Title 9 - Liberty and Security

Title Nine CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY Chapter One.
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY Section One Article 267. detention Article 268. Article 269. Illegal Detention Kidnapping and serious illegal
Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets
Slight illegal Detention Unlawful arrest
Article 267. Kidnapping illegal detention Elements: 1. 2. 3. 4.
and
serious
Section Two Kidnapping of Minors Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home Section Three Article 272. Article 273. Article 274. Slavery and servitude Slavery Exploitation of Child Labor Service rendered under compulsion
in
Offender is a private individual; He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: a. The kidnapping lasts for more than 3 days; b. It is committed simulating public authority; c. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the offender is a public officer, the crime is arbitrary detention. The public officer must have a duty under the law to detain a person to be liable for arbitrary detention. If he has no such duty, and he detains a person, he is liable under this article. When the victim is a minor and the accused is one of the parents, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 300 pesos or both (Article 271, par. 2)
payment of debt
Chapter Two CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY Section One Abandonment of helpless persons and exploitation of minors Article 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of ones own victim Article 276. Abandoning a minor Article 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of parents Article 278. Exploitation of minors Article 279. Additional penalties for other offenses Section Two Trespass to dwelling Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling Article 281. Other forms of trespass Section Three Threats and Coercion Article 282. Grave threats Article 283. Light threats Article 284. Bond for good behavior Article 285. Other light threats Article 286. Grave coercions Article 287. Light coercions Article 288. Other similar coercions (compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of wages by means of tokens) Article 289. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through violence or threats Chapter Three DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS of Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure
The essential element of kidnapping is the deprivation of the offended partys liberty under any of the four instances enumerated. But when the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, it is not necessary that one or any of circumstances enumerated be present.
correspondence Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office
When the kidnapping is done for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, actual demand for ransom is not necessary, as long as it can be proven that the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom. C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 94
It is essential in the crime of illegal detention that there be actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party.
HELD: The crime is kidnapping because the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her liberty, notwithstanding the fact that the accused only wanted the victim to produce her. People vs. Del Socorro Del Socorro grabbed a little girl and brought the child to a doctor, asking for 700 pesos in return. The doctor gave the child to her spinster aunt. HELD: The defense that the child voluntarily went with the accused is belied by the fact that the child openly resisted the abduction and even had to be carried to the jeep. People vs. Lim Lim took in two young girls who were loitering in front of her sari-sari store. Lim sent the younger girl to Cebu while the older girl stayed in the store. Days later, the girls father arrived to bring the two girls back with him. HELD: There is no kidnapping in this case because the two minors voluntarily entered Lims residence and there was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. Both girls were free to go in and out of the store. People vs. Padica A 14-year old boy was brought to a sugarcane plantation, where he was shot and killed immediately. The accused demanded ransom soon after. HELD: Where the evident purpose of taking the victim was to kill him, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latters purpose was to actually detain or deprive the victim of his liberty, the subsequent killing of the victim did not constitute the crime of murder. The demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no deprivation of liberty was involved. People vs. Luartes Luartes kidnapped a 3-yr old girl outside Isettan Recto. The girl was in the mall with her mother, who lost her. Luartes defense was that he was merely helping the lost girl find her mother. He says he had no intention of kidnapping Junichi and that the prosecution witnesses (police officers) merely misconstrued his actuations. HELD: If indeed accused-appellant was trying to help the lost child, why then did he misrepresent himself as her uncle? And, if his intention was only to help the child look for her mother, why did he have to board a passenger jeepney taking the child with him? The essence of kidnapping under Art. 267 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. The crime in this case clearly comes under par. 4 of Art. 267 of the Penal Code. The detention was committed by Luartes who was a private individual and the person kidnapped was a three (3)-year old minor.
Not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure, as long as he is deprived, in any manner, of his liberty. Detention is illegal when not ordered by competent authority or not permitted by law. Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping with murder when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty (death) shall be imposed. Where the victim is taken from one place to another solely for the purpose of killing him, the crime committed is murder.
Maximum penalty is imposed in the ff. cases: o If the purpose of detention is to extort ransom o When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention o When the victim is raped o When the victim is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Conspiracy to extort ransom makes all the conspirators liable under this article, including those who did not take part in the money.
Illegal detention Committed by a private individual, who unlawfully deprives a person of his liberty Crime against personal liberty Arbitrary detention Committed by a public officer or employee, who detains a person without legal ground Crime against the fundamental laws of the state
People vs. Tomio A Japanese national named Tomio was arrested after being implicated for possessing marijuana. Two other Japanese claimed that they paid money for Tomios release and so they held Tomio under their custody, asking for the amount they allegedly advance to the police. HELD: Even if the two accused only wanted to recover the money they allegedly advanced to the police, the crime is still kidnapping because of the essential element of deprivation of liberty. People vs. Mercado The accused held a knife against his girlfriends sister for nearly five hours. The victims ordeal ended only after the barangay captain was able to subdue the accused.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 95
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of a crime. People vs. Pavillare Pavillare was convicted of kidnapping an Indian national and sentenced to death. He argues that he should have been convicted of simple robbery only and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves that their prime motive was to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours. HELD: The pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of the charges for rape is not supported by the evidence. The accused released the complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money, he and his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant. The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material. People vs. Ballenas Accused Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma and Consorcia inside their home. Accused told Wilma to accompany him to Maria his girlfriend. Wilma refused, as they were about to eat supper. Consorcia also told her daughter, Wilma not to go out because it was already dark. Accused Ballenas forced Wilma to go out with him. Because of the abduction, Consorcia sought the help of a neighbor, Andres but to no avail, as Andres shut the door on her for fear of Ballenas as the latter is known as a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the NPA. The following morning, Consorcia reported the abduction of Wilma to her son-in-law who is a member of the Integrated National Police. She learned from Aurelio that Wilma was already dead. The police then proceeded to the scene of the incident. Ballenas was found guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced to Reclusion perpetua. HELD: BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20, 1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that took effect on December 31, 1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion perpetua to death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged in the information and proven in court, should have warranted the imposition of the death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA 7659, the trial court correctly ruled that the penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS is reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty herein of reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied regardless of any mitigating or People v. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003) FACTS: Businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Rejuso, Tormis, and Cinco to meet with Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly being sold by the latter. During the meeting Macapagal told them that someone in his family has just died and that he has to pick up an elder brother in hence, they had better transact business in the afternoon. In the afternoon, Alexanders group and Macapagal, with Teddy and Oteng both surnamed Silongan, traveled to fetch Macapagals brother. Afterwards, the group returned to Isulan on Macapagals orders. At Isulan, Macapagal gave additional instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the funeral arrangements for his relative were not yet finished. When the group finally got on their way, Macapagal who was earlier busy talking over his hand-held radio with someone in the Maguindanaoan dialect ordered the driver to drive slowly towards the highway. Oteng and his bodyguards alighted somewhere long the way. As they neared the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his 3 companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. The 4 were taken to a mountain hideout. After much haggling twelve million pesos was demanded from Alexander for his release, They made Alexander write a letter to his wife to pay the ransom which was hand-carried by a certain Jafar, alias Dante, and two of the victims, Tormis and Cinco, who both later managed to escape. No ransom was obtained so other persons were sent and one of the victims, Rejuso to renegotiate with Alexanders wife. No agreement was likewise reached. Seven days later, Alexander and Rejuso were transferred to the town proper and was guarded them by several men. When the kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they returned to the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks. At one time, Alexander Saldaa was made to stay at a river hideout where a certain Commander Kugta held him and sheltered his abductors for at least a week. There, Alexander saw Macapagal with Manap and other armed men. These men brought Alexander to different places and was made to write more letters to his family. All in all appellant was detained for a total of 6 months. Saldaa was later released to the military in exchange for a relative of one of the abductors who was caught delivering a ransom note to Alexanders family. HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary. There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abducted Alexander Saldaa
and his companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their freedom. That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only Alexander was left to be guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from being rescued by the military establish that they acted in concert in executing their common criminal design. People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335 (2000) FACTS: Mendoza was in her house when accused Cortez, Callos and Betonio, all armed with bolos, arrived. They were looking for Lolita's cousin, Esminda, and were threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos, they decided to abduct Lolita to prevent her from reporting the incident to the police. Accompanied by the other two, accused Callos pointed his bolo at Lolita's back and dragged her to the mountain. They brought her to the house of Torral, an uncle of accused Cortez, where Cortez bound her hand with a belts and thereafter continued their search for Santos. Hours later, PO2 Santos and barangay captain Colarina rescued found Lolita outside the nipa hut of the Torrals, conversing with Pablo Torral. Lolita told them that the Torrals did not prevent her from leaving their house. However, she did not attempt to escape for fear that the accused would make good their threat to kill her. Appellants allege failure to establish one of the essential elements of the crime, i.e., deprivation of the victim's liberty. They point out that at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically confined inside the house as they found her standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress that Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leaving the house. HELD: For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable proof. However, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by evidence. When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept her in the house of the Torrals. Cortez even bound her hands with a belt. Although at the time of the rescue, she was found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the appellants knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has been known to render people immobile. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence which is one of the elements of the crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002) FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did not have the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could
take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicoles grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force. The next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her if she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if she will not deliver the money, her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where Rositas sister lived. HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and how it should be delivered. People v. Acbangin, 337 SCRA 454 (2000) FACTS: Jocelyn brought four-year old Sweet to Nius house without the consent of the childs father Danilo Acbangin. When Danilo asked Jocelyn about her daughter who he last saw playing in the latters house, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's whereabouts. After 2 days, Jocelyn acompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police officers to Niu's house. The latter voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen. Sweet was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father and embraced him. HELD: In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child. Sweet was deprived of her liberty. True, she was treated well. However, there is still kidnapping. For there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Given Sweet's tender age, when Jocelyn left her in Niu's house, at a distant place in Tondo, Manila, unknown to her, she deprived Sweet of the
freedom to leave the house at will. It is not necessary that the detention be prolonged. The intention to deprive Sweet's parents of her custody is indicated by Jocelyn's hesitation for two days to disclose Sweet's whereabouts and more so by her actual taking of the child. Jocelyn's motive at this point is not relevant. It is not an element of the crime. People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 (2000) FACTS: Sukhjinder Singh, an Indian national was on his way back to his parked motorcycle when three men blocked his way. Pavillare, who was one of them, accused Singh of having raped the woman inside a Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside the cab and brought him in Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside the cab. Singh was beaten up and P100,000.00 was demanded for his release. Singh told them that he only had P5,000.00 with him. Pavillare then forced him to give the phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and then Pavillare made the call. The amount of 25,000.00 was agreed upon. An uncle and his cousin Lakhvir arrived in a motorcycle and together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The ransom money was handed to the appellant. He counted the money and then, together with his cohorts, immediately left the scene. Pavillare argues that he should have been convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves that the prime motive of the Pavillare and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only for two hours: HELD: The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267 of the RPC the penalty of death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.
was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place where the money was to be delivered. Castro told Saez to have his relatives bring the money to the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no meeting materialized. Around midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and stayed by the gate conversing with one another. The victim took the opportunity to flee. He was able to untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second storey. He jumped out through the window but the noise he created caught the attention of Castro. The latter fired his gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help alarmed some barangay officials who immediately came to his rescue and brought him to the nearest hospital HELD: The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment. In People vs. Salimbago, the Court stressed: x x x No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. People v. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364 FACTS: While Ed Henderson, the 9-year old son of spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan was on his way back to the house of his tutor in Chinese language to wait for his father, accused Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook the boy. Tampos then ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcycle parked nearby where appellants Ejandra and Revilla were waiting. Ejandra covered Ed Henderson's mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy and warned the latter not to shout. Thereafter, Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcycle, or else, he would be shot. Ed was brought to a house where one Huera, and Calunod was. Ed Henderson was ordered to write down his father's telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Eddie then received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had been kidnapped. Several calls were made and a reduced ransom of P548,000 for the safe release of Ed Henderson was eventually agreed upon. Eddie was then instructed to place the money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of a Church. Eddie did as he was told. He proceeded to the designated place. When Calunod approached and called Eddie, the latter handed over the plastic bag which contained the money. Eddie asked Calunod how his son was. Calunod told Eddie not to worry because the latter would bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the gate of the church and went home to wait for his son's return. Ed Henderson returned on board a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family. Ejandra, Calunod, Tampos and Revilla were convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced to suffer the death penalty.
Ransom
People v. Castro, 385 SCRA 24 FACTS: Saez was informed by his siblings that Castro called up to say that the latter wanted to speak with Saez. After taking a quick shower, Saez repaired to Castros residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and fired his 9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was thrown against the concrete wall of the house. He was then taken inside the house. Reyes and Jde los Angeles, joined Castro in mauling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club. At around nine oclock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone and ordered him to tell his family to raise twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. Fifteen minutes later, Castro gave back the phone to Saez and told him to instruct the person on the other line to bring the money to a place near a hospital. About half an hour later, another call was placed to follow-up the demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes, Castro instructed the two to go to the drop-off point. Nobody showed up. After an hour, Saez
HELD: Since all the foregoing facts indubitably show that the appellants conspired to kidnap the victim for ransom, the Court affirmed the conviction of Ejandra, Calunod, Tampos and Revilla of kidnapping for ransom. To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim's release. n this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim. The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death.
Article 268. Slight illegal detention Elements: 1. 2. 3. 4. Offender is a private individual; He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his liberty. The act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; The crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 267. The same penalty for slight illegal detention shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime. (normally, this is an accomplice but under this article he is treated as co-principal) Privileged mitigating circumstance (penalty lower by one degree) if the offender: o Voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the commencement of the detention; o Without having attained the purpose intended; and o Before the institution of criminal proceedings against him. Voluntary release is not a privileged mitigating circumstance if the victim is woman, because the detention would then be punished under Article 267. Voluntary release is not mitigating under that article. Article 269. Unlawful arrest Elements: 1. person; 2. 3. The purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities; The arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable ground therefor. Offender arrests or detains another
Mandatory Imposition of Death Penalty

People v. Morales, 427 SCRA 765 FACTS: Jefferson Tan was with his siblings, Jessie Anthony and Joanna Tan, his cousin, Malou and their driver, Cesar on board the family L-300 van. Along the highway, the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road when Malit suddenly poked a gun at Cesar. Simultaneously, Morales, Esguerra, and Saldaa entered the van. Esguerra took the driver's seat and the other two blindfolded the five victims. Jefferson was eventually sent home to get the 2M ransom which was later reduced to 1.5M, from his father, Feliciano. Jefferson was instructed to bring the ransom to a snack center. Feliciano did not allow his son to bring the ransom and explained to the kidnappers that Jefferson was in shock and could not go. When asked about the ransom money, he told the caller that he could only give P92,000. The caller agreed. Later, at the place where the kidnappers instructed Feliciano to go, the latter gave the money and he was handed the keys to the L-300 van where his children are. HELD: The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Unlawful arrests by public officers should be punished under Article 124, if the public officer has the legal authority to arrest and detain a person, but the arrest is without legal ground. If the public officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person, or if he did not act in his official capacity, he should be punished for
unlawful arrest under this article. Compare with art. 267
The motive of the person arresting is controlling. If his purpose is to deliver to proper authorities, this article applies. Absence of this motive may be shown by the length of time the victim is detained. If the purpose of delivering to proper authorities is not shown, the person may be liable for other illegal detention (under 267 or 268, depending on the circumstances of the case)
Unlawful arrest The detention is not authorized by law Crime is committed by making an arrest not authorized by law Delay of delivery of detained persons The detention is for some legal ground Crime is committed by failing to deliver such persons to the proper judicial authority within a certain period of time
HELD: Two elements must concur in the crime of kidnapping of a minor: (a) the offender had been entrusted with the custody of the minor; and (b) the offender DELIBERATELY fails to restore said minor to his parents or legal guardian. In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure to return the minor as it was proven that the doctors tried their best to locate the child, even seeking NBIs assistance along the way. People vs. Gutierrez (1991) Lilia Gutierrez was convicted by the RTC of Manila of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The minor was Hazel Elpedes, her 2 and a half-year-old nephew (yup, Hazels a guy in this story), whom Gutierrez allegedly sold to the spouses Felipe for P250 (Lilia claims she did it to spite her husband, brother of Hazels mom, who had abandoned her). HELD: The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of the RPC consists of 2 elements: the offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. It is clear that Gutierrez admitted the existence of the first element (she asked her in-laws for permission to take the boy out). The second element has likewise been established. In the first place, Gutierrez's own conduct in leading the boys father and police to the Felipe residence in Intramuros indicated her awareness of the probable whereabouts of the child. The logical conclusion is that she must have been the person responsible for originally leaving the child with the Felipe spouses. In the second place, the precise motive that Gutierrez might have had for bringing Hazel Elpedes to the Felipe spouses and leaving him with them, apparently for an indefinite period, is not an indispensable element of the offense charged. All that was necessary for the prosecution to prove was that she had deliberately failed to return the minor to his parents. People vs. Reyes (1996) Delia Reyes, maid of the Mohamad spouses, was convicted of kidnapping one of their daughters, Asnia. After spending 300-grand on a manhunt, Asnia was recovered a couple of months later. Reyes claims that, while out with Asnia, she ran into her sister who informed her of their moms death; Reyes then allegedly had a friend take Asnia home while she (Reyes) and her sister went to La Union for their moms wake (basically, shes blaming somebody else). HELD: Reyes's negligence is wanton and gross as to amount to a deliberate and willful scheme to take the child away from her parents. This willfulness is sufficiently established by the following circumstances: (1) appellant lured Asnia and her sister into leaving their house; (2) she instructed the two elder sisters to go home but kept the youngest with her; (3) she and Asnia could not be located despite extensive search by the authorities and the widespread publicity generated through the television, radio and print media; (4) the child was found two months later and only
Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor Elements: 1. Offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether over or under seven years but less than 21 years of age); 2. He deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is punished is the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. When the crime is committed by the father or mother of the minor, the penalty is arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 300 pesos or both.
Article 270 Offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor Article 267 The offender is not entrusted with the custody of the minor
People vs. Ty A mother left her sick child in a clinic and only came back to claim the child five years later. Unfortunately, the doctors had already entrusted the child to a guardian.
after the arrest of appellant; and (5) appellant harbored ill-feelings against the Mohamads family (she admitted that, at one point, the Mohamads did not pay her salary for 5 months when she worked for them in 1989). People vs. Borromeo (2000) Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged by her due to negative attitude problems, kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son. The next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of kidnapping a minor for ransom and was sentenced to death. HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for the payment of ransom, both specifically described in the Information, were clearly established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt. People v. Borromeo (2000) FACTS: Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged by her due to negative attitude problems, kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son. The next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of kidnapping a minor for ransom and was sentenced to death. HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently established: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for the payment of ransom, both specifically described in the Information, were clearly established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt. People v. Pastrana, 387 SCRA 342 FACTS: Postejo, working as a domestic helper in Canada, has four children namely, Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola, and 9-year old Willy. Erma was introduced by her sister to spouses Frias who informed her that their daughter, Pastrana can help process Willy's travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her son's papers. In one of the telephone conversations of Erma and Pastrana, the latter informed Erma that Willy was suffering from acute bronchitis. Erna sent money for the medical treatment of his son. Pastrana then fetched Willy and Aresola from their residence in Caloocan and brought them to her apartment. Thought she never brought Willy to a hospital for treatment, Pastrana kept on demanding money
from Erma which include the amount of P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her apartment allegedly for Willy's safety, and for additional money for her job application in Singapore. Erna, however, refused to transmit the amounts demanded by Pastrana and ordered the return of Willy to their residence in Caloocan. Pastrana deliberately failed to return Willy for 7 days until the latter disappeared while allegedly playing in front of Pastranas apartment. HELD: Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with the custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her children trusted accused-appellant that they sent her money for the processing of Willy's travel documents, and more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. As to the second element, It was this deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return custody of Willy to his relatives that gave rise to her culpability under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. The disappearance of Willy and accused-appellant's inability to return him to Caloocan by reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was her willful disobedience to Erma's order that consummated the crime. People v. Bernardo, 378 SCRA 708 FACTS: While Rosita was undergoing medical check up inside a hospital, her two daughters waited at the lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old sister on her lap. Bernardo befriended Roselle and later gave her P3.00 and asked her to buy ice water. Thereafter, Bernardo took the baby from Roselle. Roselle was not able to find ice water for sale and on her way back to the hospital, she saw Bernardo running away with her baby sister. Roselle pulled and pulled Bernardo's skirt to prevent the latter from getting away. Torres saw Bernardo carrying a child and struggling with Roselle. Roselle begged Torres to help her because her mother was at the hospital and the accused was getting her baby sister. Torres took the baby from the Bernardo and entrusted the baby to his wife. Then he led Bernardo and Roselle to the hospital to look for Rosita who confirmed that she was the mother of the baby. The RTC convicted Bernardo of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the RPC. HELD: The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong. When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant before setting
out on an errand for appellant to look for ice water, the first element was accomplished and when appellant refused to return the baby to Roselle despite her continuous pleas, the crime was effectively accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial court's finding that appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
3.
It is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor. The existence of an indebtedness constitutes no legal justification for holding a person and depriving him of his freedom to live where he wills.
Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home Elements: 1. A minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the home of his parents or guardians or the person entrusted with his custody; 2. Offender induces said minor to abandon such home. The inducement must be actual, committed with criminal intent, and determined by a will to cause damage.
Article 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt Elements: 1. Offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household servant or farm laborer; 2. It is against the debtors will; 3. The purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.
Service under compulsion Does not distinguish whether the victim is a minor or not The debtor himself is the one compelled to work for the offender Limited to household work or farm labor Exploitation of child labor Victim must be a minor The minor is compelled to render services for the supposed debt of his parent or guardian Service is not limited
It is not necessary that the minor actually abandons his home, as long as there is inducement. The minor should not leave his home of his own free will. Father or mother may commit this crime (as well as Article 270), if the parents are living separately and custody has been given to one of them. Article 272. Slavery Elements: 1. Offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being; 2. The purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being. If the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to some immoral traffic (prostitution), the penalty is higher. Differentiated from kidnapping: If the purpose is to enslave the victim, the crime is slavery; otherwise the crime is kidnapping or illegal detention. Article 273. Exploitation of child labor Elements: 1. 2. Offender retains a minor in his services; It is against the will of the minor;
Article 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of ones own victim Acts punishable: 1. Failing to render assistance to any person whom the offender finds in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense. Elements: a. The place is not inhabited; b. Accused found there a person wounded or in danger of dying; c. Accused can render assistance without detriment to himself; d. Accused fails to render assistance.
2. Failing to help or render assistance to another whom the offender has accidentally wounded or injured; 3. By failing to deliver a child, under seven years of age, whom the offender has found abandoned, to the authorities or to his family, or by failing to take him to a safe place. If a person intentionally wounds another and leaves him in an uninhabited place, he shall not be liable under this article because be did not FIND him wounded or in danger of dying. It is immaterial that the offender did not know that the child is under seven years. The child under seven must be found by the accused in an unsafe place.
Lamera vs. CA An owner-type jeep driven by Lamera hit and bumped a tricycle, damaging the said tricycle and injuring the driver and passenger in the process. Two separate informations were filed, one for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries and another one for abandonment of ones victim. HELD: The rule on double jeopardy cannot be applied in this case because the two informations were for separate offenses the first falls under quasi-offenses while the second is a crime against security.
and not to crimes against security, particularly the crime in this article. A permanent, conscious and deliberate abandonment is required in this article. There must be an interruption of the care and protection the minor needs by reason of his age. Parents guilty of abandonment shall be deprived of their parental authority. Article 277. Abandonment of minor by the person entrusted with his custody; indifference of parents Acts punishable: 1. Delivering a minor to a public institution or other persons without the consent of the one who entrusted such minor to the care of the offender or, in the absence of that one, without the consent of the proper authorities; Elements: a. Offender has charge of the rearing or education of a minor; b. He delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons; c. The one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to such act; or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent, the proper authorities have not consented to it. 2. Neglecting his (offenders) children by not giving them the education which their station in life requires and financial condition permits. Elements: a. b. c. Offender is a parent; He neglects his children by not giving them education; His station in life requires such education and his financial condition permits it.
Article 277 The custody of the offender is specific, that is, the custody for the rearing or education of the minor The minor is under 21 years of age The minor is delivered to
Article 276. Abandoning a minor Elements: 1. 2. age; 3. 4. He abandons such child; He has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned. Offender has the custody of a child; The child is under seven years of
Circumstances qualifying the offense: 1. When the death of the minor resulted from such abandonment; or 2. If the life of the minor was in danger because of the abandonment.
When there is intent to kill, this article does not apply. The purpose in abandoning the minor must be to avoid the obligation of taking care of said minor. The ruling that intent to kill is presumed from the death of the victim is applicable only to crimes against persons,
Article 276 The custody of the offender is stated in general The minor is under 7 years of age Minor is abandoned in
such as way as to deprive him of the care and protection that his tender years need
a public institution or other person
Minor under 16 years of age
Minor under 21 years of age
Obligation to educate children terminates, if the mother and children refuse without good reason to live with the accused. Failure to give education must be due to deliberate desire to evade such obligation. If the parents cannot give education because they had no means to do so, then they will not be liable under this article. Article 278. Exploitation of minors Acts punishable: 1. Causing any boy or girl under 16 years of age to perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength or contortion, the offender being any person; 2. Employing children under 16 years of age who are not the children or descendants of the offender in exhibitions of acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver, or wild-animal tamer, the offender being an acrobat, etc., or circus manager or engaged in a similar calling; 3. Employing any descendant under 12 years of age in dangerous exhibitions enumerated in the next preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any of the said callings; 4. Delivering a child under 16 years of age gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in paragraph 2, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being an ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of such child; and 5. Inducing any child under 16 years of age to abandon the home of its ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings mentioned in paragraph 2 or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar, the offender being any person.
Exploitation of minors (par. 5) Purpose of inducing minor is to abandon home is to follow any person engaged in any of the callings of being an acrobat, gymnast, etc. Inducing a minor to abandon his home No such purpose
If the delivery of the child to any person following any of the callings enumerated, is made in consideration of any price, compensation or promise, the penalty is higher. The offender shall be deprived of parental authority or guardianship. Exploitation of minors refers to acts endangering the life or safety of the minor.
R.A. 7610 Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act A. CHILD PROSTITUTION Who are children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse? Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. Who are punishable? 1. Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution, which include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; b. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; c. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute; d. Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or e. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution. 2. Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; If the victim is under 12, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and or lascivious conduct under the RPC as the case may be However, the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be higher (reclusion temporal in its medium period) 3. Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or
which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. When is there attempt prostitution? to commit child
Who are punishable? Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials. D. OTHER PERSONS PUNISHABLE UNDER THE ACT 1. Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 (criminal liability of parents due to abandonment, neglect etc.), but not covered by the RPC; 2. Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who is ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places UNLESS s/he is related to the minor within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty. 3. Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph; 4. Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him to such place or places any minor herein described; 5. Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to; Beg or use begging as a means of living; Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; Conduct any illegal activities E. WORKING CHILDREN Who are punishable? Any person who shall violate any of the provision of the Act with respect to working children (conditions for the employment of children under 15, prohibitions on the employment of children for certain advertisements etc.) F. CHILDREN OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES Who are punishable? Any person who discriminates against children of indigenous cultural communities COMMON PENAL PROVISIONS
A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals of an attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution, committed as follows: 1. Attempt of (1) above When any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse; or 2. Attempt of (2) above When any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. B. CHILD TRAFFICKING What is child trafficking? Child trafficking is committed by a person trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter. When is there attempt trafficking? to commit child
(An attempt is punishable by a penalty two degrees lower than the penalty for the consummated offense) There is an attempt to commit child trafficking: 1. When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian; 2. When a person, agency, establishment or childcaring institution recruits women or couples to bear a children for the purpose of child trafficking; 3. When doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; 4. When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other childduring institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking. C. OBSCENE SHOWS PUBLICATIONS AND INDECENT
People v. Delantar (2007) Appellants violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as clear as day. The provision penalizes anyone who engages in or promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution either by: (1) acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; or (2) inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; or (3) by taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; or (4) threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefits to the child with the intent to engage such child in prostitution. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to consent to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. In fact, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the woman is below the age of twelve Navarrete v. People (2007) The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be proven in addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of RA 7610 as: [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
not prevent the imposition upon the same person of the penalty provided for any other felonies defined and punished by the RPC. Article 280. dwelling Elements: 1. 2. 3. Offender is a private person; He enters the dwelling of another; Such entrance is against the latters will. Qualified trespass to
Cases to which the provisions of this article is not applicable: 1. When the purpose of the entrance is to prevent serious harm to himself, the occupant or third persons; 2. When the purpose of the offender in entering is to render some service to humanity or justice; 3. Anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses while they are open.
Marzalado v. People, 441 SCRA 595 (2004) FACTS: The petitioner, Marzalado, argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings below, there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the unit. HELD: In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession. As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner (Marzalado) because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet. . . ." As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalados, judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.
Article 279. Additional penalties for other offenses The imposition of the penalties prescribed in the preceding articles shall
Trespass to dwelling
Purpose of the law: to protect and preserve the privacy of ones dwelling If the offender is a public officer or employee, the entrance into the dwelling against the will of the occupant is violation of domicile. Dwelling place devoted for rest and comfort, as distinguished from places devoted to business, office etc. Dwelling includes a room when occupied by another person (example: room at a boarding house)
The offender is a private person The offender enters a dwelling house The place entered is inhabited The act constituting the crime is entering against the will of the owner Prohibition to enter is express or implied
Other forms of trespass The offender is any person The offender enters a closed premises or a fenced estate The place entered is uninhabited The act constituting the crime is entering without securing the permission of the owner or caretaker Prohibition to enter must be manifest
Against the will should be against the presumed or express prohibition of the occupant, not mere lack of consent. There must be opposition on the part of the owner of the house to the entry of the accused. However, presumed or implied prohibition is sufficient (e.g. entrance during the late hour of the night) Prohibition must be existent prior to or at the time of entrance.
Article 282. Grave threats Acts punishable: 1. Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that of this family of any wrong amounting to a crime and demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and the offender attained his purpose; Elements: a. The offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the latters person, honor or property, or upon that of the latters family, of any wrong; b. Such wrong amounts to a crime; c. There is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed, even though not unlawful; d. The offender attains his purpose. 2. Making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose; 3. Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being subject to a condition.
QUALIFIED TRESPASS: If the offense is committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty is higher. Violence may be against persons or property, but there are conflicting views as to this statement. The violence or intimidation may take place immediately after the entrance. Proof of express prohibition to enter is not necessary when violence or intimidation is employed by the offender. If there is no overt act of the crime intended to be committed, the crime is only trespass to dwelling. Article 281. Other forms of trespass Elements: 1. Offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of another; 2. The entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited; 3. The prohibition to enter is manifest; 4. The trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof. Premises signifies a distinct and definite locality. This may include a room, shop, building or definite area.
The essence of the crime of threats is intimidation; i.e. the promise of some future harm or injury. Not necessary that the wrong threatened to be inflicted must amount to any of the crimes against persons, honor or property. Law requires that the wrong must be UPON the person, honor or property.
As the crime consists in threatening another with some future harm, it is not necessary that the offended party was present at the time the threats were made. It is sufficient that the threats, came to the knowledge of the offended party. The crime of grave threats is consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened. Threats made in connection with the commission of other crimes are absorbed by the latter. The offender in grave threats does not demand the delivery on the spot of the money or other personal property demanded by him. When threats are made and money is taken on the spot, the crime may be robbery with intimidation. The penalties for the first two types of grave threats depend upon the penalties for the crimes threatened to be committed. One degree lower if the purpose is attained, and two degrees lower if the purpose is not attained. If the threat is not subject to a condition, the penalty is fixed at arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. In the first two types, if the threat is made in writing or thorough a middleman, the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period. The third type of grave threats must be serious and deliberate; the offender must persist in the idea involved in his threats. The threat should not be made in the heat of anger, because such is punished under Article 285. If the condition is not proved, it is grave threats of the third type.
People vs. Timbol The accused made several advances towards the offended party. He threatened to kill the womans husband if she did not accede to his advances. He was convicted of acts of lasciviousness and grave threats. HELD: The accused should not be convicted of grave threats because such threats formed part of the intimidation that he employed to succeed in his lewd designs. Reyes vs. People A disgruntled employee staged a demonstration in front of the house of the guy who dismissed him from work. Phrases of this nature were spoken out loud: Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!
HELD: All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 paragraph 2 are present: (1) the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) the wrong amounted to a crime and (3) the threat was not subject to a condition.
Article 283. Light threats Elements: 1. 2. 3. 4. Offender makes a threat to commit a wrong; The wrong does not constitute a crime; There is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even though not unlawful; Offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his purpose. Light threats are committed in the same manner as grave threats, except that the act threatened to be committed should not be a crime. Blackmailing may be punished under this article. Article 284. Bond for good behavior In what cases may a person be required to give bail not to molest another? 1. When he Article 282. 2. When he Article 283. threatens threatens another another under under
Bond for good behavior Applicable only to grave threats and light threats If offender fails to give bail, he shall be sentenced to destierro
NOT a distinct penalty
Bond to keep the peace Not made applicable to any particular case If the offender fails to give bond, he shall be detained for a period not exceeding 6 months (if prosecuted for grave/less grave felony) or not exceeding 30 days (light felony) A distinct penalty
Article 285. Other light threats Acts punishable: 1. Threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense; 2. Orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm constituting a C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 108
crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat; 3. Orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony. Under the first type, the subsequent acts of the offender must show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat. Threats which are ordinarily grave threats, if made in the heat of anger, may be other light threats. If the threats are directed to a person who is absent and uttered in a temporary fit of anger, the offense is only other light threats.
Other light threats Grave threats (second type) (third type) Harm threatened to be committed is a crime Threat is not deliberate Threat is deliberate (made in the heat of anger) Other light threats Light threats (third type) Harm threatened to be committed is not a crime There is NO demand for There is demand for money, or other money, or other condition imposed condition imposed
Article 286. Grave coercions Acts punishable: 1. Preventing another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, from doing something not prohibited by law; 2. Compelling another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. Elements 1. A person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will; be it right or wrong; 2. The prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3. The person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of law or the right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
The purpose of the law in penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands, and that our government is one of law, not of men. In grave coercion, the act of preventing by force must be made at the time the offended party was doing or about to do the act to be prevented. If the act was already done when violence is exerted, the crime is unjust vexation. Instances when the act of preventing another is classified as another crime: o A public officer preventing by means of violence or threats the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion is guilty of interruption of religious worship (Art. 132) o Any person who, by force, prevents the meeting of a legislative body (Art. 143) o Any person who shall use force or intimidation to prevent any member of Congress from attending the meetings thereof, expressing his opinions, or casting his vote (Art. 145) Compelling another to do something includes the offenders act of doing it himself while subjecting another to his will.
A person who is in actual possession of a thing, even if he has no right to that possession, cannot be compelled by means of violence to give up the possession, even by the owner himself. This will amount to grave coercion. Note however that an owner and actual possessor a property has a right to use such force was may be reasonably necessary to prevent another from dispossessing him of his property. Instances when the act of compelling is another offense: o A public officer not authorized by law who compels a person to change his residence (Art. 127) o Kidnapping a debtor to compel him to pay his debt (kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267) The crime is not grave coercion when the violence is employed to seize anything not belonging to the debtor of the offender. This is light coercion under Article 287. Surrounding the victim in a notoriously threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute intimidation. C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 109
The force or violence must be immediate, actual or imminent. The owner of a thing has no right to prevent interference with it when interference is necessary to avert greater damage. There is no grave coercion when the accused acts in good faith in the performance of duty.
claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. Lees threat is not improper because there is nothing unlawful about the threat to sue. Finally, there is a difference between performing an act reluctantly, even against ones good sense and judgment versus performing an act with no consent at all, such as when a person acts against her will or under a pressure cannot resist. In this case, de Chin consented to signing the withdrawal slips. She did so voluntarily, although reluctantly. Hence, there is no coercion. People vs. Alfeche, Jr. (1992) Complaint for Usurpation of Real Rights in Property (Art312) in relation to Grave Coercion (Art286) was filed against accused where it was alleged that he usurped the possession of the tenants from the land by threatening to kill them if the latter resisted. This was filed in the RTC. RTC dismissed saying that the penalty under Art312 was below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC therefore it had no jurisdiction on the assumption that the grave coercion was absorbed with the usurpation. HELD: RTC had jurisdiction. Art312 defines a single, special and indivisible crime with a 2-tiered penalty. The principal one for the usurpation with violence/ intimidation and an incremental penalty based on the value obtained in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence and intimidation. When the usurpation is done with violence or intimidation (in the CAB, grave coercion), the accused must be prosecuted under Art312 for usurpation and not for the acts of violence or intimidation under Art286 for grave coercion. But whenever appropriate, accused may be held liable for the separate acts of violence or intimidation (e.g. grave coercion). This separate penalty is in addition to the fine based on the gain obtained by him. People v. Santos, 378 SCRA 157 (2002) FACTS: Josephine gave a 1-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely pay the debt. For the next 4 years, Josephine was unsuccessful in securing payment from Leonida as the latter stubbornly maintained her having already settled the account. Josephine, Manny et. al., with the assistance of CIS agents, then brought Leonida to Baguio City from her house in Pangasinan, in order to surrender her to the custody of Baguio City authorities where Josephine thought she could rightly seek redress. She was advised, however, that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City, where a case could be lodged. The trial court convicted Josephine on the ground that the deprivation of Leonida of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for less than twenty-four hours, was sufficient to support the charge of kidnapping. HELD: The circumstances that have surfaced warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its elements are First, that the offender has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; second,
Coercion is consummated even if the offended party did not accede to the purpose of the coercion. (MEL this is doubtful, please check) A higher penalty (prision mayor) is imposed if the coercion is committed: o In violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage; o To compel another to perform any religious act.
Grave coercion There is no clear deprivation of liberty Illegal Detention There must be actual confinement or restraint on the person of the victim Maltreatment of prisoner The offended party is a prisoner
Grave coercion (compelling a person to confess/give info) The offended party is NOT a prisoner
Timoner vs. People (1983) Jose Timoner, the mayor of Daet, ordered the fencing off of stalls which protruded into the sidewalks of Maharlika highway. The stalls were recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. HELD: There is no grave coercion when the restraint was made under authority of law or in the lawful exercise of a right. Mayor Timoner had the authority under the Civil Code to abate public nuisances. Also, he was merely implementing the orders of the municipal health officer and was acting under the authority of a previous decision which declared one of the stalls as a public nuisance. Lee vs. CA (1991) Francis Lee, the branch manager of Pacific Banking Corporation, threatened to file charges against complainant de Chin, unless she returned all the money equivalent to a forged Midland National Bank cheque which de Chin deposited in an account in the Pacific Bank. HELD: To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. De Chin was pregnant, but she was also educated and familiar with banking procedures. She could not have been easily intimidated by Lee. Besides, a threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the
that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the accused can be convicted of the offense proved.
During a pabasa, the appellants started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. The noise disrupted the ceremonies and some of the participants even fled, fearing trouble. The appellants were convicted of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133. HELD: The construction of a fence even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present is not such an act as can be designated as notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The appellants act was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The circumstances under which the fence was constructed late at night, vexing and annoying those who had gathered indicate that the crime committed was only unjust vexation. People vs. Anonuevo (1937) Teodulo Anonuevo embraced and kissed Rosita Tabia and held her breasts while in church. He was convicted of abuse against chastity. HELD: It is error to ascribe the conduct of appellant to lustful designs or purposes in the absence of clear proof as to his motive. The religious atmosphere and the presence of many people belie the fact that he acted with lewd designs. He either performed a bravado (in defiance of alleged threats of Rositas boyfriend) or wished merely to force Rosita to accept him as a lover. He is only guilty of unjust vexation. Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 (2000) Ong Chiu Kwan admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of complainant's business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permits or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner's act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. Baleros v. People (2007) The court wishes to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
Article 287. Light coercions Elements: 1. 2. debtor: 3. The seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence or a display of material force producing intimidation; The purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment of the debt. The seized property must be applied to the PAYMENT of the debt, not merely as SECURITY for the debt. Offender must be a creditor; He seizes anything belonging to his
4.
Taking possession of the thing belonging to the debtor, through deceit and misrepresentation, for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, is unjust vexation under the second paragraph of this article. Actual physical violence not necessary, grave intimidation is sufficient. Unjust vexation (other second paragraph) light coercion,
Includes any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would, however, unjustly annoy or vex an innocent person. The act must cause annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or disturbance. There is no violence or intimidation in unjust vexation. Examples: kissing a girl (despite her objections, of course!) When the first and third elements of grave coercion are present, but the second element (violence, threats or intimidation) is absent, the crime is unjust vexation.
People vs. Reyes (1934)
Article 288. Other similar coercions (compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of wages by means of tokens) Acts punishable:
1. Forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permitting the forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase merchandise of commodities of any kind from him; Elements: a. Offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation; b. He or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees; c. He forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or from said firm or corporation. 2. Paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or object other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless expressly requested by such laborer or employee. Elements: a. Offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him by means of tokens or object; b. Those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines; c. Such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid by means of tokens or objects. As a general rule, laborers and employees have the right to receive just wages in legal tender. Inducing an employee to give up part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means is not punished under the RPC, but under Article 116 of the Labor Code. Article 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through violence or threats Elements: 1. Offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work;
2. The purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or labor, strike of laborers or lockout of employers. The act should not be a more serious offense under the RPC. For example, if death or other serious physical injuries are caused, the act should be punished as such and not under this Article. Peaceful picketing is not prohibited, it is a valid exercise of freedom of speech. Employing violence or making threat by picketers may make them liable for coercion. Preventing employees from joining any registered labor organization is punished under the Labor Code, not under the RPC. Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence Elements: 1. Offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the exercise of his official function; 2. He seizes the papers or letters of another; 3. The purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person; 4. Offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.
To seize means to place in the control of someone a thing or to give him the possession thereof. It is not necessary that there be force or violence. Prejudice is not an element of the offense. When the offender reveals the contents of such paper or letters of another to a third person, the penalty is higher. Thus, revealing the secret is not an element of the offense, it only qualifies the offense. This article is not applicable to: o parents, guardians or persons entrusted with the custody of minors with respect to papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or custody; o spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them. Unlawful opening of mail matter by an officer or employee of the C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 112
Bureau of Posts is punished under the Administrative Code.

Discovering secrets (Art. 290) Offender is a private individual, or public officer not in exercise of official function The offender SEIZES the papers or letters Revealing secrets (Art. 230) Offender is a public officer The offender COMES TO KNOW of the secrets of the private individual by reason of his office. Not necessary that the secrets are contained in papers/letters The offender reveals such secrets without justifiable reason.
workman had ceased to be connected with the establishment. Prejudice is an element of the offense.
The purpose of the offender is to discover the secrets of another, revelation to another is not an element of the crime
Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office Elements: 1. 2. 3. Offender is a manager, employee or servant; He learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity; He reveals such secrets. Secrets must be learned by reason of their employment. The secrets must be revealed by the offender. Prejudice/damage is not necessary under this Article. Article 292. secrets Elements: 1. Offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a manufacturing or industrial establishment; 2. The manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the industry which the offender has learned; 3. Offender reveals such secrets; 4. Prejudice is caused to the owner. Secrets must relate to manufacturing processes. The act constituting the crime is revealing the secret of the industry of employer. The revelation of the secret might be made after the employee or C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 113 Revealing of industrial

Title 9 - Liberty and Security

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Title Nine CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY Chapter One.

Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets

Slight illegal Detention Unlawful arrest

Article 267. Kidnapping illegal detention Elements: 1. 2. 3. 4.

correspondence Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office

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Mandatory Imposition of Death Penalty

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unlawful arrest under this article. Compare with art. 267

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a public institution or other person

Minor under 16 years of age

Minor under 21 years of age

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NOT a distinct penalty

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Bureau of Posts is punished under the Administrative Code.

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