IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH Brandia Taamu (Defendant) V City

of Everett (Plaintiff) Writ of Mandate to represent myself Pro Se Filed in conjunction with 1) Motion for Release of Private Property for Violation of Due Process, Procedural Errors & Undue Harship 2) Emergency stay of execution & or transfer of pets outside of facility 3) Gag order for Everett Animal Control 4) Motion to Dismiss case pending

Comes now Brandia Taamu to plead with a court of higher ruling to grant the relief requested of judgements & lack thereof of an inferior court in the County of Snohomish INDEX: A) Writ of Madate B) Petition for the release of Property & Gag Order for Everett Animal Control C) Demand for Release of Property & Pets D) Motion to Dismiss Case Pending

WRIT OF MANDATE TO REPRESENT MYSELF PRO SE I am requesting the right & the priviledge to defend myself in regards to a misdemeanor criminal matter before the Everett courts. I realize full well the perils of self representation but this matter is a cause of life or death. One of my animals has already been executed without my knowledge or consent, 5 more are being held at Everett Animal Control, worse yet, they are in foster care, I have no idea who these people are, what their qualifications are or how they are being cared for. This case has the ability to literally destroy my life & my livelihood, I run an animal rescue called Finally Home Rescue & am licensed to do business in the State of Washington. The public defender I have been appointed lacks any trial experience, & is by all standards, not qualified in any means to handle a case like mine which involves, Due Process, Siezure of Property, Maritime, & Federal Laws. A perfect example of her lack of understanding of the law is: I filed an Affidavit of Prejudice against the original Judge who signed the warant, because in effect he had already convicted me with his signature without even ascertaining the witness credibility, my PD

asked the Judge to hear her Motion to Withdraw... He had to explain to her why he couldn't rule on her Motion. Plus he sent my original return to return my animals to the house of the woman who was calling on me, not to my address so I had even more harassment from her than before. Furthermore her credentials are lacking at the very best. I am not a lawyer & have had no prior training but I am the owner of these animals, I am the one who will lose everything if I don't win this case, this is my life & my understanding was that the 6th Amendment guaranteed me a right to defend it. My animals are special needs, & senior animals, who would most likely be euthanized if I were to lose, my standing in the community I work in would be forever destroyed with a conviction of Animal cruelty, I have waited 40 yrs to do this for a living & I am good at it, not so much at making any money at it but I am making a difference. I am not sure why with the budget woes Everett claims to have that they have so much time & money to prosecute a woman sleeping temporarily in a car with her Animals, with 7 years of vet records that show that my dogs, cats & other furries have always had consistent vet care. I have been to court about 14 times on this matter & we haven't even made it to pre-trial motions not to mention that they keep scheduling me with the wrong judge when they know full well that I have horrific Agoraphobia & one of the dogs they took was my own personal therapy dog, so just getting out the door is monumental, almost as if they are having fun just playing with me. The judge in this matter stated "The Washington State Supreme Court believes you have a right to represent yourself, we here in Snohomish County don't think so" & then he made a statement that he wasn't going to let me procede Pro Se because every time he does, they send it back, I don't know who "they" is & I dont know what it is they send back, that is not my issue, & furthermore the Judge has already stated in a hearing to transfer my dogs out to foster care when I requested they leave them where they were so I would know where they were, he said in open court "well you abused your animals so I think that Everett Animal Control knows what is better for them" When I asked if he had already convicted me he refused to answer, but his statement said it all. So now I have to trust a lawyer who doesn't understand courtroom procedure, to a prosecutor who has tricked me into presenting my whole criminal case in the Petition hearing, & a Judge who believes he is above the Washington state Supreme court & has already convicted me. Who also sits on the Superior Court according to him. I am trying to learn if I can get a Change of Venue without this taking too long & I have filed complaints with everyone involved with the Bar Asociation, the Judicial Commission, the Ethics Commitee & the Dept of Justice because there is far more involved than what is relevent to my request to represent myself. It has been well over 116 days since I have seen my Animals, (they were taken January,6th, 2011) for living in a car. I honestly don't believe I will get a fair trial or anything close to it so it absolutely imparitive that I represent myself so that I can introduce the evidence I need to in order to have a basis for appeal. Rspectfully Submitted On May,2nd, 2011 Brandia Taamu

PETITION FOR THE RETURN OF PROPERTY & A GAG ORDER FOR EVERETT ANIMAL CONTROL IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH

BRANDIA TAAMU PETITIONER | V CITY OF EVERETT & OF PETS CITY OF EVERETT ANIAL CONTROL ANIMAL RESPONDENTS | | |

| |

COMPLAINT FOR RELEASE OFPETITIONER'S

PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR VIOLATION OFDUE PROCESS, PROCEDURAL ERRORS.&UNDUE HARDSHIP. EMERGENCY INJUNCTION FOR | STAY OF EXECUTION OR TRANSFER | | & A CEASE & DESIST FOR EVERETT AN CONTROL RELEASING PRIVATE INFO

PETITIONER BRANDIA TAAMU, PRO SE, RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THIS PETITION, & MOTION IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT FOR RELEASE OF PETITIONERS PETS FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS & UNDUE HARDSHIP. ALSO FOR AN EMERGENCY INJUCTION PREVENTING THE EUTHANISIA OF ANY MORE OF PETITIONER'S PETS OR TRANSFER OUT TO ANOTHER FACILITY. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1) ON JANUARY 6 2011 EVERETT ANIMAL COTROL SHOWED UP WITH EVERETT POLICE DEPT WITH A WARRANT TO TAKE DOGS FROM MY VEHICLE. THE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER SHOWED ME THE WARRANT NOT THE EVERETT POLICE DEPT. I WAS NEVER READ MY RIGHTS & THE ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER DID NOT LEAVE THE WARRANT, THE REPORT, OR ANY INFO THAT WOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT IF ANY LEGAL REMEDIES THAT I HAD AVAILABLE TO GET MY DOGS BACK IN VIOLATION OF RCW 16.52.085 (3) & I BELIEVE THAT BEFORE THE WARRANT I WAS NEVER CITED NOR GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY ANY CONDITIONS ANIMAL CONTROL SEEN UNFIT. I WAS NOT EVEN A RESIDENT OF THE CITY OF EVERETT & WAS HOMELESS AT THE TIME. 2) EVERETT ANIMAL CONTROL HAS NOT ALLOWED ME TO CALL TO CHECK ON THE HEALTH & WELARE OF MY ANIMALS NOR ALLOWED ME TO VISIT THEM. I DID NOT FIND OUT THAT MY SENIOR ESKIMO WAS DEAD UNTIL THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TOLD ME THAT. I HAVE NOT SEEN MY DOGS OR CAT IN OVER 41 DAYS. 3) OFFICER'S TRASK & DELGADO HAVE REFUSED TO LET ME SEE A REPORT OR THE COMPLAINT OR EVEN GIVE ME AN IDEA OF WHAT I WAS BEING CHARGED WITH. THEY ARE ALSO REFUSING TO GIVE ME MY DEAD DOGS BODY BECAUSE THEY SAY HE IS "EVIDENCE" 4) THE PERSON WHO MADE THE COMPLAINT LIED & DID THIS OUT OF MALICIOUSNESS & HAS POSTED NUMEROUS SLANDEROUS POSTS ABOUT ME ON CRAIGSLIST & SENT OUT MASS EMAILS DISCREDITING ME. SHE IS ALSO CLAIMING THAT ANIMAL CONTROL AGENTS ARE SHOWING HER ON THEIR COMPUTER THAT I HAVE DUMPED NUMEROUS DOGS ON THEM, WHEN IN FACT I USED TO PULL DOGS OUT OF THERE FOR RESCUE. SHE IS ALSO CLAIMING THEY ARE CALLING HER TO TELL HER MY DOGS HAVE GIARDIA & WORMS. HER HARASSMENT HAS GOTTEN SO BAD THAT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GET AN ANTI HARASSMENT ORDER AGAINST HER AS WELL. IF IN FACT ANIMAL CONTROL IS GIVING HER PERSONAL INFORMATIION ABOUT MY ANIMALS I WOULD LIKE A CEASE & DESIST ORDER PUT IN PLACE AS THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO DISCUSS MY CASE OR ANY OF MY INFORMATION WITH ANYONE EXCPET FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT. SHE HAS GONE SO FAR AS TO CLAIM I DON'T HAVE A BUSINESS LICENSE & THAT I AM NOT A MINISTER 5) ALL OF MY ANIMALS ARE RESCUES & HAVE SEVERE EMOTIONAL & SOME PHYSICAL

ISSUES & BEING CONFINED IN AN AREA BARELY TWICE AS BIG AS MY CAR WITHOUT LOVE & COMFORT IS DETRIMENTAL TO THEIR HELATH & SAFETY. I REALIZE LIVING IN A CAR WAS NOT AN IDEAL SITUATION FOR ANY OF US BUT I WAS ACTIVELY SEARCHING FOR A NEW HOME FOR ALL OF US BUT TRYNG TO SAVE ENOUGH MONEY TO DO SO. I HAVE NOW SECURED A RESIDENCE WHERE WE CAN ALL BE TOGTHER INSIDE FROM THE ELEMENTS. 6) IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE OFFICER TOLD ME SHE WAS TAKING THE ANIMALS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT HAVE 24 HOUR A DAY WATER. WHEN THEY CAME THERE WAS IN FACT A WATER BOTTLE ON THE HOOD OF THE CAR. EVERETT MUNICIPAL CODE 6.04.070 STATES THE DOGS MUST HAVE CONSTANT ACCESS TO WATER 24HRS A DAY WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH RCW 16.52.310 (D) THAT STATES THEY MUST HAVE ADEQUATE WATER. RCW 35.27.370 (1) & (16) CLEARLY STATE THAT ANY TOWN IS NOT ALLOWED TO PASS LAWS WHICH ARE IN CONFLICT STATE RCW'S. ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICERS TOOK PICTURES OF THE 5 BAGS OF DOG FOOD I HAD FOR THE DOGS AS WELL AS THE CASES OF WET FOOD FOR THE DOGS & THE CAT(S) & I BELIEVE THAT UNDER 16.52.207 (4) I BELIEVE I WILL BE AQUITTED OF ANY CHARGE 7) I AM ALSO REQUESTING THE RETURN OF ALL OF MY DOG'S MEDICATIONS, MY KENNELS, & OTHER DOG SUPPLIES THAT WERE TAKEN FROM MY CAR. 8) Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners without following statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denial of procedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followed by the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal seizure statutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets setting forth the reason for the seizure and the process whereby the petitioners may reacquire possession of their property in their pets. Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by the City of Everett and/or (AC) authorities. The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT in a life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. Property owners have the right to challenge such seizures and, if they substantially prevail, recover their costs and reaasonable attorney fees. RCW 69.50.505(6). (1) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in them (6) In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a court hearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved, the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adopted to protect people from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. In Guillen v. Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that an owner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of market value. Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No. 82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of his personal property no matter the market value. Id. Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and very specific procedures must be followed.by government officials and its agents when seizing property, including animals. If statutory procedures are not followed, the property was illegally seized and a person is lawfully entitled to possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed for evidence, the petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must be returned. Id. The petitioners are the rightful owners of their dogs and cats, their property in dogs and cats is not contraband, statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned to the petitioners. If the state argues that the pets are derivative contraband and that petitioners are somehow guilty of a crime, the government must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs

and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvannia, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. The State cannot confiscate property merely because it is derivative contraband. Instead it must forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a statutory forfeiture procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. RCW 16.52.100 provides that if an animal is confined without necessary food or water for more than 36 hours, and the officer finds it extremely difficult to provide the animal with food or water, the officer may remove the animals to protective custody for that purpose. RCW 16.52.085 sets forth the method whereby an animal may be seized for protective custody for feeding and care. An animal may be seized by an officer only with a warrant UNLESS the animal is in an immediate lifethreatening condition. If the officer decides that an animal is in an immediate life threatening condition to justify summary seizure of the animals, proper notice must be given to the owner of the animal by (1) posting at the place of seizure, and (2) personal service to a person residing at the place of seizure, OR by registered mail to the owner. The Notice must be written notice to the owner of the circumstances of the removal of the animals (without a warrant) and the legal remedies available under this chapter to the owner of the animal(s). The proper procedures by statute are enumerated below. Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due process rights were violated.

IN SUMMARY ON 1/6/2011 EVERETT ANIMAL CONTROL TOOK MY DOGS & CAT FROM MY VEHICLE WITHOUT GIVING ME DUE PROCESS TO FIX OR RESPOND TO ANY ISSUES. ON 1/4/2011 I HAD A RUN IN WITH OFFICER TRASK WHO WAS BEING VERY AGRUEMNTATIVE & LEFT THE PROPERTY, WHEN I REURNED EARLY ON 1/6/2011 SHE SHOWED UP WITH POLICE & AFTER THE FACT THE WOMAN LIVING AT THE RESIDENCE GAVE ME A NOTICE SHE HAD LEFT THERE SAYING I HAD TO TAKE THEM TO A VET & CALL HER BUT NO TIME FRAME WAS GIVEN. THE REPORT WAS A LIE, BUT THEY TOOK THE WOMAN'S WORD BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT SHE WAS THE ONE WHO GAVE ALL THE INFO, VIDEO, & WITNESSES TO THE SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTOR TO SHUT DOWN THE RENE ROSKE PUPPY MILL & ONCE I PROVED THAT IT WAS IN FACT ME WHO PROVIDED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST ME. IT ALSO SAYS IN MY CHARGING PAPERS THAT I AM GUILTY OF ABOUT 6 DIFFERENT THINGS. WHEN THE OFFICERS ARRIVED I WAS ASLEEP IN MY CAR WITH MY ANIMALS WHICH IS WHERE I ALWAYS SLEPT SO I COULD TURN ON THE CAR WHEN WE NEEDED HEAT & SO THEY DIDN'T GET COLD, THE OFFICERS TOOK PICTURES OF THE BAGS OF FOOD & THE CANNED FOOD, I HAVE WELL OVER 42LBS OF VET PAPERS PERTAINING TO MOST OF THE DOGS YOU HAVE IN CUSTODY TO PROVE THEY WERE GETTIN VET CARE, THAT MY ANIMALS HAVE ALWAYS RECIEVED TIMELY VET CARE. MY SENIOR ESKIMO THAT WAS KILED HAS

LYMPHOMA, IT WAS TERMINAL, THERE WAS NO TREATMENT & IT HAS BEEN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE VETS & MYSELF THAT THE TREATMENT USUALLY KILLS THEM FASTER, SO OUR PLAN WAS TO KEEP HIM WITH ME UNTIL IT SEEMED HE WAS IN PAIN OR WAS SUFFERING, HE WAS ACTUALLY IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE EXCEPT FOR CHRONIC CONJUNCTIVITIS, BUT SINCE I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING HOW BEING TAKEN FROM ME AFFECTED HIM EMOTIONALLY OR PHYSICALLY I DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS TRUE CONDITION WAS WHEN HE WAS MURDERED. NONE OF THE DOGS HAD ANY LIFE THREATENING CONDITIONS NONE WERE MALNOURISHED OR DEHYDRATED, NONE WERE INJURED, ALL WHO HAD PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS HAD MEDICATIONS FOR THEM LIKE LIBBY HAD HOT SPOTS, SHE HAD MEDS, HOKI HAS SEIZURES, HE HAS MEDS, SOFFIE HAD CHRONIC BLADDER INFECTIONS WHICH I WAS TOLD BY ONE VET IN SHELTON WAS BLADDER CANCER BUT ANOTHER VET IN SEATTLE SAID SHE WAS JUST FAT, SINCE SHE HAD BEEN BRED 11 TIMES BY THE TIME I GOT HER AT ALMOST 6 YRS OLD, HE SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT SHE HAD ALOT OF INTERNAL DAMAGE AS WELL, SHE DID HAVE A HERNIA THAT REQUIRED EMERGENCY SURGERY FROM BEING OVERBRED SOME 4 YRS AGO AS WELL. I KNOW LIVING IN A CAR WAS NOT IDEAL BUT THEY WERE NEVER UNPROTECTED FROM THE ELEMENTS, & I ONLY FEED MY DOGS QUALITY HIGH END FOODS, WHICH WERE PRESENT IN THE CAR. I NOW HAVE A HOME FOR THEM TO BE, & STILL HAVE ALL OF THEIR FOOD, TOYS & SUPPLIES. IF YOU WILL NOT ORDER THE RETURN OF MY ANIMALS I WANT AN ORDER ALLOWING ME TO SEE THEM TO CHECK ON THEM DAILY SO THAT I CAN KNOW HOW THEY ARE DOING & TO PREVENT FURTHER EMOTIONAL DAMAGE TO THEM OR MYSELF. I AM OPEN TO CONDITIONS OF RELEASE WHICH WOULD BE FEASIBLE TO MY LIVING & ECONOMIC SITUATION, AS THIS IS CAUSING UNDUE HARDSHIP FOR ME EMOTIONALLY & ECONOMICALLY AS WELL. I AM NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THIS MATTER IS SETTLED IN CASE I AM NEEDED AT COURT & BECAUSE I AM POOR SO I AM HAVING TO DO ALL OF THE RESEARCH FOR MY OWN CASE. ALMOST EVERY DAY I PARK ACROSS THE RIVER HOPING TO CATCH A GLIMPSE OF MY DOGS & NEVER HAVE SEEN THEM SO THEY ARE NOT BEING BROUGHT OUTSIDE FOR EXERSIZE & ARE BEING KEPT IN A PLACE BARELY TWICE AS BIG AS MY CAR, WITH THEIR KENNELS BEING HOSED DOWN ONCE A DAY UNTIL WHICH THEY ARE FORCED OT STAND OR SIT IN THEIR OWN WASTE, THEY ARE BEING HOUSED SEPERATELY & HAVE BEEN USED TO BEING TOGETHER, THERE IS ALSO THE ISSUE OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES WHICH THEY COULD BE BEING EXPOSED TO ON A DAILY BASIS, WHICH IS ENDANGERING THEM DAILY. I KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THEY ARE BEING KEPT & WHAT THE HOLDING CELLS LOOK LIKE BECAUSE I USED TO RESCUE DOGS FROM EVERETT ANIMAL SERVICES WHICH THEY PROBABLY WON'T ADMIT BUT I HAVE THE PAPERWORK & VET RECORDS TO PROVE IT. I AM REQUESTING THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF MY DOGS, & OTHER PROPERTY. I REALIZE IN A COURT OF LAW THAT ANIMALS ARE PROPERTY, BUT THEY ARE SENTIENT BEINGS, WITH FEELINGS, THAT FEEL PAIN, DEPRESSION SADNESS, JOY, ELATION, LOVE, LOYALTY, BETRAYAL, & ANY OTHER HOST OF EMOTIONS THE SAME AS YOU OR I WOULD FEEL, KEEPING THEM AWAY FROM ME & EACHOTHER IS NOTHING SHORT OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR A CRIME I HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN CONVICTED OF & DUE IN NO PART TO ANY WRONG DOING FROM THEM. THEY ARE INNOCENT. RESPECTFULLY BRANDIA TAAMU (425) 319-3298 FINALLYHOMERESCUE@YAHOO.COM

DEMAND FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY & PETS CITY OF EVERETT V BRANDIA TAAMU STATEMENT OF FACTS: 1) I have tried petitions, I have tried motions, & yet the City of Everett, refuses to return property & animals which clearly belongs to me amounting to criminal theft. 2) The court made statements in a criminal court hearing that were absolutely inappropriate during a hearing to place my dogs outside of the Everett Animal Shelter to the effect of "you abused your dogs so I think that the shelter knows what is better for them" When I asked if the court had already indicted me, there was a refusal to answer but it was crystal clear from the statement that the courts had already done so. 3) In my Motion for dismissal which the courts said "made me look bad" I have also cited the various laws. At the cost of "looking bad", I have begged the courts, petitioned the courts, now I am demanding that my animals & property be returned to me including my dead dog's body so he can have a customary blessing & proper burial. At the cost of "looking bad" I am demanding my rights as a citizen of the United States of America, & Washington state. 4) My due process & civil rights have been violated & I am citing the laws to you in regards to this matter in case you are not aware of it A) I was never given notice of my legal remedies as REQUIRED by state law under RCW 16.52.085. Notice requirements after removal of personal property by authorities is provided in paragraph (3). After removal of animals, notice must be provided by posting, personal service or certified mail and the owner must be provided written notice of the reasons for removal in this notice and legal remedies available to the owner. B) My animals are NOT subject to forfeiture pursuant to RCW 69.50.505 Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adopted to protect people from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. In Guillen v. Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that an owner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of market value. Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No. 82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of his personal property no matter the market value. Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and very specific procedures must be followed.by government officials and its agents when seizing property, including animals. If statutory procedures are not followed, the property was illegally seized and a person is lawfully entitled to possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed for evidence, the petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must be returned. C) Everett Animal Control has already gleaned all the "evidence" they needed from blood work, lab testing & photographs, my animals are not contraband: derivative, or otherwise & they are not subject to forfeiture under statute. They have not been used in the commission of a felony, they have not been used in any drug transaction & in case it has been forgotten by the courts I have not been criminally convicted my court case has not even commenced yet. Furthermore The State cannot confiscate property merely because it is derivative contraband. Instead it must forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a statutory forfeiture procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claiming an interest in it then has 45 days ( DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE ( RETURN OF MY SEIZED ( ANIMALS & PROPERTY

to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners without following statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denial of procedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followed by the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal seizure statutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets setting forth the reason for the seizure and the process whereby the petitioners may reacquire possession of their property in their pets. Petitioners have been denied procedural due process by the City of Everett and/or (AC) authorities. D) The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT in a life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. I am the rightful owners of these dogs and cats, my property in dogs and cats is not contraband, statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned to the me. If the state argues that the pets are derivative contraband and that I am are somehow guilty of a crime, the government must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. The proper procedures by statute are enumerated above. Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due process rights were violated. E) In regards to the euthanasia of George amounting to permanent deprivation of property & the continued impound of my animals/property my due process rights have been blatantly trampled on. There is no question that I have a protected property interest in the ownership of these animals, and the seizure and impoundment of these dogs triggers due process, Pasco v. Reihl, 635 So.2d 17 (S.Ct. 1994). In the instant case, the petitioner's private property was subject to, among other things, physical confinement, and muzzling. In the aggregate, these restrictions are a deprivation of property and before such restrictions are imposed, a property owner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. I have suffered a deprivation of property without benefit of a hearing, and such violation was a violation of my procedural due process rights. Id. at 19. See also, Mansour v. King, 131 Wash. App. 255 (Wash. App.2006) and Philips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Ca. App. 3d 372 (Cal. App. 1986). The deprivation here is unquestionably more severe than Pasco, as this case involves destruction; a total, complete and final deprivation of my property rights. Where the property was forfeited without constitutionally adequate notice to the claimant, the courts must provide relief, either by vacating the default judgment, or by allowing a collateral suit. See Seguin v Eide, 720 F2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), on remand after judgment vacated, 462 U.S.1101,103 S. Ct. 2446 (1983); Wiren v Eide, 542 F2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976). Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1972); Jaekel v United States, 304 F Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y 1969); Glup v United States, 523 F2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1975). (See FED. R. CIV. P. Supplemental Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions Rule A(1)(B) (making rules applicable to forfeiture actions in rem arising from a federal statute) Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case

due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 35 S. Ct. 625, 629, 59 L. Ed. 1027 (1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), only "wip[ing] the slate clean ... would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place." The Due Process Clause demands no less in this case. Peralta, supra, 108 U.S. at 898-99, 900. F) I have an affirmative defense, which is required as in Federal Forfeiture laws & in Washington state law. Affirmative defenses must be raised in the answer, Fed. R. Civ. P and Sup. Ct. R. Civil Rule 8(c), but the answer may be amended even at the time of trial to conform with the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P and Sup. Ct. R.-Civil Rule 15(b). Also in Washington state RCW 16.52.207 (4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control. G) This whole situation seems to be falling into the "Color of Law" In the words of Supreme Court Judge, Mr. Justice Rutledge He who acts under "color" of law may be a federal officer or a state officer. He may act under "color" of federal law or of state law. The statute does not come into play merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports to act is violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by that action. The fact that it is also a violation of state law does not make it any the less a federal offense punishable as such. Nor does its punishment by federal authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state from its responsibility for punishing state offenses. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 108 (1945). This section was before us in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, where we said: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 109 (1945). For it was abuse of basic civil and political rights, by states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing legislation were adopted to uproot. The danger was not merely legislative or judicial. Nor was it threatened only from the state's highest officials. It was abuse by whatever agency the state might invest with its power capable of inflicting the deprivation. In all its flux, time makes some things axiomatic. One has been that state officials who violate their oaths of office and flout 117*117 the fundamental law are answerable to it when their misconduct brings upon them the penalty it authorizes and Congress has provided. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 116-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. "It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional. . . [It] dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump . . ." United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 387. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 119 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. Separately, and often together in application, 19 and 20 have been woven into our fundamental and statutory law. They have place among our more permanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many rights and privileges apart from political ones. Among those buttressed, either by direct application or through the general conspiracy statute, 37 (18 U.S.C. 88),[24] are the rights to a fair trial, including freedom from sham trials [including sham Collection Due Process Hearings] ; to be free from arrest and detention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property [by threat of levy, lien, or lockdown letters] by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited or shared by state officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion and demand; from interference with the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly;[25] and 127*127 the necessary import of the decisions is that the right to be free from deprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through abuse of state power by state officials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 126-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. They simply misconceived that the victim had no federal rights and that what they had done was not a crime within the federal power to penalize.[30] That kind of error relieves no one from penalty. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 128 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result.

I am the owner of these animals, I was never given proper notice of my rights & all of my constitutional rights have been violated, from the the 4th, 5th, 8th & 14th amendments at least. Not to mention I have suffered cruel & unusual punishment, as have my animals more so than myself. It has been 108 DAYS since I have seen MY dogs & cat, not yours, not the City of Everett's, not the Everett Animal Shelter's, but MY dogs & cat. I am not even sure WHY Everett is continuing in the case against me, unless they have this much money to waste on a woman sleeping in a car, which is absolutely entirely ridiculous & I am sure the people of the city would love to know that their tax dollars are hard at work trying to prosecute MISDEMEANOR cases that have an affirmative defense. I realize that these statements may be taken as contempt, they are NOT, they are common sense, which has up til now not prevailed. Because of your bias, law says you should step down anyway, it is recorded, these are statements you have made in an open court that have been recorded & will soon be transcribed. I am completely flabbergasted with the lack of regard or respect for Washington state law, & Constitutional law, I would submit that is the courts who are in contempt of me, not I, who are in contempt. In your statement that the "Washington State Supreme Court believes I have the right to represent myself, but you in Snohomish County don't think so" further illustrates my point. In every appeal docket I have read, when Snohomish or Everett seizes property the appellate always wins, so this is a pattern in this district, the arbitrary taking of a persons property is prohibited, but beyond the law, the permanent deprivation of the last days of life with George, & the past 108 days without my animals are reprehensible & the courts have made themselves a willing party to this with just the statements that have been made. I now ask for the relief sought, or another quick dismissal so that I can move forward with this action to other administrative agencies as well as the governing court authority of the state of Washington. I am not a lawyer, I am sick & tired, & broken-hearted, you have summarily dismissed my Petition for the return of my animals & property, the Petition to represent myself Pro Se, my Petition for Dismissal, & my request to leave my animals where they were so that I would know where they are at. It is absolutely insane that I have to learn the law & cite law to anyone in the courts. I want my animals & property back, I am entitled by law to have them returned, no matter what the court's "opinion" is of me, the law is the law which you have sworn to uphold. Respectfully Submitted, Brandia Taamu April,23rd, 2011

PETITION FOR DISMISSAL OF CHARGES & RETURN OF PROPERTY Municipal Court of Everett Washington County of Snohomish In re: No. CRP-3735

City of Everett V. Brandia Taamu

(PetitionforDismissal (of all Charges & Return (of all Seized Property

Brandia Taamu moves the court for an order dismissing this action City of Everett V. Brandia Taamu for these reasons: 1) It will be shown that my affirmative defense is in fact credible & that my animals did NOT suffer unjustifiable pain. I got evicted, my husband ran off with everything & I was out of work 16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree. (2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence: (a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure (4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control. 2) It will be shown that Officer Weaver & Officer Trask conspired to make false allegations attirbuting statements to a party who did not make them, taking photos that CLEARLY left out one side of my vehicle that in particular contained the dog's food & supplies. My vet is supposed to beconsulting a lawyer as well because of the statements Officer Weaver made that were untrue. It is also amazing to me that Prosecutor Fisher even believed he could file a case that would have any merit, with all the conflicting evidence. He also let me present my whole case in front of the Commissioner in Superior Court & neither one let me know I had the right to invoke my 5th Amendment rights in order not to incriminate myself or give away my case. If you honestly take a look at my dogs intitial vet exam records you will see all but George (who was terminally ill)were "Bright, Alert, & Responsive" all had clean fecals, except for non-motile bacteria on 2 of them, then the next statement from the same day they were all "dying", had bloodshot eyes, even their teeth got worse, oh but most precious of all is my GRAY dog supposedly had urine stains on her fur, impossible, & my Tri-Colored dog with BLACK feet also had urine stains supposedly. You will aslo note that Soffie the dog who had a bladder stone removed... They never even called the vet in Shelton to confirm she had been seen there & tested, not did they request her records from our current vet. Shelton said she had cancer, our new vet said she was just fat (because I thought she was dying so I spoiled her but after a year of her doing well & just getting fat I took her to our new vet & he didn't catch anything about a bladder stone) RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; (b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing; (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; (f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.

Comment [1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4. [2] In some jurisdictions, a defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c) does not apply, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence. [6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutor of the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to lawenforcement personnel and other relevant individuals. [Amended effective September 1, 2006.] CHAPTER 42.52 RCW ETHICS IN PUBLIC SERVICE. RCW 42.52.010 Definitions. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter. (1) "Agency" means any state board, commission, bureau, committee, department, institution, division, or tribunal in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of state government. "Agency" includes all elective offices, the state legislature, those institutions of higher education created

and supported by the state government, and those courts that are parts of state government. (2) "Head of agency" means the chief executive officer of an agency. In the case of an agency headed by a commission, board, committee, or other body consisting of more than one natural person, agency head means the person or board authorized to appoint agency employees and regulate their conduct. (3) "Assist" means to act, or offer or agree to act, in such a way as to help, aid, advise, furnish information to, or otherwise provide assistance to another person, believing that the action is of help, aid, advice, or assistance to the person and with intent so to assist such person. (6) "Confidential information" means (a) specific information, rather than generalized knowledge, that is not available to the general public on request or (b) information made confidential by law. (8) "Ethics boards" means the commission on judicial conduct, the legislative ethics board, and the executive ethics board. (9) "Family" has the same meaning as "immediate family" in RCW 42.17.020. (12) "Official duty" means those duties within the specific scope of employment of the state officer or state employee as defined by the officer's or employee's agency or by statute or the state Constitution. (13) "Participate" means to participate in state action or a proceeding personally and substantially as a state officer or state employee, through approval, disapproval, decision, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise but does not include preparation, consideration, or enactment of legislation or the performance of legislative duties. (14) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, corporation, firm, institution, or other entity, whether or not operated for profit. (15) "Regulatory agency" means any state board, commission, department, or officer, except those in the legislative or judicial branches, authorized by law to conduct adjudicative proceedings, issue permits or licenses, or to control or affect interests of identified persons. (16) "Responsibility" in connection with a transaction involving the state, means the direct administrative or operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either exercisable alone or through subordinates, effectively to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct state action in respect of such transaction. (17) "State action" means any action on the part of an agency, including, but not limited to: (a) A decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order; and (b) A grant, payment, award, license, contract, transaction, sanction, or approval, or the denial thereof, or failure to act with respect to a decision, determination, finding, ruling, or order. (18) "State officer" means every person holding a position of public trust in or under an executive, legislative, or judicial office of the state. "State officer" includes judges of the superior court, judges of the court of appeals, justices of the supreme court, members of the legislature together with the secretary of the senate and the chief clerk of the house of representatives, holders of elective offices in the executive branch of state government, chief executive officers of state agencies, members of boards, commissions, or committees with authority over one or more state agencies or institutions, and employees of the state who are engaged in supervisory, policymaking, or policy-enforcing work. For the purposes of this chapter, "state officer" also includes any person exercising or undertaking to exercise the powers or functions of a state officer. (19) "State employee" means an individual who is employed by an agency in any branch of state government. For purposes of this chapter, employees of the superior courts are not state officers or state employees. (21)(a) "Transaction involving the state" means a proceeding, application, submission, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, case, or other similar matter that the state officer, state employee, or former state officer or state employee in question believes, or has reason to believe:(i) Is, or will be, the subject of state action; or (ii) Is one to which the state is or will be a party; or (iii) Is one in which the state has a direct and substantial proprietary interest. RCW 42.52.040 Assisting in transactions. (1) Except in the course of official duties or incident to official duties, no state officer or state employee may assist another person, directly or indirectly, whether or not for compensation, in a transaction involving the state: (4) This chapter does not prevent a state officer or state employee from assisting, in a transaction involving the state:

RCW 42.52.050 Confidential information--Improperly concealed records. (1) No state officer or state employee may accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity that the officer or employee might reasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official or employee by reason of the official's or employee's official position. (2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidential information gained by reason of the officer's or employee's official position or otherwise use the information for his or her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of another, unless the disclosure has been authorized by statute or by the terms of a contract involving (a) the state officer's or state employee's agency and (b) the person or persons who have authority to waive the confidentiality of the information. (3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information to any person not entitled or authorized to receive the information. (4) No state officer or state employee may intentionally conceal a record if the officer or employee knew the record was required to be released under chapter 42.17 RCW, was under a personal obligation to release the record, and failed to do so. This subsection does not apply where the decision to withhold the record was made in good faith. [1996 c 213 4; 1994 c 154 105.] RCW 42.52.060 Testimony of state officers and state employees. This chapter does not prevent a state officer or state employee from giving testimony under oath or from making statements required to be made under penalty of perjury or contempt. [1994 c 154 106.] RCW 42.52.100 Conditions on appearance before state agencies or doing business with the state-Hearing-Judicial review. (1) The head of an agency, upon finding that any former state officer or state employee of such agency or any other person has violated any provision of this chapter or rules adopted under it, may, in addition to any other powers the head of such agency may have, bar or impose reasonable conditions upon: (a) The appearance before such agency of such former state officer or state employee or other person; and (b) The conduct of, or negotiation or competition for, business with such agency by such former state officer or state employee or other person, such period of time as may reasonably be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter. (2) Findings of violations referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be made on record after notice and hearing, conducted in accordance with the Washington Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. Such findings and orders are subject to judicial review. (3) This section does not apply to the legislative or judicial branches of government. [1994 c 154 110; 1969 ex.s. c 234 27. Formerly RCW 42.18.270.] RCW 42.52.160 Use of persons, money, or property for private gain. (1) No state officer or state employee may employ or use any person, money, or property under the officer's or employee's official control or direction, or in his or her official custody, for the private benefit or gain of the officer, employee, or another. (2) This section does not prohibit the use of public resources to benefit others as part of a state officer's or state employee's official duties. (3) The appropriate ethics boards may adopt rules providing exceptions to this section for occasional use of the state officer or state employee, of de minimis cost and value, if the activity does not result in interference with the proper performance of public duties. [1996 c 213 7; 1994 c 154 116; 1987 c 426 3. Formerly RCW 42.18.217.] RCW 42.52.360 Authority of executive ethics board. (1) The executive ethics board shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with respect to state-wide elected officers and all other officers and employees in the executive branch, boards and commissions, and institutions of higher education. (2) The executive ethics board shall: (a) Develop educational materials and training; (b) Adopt rules and policies governing the conduct of business by the board, and adopt rules defining working hours for purposes of RCW 42.52.180 and where otherwise authorized under chapter 154, Laws of 1994;

(c) Issue advisory opinions; (d) Investigate, hear, and determine complaints by any person or on its own motion; (e) Impose sanctions including reprimands and monetary penalties; (f) Recommend to the appropriate authorities suspension, removal from position, prosecution, or other appropriate remedy; and (g) Establish criteria regarding the levels of civil penalties appropriate for violations of this chapter and rules adopted under it. (3) The board may: (a) Issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter under examination by the board or involved in any hearing; (b) Administer oaths and affirmations; (c) Examine witnesses; and (d) Receive evidence. (4) The executive ethics board may review and approve agency policies as provided for in this chapter. (5) This section does not apply to state officers and state employees of the judicial branch. [1994 c 154 206.] RCW 42.52.370 Authority of commission on judicial conduct. The commission on judicial conduct shall enforce this chapter and rules adopted under it with respect to state officers and employees of the judicial branch and may do so according to procedures prescribed in Article IV, section 31 of the state Constitution. In addition to the sanctions authorized in Article IV, section 31 of the state Constitution, the commission may impose sanctions authorized by this chapter. [1994 c 154 207.] RCW 42.52.410 Filing complaint. (1) A person may, personally or by his or her attorney, make, sign, and file with the appropriate ethics board a complaint on a form provided by the appropriate ethics board. The complaint shall state the name of the person alleged to have violated this chapter or rules adopted under it and the particulars thereof, and contain such other information as may be required by the appropriate ethics board. (2) If it has reason to believe that any person has been engaged or is engaging in a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, an ethics board may issue a complaint. [1994 c 154 211.] RCW 42.52.420 Investigation. After the filing of any complaint, except as provided in RCW 42.52.450, the staff of the appropriate ethics board shall investigate the complaint. The investigation shall be limited to the alleged facts contained in the complaint. The results of the investigation shall be reduced to writing and a determination shall be made that there is or that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it has been or is being committed. A copy of the written determination shall be provided to the complainant and to the person named in such complaint. [1994 c 154 212.] RCW 42.52.430 Public hearing-Findings. (1) If the ethics board determines there is reasonable cause under RCW 42.52.420 that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it occurred, a public hearing on the merits of the complaint shall be held. (2) The ethics board shall designate the location of the hearing. The case in support of the complaint shall be presented at the hearing by staff of the ethics board. (3) The respondent shall file a written answer to the complaint and appear at the hearing in person or otherwise, with or without counsel, and submit testimony and be fully heard. The respondent has the right to cross-examine witnesses. (4) Testimony taken at the hearing shall be under oath and recorded. (5) If, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondent has violated this chapter or rules adopted under it, the board shall file an order stating findings of fact and enforcement action as authorized under this chapter. (6) If, upon all the evidence, the ethics board finds that the respondent has not engaged in an alleged violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, the ethics board shall state findings of fact and shall similarly issue and file an order dismissing the complaint. (7) If the board makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation has been or is being committed or has made a finding under subsection (6) of this section, the attorney general shall represent the officer or employee in any action subsequently

commenced based on the alleged facts in the complaint. [1994 c 154 213.] RCW 42.52.440 Review of order. Except as otherwise provided by law, reconsideration or judicial review of an ethics board's order that a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it has occurred shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 34.05 RCW applicable to review of adjudicative proceedings. [1994 c 154 214.] RCW 42.52.450 Complaint against legislator or state-wide elected official. (1) If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by a legislator or state-wide elected official other than the attorney general, the attorney general shall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 and recommend action to the appropriate ethics board. (2) If a complaint alleges a violation of RCW 42.52.180 by the attorney general, the state auditor shall conduct the investigation under RCW 42.52.420 and recommend action to the appropriate ethics board. [1994 c 154 215.] RCW 42.52.460 Citizen actions. Any person who has notified the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general in writing that there is reason to believe that RCW 42.52.180 is being or has been violated may, in the name of the state, bring a citizen action for any of the actions authorized under this chapter. A citizen action may be brought only if the appropriate ethics board or the attorney general have failed to commence an action under this chapter within forty-five days after notice from the person, the person has thereafter notified the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general that the person will commence a citizen's action within ten days upon their failure to commence an action, and the appropriate ethics board and the attorney general have in fact failed to bring an action within ten days of receipt of the second notice. If the person who brings the citizen's action prevails, the judgment awarded shall escheat to the state, but the person shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the state of Washington for costs and attorneys' fees incurred. If a citizen's action that the court finds was brought without reasonable cause is dismissed, the court may order the person commencing the action to pay all costs of trial and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the defendant. Upon commencement of a citizen action under this section, at the request of a state officer or state employee who is a defendant, the office of the attorney general shall represent the defendant if the attorney general finds that the defendant's conduct complied with this chapter and was within the scope of employment. [1994 c 154 216.] RCW 42.52.470 Referral for enforcement. As appropriate, an ethics board may refer a complaint: (1) To an agency for initial investigation and proposed resolution which shall be referred back to the appropriate ethics board for action; or (2) To the attorney general's office or prosecutor for appropriate action. [1994 c 154 217.] RCW 42.52.480 Action by boards. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, an ethics board may order payment of the following amounts if it finds a violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it after a hearing under RCW 42.52.370 or other applicable law: (a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct constituting the violation; (b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per violation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought in violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it, whichever is greater; and (c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as part of the limit under (b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The payment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs paid. (2) Damages under this section may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil case. [1994 c 154 218.] RCW 42.52.490 Action by attorney general. (1) Upon a written determination by the attorney general that the action of an ethics board was clearly erroneous or if requested by an ethics board, the attorney general may bring a civil action in the superior court of the county in which the violation is alleged to have occurred against a state officer, state employee, former state officer, former state employee, or other person who has violated or knowingly assisted another person in violating any of the provisions of this chapter or the rules adopted under it. In such action the attorney general may recover the following amounts on behalf of the state of Washington: (a) Any damages sustained by the state that are caused by the conduct constituting the violation;

(b) From each such person, a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars per violation or three times the economic value of any thing received or sought in violation of this chapter or the rules adopted under it, whichever is greater; and (c) Costs, including reasonable investigative costs, which shall be included as part of the limit under (b) of this subsection. The costs may not exceed the penalty imposed. The payment owed on the penalty shall be reduced by the amount of the costs paid. (2) In any civil action brought by the attorney general upon the basis that the attorney general has determined that the board's action was clearly erroneous, the court shall not proceed with the action unless the attorney general has first shown, and the court has found, that the action of the board was clearly erroneous. [1994 c 154 219.] RCW 42.52.520 Disciplinary action. (1) A violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it is grounds for disciplinary action. (2) The procedures for any such action shall correspond to those applicable for disciplinary action for employee misconduct generally; for those state officers and state employees not specifically exempted in chapter 41.06 RCW, the rules set forth in chapter 41.06 RCW shall apply. Any action against the state officer or state employee shall be subject to judicial review to the extent provided by law for disciplinary action for misconduct of state officers and state employees of the same category and grade. [1994 c 154 222; 1969 ex.s. c 234 26. Formerly RCW 42.18.260.] RCW 42.52.530 Additional investigative authority. In addition to other authority under this chapter, the attorney general may investigate persons not under the jurisdiction of an ethics board whom the attorney general has reason to believe were involved in transactions in violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it. [1994 c 154 223.] RCW 42.52.540 Limitations period. Any action taken under this chapter must be commenced within five years from the date of the violation. However, if it is shown that the violation was not discovered because of concealment by the person charged, then the action must be commenced within two years from the date the violation was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered: (1) By any person with direct or indirect supervisory responsibilities over the person who allegedly committed the violation; or (2) if no person has direct or indirect supervisory authority over the person who committed the violation, by the appropriate ethics board. [1994 c 154 224.] RCW 42.52.900 Legislative declaration. Government derives its powers from the people. Ethics in government are the foundation on which the structure of government rests. State officials and employees of government hold a public trust that obligates them, in a special way, to honesty and integrity in fulfilling the responsibilities to which they are elected and appointed. Paramount in that trust is the principle that public office, whether elected or appointed, may not be used for personal gain or private advantage.The citizens of the state expect all state officials and employees to perform their public responsibilities in accordance with the highest ethical and moral standards and to conduct the business of the state only in a manner that advances the public's interest. State officials and employees are subject to the sanctions of law and scrutiny of the media; ultimately, however, they are accountable to the people and must consider this public accountability as a particular obligation of the public service. Only when affairs of government are conducted, at all levels, with openness as provided by law and an unswerving commitment to the public good does government work as it should. The obligations of government rest equally on the state's citizenry. The effectiveness of government depends, fundamentally, on the confidence citizens can have in the judgments and decisions of their elected representatives. Citizens, therefore, should honor and respect the principles and the spirit of representative democracy,recognizing that both elected and appointed officials, together with state employees, seek to carry out their public duties with professional skill and dedication to the public interest. Such service merits public recognition and support. All who have the privilege of working for the people of Washington state can have but one aim: To give the highest public service to its citizens. [1994 c 154 1.] 3) It can be clearly shown that Officer Trask made NO attempt to check out the credibility of the

witnesses, as evidenced by the fact that the Landlord made the complaint thinking they were Rose Adams dogs, & the fact that right in the Washington state court system is a termination of parental rights for Rose Adams that clearly states she is mentally deficient& has been for quite some time, the "nieghbor" staking the complaint did so at the request of Rose Adams & it should be noted that she is also living with 2 sexual predators who are currently under supervision & trying to conceive a child with her current boyfriend who repeatedly raped a 3 yr old child & stalked a 13 yr old child as well & who by court order is not even supposed to be around children Just a precusory look at Rose Adams criminal record should've been enough to give anyone pause. SNOHOMISH Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div 165176 02-16-1993 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 93-2-04928-3 08-31-1993 Adams, Rose M Respondent Snohomish Superior 95-2-05009-1 07-05-1995 Adams, Rose M. Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A95-00268 09-28-1995 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00260 10-16-1996 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00258 10-16-1996 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A96-00261 10-16-1996 Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-311AH 08-26-1997 Adams, Rose Respondent Sno Co-everett Div 97-171AH 05-22-1997 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-everett Div 97-207AH 06-16-1997 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 98-2-09032-2 12-02-1998 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div A99-00063 03-31-1999 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00036999 12-29-1999 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 00-2-09388-6 12-06-2000 Adams, Rose M Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 00-9-03737-0 06-15-2000 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00039284 11-07-2000 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00338-9 03-12-2001 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 01-2-01649-9 01-08-2001 Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 01-9-01682-6 03-14-2001 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00337-1 03-12-2001 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 01-2-00339-7 03-12-2001 Adams, Rose T H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 02-2-08098-5 07-12-2002 Adams, Rose T H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 02-9-05607-9 07-15-2002 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div D03-00170 10-24-2003 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div PC04-2218 08-25-2004 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00011544 09-27-2004 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00011543 09-27-2004 Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Sno Co-everett Div U04-00671 04-22-2004 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 04-2-00445-2 04-20-2004 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 05-2-10520-6 08-02-2005 Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 05-9-09830-2 08-02-2005 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Snohomish Superior 05-1-01959-4 07-29-2005 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00087109 07-25-2005 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div C00087110 07-25-2005 Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 07-9-08916-4 09-07-2007 Adams, Rose H/w Defendant Snohomish Superior 07-2-07272-0 09-04-2007 Adams, Rose H/w Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 07-9-08913-0 09-07-2007 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 07-2-07370-0 09-07-2007 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div C07-00782 03-09-2007 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-south Div I05420944 12-13-2007 Adams, Rose T And John Doe Defendant Sno Co-south Div C08-01858 06-27-2008 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 09-2-11839-4 12-18-2009 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00053 03-18-2009 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U09-00054 03-19-2009 Adams, Rose Defendant Snohomish Superior 10-2-02911-5 02-24-2010

Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Snohomish Superior 10-9-08050-7 04-14-2010 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-evergreen Div XY0026677 02-01-2010 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Snohomish Superior 10-2-00835-5 06-07-2010 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Sno Co-everett Div 1095A10FE 05-07-2010 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00012 01-19-2010 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Sno Co-south Div U10-00011 01-19-2010 EVERETT Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal CR0081455 /04-02-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Everett Municipal IN0128726 /12-01-2010 THURSTON Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 07-2-30559-6 08-09-2007 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30308-7 05-09-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30307-9 05-09-2008 Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-00725-4 06-03-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Respondent Thurston Superior 08-2-30502-1 07-29-2008 Adams, Rose Plaintiff Thurston County Dist 27974 07-29-2008 Adams, Rose Defendant Thurston Superior 08-2-01621-5 07-08-2008 Adams, Rose Judgment Creditor Thurston Superior 08-9-01041-7 08-01-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30590-0 08-29-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30627-2 09-12-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Petitioner Thurston Superior 08-2-30628-1 09-12-2008 Adams, Rose Marie Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01282-7 10-01-2008 Adams, Rose Judgment Debtor Thurston Superior 08-9-01567-2 12-05-2008 KING COUNTY Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00046326 12-12-1989 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00041398 12-12-1989 Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 89-2-13774-7 07-17-1989 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kcdc-east Div (sho) J00009876 02-16-1990 Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 90-2-02137-8 01-29-1990 Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 90-2-13305-2 07-03-1990 Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 91-2-19788-1 09-10-1991 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 91-009057 09-06-1991 Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000843 07-05-1995 Adams, Rose M Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 95-2-18323-9 07-26-1995 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000749 06-12-1995 Adams, Rose M Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-001200 09-13-1995 Adams, Rose Petitioner King Co Superior Ct 95-2-17127-3 07-07-1995 Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000841 07-05-1995 Adams, Rose Petitioner Kcdc-east Div (sho) 95-000842 07-05-1995 Adams, Rose M Plaintiff King Co Superior Ct 97-2-16445-1 06-30-1997 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant King County District IT0038177 09-06-2007 Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Kirkland Municipal XY0073502 01-19-2010 LYNNWOOD Adams, Rose Marie Defendant Lynnwood Municipal I00168820 01-08-2009 SEATTLE Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 65919 06-06-1991 Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 201656 06-22-1991 Adams, Rose M Defendant Seattle Municipal Ct 201656 06-22-1994 APPELANT Adams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506374 06-19-2002 Adams, Rose Appellant Coa, Division I 506366 06-19-2002 PIERCE COUNTY Adams, Rose M Petitioner Pierce Co Superior 93-3-01866-4 04-19-1993

Court of Appeals Division I State of Washington Opinion Information Sheet Docket Number: 50636-6-I Title of Case: In RE the Dependency Of: J.A.B. (dob 8/20/92) v. Rose Adams and George Beutler, App. V. Dshs, Resp. File Date: 03/03/2003 SOURCE OF APPEAL Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County Docket No: 017006963 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 06/06/2002 Judge signing: Hon. Richard J. Thorpe IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN RE THE DEPENDENCY OF: No. 50636-6-I J.A.B., consol. with Cause Nos. DOB: 08/20/92, 50637-4-I, 50739-7-I C.A., DOB: 05/31/86, DIVISION ONE Minor Children. ROSE ADAMS and GEORGE BEUTLER, Appellants, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent. FILED Per Curiam. In this consolidated appeal, Rose Adams and George Beutler challenge the order terminating their parental rights in their son, J.B. Adams also challenges the termination of her parental rights in C.A., J.B.'s half-sister. Because the State has satisfied its burden of proving the statutory elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190, we affirm. Facts Adams and Beutler are the biological parents of J.B., who was born on August 20, 1992. Adams is also the biological mother of C.A., who was born on May 31, 1986. Both C.A. and J.B. were removed from the home following the filing of a dependency petition in February 2000. The dependency petition recited a lengthy history of referrals and concerns about neglect, anger management, domestic violence, parenting skills, and mental health issues. In particular, the petition alleged that Adams had physically and verbally assaulted both children and expressed concerns about Beutler's ability to protect the children. Adams and Beutler acknowledged that there had been "extreme family conflict" in the home, including "inappropriate discipline" of the children. The parents also acknowledged that there had been indications of substance abuse, including the fact that Beutler had tested positive in February 2000 for amphetamine/methamphetamine and THC. Dr. Jolynn-Marie Wagner, a licensed psychologist, completed the court-ordered psychological assessments of both parents in late 2000. The assessments were delayed for several months while Dr. Wagner waited for Adams and Beutler to return questionnaires. Dr. Wagner never received the questionnaires and issued her report in January 2001. As part of the evaluation, Dr. Wagner interviewed Adams and Beutler separately and together and observed Beutler interacting with J.B. and Adams interactingwith J.B. and C.A. Dr. Wagner diagnosed Adams with antisocial personality disorder, finding her to be hostile and with little insight into the events involving her children. Adams also displayed features of narcissistic personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Adams generally blamed "the system" for her children's behavior and emotional difficulties. According to Dr. Wagner, it is difficult to treat individualswith a similar profile because they tend to blame others. Dr. Wagner observed little evidence of bonding between Adams and C.A. or Adams and J.B. and concluded that an attempt at reunification with their mother was not in the children's best interest Dr. Wagner diagnosed Beutler with dependent personality disorder, noting his difficulty in expressing disagreement with others, his excessive need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas in his life, and his difficulty in making everyday decisions without advice and reassurance. Dr. Wagner found Beutler's dependency reflected in his commitment to the relationship with Adams, which was generally controlled by Adams and in which Beutler was demoralized and verbally abused. Dr. Wagner observed a relatively strong bond between Beutler and J.B. Based on Dr. Wagner's evaluation, the court eventually ordered both Adams and Beutler to participate in psychotherapy and parenting training. Beutler moved out of Adams' house shortly after the

hearing and obtained a separate residence. But he went to Adams' house on December 16, 2001, in violation of a restraining order. After January 2002, Beutler had no further contact with Theresa Espana, his social worker. No visitation occurred between Adams and C.A. during the two-year dependency. Visitation would have been permitted at C.A.'s request, but she never expressed a desire to see her mother. Adams' visitation with J.B. was suspended in February 2001, because she was not in compliance with services and was not making progress. Visitation was never restored. Decision Standard of Review An order of permanent termination of the parent-child relationship may be entered when the statutory elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 Rose Adams Adams first contends that the trial court erroneously considered the children's hearsay allegations as substantive evidence of physical abuse. Prior to trial, Adams moved to exclude statements that C.A. and J.B. had made to various persons alleging that she had physically abused them, Adams flatly denied ever abusing J.B. or C.A. Beutler denied that he ever saw Adams abusing the children, but acknowledged that he suspected physical abuse when he heard yelling and something that sounded like slapping. The trial court then entered the following findings of fact: 1.28 J.B. and C.A. consistently reported ongoing emotional and physical abuse by the biological mother to the evaluators in this case, the therapists, school personal {sic}, social worker, and guardian ad litem. Any hearsay statements were not proof of abuse but the fact that J.B. and C.A. made consistent repeated statements is evidence of abuse. 1.29 The totality of the trial evidence confirms, and this court finds that the children were physically abused by the mother. The trial court also found that Beutler's testimony denying knowledge of abuse was not credible. Adams argues that by considering the hearsay statements cumulatively, the trial court effectively reversed the ruling that it would not consider the statements as substantive evidence of abuse. The findings themselves do not identify the specific nature of the "physical abuse." Under the circumstances, we decline the State's invitation to review the record in order to find an alternative basis upon which to sustain the trial court's finding of physical abuse. But even without the finding of physical abuse, the record supports the trial court's termination of Adams' parental rights. Adams does not challenge the trial court's finding that she has been offered all necessary and reasonable services, and the record demonstrates that Adams has participated in numerous services, including parenting classes, anger management classes, domestic violence classes, counseling, and in-home therapy services. But the State's witnesses clearly established that Adams had made no significant progress in her ability to parent J.B. or C.A. Dr. Wagner, who diagnosed Adams with an antisocial personality disorder, noted that during the psychological evaluation, Adams frequently became angry and raised her voice, cursing and going off on tangential topics. Adams dominated the conversation whenever Beutler was present and frequently abused him verbally. Despite her acknowledgement at the time of the agreed dependency order that there had been extreme family conflict and inappropriate discipline, Adams blamed C.A., Beutler, and "the system" for the family's difficulties, and characterized C.A. as manipulative and dishonest. The record was also undisputed that J.B. and C.A. suffer from severe emotional or behavioral problems. J.B. had gone through extensive counseling, with the recognition that he needed continued social and emotional development in a structured and safe environment. C.A. told Dr. Wagner that her greatest fear was that her mother was correct and that she was a bad child. No evidence indicated that Adams had any insight into the severity of the children's problems, whatever their source, or that she could acquire any meaningful ability to respond to the children's needs in the foreseeable future. Dr. Wagner also observed little evidence of a psychological bond in the interaction between Adams and J.B. and C.A. J.B. remained unresponsive to Adams' attempts at affection, and Adams exhibited little eye contact, smiling, or verbal give and take in her interaction with both children. Adams did not respond to C.A.'s rudeness and the two maintained a wide distance between one another. Based on her evaluation, Adams' inability to control her anger, lack of insight, poor prognosis for treatment, and failure to benefit from many years of services, C.A.'s strong desire to remain in her father's home, and J.B.'s expressed fear of Adams, Dr. Wagner concluded that reunification with their mother was not in the children's best interest. Other State witnesses reached similar conclusions. Ellis Amdur, a child mental health specialist, interviewed Adams in conjunction with an assessment of C.A.'s placement with her father. During the

interview, Adams asserted that all of C.A.'s allegations were false and blamed C.A. for many of the things that had happened during the dependency. Adams denied any personal responsibility. Dr. Bramhall diagnosed Adams with a bipolar II disorder, "characterized by alternating cycles of hypomania and depression and recently mixed states." During the interview, Adams insisted that prior CPS referrals had all been based on deliberate lies. Dr. Bramhall concluded that Adams' inability to control her anger prevented her from forming significant attachments with her children and setting appropriate limits. Leila Copeland testified that she provided in-home parenting services for Adams for approximately 18 months. Copeland felt that Adams wanted to make changes in her behavior patterns, that she was resourceful in seeking out assistance in the community, and that there was improvement in Adams' ability to control her anger as to the child that remained in her home. But Copeland also observed that Adams frequently reverted to old habits. Copeland characterized Adams' overall progress with parenting, anger management, and communication skills as "minimal." At the end of the intervention, Copeland concluded that Adams had "minimal" insight into the effect of her actions on others. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports the trial court's findings that all necessary and reasonably available services capable of correcting parental deficiencies have been offered or provided, that no amount of services will be capable of correcting Adams' parental deficiencies, and that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied within the foreseeable future. Continuation of the parent-child relationship clearlydiminishes C.A.'s and J.B.'s prospects for integration into a stable andpermanent home.8 Substantial evidence also established that termination of Adams' parental rights is in the best interests of C.A. and J.B. Even without the finding of physical abuse, the State satisfied its burden under RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190; substantial evidence supports the trial court's termination order as to Adams. George Beutler Beutler conceded that his relationship with Adams was hostile, violent, abusive, and extremely harmful to J.B. and that separation was necessary to insure J.B.'s safety. Beutler did not establish a separate residence until the court ordered him to do so in November 2001. Less than one month later, he violated a court order by going to Adams' residence. Several witnesses testified that Adams and Beutler were continuing to see one another shortly before the termination hearing. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that there is little likelihood Beutler's deficiencies will be remedied so that J.B. can be returned in the near future. Continuation of Beutler's parental relationship clearly diminished J.B.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. Affirmed. For the court: (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. (f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. Spinelli v.United States 393 U.S. 410 (1969) STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Spinelli (D) argued that the evidence gathered was inadmissible having been obtained pursuant to a search warrant improperly issued on the basis of a confidential informant's tip, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The warrant lacked probable cause. PROCEDURE BELOW: The D was convicted of traveling in interstate commerce with the intention of conducting illegal gambling activities. The District Court refused to suppress evidence obtained through a search of an apartment. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: The D was convicted for traveling to Missouri from Illinois with the intention of gambling. D appealed, challenging the search warrant obtained by the FBI to obtain

evidence. The application on which the warrant was based included four main parts: 1. The FBI had tracked D for five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to a certain apartment house in Missouri, and on one day he was further tracked to a specific apartment in the building; 2. Two phone numbers are associated with the specific apartment; 3. The government officials stated that this person was a known bookie; and 4. A reliable informant told the FBI that D was a bookie and used the two phone numbers associated with the apartment in Missouri. LEGAL ISSUE: Does an informant's tip provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant? HOLDING: An informant's tip does not provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant. OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. The warrant was granted by a magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had observed defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliable informant had informed the authorities that defendant was operating a gambling operation. On certiorari, the court found that the application for the warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's information. Also the affiant-officers failed to support their claim that their informant was "credible" or his information "reliable." The bald assertion that defendant was "known" as a gambler was entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and the Court rejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced by the court of appeals. Thus, the affidavit fell short of providing probable REASONING: (Harlan, J.) An informant's tip does not provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable and does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL SO THAT THE MAGISTRATE MAY KNOW HE IS RELYING ON SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN A CASUAL RUMOR. The Aguilar two part test is used: 1. Is the information reliable? 2. Is the informant reliable? In this case, there are no facts provided in the informant's tip to explain why the informant thought D was involved in gambling. The FBI also did not provide any reasons why they thought this particular informant was reliable. Therefore, there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. The conviction should be overturned. Reversed, for D. CONCURRENCE: (White, J.) The Draper approach would justify the issuance of a warrant in this case; nonetheless, pending a full reconsideration of that case and the Aguilar-Nathanson cases, a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided court. CRITICAL SUMMARY: I agree with the decision; otherwise, the authorities could fabricate their own tips and have almost unlimited access to our homes. AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--- IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE, A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP, (can be coroberated (helps w/ great details), track reckord, veracity) [2] BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DONT KNOW HOW THE INFORMAT GOT THE INFO At no point in her request for a warrant does Officer trask say how or why she knows the rose adams is a credible witness she just says

she know her to live there

4) It is evident that Officer Trask has an ongoing personal issue with my body wieght & ethnicity as evidenced in her REPEATED mention of both in any report she makes about me from the court report, the warrant report & the incident report, yet the other animal control officers & the Everett Police Officer can describe me without having to use those identifiers. In her warrant request, in her statement to the court & in her incedent report she repeatedly refers to me as a "Thin Native American Woman" if it was once, I could get that but it is crystal clear that there is an underlying personal theme in this. The ACLU & the Department of Justice both, give this merit as well. I haven't figured it out yet but somewhere in law there has to be something to do with being a "whistleblower" in regards to my complaints against the injured dogs I was puling from the shelter, but don't worry I will figure it out. I would also like to point out no matter how much good stuff I find I always check for an appellate ruling on it to make sure I am not just making pointless claims or statements 9.91.010 Denial of civil rights Terms defined. Terms used in this section shall have the following definitions: (1)(a) "Every person" shall be construed to include any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent or employee whether one or more natural persons, partnerships, associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, of this state and its political subdivisions, boards and commissions, engaged in or exercising control over the operation of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement. (b) "Deny" is hereby defined to include any act which directly or indirectly, or by subterfuge, by a person or his agent or employee, results or is intended or calculated to result in whole or in part in any discrimination, distinction, restriction, or unequal treatment, or the requiring of any person to pay a larger sum than the uniform rates charged other persons, or the refusing or withholding from any person the admission, patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwelling, staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons, regardless of race, creed or color. (c) "Full enjoyment of" shall be construed to include the right to purchase any service, commodity or article of personal property offered or sold on, or by, any establishment to the public, and the admission of any person to accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement, without acts directly or indirectly causing persons of any particular race, creed or color, to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired or solicited. (d) "Any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement" is hereby defined to include, but not to be limited to, any public place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or reward, or where charges are made for admission, service, occupancy or use of any property or facilities, whether conducted for the entertainment, housing or lodging of transient guests, or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise, or for the rendering of personal services, or for public conveyance or transportation on land, water or in the air, including the stations and terminals thereof and the garaging of vehicles, or where food or beverages of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, or where public amusement, entertainment, sports or recreation of any kind is offered with or without charge, or where medical service or care is made available, or where the public gathers, congregates, or assembles for amusement, recreation or public purposes, or public halls, public elevators and public washrooms of buildings and structures occupied by two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or more tenants, or any public library or any educational institution wholly or partially supported by public funds, or schools of special instruction, or

nursery schools, or day care centers or children's camps; nothing herein contained shall be construed to include, or apply to, any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is by its nature distinctly private provided that where public use is permitted that use shall be covered by this section; nor shall anything herein contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution; and the right of a natural parent in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed. (2) Every person who denies to any other person because of race, creed, or color, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [1953 c 87 1; 1909 c 249 434; RRS 2686.]

49.74.005 Legislative findings Purpose. Discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, marital status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap is contrary to the findings of the legislature and public policy. The legislature finds and declares that racial minorities, women, persons in protected age groups, persons with disabilities, Vietnam-era veterans, and disabled veterans are underrepresented in Washington state government employment. The purpose of this chapter is to provide for enforcement measures for affirmative action within Washington state government employment and institutions of higher education in order to eliminate such underrepresentation. [1985 c 365 7.]

RCW 49.60.030 Freedom from discrimination Declaration of civil rights. (1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: (b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement; (f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this section shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by the laws of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or national origin or lawful business relationship: PROVIDED HOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts as authorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices; and

(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).

RCW 9.62.010 Malicious prosecution. Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor, cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which he or she is innocent: (1) If such crime be a felony, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years; and (2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [2003 c 53 40; 1992 c 7 15; 1909 c 249 117; Code 1881 899; 1873 p 203 98; 1854 p 92 89; RRS 2369.]

RCW 9A.36.080 Malicious harassment Definition and criminal penalty. (1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap: (b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or (2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits one of the following acts: This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection. (3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap. (4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness. (b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to: (i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person. (7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony. (8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law. (9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington. [2010 c 119 1; 2009 c 180 1; 1993 c 127 2; 1989 c 95 1; 1984 c 268 1; 1981 c 267 1.] Notes: Severability -- 1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078. Construction -- 1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [1989 c 95 3.] Severability -- 1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its

application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [1989 c 95 4.] Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW. 5) It is also clearly evident that someone from the Everett Animal Shelter has been sharing some true & some false information with Rose Adams in regards to my private personal information. 6) The person responsible for this personal attack on me has been given other personal information in regards to my case BY THE COURTS THEMSELVES, Judge Odell sent them to HER house even though they knew my address & it was CLEARLY NOT her address they sent it there anyway, even if it was not malicious in intent it was lazy & damaging to my own personal safety & reputation. 7) Everett Municipal Code is CLEARLY in conflict with Washington state's RCW's & contrary to Prosecutor Fisher's assertions that Everett is a "First Class City" & does not answer to the Constitution of Washington State or The Constitution of the United States he is incorrect in his assumptions, Municipal Courts are only granted thier very right to EXIST by Washington state laws, Constitiions & RCW's. His statements were recorded in an open Superior court room on my petition matter, he honestly believes that he is NOTaccountable to the state of Washington & that the City has free will to make up laws as they see fit, which is a very dangerous & wreckless attitiude, leaving the City itself open to many lawsuits RCW 16.52.085 Removal of animals for feeding Examination Notice Euthanasia. (3) Any owner whose domestic animal is removed pursuant to this chapter shall be given written notice of the circumstances of the removal and notice of legal remedies available to the owner. The notice shall be given by posting at the place of seizure, by delivery to a person residing at the place of seizure, or by registered mail if the owner is known. In making the decision to remove an animal pursuant to this chapter, the officer shall make a good faith effort to contact the animal's owner before removal. ***I was NEVER given any notice of any legal remedies available to me, I had to read pretty much the entire state's RCW's WAC's & Everett Municipal Codes on my own to find out (4) The agency having custody of the animal may euthanize the animal or may find a responsible person to adopt the animal not less than fifteen business days after the animal is taken into custody. A custodial agency may euthanize severely injured, diseased, or suffering animals at any time. An owner may prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by: (a) Petitioning the district court of the county where the animal was seized for the animal's immediate return subject to court-imposed conditions, or (b) posting a bond or security in an amount sufficient to provide for the animal's care for a minimum of thirty days from the seizure date. If the custodial agency still has custody of the animal when the bond or security expires, the animal shall become the agency's property unless the court orders an alternative disposition. If a court order prevents the agency from assuming ownership and the agency continues to care for the animal, the court shall order the owner to renew a bond or security for the agency's continuing costs for the animal's care. When a court has prohibited the owner from owning or possessing a similar animal under RCW 16.52.200(3), the agency having custody of the animal may assume ownership upon seizure and the owner may not prevent the animal's destruction or adoption by petitioning the court or posting a bond. (5) If no criminal case is filed within fourteen business days of the animal's removal, the owner may petition the district court of the county where the animal was removed for the animal's return. The petition shall be filed with the court, with copies served to the law enforcement or animal care and control agency responsible for removing the animal and to the prosecuting attorney. if the court grants the petition, the agency which seized the animal must deliver the animal to the owner at no cost to the owner. If a criminal action is filed after the petition is filed but before the animal is

returned, the petition shall be joined with the criminal matter. (6) In a motion or petition for the animal's return before a trial, the burden is on the owner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the animal will not suffer future neglect or abuse and is not in need of being restored to health. [2009 c 287 2; 1994 c 261 6; 1987 c 335 1; 1974 ex.s. c 12 2.] RCW 16.52.207 Animal cruelty in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. (2) An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence: (a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure; (4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control. Everett Municipal Codes 6.04.070 Prohibited conduct. C. Offenses Relating to Cruelty. It shall be unlawful for any person to: 2. Under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty as defined in RCW 16.52.205, fail to provide an animal with sufficient good and wholesome food and a constant source of clear potable water, proper shelter and protection from the weather, veterinary care when needed to prevent suffering, and with humanecare and treatment; RCW 16.52.310 Definition (d) Provide dogs with easy and convenient access to adequate amounts of clean food and water. Food and water receptacles must be regularly cleaned and sanitized. All enclosures must contain potable water that is not frozen, is substantially free from debris, and is readily accessible to all dogs in the enclosure at all times. *** The revised code of Washington states the animals must be given access to ADEQUATE amounts of clear potable water. I was following Washington state law & common sense in regards to giving them water. I had just given them water before we all went to bed, several hours earlier, there was a water container on the hood of my car & if you can view the pictures they took of a big black pan you could still see a little water at the bottom of the pan so it didn't have time to dehydrate. Snohomish County, Washington, Code of Ordinances >> Title 9 - ANIMALS Chapter 9.12 9.12.080 - Cruelty to animals. The following, singly or together, are deemed to constitute cruel treatment to animals. Therefore, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to: (3) Neglect to provide adequate daily rations of food or water to any animal within his care, custody or control;

West's Revised Code of Washington Annotated Currentness. Title 35. Cities and Towns. Chapter 35.27. Towns. 35.27.370. Specific powers enumerated Citation: WA ST 35.27.370 Citation: West's RCWA 35.27.370 Last Checked by Web Center Staff: 09/2010 Summary: This Washington statute provides that the council of said town shall have power to pass

ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States. Specifically, the council may regulate, restrain, or prohibit the running at large of any and all domestic animals within the city limits, or any part or parts thereof, and to regulate the keeping of such animals within any part of the city; to establish, maintain and regulate a common pound for estrays, and to appoint a poundkeeper, who shall be paid out of the fines and fees imposed on, and collected from, the owners of any impounded stock. Statute in Full: The council of said town shall have power: (1) To pass ordinances NOT IN CONFLICT with the Constitution and laws of this state, or of the United States; (7) To impose and collect an annual license on every dog within the limits of the town, to prohibit dogs running at large, and to provide for the killing of all dogs found at large and not duly licensed; (14) To impose fines, penalties and forfeitures for any and all violations of ordinances, and for any breach or violation of any ordinance, to fix the penalty by fine or imprisonment, or both; but no such fine shall exceed five thousand dollars, nor the term of imprisonment exceed one year, except that the punishment for any criminal ordinance shall be the same as the punishment provided in state law for the same crime; or to provide that violations of ordinances constitute a civil violation subject to a monetary penalty, but no act which is a state crime may be made a civil violation; (16) To make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the state of Washington, as may be deemed expedient to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the town and its trade, commerce and manufacturers, and to do and perform any and all other acts and things necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter. 8) I was never given a copy of my legal remedies, nor was I given a copy of the warrant, the warrant was handed to me by Officer Trask who is NOT a lawenforcement officer. The warrant disappeared when everyone left & I had NO pockets in which to put the warrant in as asserted by Officer Harmer. 9) I was not given competent counsel, who had ANY experience in Animal Law or Civil Rightslaw. As a matter of fact I was given an attorney who had just passed her bar exam 2 yrs ago who could not & would not produce any experience in my type of criminal case. I might add that she was a graduate of the Cooley Law School a 4th tier law school & an online schol at that, where the SAT & GPA qualifications make it the bottom of the 4th tier plus to make matters worse the rest of her training was at Gonzaga. I called over 30 law firms & got the same response many times over: When they see those credentials on an applicant the "can" the resume. I even had one of them tell to go it alone because it was better to have a fool for a client (myself) then an idiot for a lawyer. She may turn out to be an incredible lawyer but I don't want her "practicing" on me when my dogs lives are at stake. Animal law is a newly emerging practice which is mixed with procedural, civil & even admiralty laws regardingsearch & seizure, best left to someone with experience with all or part of these areas of law. 10) I have already been deprived of my due process & my personal property permanantly without even being convicted yet, so I would respectfully request that the court redeem themselves to the extent they are able & dismiss all charges, expunge this records & all proceedings within,return my personal property, & refrain from harassing me any further Additionally, the practice of seizing the personal property of owners without following statutory notice requirements, as occurred in this case, is a denial of procedural due process. No proper notice procedures have been followed by the City of Everett/animal care and control authorities under animal seizure statutes, or property forfeiture statutes, to the owners of the pets setting forth the reason for the seizure and the process whereby the petitioners may reacquire possession of their property in their pets. Petitioners have been denied procedural due process

by theCity of Everett and/or (AC) authorities. The pets were seized unlawfully as they were NOT in a life threatening condition pursuant to RCW 16.52.085. Property owners have the right to challenge such seizures and, if they "substantially prevail," recover their costs and reaasonable attorney fees. RCW 69.50.505(6). (1) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in them (6) In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a court hearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved, the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Washington state's civil forfeiture act was adopted to protect people from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. In Guillen v. Contreras (Sup. Ct. En Banc. No. 82531-9 (9/2010), amicus notes that "an owner has the right to resist the taking of any of his property regardless of market value." Amicus Br. At 8, cf Guillen v. Contreras, Sup. Ct. En Banc, No. 82531-9 (9/9/2010). A citizen has the right to object to seizure, even if temporary, of his personal property no matter the market value. Id. Forfeitures of personal and real property are not favored in the law and very specific procedures must be followed.by government officials and its agents when seizing property, including animals. If statutory procedures are not followed, the property was illegally seized and a person is lawfully entitled to possession thereof. Unless the seized property is needed for evidence, the petitioners are not the rightful owners, the property is contraband, or the property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to statute, the seized property must be returned. Id. The petitioner is the rightful owners of their dogs and cats, their property in dogs and cats is not "contraband", statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned to the petitioners. If the state argues that the pets are "derivative contraband" and that petitioner is somehow guilty of a crime, the government must follow property forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in dogs and cats. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvannia, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). Washington courts often look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture procedures. The State cannot confiscate property merely because it is "derivative contraband". Instead it must forfeit it using property forfeiture procedures. Washington has a statutory forfeiture procedure. . . RCW 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. RCW 16.52.100 provides that if an animal is confined without necessary food or water for more than 36 hours, and the officer finds it extremely difficult to provide the animal with food or water, the officer may remove the animals to protective custody for that purpose. RCW 16.52.085 sets forth the method whereby an animal may be seized for protective custody for feeding and care. An animal may be seized by an officer only with a warrant UNLESS the animal is in an immediate life-threatening condition. If the officer decides that an animal is in an immediate life threatening condition to justify summary seizure of the animals, proper notice must be given to the owner of the animal by (1) posting at the place of seizure, and (2) personal service to a person residing at the place of seizure, OR by registered mail to the owner. The Notice must be written notice to the owner of the circumstances of the removal of the animals (without a warrant) and the legal remedies available under this chapter to the owner of the animal(s). The proper procedures by statute are enumerated below. Petitioners received no lawful notice and their due process rights were violated. I have not seen my animals in 80 days, i have not been allowed to visit them, to call to check on them, I did not even find out the one was dead til the prosecutor just casually said oh they put that

one to sleep. This is more than cruel & unusal punishment for a crime I have not even been convicted of yet, I was not even a resident of the city of Everett, nor would I ever be even if I was paid to be. It should also be noted that I used to rescue dogs from the Everett Shelter til I started to realize that EVERY dog I pulled from there was either injured or maced, sometimes both so it is very evident because of the prior harassment of Officer trask when I was an Everett citizen years ago, & the complaints I made about the injured dogs I was pulling out of there. It is crystal clear that this is malicious, in intent, & motivated by revenge & prejudice I pray that you & your courts will no longer be a party to this action. Please also let it be noted that if you deny this motion that I am willing ready & able to proceded with the court hearing as it stands. I have 32 reams of evidence, 42lbs of vet records & I have a witness list of over 148 people so far, still waiting on word from another 78 people. Two of the 148 are going to fly up from California so I would like to go on record stating that I will not waive my rights to a speedy trial nor will I accept any continuances in this matter. I have not recieved full discovery, nor have I recieved competent counsel, the last attorney didn't even understand about the concept of Affidavit of Prejudice & why Judge Odell could not rule on her motion to withdraw the same day. I also have 14 motions ready for consideration, & want to have a jury trial of my peers including "Thin Native American Women" the real kind, not the blond blue eyed ones who's grandmother was a Cherokee "Princess" or still believe that Pocahontas & John Smith fell in love & got married & lived happily ever after, the one's who are college educated, & I would like atleast 1 or 2 people who have high functioning autism like myself. I am not trying to make you crazy I just want to make sure that I present every scrap of evidence as I can so I have something to appeal in case I were to lose. Plus the prosecutor ATTACKED my character by stating that I kept my dog with cancer alive to garner donations when I never have asked a dime for him, he was my boy. I was just trying to get the last few precious moments with him that I could. The day Mr fisher told me he was dead I wanted to die myself, to think he died alone, afraid & thinking I had abandoned him is more than either one of us deserved. The prosecutor has the responsibility to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that I am guilty, I have the Constitutional right to prove beyond a doubt that I am not & to defend myself & my character, this charge could destroy my ability to rescue, my ability to own my own animals, it could ruin my life which is exactly what it was intended to do. By taking my animals from me all I have to do is read & learn for 18 to 20 hours a day, I can't sleep because I have nightmares that they are killing my animals, they won't even give me back my dead dog's body because he is "evidence" he WAS a iving breathing loving sentient being, with feelings, who could love, feel fear, feel pain, & feel sorrow, & now I don't know where he is or all of his parts are. He spent 12 yrs in a puppy mill before he was rescued, I only got less than 2 years of his life to prove to him all humans weren't bad, I was wrong. Meanwhile my dogs are living in glass cages barely twice the size of my car, having to eat, sleep, pee & poop in the same area, they are left alone from 6p.m. to 10a.m. & their cages are hosed down to be cleaned out. In a shelter that can not guarantee that they will even be safe from disease or harm as evidenced by all the cats they killed several months ago because they have no clear cut methods for quarantining animals. They are being separated from eachother in a shelter that animals are abused in, when they are used to sleeping with me, eating with me & being together. Soffie(my schnauzer)Hoki (my Kelpie) & Taz (my cat) have never been away from me for more than 46hrs. Dogs are pack animals by nature, & my poor cat thinks he's a dog because he actually was nursed by a wolf mother, he fetches, walks on a leash & the doofus even lifts his leg to pee, he just doesn't know any better. They are giving my Kelpie 4 times higher doses of Phenobarbitol then is required, They are seniors dogs & a black cat, they stand no chance of being adopted. I know for legal purposes they are defined as "property" & I am going to change that law, but they are not just property they are my babies, everyone has a story, I found Hoki in a ditch in Lewis county with his mother & father & most of his littermates heads bashed in only 3 of them lived, his head was caved in & I put him in the back of my van with his parents & siblings bodies til I heard a scream from the back, his sister & brother got adopted but no one wanted a spaztic siezure dog except for me, & I was glad, Soffie I got her from the Everett Police Dept she was covered over 75% of her body in cigarette burns, she was terrified of everything, pop bottles, cans, lighters, cigarette packs, plastic bags, grooming, nail clips, the vet estimated that all of her ribs had been fractured multiple times, she had also been bred atleast 10 times by the time I got her maybe 11, she had a hernia & an exploded uterus from giving birth so much, which may be why she had the bladder stone as well.

Taz was no bigger than my hand when he ran out in front of my van almost 6 yrs ago, on Broadway, I tried to take him to the Everett Shelter but they were just going to euthanize him so I became the mother of a snot nosed, bloody eared, green goopy eyed monster who was nursed by a wolf mother & got a lttle screwy in life as a result but he a good guy. Misty was taken from a puppy mill, guarding the skeletal remains of 6 of her puppies, she was taken by another rescue, adopted out & I got her back pregnant when it turns out the rescue was breeding those dogs. Libby was literally rotting away when I pulled her from an Eastern Washington shelter, I kid you not she was mostly bald & rotting flesh, she had maggots under the patch of scabs & skin she had left, the shelter manager just shook her head when I pulled her & put her in my car, she said "You know that one is going to die too right?" I told her she would die at home being loved then, those are the kind I take, the kind that break my heart, but the ones I love the most, Libby didn't die, she thrived, now she is once again abandoned for all she knows.The people who brought her in said she was old & they dumped her there to be put to sleep & adopted another puppy that day, she is only 2 or 3 yrs old. This is my life's work, my heart & my soul. I have a beat up little Toyota that stinks to high Heavens because in the little over 15 mnths I have owned it I have put 40,000 miles on it & have transported, rescued, & pulled somewhere around 1200 dogs, cats, even a 400lb pig, ferretts, rabbits, birds, raccoons, possoms, a few old ladies & numerous college kids stranded on old lonely roads in that car. I am the one who sits up in the woods for days on end trying to catch an injured feral dog, getting jumped by stupid bobcats, & the crud kicked out of me by deers, not to mention being followed around by cougars & bears, or drives over 2 mountian passes in freezing rain storms & white out blizzards by just letting a little air out of my bald tires & driving slow,no chains, no snow tires I'm the one who chases vagrants around uder bridges & over passes to give their dogs, shots, wormers, dog food & flea meds. When you see the ads on craigslist offering free flea meds, wormer & shots, that's me too.This whole fiasco has caused the lives of over 180 animals at last count & I quit counting 3 weeks ago because it hurt too bad. I'm pretty sure, or atleast I was til this, that is how I'm gonna die, saving some animal, but that was okay with me. I will go to court, I will fight & win, even if I have to take this to the Supreme Court of the United States of America. I don't know what line of Mitchell's you decend from but I come from West Virginia line & we don't quit fighting til we're dead & there's even a few folk legends of us fighting after that. True story, you can look it up on WVCuture.org just type in Mitchell when you have a couple few free days I don't know if I did this right or not, I'm pretty sure I have laid out my whole case here, along with my defense, but it is the best I can do with what I know so far. Not to mention I have been sleep deprived for 80 days because i keep having nightmares that that lady is drowning mydogs & I keep running towards them but they just keep getting further away no matter how fast i run & I can hear them screaming for me & she just keeps holding them under & then brings them up to revive them & then drowns them some moreI would also like you to take a look at my web pagethe 3rd link is to do with my court case, it was private but since the prosecutor already tricked me into presenting my case in front of him at the Superior Court hearing it's kind of pointless to hide it anyway.Doesn't seem fair since I only got some vet reports, & the warrant request,even though I asked for discovery weeks ago, but if we go to court I can fie a motion for that too I guess. Rescue Page http://www.orgsites.com/wa/finallyhomerescue/ Ministry Page http://finallyhomerescueministries.yolasite.com/ Court Page http://taamuvcityofeverettanimalcontrol.yolasite.com/ Signature of moving party Brandia Taamu

Date: March 27th, 2011