9

Setting Considerations
Before attempting to develop protective relay settings, standardized setting criteria (sometimes referred to as protective relay setting principles and practices or business rules) should be developed and documented. Then, the standardized setting criteria should be consistently applied for operating conditions that include all components in service, some components out of service, and various combinations of components in and out of service. In addition to operating conditions, sequential fault clearing, automatic fault testing, and stuck circuit-breaker conditions need to be considered and evaluated. This chapter contains items that should be considered when developing protective relaying setting criteria. These items can be used as a starting point and customized as needed for specific application considerations.

9.1 Power System Configuration and Operation

The configuration of a power system changes as components are added, outages occur, maintenance activities are performed, load levels increase or decrease, economic dispatch changes, faults are cleared, etc. Figure 9.1 illustrates a networked 230-KV transmission system with an underlying radial distribution system. This simple power system consists of four 230-KV substations with eight transformers, five 230-KV lines, and five generators. In Figure 9.1, power system components are shown in several commonly installed configurations. Harrisburg is equipped with two generators, three 230-KV lines, and two transformers that are connected via a sectionalized, 230-KV, double-bus, double circuit-breaker arrangement. Bethlehem is equipped with two 230-KV lines and two transformers that are connected via a single, 230-KV bus, double circuit-breaker arrangement. Newark is equipped with two generators, three 230-KV lines, and two transformers that are connected via a sectionalized 230-KV bus, multiple circuit-breaker arrangement. Plymouth is equipped with one generator, two 230-KV lines, and two transformers that are connected via a 230-KV ring-bus, circuit-breaker arrangement. The distribution system is operated as multiple independent radial systems. 131
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Harrisburg 230 KV 1W Gen 1 #1 1E

2301 Line 2302 Line Bethlehem 230 KV #1 #2 2303 Line #1

Newark 230 KV 1N Gen 3

1S 2N

Gen 2 2W

#2

Gen 5

Plymouth 230 KV

#2 2305 Line 2S

Gen 4

2E 2304 Line #1 #2

System Voltage: Scheduled Voltage: Generator Capacity: Substation Load:

230 KV 235 KV at Harrisburg, 234 KV at Plymouth, 233 KV at Newark. 225 MVA, 90% pf 140 MW and 68 MVAR (90% pf )

Figure 9.1 Simplified 230 KV transmission system diagram.

Before attempting to set protective relays, it is important to develop an understanding of how the power system has been constructed and how it will be operated. The system shown in Figure 9.1 has been designed to tolerate failure of any single generator, 230 KV line or 230 KV buswith a subsequent circuit-breaker failure (to interrupt) with no loss of customer load. Inherent in a system like this is the assumption that failures can be quickly repaired. If any component is difficult to replace or repair (for example, 230 KV lines that are underground, pipe-type cable are difficult to repair), it may be necessary to develop settings based on loss of two components along with a subsequent failure. Traditionally, protective relay settings are developed that cover many different operating arrangements. Usually settings are calculated for worst case conditions and then checked for adequacy during other operating conditions. Worst-case conditions may be with minimum or maximum generation, transformers in or out of service, lines in or out of service, and other expected conditions. If protective relay settings needed for a specific, unusual operating arrangement are problematic, one alternative is to establish rules that prevent establishing that specific arrangement unless protective relay setting changes are implemented. When microprocessorbased relays are installed, automatic switching of protective relay setting groups can be used to provide appropriate settings during selected operating conditions.

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Typical power system configurations that need to be considered include 1. System normalpeak load 2. System normallight load 3. Single contingency (line, generator, transformer, circuit breaker, or line and tapped transformer out of service) 4. Single contingency with generator(s) out of service 5. Double contingency 6. Double contingency with generator(s) out of service 7. Single contingency with circuit-breaker failure (to interrupt) 8. Single contingency with generator(s) out of service and with a circuit-breaker failure (to interrupt) 9. Selected multiple contingenciesfor example, flashover of insulators on two circuits when two transmission lines utilize single pole, double-circuit construction 10. Startup and shutdown of peaking generatorsgenerator step-up transformers may remain in service when generators are off-line 11. Dispatch of distributed generation Each of the aforementioned configurations needs to be analyzed for three-phase and single phase-to-ground faults with all circuit breakers closed and with selected circuit breakers open as would be expected during maintenance and during sequential fault clearing. As a minimum, close-in faults and end-of-zone faults should be evaluated for bolted fault and restricted fault conditions. In addition, two possible component characteristicsmutual coupling of adjacent lines and transformer ground bank actionneed to be evaluated. 9.1.1 Mutual Coupling Mutual coupling is the term used to describe the condition where current flow in a line induces voltage in nearby lines that can impede or enhance current flow. Basically when lines are adjacent to each other, the lines can be considered to be an air-core transformer (with two lengthy windings). Simplified physical line arrangements for two lines connected between the same substations and corresponding zero sequence equivalent circuits for line-end faults with open and closed circuit breakers are shown in Figures 9.2 through 9.5. The impact of mutual coupling is that the zero sequence equivalent circuit is much different than the positive sequence equivalence circuit.

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Bus 1 B

Line 1 Mutual Coupling

D E G

Bus 2 Fault Location

Line 2

ZL10 = Line 1 Zero Sequence Impedance ZL20 = Line 2 Zero Sequence Impedance ZM120 = Line 12 Zero Sequence Mutual Impedance Figure 9.2 Simplified representation of two lines on same right-of-way.

ZL10 ZM120 ZM120 Bus 1 ZL20 ZM120 Bus 2

Mutual Impedance Impedes Current Flow from Bus 1 to Bus 2 for Fault at Bus 2 Then, the equivalent zero sequence impedance from Bus 1 to Bus 2 is: If ZL10 = 10 , ZL20 = 10 , and ZM120 = 5 ,

Zeq =

ZL10 ZM120 10 5 + ZM120 = + 5 = 7.5 ZL20 ZM120 10 5

Figure 9.3 Zero sequence equivalent circuit for single phase to ground fault at Bus 2 (shown in Figure 9.2).

Bus 1 B

Line 1 Mutual Coupling

D E G

Bus 2

C CB Open Fault Location

Line 2

Figure 9.4 Simplified representation of two lines on same right-of-way with single phase to ground fault at X with CB C open.

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ZL10 ZM120 ZM120 Bus 1 Z210 ZM120 Bus 2

Mutual Impedance Enhances Current Flow from Bus 1 to Fault at X. If ZL10 = 10 , ZL20 = 10 , and ZM120 = 5 and there are no other zero. sequence connections at Bus 2, en, the equivalent zero sequence impedance from Bus 1 to the Fault at X is 10 5 + 10 5 = 10 .

Figure 9.5 Zero sequence equivalent circuit for two mutually coupled lines single phase to ground fault at X, near C.

9.1.2 ground bank action Ground bank action is the term used to describe current flow that occurs for phase-to-ground faults when three-phase transformers with wyegrounded, delta windings are installed. Basically in the zero sequence network, the delta windings act as a current source for the wye-grounded windings. Ground bank action occurs on the wye-grounded side of any wyegrounded, delta transformer whenever a ground fault occurs on the system connected to the wye-grounded windingwhether or not a power source is connected to the delta winding of the transformer. Ground bank configurations for two- and three-winding transformers are illustrated in Figures 9.6 through 9.11. Note: H, X, and T nodes are connected in a zero sequence equivalent circuit at the same location as the corresponding transformer bushings. The R or reference node is connected to the zero sequence reference bus. Ground banks change the zero sequence equivalent circuit so that the zero sequence impedance network is not the same as the positive sequence impedance network. example 9.1
Fault conditions that need to be considered when selecting protective relay settings for the 230-2 line shown in Figure 9.1. Close-in faults at Harrisburg with all circuit breakers closed All generators operating Generator 1 off-line Generator 2 off-line
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H1 Connected to Power System H2 H3

X1

X2 X3

Figure 9.6 Wye-grounded/delta transformer. H X R

H - Connection from Transformer to High Voltage System X - Connection from Transformer to Low Voltage System R - Connection from Transformer Delta Winding to Zero Sequence Reference Bus Figure 9.7 Zero sequence equivalent circuit for Wye-grounded/delta transformer. H1 X1 X2 H2 H3 Figure 9.8 Delta/wye-grounded transformer. H X X3 Connected to Power System

H - Connection from Transformer to High Voltage System X - Connection from Transformer to Low Voltage System R - Connection from Transformer Delta Winding to Zero Sequence Reference Bus Figure 9.9 Zero sequence equivalent circuit for delta/Wye-grounded transformer.

230-1 line out of service 230-2 line out of service 230-4 line out of service Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-2 line out of service

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H1 H2

T Winding T1

X1 X2

H3

H Winding

T3

T2

X Winding

X3

Figure 9.10 Three winding transformer connected Wye-grounded/delta/Wye-grounded. H X

R T H - Connection from Transformer to High Voltage System X - Connection from Transformer to Low Voltage System T - Connection from Transformer to Third Voltage System R - Connection from Transformer Delta Winding to Zero Sequence Reference Bus Figure 9.11 Zero sequence equivalent circuit for three winding transformer connected Wye-grounded/ delta/Wye-grounded.

Generator 1 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Generator 1 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 and 2 off-line Generator 2 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and 230-2 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Generator 2 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service

Close-in faults at Harrisburg with 230-2 line circuit breakers open at Bethlehem All generators operating Generator 1 off-line Generator 2 off-line 230-1 line out of service 230-4 line out of service Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service

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Protective Relay Principles

Generator 1 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Generator 1 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 and 2 off-line Generator 2 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 1 out of service Generator 2 off-line and Harrisburg Transformer 2 out of service

Line-end faults at Bethlehem, radial from Harrisburg, with circuit breakers open at Newark All generators operating Generator 1 off-line Generator 2 off-line 230-1 line out of service 230-4 line out of service Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 1 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 and 2 off-line Generator 2 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 2 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service

Close-in faults at Bethlehem with all 230-KV circuit breakers closed All generators operating Generator 1 off-line Generator 2 off-line Generator 3 off-line Generator 4 off-line 230-1 line out of service 230-4 line out of service 230-5 line out of service Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 1 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 1 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generators 1 and 2 off-line Generators 1 and 3 off-line Generators 1 and 4 off-line Generator 2 off-line and 230-1 line out of service

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Generator 2 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 2 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 2 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generators 2 and 3 off-line Generators 2 and 4 off-line Generator 3 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generators 3 and 4 off-line Generator 4 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-4 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service

Close-in faults at Bethlehem with 230-2 line circuit breakers open at Harrisburg All generators operating Generator 3 off-line Generator 4 off-line 230-1 line out of service 230-5 line out of service Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 3 and Generator 4 out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service

Line-end faults at Harrisburg, radial from Bethlehem, with circuit breakers open at Harrisburg All generators operating Generator 3 off-line Generator 4 off-line 230-1 line out of service 230-5 line out of service Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 3 off-line and 230-5 line out of service

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Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 3 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service Generator 3 and Generator 4 out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-1 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and 230-5 line out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 1 out of service Generator 4 off-line and Bethlehem Transformer 2 out of service

N OT e : Usually only a few of the preceding fault conditions are critical.

Unfortunately the most critical combinations are not obvious until after fault calculations are completed and setpoints are established.

9.2 Power System Requirements

After an understanding of the power system configuration has been developed, an understanding of protective relay performance requirements must be established. This includes concerns such as Do transmission system protective relaying schemes operate quickly enough to meet power system stability requirements? Is time-delayed clearing of faults acceptable or must all unrestricted faults be detected immediately and cleared without delay in order to control recovery voltage transients, that is, transients that occur when running loads simultaneously reaccelerate as voltage recovers to prefault conditions? Are special schemes or unique protective relay applications required to minimize equipment damage to ensure rapid fault isolation or to prevent system collapse? Have abnormal conditions that can lead to system collapse been evaluated (underfrequency, overfrequency, undervoltage, undervoltage)? Is the electrical system grounded? If the system is ungrounded, should undervoltage and overvoltage detection be installed? Do distribution system protective relaying schemes operate quickly enough to prevent fuses from opening unnecessarily? Are distribution system instantaneous relay settings high enough to minimize overreach of downstream protective devices, even if instantaneous relays are not permitted to trip circuit breakers unless circuit breakers have remained closed for a short period of time? Does actuation of protective relay schemes result in de-energization of an acceptable portion of a power system when circuitbreaker failure considerations are evaluated?
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If protective relay settings are developed without considering the consequences of faults and protective relay actuations, the applied settings, while adequate to ensure that faults are cleared, may not meet electrical system operational requirements.

9.3 Maximum Short-Circuit CurrentFault in Protected Zone

Maximum short-circuit current with all lines, transformers, and generators in service must be calculated and evaluated for both three-phase and single phase-to-ground faults. Motor contributions should be considered and ground banks need to be included in calculations. Usual concerns that need to be evaluated for maximum available short-circuit current include Current transformer saturation: The possibility that CT saturation can cause a differential relay to misoperate or a transmission-line or distribution-line protective relaying scheme to fail to operate must be evaluated. Circuit breaker, fuse, and other circuit-interrupting device capability: The maximum available short-circuit current should be less than the maximum interrupting capability of associated circuit breakers and other fault-interrupting devices. If maximum available short-circuit current is excessive, blocking schemes that inhibit circuit-breaker operation, circuit-breaker replacements, etc., need to be considered. Mechanical strength of bus conductors and insulators: The withstand capability of bus conductors and insulators should be considered and upgraded, if required, to ensure that consequential damage does not occur even though faults are cleared in accordance with design parameters. Transformer, power cable, and grounding conductor (thermal) withstand capability: Transformer damage curves, power cable damage curves, overhead cable annealing curves, and grounding conductor melting curves need to be evaluated at maximum short-circuit current values. Arc energy: The maximum amount of energy that can be released during fault conditions should be calculated and prominently displayed in work areas. Instantaneous relay operation: Sufficient margins should be allowed so that there is a high degree of confidence that instantaneous relays will actuate for maximum fault conditions.
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9.4 Maximum Relay Short-Circuit CurrentFault in Adjacent Zone

Maximum short-circuit current through each specific relay for faults within other zones of protection is a function of system configuration. Therefore, in order to determine maximum values, relay short-circuit current must be calculated with all lines, transformers, and generators in service and with selected lines, transformers, and generators out of service for both three-phase and single phase-to-ground faults. Maximum short-circuit current through specific relays for faults within other zones of protection most likely occurs when some lines, transformers, or generators are out of service.

9.5 Minimum Relay Short-Circuit CurrentFault in Protected Zone

Minimum relay short-circuit current with selected lines, transformers, and generators out of service should be calculated for both three-phase and single phase-to-ground faults. Ground banks need to be included in calculations as ground banks can increase total current while reducing the contribution detected by protective relays. The usual concerns that need to be evaluated for minimum relay short-circuit current include Fault restriction: Arc resistance, contact resistance, poor conductivity, etc., can reduce available fault current significantly. Fault restrictions of 1 ohm, 10 ohms, 100 ohms, or as dictated by analysis of previous fault conditions, should be considered. Generator demagnetization: When sustained faults occur, nearby generators and motors will be demagnetized and generator impedance will increase. When generator impedance increases to its synchronous value, generator short-circuit current may be less than generator full-load current. This may significantly reduce available fault current. Voltage restrained overcurrent relays may be needed to detect short-circuit current that approaches generator full-load current. Line-end faults: Line-end faults need to be evaluated for normal system conditions when all circuit breakers are closed, for sequential fault clearing where some circuit breakers open later than oth-

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ers, and for fault testing conditions where one circuit breaker is closed to check whether the fault was a transient condition, etc. Ground bank action: Depending on the configuration of the power system, ground banks can enhance the operation of overcurrent phase relays and enhance or inhibit the operation of overcurrent ground relays. This possibility must be recognized and evaluated. Various contingencies: Planned and forced equipment outages can reduce the number of current sources or the efficacy of each source. Protective relaying schemes must be designed to detect faults subsequent to loss of a line, transformer, and/or generator due to maintenance or repair activities. If the power system is capable of continued operation with multiple lines, transformers and generators out of service, then protective relaying schemes need to be as flexible as the system they protect. Fault testing: Available fault current can be greatly reduced during fault testing conditions, that is, when one circuit breaker is closed to learn whether a fault is transient or permanent. Transformer winding connections: Transformer primary current may be significantly less than transformer secondary current due to transformer winding connections (-Y, Y-, Y--Y).

9.6 Fault Current Ratio

The ratio of total fault current to the current flowing through specific lines and transformers needs to be considered. This is true for both network and radial systems. When protecting radial systems, the usual concerns are that maximum ratios need to be considered when coordinating relays and that minimum ratios need to be considered when evaluating stuck circuit-breaker conditions. When protecting networked systems, unequal fault-current distribution is an additional consideration. Typical fault current ratio considerations are illustrated in Examples 9.6. example 9.2a: Maximum ratio, radial Feeder
Objective: Coordinate relays at Bus A, Line 1 with relays at Bus B, Line 2 (illustrated in Figure 9.12). Significant setting consideration: In order to maximize ratio of current between Line 1 relays and Line 2 relays, Line 3 is assumed to be out of service.

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B Line 1 I = 4,000 Amps Line 3 Out of Service Line 2 I = 4,000 Amps

Figure 9.12 Maximum current ratio coordination illustration. B A Line 1 I = 4,000 Amps C Line 3 I = 4,000 Amps Figure 9.13 Minimum current illustration. Line 2 I = 8,000 Amps

example 9.2b: Minimum ratio, radial Feeder

Objective: Set relays at Bus A, Line 1 to detect stuck circuit breaker at Bus B, Line 2 (illustrated in Figure 9.13). Significant setting consideration: In order to minimize current detected simultaneously by Line 1 relays and Line 3 relays for a stuck circuit breaker at Bus B, both lines are assumed to be in service. (If either line is removed from service, the remaining line would carry more fault current to the fault near Bus B.)

example 9.2c: unequal Distribution, Networked Feeder

Objective: Set communicated aided relays at Bus A and Bus B so that close-in faults at Bus A will be detected simultaneously by relays at both Bus A and Bus B (illustrated in Figure 9.14).
A I = 40,000 Amps C Line Out of Service Figure 9.14 Unequal current distribution illustration. I = 400 Amps B

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Line 1 I = 8,000 Amps I = 4,000 Amps

Figure 9.15 Unequal current distribution illustration, fault on radial tap.

Significant setting consideration: Relay setting at Bus B for faults close to Bus A may be more critical than the setting at Bus A if relays at both line terminals need to detect line faults simultaneously. When evaluating this condition, removing other lines from service one at a time, terminating at Bus B, should be considered to minimize current flow from Bus B to the fault.

example 9.2d: Networked Feeder, radial line Tap

Objective: Set relays at Bus A and Bus B to detect faults at end of tap (illustrated in Figure 9.15). Significant setting considerations: 1. If simultaneous fault detection is required at Bus A and Bus B, faults should be calculated with lines terminating at Bus A removed from service, one at a time, when determining setting for relays at Bus A for Line 1. Then faults should be calculated with lines terminating at Bus B removed from service, one at a time, when determining setting for relays at Bus B for Line 1. 2. If sequential fault clearing is acceptable and relays at Bus A need to actuate to clear the fault before relays at Bus B can detect the fault, then faults should be calculated with lines terminating at Bus A removed from service, one at a time.

9.7 Relay Sensitivity

Relay setpoints need to include margins for arc resistance, sequential clearing, and fault testing. The usual concerns that need to be evaluated include Overcurrent relays need to be able to detect highly restricted ground faults. (Dry concrete is an insulator.)
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Arc resistance needs to be included in phase distance relay setpoint calculations. Apparent impedances need to be included in distance relay setting calculations. Minimum repeatable relay pickup needs to be established. For current relays, this may be 10%, 25%, or 50% of tap value. For voltage relays, this may be 1%, 2%, or 5% of tap value. Directional unit sensitivity needs to be checked. Pilot scheme sensitivity needs to be checked for close in faults at all line terminals. Sensitivity of ground relays on double circuit lines needs to be checked. Impact of ground banks on ground relay sensitivity needs to be checked. Impact of distributed generation needs to be considered.

9.8 Circuit Loading

Ideally protective relays should not limit circuit loading. When working with equipment that conforms to National Electric Code requirements, circuit load is limited to the lowest value that ensures components are not dangerously overloaded. When working with electrical equipment that is exempt from National Electric Code requirements, that is, electric utility systems, components are designed to be loaded to their maximum thermal capability. This includes 15-minute, 4-hour, and 24-hour emergency load values for both summer and winter. Load values need to be compared to protective relay settings, protective relay coil ratings, and CT ratings. When protective relay setpoints or current coils limit circuit loading, relay setting changes or relay replacements should be considered. When CTs limit circuit loading, replacing CTs or changing CT ratios should be considered. Steady state, short time, and transient load limits should be determined, in amps and/or in MVA, for each protective device and documented for reference. Steady state refers to long-time load. Short time refers to load during voltage recovery, cold load pickup, and motor-starting conditions. Transient load refers to load during system swings, during makebefore-break load transfers, during fast dead-bus transfers and during circuit energization. When determining load capability, margins must be included for setpoint accuracy, CT accuracy, VT accuracy, load variability, voltage

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variations, and unknowns. Actual margins need to be based on experience and expectations. If the expectation is that highly accurate settings are required, every effort may be made to reduce margins to minimal values. If the expectation is that settings are developed quickly, margins may be increased to account for unknowns and inaccuracies. Typical values fall within the following ranges:
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: VT accuracy Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin (typical): 310% 0.52% 0.12% 5600% 520% 5100% 20400%

example 9.3a
Calculate steady-state load current that would cause a time overcurrent phase relay to operate if the system voltage is 13.8 KV and the relay is set to pick up at 600 amps. Typical margins that are used to develop maximum load capability of time overcurrent relays during steady-state conditions are
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin: 3.0% 0.5% 5.0% 10.0% 6.5% 25.0%

When a 25% margin is applied to a time overcurrent relay set to pick up at 600 amps, the maximum advisable steady-state load current is 450 amps (600A (125%)). If load current is greater than 450 amps, undesired protective relay actuation may occur during peak load conditions. If this relay is used to protect a 13.8-KV line, the maximum advisable steady-state load is 10,750 KVA at 13.8 KV.

example 9.3b
Calculate steady-state load current value that should not be exceeded if a time overcurrent phase relay is set to pick up at 600 amps, the system voltage is 13.8 KV, and the relay must not operate when short-time loading conditions occur. Typical margins that are used to develop maximum load capability of time overcurrent relays during short-time conditions are

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Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin:

3.0% 0.5% 30.0% 10.0% 6.5% 50.0%

Short time is generally defined in seconds and relay operating time can be evaluated at some short time, for example, 2 seconds. If a time overcurrent relay set to pick up at 600 amps will actuate in 2.0 seconds or more at 125% of pickup and a 50% margin is applied, the maximum advisable steady-state load current is 375 amps (600A 125% (150%)). If load current is greater than 375 amps, undesired protective relay actuation may occur during peak load conditions if a short-time overload occurs. If this relay is used to protect a 13.8-KV line, the maximum advisable steady-state load is 8960 KVA at 13.8 KV.

example 9.3c
Calculate the minimum instantaneous overcurrent relay setting required if the maximum steady-state load current value is 450 amps. The system voltage is 13.8 KV and the relay must not operate when transient loading conditions occur. Typical margins that are used to develop minimum instantaneous overcurrent relay settings during transient conditions are
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin: 15.0% 0.5% 600.0% 10.0% 74.5% 700.0%

Transient time is generally defined as instantaneous. If an instantaneous overcurrent relay must be set so that it does not operate during transient conditions, anticipated circuit load would be multiplied by the total margin to determine the minimum instantaneous overcurrent relay pickup setting. If the time overcurrent relay setting is 600 amps, then the minimum instantaneous overcurrent relay setting would be 3150 amps (which is seven times the maximum circuit load during steady-state conditions). When determining the load capability of impedance or distance relays, relay maximum torque angle (MTA; generally the relay maximum torque angle is the line angle unless specifically noted) and power factor angle (pfA) must be considered. Typical values for power factor are between 40 and 90%.

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example 9.3d
Calculate steady-state load current that would cause a mho-type phase distance relay to operate if the system voltage is 138 KV and the relay is set at 20 ohms at a maximum torque angle of 85. Typical margins that are used to develop maximum load capability of impedance or distance relays during steady-state conditions are
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: VT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin: 3.0% 0.5% 0.2% 0% 5.0% 6.3% 20.0%

Before a 20% margin is applied to an impedance or distance relay, the apparent impedance of the load point must be determined, either graphically or algebraically, as shown in Figure 9.2. When considering steady-state conditions, a power factor of 75% is reasonably conservative. Given: ZR = 20 ohms, Relay MTA = 85, pfA = 41.4 (power factor = 75%) Calculate ZL: ZL = 20 sin (90 (85 41.4)) = 14.48 ohm Calculate Load MVA at 138 KV. Relay steady-state load capability, in MVA, is given by the equation MVA = KV 2 (138 KV )2 (1 Margins) = (1 0.20) = 1052 MVA @ 138 KV ZL 14.48

Generally the phase distance relay (Zone 2 or Zone 3) with the largest reach would be the relay that is the most likely to operate on steady-state load current.

example 9.3e
Calculate short-time load current that would cause a mho-type phase distance relay to operate if the system voltage is 138 KV and the relay is set at 20 ohms at a maximum torque angle of 85.

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Typical margins that are used to develop maximum load capability of impedance or distance relays during short-time conditions are
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: VT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin: 3.0% 0.5% 0.2% 25.0% 10.0% 6.3% 40.0%

Before a 40% margin is applied, the apparent impedance of the load point must be determined as shown in Figure 9.16 for a mho-type relay. When considering short-time conditions, a power factor of 75% is reasonably conservative. Given: ZR = 20 ohms, Relay MTA = 85, pfA = 41.4 (power factor = 75%) Calculate ZL: ZL = 20 sin (90 (85 41.4))= 14.48 ohm Relay short time load capability, in MVA, is given by the equation MVA = KV 2 (138 KV )2 (1 M argins) = (1 0.40) = 789 MVA @ 138 KV ZL 14.48

Short time is generally defined in seconds. Generally the phase distance relay (Zone 2 or Zone 3) with the largest reach would be the relay that is the most likely to operate on short-time load current.

ZL10 ZM120 ZM120 Bus 1 ZL20 ZM120 Bus 2

Mutual Impedance Impedes Current Flow from Bus 1 to Bus 2 for Fault at Bus 2 If ZL10 = 10 , ZL20 = 10 , and ZM120 = 5 , Figure 9.16 Then, the equivalent zero sequence impedance from Bus 1 to Bus 2 is: Calculation of apparent load impedance, given MTA, pfA, and ZR (Example 9.3d). ZL10 ZM120 10 5 Zeq = + ZM120 = + 5 = 7.5 ZL20 ZM120 10 5

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example 9.3f
Calculate transient load current that would cause a mho-type phase distance relay to operate if the system voltage is 138 KV and the relay is set at 20 ohms at a maximum torque angle of 85. Typical margins that are used to develop maximum load capability of impedance or distance relays during transient conditions are
Setpoint accuracy: CT accuracy: VT accuracy: Load variability: Voltage variations: Unknowns: Total margin: 3.0% 0.5% 0.2% 30.0% 10.0% 6.3% 50.0%

Before a 50% margin is applied to an impedance or distance relay, the apparent impedance of the load point must be determined as shown in Figure 9.16 for a mho-type relay. When considering short-time conditions, a power factor of 70% is reasonably conservative. Given: ZR = 20 ohms, Relay MTA = 85, pfA = 45.6 (power factor = 70%) ZL = 20 sin (90 (85 45.6))= 15.45 ohm Relay transient load capability, in MVA, is given by the equation MVA = KV 2 (138 KV )2 (1 M argins) = (1 0.50) = 616 MVA @ 138 KV ZL 15.45

Transient time is generally defined as instantaneous. Generally the Zone 1 phase distance relay would be the relay that is the most likely to operate on transient load current. During system swings, the possibility that communication aided phase distance relays may operate must also be evaluated.

9.9 Relay Coordination

When two or more relays are able to detect a fault, only the relays associated with the faulted component should initiate fault clearing. Relays associated with other components should be delayed from tripping until after the first relay has attempted to isolate the failed component. In network

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applications, relays must be coordinated with both upstream and downstream devices. Typical margins that are used to develop coordinating intervals include allowances for Protective relay actuation Circuit-breaker opening Protective relay reset Timers Lockout relays Auxiliary relays Overtravel Circuit-breaker failure Margin for unknowns 32 milliseconds or as needed 50 ms, 83 ms, 133 ms, or as needed 50 ms or as needed as needed 16 ms, 32 ms, or as needed 4 ms, 8, ms, 16 ms, or as needed 50 ms, 100 ms, or as needed t wice circuit-breaker opening time or as needed 100 ms, 200 ms, or as needed

Coordination should be evaluated for maximum current conditions and for faults that are restricted to slightly less than the pickup of instantaneous relays. Coordination should be checked for normal fault clearing (with all components in service and with selected components removed from service), stuck breaker conditions, and for other conditions that could result in unnecessary customer interruptions. Development of coordination time intervals for time overcurrent relays is illustrated in Figure 9.17. After coordination delays are determined for relay at B, coordination between relays at A and B must be checked and settings must be revised, if needed. Generally, setting changes are initiated when miscoordination is possible. This may include increased time delay for the upstream relay, increased pickup settings for the upstream relay, replacement of protective relays at one or more locations, installation of communication-aided relaying schemes, reduced pickup setting for the downstream relay, reduced time delay for the downstream relay, etc.

9.10 Directionality
If the flow of fault current for a fault in the forward direction is less than the flow of fault current for a fault in the reverse direction or if the direction of fault-current flow is a significant variable, then directional relays should be considered. This consideration is illustrated in Figure 9.18.
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Relay at A

Relay at B

Relay at C

Fault clearing at C, restricted fault: Circuit breaker failure timer at C 100 ms Lockout relay at C Backup circuit breaker at C Relay overtravel at B Margins for unknowns Minimum coordinating time interval at B:
Figure 9.17 Relay at B must be delayed to coordinate with relay at C. A B I = 4,000 Amps A

16 ms 50 ms 50 ms 100 ms 316 ms

I = 8,000 Amps Figure 9.18 Current from A to close in fault at A is less than current from B to A for a close in fault on an adjacent line at A.

9.11 Accuracy of Calculations

Although it is possible to develop very accurate calculations (2%), most calculations are reasonably accurate (10%) for the task at hand. Generally calculations are developed using nominal transformer turns ratio and the impedance stamped on the transformer nameplate. Actual transformer impedance at other tap connections may be less or a little more than the impedance stamped on the nameplate. Generally transformer impedance (Z), rather than transformer winding resistance (R) and leakage
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reactance (X), is used in short-circuit calculations. For large transformers, X/R is greater than 10 and this simplifying assumption is reasonable. Generally transmission-line impedances are calculated values that take actual conductor spacing, tower height, line length, and conductor sag into consideration. Actual transmission-line impedance will vary with temperature, but temperature variations are neglected. Generally transmission-line conductors are not transposed. The result is that the impedance of each phase will be slightly different from the value used in short-circuit calculations. Generally typical distribution-line impedances are sufficient as variations in line construction make calculation of distribution-line impedances tedious and time consuming. Typical calculations are generally developed for each different conductor type, size, and application (overhead or underground) as resistance varies considerably with different applications. Typical impedance values are generally used for small generators. Actual values are generally used for large generators. In most cases, generator subtransient reactance is used in short-circuit calculations. Generator transient or synchronous reactance may need to be used when calculations associated with generator protection are developed. (When transient or synchronous reactance is used, generator time constants need to be included in the analysis.) When developing short-circuit calculations that will be used to develop protective relay settings, motor contributions are usually omitted. When developing circuit breaker-interrupting current calculations or bus short-circuit withstand calculations, motor contributions are included in calculations.

9.12 Device Accuracy

When selecting setpoints for protective relays, the accuracy of current transformers, voltage transformers, and relay setpoints needs to be assessed. Deviations from textbook time-current curves and minimum operate current or voltage needs to be evaluated. For current-sensitive relays, allowance for device accuracy can be as low as 3% and as high as 25%. For voltage-sensitive relays, allowance for device accuracy can be as low as 2% and as high as 10%. For impedance- and product-sensitive relays, allowance for device accuracy can be as low as 2% and as high as 15%. Time-current curves for electromechanical relays may not be repeatable unless current exceeds 150% of minimum pickup. Time-current curves for other relays may have repeatable time-current curves that are plotted to 110% of minimum pickup current. When multiple input, such as directional overcurrent, or multifunction relays are used, accuracy of individual functions as well as accuracy of multiple functions, in combination, need to be considered.
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9.13 Circuit-Breaker Operating Times

Circuit breaker interrupting time needs to be included when determining coordinating delays and when setting circuit breaker-failure timers. Actual circuit-breaker opening times should be used, as the interrupting time of older circuit breakers can be much different than the interrupting time of newer circuit breakers. When automatic, high-speed ground switches are used, circuit breakerinterrupting time needs to be considered in order to ensure that highspeed ground switches do not close while a circuit breaker is opening. The concern is that short-circuit current could suddenly increase from a few hundred amperes to thousands of amperes as circuit-breaker contacts are opening.

9.14 Transient Overreach

Relay operation must be evaluated for expected transients. Most faults have a decaying DC component in addition to the AC component. This is due to the fact that current cannot change instantaneously in inductive circuits. DC current offsets AC current at t = 0, as illustrated in Figure 9.19. The magnitude of the DC current is a function of when the fault occurredat voltage zero or at peak voltage. The time constant of the decaying DC current is a function of X/R of the power circuit. If protective relays respond to DC current, then AC and average DC current must be added algebraically, using the following equation to determine setpoints that will not be susceptible to overreach. Total current is a function of average DC current. Faster relays require greater margins because the average DC current is greater. I +I 2 I Total = I AC + DC0 DC 2 2 IDC0 = I AC IDC 2 = I AC
Peak 2

= 2 I AC e
Rt L

RMS

Peak

where L = the inductance of the circuit R = the resistance of the circuit t = expected operating time of the relay
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1500 1000 500 0 Amperes 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Time

Figure 9.19 Asymmetrical current.

Figure 9.7 is the effective current sensed by an instantaneous overcurrent relay that responds to both AC and DC current if the symmetrical AC RMS current is 3000 amps, X/R of the circuit is 6, and the relay response time is 16 ms. 4243 + 1553 I Total = (3000)2 + amps 2 I Total = 4171 amps This would indicate that a margin of 39% would be required in order to provide a setting that does not overreach when DC current is a design consideration. When selecting settings for phase distance relays, transient response can be affected by CCVTs (voltage cannot change instantaneously in capacitive circuits). Margins for phase distance relays supplied via CCVTs are relay specific. Typical margins may need to be increased 510% when working with CCVTs.
2

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9.15 Cold Load Inrush

When customer load is restored after extended outages, circuit load may be substantially greater than peak load. This is a naturally occurring phenomenon that is referred to as cold load inrush. After outages, total circuit load, which is the combination of continuous load and cycling load, increases above normally observed values until normal load diversity recovers. In summer, the dominant cycling load will be air conditioning. If, during summer conditions, one of every two connected air-conditioning units is operating, many air-conditioning units can be expected to start and remain in operation when a circuit is restored following a prolonged outage. Cold load inrush is calculated using the following equation: Cold Load Inrush = 1 Diversity Factor

In the one of every two cases, the diversity factor for cycling loads would be 50% and the cold load inrush would be calculated as follows: Cold Load Inrush = 1 = 200% 50%

In winter, the dominant cycling load will be space heating. If, during winter conditions, one of every two space-heating units is operating, many space-heating units can be expected to start and remain in operation when a circuit is restored following a prolonged outage. Heat pumps with auxiliary resistance heaters may increase circuit load even higher. For heat pumps with auxiliary heaters the cold load inrush would be calculated using the following equation: Cold Load Inrush = 1 (1 + Auxiliary Heater Factor) Diversity Factor

The auxiliary heater factor is the percentage of heat pumps with electric resistance auxiliary heaters. With a diversity factor of 50% and an auxiliary heat factor of 75%, the cold load inrush would be calculated as follows: Cold Load Inrush = 1 (1 + 75%) = 350% 50%

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Table 9.1 Estimated Cold Load Inrush

Load Period: Peak, Winter % of Peak Load Group 1 Loads Incandescent Lights Small Motors Space and Water Heaters Heat Pumps Air Conditioning Other Loads Group 2 Loads Loads with Alternate Supply Group 3 Loads Large Loads Group 4 Loads Unassigned Load Type Estimated Cold Load 10% 10% 20% 20% 0% 20% 0% Cold Load Estimate Load Auxiliary 16 ms 2 Seconds 30 Minutes Diversity Heat Factor Factor Watts Vars Watts Vars Watts Vars 100% 25% 50% 50% 50% 100% 100% 50% 80% 96% 220% 40% 116% 120% 15 min. 220% 10% 32% 24% 40% 48% 24% 20% 10% 8% 40% 6%

48% 24% 20%

0% 20%

100%

15 min. 120% 20% 20%

100%

572% 440% 170% 48% 146% 30%

Cold Load Projections: 16-Millisecond Inrush 2-Second Load 15-Minute Load Diverse Load

722% of Winter Peak Load 177% of Winter Peak Load 149% of Winter Peak Load 100% Winter Peak Load

Cold load inrush should be calculated for instantaneous current, for short-time load, and for long-time load. Power factor can be a significant consideration for instantaneous and short-time loading. In Table 9.1, cold load inrush calculations for winter peak load are shown. This table was developed with the following assumptions: Average current for incandescent light filaments is eight times normal during the first 16 milliseconds while the filament is heating; power factor of starting motors is 40%; power factor of running motors is 80%; motor inrush current is six times full load current; large motors are started manually; loads with alternate
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supplies are transferred to their alternate power source; and voltage does not collapse because of cold load inrush. As circuit load increases, the possibility of cold load inrush causing undesired protective relay actuations increases. During peak conditions, loss of load diversity can become a problem within an hour. During near peak conditions, loss of load diversity may not become a problem unless the circuit is interrupted for several hours.

9.16 Redundancy
Protective relaying schemes, circuit breakers, protective relays, current transformers, etc., are very reliable. Nevertheless, redundant protective relaying schemes should be installed so that short circuits can be isolated even if a circuit breaker fails to trip or a protective relay fails to actuate. For transmission system applications, redundant protective relaying schemes are essential as an undetected fault can cause widespread grid collapse. As discussed in Chapter 7, redundant schemes may be designated Scheme I and Scheme II, Primary and Secondary, Primary and Backup, Line 1 and Line 2, Channel A and Channel B, Division I and Division II, etc. For distribution system applications, overlapping zones of protection can be used to obtain redundancy. With overlapping zones of protection, faults may persist for seconds before a remote backup scheme actuates to isolate a fault. This is an acceptable compromise as delayed clearing of distribution system faults should not cause widespread problems.

9.17 Relay Drift

Protective relays are very reliable devices. Nevertheless, the possibility of unplanned setting changes should be a design consideration. When using electromechanical relays, panel vibration (bearing damage), high temperatures (grease hardens over time), dust, and dirt can cause setting drift. When using solid-state relays, component aging or thermal cycling can cause setting drift. When using microprocessor-based relays, the original software, and all subsequent patches, must be validated by the manufacturer before a microprocessor-based relay is returned to service after software changes as well as before a microprocessor-based relay is initially placed in service. General practice is to establish maintenance intervals for protective relays that are based on manufacturers recommendations and to adjust the maintenance interval based on test results during periodic maintenance activities.
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9.18 Security
Generally protective relay schemes are designed with OR logic; that is, if relay 1 or relay 2 actuates, circuit breakers are tripped to isolate components. In power system applications, the focus has been on designing protective relaying schemes that guarantee quick detection and rapid isolation of faultseven when single failures occur as well as when various power system components are out of service for planned or unplanned reasons. In other industries, the focus has been on designing schemes that are secure from inadvertent actuation. The security of protective relay schemes has been increased by the utilization of Timers that delay tripping Relays that require more than one input to actuate (differential relays, impedance relays, directional relays, etc.) Communication-based schemes that require two or more inputs (directional comparison, permissive overreaching, etc.) Settings that minimize overreach Permissives that supervise relay actuation The security of protective relaying schemes can be further increased by the utilization of AND logic. Relay 1 and relay 2 must actuate to trip circuit breakers. Two of three voting logic. Relay 1 and relay 2 or relay 1 and relay 3 or relay 2 and relay 3 must actuate to trip circuit breakers. One of two taken twice voting logic. Relay 1 or relay 2 and relay 3 or relay 4 must actuate to trip circuit breakers. Detailed descriptions of control logic associated with various protective relaying schemes are discussed in Chapter 10.

9.19 Arc Flash Hazard

When faults occur, the instantaneous conversion of electrical energy to thermal energy is an essential part of protective relay setpoint selection. The equation used to calculate the distance, from a fault, where an

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individual would not be expected to sustain a life-threatening burn is given by the following equation. D C = 2.65 MVA bf t where DC t MVAbf = Distance in feet of a person from an arc source for a just curable burn = time in seconds = Bolted fault MVA at the point involved

Typical values would be as follows:

System Voltage 500 KV 345 KV 230 KV 138 KV 69 KV 34 KV 23 KV 12 KV Maximum ShortCircuit Current 63,000 amps 63,000 amps 63,000 amps 63,000 amps 63,000 amps 40,000 amps 40,000 amps 40,000 amps MVAbf 54,560 MVA 37,650 MVA 25,100 MVA 15,060 MVA 7530 MVA 2360 MVA 1560 MVA 831 MVA Time 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms 100 ms DC 120 feet 100 feet 82 feet 63 feet 45 feet 25 feet 21 feet 12 feet

The significance is that when work is performed near exposed, energized circuits or circuit parts within the calculated distance and the work has the potential to create an accidental arc hazard, then the incident energy level must be calculated and personnel must be outfitted in arc flash protective equipment appropriate for the work activity.

9.20 Circuit Breaker-Failure Detection and Isolation

When a circuit breaker fails to open or interrupt, other circuit breakers must trip to isolate the failed circuit breaker. The type of breaker failure scheme and the required number of circuit-breaker schemes are a function of switchyard design (single-breaker, single-bus; double-breaker, double-bus; ring bus, breaker and one half, etc.) Breaker failure schemes can be local or remote. Detailed descriptions of control logic associated with various protective relaying schemes are discussed in Chapter 17. All circuit breakers in transmission system applications must be equipped with circuit breaker-failure schemes.

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9.21 Free-Standing CT Flashover Detection

Generally current transformers are placed at the grounded side of transformer or circuit-breaker bushings. If free standing CTs are used, schemes must be installed to detect the flashover of the CT support insulator.

9.22 Switchable Settings

When microprocessor-based relays are installed, settings can be switched by operator action as well as by control logic and by circuit-breaker position indicating switches (open or closed). Switchable settings can be used to minimize cold load inrush concerns, to disable selected functions temporarily, or to enable selected functions temporarily.

9.23 Recovery Voltage Inrush

When customer load is recovering from voltage sags due to three-phase short circuits, circuit load may be substantially greater than prefault load. This is a naturally occurring phenomenon that is referred to as recovery voltage inrush. After faults are cleared, circuit load increases above normally observed values until motor speed recovers. In summer, the dominant cycling load will be air conditioning. If, during summer conditions, a fault persists long enough for air conditioning motors to stall, many air conditioning units can be expected to simultaneously draw locked rotor current until motor speed increases to normal (above 90% of synchronous speed). Recovery voltage transients that are due to stalled air conditioners may not be recoverable if traditional undervoltage relays are used to detect the anomaly. Due to undervoltage tripping requirements, voltage comparison schemes that compare substation transformer primary voltage and substation transformer secondary voltage are the preferred tripping schemes.

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