Iran and the Middle East: Foreign Policy and Domestic Change Author(s): Fred Halliday Source: Middle

East Report, No. 220 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 42-47 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559410 . Accessed: 06/06/2011 14:21
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Iran

and

East

the

Foreign
Fred
Halliday

Policy

and

Domestic

Change

on Theviewsof Iran's "reformists" "conservatives" domesticpolicydo notmatchupneatlywithcomparable and divided.Noris Iranian bothtrendsare diverseand internally views on foreignpolicy, in partbecatuse foreign Iranis faced with not one, or two, but with determined Iraq,the Gulfor Israel-Palestine. by policy uniquely isolationat the handsof the UScontinuesto several interlocking regionalsecurityconcerns.Its international cast a longshadow.

in large measure, dependent on politics within that country, and on the slow and often interruptedprocess of post-revolutionarychange which Iran is undergoing two decades after the fall of the Shah. As has been widely reported over the past four years, politics in Iran has been dominated by events surrounding the rivalry of reformist and conservativeforces in both the overt, electoral field and in the more hidden world of factional maneuver.The high points of this process have been the election in 1997-and re-election in 2001-of PresidentMohammad Khatami, the parliamentaryelections of February2000 and the rise and contraction of a freer and more critical press. Nothing has been resolved in the post-revolutionary process. Many Iranians hold that the reform movement, sustained by a very powerful and countrywide desire for change, will prevailin the end. But the conservative forces have not gone away: they arewell entrenched in sections of the security forces, in the judiciaryand in the constitutional bodies overseeingthe parliament.The conservatives government and Majlis, Iran's

of of he external relations the Islamic Republic Iranare, are not of one mind: while Ayatollah Khamene'i, the spiri-

at He FredHallidayteaches theLondon School ofEconomics. is author ofThe World the and editor thismagazine. visited Institute He at 2000 (Palgrave), a contributing of in 2000. and Studies, Tehran, September ofPolitical International

tual leader,has remained adamantly opposed to normalization of relationswith the US, others favor a more pragmatic approach.For its part, the reformmovement itself is diverse, if not divided, and lacks the political and organizational ability to defeat the conservatives. The implications of domestic politics for foreign policytoward the West, Russia and the Middle East as a wholeare several. First, the views of factions on domestic policy do not match up neatly with comparable views on foreign policy. Most, if not all, of the domestic debate in Iran is about domestic issues: the rule of law, liberalizationand different interpretations of the 1980 constitution and of the Islamic tradition. There is a general wish to improve relations with the outside world, and change in Iran'sinternational relations is implicit in much of the domestic policy debate. Clearly, any improvement in Iran'seconomic relations involves improved relationswith the West and the international financial institutions, and this means a rapprochementwith the US. But internationalissues arenot so much on the minds of the population as are domestic questions. Second, there is no single center for the making of foreign policy in Iran. Within the government itself, the
2001 220 REPORT * FALL EAST MIDDLE REPORT ? FALL EAST 220 2001

42MIDDLE 42

National Security Council, at: tended by both president and '. A iS spiritualleader,but other bodies, ' including the security services,i iiii i: i::i ..... semi-independent foundations iiiiii i ! and the Majlis have their own; ;^! : ... ..... j priorities. The multiplicity of i iii : centers and vigorous depower ... . \ ...... r *.. .; bate among the factions means that foreign policy is not formu!i lated in one clear manner, as it would be in a dictatorial regime. Nor is implementation of foreign ;^:i policies alwaysclear.The Foreign Ministry is broadly aligned with Khatami's reformist approach, but it is under regularattackfrom sections of the press and the Majlis,and from elements around spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamene'i. On the other hand, elements of the more conservative camp, associatedwith former President Ali Akbar Hashemit and through him Rafsanjani, with the bazaarmerchants, favor. economic relations improved :ll with the outside world, but face opposition within the Majlis *. from reformists who want continued controls on foreign investment in the oil and gas industry, and a continued state role in the economy. Here again divergences within the conservative camp are relevant:those, particularlyAyatollah Khamene'i, who have a strong ideological commitment to the cause of Palestine, pay less
heed than the commercial sector
.

body is the top decision-making

to the need to normalizerelations i with the outside world. Most importantly, there is no : simple correlation between reformist views on the domestic si frontand more moderateviews on to the si- Iranianworker outside oil a a- L Tehran. APPHOTO/VAHID SALEMI foreignpolicy.Analogies repairspipeta refinery multaneous domestic and foreign policy reforms of Gorbachev's momentsof the revolution,includingthe do perestroika not apply to contemporaryIran. Whatever its the most radical of problems, the Iranianrevolution is not in a terminal condi- establishment statecontrolof the economy,the cultural in and the seizureof the US emtion, as the USSR was in the 1980s. The reformistcoalition revolution the university are On someeconomicissues,the reformists morereKhatami-the Second of Khordad Front-includes led by bassy. in As some people who areinfluenced by Westernliberalism,a cur- sistantto changethanthe conservatives. elsewhere the widehas rent much disparagedin Iran in the past but now more re- MiddleEast,the issueof "globalization" provoked But it also includes people who were associatedwith spreaddebatewithin Iran:therewas even a disputeabout spected.
EAST 220 2001 MIDDLE REPORT * FALL 220 2001 MIDDLE REPORT ? FALL EAST 43 43

how to translatethe word into Persian,those opposed favorand ingjahanigiri ("world-grabbing"), those less hostile prethe now prevalent term jahanishodan ferring Many of the criticismsmade of global("world-becoming"). ization are similar to those made elsewhere:that it is a hegemonic, imperialisttrend, and a continuation of colonialism. Those with interestsin the state sector of the economy, and the wider network of the elite who have access to oil rent for business purposes, are nervous about liberalization of the economy. Others stress the opportunities for Iran, and the strengths that Iran, with its mineral wealth, population and historic culture, has within the global system.

is logue of civilizations" aiqalternativeto the "clashof civilizations" and demagogic Islamic rhetoric about the West. It is also a statist project, designed to block the intrusion into areas of sovereign authority of universal criteria like human of rights,and of representatives an independent, criticaltrend within Iran itself.

IsTime Iran's on Side?

Two other opinions on foreign policy cut acrossthe internal factional divides in Iran. The first is a curious lack of urgency in the debate about international relations, particularly relations with the US. Despite much rhetoric, there is a sense that, whateverthe problemsit faces, the world should come to Iran rather than the other way around. Time is on Khatami has made some clear innovations in foreign policy. Iran'sside, as the thinking goes. If the oil and gas deals are He has built on his own long-standing ties with SaudiArabia not done, the world energy market will rebound. If relaand the Shi'ite community in Lebations with the US are not restoredfor non to improve Iran'srelations with a the time being, Washingtonwill in the number of Arab states. He has made end come to its senses. The repeated

of "Dialogue Civilizations"

statevisits to a numberof developed

countries-France, Italy, Germany talked of the US in a more conciliatory manner. He has also, in line with

andJapan, not Britain. has but He

his philosophic whichengage writings

Id raging aroun ithas

support

In none of t he conflicts insistenceby Iranianofficialson the need for the US to apologize for the
p oie

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creatively with Western political thought, espoused a view of greater openness towards the non-Islamic world, epitomized in his call for a "dialogueof civilizations," a call taken up at the official level by the UN in 2001-02. Yet whereas Khatami has clearly been engaged in rivalry with domestic factions over freedom of the pressand reform of the judiciary, in external relations his views are not so open. He has not advocated a substantive dialogue with the US government; he is not Mao waiting to greet Nixon in conditions for improved Beijing in 1972. He reiteratesIran's relations:restitution of military debts dating from the time of the Shah, calculated by Iran at $6 billion, a lifting of US tradeand investmentsanctionsand US recognitionof wrongs done to Iran in the past, through support for the Shah up to 1979 and backing for the Iraqi war against Iran between 1980 and 1988. On defense policy-something the US and many states in the Middle East watch carefully-Khatami has supported a strong line. Khatamibacksthe programIran probably has for weapons of mass destruction. The "dialogueof civilizations" itself indicatescertainlimits beyond which this dialogue should not go: the very framework of "civilizations" an implicit rejectionof debate based is on universalstandards,such as UN human rights covenants. It is clear that the participantsin "dialogue" to be repreare sentativesof states, not civil society: neither Amnesty International, to which Khatami is very opposed, nor of representatives the independent pressor social movements within Iran. These limits are tied to a resistance,shared by reformersand their opponents, to Oanydiscussion of human rightsviolations in the earlyyearsof the revolution.The "dia44

"Islamic"

as in of "dialogue theh0obvious Khatamihas,called his a more open e v u us 0 for civilizations," to the West, c indidate. attitudecertainforms ofand has condemned violence, but
hC
-

Iran

past reflects this approach. President

this is offset by the continued insistence on Iran's moral superiority within the international system. If the former Soviet republics in Central Asia are falling under the influence of the West, and its proxy Turkey,they will sooner or later come back to the state that was hegemonic in the region long before Americans, Russians or even Turkswere in the picture. In modern times, Iranian leaders have often thought they had more time than they had: Reza Khan before being deposed by the British and the Russians in 1941, Mosaddeq before being deposed by the British and the Americans in 1953, the Shah before the 1979 revolution, Khomeini when Iraqwas on the defensive in 1982. The Islamic regime is not in imminent danger, but it is losing opportunities and paying a long-term price by postponing major decisions on foreign policy. The postponement is, of course, made easier by factional disagreementsand higher oil prices. The second, widely shared outlook is an increasedstress on Iraniannationalism.Throughout modern Iranianhistory, nationalismhas been a very powerfulforce, whether directed at Britainand the US or at Russia.This was true of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and of the movement against foreigncontrolof oil led by PrimeMinisterMosaddeqin 195153. The Islamistmovement that gatheredforce in the 1970s appeared to denounce secular nationalism, repudiate Mosaddeq and attribute the divisive impact of nationalism among Muslim nations to imperialism.Khomeini famously said that "nationalism slapped Islam in the face."But nahas tionalist themes-against foreign intervention and the domestic clients of imperialism-were always present in the
2001 220 EAST MIDDLE REPORT * FALL MIDDLE REPORT ? FALL EAST 220 2001

revolution.The warwith IraqreinvigoratedIraniannationalism. When it started, the media began playing nationalist music from the time of the Shah. With the waning of the belief in an internationalIslamicrevolution,the Iranianstate, like its earlier has post-revolutionary counterparts, turnedmore and more to emphasis on Iran as a nation. Quotes from Khomeini using the term in mellat-ibozorg (this greatnation) are painted on the walls of Tehran, and repeated by today's politicians. Nationalism has at least three consequences for foreign policy: a widespread sense of the need to resist US whetherdirector throughglobalization,recognition pressure, of the need to build up Iran's national securitypotential and a sense of disdain, sometimes borderingon arrogance, other for peoples of the region-Arab, Turkishand, above all, Afghan and Pakistani.During the confrontation with the Talibanin 1998, AyatollahKhamene'idenounced the Afghanmovement asjuhul, a Qur'anic term meaning "ignorant."On other occasions he has stated that Persian,not Arabic, is the "true" languageof Islam.

Eastward Looking
Regional and Western analyses of Iranianforeign policy often mistakenly see it as determined by one particularissue: Iraq, the Gulf or Israel-Palestine.Iran is faced with not one, or two, but with severalinterlocking regional security concerns. To the southeast lies Pakistan, a nuclear power since 1998, and one with regionalaspirations,in Afghanistan and in Central Asia, that conflict with those of Iran. Disparagement of Pakistan, as a corrupt, unstable, historically proAmerican and basically artificial nation-state, has become much more common in Iran in recent years. Iran has tried to work with various Pakistani regimes, but does not trust them and pays scant heed to any Pakistani use of the "Islamic" dimension to explain its actions. Khomeini used to referto the Pakistan-backed in guerrillas Afghanistanas islami amrikai (AmericanIslam). As a result of its concerns about Pakistan, Iran has developed a substantial alliance with India. There is considerable trade between the two, and India will import Iraniangas in large quantities. Notwithstanding the apparent expectations of Islamic solidarity, Iran has refused to become involved in the Kashmir issue. The point of greatestIranian-Pakistani conflict is Afghanistan. Iran bearsa particularlyheavy burden as a result of the ongoing Afghan war, with over 2 million Afghan refugees based on its territory.Becauseof concerns about intelligence operativesusing refugeeassistanceas a cover,it has not sought assistancefor the Afghans from the UNHCR. It also faces a daily low-level conflict on its Afghan frontier because of attempts to export drugs into Iran: several hundred Iranian securitypersonnelhavedied along the frontierin recentyears. The rivalry that existed between Iran and Pakistan during the war against the USSR and the communist Afghan regime has become much more acute since the rise of the Taliban in 1994. Iran recognized, and continues to support, the government of Rabbani, whom the Taliban ousted from Kabul in 1996. Although the northern coalition now conMIDDLE REPORT *" 2001 EAST 220 FALL

trols only around five percent of Afghan territory,Iran and Russia continue to supply arms to it, while Pakistan backs the Taliban. The Taliban are militant Sunnis who have terrorizedthe Shi'ite partsofAfghanistan. Iranhas been greatly angered by the massacres committed against Shi'ites and speakersof Tajik, a form of Persian, in the northern plains and in the Hazarajatregion. The high point of conflict came in the summer of 1998 when severalIraniandiplomats were murdered by the Taliban when the latter took the northern capital of Mazar-i Sharif.Amidst great popular indignation in Iran, many called for an Iranianinvasion of Afghanistan (something permitted, in international law, under the 1857 Treaty of Paris). Perhaps the most difficult decision taken by the Iranian leadership in foreign policy in recent years was to refrain from retaliating against the Taliban at that time. (Any invasion, even one designed only for punitive purposes, would have been militarily difficult, and would have aroused widespread opposition in Pakistanand in the Sunni world as a whole.) Since 1998 tensions have eased somewhat, and there is now some cross-bordertradearound Herat. But the two radicalIslamic regimes remain in overall conflict, fueling the distrust between Iran and Pakistan.

Northward Looking
To the north lies the formerSoviet Union, scene of the greatest change in Iran's externalenvironmentsince the revolution of 1979. At the end of 1991, Iranfound itselfwith three new and neighbors in the Transcaucasus five in CentralAsia. Initial hopes that they would turn to Iranas an ally and mentor, on grounds of Islamic solidarity and history, proved unfounded. Ironically,the only formerSoviet republicto form a close alliancewith Iranis Armenia,a Christiancountrywhich shares a frontier with Iran and needed a counterpoint to alliancewith Turkey.As with Kashmir,strategic Azerbaijan's Within a few interesttook precedenceover Islamicsolidarity. of the collapseof the USSR, Iranhad given up hopes of years forming alliances with the Central Asian states, preferring insteadwhat one Iranian experttermedsiasat-idast-igol (policy airof the bunch of flowers):whoever turned up at Tehran's on an official visit would be welcomed. All of this is port made more difficult becausethroughout the region Iran's opponents-the US and, in a junior role,Turkey-are active in trying to counter Iranianinfluence. This applies particularly to US effortsto preventthe Asian republicsfrom helping Iran breakout of its economic isolation. After the initial uncertaintiesaccompanying the collapse of the USSR, Iran has tried to engage with these states at three levels. First, it has sought economic ties, a policy limited by US trade and investment restrictions. Nonetheless, Iran has, for example, built rail and gas pipeline links with Turkmenistan. Second, Iran has tried to keep out of, and help to mediate, the ethnic and other conflicts in NagornoKarabakh,Chechnya and Tajikistanthat have blown up in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. In none of these conflicts has Iran supported the obvious "Islamic"candidate. Indeed, Iran has shown concern to limit the spread of con45

45

flict, not only because of the implications of such disputes for its own multi-ethnic society, but also because it fearsfor the long-term stability of Russia itself. While neither Moscow nor Tehran entertain great illusions about each other, cooperation on defense, strategic and economic issues is a shared interest. Iran'sbig hope rests on a resolution of the complex problems surrounding the Caspian Sea. Not only do US sanctions prevent the oil and gas pipelines of Kazakhstanand Azerbaijan from running along the geographically natural route, through Iran to the Indian Ocean, but Iranhas found itself in dispute with the other four Caspian littoral states (Azerbaijan,Russia, Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan) over jurisdiction in the sea itself. Iran insists the Caspian is a lake, not a sea; hence its resourcesshould be sharedequally among all the states. Russia used to support this position, but has recently shifted to the "sea" position, by which each country would have its own zone of exploration. Iran, whose offshore watersare believed not to be rich in oil and gas, would lose access to the resources that lie nearer other states. For Iran,the Caspianis of immense economic, strategicand symbolic importance. Inclusion would give Iran a stake in this region, and symbolize its acceptance by the West and the regional states. Exclusion is seen as an ongoing result of US enmity and denial of Iran'sjust and historical place in the region. For US-Iranian relations, the Caspian Sea is among the issues of greatestimportance and continued US support for Azerbaijanis all the more enraging in the light of conflicts between Iranian naval forces and Azerbaijanover oil exploration in disputed territorialwaters.

in the long run, to change the regime. This has more or less been the case since August 1990, and Iran was careful to resist very direct overtures from Saddam to join him in a common war at that time. But this could change over time, especially if US pressure on Iran, through ILSA and other means, continues. The Iranian fear is that, as in the 1980s, the West-and particularlythe US-may decide that Iraq is a preferableally to Iran.Already Iran finds itself under an oil export ban imposed by the US, while Baghdad is the fifth largest exporter to the US. Hence Iranhas pursuedimprovedrelationswith the Arab world. Khomeini refused to use the term "Saudi Arabia," referringto it as "theso-called Kingdom ofNajd and Hijaz," but there has been a significant improvement in relations with Riyadh. Diplomatic ties with Egypt and Algeria, hitherto denounced as secularistoppressors,have been renewed. Yet there are limits, on both sides, to this realignment.The Saudis remain concerned about Iran'slong-term intentions, and the rise within the Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia, of a Sunni fundamentalist salafi movement has brought anti-Shi'ite sentiments to the fore. There is considerable sympathy in the Peninsula for the Taliban and for Osama bin Laden, all of which feeds into not only antiAmerican but also anti-Iranianfeeling.

TheQuestion Palestine of
On top of all these concerns lies the Palestine question-a major,but not the only or predominant, concern of Iranian foreign policy. The Islamic republic has a record of strong rhetorical, and some material, support for the Palestinian cause, and for factions opposed to the Oslo accordsof 1993, which are seen as another sellout by secularnationalists. An initial alliance with the PLO fell afoul of the Iran-Iraqwar when Arafat sided with Saddam. Iran'smain influence on the Arab-Israeliconflict is through Syria and in Lebanon, where Iran has since 1982 acted as a supporterof Hizballah. Iran saw the ejection of Israel from southern Lebanon in July 2000 as a great victory for its strategy. Iran'sother main concern is to use its support for the Palestinians,and for the second intifada, for political mobilization, within Iran and within the Middle East and the Islamic world as a whole. Yet here clear differences emerge which, for once, do run along more or less the same lines as on domestic politics. Not surprisingly,the conservativesin the Majlis and around spiritual leader Khamene'i have pushed for the most militant line on Palestine, refusing to accept any compromise with Israel. In April 2001, against the wishes of the Foreign Ministry and the reformists, they organised a major conference in Tehran on the intifada. Those sections of the security forces who oppose reform at home and compromise abroad-who have carriedout violent actions in the Middle East and assassinationsof Iranian opposition politicians in Europe-calculate, rightly, that support for a militant policy on Palestine will weaken any possible dialogue with the West as a whole. Iraniandiplomats, when asked about Iran's policy on Pal2001 220 EAST MIDDLE REPORT .? FALL MIDDLE REPORT EAST 220 FALL 2001

Gulfward Looking
To the west and south, Iran faces the Gulf. Iran is the most populous state in the Gulf. The revolutionary regime promoted revolution in neighboring states, but very soon after it came to power insisted that the Gulf be termed the "Persian Gulf" as the Shah had done. The biggest challenge was, and remains,Iraq,with whom Iranfought an eight-yearwar, losing over 100,000 dead. Two decades after the Iraqiattack on Iran, Tehran remains nervous about the Iraqi regime, which is now more confident and prosperous than at any time since 1980. The twin objects of US dual containment alwaysjudged it wiser to portraythe other as the real enemy of international stability rather than to band together, and each continues to support opposition groups committed to the overthrow of the other's regime. Iranian pilgrims and traders now visit Baghdad and Shi'ite shrines in Iraq, but the rhetorical war continues: in recent months, Saddam Hussein has stepped up propaganda about Iran as the enemy of Iraq. Iran knows that, in the longer run, a revived Iraq may turn on it again, as it did in 1980. Because Iran has tried harderthan any other regime, Arab or Western, to overthrowthe Ba'thistregime, it does not underestimatethe difficulties involved. It would not associate itself with Western pressure,via sanctions, but there is a broad convergence of Iranian and Western policy to keep Iraq contained and,
46

estine, argue that Iran'swords should not be confused with its actions, and that Iran would, in the end, accept a peace agreement that was acceptable to the Palestinians. But unless and until there is such a peace, Palestine, like the seizure of the US embassy in 1979, or the denunciation of Salman Rushdie in 1989, will serve as one of those symbolic issues around which to mobilize international Islamic radicalism and isolate domestic reformersand moderates.

Social Science Research Council

International Collaboration Research Grants:

State" Under Review "Rogue

All of these regional concerns feed into the broaderstrategic context, that of relationswith the West and the US. The Iranian state is now awarethat in its earlyyearsof power it paid a high price for its repressionat home, and also for its export of revolutionto other states.In private,officialsrecognizetwo largemistakes:the seizureand occupation of the US embassy in November 1979, and the failureto make peace, on favorable terms, with Iraq in July 1982. The US embassy compound in Tehranis still used by the revolutionaryguards,its wall coveredwith anti-imperialistposters.Yet henceforward, the officials imply, interestwill prevailover ideology. But time may not be on the Iranianside. Regionally, developments in Afghanistan, Iraqand Palestine all pose challenges to Iran that are difficult to ignore. Most importantly, the advent of the Bush administration to office held out the prospect of serious improvement in relations with the US. Bush ordered a review of US policy on Iran-recommending that the Iran-LibyaSanctions Act be renewed for two years instead of five-but current signs point in the opposite direction. Despite the voices calling for dialogue with Tehran, there is a strong lobby in the US-particularly in Congress-against thawing relationswith Iran.Israelis pressing for a hard line on Iran, in light of Iran'sPalestine policy and its development of intermediate-rangemissiles. On July 19, the US delegation blocked Iran'sapplication to join the World Trade Organization. More to the point, Bush needs an enemy to justify his national missile defence (NMD) program. While the real enemies are Russia and China, as everyone knows, the formal justification for NMD is that smaller "roguestates," such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran, may try to attack the US. North Koreaand Iraqare implausible "roguestates"under presentcircumstances,which leaves Iran. Deployment of sea-based anti-ballistic missiles could take place in the Gulf by 2003. If Bush needs a threat, he is likely to find it, and possiblypromote it, in Tehran.US policy is, of course, a result of conflicting pressures:the oil and gas supermajors,with an eye to the overall strategic picture in west Asia, want improved relationswith Iran. But, especially in the context of developments in Palestine,Congressis resolutely anti-Iranian, as its renewal of ILSA for five years in August demonstrated. The consensus emerging within US security and foreign policy circles seems to be that there is no benefit in working to improve relations with Iran, and, indeed, that it may be better to wait for the conservativesto get the upper hand again. The omens are not that good. U The Great Satan, it would seem, never sleeps.
MIDDLE REPORT * FALL 2001 220 ? EAST

Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in the Middle East and North Africa

Middle East & North Africa (MENA) Program of the SSRC is launching a research grants program to encourage international collaborative research focusing on the MENA region, which is defined as stretching from Iran to Morocco. We invite proposals that bring together researchers in different locations to address issues related to the changing nature of public spheres in the region. The notion of "public spheres" is used in its broadest sense, encompassing the transformation of socio-economic conditions, state and non-state structures, individual and collective identities and cultural production. The research grants awarded will be for a maximum amount of $35,000 and for a maximum period of 18 months.The competition is open to PhD holders of any nationality or discipline. The deadline for preliminary proposals is The

October 15, 2001.

For further information and guidelines contact: MENA Program Phone: (212) 377-2700, ext. 441 Fax: (212) 377-2727 E-Mail: mena@ssrc.org URL: http://www.ssrc.org/mena

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