Institute of Pacific Relations

America Maneuvers in Asia Author(s): Miriam S. Farley Source: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 10, No. 13 (Jul. 14, 1941), pp. 148-155 Published by: Institute of Pacific Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021920 . Accessed: 14/06/2011 05:39
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148 authorities. In 1941, however, the situation was changed com? pletely. The rice crop failure forced the Wang Chingwei Government to import rice on its own. Shortly after the first municipal imports of rice arrived in Shanghai, rice shipments arrived for the Nanking Government

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railway, heavily along the Shanghai-Hangchow risoned by the Japanese Army since 1937 and an portant entrepot for central China rice. Popular content was provoked by the fact that Chinese

which were transshipped immediately by steamer and rail to Nanking. Further arrivals were to be distributed in Hangchow, Wasih, and other cities located in hitherto prosperous rice-growing regions. In mid-May riots broke out in Sungkiang, a transportation center

sumers found their local rice dealers quoting Shanghai prices. The Japanese rice crisis was now casting its shadow not only upon Shanghai but deep into those urban areas of central China which Japan succeeded in holding and which she is trying to incorporate into her New Order. r. w. B.

America

Maneuvers By MIRIAM S. FARLEY

in

Asia1

Japan's attack on China confronted the United Since States with a major challenge to what it had long considered its vital interests in the Pacific, the course of American Far Eastern policy has puzzled many observers, including the Japanese. In one respect, the United States has been thoroughly consistent: it has never deviated

That highly intricate drama has now reached, in Mr. Churchill's phrase, its fourth climacteric, with Ger? many's invasion of the Soviet Union. As with the other three?the fall of France, the Battle of Britain in 1940 and the United States lease-lend bill?the effects of this new shift in the balance of power will be felt in the Far East. Since September 1939 the American attitude to? ward Japan has fluctuated, broadly speaking, with the military fortunes of Great Britain: the brighter Britain's prospects, the bolder America's stand in the Far East, and vice versa. Initially, therefore, one might ex-

from its support of certain broad prinof international conduct such as the sanctity of ciples treaties, the peaceful settlement of disputes and freedom of international trade. These principles, as interpreted in Washington, were diametrically opposed to the Japanese conception of a New Order in eastern

Asia. Nevertheless, while Japan vigorously sought to carve out her New Order, the United States has been slow to implement its declared policies in the field of action. In this field it has been cautious, hesitant and apparently inconsistent, as in giving material aid to China while permitting war materials to be ported to Japan. Many have defended this one of deliberate and skillful maneuvering in cated situation; many have denounced it freely ex? policy as a complias weak-

pect the United States to respond to the newest de? velopment with redoubled firmness in the Orient; later consequences the Russian

would depend on the fortunes of war on front. This simple pattern, however, is complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union, now at last caught up in the maelstrom of war, forms the land bridge between Europe and Asia. Hence its belligerency

kneed or even hypocritical. The tortuous course of American policy is, of course, chiefly the result of the multiplicity of influences entering into its formation: the predilections of high of? ficials, the conflicting pulls of public opinion and of pressure groups, considerations of internal politics and economies, and the rapidly changing international situ? ation as a whole. The outbreak of war in Europe ushered in a new phase in which international factors have played an increasingly important part in shaping American policy toward the older war in China, now merged in a world struggle from which the United States found it impossible to remain aloof.

may be expected to affect Far Eastern politics directly as well as indirectly. It is not the purpose of this article to predict what new political patterns may emerge in Asia, but rather to provide a background for such predictions by tracing the course of American Far Eastern policy as it has developed since the beginning of the European war. In

tries were giving aid to China, cooperation between them has been conspicuous by its absence. This has been due partly to ideological differences and consequent mutual distrust; partly to the shock given Ameri?

this story the Soviet Union plays little part. Despite the similarity of American and Soviet interests in the Sino-Japanese conflict, despite the fact that both coun?

in (1) This article summarizesrecentdevelopments U. S. Far Eastern policy,which are recorded more fully in a chapter con? tributed the presentauthor to a new editionof T. A. Bisson's by American Policy in the Far East: 1931-1940 (Inquiry Series, Instituteof Pacific Relations, New York, 1940), to be published shortly.

can opinion by the Nazi-Soviet pact; partly to the fact that the Soviet Union was regarded as a quasi-ally of Germany, and constituted an actual or potential leak in the British blockade. The German-Soviet war has swept away many of these obstacles to cooperation, and the American Gov? ernment has followed the British lead in pledging aid

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149 the possibility that the progress of the war in Europe might call for new and far-reaching decisions on the part of the United States. This led it to pursue a goslow policy in the Orient. Also the British Government at this time was courting Japan's friendship. American officials may or may not have shared the British hope of enlisting Japan as at least a passive ally. But the United States was already identifying its interests with those of Great Britain?a tendency which grew ever

to Russia in her struggle against German aggression. This opens up possibilities of new complications be? tween the United States and Japan in case the latter should, on Germany's behalf or on her own, try to invia Siberia. terrupt American-Soviet communications These possibilities, however, may complicate but do not basically alter the issues between the United States and Japan, which are still concerned with Japan's bid for hegemony in eastern Asia. American-Japanese Issues

Those issues remain unsettled. Japan has not abandoned her pretensions; on the contrary,she has enlarged them. The United States has conceded none of Japan's claims and its opposition has advanced, albeit haltingly, from words to action. Yet recurrent prophecies of an early showdown have been refuted by events. Neither Japan nor the United because

stronger as the war went on. At any rate the United States seems to have made an effort, in the fall of 1939, to achieve a settlement of outstanding issues with Japan. The first move was the strong speech delivered by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo in October.<2) It served two purposes: to give notice that the American attitude toward Japan's actions in China had not been altered by the developments in Eu? rope, and to bring home to the Japanese public, as dis-

States really wants a of weakness, the United showdown?Japan States because of its wider preoccupations. Neither considers a showdown inevitable, and neither has yet given up hope of attaining its major objectives without pre-

cipitating a trans-Pacific war. When the long-predicted war finally broke in Europe in September 1939, relations between Japan and the United States had reached a critical stage. For two years, while Japan and China had fought to a stalemate on the battlefield, Japan and the United States had engaged in verbal warfare with the same result. The United States was cautiously girding its loins for

tinct from Foreign Office officials, the depth of Ameri? can resentment at Japan's policies. Mr. Grew's main emphasis, however, was on the preservation of Ameri? can rights and interests in China rather than on the preservation of China's integrity; and his speech was noteworthy for the tone of conviction in which the Ambassador insisted that his only aim in making so frank a statement was to lay the basis for an improve? ment in Japanese-American relations. Japan Worried

action. During the summer it had denounced its com? mercial treaty with Japan, thus clearing the decks for possible economic reprisals. The initial effect of the European war was to cause the United States to draw in its horns; and the Administration, which had previously been ahead of public opinion in desiring action in the Far East, now counseled caution in the face of growing public demand for economic embargoes against Japan. The events of August and September 1939 placed the United States in a commanding position in the Pacific. Japan, stunned by the German-Soviet agreement, was

What took place in the conversations subsequently held between Mr. Grew and Foreign Minister Nomura has not been revealed; but if hopes of any far-reaching agreement were entertained on either side, they were disappointed. Japan was obviously worried by the impending treaty lapse and sought to secure a new trade agreement before the expiration of the old one; but whatever price she may have offered, it was not acceptable. Nevertheless, after the treaty had expired on January 26, the United States did not take advantage of the situation

isolated. With Great for the moment diplomatically Britain and France otherwise engaged, the burden of defending western interests in Asia devolved upon the United States. The European conflict created a boom market in war materials, in which America shared, and left the United States as the only important industrial nation whose supplies were available to Japan. Unilateral sanctions appeared to be a practical possibility

to impose discriminatory restrictions on trade with Japan. During 1939 various measures providing for an em? bargo on shipments to Japan of war materials, such as munitions, metals, petroleum products and machinery, had been introduced in Congress.<3) Strong public sup? port for these proposals was indicated in public opin? ion surveys, and it was understood that such a measure

for the first time since 1937. That the United States did not at once take advantage of this commanding position was due chiefly to the American Government's concern with events across the Atlantic. Throughout the first, inactive stage of the European conflict Washington

had a good chance of adoption. But the Administration used its influence to keep them buried in committee. Thus the United States, having exhausted the re? sources of diplomacy unfortified by action to secure respect for its rights in China, and having advanced

was acutely conscious of

(2) Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1939, p. 509. (3) For summary, William W. Lockwood (ed.), Our Far cf. Eastern Record (American Council, Institute of Pacific Rela? tions, New York, 1940), p. 40.

150 to the brink of action, reverted once more to its old tactics. These consisted of holding the sword of em? bargoes over Japan's head, while countering each for? ward move on her part with another gesture in aid of

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the right to station inspectors in Indo-China. At the same time, on June 19, she obtained Great Britain's signature to an agreement ending, on terms favorable

China. On March 7, 1940, the United States announced a credit of $20 million to China through the ExportImport Bank, to be repaid by shipments of tin. Coming at a time when preparations were under way to inaugu-

to Japan, the year-old dispute over the Tientsin concession.(7) More Japanese demands immediately fol? lowed. On July 12 Great Britain yielded to pressure and agreed to close the Burma Road to shipments of military supplies for a period of three months. In announcing this to Commons, Prime Minister Churchill intimated that he hoped within that time to see a negotiated

rate a central puppet government in China under Wang Ching-wei, this move was regarded in Tokyo as an "unfriendly act."(4) When the new regime was finally installed at Nanking on March 30, Secretary Hull is? sued a statement reaffirming the United States' recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's government at Chungking as the legitimate government of China.(5) The tone of Mr. Hull's statement contrasted sharply

peace between China and Japan.(8) Secretary on July 16, deplored the closure of the railway Hull, and the highway as "unwarranted interpositions of obstacles to world trade."(9) But although the United

with that of a speech delivered by the British Ambas? sador, Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, in Tokyo only two days before.(6) Sir Robert recadled the Anglo-Japanese alliance, stressed the essential similarity of British and Japanese objectives, and declared his confidence in the

States had doubtless been consulted in the matter, it was evidently not prepared to give Britain such assurances of assistance in case of need as might have induced her to stand firm against Japanese pressure.

future of Anglo-Japanese relations. This speech was at? tacked in the House of Commons as implying that the British Government condoned Japanese aggression. Mr. Hull's statement indicated considerable divergence of views between Washington and London on Far East? ern questions?a divergence perhaps natural in view of their respective circumstances. It was evident, however, that if it desired to pursue a more positive policy in the Orient the United States would have to play a lone hand. Blitzkrieg in Europe In April, the European war began in earnest. Hitler's lightning occupation of Denmark and Norway was followed by the conquest of the Low Countries and the downfall of France. Great Britain, anticipating inva?

The retreat continued during August with the with? drawal of British troops from North China and Shanghai. This led to a dispute between Japan and the United States as to which should patrol the key central sector of the International Settlement, formerly held by the British. As neither side would give in, a compro? mise was effected by turning the disputed sector over to the Shanghai Volunteer Corps.

So far, Japan's cautious but steady advance had been opposed only by delaying tactics. During the autumn, however, there became evident a gradual stiffening of the Anglo-American attitude in the Orient, first clearly manifested in the British decision to reopen the Burma Road. The new attitude resulted from a combination of factors which had been discernible even in the sum? mer, but which gained winter months. strength during the fall and

Japan's Threat to Southeast

Asia

sion at any moment, prepared herself for a desperate struggle. The United States, fearing for its own secur? ity if the British fleet were lost, hastily enlarged its armament program, rushed plans for hemisphere de?

fense, and meditated transfer of its fleet back to the Atlantic. Had Japan struck boldly at this time in south? east Asia, she might well have been successful; but she was handicapped by her unfinished war in China and by divided counsels at home. Nevertheless she lost no time in bringing pressure to bear on the British and

Perhaps the most fundamental of these factors was the enlargement of Japan's declared aims, accompanied by concrete moves in this direction, to include control not only of China but also of southeastern Asia?the heart of western imperial interests in the Orient.(10)

French for limited objectives, and met with little re? sistance. To these moves Ihe United States offered no opposition save for diplomatic protests. Japan's first move was to secure from prostrate France closure of the Indochina-Yunnan railway and

matched by its strategic importance. The great fortress of Singapore dominated the approaches not only to British and other colonial possessions but to Australia and New Zealand as well. With Singapore in the hands (7) Cf. ContemporaryJapan, July 1940, p. 928. (8) Cf. T. A. Bisson, "Indo-China: Spearhead of Japan's Southward Drive," Foreign Policv Reports, Oct. 1, 1940, pp. 170-71. (9) Department of State Bulletin, July 20, 1940, p. 36. (10) Cf. W. W. Lockwood and Michael Greenberg (eds.), Shozvdownat Singapore?, American Council, Instituteof Pacific Relations, New York, 1941.

Here Great Britain, France, Holland and the United States shared a colonial empire rich in tin, rubber, oil and tropical products, whose economic value was

(4) Statement of Foreign Office spokesman, Nezv York Times, Mar. 9, 1940. (5) Department of State Bulletin. Mar. 30, 1940, p. 343. (6) Text in Amerasia, May 1940,p. 125.

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151 had it not been for the gradual improvement, during the fall and winter, of her own military pros? pects in the west. The R.A.F. held its own in the air, the threatened invasion did not materialize, the British and Greeks battered the Italians in the Mediterranean. Britain's situation was still critical, but it did not seem so desperate as in the black summer of 1940. Behind Britain's increased optimism, and of decisive importance in the evolution of American Far Eastern policy, were the redoubling of America's drive for pre? paredness after the summer blitzkrieg, and the growing coordination of American military and diplomatic poli? cies with those of the British Commonwealth. Defense appropriations reached sums unprecedented except in time of war; another precedent was shattered in the adoption of peacetime military conscription; economic controls reminiscent of the first World War were set up to speed munitions production; and, most significant for Tokyo observers, Congress authorized in July 1940

of a hostile power these British Dominions would be helpless and India would be in danger. Immediate as well as long-range considerations emphasized the importance of maintaining British com? munications in this area. In her war against Germany and Italy, Britain was relying heavily upon men, muni? tions and raw materials from her eastern empire. For the United States, also, southeast Asia was an impor? tant source of strategic materials. Moreover, Britain's eastern empire, especially

Australia and India, was as a self-sufficient military rapidly being developed base, capable of supplying and equipping troops for use either in the western theater of war or, if need be, in its own defense.(11) Impetus to Japan's Southward Drive

The intensification of hostilities in Europe and par? ticularly the fall of France were the signal for renewed clamor in Japan for launching of the southward drive

terms Japan's claim to hegemony throughout eastern Asia.(12) This was answered by implication by Secre? tary Hull in his statement of July 5, which rejected the claims of both Germany and Japan to regional hege? the implied mony based on force, and repudiated analogy with the Monroe Doctrine.(13) But in August the policy statement of the new Konoye Cabinet asserted in even more specific terms Japan's aim of con-

long advocated by certain groups. Such pressure was reflected in Foreign Minister Arita's speech of June 29, 1940, which laid down in broad though purposely vague

construction of a two-ocean navy representing an in? crease of 70% over existing naval strength. After the presidential election in November, America's role as nonbelligerent ally of the British Empire was stated with increasing frankness and vigor, and was implemented by various steps culminating to date in the lease-lend bill, designed in the President's words make the United States "an arsenal of democracy." Anglo-American Solidarity to

structing "a new order in Greater East Asia."(14) The second factor was Japan's drift back toward the Rome-Berlin Axis, which was spurred by the fall of France and doubtless encouraged by British and Ameri? can passivity in Asia. This culminated on September 27, 1940, with the signature of the Tripartite Treaty,

That this growing Anglo-American solidarity might be reflected in the Far East as well as in Europe was emphasized by the important, though secret, discus? sions which took place in the autumn and winter of 1940-41 between the governments of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands. The presence of an Australian minister in Washington was symbolic of the United States' awakened interest in the British Dominions in the south Pacific?and of theirs in America. Apparently these conversations were begun in Washington early in September, when Japan was threatening Indo-China. They were continued thereafter, but little information as to their content was allowed to leak out. There can be little doubt, however, that during this period the possibilities of joint action against Japan for the defense of Singapore and adjacent areas were thoroughly canvassed. The

by a fanfare undoubtedly intended to accompanied convince the United States that further opposition to the Axis allies would involve the risk if not the certainty of a two-ocean war. The effect of this threat,

however, was to inflame rather than to dampen Ameri? can public opinion, and also to bring Japan within the focus of the rising war sentiment, which had hitherto been directed mainly against Germany. Moreover, Japan's action in formally casting in her lot with Brit? ain's enemies was a heavy blow to any hopes which may have been entertained in London or Washington of dealing with Japan by the methods of appeasement at their own or another's expense. Even so, Great Britain might under pressure of sheer necessity have continued to give ground in the Far

technical groundwork was unobtrusively being laid for joint action if and when the various governments con? cerned should decide that action was called for. of Finally, an indirect but important consequence program was the proof American exports to Japan. gressive The Sheppard-May bill, which became law on July 2, the President broad powers to restrict or 1940, gave prohibit the export of materials needed for the defense curtailment program. This authority has been used to place under a the United States' rearmament

(11) Cf. Michael Greenberg,"Britain Mobilizes Her Eastern Empire," Far Eastern Survey, Mar. 26, 1941, p. 58. (12) ContemporaryJapan. Aug. 1940, p. 1077. (13) Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1940, p. 4. (14) ContemporaryJapan, Sept. 1940, p. 1224.

152 license system, by proclamations issued from time to time, a large number of commodities including many which were important in Japanese-American trade. The articles affected now include munitions, aircraft, scrap iron, pig iron, many iron and steel products, many types of machinery and tools, copper, lead and other metals

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Furthermore, the United States took several steps indicating that although it might be retreating it had not abandoned the field. On September 25 it announced the extension of a $25 million credit to China through the Export-Import Bank, to be repaid by shipments of of metals. The next day brought announcement first action under the the full scrap iron embargo?the bill with real teeth in it. News of the Sheppard-May was released the day before signature of the embargo Three-Power forewarned. Pact, of which the United States had been The pact, which created a sensation in America, was greeted by Secretary Hull with a terse statement to the effect that Japan's alignment with the Axis was nothing new and nothing to get excited about. During the autumn there were many indications of a stronger attitude in Washington and London. On Oc?

and chemicals, and most recently petroleum products. The list now covers nearly all of the chief export items except cotton, lumber and automobiles. In only two cases?aviation gasoline and scrap iron? was a complete embargo imposed, exception being made for Great Britain and countries of the western hemisphere.(15) V. 5. Restrictions Hit Japanese Trade Export figures do not reveal just how strictly the license system has been applied against Japan, but it is evident that the American restrictions have proved highly embarrassing. Total exports to Japan began to drop sharply in November 1940, and in the first three months of 1941 they were 48% below the level of the previous year. As imports dropped less rapidly, most

tober 8 Great Britain confirmed her intention of reopening the Burma Road on the 18th. It was reported that this action had been prompted by urging from the United States, strengthened no doubt by the discus? sions of Far Eastern strategy which were then under way. Early in October, also, the United States warned

of the active American trade balance has been wiped out. By March 1941 iron and steel, including scrap, had for all practical purposes disappeared from the ex? port statistics; so had copper, zinc, aluminum, ferroand ammonium alloys, carbon black, automobiles sulphate. Shipments of machinery, hides and cotton had declined sharply (cotton because of Japanese, not American, restrictions). Exports of petroleum remained high, as did wood pulp, lead and borax. These products have recently been put under license, with what consequences remains to be seen. These restrictions were not directed specifically against Japan and carried no hint of invidious discrimi-

announcement on the same day, November 30, of an American credit of $100 million to the Chinese Govern? ment, half for the purchase of strategic commodities, half for the support of the Chinese currency. Ten days later Great Britain granted a credit of ?10 million, similarly divided. Meanwhile both Britain and America were strengthening their Far Eastern defenses. November Oil Agreement

its nationals to leave the Far East, which occasioned some alarm in Japan. Japan's formal recognition of the Nanking puppet government was countered by the

nation. They were dictated primarily by the require? ments of the United States' defense program and its policy of aid to Britain. Nevertheless they had the ef? fect of a partial embargo, the less easy to bear since British Empire countries were also reducing shipments to Japan for similar reasons. The American regulations have, in fact, called forth protests from Japan on sev? eral occasions. Moreover, some of the licensing procla?

The United States, while implementing its support of China, was not however prepared to oppose Japan at all points. On November 11a Japanese economic mission in Batavia reached an agreement with the Stand? ard Vacuum (American) and Rising Sun (British) oil companies, under which shipments of oil to Japan from Netherlands India were greatly enlarged. The agree? ment, which ran for six months, was renewed in May. While Japan did not get as much oil as she had asked for, partly because the British had previously placed preemptive orders, this agreement nevertheless repre? sented a substantial victory. Presumably the United States might have blocked it, either by putting pres? sure on its own oil interests and on the British, or by giving the Dutch Government such assurances as would have justified them in forbidding the oil to be exported. It would appear that the American Government con? sidered such a course too risky. American foreign relations during the first two months of 1941 were dominated by Congressional discussion of the lease-lend bill, during which it was made clear that, while aid to Britain was the main object,

mations were timed in such a way as to constitute an implied rebuke and warning to Japan. The new trend of Anglo-American policy was not im? mediately apparent. In September, when Japan renewed her demands on Indo-China and secured the right to establish air bases and maintain a garrison in the north? ern part of the colony, the United States offered little opposition. But it is possible that British and American protests at Tokyo may have induced Japan to modify her original demands. (15) The same applies to shipmentsof petroleum products from the east coast only. (New York Times, June 21, 1941). "Moral embargoes" had previouslybeen applied to aircraft and a few other items.

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153 fused funds for Guam on two previous occasions. On February 15 Secretary Hull renewed his conversations with the British, Australian and Dutch envoys. The brief war scare produced by the Australian demarche of February 13 soon subsided, but there was evidence that Japan had been thoroughly alarmed. On February 18 the Foreign Office issued a statement cal-

aid to China was also contemplated. Secretary Hull, testifying in support of the bill on January 15, de? nounced Japan at length and with emphasis. Japan was plainly worried and reiterated her peaceful intentions in southeast Asia. Doubt was east on these assertions, however, by Japan's actions in connection with Thailand's irredentist war on Indo-China, which flared up during Janu? ary. Japan induced both parties to accept her mediation and a peace conference assembled on February 7 in Tokyo, where a territorial agreement favorable to Thailand was signed several weeks later. During these negotiations, Japanese forces in northern Indo-China were reinforced, a small detachment of troops was landed at Saigon, and Japanese warships in consider? able strength were operating off the coasts of both coun? tries. Press reports asserted that Japan was demand-

culated to calm the apprehensions of the Japanese pub? lic and to reassure foreign powers as to Japan's peaceful intentions. This brought an immediate response

ing as the price of mediation the right to establish air, military and naval bases in either or both countries. Such bases would be within easy striking distance of Netherlands India and Singapore. War Scare in Pacific Whatever the truth of these reports, the British Gov? ernment, which was doubtless better informed than the public at large, chose this moment to make an ostentatious display of strength in the south Pacific. British

from Undersecretary Welles, who observed that the United States Government was more interested in deeds than in words. It was revealed that American bombers purchased by Britain were being flown to Singapore, and that former American navy pilots were acting as flying instructors in Netherlands India. The United States reinforced its own air strength in the

Philippines and Alaska, while more Australian troops were landed at Singapore. The Thai-Indochinese treaty was finally initialed on March 11. Japan had achieved a succks d'estime, and had fortified her own position in both of these highly strategic territories. There is no conclusive evi?

dence, despite continuing rumors, that she had secured further military concessions from either country; in fact the Japanese troops which had been sent to Saigon

and Australian air squadrons were sent to reinforce the defenses of British Malaya, waters adjacent to Singa? pore were mined, and troops were moved to the Thai? land border. The climax was reached on February 13, when the Australian Advisory War Council announced that the situation was one of "the utmost gravity," and

were subsequently withdrawn. It was clear at any rate that a firm show of resistance by Britain and the United States had administered a check to Japanese the time being at penetration of southeast Asia?for least. American Attitude Stiffens Passage of the lease-lend bill ushered in a new era of American policy, the significance of which was emphasized by President Roosevelt in a ringing speech on March 15: This decision is the end of any attempts at appeasethe American people . . . have ment in our land ... demanded, and got, a policy of unqualified, immediate, all-out aid for Britain, Greece, China, and for all the governments in exile .. . In January, Lauchlin Currie and Emile Despres had been dispatched on a special mission to Chungking. According to reports, the purpose of this mission was to ascertain China's specific needs for lease-lend mate? rials; to advise the Chinese Government on measures

hastily summoned a Cabinet meeting. This was atwho had been tended by Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, take charge of sent out from England in November to coordinating British defense efforts in the Far East. The United States backed the British stand by vari? ous gestures, including renewal of the warning to its

nationals to leave the Far East. On February 11, just as the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, arrived in Washington, President Roosevelt told his press conference that, although he did not anticipate war with Japan, such an eventuality would not inter-

fere with American aid to Great Britain.<16) This was a clear intimation that neither German hopes of blocking aid to Britain by a Japanese diversion in the danger Orient, nor Japanese hopes that England's would divert American attention from the Far East, were likely to be realized. On the following day the President asked Congress

to solve its serious economic problems; and to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek the necessity of maintaining Chinese internal unity if American assistance were to be effective.(17) Late in May it was stated in Chungking

for an additional defense funds for harbor improveincluding appropriation ments and fortifications in Guam, Samoa and Alaska. These were promptly voted although Congress had re(16) New York Times, Feb. 12, 1941.

that arrangements had been made for the shipment of some $100 million worth of American supplies to China under the lease-lend bill. (17) It has been reported that the Soviet Government,in connection with its pledge of continued assistance to China, offeredsimilar advice.

154 While thus cementing its ties with China and stimulating her resistance to Japan, the United States made other gestures calculated to make Japan think twice before fulfilling her agreement to support Germany in case war should develop between Germany and the United States?as seemed increasingly probable in the spring of 1941. In March a flotilla of four cruisers and nine destroyers paid a visit to and New Zealand, where they were warmly The visit emphasized the possibility of using American Australia received. American barrass the United States

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and Great Britain in their As a further deterrent, Brit? struggle against Germany. ish, American and Dutch defense forces in this area have been strengthened to the point where the chances of a successful Japanese attack would be at least proband the bulk of the American fleet as yet lematical; so far as is known, in the Pacific. Restriction remains, of exports under the defense regulations slowly under-

warships in the south Pacific, basing them on Singa? pore. A further intimation of Anglo-American-Dutch collaboration was given in the two visits of Sir Robert to Manila early in April, when he Brooke-Popham conferred with American military and naval commanders and with the Dutch Foreign Minister, E. N. van Kleffens, then on his way to Batavia. During June,

mines Japan's economic strength. But at the same time the United States refrains from applying the full potential weight of economic pressure. Japan is permitted to continue normal trade in com? modities not urgently required for the defense of America and Britain. Shipments of American-owned oil from the United States and from the Dutch East Indies to continue, because it is feared that their interruption would cause Japan, in desperation, to strike southward and thus force the United States to acquiesce or fight. Hitler Chief Menace? The object of this policy is to keep Japan busy in China, to hold her southward drive in check, to keep her guessing, to weaken her slowly by gradual applica? tion of economic pressure, but to avoid any sudden or drastic action which might precipitate war in the Pacific, at least until accounts have been settled with Hitler. This policy is based upon that plan of strategy are allowed

were categorically rejected by the Dutch Government. The calm confidence displayed by the Dutch, and Japan's passive acceptance of this rebuff, strongly indicated that Britain and the United States were backing

Japan suffered a sharp setback when her demands for preferential economic treatment in Netherlands India

the Dutch behind the scenes. All these moves strengthened the impression, which Washington undoubtedly desired to foster, that the United States was determined to prevent any further Japanese advances in southeast Asia. America manifested a calculated indifference to the Soviet-Japanese treaty of April 13, which was liberally advertised in Tokyo as freeing Japan's hands for action in the south. Yet during May there were some indications of a less stern attitude in Washington?coinciding with a string of German victories in the eastern Mediterranean. The President's speech of May 27, declaring an unlimited national emergency and pledging the United

which assumes that the defeat of Hitler is the first order of business, to which all else must for the time being be subordinated. Japan can be dealt with later. In the meantime, she must be kept quiet?intimidated if possible, pacified if necessary. Supporters of this policy assert that limited concessions to Japan are justified on tactical grounds in the present critical situa? tion, but firmly deny that they represent "appeasement" in the sense that they are based on the same illusions which have brought that term into disrepute. Certain sections of American opinion challenge the soundness of the United States' present policy on both strategic and political grounds. These tactics, it is said,

States to defend the freedom of the seas, made no reference to Japan. Japan was not included in the order of June 14 freezing Axis assets in America. The Admin? istration held out against considerable public pressure for an oil embargo, although on June 20 all petroleum products were placed under the license system and a limited embargo, effective against Japan, was applied

to shipments from the east coast, where a shortage was developing. Voices were again raised to urge an allround settlement with Japan which would free Amer? ica's hands in the Atlantic. Thus the situation stands as the European war enters a new phase whose outcome may spell victory or defeat for German arms. The main outlines of the American Government's That present policy reasonably policy is to give enough support to China to enable her to keep Japan actively engaged for the present and eventually to take the offensive. With the Chinese still in the field, Japan will hesitate to launch a drive in southeast Asia, which would emseem clear.

merely encourage Japan gradually but steadily to ex? pand the area under her control, at relatively small cost. Since the New Order must be challenged sooner or later, let it be challenged now, before it has strength? ened itself by further acquisitions. Furthermore, Japan

?the

represents the weakest end of the Axis. Sound strategy demands that the weakest opponent be dealt with first. war if necessary By determined action now?including Japanese threat can be quickly eliminated, and America can then face Hitler without fear of an assault on her rear.

Some critics further contend that America's present not only in its objective policy is in fact "appeasement" results but in that it is based on the hope?which they consider illusory?of an eventual accommodation with

JULY

14, I94I

1SS The year 1939 was a year of exceptional prosperity in the Formosan countryside, according to official sta? tistics on the value of agricultural production. The total value of such production increased by almost 20% as compared with 1938, and was 42% above the total for 1936, the last prewar year. Especially rapid growth was noted in the value of special crops, chiefly sugar, and of animal products. However, the volume of most crops in 1939 was below that of 1938. The sharp rise in values noted above must be explained, therefore, chiefly by the influence of inflation. Only sugar cane?for the tobacco and pine? sugar year 1938-1939?tea, jute, apples yielded larger crops than in the preceding year. Especially remarkable was the reported rise in sugar

a Japan purged of her more extreme military leaders and rehabilitated under a businessman's government. The American Government, it is said, while deploring

the extreme measures taken by Japan in China, does not wish to destroy Japan's military power but rather to preserve Japan as a counterweight to Soviet Russia. The United States' policy toward Russia in her pres?

ent emergency may throw some light on the authenticity of this interpretation. However, while hope of reaching some sort of satisfactory compromise with Japan, and even of enlisting her nonbelligerent aid against Germany, is undoubtedly entertained in some quarters in Washington, the possibility that such hopes

may be realized appears remote. The record of the last few years would indicate that neither Japan nor the United States is prepared voluntarily to make sufficient concessions to the other's point of view to secure agree? ment on fundamental issues. As has been pointed out, American aid to the Soviet Union may create new points of friction with Japan, should the latter attempt moves which would interfere with American shipments to Russia through Siberia. For the present, however, Japan is playing a waiting game. The addition of the Red Army to the anti-Axis forces has tipped the scales in their favor, and so long as the Soviet Union remains unconquered Japan will

cane production, from 151 to 214 million piculs. The accuracy of this official estimate is open to question, suffered an acute sugar for Japan and Manchoukuo in 1939 and 1940?and 85% of Japan's sugar shortage

supply comes from Formosa. Japan's sugar shortage in 1939-40 defies explanation, if official figures are accurate. The empire's production in 1938-39 was reported as nearly 28 million piculs, some 38% higher than the previous year, and even the 1939-40 figure was 10% higher than that for 1937-38. Imports during 1939 and 1940 almost disappeared; they were insignificant in 1938, although they had been sizable

probably make no major move, either northward or southward, which might precipitate a crisis. Should Russian resistance collapse, Germany's stock, which has declined somewhat since last fall, would rise to new heights in Tokyo and the temptation to move in one or the other direction would be very strong. In that event the long-postponed showdown might arrive under conditions disadvantageous Formosan Formosa to the United States.

in 1937. Explanation of the shortage might be sought in increased exports to the yen-bloc area, but statistics do not support this view: exports amounted to little more than 2l/2 million piculs in both 1938 and

Granary (Taiwan)

Shrinking

1939. Hoarding might account in some degree for the apparent shortage. Formosa's sugar production fell by some 20% in 1939-40, and a further drop is predicted for the current year. This is partially accounted for by bad weather, pests and a typhoon in the second half of 1940. But similar decreases Japanese

is one of Japan's granaries. In the five years 1935-39, the island exported to Japan an annual average of 4.6 million koku of rice, from an average crop of 9.3 million koku. This amounted to

more than 6% of Japan's average annual consumption of rice during the same period. In addition, Formosa supplies 85% of the sugar and almost all of the bananas and pineapples consumed in Japan. Not only is Formosa's agriculture important to it is of vital importance to the Formosans them? Japan; selves. Almost the entire population of nearly six mil? lion is directly or indirectly dependent upon agricul? ture. According to official estimates, out of a total gross value of production of ?845.2 million in 1938, agricul? ture was responsible for 54.5%. In this figure, many

appear in sugar production in the South Sea islands, in Kagoshima, and in sugar-beet areas of Hokkaido and southern Sakhalin. To some extent this simultaneous decline of sugar out? put in all producing areas of the Japanese Empire may, therefore, be ascribed to common causes, especially the

general shortages of labor and fertilizer. In addition, however, the general conclusion seems inescapable that 1938-39 production figures were exaggerated. In 1940 Formosa's rice production also decreased to less than 8 million koku, as compared with the high

agricultural products enter twice, first as agricultural products and then as raw materials for industry. It is quite possible that, of the net value of production, agri? culture makes up as much as 70% or 75%.

previous period under consideration. The same factors which impaired the sugar crop seem to have affected Formosa's rice crops. Their incidence was, of course,

figure of 9.8 million in 1938 and 9.2 million in 1939. The government explained the rice-crop failure to the natural causes noted above, all of which affected the second-crop period (in Formosa two crops of rice are usually raised). But production during the first period was only 4.2 million koku, less than in any year in the