International Politics 37: 345-368, September 2000 o 2000 Kluwer Law International.

Printed in the United States

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Defeat, National in International

Humiliation, Politics

and the Revenge

Motif

ROBERT E. HARKAVY
Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

between national defeat, and the resultant humiliation and compulsion to revenge, constitute a critical understudied area of international relations. Recent historical illustrations abound: Russian after the Cold War, the Arabs, France after several defeats, Germany after World War I, Argentina, etc. The salience of this factor may also call for critical adjustments to realist and rational choice theories hinged on assumptions of rational behavior. There is no existing relevant scholarship directly on this subject. But there are some strands of the literature which, in combination, may form the basis for future research: general works on revenge, territorial irredentism, and military defeat; psychological studies of shame and narcissistic rage; and applications of concepts in the clinical psychology of individuals as possibly applied to nation-state aggregates.

Abstract. The complex relationships

Introduction One of the curiosities of contemporary international relations is that someof its presumably most important dimensions remain ignored or understudied. Most notable is the absence attention to the interconnection - on a comparative basisof between defeat (usually but not always military defeat), national (or other levels of identity) humiliation or shame,and the consequentand resultant quest for compensatory revenge.Whether this involves an outright taboo on the subject of revenge, as is actually claimed by SusanJacoby in a recent work, is a question to which we shallreturn.1 Further, whether this is the result of methodological or political bias, or just becausethesesubjectsappear to be un-measurablein an empirical sense, also is an interesting point of speculation. Whether or not subject to actual measurementor empirical research,this subject lends itself to an implicit model (See Figure 1 below). Amidst obvious complexity, and begging some definitional problems that will be addressedin the following analysis,the core of the model is fairly simple. It depicts a relationship between military defeat, the psychological absorption of such defeat by a collective body, subsequent widespreadand persistent shameand humiliation, and a resulting collective rageand an almost ineradicableneed for vengeance.The model allows for somevariants of defeat, for the nuanced distinction between deep psychological humiliation and mere revisionism, and the possibilities for alternative responses other than vengeance, withdrawal (acceptance)or internal revolution. i.e.

tt Figure 1: A Model of Defeat, Humiliation, and Revenge

Narcissistic injury, shame, humiliation, revisionism, lowered testosterone at individual level

/ -cl
Chronic collective narcissistic rage \ \ Cultural produce response differences variations in

Vengeance
Or

Withdrawal or lnternrl revolution

Begs questions of long-term persistence

Humiliation, Revenge, and International Relations Theory Humiliation and revenge relate, directly or tangentially, to several important, even pivotal issues of international relations theory. Indeed, the accepted wisdom associated both with realist and liberal perspectives may confront questions arising from this analysis. Were revenge seen as a major component of international politics, foreign policy models based on assumptions of realism, rational choice or rationality, would be weakened as would notions that have been labeled endism and the obsolescence of war. In traditional realist or neo-realist models, in the tradition running from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz and others, such psychological issues are simply submerged or altogether marginalized relative to those involving system structure and the security dilemma. Morgenthaus brief nod to the concept of revisionism is the only exception - but, even then, his view of revisionism was absent any mass psychological component, and more or less coterminous with imperialism.2 For the most part, too, the realist scholarly tradition does not allow much for cultural differences in foreign-policy making - a topic to which I return later. Psychological factors such as humiliation and revenge at first blush would appear also to run against the grain of rational choice models with their built-in assumptions about value maximizing and a bias towards economic determinism. Or do they? Some rational choice scholars might claim, to the contrary, that vengeance can very easily fit within preference functions and that, indeed, there is nothing to preclude vengeance from being a dominant preference in some situations. They would claim, in other words, that vengeance is not necessarily irrational, even pathological, as assumed by psychiatrists and psychologists who deal with this subject.

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Most of all, the humiliation/vengeance syndrome runs against the grain of theses that, in the modern zeitgeist, fall under the colloquial labels of endism or the obsolescence of war. The central point of endism is that bad things are coming to an end. Huntington sees endism as manifest at three levels - the end of the Cold War (indisputable), the proposition that wars among nation-states, or at least among some nation-states, are coming to an end and, per Fukuyama, the end of history as such, which results from the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism and the exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives.3 The related obsolescence of war thesis is closely associated with political scientist John Mueller and military historian John Keegan. 4 In their writings, one finds the assumption that warfare among modern and relatively wealthy democracies has become anachronistic, even unthinkable, to the extent that analogies are drawn with the disappearance of slavery. In a related vein, the democratic peace thesis claims that, historically and with few exceptions, democracies have not committed aggression against each other.5 Further, low politics (trade competition) is said now permanently to have superseded anachronistic high politics (national security) as the central focus of competition among the major contending powers.6 Additionally, the long period dating back at least to the 1930s, in which ideological competition has defined international bloc rivalries, is now seen to have come to a permanent end. The role of the nation-state is said to be in decline, nibbled at from above by international organizations and multinational corporations, and from below by increased regionalism and the strengthening of sub-national identities. 7 If these trends are permanent, then the old tradition of balance of power politics would be dead, in practice and in theory. Replacing it is, for instance, an image of the emerging international system that centers on a three-bloc, neo-mercantilist economic competition between a US-led Americas bloc, a German-led European bloc, and a Japan-led Asian bloc.8 Otherwise, a recent and frequently reviewed work by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky dwells on the coming sharp bifurcation between zones of peace (peaceful economic competition between the major democracies, singly or en bloc) and zones of turmoil (the assumption of looming chaos and neo-Malthusian disaster - poverty, AIDS, tribal warfare, etc.) in the developing areas.9 Endism and the obsolescence of war are not without their critics. But, to the extent such concepts are prophetic, the revenge motif might be relegated to the developing world or to areas characterized by Singer and Wildavsky as zones of turmoil. And, indeed, accumulated humiliations in northern zones of peace are more likely to be worked out through economic competition (as with Japan and Germany) or conventional and nuclear arms sales (as France and China utilize). But the jury is still out. Richard Rosecrance has, for instance, by way of partial dissent, characterized the present period as one of a concert of powers similar to what transpired after the Napoleonic wars and World War I - a concert likely to break up and lead to a renewal of big power security rivalries.10 Is the syndrome from shame and humiliation through collective narcissistic rage, to vengeance, an anachronism rooted in the family structures and cultures of less-thanfully modern societies, of which the Arab - or more broadly, Islamic - world would be a good example? According to this thesis, modern consumer societies and/or democracies would, by their very natures, be less prone to collective fantasies about revenge.

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The humiliation/revenge thesisthus raisesquestionsabout realism,rational choice theory and the basic tenets of liberalism applied to international relations. Such a contrarian thesisallows for, and often expects, what some might deem irrational national behavior basedmore on emotions than narrowly defined interests. In the latter case,it raisesserious doubts about the sustainability of optimistic views on limiting war and conflict particularly in long-term conflicts and serial wars where somenations national pride hasbeen wounded. Recent Historical Examples The importance of this subject is brought to mind via numerous analysesof the interminable Arab-Israeli conflict. In such a case,the deep humiliation felt by Arabs over the lossto Israel of at leastfive wars, hasbeen noted. Given the disparity in rival populations and the magnitude of the military defeats,such loseshave been humiliating. Immediately after the 1967 war, for instance, The New York Times cited an Arab sourceassaying: Tallalsdepressionand subsequentturn toward a more fundamental belief in Islam after the 1967war is, by all accounts, not uncommon. Many people feel that the resurgenceof Islamic militancy in Egypt dates to that overwhelming defeat...everyone was questioning themselvesafter the war...they kept asking what it was about our society, our culture, our political system that could pave the way for sucha defeat.12 Indeed, the recognition of a linkage between suchhumiliation and the subsequent need for revenge prompted Henry Kissingers strategy at the outset of the 1973war, one designed to allow the Arabs a limited victory, even if largely mythical. Such action was meant to relieve them of enough shame and humiliation to allow for making peace.Some writers have questionedwhether a permanent Arab-Israeli settlement is truly possible,given the Arabs deep rage over a succession humiliating of defeatsby Israel dating back to 1948,striking at the core of self-respect,honor, and pride. This rage may have beenheightened by Iraqs humiliating defeat in the second Gulf War, even among the masses Egypt, Syria, and Morocco who, nominally, were in part of the victorious coalition.13 There are numerous other recent examples.During the recent mini-war between Ecuador and Peru, one Ecuadorian journalist wasquoted assaying that Ecuador is a nation wounded in its dignity...It is a nation with a defeat complex.14The Argentine bid to take the Falklands/Malvinas islandsin 1982 was discussed the context of in historical grievance and national humiliation over foreign occupation of a part of Argentina. The subsequentlossof the war must have enhanced that Argentinean humiliation and need for vengeance.15 Not all such examples are contemporary; indeed, this is a classical historical theme. Barbara Tuchman, in her work on the origins of World War I, The Guns of August, provides a vivid portrayal of the workings of the related themesof humiliation and revenge with respectto Franceslossof Alsace-Lorraine in the previous war with Germany in the early 1870s:

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Through returning prosperity and growing empire, through the perennial civil quarrels - royalism, Boulangism, clericalism, strikes, and the culminating, devastating Dreyfus Affair - the sacredanger still glowed, especiallyin the army. The one thing that held together all elements of the army, whether old guard or republican, Jesuit or Freemason,was the mystique dAlsace. The eyesof all were fixed on the blue line of the Vosges.A captain of infantry confessed 1912that he usedto lead the men of his comin pany in secretpatrols of two or three through the dark pines to the mountaintops where they could gaze down on Colmar. On our return from those clandestineexpeditions our columns reformed, choked and dumb with emotion.16 Thomas Scheff quotes Gambettas legendary advice to the French about this defeat: Speak of it never, think of it always,which he calls a counsel of obsession, denial and bypassingof shame.17 also arguesthat Francessense shameand He of loss,and its needfor revenge,wasa primary, albeit rarely acknowledged,contributing causeof World War I. These themes are almost omnipresent in discussionsof contemporary affairs. With a US-Japanstruggle for global economic hegemony looming a few years ago, some analystsquietly worried that Japans defeat in 1945 lay just under the surface (in what was,we should not forget, a war without mercy, ashighlighted in the title of one recent widely read book). l8 One study of nuclear proliferation attributes French aggressiveness sellingweaponstechnology to a need for compensation in in relation to a long string of national defeats,from the Napoleonic wars to Algeria.9 So common are these themes that they may not be dismissedeasily or entirely as excessive psychologizing. Sometimes,the need for vengeancefollowing a defeat may be displacedon other objects,or time-delayed. In the aftermath of its defeat by Iraq in 1988,much of Irans animus was directed against the US or the West. Only many years later did Iranians begin, publicly, to mull over the reasons their defeat againstwhat normally would for have beenthought of asa weaker foe.20 Not all casesof humiliation/revenge involve military lossesby nation-states. Indeed, they may not involve contests between nation-states or national identities. Some sub- or supra- national identities may be strong enough to provide the basis for collective shamerequiring vengeance.And, sometimes,defeatscan be of a sort other than outright or easily identified military losses. The seemingly endlessspiral of defeat and revenge involved in the struggle between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi is but one of many examplesin connection with ethnic, tribal or religious wars in the Third World. Others can be seenin Northern Ireland, Kurdistan, the Caucasus, Peruvian mountains, and Afghanistan. the Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the caseof ex-Yugoslavia, where one is reminded constantly of the roots of Serb bitternessand humiliation that originated with the Serbsdefeat by Ottoman Turks at KosovaPolje, and with the Jasenovicconcentration camp in World War II. 21 The current and much discussedIslamic rage againstthe West (perhapsyet to be expanded to a clash of civilizations b la Hunt-

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ington) is obviously connected to a history of humiliation, defeat, and dominance by the West, culminating in Desert Storm. Much of that rage is openly couched in the rhetoric of revenge. 22 Indeed, one of the major Arab terrorists of the recent period utilized a nom deguerre that meant father of revenge.*3 Asian leaders in recent years have hinted often at a psychological requirement for overturning centuries of humiliation rooted in racism as well as defeat and domination, usually accompanied by the prediction that the next century will be Asias century - there is more than a hint of revenge in that. 24 Latin America has long seethed with resentment of the Yanquis from the Colossus of the North, although most of the regions nations (Mexico is an exception) have never suffered a military defeat at the hands of the US. Visitors to the Yad Vashem memorial in Jerusalem will see a vivid exhibition of German primary school books in the 1930s which focused on the theme of the dolchstoss (stab in the back) attributed to Jewish anti-war leftists towards the end of World War I, deemed by the Nazis responsible for Germanys defeat and humiliation and, hence, requiring revenge.*5 Thomas Scheff also underscores this point, stating that Hitlers appeal lay in his public being in a chronic state of humiliation over Versailles.26 Some of the examples of humiliation/revenge are deeply rooted in past centuries, and constitute examples of the permanent effects of defeat. French Canada is a good example. That problem is not merely a matter of minority status within Canada, various esoteric (to an outsider) constitutional issues, or a desire for a more solidly rooted national identity. Rather, French Canada psychologically confronts its own humiliation by military defeat in I759 - a defeat also associated with ethnic cleansing. Growing discussions about the role of national humiliation and revenge in Russia are also worth noting. Article after article in press coverage of the late 1990s into 2000 portrays Russians susceptibility to appeals rooted in the shame and humiliation of the loss of the Cold War and its status as a superpower. Added to these momentous shifts was shame over losing the first war in Chechnya and shame produced by the need for Western economic aid.27 Indeed, much of the current policy debate in the US - particularly as pertains to the eastward extension of NATO - is centered on the perceived dilemma of security policy practicalities and a desire to push forward European integration versus what some see as the danger of piling on - i.e., of further humiliating the Cold War loser to the point that it may strike back and seek revenge. Concepts and Definitions: From Humiliation to Revenge The causal nexus between humiliation and revenge, with an arrow between them running from left to right, is my principal interest. A bit of terminological and definitional confusion may surround these and related terms. On the left side of this equation, so to speak, are humiliation, shame, defeat, and loss. On the other side of the equation are revenge and vengeance, plus retaliation, payback, tit for tat and, perhaps, revisionism and irredentism. These are no mere quibbles; instead, some fairly important nuances may be masked by these terms, the discussion of which can shed light on important causal relationships. The meanings of defeat and loss would appear to be self-evident if we leave aside questions about the depths, frequency, and other dimensions of such an occurrence. In

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defining humiliation, Websters Dictionary employs cognates such as humbling and mortification, and goes with to reduce to a lower position in ones own eyes or in the eyes of others. Shame is defined as a powerful emotion excited by consciousness of guilt, shortcoming or impropriety, and further refers to disgrace and dishonor or (in verb form) to cover with reproach or ignominy. The key definitional fragments for revenge are to inflict harm or injury in return for, to vindicate by avenging, and vindictive retaliation. Vengeance seems defined a little more strongly: punishment inflicted in return for an injury or an offense, retribution . . . often, passionate or unrestrained revenge. With great violence, force and the like. The term with a vengeance is noted here as reflective of the underlying force involved. There may be a scale here, with vengeance at the one extreme and revenge close by. Retaliation does not appear to capture the meaning sought here, because it is more redolent of the tit for tat familiar in a game theoretical context, i.e., involving shortterm or transitory matters, devoid of much deep emotion (such as retaliating to the imposition of a tariff with one of your own). Vengeance, however, captures a deeply rooted and primordial rage associated with humiliating defeat, leaving a nation or other identity group seething in mass hatred. Convergent Strands of an Emergent Literature on Humiliation and Vengeance Several disparate and otherwise seemingly unconnected strands of social science literature are germane to the study of humiliation and revenge. In recent years, several major works have appeared which come at the subject from different angles. Together, they provide the basis for a more serious look at the revenge motif in international relations. We must still confront a dearth of badly needed basic data, and daunting methodological problems that render truly empirical work in this area a difficult proposition. Nevertheless, various strands within expert literature can be discerned: . Two important works devoted explicitly to the concept of revenge as an historical, religious, legal, literary and psychological theme, require our attention; in one case, the analysis is more centered on the individual level and on criminal behavior than on the application to international relations. In the other, a split exists between an emphasis on domestic and family situations and two cases involving national shame and vengeance. . A second theme is evident in a major work on territorial irredentism, mostly involving the study of lost wars, but centered on ethnography and the geography of borders and largely devoid of related psychological content. . Third one can identify several works on military defeat and misfortune, in the context of how nations adjust strategies and tactics after losing - or winning - wars, works that touch on the problem of national humiliation and revenge. . Two recent studies are a fourth touchstone within the social science literature on the nexus between personal and national identity - on identification theory. These books probe questions about collective

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moodsand actionsand the extent to which one can legitimately utilize concepts applicable to individuals to gauge the behavior of national or other aggregates, the problem of isomorphism and i.e., anthropomorphism. . Fifth, a significant body of writing in psychiatry, much of it years ago, focusedon the conceptsof narcissisticrage and shame-rage cycles, claimed to underpin neurotic individual vengeance and vindictiveness. . A small literature on comparative political culture and comparative cultural psychiatry is a sixth strand, raising the crucial issueof whether some peoples or nations may be abnormally prone to shameor humiliation - and hence to compulsions to vengeance - in turn rooted in family and small group relations and patterns, or historical tribal behavior. . Some recent work in sociobiology suggests seventh strand that a involves decreases testosteronelevelsafter individuals are defeatin ed in sports contestsor suffer a lossof social status.This raisesan intriguing question about the applicability of such patterns to nations in the aftermath of defeat, although researchingsuch matters for large populations and in historical retrospective confronts obvious impediments. . Finally, socio-psychologicalresearchand writing, past and present, has dealt with nationalism, patriotism, group loyalty and the wethey phenomenon. Each of theseis discussed more detail below.z8 in Works on Revenge work devoted explicSusanJacobyswork, Wild Justice, is one extant social science itly to the study of revenge(Scheffs is the other). 29As noted, it makesonly occasional references to international relations, being largely devoted to the interplay of revenge and justice as an historical problem largely cast in legal and religious terms. Jacoby reviews the historical record of the revenge motif as expressedin literary works and embeddedin legal systemsand associated codesof legal ethics in Ancient Greeceand Rome, the Bible, and Europe sincethe Medieval period. Sheaddresses the popular fascination with revengeexpressed literature, film and theater, referring to in the popularity of revenge as a theme in modern massentertainment.30 Indeed, Jacoby refers to the semi-pornographic fascination with revenge themes in literature and drama, noting that 17th Century revengethemesin English tragedieswould strike a familiar chord in connection with any number of contemporary works. A late 1990sfilm that appearedmore than a decadeafter Jacobysbook - Sleepers, featuring Robert DeNiro - epitomizesher point. Jacobyseems agreewith Karen Horney and others to the extent that vengeance to is discussed an archaic, illegitimate and neurotic emotion and activity - . . .the as sick vestige of a more primitive stageof human development.31Vindictiveness is seenas neurotic and, although the urge to retaliate may be universal, it is deemed

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unhealthy. In domestic systems, retributive systems, i.e., the courts, are claimed to remove the burden of revenge from individuals; otherwise, the religiously inclined are advised to look to a higher authority to provide retribution, In the interstices of her analysis, however, Jacoby makes some points interesting and germane for this discussion. First, she concedes that, certainly in the modern world and even when compared to recent centuries, a virtual taboo exists on the subject of revenge. In a related vein, she notes the paucity of literature on this subject in psychoanalysis, although that discipline would appear clearly suited to the exploration and explanation of the theme of revenge. This would seem all the more so in view of the pervasive importance of the vengeance theme in Greek mythology. In summary, she says that a taboo has been attached to the subject of revenge in a century that has witnessed the fearful union of mass vengeance with technology, a reference to Nazi revenge against the Jews as manifested in the Holocaust.32 By extension, one might speculate that the taboo Jacoby perceives in connection with domestic legal systems has been extended to the field of international relations. One might argue that, to the extent that liberal analysts project the normative illegitimacy of revenge onto the field, a defacto taboo does, indeed, underlie the study of international conflict. And, whereas Jacoby and others may decry the emotion and practice of revenge in domestic systems where courts may provide surrogate avengers of sorts, no such authorities exist in the anarchic international system - except, perhaps, the occasional war crimes tribunals such as Nuremberg and The Hague. Literature on Irredentism The recent publication of at least one major edited work on territorial irredentism by Naomi Chazan coincided with growing interest in ethnic politics.33 This volume provides concepts and historical context of several waves of irredentism after its emergence as a distinct process. Such an emergence occurred when issues of state formation and national awakening converged over the delineation of political boundaries.34 Those waves have occurred, respectively, during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century; after World War I at the time of the Paris Peace Conference; during the decolonialization process after World War II; and, again, after the Cold War in conflict-prone areas of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Several related definitions of irredentism exist. One has to do with attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people who inhabit them in the name of historical, cultural, religious, linguistic, or geographic affinity? Alternatively, another view asserts that intrinsic to the notion of irredentism is a tension between people and territory, between politics and culture - indeed, between symbolic and instrumental aspects of international relations.36 Such competing definitions, exhibit tension over the relative importance of people versus territory, and over the centrality of the nationstate which demands that territory be seen as a part of national heritage. In the Chazan volume, a number of case studies are provided: Alsace, post-World War I boundary problems in Europe, irredentism in Germany since 1945, Turkey, and Africa in toto in the wake of the decolonialization process. In many but not all of these cases, defeat in war accompanying humiliation and striving for revenge all have been involved. And, the authors in this collection stress the sentimental and subjec-

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tive features of irredentism. The contribution on Turkey notes that Pan-Turkism is evidently romantic and emotional,37 while another contributor dubs irredentism the atavistic call of the wild of modern nationalism, which recalls the instinctive urge of humans to define their territory in the sameway that animals do, although not by the samephysical means.38 Generally speaking,however, Chazansvolume doesnot employ the languageconceptsof clinical psychology, particularly those that have to do with identity or identification theory, to which we shall return. The psychology of revengeis little noticed. But the importance of the psychology of loss,humiliation, and (at least asit is perceived) physical dismemberment, however, is implied - sentiments at the heart of the humiliation and vengeancetheme. Some current examples underscore that point. Americans have some difficulty in understanding the persistent obsession mainland China about the reincorpoof ration of Taiwan, perceived at all levels of Chinesesociety ashistorical dismemberment following from earlier defeats by Japan and, in a senseby the US, which undertook to maintain Taiwansseparation from China at the outset of the Korean War. For many Chinese, the Taiwan problem is symbolic and expressive of past humiliations and defeat.39 Likewise, in the Middle East, Israels existence is, for many if not most Arabs, a concrete symbol of their past defeats and humiliations, first at the hands of the West in general, and then by Israel after World War II. In both cases, irredentist claims on territory appear to be closely linked to heartfelt feelings of the nations physical mutilation. Irans feelings about Persian Gulf islandsevoke similar metaphors; likewise, Iraqs irredentist emotions about Kuwait, Pakistans about Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh in the eyes of Armenians, and numerous other cases.Many of these casesare linked to historical memories of military defeat and national humiliation. Volkanswork, focused on group identity and self esteemand emerging from Eric Ericksonsearlier pioneering work, addresses problem of territorial lossand irrethe dentism. He avers that a physical border, psychologically speaking,is like a second skin around a group, the piercing of which can causeunbearablemassanxiety.40

Lessons of Lost Wars

Lossin war compelschangein military doctrine and strategy. One recallsthe generalization in the military history literature that winners stand pat while losersreview their failures and innovate in the expectation of future conflicts. In particular, a significant literature follows Germany and France through the Napoleonic Wars, the France-Prussianwar of the early I87Os,and World Wars I and II. Similar accounts have followed the progressionof the severalArab-Israeli wars, in the late I94Os,1967, 1969-70, 1973,and 1982.Both of thesesituations of serial war are suffusedwith the themesof defeat, humiliation, and vengeance. Recently, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have written a book on Military Misfortunes, which is an analysisof military failures.41 In it, they point out that one main reasonfor Israelsseemingintelligence failure to predict the I973 Arab onslaught was a lack of empathy among Israelsleadersfor the Egyptians and Syrians need to overcome past feelings of shameand damaged national honor. This deeply wounded

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sense had to be addressed even at the price of still another defeat for the Arabs, for whom the status quo was psychologically unbearable. Failure to take into account the revenge motif then became a prominent cause of intelligence failure (not only with respect to the Arabs, but also the Soviets, who responded to the humiliation of their weapons in 1967 by introducing whole new classes of weapons into the conflict). Individual and National Identity: The Issue of Anthropomorphism By far the most important and daunting methodological and conceptual problem in the study of national (rather than individual) vengeance is how to apply the conceptual baggage of individual or small group psychology to nation-states, or other collectivities. This raises the issue of anthropomorphism. Of course, that issue can be raised in various contexts of international relations - for instance, when preference scales are attributed to the nation-state. But, somehow, the issue seems particularly difficult dealing with irrational states of mind involving vengeance, more than when rational behavior may be attributed. Such a methodological issue is not new in the application of social-psychological concepts to foreign policy. Indeed, it was cited as a major obstacle to research and understanding long ago by S. E. Perry, Herbert Kelman, and Otto Klineberg - all pioneers in the application of psychological concepts to the study of international relations.J2 More recently, this issue has been addressed head-on in a full-length treatment by William Bloom.43 In it, Bloom engages in a lengthy exegesis of what he refers to as identification theory, drawing variously upon the works of Sigmund Freud, George Herbert Mead, Erik Erikson, Talcott Parsons, and Jurgen Habermas. Bloom avers that, in making statements such as France declared war on England, an implication is made that entire populations have a joint attitude. Further, he notes that, by making such statements, academic integrity and intellectual credibility are severely strained, and that this strain is due to the lack of theory which in a methodologically coherent way explicates the relationship between a mass national population and its state.44 He looks to the possibility of a psychological theory - what he calls identification theory - giving the mass national population of a state just such a theoretically coherent status. Bloom recognizes that the lack of any theoretical status for the mass national population became more apparent with the advent of the behavioral revolution in the study of international relations in the 1960s. In particular, he notes, the language of anthropomorphism in which nation-states as apparently coherent personalities acted and reacted on the international stage...along with such notions as national honor: national prestige, and national character, was shown up as having little if any explanatory power and certainly no methodologically coherent internal logic45. In what then becomes a lengthy and complicated analysis, devoted to a variety of key areas of international relations theory, Bloom further attacks what he calls the individual-aggregate problematic. He draws on an essay by J. David Singer,46 in which Singer, first having delineated certain attributes of the international system, proposes the use of three psychological variables - personality, attitude, and opinion - said to interact

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with the system.Singeris then discussed quoted asfollows,providing a good sumand mary of the methodologicalissues involved: In other words I would hold that the aggregationof individual psychological properties provides a quite sufficient basefor describing the cultural properties of the larger social entity which is Xomprised of those individuals. He repeated further on that, The position taken here is that the cultural properties of any subnational, national or extranational system may be described in a strictly aggregativefashion, by observing the distribution and configuration of individual psychologicalproperties.47 Bloom concludes that there is no psychological theory which precisely explains how to argue coherently from the individual to aggregategroup or massbehavior, which explainspolitical integration and mobilization,48 and cites political psychologistssuch as Kelman and Fred Greenstein ashaving been acutely aware of the need for a coherent psychological theory which could be applied so as to aggregatefrom the individual out to the group.49 Particularly germaneto our central focus here on collective feelingsof humiliation, shame,and vengeanceis his discussionof the work of Erik Erikson - specifically, Eriksonswork on the individual need to protect and enhanceego identity, and the projection or aggregation of that problem to a more collective basis. Bloomsanalysisis echoedby Harvard psychiatrist John Mack and by the sociologist Thomas Scheff. Mack discusses collective psychologicalforces in the study of the history and collective myths, and further notes that there is no equivalent at a group or collective level to the superegorestraints which can operate at an individual level to curb hostile or violent impulses.50 refers to the difficult methodological He problem of finding a sound, conceptual balance among the relevant insights of individual and group psychology - in a field where realities are multilayered and compelling.151 Scheff, on the samewavelength, admits that in claiming an isomorphism between interpersonal and international relations, I realize that I challengean article of faith of modern social science:that structure and processat the societal level are fundamentally different from those at the level of persons,asDurkheim claimed, is a reality sui generis.52 Narcissistic Ragein Psychiatric Literature Moving back to the specific subjectof humiliation and vengeance,it is noteworthy that in psychiatric literature, the clinical term narcissistic rage is most commonly used. It provides the link between, on the one hand, shame and humiliation aggregatedto the collectivity of the nation - and on the other, aggressiveness and vengeance.According to Heinz Kohut, 53this actually involves a spectrum describing relative degreesof such rage, culminating at the extremes to what the author sees as the neurotic and dangerousstate of chronic narcissisticrage.54Hence, this spectrum is seento run from the deepestand most inflexible grudge of the paranoiac to the apparently fleeting rage reaction of the narcissisticallyvulnerable after a minor slight.55 (The author is mum, however, on whether there really is such a thing as a narcissisticallyinvulnerable person, and whether such a person could really cope in

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most human environments.) Thosein the grip of a narcissisticrage are said to show total lack of empathy towards the defender.56Chronic narcissisticrage is deemed one of the most pernicious afflictions of the human psyche - either, in its still endogenousand preliminary form, as grudge and spite; or, externalized and acted out, in disconnectedvengeful actsor in a cunningly plotted vendetta.57 Kohut elaboratesin this context on the metapsychologicalposition of shameand rage,which he callsthe two principal experiential and behavioral manifestations of disturbed narcissistic equilibrium, and notes, in this regard, narcissistic rage belongsto the larger psychologicalfield of aggression, anger, and destructiveness.58 Anticipating one of our later-to-be discussed researchproblems, he alsosuggests that the narcissisticallyvulnerable individual respondsto actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefacedwithdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight):59 beggingthe important question of why and when either of thesetwo alternative responses occur. Thesequestionsare addressed Mack, Volkan, and Scheff aswell. Mack, in disby cussing collective psychological forces in the study of history, stresses collective myths, the pain of their histories, the accrued grief of the centuries, the problem of historical grievances, and the rise and fall of national self-esteem.60Scheffs emphasis on unacknowledgedor bypassedshame,and on prestige asa codeword is for honor and the avoidanceof shame.61

Comparative Cultural Propensity to Shame, Humiliation,

Vengeance

Kohut joins other psychiatrists and other social scientists by asking whether propensitiesto shameand humiliation, and to narcissisticrage,and hence to vengefulness,may be more strongly evidenced in somecultures than in others, just asthey may be more strongly evidenced in some individuals within thesecultures. In some writings, this is perceived as derived from deeply rooted cultural legaciesof family structure, child-rearing, and genderrelations. The psychiatrist H.W. Glidden and the political scientistLeonard Binder (the latter writing about Egypts political culture in an edited volume devoted to the comparative aspects of that subject) have, for instance, characterized Arab societies as intensely suffused with propensities to shameand humiliation. Binder actually refers to Egypt asa shameculture, one with a deeply rooted masstendency for conformity in relation to fear of shaming.62 Glidden applied this explicitly to the Arabs hitherto incapacity or unwillingnessto make peacewith Israel,absentthe psychiatric terminology of narcissisticrage: Failure to conform, however,brings shame. Shameis intenselyfeared among the Arabs, and this fear is so pervasive that Arab society has been labeled a shame-oriented one. This contrasts sharply with Judaism with WesternChristian societies, and which are guilt-oriented. It is to be noted, however,that in Arab termsshameis not defined asthe commissionof an act condemnedby the value system;instead, it meansthe discovery by outsidersthat a given individual or group committed suchan act. Hence there is an intenseconcern with and catering to outward appearancesand public opinion that many observers havenoted asbeing characteristicof the Arabs.63

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Numerous writers on the interminable civil war still raging in Afghanistan have observedthe deeply embeddedAfghan cultural traditions of retaliation and revenge. Kohut, meanwhile,in discussing work of Ruth Benedict, refers to the propensity the toward narcissisticrage in the Japanese, attributed to their methods of child-rearing through ridicule and the threat of ostracism and to the sociocultural importance which maintaining decorum has in Japan. Benedict is quoted as noting that in Japan, sometimespeople explode in the most aggressive acts...They are roused to theseaggressions when their principles or their freedom is (sic) challenged...but not when they detect an insult or a detraction.e4 Benedict doesnot, apparently, attempt to project theseclaimed national attributes from the individual to the collective level much lessto national behavior. Seeminglymissingin the literature is a discussionof cases the other end of the extreme, i.e., those of cultures or nations deemed relaat tively lessinclined to collective narcissisticrage and vengeful behavior. Might this apply, for instance, to more modern or liberal or democratic cultures, or to thosewith a history of successful diplomatic and military endeavors? Gliddens article, almost alone in the literature, posits a causal relationship between family and tribal structures, culturally basedvalue systems, collective shame and humiliation, and the compulsion to revenge.65He posits, ingroup solidarity, stemmingoriginally from Arab tribal values,is probably the most salientcharacteristic of the mechanics of Arab society.@jFurther, this ingroup solidarity is said to demand a high degreeof conformity and therefore imparts a strong authoritarian tone to Arab culture and society. In that connection, Glidden refers to the prevalence of an other-directed personality in Arab culture, said to be characteristic both of Arab tradition and of the outlook of Islam. He then proceedsto discussthe role of shameand conformity in Arab society, asfollows: Conformity brings honor and social prestige,and it alsoensuresfor the individual and his group a secureplace in society.As long as the individual conforms, the other membersof his ingroup and its allies . and clients are bound to help him advance his interests and to defend him unquestioningly againstoutsideforcesand agencies... Why is this fear of shameso powerful among the Arabs?Shame destroys one of the key elementsin the Arab prestige system: the ability to attract followersand clients. (Arab society is and alwayshas beenbasedon a systemof client-patron relationships.)Sinceamong the Arabs the identification betweenthe individual and the group is far closerthan it is in the West (indeed, it may be saidthat the group is the individuals alter ego). The consequences shameare thereof fore much more widespread and complex than in Westernculture.67 Glidden relates this analysisto the matter of vengeance,specifically, the requirement for revengeagainstthe Jewsfor the history of Arab defeat. He statesthat for the Arabs, defeat does not generatea desire for peace;instead it produces an emotional need for revenge,and this needis deepened rather than attenuated by each successive defeat.68With referenceto Bloom, et al, regarding the issueof anthropomorphism, Glidden suggests that the first thing to note is that sincethe Arab value systemis a group- and not an individual-based one, it is not possiblefor the individual Arab

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states to dissociate themselves from the Arab collectivity any more than the individual can dissociate himself from his clan.@ Hence, he concludes that all Arabs and their governments are driven to eliminate the shame that had been visited on them and the other Arabs by their defeats by IsraeL70 Because Gliddens analysis is near sui generis in the literature, particularly with respect to its focus on revenge, one wonders about its more genera1 applicability, perhaps to situations involving Arabs and/or Islam. What, for example, does it tell us about the future of Iranian need to extract vengeance against Iraq, given that Irans defeat in 1988 involved the large-scale use of chemical weapons against the Iranian army? What about Pakistans compulsion for revenge against India, given the backdrop of the 1971 defeat that led to the creation of Bangladesh? Further, what is the applicability to Bosnia, Chechnya or, for that matter, Ireland, Japan or Peru? And, in a reversal of the standard analysis of humiliation and vengeance in the Middle East, one writer - Jay Gonen, in his Psychohistory of Zionism -has characterized Israeli bravado and machismo as a function of the humiliation of the Holocaust, also requiring a kind of psychological vindication, if not outright revenge.71 Americans, even the social scientists among them, may less easily comprehend these problems. The US collective psyche lacks a strong shame component. Even Vietnam was a mere pinprick, and collective shame could easily be assuaged by the knowledge that the North Vietnamese could easily have been beaten by an all-out effort. Pearl Harbor probably caused more shock than shame, but it did give rise to a vengeful response. But, overall, Americans have been spared this kind of deep national trauma, and they may not easily understand it elsewhere.72 Sociobiological Research and Socio-Psychological Literature on Nationalism Approaching this subject from different disciplines and a different level of analysis, recent work in sociobiology has measured declines in testosterone levels suffered by individuals after athletic defeats such as tennis and chess, or as a result of loss of social status.T3 This refers back to Mazurs biosocial theory of status, which hypothesizes a feedback loop between an individuals testosterone level and his or her assertiveness in attempting to achieve or maintain interpersonal status or dominance rank.T4 Winning raises testosterone levels, losing decreases it; this is further claimed to explain, in part athletic winning or losing streaks, or the alternations between hot streaks and slumps on the part of baseball players, among others. Whether such phenomena could be attributed or applied to international politics and victory or defeat in war may be far from trivial. Finally, an extensive social-psychological literature on the roots of nationalism has long focused on individuals and small interacting groups, often involving laboratory experiments and surveys of college students. This approach has ramifications for the role of attachments, national and group identities in cognitive development, ingroup versus out-group loyalties, the denigration of outside groups, individual and collective images of others, the role of reference groups in enhancing individuals self-esteem, and negative self-identities. This literature has been surveyed by Daniel Druckman, who dwells on the extent to which groups and nations provide security and safety as well as status and prestige in return for loyalty and commitment.

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Druckman seems focused on symmetrical research that analyzes the asymmetrical humiliation, and revenge.75

Relationships Among Disparate Strands of Analysis The foregoing seven or eight somewhat disparate strands of literature and analysis, laid out separately, may have heuristic utility, pointing the way to further research. How, then, in a theoretical or conceptual sense, do they combine to inform scholars intent on moving the subject forward to more empirical analysis? That is not easily answered. The key, however, lies in finding a way to bridge the levels of analysis problem all too familiar in international relations. The literatures on revenge (Scheff, Jacoby), bio-social status (Mazur, et al), and narcissistic personalities (Kohut, et. al.) are obviously focused on the individual level of analysis. Literature on the comparative cultural aspects (Glidden, et. al.) is directed, if only implicitly, at the nation-state level, i.e., at comparative national behavior. The literatures on nationalism (Druckman, et. al.) and on irredentism (Chazan) and on lost wars (Cohen) involve aspects both at the national and systemic levels, primarily the former, treating the nation-state as a unitary actor with imputed psychological characteristics. Tying this all together, the works on individual and national identity, focused on the issue of anthropomorphism (Bloom, Perry, et. al.) attempt to provide a bridge over this conceptual divide. How Could this Subject be Researched? How, then, could this subject further be subjected to empirical analysis, to move beyond the merely heuristic? No database exists, and historical data would be acquired only with great difficulty since subjects (people) are gone and, even for wars a decade or two old, the topic has become stale. This subject would require individual level analysis via survey research in nations defeated at war, perhaps with time series analysis to gauge the progression of vengeful attitudes at intervals beyond wars end. Psychological analysis as pioneered by Robert Lane in New Haven might be particularly appropriate here as objective responses in such a sensitive and threatening area might be difficult to obtain.76 Content analysis of statements by leaders or of the press in relevant nations would be very valuable in contemporary analyses of historical cases, but here the bridge would have to be established between public or mass attitudes, and those attributed to a nation via its elite. And, such research would require native country specialists, in most cases with requisite language skills and an ability to interpret country-specific attitudes. A Research Format for the Study of Humiliation/Revenge The relationship between shame, humiliation, and vengeance may be fairly complex, particularly because the variety of defeat may be the underlying cause of shame or humiliation. Just looking at the various types and levels of loss and defeat may help us to assemble questions that may act as a guide to research in this area.

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As noted above, we may be talking about an actual military defeat or a functional equivalent. Egypt and Syria in 1967 and 1973, Iran in 1988, Argentina in 1982, Germany in both world wars may be cited as examples of clear-cut military defeat. But even here, there may be important distinctions. Otherwise, the Soviet Union as represented by Russia suffered a non-military defeat at the end of the Cold War, with resulting narcissistic injury to the Russian people that is now becoming apparent. Or, as previously noted, numerous ex-colonial peoples, now independent, may suffer from various levels of shame and humiliation related to long-term subjugation that may or may not so easily be related to discrete and identifiable military defeats. Further, some situations of territorial irredentism may also not so easily be related to military defeat, although they may have come to represent, psychologically speaking, various levels of dismemberment and territorial mutilation, with consequences in the areas of shame and humiliation, or at least, some level of frustration. The extent or depth or type of defeat may be very important in determining the level of resulting humiliation. The Arabs in 1967 and Iraq in 1991 suffered overwhelming, humiliating defeats of the kind that produces lasting shame. In both cases, before-the-war boastfulness (enemies were going to drown in their own blood) was followed by almost comic-opera levels of military performance, widely interpreted throughout the world as something akin to cowardice that, subsequently, was to produce high levels of shame. 7 In the case of Iraq in 1991, as noted, there is some evidence that this shame was shared on the Arab street even in some countries that nominally were part of the US-led victorious coalition. Particularly in 1967, a defeat was absorbed by the side that had an overwhelming numerical advantage as well as asymmetrical levels of international support and weapons supply, all the worse at the hands of a people that historically had been considered inept in military matters. It is that combination of factors that led to the shame and vengeance syndrome so well described by Glidden. Volkans work suggests the need for further attention to what he refers to as chosen traumas, i.e., powerful historical memories or images associated with major defeats and humiliations.78 For Greek Cypriots, this means the defeat in 1974; for the Arabs, above all the 1967 war; earlier for the French, the 1871 loss of Alsace and Lorraine; and, later, for the Germans, Versailles. For the Serbs, it is Kosova over 600 years ago. One recent article, in discussing the growing anti-Americanism of Chinese youth, portrayed the vivid symbolry involved in the memory of the Opium Wars and the humiliation by the British (representing the West) as long ago as 1848.79 Research on such chosen traumas, either via survey research or in-depth interviews, might reveal the roots and depths of historical national humiliations. Some military defeats might leave the defeated sides honor at least partially intact. Both the German and Japanese armies in World War II were widely adjudged, even by Western military experts, to have been superior to allied armies on a man-to-man basis. They were ultimately defeated in long and hotly contested wars by overwhelming numerical superiority on the part of their foes. But the psychological impact, at least in part, may have been equivalent to that upon an underdog football team that plays a good game and comes close to an upset - a kind of moral victory - which at least minimizes shame. There is a spectrum here. Argentinas defeat in 1982 was

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similar to that of the Arabs in 1967 - a horrendous, shameful embarrassment after a big rhetorical buildup. Pakistan, in 1965, fought a larger foe to a near stand-still; hence, even though defeat may have been looming at the close of the war, Pakistan may have been left with a feeling that it had fought well, certainly nothing about which to feel ashamed. Further, the factor of surprise may be important, having to do with nations losing wars they had expected to win, even to win easily. There is another hypothesis worth noting in this regard. Kohut has stated, with reference to an individual, that the narcissistically vulnerable individual responds to actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefaced withdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight). 80 Implied in Kohuts statement is the idea that these responses are somewhat optional, or that given individuals might respond to the same level of humiliation with either response, whether randomly distributed or, more likely, as a function of personality structure. Years ago, in discussions of this matter with the late Harold Lasswell, he provided another possibility. His view was that a person or nation undergoing an overwhelming defeat where, most importantly, there did not appear any reasonable chance of ever getting retribution or revenge, would likely become withdrawn, apathetic and submissive. 81 Even in a situation where an overwhelming defeat had been absorbed, the presence of reasonable hope for a comeback and reversal means vengefulness is likely to be a normal psychological response. This may, for instance, account for the behavior of the Arabs throughout the conflict with Israel, during the whole of which time they have felt that their numerical superiority would some day be translated into victory, even if preceded by numerous intermediate defeats. Germany after World War II, on the other hand, might be cited as a case where there must have appeared almost no hope for winning another round against what now would be, in addition, nuclear-armed foes such as Russia and the US. Hence, few manifestations of vengefulness have appeared, at least on the surface. Of course, others would argue that guilt over the Holocaust and Germanys broader role during the Nazi period might have precluded that type of response.82 Post-Cold War Russia, where all signs of the humiliation/vengeance syndrome appear to be in play, would appear to be another case where there is sufficient hope for a turnaround to produce a response of revenge, not withdrawal. Whether the humiliation of the defeated - and hence its compulsion to revenge has resulted from serial defeats may be important. The Arabs were defeated by Israel in multiple wars without a compensating victory. France went down against Germany, or combinations in which Germans wer involved, in 1870 and 1940, and would have been I defeated by Germany in 1914 if it had to go it alone. Pakistan has been bested, to one degree or another, in three conflicts with India, though only the last of these was decisive. But, the point is, defeat and humiliation may become cumulative. Whether a nation loses a war that it has started, or one where it has been the victim of aggression, may also be important, notwithstanding difficulty in defining aggressors and victims in war. Germany, Japan, the Arabs, Iraq all lost wars they had begun, by most peoples calculations, and the shame of losing such a war (presumably begun with the expectation of success), may be all the greater. The factor of social distance between foes, and/or the degree of hatred or condescension involved may also be a factor in determining the level of shame and humili-

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ation that follows defeat. Various wars may be compared to what John Dower called the US-Japan Pacific War: a war without mercy, with obvious racial overtones, and between peoples of vastly different cultures as well as races.83 These factors may be present in the Arab-Israeli conflict, just as they were, relatively speaking, absent in the European wars of this century and also the Cold War. The vengeance factor may or may not vary accordingly. Finally, there is the factor of time, which may be related to some of the cultural factors discussed above. How long does it take before shame and humiliation associated with a defeat fades away, at least to the point where it no longer requires a vengeful response? And, how does that relate to, for instance, the magnitude and the level of embarrassment of defeat? In the case of the Arabs narcissistic rage vis-a-vis Israel, for instance, Glidden sees an almost open-ended time frame. Hence, according to Glidden: As for the element of time, the Arabs consider it to be of little account in the quest for vengeance, which to them is an integral part of what they conceive of as justice. There are vendettas among the Arabs that have lasted for centuries, as all students of the Near East are aware. In Islamic law, the question of the conduct of Islam in defeat is regarded as an anomaly and is almost totally ignored. Those few jurists who did deal with it maintained that the battle would be resumed no matter how long the Muslims had to wait.84 The impact of defeat in war and the accompanying humiliation may be examined in some related contexts. For instance, there is the long-standing generalization that internal revolutions tend to follow military defeats. That thesis has been applied to France after its defeat in the French and Indian wars in the 176Os, Germany and Russia after World War I, Argentina after the Falklands War, and many others.85 Some have pointed to the connection between the Soviets debacle in Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the regime. Indeed, some have also pointed to the connection between Americas debacle in Vietnam and the accompanying domestic disarray, even if well short of a revolutionary situation. Heretofore, we have surmised a rough equivalence, psychologically speaking, between defeat in wars and resulting humiliation, and humiliation derived from colonial domination and racial oppression as per Franz Fanon. Druckman, however, posits an alternative view in discussing Latin America and the concept of xenocentrism:87 or, the situation in which dependent countries under-value themselves and over-value their dominators. Such an inward-turning, negative self-identify was also discussed by Volkan in the context of masochism and the turning of aggression inward in anticipation of further danger and humiliation.88 One major recent work has pointed to a possible connection between defeat and the need for revenge as a driving force behind nuclear proliferation. This may, of course, be a merely pragmatic response to defeat, the psychological effects notwithstanding. India appears to have reacted to its defeat by China in 1962 with a drive towards nuclear weapons.89 Ditto Iran after its defeat in 1988 in which it was on the receiving end of chemical weapons. Concerning Pakistan, in the period after its defeat by India in 1971, Burrows and Windrem describe the public hero worship

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devoted to scientist A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani bomb, who is seen as personally representing that nations transcending of defeat and humiliation via nuclear precociousness.g0
Summary

The relationship betweennational defeat, humiliation, and revengeis crucial to an understanding of international relations. This relationship has received far too little attention becauseof inherent research obstacles,problems of anthropomorphism and isomorphism, and a virtual taboo on discussions revenge in modern liberal of societies.There is no data base.Some survey data might be compiled, none of it retroactive. Small sample,in-depth interviews might be assayed, either or both with decision-makers the public at large. or Quite probably, moving this subject forward will require detailed casestudies by country specialists(combining the efforts of political scientistsand psychologists) who would be able to tap a variety of sources- conflict data, survey research,literary works, the media - in an attempt to produce a balanced picture. Still, such efforts risk being branded as merely intuitive or anecdotal to the extent solid, empirical materialsare elusive.Truly comparative researchwill be difficult. Nonetheless,at the very heart of most war and peaceissues the contemporary world, the in humiliation and revengepath demandsfurther scrutiny.

NOTES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. a. Susan Jacoby, WildJustice: The Evolution of Revenge (New York: Harper and Row, 1983). Hans Morgenthau, Politics AmongNations, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1961), pp. 54-55. Samuel Huntington, No Exit: The Errors of Endism: The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 3-11. John Mueller, The Retreat from Doomsday The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993). See, among numerous sources, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Richard Rosecrance, The Rise ofthe Trading State State (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Keichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, Foreign Afiirs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1993), pp. 78-89. See also Daniel Nelson,Threats and Capacities, Contemporary Politics,Vol. 3, No. 4 (1997), pp. 341-363. Edward ttwak, The Endangered American Dream (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993); Jeffrey Garten, r Cold Peace (New York: Times Books, 1992); and Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle amongJapan, Europe, and America (New York: Morrow, 1992). Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993). Richard Rosecrance, A New Concert of Powers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1992), pp. 64-82. See Gil Carl Alroy, Behind the Middle East Conflict: The Real Impasse Between Arab and Jew (New York: Putnam, 1975); and Robert E. Harkavy, After the Gulf War: The Future of Israeli Nuclear Strategy, T!re Washington Quarrerly,Vol. 14, No. 3 (1991),PP. 161-179. Rise of Militancy by Moslems Threatens Stability of Egypt, The New York Times (October 27, 1981), p. Al. This paradoxical point is discussed in Ahmed Abdalla, Egypt and the Gulf Crisis: Short-Term Tremor, Long-Term Trauma, in John OLoughlin, Tom Mayer, and Edward S. Greenberg, eds., War and Its Consequences: Lessons from the Persian Gulf Conflict (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 125-131.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

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14. 15.

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16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

Two Leaders Seek Laurels Along Peru-Ecuador Border, The New York Times (February 9,1995), p. A6. See for example Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chapter 2; and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Barbara Iuchman, The Guns ofAugust (New York: Dell, 1962), p. 47. Thomas Scheff, Bloody Revenge (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), p. 87. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 107-108. Authors private conversation with Shahram Chubin, noted Iran scholar. See also Chubin and Jerrold D. Green, Engaging Iran: A US Strategy, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1998), pp. 153-169. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martins, 1993). Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 22-49. The thesis of an all-encompassing Islamic rage and its threat to the West is countered in, among other sources, John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Portrait of Pan Am Suspect: Affable Exile, Fiery Avenger, The New Yark Times (December 24, 1989), p. Al; discussing Mohammed Abu Talb, whose nom de guerre is Intiqam, revenge. Others have noted that the names of various Arab terrorist organizations are often redolent of the vengeance theme, as noted in Harold Glidden, The Arab World: American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 128, No. 8 (1972), p. 100. Glidden notes organizations with names like Vengeance Partisans, Youth for Revenge, etc. The lingering humiliation in China over past defeats by the West is noted in Life and Death in Shanghai, Time (June 8, 1987), p. 47, with reference to the British bombardment of the Chinese coast in 1840. This may be even an older theme than many people realize. One article has pointed out that, earlier, the Jews were blamed for the humiliation visited upon Germany by Napoleon. See Emil J. Fackenheim,Germanys Worst Enemy, Commentary, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1990), pp. 31-34. Scheff, op. cit., p. 118. Among numerous items, see The Zhirinovsky Phenomenon: Bombast and Barbs but Devout Believers, The New York Times (April 5, 1994), p. A12; William H. Luers, Dont Humiliate Gorbachev, The New York Times (January 30,1989), p, Al 7. In addition, Donald Kagan has initiated a discussion of the role of honor in international affairs, a theme closely linked to the concerns of this paper. See Kagan, Our Interests and Our Honor, Commentary,Vol. 103, No. 4 (1997), pp. 42-50. Jacoby, op. cit. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 362. Naomi Cha d n, ed., Irredentism and InternationalPolitics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). Ibid., p. 142. Ibid., p. 139. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 139-140. Hedva Ben-Israel, Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined, in Chazan, ed., op. cit., p. 33. This writer spent a brief two weeks lecturing in China in 1995, and was stunned at the extent to which Chinese people at all levels of society, most of whom appear very well-disposed towards Americans, would react with an extreme level of emotion when the subject of Taiwan, and US support for it, arose. This emotion is not often analyzed or understood in coverage by the American media. Vamik Volkan, Ethnonationalist Rituals: An Introduction, Mind and Human Interaction, Vol. 4, No. l(l992) p. 10. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990). See also Charles Fair, From theJaws ofvictory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).

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S. E. Perry and A. Stanton, Personality and Political Crisis (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964); and Herbert C. Kelman, Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations, in H.C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965); and especially, S. E. Perry, Notes on the Role of National: A Social-Psychological Concept for the Study of International Relations: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1957), pp. 346-363. See also Harold Lasswell, The Climate of International Action, in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 339-353, particularly the discussion about a Theory of Collective Mood, on pp. 344-346. According to William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 19, Kelman did grasp the nettle of the crucial issue of the psychological link between the individual and the nation-state, recognizing its pivotal place in any attempt to work towards a psychological theory of international relations. Ibid. See, in addition, Richard Berk, Collective Behavior (New York: Richard C. Brown, 1974); Wilfred Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953); and Neil Smelser, Theory ofCollective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1962). Bloom, op. cit., p. 1. Ibid., p. 2. J. David Singer, Man and World Politics: The Psycho-Cultural Interface, Journal ofSocial Issues, Vol. 24,No. 3 (1968),pp. 127-156. Bloom, op. cit., p. 2 1. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23. John Mack, Foreword, in Vamik Volkan, Cyprus - War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1979), p. XV. Ibid., p. XIX. Scheff, op. cit., p. 75. Heinz Kohut, Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage, The Psychoanalytic Study ofthe Child, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1972), pp. 360-400. Among the useful pieces in this area, most devoted to the psychology of shame and humiliation, are Sidney Levin, The Psychoanalysis of Shame, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1971), pp. 355-361; Moshe Halevi Spero, Shame: An Object-Relational Formulation, Psychoanalyric Study of the Child, Vol. 39 (1984), pp. 259-282, and A. Morrison, Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Vol. 39 (1983), pp. 295-318. The latter has a discussion of the distinction between the two effects of shame and guilt, and what is referred to as the hairline distinctions between shame, humiliation, and mortification (p. 261). Also discussed are narcissistic depletion and loss, shame personalities, and the severity of narcissistic trauma, all relevant to our analysis of the underpinnings of revenge. Perhaps only Blema Steinberg, heretofore, has attempted to tie these themes to political events, as in her Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychoanalytical Perspective, Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1991), pp. 653-690. Also valuable is Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), wherein there is a discussion of the narcissistic projection of aggressive impulses outward (p. 57). Kohut, op. cit., p, 396. Ibid., p. 386. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 396-397. Ibid., p. 379. The methodological and philosophical problems involved in utilizing a concept such as shame are discussed in Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Men, The Review of Metaphysics,Vol.XXV, No. 1 (1971), pp. 3-51, esp. p. 13. Kohut, op. cit., p. 379. Mack, op. cit., p. XIII. Scheff, op. cit., pp. 3-4,96-97. Leonard Binder,Egypt: The Integrative Revolution, in Lucian Pye, ed., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 396-449. See also David Pryce-Jones, The Closed Circle: An Interpretation oftheAr& (New York: Harper and Row, 1989).

43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62.

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63. 64. 65.

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66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82.

83. 84. 85.

Harold W. Glidden, The Arab World,American Journal ofpsychiatry, Vol. 128, No. 8 (1972), p. 99. Kohut, op. cit., p. 380. Glidden, op. cit. The only other useful source that pursues some of these themes, if only implicitly and absent of explicitly psychological analysis, is Gil Carl Ahoy, Behind the Middle East Conflict: The Real Impasse Between Arab and lew (New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1975), esp. Chapters 5 and 6. In relation to these themes, see also Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception ofJustice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984). Glidden, op. cit., p.100. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 99-100. Ibid., p. 100. Jay Gonen, A Psychohistory ofZionism (New York: New American Library, 1975). Though there is nothing in the literature that specifically focuses on shame, humiliation and vengeance, there are some socio-psychological interpretations of US foreign policy behavior in a related vein. See, in particular, Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955) in which the author discusses Americas liberal absolutism and the hysteria surrounding the red scare after World War I and again during the McCarthy period in the 1950s. Absent psychological modes of analysis, this work focuses on the propensity of Americans to project values onto others and to become angry when that is ill-received. Alan Booth, Greg Shelley, Allan Mazur, Gerry Tharp, and Roger Kittok, Testosterone, and Winning and Losing in Human Competition,HormonesandBehavior, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1989), pp. 556-571. Allan Mazur, A Biosocial Model of Status in Primate Groups, Social Forces, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1985), pp. 377-402. Daniel Druckman, Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, Supplement 1 (1994), pp. 43-68. Robert Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind (Chicago: Markham, 1969). This is noted in Jonathan C. Randal, The Monkey on the Iraqis Back: Hussein Hangs on Amid His Peoples Growing Bitterness, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (June 10-16, 1991), p. 18, wherein one member of the Iraqi Baath Party is quoted as saying that in losing the war, we lost our dignity as Iraqis, as Arabs and as men and so did the president. According to Randal, the speaker was reflecting a sense of shame at the Iraqi militarys rapid collapse, the helplessness felt during the war; etc. See Volkan, Ethnonationalistic Rituals, op. cit., p. 16. Rebels New Cause: A Book for Yankee Bashing, The New York Times (September 4, 1996), p. A4, wherein a student is quoted as saying: Britain sold opium to China and waged the Opium Wars against China. That was a great infringement on Chinese human rights. Yet I never heard of any apologies being made by your Government. Likewise, see James R. Lilley, Nationalism Bites Back, The New York Times (October 24, 1996), p. A27, wherein nationalist xenophobia is discussed as a rallying cry for Chinese everywhere - from Shanghai to San Francisco, in the context of a century of humiliation. Kohut, op. cit. Authors conversations with Lasswell, circa 1968. Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994), discusses the war guilt and post-war pacifism of Germany and Japan as largely precluding a temptation to revenge. Dower, op. cit. Glidden, op. cit., p. 101. See David Ggess, Demystifying the French Revolution, Commentary, Vol. 88, No. 1 (1989), pp. 4249, wherein, the flip side of the anti-British resentment was a growing demand that France, as it were, pull itself together, rise as a united nation, and take revengefor past insults and defeats. This burgeoning nationalism spurred the French intervention in the American Revolution; but that was not enough (p. 46).

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86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

Robert E. Harkavy
Franz Fanon, The Wretched ofthe Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), with a foreword Sartre. Druckman, op. cit., p. 61. Volkan, Ethnonationalistic Rituals, op.cit.,p. 13. Burrows and Windrem, op.cit., pp. 107- 108. Ibid., chapter 11. by John Paul

Address for correspondence: Robert E. Harkavy, Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University, Department of Political Science 164N Burrowes Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA. Phone: 814-863-0743; Fax: 814-865-3098; E-mail: reh2Gpsu.edu