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NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs. REYES Facts: On October 13, 1994, Mr.

Reyes (Amay Bisaya) went to Mrs. Tsuruokas (former owner of Hotel Nikko) party, allegedly invitation under that Dr. same Violeta Filarts Ruby (guest) Lim verbal afternoon. (executive

secretary of Hotel Nikko for 20 yrs.) knowing that the guest list was limited to approximately 60 people and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited, asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Mr. Reyes began screaming and making a big scene. After that he said that he was humiliated in the party and was rudely asked to leave On April 26, 1999, RTC ruled that Ms. Lim did not about her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. On November 26, 2002, Court of appeals ruled that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes in telling him not to finish his

food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of the guests. Issue: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party where he was not invited

by the celebrant, thereby becoming liable under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Held: Supreme Court held that Ms Lim could not be held liable. The petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotes is granted. He who alleges proves, Mr. Reyes had not presented any witness to back his story up. A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. Without proof of any ill motive in her part, if at all Ms. Lim is only guilty of bad judgment, which if done with good intention cannot amount to bad faith.

GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private the respondent, for the without alleged the assistance of of

counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint against petitioner violation their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old,

single, character citizen

Filipino and residing

and

pretty

lass

of

good in

moral her

reputation at the

duly Lozano

respected Apartment, 20,

community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian Guilig, the Dagupan City, and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 1987, latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondents parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A week before the filing of the complaint,

petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the and; complaint, the petitioner is repudiated their to marriage someone agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore petitioner already married living in Bacolod City. Private ordering the respondent petitioner then to pay prayed her for damages judgment in the

amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual

expenses amounting to P600, attorneys fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. Held: The Supreme Court held that when a mans promise to marry is of in to fact his the love proximate by that a cause of and the his acceptance woman promise that her

representation him in the no

fulfill congress, of

thereafter he had, that in the

becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto sexual proof reality, intention marrying and

promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO Facts: On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escao, 27, Marries Pastos Tenchavez, 32. The marriage was kept secret to the parents of Escao. When Escaos parents learned about it, they asked for the recelebration of the matrimony which did not took place. Vicenta Pastor. On complaint Judicial August for 22, divorce 1950, in she filled in the on a verified second of ground left for the states without informing

against

Pastor

the

District

Court

Nevada

extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. On issued. On September 13, 1954, Escao married an American and had children and later acquired American Citizenship. Issues: Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was

of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may be invoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. Held: The Supreme Court held that the divorce is not valid, making the second marriage void since marriage ties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing. Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separation because Escao committed sexual infidelity because of the fact that she had children with the American. Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of the

grounds for legal separation.

ABUNADO v. PEOPLE Facts: Salvador Abunado, and Narcisa Arceno got married, their marriage remains existing, Abunado contracted a second married with Zonaida Beas. On January 1995, an annulment case was filed against Arceno. On the other hand, Arceno filed a case of bigamy against Abunado on May 1995. on October 1998, Abunado obtained a judicial

declaration of nullity of marriage. On May 2001 the RTC of Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy. Issue: Whether or not Abunado constitutes the crime of bigamy and if his marriage (1st) was still subsisting at the time he marry Beas. Held: Yes, the second marriage was bigamous because of the fact that the first marriage was still subsisting when he contracted second marriage. Under the family code, before one can contracted a second marriage, the first marriage must be declared annulled or void as the case may be liability and is not was a prejudicial question. prior Because to the the subsequent of judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage immaterial because declaration nullity the crime was already consummated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of Abunados marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of Abunados innocence or quiet in the case of bigamy. Quimiguing vs. Icao 34 SCRA 132

Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, a student, and Felix Icao,

married, were neighbors. They had carnal intercourse several times until Carmen became pregnant. Assisted by her parents, she filed a claim for support at P120/month plus damages. Icao filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the child is yet unborn. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint, Carmen amended it but the trial court disallowed it. Issue: Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing

Carmens complaint. Held: Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it.

GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS 2 SCRA 801

Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz in 1948 through her aunt. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her then boyfriend now husband but she had a baby aborted. After getting pregnant, after their marriage, she again aborted the fetus because of work. Less than 2 years later, she became pregnant and aborted it again. It is this last abortion that is the basis of this action. Issue: Whether voluntarily or not, the her husband of a woman, who

procured

abortion,

could

recover

damages from physician who caused the same. Held: The the law. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntary aborted a child cannot recover damages from the abortionist since damages must be inflicted upon the parents so as to collect damages at all. Similarly, an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or lower court erred in awarding damages. The

fetus is not endowed with personality as required by

death. Pertains primarily to the injured. DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA 58 Phil 866 Facts: Out of amorous relations, a baby was begotten by Cesar Syquia with Antonia de Jesus. During the pregnancy, Cesar wrote a priest to name the baby after him for it was his. Syquia took them to a house where they lived in a regular family style, until Antonia had her second pregnancy Syquia and Syquia left the and child the married stopped letters another Syquia woman. to disowning the child

giving support. Thus Antonia filed this case to Compel acknowledge using written by him as evidence. Issue: Whether or not letters are sufficient to prove

acknowledgement of paternity. Held: Yes, the words of recognition junior, contained in the note refer to a baby then conceived was expected to be born in June. Although the child was given a name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr., his

identity

as

the

child

who

Syquia

intended

to

acknowledge is clear.

LIMJOCO vs. INTESTATE OF FRAGRANTE Facts: Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, where the Public Service Commission held that the public interest an convenience will be prompted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half tons in the municipality of San Juan, that the original applicant Fragnante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The commission issued a certificate convenience Fragnante, to Intestate said Estate of authorizing Intestate of the Estate public deceased through

its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate said plant. Petitioners claim that the granting of certificate applied for the estate is a contravention of law.

Issues: Whether or not the estate of Fragnante can be

considered as a person within the meaning of the Public Service Act? Whether or not citizenship of decedent extended to his estate? Held: The Supreme Court held that the estate of P.O.F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his the estate which, of of course, includes the of exercise which during the judicial administration of those rights and fulfillment those obligations his survived after his death. The Supreme Court furthered that if by legal

fiction the personality of P.O.F is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving rights may be exercised heirs, there and for for is the no benefit sound and of his creditors of his and cogent it as

reason for denying the application of the same fiction citizenship, not considering Public likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished Commission. proceeding before the Service

DUMLAO vs. FAMILY PLASTIC PRODUCTS Facts: On February 28, 1962, CFI of Pangasinan issued a judgment ordering defendants Soliven, Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity quality plastics products, Inc. the sum of P3667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November of 1958. Upon the defendants failure to pay said amount, lower Court ordered upon motion of Quality Plastics Products, Inc. the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction the land of Pedro Oria which he has given as security under the bond. On September 24, 1962 Orias land was sold and was confirmed by the lower court on November 20, 1962. However, Oria died on April 23, 1959, and on March 1, 1963 heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastics Products, Inc. for the annulment of judgment against Oria and execution against his land. Issue: Can Orias heirs claim from Quality Plastics. Held:

Judgment against Oria was void and sale of his land is also void. However, Orias heirs are not entitled to claim from the corporation. It is for the reason that the corporation is unaware of Orias death because soliven did not appraise the Court or the corporation of Orias demise.

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