How Successful was Nixon in Obtaining Honourable Peace in Vietnam War.

Jurgis Kovas Candidate number 00098021 Vilnius Lyceum May 2006

Extended essay

Abstract This essay investigates Richard M. Nixon administrations policy towards Vietnam. What were measures taken to achieve the peace with honour in Vietnam War? How successful were methods employed? And how their success amounted to a conclusion of Vietnam War? This paper investigates these questions trying to answer to a more fundamental question: how successful was Nixon in reaching honourable peace. The essay focuses on the years when Richard M. Nixon was in office and U.S. was directly involved in Vietnam War: from 1969 to 1973. The investigation is developed by examining secondary sources of respected historians in the field as well as primary sources such as Nixon Kissinger memorandums, Paris peace treaty of 1973 and CIA reports on pacification. Each This essay concludes that Nixon, using variety of means, was able to reach at least in some way an honourable peace. Most of the measures proved to be efficient only in combination. Yet none of the measures employed were fully successful. That resulted in significant drawbacks Major Nixon success was in diplomatic field when he ensured that North Vietnam was pressed by both communist giants Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China - to make peace. The Peace settlement, reached at Paris in 1973, allowed extricating U.S. troops, returning of POWs and continuing assistance to South Vietnam. Word count 220

Table of contents

Introduction Situation before Nixon took office Body Measures for obtaining honourable peace Vietnamization program Pacification programs Invasion of Cambodia and Laos Extensive bombing throughout Indochina Suppression of opposition at home Diplomatic pressure to Soviet Union and People Republic of China Paris peace talks and peace agreement Conclusion Endnotes Bibliography

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Vietnam War is one of the most controversial entities in the history of United States., Vietnam, after the end of Second World War, was given the priority which rose as years passed by. At the beginning U.S. provided equipment and funds for French trying to reestablish colonial rule. When French were finally defeated at battle of Dien Bien Phu 1954, the future of Vietnam was decided at Geneva conference. Vietnam was partitioned by 17 th parallel and the universal election was to be held in summer, 1956. Emperor Bao Dai, a legitimate ruler of southern Vietnam according to Geneva agreements, was ousted by Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was backed by U.S. as a strict anti-communist. U.S. encouraged Diem to violate Geneva Accords and not to arrange general elections1. U.S. attitude to Vietnam can be accurately represented by words of Senator John F. Kennedy (1956): Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone in the arch, finger in the dike
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. Driven by Domino theory and views similar to Kennedys, Eisenhower administration

firmly committed the support by finance and military equipment to its South Vietnam ally. After initial success, Diems regime compromised itself. The reasons for it were as follows: violent confrontation with political opponents, unpopular agricultural policy, and discrimination of religious majority Buddhists, and sparked off insurgency in Southern Vietnam, which was mainly organized by NLF (National Liberation Front also referred as Viet Cong), communist dominated organization. To aid Diems regime against insurgency and to show American credibility, Kennedy administration devised strategy known as flexible response. It emphasised that U.S. must contain communism using measures

adequate to those employed by the enemy. Therefore the escalation of conflict by NLF or Viet Cong and North Vietnam must be countered by the escalation on American side, yet it should both prevent extreme escalation and humiliation3. This was the basic strategy until Nixon administration came to the White House.

In the light of past developments, Nixons goals in Vietnam differed. He won election by promising a mysterious way of obtaining an honourable peace in Vietnam 4. Indeed his administration put efforts to end the war and successfully negotiate a peace settlement which was achieved in 1973. The question, this essay tries to analyse, is how successful were the means employed by Nixon administration to reach conclusion in conflict; and how successful was the outcome of these measures of the peace settlement. Success is questionable - the peace agreement was signed in 1973, but did not last long. South Vietnam was overrun by North Vietnam Army and National Liberation Front forces by 1975. In order to understand the logic of Nixons policies, it is essential to know the situation in Vietnam when he took office. All parties of the conflict were recovering after the 1968 Tet offensive which had very serious consequences for all factions. It was complete military defeat for VC (Viet Cong) and PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam). NLF hopes that simultaneous attacks on almost all major cities 36 out of 44 district capitals - would spark off a popular revolution were in vain. Furthermore, U.S. and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Viet Nam) units were able to repel initial attacks in most locations. In areas, where initial attacks were successful, insurgents were unable to solidify their advantage, except for Hue, which lasted for three weeks. And at last VC and PAVN suffered tremendous losses somewhere about 40.000, yet it is a rough estimate, as the body count tended to be inflated 5. South Vietnam also suffered setbacks ARVN had to concentrate in the cities and to leave countryside unprotected, therefore pacification programs were hampered. Because of that military action inflicted damage to civilian population both by death and by the destruction of infrastructure. Yet the major effect was in U.S. itself. Johnson administration and military command had been boasting of success and seeing Light at the end of the tunnel 6. Media covered offensive extensively and public support for war effort dwindled as well as massive anti-war riots took place7. Awareness of public feelings and situation in Vietnam made

Johnson administration change policy towards Vietnam in summer, 1968. Additional troop reinforcement, asked by field commander general Westmoreland, were declined, and at the end of 1968 even bombing of North Vietnam was stopped with the goal to get peace talks on the move and calm down peace-feelers, showing that government was doing everything. To sum up Nixon took office when things in Vietnam were not good, yet it was calm period, with NLF bolstering their forces rather than acting, South Vietnam rebuilding and consolidating power in countryside. After prolonged discussions over proceedings, Paris peace talks had started, yet soon reached stalemate. Nixon administration conceived different views from Kennedy or Johnson on Vietnam, primary due to Henry Kissinger, Nixons national security adviser. He inherited an opinion that the balance of power was zero sum game - if one power gains then other losses. Yet very important was an overall sum, not victories or defeats in individual contests. For example, drawback such as stalemate in Vietnam could be compensated by a successful strategic arms limitation treaty 8. This rift in foreign policy opened up more options in Vietnam conflict. Firstly, it allowed more flexible diplomacy, as more concessions were possible. Secondly, it put Vietnam to a proper perspective, not as a show off point for the rest of the world but, as Kissinger said a small peninsula on a major continent. 9 These views, however, did not mean abandoning of South Vietnam. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger was eager of communist triumph in Vietnam. Nixon was especially concerned with Vietnam as he had promised honourable end of the war about which he admitted privately Ive come to a conclusion that there is no way to win the war 10. Primary prerequisite for honourable U.S. extrication from a conflict was socalled a Vietnamization program. It meant that ARVN must be strengthened and gradually take over all military operations in Vietnam. Vietnamization implied strengthening ARVN significantly by providing the equipment, training and increasing numbers. Total force of

ARVN in February 1969 was slightly over 850.000, and that number increased significantly by 1972 to over one million soldiers11. Vietnamization also meant the expanding of military training and organizing of local militia. Militia levels rose four times from one million in 1969 to estimated four million by 1970. Yet militia was usually poorly trained and rather represented an attempt to involve all levels of the population in the war effort, whatever their military value. 12 Sharp rises in quantity of armed forces of South Vietnam implied a lot of difficulties. First of all, training facilities were to be expanded to meet new recruits. This was managed on an acceptable level and a basic training was available, whereas the officer shortage was evident. It remained constant and became one of the bitterest problems of Vietnamization. ARVN was short of qualified commanding officers since its establishment and rise in quantity of army could not be met in equal quantity of officers. Furthermore, Vietnam army was corrupt and neither U.S. military advisors nor high-ranking Vietnamese officers disposed of unable officers. Even on the contrary, lack of officers and pressure of U.S. military command to fill in vacant positions encouraged a rapid promotion without sufficient training or experience. Another problem that plagued South Vietnam army was desertion. Its rates amounted for over than 120.000 soldiers13 annually and despite all the U.S. and South Vietnam efforts remained that high until the end of war. This was both an indication that discipline in ARVN was low and that high level of recruitment was required for constant maintenance of soldier numbers. High desertion rates undermined training capacities of South Vietnam. A good way to evaluate the success of Vietnamization program is to consider a challenge posed to it by PAVN/VC offensive in spring-summer, 1972. During this offensive PAVN units crossed the border, the demilitarized zone and with conventional warfare engaged ARVN units deployed by the DMZ. Initially offensive was an unquestionable success for PAVN. There are several reasons which explain a poor performance of ARVN. Firstly, units deployed near the front line lacked a combat experience

and the leadership was poor. Secondly, ARVN was trained primary for counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla warfare, not for resisting massive coordinated attacks with tank and heavy artillery support. Conventional warfare employed by PAVN made it dependant on ammunition and fuel supply. U.S. supported ARVN units by bombing re-supply routes both in South and North Vietnam. Utilizing air support ARVN was able to stop PAVN advance only 60 miles from Saigon. Casualties were large 100.000 for PAVN and 25.000 for ARVN14. Battles of 1972 summer and spring made the evident controversy of the Vietnamization program. Despite the enlargement and the rearmament of ARVN, it still needed U.S. support. On the other hand, ARVN could inflict severe casualties on their enemies and was a formidable force. To conclude, Nixon administration successfully implemented and supported Vietnamization. Furthermore, it is evident that for debility of ARVN was more blame to be put on Saigon than on Nixon administration. Another major ingredient of Nixons effort to end the war honourably was the pacification of Vietnam countryside. Various pacification programs have been underway since 1954, yet their success was limited. When Nixon took office CIA was directed to resume and enhance pacification efforts. Accelerated Pacification Campaign was started; central part of it was Phoenix program. Phoenix goal was to destroy VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) and reduce its support by population 15. Phoenix program was supposed to reach its goals by assassinating and imprisoning VC cadres. Furthermore, Phoenix program organized surveillance of suspected individuals and drawing up public lists of suspects. Another goal of Phoenix program was to incorporate civilian population in anti VC operations. It was done by offering cash rewards for information on VC or its supporters. Often Phoenix program was combined with military raids and routine checkpoints. Phoenix officials provided lists of individuals for arrest and ARVN acquired suspects. As Washington insisted on advance in pacification programs CIA established monthly quotas for arrests. The

evaluation of success of Phoenix is difficult. It struck VCI hard when the communists finally won in 1975, there were many villages that could no longer produce a Communist committee 16. On the other hand, it was often used by president Thieu to crush the political opposition. So, instead of pacifying, it alienated population to some extent. But Phoenix program was not only a mean, employed to pacify the countryside. U.S. and South Vietnam used both stick and carrot. Carrot was the policy of winning hearts and minds of Vietnamese population. Health care infrastructure, schools and roads were built in order to rally public support for Thieu regime. This part of pacification program is even harder to evaluate as public support for non-democratic Thieu regime rouse insignificantly during Nixons presidency17. Considering these facts Nixons success in pacification is only limited. It succeeded in crippling Viet Cong, but failed to create the support for South Vietnam government in countryside. And it was vital for the goal of U.S. which was strong and independent Vietnam and that would allow ending U.S. involvement and not loosing to communism. A solution was sought in such a way by Nixon. The situation in Indochina changed in March of 1970. Cambodian ruler Prince Sihanouk was over thrown by Prime Minister Lon Nol. Sihanouk preserved Cambodian neutrality towards the conflict in Vietnam, even when it was violated by VC/PAVN units, which established sanctuaries in border regions. Lon Nol was a pro-American. Despite U.S. formal denial of any participation in coup, Lon Nol was acknowledged by U.S. and given a military aid18. Soon afterwards, Nixon authorized the attack of PAVN base area in Cambodia by U.S. troops. This meant an invasion of sovereign country. But the time for such an action was ripe. U.S. could justify its actions as backing friendly government in Phnom Penh. Furthermore, it would be an important preventive manoeuvre, limiting PAVN offensive capabilities, which could buy some time for Vietnamization and pacification programs. In addition to this, Nixon was eager to press North Vietnam by all means and to show his

determination, and persuading Northern government to consider negotiations as a favourable option. On the other hand, incursion to Cambodia meant the escalation of the war. But Nixon was promised to deescalate and thus could have intensified anti-war protests. Nixons choice was illustrated by his words that administration was going to get unshirted hell for doing this at all; it might as well go for all the marbles 19. Cambodian invasion caused massive protests during which protesters were shot and killed at Kent State University. This raised more anti-government feelings in society. Furthermore, operations military success was disputable. Communists retreated to inner Cambodia sustaining casualties only up to 2000 troops; nevertheless U.S. claimed that sanctuaries were rendered unusable for some time. This limited success diminished as Hanoi did not made concessions at the negotiating table. On the contrary, North Vietnam began to supply Khmer Rouges movement. Khmer Rouge successfully fought against Lon Nols government. Thus U.S. Cambodian intervention had completely opposite influence in internal politics of Combodia than initially been intended. Putting everything into consideration, it is obvious that Cambodian intervention was a failure. Goals achieved were only temporary, and the situation after the incursion was even more complicated than before. Yet Nixon was ready for another similar venture in 1971. This time he authorized ARVN incursion into Laos with a mission similar to Cambodia. Its goal was to wipe-out sanctuaries and to destroy supply routes. Reasons for Nixons actions were similar as a year before - providing time for pacification and giving message to Hanoi that sanctuaries across the border of Vietnam were not off-limits as were under previous administrations. The invasion into Laos proved to be even less successful. PAVN concentrated large force estimated as large as 36.000, supported by Russian tanks. After month and a half of intense battles, ARVN had to retreat. It was a failure in a sense that ARVN had to retreat. Furthermore, American television showed ARVN soldiers desperately

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clinging onto departing helicopters

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, a view that undermined Nixons administration

credibility for a successful war effort and Vietnamization. Both efforts in engaging PAVN across borders of South Vietnam appeared to be futile. They brought Nixon no closer to an honourable peace and just stirred the anti war resistance, which aggravated policy making of Nixon. More than ever bombs were dropped in Indochina during Nixons presidency time. It was only logical to be that way. Nixons resort to heavy bombing of both South and North Vietnam came out because of the need to support the war effort while escaping large casualties on U.S. Large casualties would stir up the opposition as well as to confront administrations principle of Vietnamization. Bombing campaigns were not limited to Vietnam; they extended to Cambodia and Laos. At first there were only secret bombing campaigns of border regions. But after the coup and incursion into Cambodia, air strikes were publicised and expanded. The rationale for intensive bombing of Cambodia and Laos was double. First it was advocated by Joint Chiefs of Staff as a measure to reduce the ability of PAVN/VC to mount a large scale offensive. Secondly it was a mean of forcing Hanoi to accept U.S. peace terms. Both objectives were not achieved. The bombing did not force Hanoi into the submission nor did it prevent PAVN of mounting an offensive in spring of 1972. On the other hand, the heavy bombing can be attributed to some success. U.S. air strikes were unsurprisingly more effective than ever in the battles of 1972. PAVN was using more artillery and heavy armour and depended on the supply of fuel and ammunition. These requirements made a perfect target for one of the largest bombing campaigns in Vietnam War. Nixon urged a strong retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam The bastards have never been bombed like they are going to be bombed this time 21. The last bombing campaign took place before Christmas of 1972. It was mounted as well as previous bombings in order to help to reach conclusion at the peace negotiations. Furthermore, it weaken North Vietnam to

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the point that it would be unable to pose a serious threat to the independence of the South. Some success may be attributed to this campaign as the agreement was reached soon after. Nevertheless, the effect of it was hampered by on an international scene. Russia and China quickly condemned it. On the whole, Nixons ambition to reach the political advantage through an extensive bombing was, at best, partially successful. Despite the fact that it inflicted casualties to the enemy and caused a massive devastation, Hanoi was determined not to give up its goals. Nixon took office with the anti-war movement gaining its pace. In order to produce sound foreign policy, Nixon required unity at U.S. The President realized that the commitment in Vietnam could be ended honourably only with the support of nation. Nixon administration employed various means of silencing the opposition and gaining the support. First major effort to shore up his opposition came on the 3rd of November, 1969. Then President addressed nation and appealed for the support of great silent majority 22. The speech was successful and it was shown by polls 23. Yet another challenge came soon when Nixon authorised the invasion of Cambodia. Protests broke out and four protesters were killed by National Guard in Kent State University. Furthermore, this escalated even higher levels of violence in America. In addition to this, New York Times began the publication of Pentagon Papers, documents concerning Vietnam War decision making. The situation played into the hands of Hanoi, thus Nixon was desperate. Arrests of protesters followed, but Nixon was unable to stop the publication of Pentagon Papers. Then he set up a clandestine group called Plumbers. Their main objective was to plug future leaks of information and to discredit Ellsberg a Pentagon official who leaked Pentagon papers 23. Another way which President Nixon took to calm peace movement was highlighting that U.S. soldiers were coming home. Nixons policies in Vietnam were sharply challenged by public protests. Yet the President managed to retain the support of his actions by the end of 1972. Public poll

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reflected it because over 60 percent of population supported Christmas bombing campaign 25. Overall conclusion is that Nixon was successful in levelling public attitudes without serious damage to policy. Yet the opposition conveyed the message to Hanoi that the administration was under the pressure of time and imposed some restrictions on options available for favourable outcome of the war. Hanoi government was reluctant to make the peace agreement while the military victory was at hand and it was supported by both communist giants - U.S.S.R. and Peoples Republic of China. To undermine this position, Soviet Union was pressed by Kissinger to change its attitude towards Vietnam War. Nixon insisted that the solution of Vietnam question was crucial in U.S. U.S.S.R. relationship. As soon as Vietnam was out of the way and especially if Russians took understanding attitude, we would go further, - this Kissinger Dobrynins excerpt illustrates a firm push for Soviet Union to press Hanoi for peace. Soviets were interested in the economic cooperation with U.S. due to their own economical problems. Kissinger exploited the situation and made it clear that resolving Vietnam question is a prerequisite for cooperation. U.S. escalated bombing but Soviet Union did not cancel the presidential visit to Moscow. In addition to this, Soviet Union sent a diplomat to Hanoi urging a peace settlement. China was not willing to sacrifice dtente for North Vietnam as well. It also pressed Hanoi to make peace settlement by late 1971. Despite these diplomatic developments, economical aid to North Vietnam was not stopped. All in all, measures to use communist giants as some kind of mediators and assurances for good intent of U.S. was a successful action in obtaining an honourable peace in Vietnam. Peace negotiations, which had started in 1968, were continued under Nixons administration. Yet offers were passed by conflicting sides for most of the time as none of them favoured compromise on critical issues. Hanoi insisted that U.S. dispose of Thieu and United States were not yet willing to accept this. It could be claimed that negotiations had

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broken from stalemate only by 1972. Both sides made compromises. Kissinger was willing to offer similar peace terms before, but Hanoi was reluctant to participate in a serious negotiation. It would gladly pocket whatever offers came its way without letting affect its bargaining price
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Kissinger noted about Hanois negotiation position. Yet Le Duc Tho,

North Vietnam delegate, and Kissinger were able to devise peace settlement by October, 1972. Main points were that within 60 days of cease fire U.S. would withdraw its remaining troops, and Hanoi would simultaneously return American POWs. Political agreement and organization of election was left to National Council of Reconciliation and Concord, which would consist of government delegates, neutral delegates and delegates of PRG (Provisional Revolutionary Government- former NLF) 28. This settlement provided American extrication from Vietnam conflict. However, it certainly left Thieu compromised. Nixon was able to pursue Thieu to an agreement by providing one billion worth of military supplies and secretly assuring of assistance if peace settlement was broken by North Vietnam. During the discussion with Thieu, the situation changed and it must be attributed to primary presidential elections in U.S., where Nixon was well ahead of his opponent. Kissinger was confident of his position and raised new issues, while Led Duc Tho resisted and raised his own demands. After the inability to reach some kind of agreement, negotiations broke. Then followed Christmas bombings and Hanoi, fearing that re-elected president would continue the war effort in Indochina, considered that it would be able to get better proposals before the election. It was obvious that Hanoi foreign policy makers miscalculated and played into hands of Kissinger. Paris accords were signed on the 8th of January, 1973. The peace agreement, which was achieved, did not differ significantly from that of October. Yet it allowed both sides to emerge from satisfying negotiations. Without any doubt, to end Vietnam War honourably was a very dangerous quest that Nixon embarked on. An honourable peace was achieved in a sense that U.S. was

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able to negotiate a settlement which allowed extricating U.S. troops, returning of POWs and continuing assistance to South Vietnam. In order to achieve his goal, the President used a number of means. Only the combination of them allowed reaching the peace. Firstly, the offensive of 1972 was repelled only due to the combination of a success in Vietnamization and U.S. air support. Secondly, the mixture of domestic support for the President by late 1972, and political pressures from China and U.S.S.R. were accountable for a rapid compromise. Finally, North Vietnam resources were depleted. There was a joint influence of the pacification, bombing, Vietnamization and invasions to Laos and Cambodia. On the other hand, the peace which concluded Vietnam War era did not last. Hostilities broke out soon after American soldiers left Vietnam. Moreover, Nixon administration was unable to solve critical issues in Southern Vietnam and thus undermined the ability of Saigon to survive on an independent basis. At last, Nixon was unsuccessful in a sense, because U.S. strength and commitments could be questioned worldwide. The investigation into Nixons success raised questions on American commitments during Cold War and on the credibility of policy of flexible response. Word count 3924

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Endnotes

1- George C. Herring, Americas longest war; the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975, Newberry Award Records inc., 1979 (55) 2- Ibid (43) 3- John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment, Oxford University press, New York, 1982 (243) 4- Herring (221) 5- Ibid (191) 6- Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991 (255) 7- Jonathan Neale, The American War: Vietnam 1960-1975, Bookmarks Publication Ltd., London, 2001 (107) 8- Gaddis (275) 9- Ibid (277) 10- LaFeber(259) 11- Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr. The Development And Training Of The South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/devtrainrvn/ch4.htm/ (90) 12- Ibid (91) 13- Ibid (92) 14- Herring (249) 15- CIA, Internal Security in South Vietnam - Phoenix., 1970 http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/internal-security.pdf 16- Neale (99) 17- Ibid (98)

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18- Herring(234) 19- Ibid (235) 20- LaFeber (264) 21- Herring (247) 22- Neale (111) 23- Herring (230) 24- LaFeber (263) 25- Ibid (272) 26- Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger for the President, "Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin," 1 October 1969, enclosing memorandum of conversation between Dobrynin and Kissinger, 27 September 1969 http://www.gwu.edu/ %7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp04.pdf 27- Henry A.Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994 (690) 28- Herring (253)

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Bibliography

Warren H. Carroll, 70 Years of the Communist Revolution, Trinity Communications, 1989

CIA, Internal Security in South Vietnam - Phoenix., 1970 http://www.thememoryhole.org/phoenix/internal-security.pdf

Edward Doyle Samuel Lipsman , The Vietnam experience America takes over, by Edward Doyle Samuel Lipsman, Boston publishing company, Boston, 1982

Giedrius S.Drukteinis, Vietnamo karas, Vilnius, 1993

Dennis J.Duncanson, Government and revolution in Vietnam, Oxford University Press, 1986

Harriman, W. Averell, and Elie Abel, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half-Century of Personal Observation, Doubleday, New York, 1971

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment, Oxford University press, New York, 1982

George C. Herring, Americas longest war; the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975, Newberry Award Records inc., 1979

Michael Hunt, Crises in US. Foreign Policy: An International History Reader, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996

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Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History, Penguin, New York, 1983

Henry A.Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994

Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991

Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr. The Development And Training Of The South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/devtrainrvn/

Jonathan Neale, The American War: Vietnam 1960-1975, Bookmarks Publication Ltd., London, 2001

Neil Sheehan, The Pentagon papers based on investigative reporting by Sheehan Neil, Bantam book, 1971

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