal authorities wererevised,
mostoftendownward.It seemsthePolitburo had secondthoughts aboutthelocallypro-
posed numbers theyhadjustapproved, andproceededtolowermorethanhalfofthem.It
willbe remembered thatatthebeginning ofJuly,40 of64 provinces andnationalrepublics
hadsubmitted targetnumbers inresponsetoStalin'stelegram.Altogether, theselocal sug-
gestionshadtotaled207,345proposedarrests.AttheendofJuly, andaftertheconferences
withlocalrepresentatives, OrderNo. 447 reducedthisforty-province totalbyabout20,000
arrests,to 187,450. Of thereductions, 95 percent(18,770)wereofthecategory slatedfor
execution.Ofthe40 provinces proposing inresponsetoStalin'stelegram,
targets OrderNo.
447 reducedthenumber tobe shotin 19provinces, raiseditfor17 andleftitthesamefor4.
Itreducedthenumber tobe senttocampfor22 andraiseditfor18. Someofthereductions
oflocalproposalsforexecution weredramatic: Belorussiafrom3,000to 1,000,Azov-Black
Sea from6,600to 5,000,WestSiberiafrom11,000to 5,000,and Moscow from8,500to
5,000.67Therearerumorsthatsomeprovincial NKVD chiefsresistedthesetting ofhigh
limitsat theJulyconferences in Moscow,and we knowthatStalinand his henchmen
frequently pressedfor"intensification of thestruggle againstenemies."68Butotherlocal
66"Memorandum No. 299,"TsAFSB, f.100,op. 1,por.5,1.273. Frinovskiireferredto"DirectiveNo. 266 ofthe

Peoples' Commissar"(Ezhov),whichhis memorandum was to "supplement."At present, we do nothavethe
referenced EzhovDirectiveNo. 266 mentioned byFrinovskii.
67Basedoncomparison ofthelimitsfirstapprovedbythePolitburo (Politburoprotocols,RGASPI,f.17,op. 162,
d. 21, 11.94-99); andthetargetsspecifiedin OrderNo. 447 (TsA FSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.1,11.203-17).
68Mikhail Shreider,NKVD iznutri:Zapiskichekista(Moscow,1995),42. Shreider'saccountis secondhand and
is probablynotentirely accurate.He reports thatOmskNKVD chiefSalyn'openlyprotested thesettingoftarget
officials
didnotneedtobe pressed.In July1937manyofthemproposedrepression targets
higherthanthosethePolitburo was ultimately willingto accept.
Fifth,OrderNo. 447 seemedtoestablishlimitsrather thanquotas.69A carefulreading
ofOrderNo. 447 showsthatthetarget numbers werelimits(limity),suggesting maximums
morethanminimums.70 If thePolitburo had at thismoment expectedorwantedan open-
endedcampaign-style terror,
therewouldbe noreasontomention limitsatall. Althoughthe
were
limity said tobe onlyorientirovochnye, Ezhov'sorderwarnedlocal officials thatthey
"do nothavetherightindependently to raisethem.... In suchcases,theyareobligatedto
presentmewithan appropriate justification.Decreasingthefigures... is permitted."Ifthe
Politburowanteda widerterror beyondthelimitsitprescribed, suchstatements wouldhave
beencounterproductive. Instead,StalinandEzhovfeltitnecessary toissuewarnings tothe
contraryandinsistontheirrighttocontrol theterror.ReflectingStalin'sconcernthatlocals
mightgo outofcontrol(or outofhiscontrol),OrderNo. 447 twicewarnedthatany"ex-
cesses"inlocalimplementation oftheoperation werenotpermitted. Stalinwantedtohave
hiscakeandeatittoo:tohavea centrally managedcampaignandavoidpayingthepricethat
campaignscarried.
Lackingtranscripts oftheseconferences on OrderNo. 447, we can onlyguessat the
reasonsforthesedifferences betweenStalin'stelegram andthesubsequent order.It does
seemclear,however, thattheprocessinvolvedsomething fromthesimple
quitedifferent
imposition ofa preparedcentral plan. Itseemsunlikelythatsometime inthetendays,2-12
July,Stalinsuddenlydecidedto greatlyexpandthetargeted categoriesand increasethe
punishments whileat thesametimereducing theproposednumberof arrestsandplacing
limitsonthem.Basedontheevidencewe nowhave,itseemsmuchmorelogicaltoconsider
one oftwodifferent scenariosforthechangesadopted.PerhapsEzhov,whodrafted Order
No. 447,pushedformoreseverepunishments ofbroadercategoriesofvictims.Or,itcould
havebeenthatlocal representatives suggested expanding thecategoriesandpunishments.
Stalinagreed,butwas afraidthat,giventheirtrackrecord,thelocal leaderswouldspinthe
thingoutofcontrol, producing thefamiliar contradictions
ofcampaigns:loss ofhiscontrol
bycedingtoo muchpowerto local authorities andthetotaldestruction ofanyplansfora
centralizedlegalorder.Twoofthechanges,as we haveseen,limitedlocal prerogatives by
lowering targetfiguresandimposinglimitsthathadtobe approved.In thisscenario,Stalin
approveda massoperation againstbroadertargets,butinreturn insistedon reducing many
ofthelocallyproposedtargets andonhisrighttoapprove,foreachprovince, thesize ofthe
operation.
Therewereseveralreasonswhyregionalpartyandpoliceofficials wouldsupport, orat
leastnotoppose,massrepressive operationsintheirterritories
inmid-1937. Whatever local
figures,
towhichEzhovreactedbyarresting himatthemeeting itself.Infact,Salyn'wasnotremoved fromofficefor
severaldaysandnotarrested forseveralweeks. See N. V. PetrovandK. V. Skorkin, eds.,KtorukovodilNKVD,
1934-1941:Spravochnik (Moscow,1999),373-37.
691n
all thedocumentson thekulakoperationI haveseen,thewordlimitwas used,rather thankvota,norma,or
otherterms suggesting
minimum quotas.
70Mostoftentheyappearin theliteratureas "quotas." See, forexample,Khlevniuk, "Objectives,"162-63,
althoughtheRussianversionretainslimity
(0. V.Khlevniuk, Politbiuro: vlastiv 1930-e
mnekhanizrnypoliticheskoi
gody[Moscow,1996],190-91).
130 J.ArchGetty
chiefsmayhavethought previously,Stalin'stelegram signalednewrepression andmanyof

themmusthaveimaginedthatthePolitburo wouldlookwithfavoriftheyproposedhuge
numbers.Duringthisperiod,Ezhovwas also replacing theformerprovincialNKVD chiefs
withthosewhobelieved,as hedid,thatthehuntforenemieshadtobe accelerated, although
theymayhavebeensurprised at Stalin'sandEzhov'srelativecaution.Another reasonfor
thelocals' "enthusiasm" was self-insurance. By thistime,suspicionwas beginning tofall
onmembers ofthepartyapparatus as theNKVD castitsnetwiderandwiderfor"enemiesof
thepeople." The definition of thatcategorywas fluidand contestedas variouspolitical
actorssoughtto define"enemy"in waysconvenient and safeforthem.7'It is nothardto
imagineterritorialpartyleaderspressingto identify "kulaksand criminals"as thechief
enemies,inordertodistract attention fromtheirownfailuresand,again,touse violenceas
a substituteforadministration.
In OrderNo. 447, Stalinand Ezhov prescribed detailedprocedures and insistedon
retaining ongoingapprovalauthority. But perhapsthemostimportant decisionwas left
outsidecentral controlandinlocalhands:whowouldliveandwhowoulddie,reversing the
rulesofthepreceding years,whenthePolitburo had approvedall deathsentences.Now,
local troikascomposedof partyand police officialshad therightto tryand execute"in
expeditedfashion," andonlyhadto reportto NKVD chiefEzhoveverytwoweekson the
quantity ofthosearrested
andcharacteristics andsentenced.72 Centralattemptstomeaning-
fullymonitor thesituation wereboundtofail.
Stalinmusthaveknownthat,intheclimateofrisinghysteria aboutenemies,thelimity
in OrderNo. 447 wouldlikelybe takenas targets by thelocals. In orderto displaytheir
vigilance,theywouldsurelyrequestincreases,andthroughout theremainder of 1937and
into1938,localparty andpoliceofficials didinfactrequested augmentations oftheirlimits.
ThePolitburo approvedmany(butnotall) ofthemdespiteitsearlierconservatism on local
requests.Clearly,Stalinwas nota reluctant terroristanddidnotseektoreducetheterror,
butrather tomonitor localconductofthecampaignandreservetohimself therighttodecide
itsparameters. Buttheprocessofincreasing limitssoondisplayedthetypicaldisarray ofa
Stalinistcampaign.OrderNo. 447 specifiedthatonlyNKVD CommissarEzhov had the
rightto adjustthem,butalmostimmediately thePolitburogotintotheact,approving re-
questsfromprovincial partyandpoliceofficialsforincreasesin thelimits.By theendof
AugustsecretprotocolsofPolitburo meetings carryapprovalsofincreasedlimitsthat,ac-
cording toprocedure, theNKVD shouldhavebeenabletogive.73Atthesametime,weknow
thatEzhov also was approving increasesand thatStalinwas doingso personally.Local
partyleadersoftenwrotedirectly to Stalinaskingforaugmented limits,bypassingEzhov
and theestablishedprocedurealtogether.We have notesin Stalin'shandapprovingin-
creasesoflimitsforKrasnoiarsk, Bashkiria,Smolensk,andEngel'swhichdo notappearin
thePolitburo records.74
7'GettyandNaumov,Road toTerror.
72Examples ofthesereportscanbe foundinStepanov, Rasstrel
po limitu.
73ForexamplesofPolitburo "specialfolder"confirmation oflocalrequeststoraisethelimitssee RGASPI,f.17,
op. 162,d. 21,11.162,169,174,andd. 22,11.6, 12, 13,24.
74Moskovskie novosti,21 June1992; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65,1. 88, 97. The Stalinmemorandum on
Krasnoiarsk "Za [voting
carriedthepostscript yes],I. Stalin,V.Molotov."TheonesforSmolenskandEngel'scarry
The lackofclarityin thelimitapprovalprocessis one oftheimportant lacunaein our

knowledgeofthemassoperations.WasEzhovauthorized toapproveincreaseswithout the
Politburo'sor Stalin'sconfirmation? Whyweresomeincreasesrunthrough thePolitburo
andothersnot?Did EzhovorStalingiveoralapprovalsthatneverfoundtheirwayintothe
archives?Did thePolitburo approveincreasesforwarded tothembyStalinorEzhovwith-
outleavingwritten trace?Aretherewritten approvalsextantinotherarchivesnotavailable
toresearcherstoday?
We also knowlittleaboutpreciselyhow theoperationwas conductedand who was
arrested.We knowthatspecialNKVD operational groupswereformed, each witha geo-
graphicalterritoryto sweep,butwe knowlittleabouthow victimsactuallywerechosen.
Therearehintsthatlocalpolicesurveillance recordswerecombedforknownclassenemies,
andanti-Soviet
dissidents, elements.Wesuspectthatcriminal recordsweresiftedfornames.
Interrogations,briefas theywere,producednew names. In someplaces thechoicewas
entirelycapricious.In Turkmenistan, menwithbeardsweretaken,perhapson theassump-
tionthattheywereMuslimmullahs,andmarketplaces wererandomly swept.75
We havefragmentary evidenceaboutthecomposition ofthosearrested.In Omsk,ex-
cerptedprotocols fromtroikasessionsindicatethatpoliticallabelswereattached tomostof
theaccused,whowereoftengroupedintoorganizations: namesof"insurrectionary kulak
organizations,"secretreligiousbrotherhoods, unionsofWhiteArmyofficers, Mensheviks,
SRs, and variousTrotskyist-terroristgroupsare frequently encountered alongwithindi-
vidualcriminals, spies,andwreckers.Politicallabelswereattached
nationalists, tothevast
majority ofvictims.76Although theselabelsperhapsbearlittlerelation toreality,
theyshow
thesharppoliticalspinputon thedragnetand theeagernessof local officialsto describe
groupconspiracies, nodoubtinresponsetoEzhov'sdemandforsuchdescriptions. Thefew
reportswe havefromlocalNKVD organizations toMoscowuse considerable spacetode-
scribethevariousgroupsthey"uncovered."77 Asidefromthepoliticallabels,however, the
protocolsoftenmentiontheresidenceor occupationof thearrested.This anecdotalevi-
dencegivesthestrong impression ofpolitically
ofruralcategories "alienelements:" kulaks,
former Whiteofficers, religiousleadersandsectariansalongwithcommoncriminals.
A roughbreakdown we haveofthosearrested comesfromtheTatarSSR. It groups
victimsintocategories inuseatthetimerather thanbyspecificaccusation andmaytherefore
givea slightly ifflawed,pictureofroughproportions.
better,
theStalinnote"Za." Thiswas theformat fordraftscirculatedtoPolitburomembers fortheirvote,andfrequently

appearinthearchival"Politburo (RGASPI,f.17,op. 163)andtheninthePolitburo
materials" protocols(RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 3 [PB protocols]or op. 162 [PB specialfolders]).In thiscase, however,thereis no recordof these
documents forBashkiriaalso seemsto havebypassedthePolitburo,
in eitherlocation.Stalin'snotation reading
simply"ComradeEzhov. Wehavetoincreasebothcategories."
75Seethe1939report in GARF,f.8131,op. 27, d. 145 11.49-57.
76V.M. Samosudov, Bol'shoiterrorv OmskoinPriirtyshe,1937-1938(Omsk,1998),consistslargely ofsumma-
riesandextracts fromtroikaprotocols.
77See,forexample,thereport toEzhov:"Dokladnaiazapiskaob itogakhmassovykh operatsiiprovedennykh po
liniiUGB Tatarskoi ASSR," January 1938,inStepanov, Rasstrelpolimitu,86-117. Mostofthisreport consistsof
descriptions ofvariousenemyorganizations.
132 J.ArchGetty
VictimsoftheKulakOperation:
TatarASSR
ofconvicted
Composition Percentof Total Number Numbersent Percent
shot
totalarrests arrested shot tocamp
Formerkulaks 56.1 3009 1218 1791 40.4
Former[tsarist
period]jailers,
Whites,
policemen,gendarmes, etc. 19.5 1043 569 474 54.3
Criminal
elements 14.0 756 350 406 46.2
andMuslimclergy,
Orthodox
churchmenandsectarians 6.9 370 281 89 75.9
SRs andmembers ofother
anti-Soviet
politicalparties 2.7 150 137 13 91.3
innationalist
Participants counter-
revolutionary
organizations 0.6 34 15 19 44.1
Total 5362 2570 2792 47.9

zapiskaobitogakh
"Dokladnaia massovykh po iniiUGB Tatarskoi
operatsiiprovedennykh 1938,inStepanov,
ASSR,"January Rasstrelpo Iz istorii
limiter
repressiiv TASSRv gody "ezhovshchiny"
politicheskikh (Kazan, 1999), 86.
Theseproportions executedareroughly comparable tothenationalaverage(50.4 per-

centofall thosearrested)andtherelativesizesofthecategories arenotdramaticallydiffer-
entfromanecdotalevidenceelsewhere.Thesedataconfirm thatarrests weremadebycat-
egory,bybiography, thanbasedonanyactionorcrimebythevictim.Theyshowthat
rather
kulaks(orthoseso labelled)weretheclearmajority ofvictimsinthismassoperation, while
purported members ofreligiousorganizationsorpoliticalpartieswerefarmorelikelytobe
executedthanothers.
Based on thesourcesnowavailable(whichareprobablyincomplete) we can saythat
withOrderNo. 447 plus subsequent knownlimitincreases,Moscow gave permission to
shootabout236,000victims.Wearefairly certainthatsome386,798personswereactually
shot,leaving151,716peopleshotwithout currentlydocumented central
sanctioneither
from
theNKVD orthePolitburo.78 The possibilityexiststhatlocal authorities
wentfarbeyond
thepermitted limits,especiallywhenit came to shootingvictims.In Turkmenistan, for
example,wherewe happento havefulldataon all approvals,we knowthatthePolitburo
approved3,225executions, butlocal authoritiesshot4,037,an excessof 25 percentover
approvedlimits.79 In Smolensk,archivalresearchshowsan approvedlimitof 4,000,but
localauthorities
areknowntohaveshot4,500andcontinued shootingvictimsevenafter the
November1938decisionorderedthemtostop.Theysimplybackdatedthepaperwork and
78CalculatedfromPolitburoprotocols(specialfolders):RGASPI,f. 17,op. 162,dd.21-23; TsAFSB, collection

ofdocuments; KokurinandPetrov,GULAG,97-104; Samosudov, Bol'shoiterror,160-61,241; NikolaiIlkevich,
"Rasstrelianyv Viaz'me:Novoe o M. N. Goretskom," KraiSmolenskii 1-2 (1994): 129-44; Shearer,
"Crimeand
Social Disorder,"139-41; Moskovskienovosti,21 June1992; Izvestiia,3 April 1996; and Khlevniuk,"Les
mechanismes," 204-6. NikitaPetrovbelievesthatadditionalincreasepermissions weregivenorallyorby tele-
gramsandputstheexcessshooting figureataboutthirty
thousand (personalcommunication). Suchevidenceis not
currentlyavailabletoresearchers.
79SeeKhlevniuk, "Les mechanismes,"
204.
continued shooting.80 Some regionalpartychiefswereenthusiastic aboutthemassopera-

tions.FirstSecretary Simochkin in Ivanovolikedto watchtheshootings andwas curious
aboutwhysomeofhissubordinates chosenotto.8'InTurkmenistan, FirstSecretaryChubin
was so involvedwiththemasskillingsthatin 1938 he triedto securetherecallof a new
NKVD chiefsentto stopthem.82
The recordswe haveof approvedincreasesin limitsareusuallyjustthat:approvals.
The Politburofoldersdo notrecordinstancesinwhichlocal requestsforhigherrepression
limitsweredenied,although we knowthatsometimes theywere.InAugust1937anNKVD
letterrefuseda requestedincreaseforIaroslavl.83In January 1938,TatariaNKVD chief
Mikhailovreported toEzhovthat"datashowthatthenarrow limitsintheearlyperiodofthe
operation forthosedeserving repression delayedthedevelopment of theoperation."He
askedEzhovforpermission to doubletheexecutionlimitsin Tataria.Ezhovrefused.84 In
Smolensk, NKVD chiefKarutskii askedEzhovforpermission totripletheexecutionlimits.
Ezhovdemurred untilSmolenskpartyFirstSecretary Korotchenko backedup Karutskii's
requestwitha letterexplaining thesituation in theprovince.85
Stalincertainlyencouraged zeal inthehuntfor"enemiesofthepeople." Bothdirectly
andthrough Ezhovhe pressedformoreandmorearrests andhe approvedrequestsforin-
creased limits.At thesametime,he reservedthecenter'srightto approvethoselimits.
Despitehismurderous encouragement, afterspendingseveralyearstrying tosecurehisre-
gionalsubordinates' obedienceto his commands, thereis no reasonto believethathe ex-
pectedtobe disobeyedorthathe wantedthelocalstoexceedinstructions. We do nothave
atourdisposala singledocument suggesting thatheencouraged orplannedforlocal "spon-
taneity"thatwentbeyondhispermission, andquitea fewsuggesting thecontrary, beginning
withthelimitsandrestrictions against"excesses"andprocedures in OrderNo. 447.86
StalinandEzhovwerenotalwayshappywiththewaylocal authorities carriedoutthe
kulakoperation.In February 1938,Ezhovsenta letter totheNKVD leadership inUkraine
"andelsewhere"congratulating his subordinates on good workin arresting spiesandob-
servingthatthingsweregoinggenerally well,butnotingsome"mistakes andseriousshort-
comings"in local NKVD operations.87 Locals tendedto runup thescoreby persecuting
largenumbers ofsmall fry(whocould, afterall,vote)ratherthanmounting seriousinvesti-
gationof "counterrevolutionary leaders." It is no good,Ezhov wrote,to focuson petty
religioussectariansfromthe1920s,on thoseexhibiting anti-Soviet moodsorremarks, on
rankand fileWhiteArmyveterans, whileleavingthe"leadingcadres"untouched.The
targetsshouldbe notformer WhiteArmysoldiers,buttheirofficers; notharmlesssectar-
ians,buttheirpriests.Andaboveall,blindsweepswithout anyinvestigation orfocuswere
wrong.He chidedlocalNKVD operatives forignoring CentralCommittee directivestothe
80SeeManning, "Massovaiaoperatsiia,"239-41; andIlkevich,"Rasstrelianyv Viaz'me,"138.

NKVDiznutri,
8"Shreider, 80.
"Les mechanismes,"
82Khlevniuk, 203.
andManning,
83Danilov Tragediia.
Rasstrelpolimitu,
84Stepanov, 117.
"Massovaiaoperatsiia,"
8"Manning, 240-41.
86For view,inwhichspontaneous
another "Objectives,"167.
excesseswerepartofa Stalinplan,see Khlevniuk,
87TsAFSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.6,11.4-12.
134 J.ArchGetty
contraryandarresting peoplesimplybecausetheywereformer partymembers orbecause

theyhappenedtohavebeenamongthe2.5 millionprisoners oftheGermansduringWorld
WarI. "Thisshouldnotinanycase be done." "Itis wrongtoquicklyandformally fulfill
the
limitbyarresting everybody involved."
EzhovaccusedtheNKVD operational groupsoftaking theeasyroute:delivering "heavy
blows"on districts conveniently locatedneartheirheadquarters whileignoring anti-Soviet
groupsfurther out in countryside.The locals,on theotherhand,preferred to catchup
everyonein thenetin thenearbydistricts where"anti-Soviet elements"werethebiggest
nuisanceforthem.88
All in all, thekulakoperation of 1937-38was hardlya modelofplannedefficiency,
andthecenter'sdetailedorderswereoftendisregarded. Soonafter itbegan,itwasnecessary
forMoscowNKVD chiefsto issuemoretelegrams clarifying
procedures.89 Accordingto
OrderNo. 447,theoperation was tobeginwiththosetobe executed,followedbya second
stageencompassing thoseto be sentto camps. In theevent,regionaltroikassentenced
victimstobothcategories simultaneously.90OrderNo. 447 hadforbidden thepersecution of
familiesofthosearrested; in theevent,troikasdidthisfrequently.91 In fact,almostevery
OrderNo. 447 had placedon local conductoftheoperation
restriction was violatedin its
implementation. Giventhatlocal authoritiesdecidedhowmanywouldbe repressed, who
wouldliveandwhowoulddie,itis difficult toagreethateverything wasplannedandadmin-
istered
from Moscow.SeniorNKVD official StanislavRedenssaidata January 1938NKVD
conference, perhapswithsomeresignation, thattheMoscowNKVD was ableto giveonly
"generaldirections" becauseregionalsecretpoliceorganizations acted"independently."92
The operation lastednotthemandated fourmonths butfifteen,andin someplacesthe
shootingscontinuedafterthe 17 November1938 ordershaltingthemand insistingon
88Although theevidenceonthispointis onlysuggestive, Ezhovmayhavetransformed "limits"into"quotas"for

provincesandevendistricts withinthem.Molotovrecalledthat"Ezhovwas accusedbecausehe beganto name
quantities[ofarrests]by provinces,and in theprovincesnumbersby district.In some provincestheyhad to
liquidatenotlessthantwothousand, insomedistrictnotlessthanfifty people.... Thatis whathewas shotfor.There
was nomonitoring overit." See FeliksIvanovichChuevandVyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov,Stosorokbeseds
Molotovym: Iz dnevnika F Chueva(Moscow,1991),399. OtherevidencesuggeststhatEzhovfacedcriticism for
hishandling ofthemassoperations.In oneofhisnotebooks recording Politburo criticismofhisleadershipofthe
NKVD, thewords"massoperations" appeartwice,unfortunately without elaboration (RGASPI,f. 671,op. 1,d.
271).
89Thus,another telegram, "Supplementing Operational OrderNo. 447,"fromDeputyNKVD chiefFrinovskii,
warnedlocal police:"Sentencesofcondemned personscan be announced[tothem]onlyforthesecondcategory
[sentences to camp]. Do notannounce[deathsentences]of thefirstcategory[totheaccused]. I repeat,do not
announce"(Memorandum No. 247 oftheSecretariat, NarkomNKVD, TsA FSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.5,1.275).
90See,forexample,thebreakdowns forOmskin Samosudov,Bol'shoiterror, 160-61,241; and in Stepanov,
Rasstrelpolimitu, 51-55,71-74.
9'ThePolitburo hadauthorized persecution offamiliesofoppositionistsandof"enemiesofthepeople"convicted
byMilitary TribunalsandMilitary Collegia,butnotunderthekulakoperation ofOrderNo. 447. See Politburo
resolution"VoprosNKVD" of24 May 1937,RGASPI,f.17,op. 162,d. 21,1.45; and"Operativnyi prikazNo.486:
Ob operatsiipo repressirovaniiu zheni deteiizmennikov rodiny,"15August1937,TsAFSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.1,11.
224-35. Theseharshregulations weresoftened alreadyin 1938. See "Tsirkuliar NKVD SSSR No. 106:0 detiakh
repressirovannykh roditelei,"20 May 1938,ibid.,11.248; and"PrikazNKVD SSSR No.689: 0 poriadke arestazhen
izmennikov rodiny," 17 October1938,ibid.,11.258-59.
procuratoral sanctionforall alTests.93Morethana weekafterthat,Ezhov'ssuccessorBeria

was stillissuingdecreesto local NKVD officesto "immediately stopall massoperations"
and repeating thestrictures of the17 November1938 orderslimiting theNKVD to indi-
vidualarrests withprocuratorial sanction.94Fullysix monthsafterthat,USSR Procurator
Vyshinskii complained toStalinandMolotovthattheNKVD stillmadearrests withoutthat
sanction.95
FromthePolitburo's pointofview,thiswas certainly a blindterror.Like a psychotic
masskillerwhobeginsshootingin all directions, theStalinistcenterhad littleidea who
wouldbe killed.Itopenedfireon vaguetargets, givinglocalofficials licensetokillwhom-
evertheysaw fit. The oppositeof controlled, planned,directedfire,themassoperations
weremorelikeblindshooting intoa crowd.The Stalinist regimeresembled notso mucha
disciplined armyas a poorlytrainedandirregular forceofRed Cavalry,andtheaftermath
resembled thechaosofa battlefield, wherethecasualtiesboreonlyaccidentalresemblance
to theoriginally intended victimsbothinnumber andtype.
Itis tempting tosee themassoperations as partofa Stalinist
planforpopulation policy
or socialengineering on a vastscale. Goingbeyondthemodernist state'susualeffortsto
map,standardize, andenumerate societyinordertocontrolit,"authoritarian high-modern-
iststates,"to use JamesScott'sterminology, takethenextstepand use large-scale, con-
certedforcetoimpose"legibility, andcentralization
appropriation, ofcontrol."96 Seenthis
way,themassoperations wouldbe a deliberate "modernist" attempt tocultivate societyby
weedingoutorexcisingalienorinfected elements bykillingthemorremoving themperma-
nently fromthebodysocial. On theotherhand,as we haveseen,themassoperations were
unplanned, ad hocreactions toa perceived immediate politicalthreat.Ratherthana thought-
outpolicy,modernist or otherwise, theyrecalledinsteadtheCivil Warreflex:a violent
recoursetoterror-hostage-taking andmassshootings-inthefaceofan enemyoffensive.
Indeed,theyinterrupted theongoingpolicyofjudicialreengineering. Despitethedetailed
operational plan(whichwas,ofcourse,drawnup atthelastminuteandpromptly ignored),
9"Themass operations wereformally haltedon 17 November1938 by a jointorderof thePolitburoand the

CouncilofPeople'sCommissars, signedbyStalinandMolotov("O prokurature SSSR," Moskovskie novosti,21
June1992). Accompanying directives
restoredprocuratorialsanctionforall arrests
("Iz protokolaNo. 65 zasedaniia
PolitbiuroTsK VKP[b]: Postanovlenie SovetaNarodnykh KomissarovSSSR i Tsentral'nogo KomitetaVKP[b],"
RGASPI, f. 17,op. 3, d. 1003,11.85-87). The Politburodecisionhaltingall troikacases and "othersimplified
procedures" hadbeentakenin a 15 November1938secretresolution (ibid.,op. 162,d. 24,1.62).
94"Prikaz No. 762: 0 poriadkeosushchestvleniia postanovleniiaSNK SSSR I TsK VKP(b) ot 17 noiabria1938
goda,"26 November1938,TsA FSB, f. 100,op. 1,por.1,11.260-64.
95VyshinskiitoStalinandMolotov,21 May 1939,RGASPI,f.82,op. 2, d. 897,1.28.
96James C. Scott,SeeingLikea State:How CertainSchemesto ImprovetheHumanConditionHave Failed
(New Haven,1998). ScottdiscusssesStalinistcollectivization in theseterms, arguingthatitfailedbecauseas a
"centralizedhighmodernist solution"itcouldnotencompassthecomplexities andpeculiaritiesofagriculture and
thusfailedbothtoachievethestate'sgoal ofscientifically advancedfarming ortoputfoodon thetable(pp. 193-
222). Scottnotesthatothergoals suchas space exploration, transportation planning, floodcontrol,or aircraft
manufacturing weremoresusceptible tocentralized highmodernist treatments.Ontheotherhand,itis notatallclear
thattheseeffortsdifferedfromcollectivization in degreeofcomplexity. Collectivization was different
fromthem
as itwasimplemented
insofar bya quasimilitary andviolentcampaignthatproducedmorechaosthancentralization
intheend. Itmaybe thatefforts
orlegibility toachievestandardization,centralization,control,orconcerted national
aredoomedtofailureifimplemented
effort bytheirantithesis,a wildanduncontrollable militaryoffensivewhose
woundsandarbitrariness lastforever.
136 J.ArchGetty
themassoperationsweremorespasmthanpolicy,andtooimprecise
andlocallyarbitrary
in
theirtargets
toconstitute
centralized
socialengineering.
Wecanonlyspeculateabouttheultimate reasonsforthemassterror of 1937. Scholarshave

longthought thatit flowedfromStalin'sdesireto preemptanypossible"fifth column"
behindthelinesofthecomingwar.97Butas we havealso seen,fearthatopposition in the
countrysidewas reachingdangerous levelsalso playeda role,anditwas a purelydomestic
event(the1937electoralcampaign)thatsparkedtheterror. MuchofBolshevikpolicywas
governed bytheirfearsofopposition largeandsmall.98 Itis notdifficult
toimaginethattheir
paranoiacouldlead themto launchmassterror fromfearoflosingcontrolofthecountry-
side,as variousanti-Soviet elementsused theelectoralcampaignto organizethemselves,
spreadtheirviews,andspawndangerous rumors.Theforeign anddomestic explanations are
notmutually exclusive,and Stalinmaywell have seen thethreatening oppositionin the
countrysideas theseedsofwartime opposition.
We stilloftenreadthatStalinthought up hisplanswithno meaningful influence, con-
or
straint, pressure from anyone else. Proofs continuetobe adducedthathe was the origina-
torof everyimportant regimeinitiative.He alonedecidedwhatto do and did it,andthe
outcomewas as planned.Oneassumesthathiswisheswerealwaysrealizedand,hypnotized
bythestrident anduncompromising languageofhiscommands andthreats,we rarelystopto
wonderwhyitwas necessary tobe so threatening ortorepeatthethreats andcommands so
often.Even whentheoutcomesof his policiesweredramatically differentfromwhathe
ordered,we sometimes assumethiswas whathe wantedanywayandthedivergence is seen
as anotherexampleofhisexceedingcleverness ordeviousplanning.99 Writing history thus
becomeslittlemorethanchronicling hisplansandactions.Stalin'sterrorwasalmostincom-
prehensible in its scope and cruelty.But his policywas formulated and administered in
complicated waysand,likeotherpolicies,can be studiedwithout negatingthedictator's
roleorresponsibility.
Theevidencepresentedhere,althoughincomplete,suggeststwopossibleconclusions.First,
themass terror of 1937-38 wereunplannedand impromptu
operations reactionsto per-
ceivedimmediate policyonjudicialreform
problems.Derailingexisting andmodernization
thattheregimehad cultivatedsince1933,theyillustrate
theunpredictability
andincoher-
enceoftheStalinist
system.Unabletoplanortoefficiently carryoutanykindofoperation,
97SeeKhlevniuk, Politbiuro,
194-98;Isaac Deutscher,
Stalin.A PoliticalBiography (London,1968),373; and
JosephEdwardDavies,MissiontoMoscow(New York,1941). Molotovmadethispointinhisconversations with
FeliksChuev(ChuevandMolotov,Stosorokbesed,390,93,413-14). Bukharin also connected theterror"withthe
prewarsituation" (Istochnik,1993/0,23-25). Rumorsamongthosearrested in themassoperations includedthe
thoughtthatwarhadstarted andtheregimewas neutralizingsuspiciouselements (Stepanov, Rasstrel
po limitu,14).
Ontheotherhand,thefirst stepsweretakentostoptheterror
inautumn 1938,precisely whentheMunichconference,
theGermanoccupationof Czechoslovakia,and thePolishcrisisproducedthemostdirectsecurity threatto the
USSR.
"AfraidofTheirShadows."
98Getty,
99SeeG. T. Rittersporn,
"NewHorizons:Conceptualizing theSoviet1930s,"Kritika 2 (Spring2001): 309-10,for
a discussionofthispoint.
theStalinistsquicklyissueddetailedinstructions thatjustas quicklybecamemeaningless

in thechaos of thecampaign.100 This was an operationin whichcentraldirectives were
violatedor ignoredand whichleftlocal officialsin control.An anticipated four-month
operation againstescapedkulaksbecamea fifteen-month massacreofa widevariety oflo-
callyandrandomly identifiedtargets.The finalresultborealmostno relationto Stalin's
originaldirective,anddescriptions like"centralization" and"planning" seeminappropriate
tocharacterizesucha system.
Second,thegenesisanddevelopment oftheseoperations pointsto theimportance of
thestructureofthesystemtoan understanding ofevents.Theseterror campaignshadcon-
stituenciesbehindthemoutsideof Moscow thatsaw themas suitabletoolsof Bolshevik
administration.Thedocuments we nowhaveindicatea kindofdialecticalrelation between
Stalinandperipheral officialsin themassterror operations.It is clearthatto understand
thatsystemas a wholewe mustincludetheroleofregionalpoliticians which,in thiscase,
seemstohavebeenmorethansimpleobedienceorposingas moreroyalistthantheking.
Local authoritieshadtheirowninterests thatdidnotalwayscoincidewithMoscow's,and
therelationshipbetweencenterandperiphery is crucialtothefunctioning (anddysfunction)
ofthesystem.It seemsimportant "toexaminethedictatorship as wellas theDictator.""'0
Butheretoo,justas forStalin'ssubordinates, thespherein whichhe operatedplaced
constraintsonhischoices.He neededlocalofficials, evendisobedient ones,torepresent the
regimeandimplement itspoliciesoutin thecountry.He neededto givethemenoughau-
tonomy todo this,butwithout enoughleewaytoescapehisauthority ortogo outofcontrol
anddiscredit theregimeas a whole.102 Despitehiselevationtodivinestatus, hehadtolisten
to theirviewsandtaketheirneedsintoaccount.Stalininsistedon therightto endorseor
disapprovetheiractionsbutdealtwithinformation, structures,and eventsproducedand
oftencontrolled byothers.
Of course,at anypoint,Stalincouldanddidendthedialoguebydeploying weapons
suchas forcingpartydiscipline,organizing heuristicshowtrialsof unluckyofficialsas
lessonsto theothersor,in drasticcases,byremoving or arrestingsubordinate politicians.
Unabletosecurepreciseimplementation ofprecisedirectives, hecouldanddidterrorize the
administrators.Thistemporarily settledthecontest butcouldnotendthegame. As Moshe
Lewinobserved,"purges,howeverbloody,wereentirely uselessas a methodforchanging
bureaucracy's wayofbeing... physicalelimination ofofficialsdidnoteliminate thesociol-
ogyofthislayer." 103 Stalincouldkillofficeholders en masse,buthe couldnotdestroy the
autonomous partsof theirpoliticalspaces,because thesame elementsthatcreatedtheir
powerwereconstraints onhis:geographic distance, poorcommunications, low educational
levels,theimperatives ofeconomicadministration, andancientRussianofficeholding tradi-
tionsof avoidanceand blame-shifting playedimportant roles. Stalin'sown capriceand
'00For followedbychaosinanearliermassoperation
a similarexampleofdetailedinstructions see LynneViola,
"A Tale ofTwo Men: Bergavinov, TolmachevandtheBergavinovCommission," Europe-AsiaStudies52, no. 8
(2000).
'01IanKershaw, Hitler1889-1936:Hubris(NewYork,1998),xxviii.
'02SeeRittersporn,Stalinist forthisargument
Simplifications, indetail.
'03Moshe Lewin,"Bureaucracy State,"inStalinism
andtheStalinist inComparison,
andNazism:Dictatorships
ed. LewinandIan Kershaw(NewYork,1997),56,65.
138 J.ArchGetty
voluntarismwerereproducedeverywhere, plebeiandefi-
glorifying
andBolsheviktraditions
goodconspired
fora higher
ance,massaction,andrule-breaking outside
tocreatesituations
themodernization
thecenter'scontrolandtoprevent oftheSovietstate.

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"'PrikazNo. 762: 0 poriadkeosushchestvleniia

conspiracies,falsecharges,andmassexecutions.4 As such,thekulakoperation of 1937-38

accounting foran additional335,513sentences(including247,157executions).For space considerations, and

ofjudicialrelaxation andrelativeliberalism andfindsitsoriginsin Stalin'sgrowing fearof

8PaulHagenloh,"'SociallyHarmful Elements'andtheGreatTerror," inStalinism:NewDirections,286-308;

confirmed onlyweeksbefore.Although as a "massoperation" itresembled previouspolice

'2MerleFainsod,SmolenskUnderSovietRule(Cambridge, MA, 1958),450; 0. Khlevniuk, "Stalinismandthe

The "GreatPurges"wereinfullswingbythemiddleof 1937. Twomajorshowtrialswere

"The phrase"campaign justice"is fromSolomon,CriminalJustice,chap.3.

improvization beforeand duringtheoperation suggestbotha lack of short-term planning

Thesecomradesdo notunderstand thatthemethodofmass,disorderly arrests-if

I6"VoprosyOGPU," 10July1931,Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyiarkhivsotsial'no-politicheskoi

The day beforethe8 May 1933 decreewas published,thePolitburohad forbidden

Demandsformassexpulsionsfromthecountryside andfortheuse ofharshforms

Manylocal officials mayhavebeenat leastas quickto turnto repression as theirboss in

11"Otroikakh OGPU," 7 May 1933,ibid.,1. 16.

politicians,alwayswiththepopulation'sinterests at heart.24Nor do theyfittheheroic

24Lynne Viola,"The Campaignto EliminatetheKulakas a Class, Winter1929-1930:A Reevaluationofthe

deported thousands fromLeningrad accordingtosocialcategory. In 1935-36,policetroikas

3"SeeMartin, "TheOriginsofSovietEthnicCleansing,"848-49; andRGASPI,f.558,op. 2, d. 155,11.66-67.

it.") in whichtherewas "sharpcriticism" of massarrests.Ezhov complainedthatin the

37"DokladN. I. Ezhovaob itogakh PlenumaTsK VKP(b). Stenogramma aktivaGUGB NKVD SSSR,"

troubleandcouldevenescalateintopoliticalmovements. Bolshevikofficials werechroni-

1998); and Sheila Fitzpatrick,

The partyand stateleadersofeverymajorregionandrepublicweremembers ofthe

45Compare thepublished version("Stenograficheskii otchet," RGASPI,f.17,op.2, d. 612,vols.1 and2), which

struggle againsttheseelements."50 Another observedthat"kulakelements, priests,sonsof

saying]thereis no electorallaw.(Eikhe:Thisis pressure, MikhailIvanovich.)Kalinin:Of

later,in October,speakersat a CentralCommitteeplenumwouldrespondto Molotov's

63PlenumnTsK VKP(b) 11-12oktiabria 1937g.,stenogramma, RGASPI,f. 17,op. 2, d. 625,11.1-10,38,49,55,

I repeat,do notbegin." Frinovskii wenton to saythattheprecisedateforbeginning the

66"Memorandum No. 299,"TsAFSB, f.100,op. 1,por.5,1.273. Frinovskiireferredto"DirectiveNo. 266 ofthe

chiefsmayhavethought previously,Stalin'stelegram signalednewrepression andmanyof

The lackofclarityin thelimitapprovalprocessis one oftheimportant lacunaein our

theStalinnote"Za." Thiswas theformat fordraftscirculatedtoPolitburomembers fortheirvote,andfrequently

Formerkulaks 56.1 3009 1218 1791 40.4

Total 5362 2570 2792 47.9

Theseproportions executedareroughly comparable tothenationalaverage(50.4 per-

78CalculatedfromPolitburoprotocols(specialfolders):RGASPI,f. 17,op. 162,dd.21-23; TsAFSB, collection

continued shooting.80 Some regionalpartychiefswereenthusiastic aboutthemassopera-

80SeeManning, "Massovaiaoperatsiia,"239-41; andIlkevich,"Rasstrelianyv Viaz'me,"138.

contraryandarresting peoplesimplybecausetheywereformer partymembers orbecause

88Although theevidenceonthispointis onlysuggestive, Ezhovmayhavetransformed "limits"into"quotas"for

procuratoral sanctionforall alTests.93Morethana weekafterthat,Ezhov'ssuccessorBeria

9"Themass operations wereformally haltedon 17 November1938 by a jointorderof thePolitburoand the

Wecanonlyspeculateabouttheultimate reasonsforthemassterror of 1937. Scholarshave

theStalinistsquicklyissueddetailedinstructions thatjustas quicklybecamemeaningless

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