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December 14, 1992 SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA vs CA FACTS: Petitioner Salvador D.

Briboneria, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer, after issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on the private respondent Magisa a request for admission. Petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment, claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission. The private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari ,prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order of the court a quo, alleging that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismisses the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that the matters of fact and the documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. HELD: He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath. The petition cannot be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit. "The material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer." it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request. The petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

4.5 G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981 SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents. Facts: This is a consolidation of two cases having identical facts and raising same question of law to which in both cases, respondents admitted that they have not fully paid the purchase price of the respective units. In the first case, respondent Aguilar-Bernares Realty (ABR), owned by Spouses Emmanuel and Zenaida Aguilar was the assignee of Solana, in the Sunset View Condominium Project and La Perla Commercial (LPC) as the assignor. LPC then bought the said unit from the Tower Builders, Inc. Thereafter, petitioner filed a collection of assessment levied against the unit of ABR before the CFI of Pasay City. The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) alleging thereto that there is no cause of action and the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The MTD was granted and judge ruled that the case should be tried in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The MTD having been denied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. In the second case, petitioner Sunset View Condominium Corporation filed before the CFI of Pasay City a collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance premiums and the interest thereon amounting to P6,168 06 against respondent Lim Siu Leng to whom was assigned on July 11, 1977 a unit called "Alegria" of the Sunset. View Condominium Project. As a response, respondent filed a MTD alleging that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the dispute arises from a intra-corporate relationship thus jurisdiction is before the SEC. However, the said MTD was denied. The respondent move for reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Aggrieved, respondent appealed, hence, petitioner move to dismiss the aforesaid appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from is interlocutory. However, this was denied by the court. The court rendered its decision favoring respondent and direct the parties to ventilate their case with the SEC. The petitioner move to reconsider but it was denied. Hence, this petition on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the regular courts has jurisdiction to try over the case. Held: The court ruled that since it was proven that the private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price of their units, they are not shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation. Thus, instant cases for collection cannot be a controversy arising out of intra-corporate or partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively which controversy under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902 A. The subject matters of the instant cases according to the allegations of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Petition affirmed with cost against the respondents.

4.6 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-9531 May 14, 1958 WARNER BARNES and CO., LTD., plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO C. REYES, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Facts: The plaintiff herein filed against the defendant an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The defendant filed his corresponding answer to the complaint in which the defendants asserts that they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averments of the remainder of the complaint; and they hereby reserve the right to file an ammended answer . Upon failure of the defendant to file an ammended answer, the plaintiff move on the judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer of the defendant failed to raise tender issues. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and held that the denial of the defendants of the material allegations of the complaint under the guise of lack of knowledge is a general denial so as to entitle the plaintiff to judgment

on the pleadings. Hence, the defendant appeal from the decision of the trial court. Held: The rule specifically authorizing an answer that defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is to the knowledge of the court so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue. In the present case. It is notheworthy that the answer was filed after an extension granted by the lower court, and that while a reservation was made to file an ammended answer, no such pleading was presented. If these show anything, it is the appellant that obviously did not have any defense or wanted to delay the proceeding. The form of denial adopted by the appellants, although allowed by the Rules of Court, must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith,certainly neither for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the complaint are really put in issue nor for, the purpose of delay. Wherefore the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with cost against the appellants.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CORP. vs. DEL ROSARIO GR No. 138739, July 6, 2000 FACTS: Spouses del Rosario contracted a loan with Radiowealth Finance Corporation, and, in connection therewith, they executed a Promissory Note. However, in the promissory note, there was no specific date as to when the payment will become due and demandable. When respondent spouses defaulted in the payment, herein petitioner instituted a case of collection of money against the spouses. When the petitioner presented its evidence and thereafter rested its case, spouses del Rosario, through their counsel, filed a Demurrer to Evidence for lack of cause of action on the part of herein petitioner. The trial court granted said demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. So, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter reversed the ruling of the lower court and remanded the case for proper further proceeding, despite the partial motion for reconsideration of the petitioner because according to the petitioner, respondents already

lost its right to present evidence, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents del Rosario are barred from presenting evidence. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court that respondents who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them, but if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lost the right to present their own evidence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should render judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff instead of remanding the case for further proceedings. PETITION GRANTED.
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case no. 3 of 5th set LA NAVAL DRUG CORP. versus CA and WILSON YAO GR No. 103200, 31 Aug. 1994 FACTS: Respondent Yao was the owner of a commercial building, a portion of which is leased to herein petitioner. However, during the renewal of the contract of lease, the two disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the controversy, they submitted their disagreement to arbitration. Two arbitrators (Alamarez and Sabile) has been appointed by the parties while the appointment of the third arbitrator (Tupang) was held in abeyance because La Naval Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until its Board of Directors could convene and approved Tupangs appointment. This was theorized by the respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that a summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2 arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and the applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it. The respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso as the third arbitrator and ordered the parties to submit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. However, respondent court was not persuaded by petitioner's

submission, hence, it denied the motion for reconsideration. While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court it has jurisdiction over the person 2. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the subject matter. HELD: As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense. With regard to the second issue, it was held that where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune

BPI LEASING CORP. vs. CA, et al. GR No. 127624, 18 Nov. 2003 FACTS: BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. For the calendar year 1986, it paid Commissioner of Internal Revenue a total of P 1,139,041.49 representing 4% contractors percentage tax as imposed by the National Internal Revenue Code. However, in November 1986, CIR issued a Revenue Regulation which provides that companies registered under RA

5980, like BLC, are no longer liable for contractors percentage tax, instead, subject only to gross receipts tax. Thereafter, BLC filed a claim for refund before the CIR and simultaneously filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeal in order to stop the running of the prescriptive period for refunds. Both cases were denied, despite motion for reconsideration by BLC, hence, they appealed before the Court of Appeals, which the latter affirmed the decision of CTA and CIR. Aggrieved by the decision, BLC instituted a petition before the SC. However, the certification against non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed by the counsel on record of the BLC, who was not specifically authorized to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer is authorized to validly sign, for and in behalf of its client, the certification of non-forum shopping. HELD: It was held that while the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed, for an on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document, it does not mean that any lawyer, acting on behalf of the corporation he is representing, may routinely sign a certification of non-forum shopping the lawyer must be specifically authorized in order to validly sign the certification. Since powers of corporations are exercised through their board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by laws or by specific acts of the board of directors. Being counsel of record does not vest upon a lawyer the authority to execute the certification on behalf of his client. PETITION DENIED.

CASE 6/Set 10 G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002 ANITA MANGILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA, respondents

Facts: Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of private respondent for shipment of petitioners products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery. On the first shipment, petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay private respondent. However, for the next three shipments, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges. Hence, private respondent filed before the RTC of Pasay City for collection of sum of money. However, there was a failure to serve summon to the petitioner on her residence in Guagua, Pampanga for she was on a business trip in Guam. Respondent filed a petition for preliminary attachment in which the court issued. There after, a notice of levy with the order, affidavit and bond was served on petitioners household help in San Fernando, Pampanga. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court in which after hearing, the court granted the said motion. Private respondent applied for an alias summons, which the trial court issued on January 19, 1989. It was only on January 26, 1989 that summons was finally served on petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of improper venue considering that the stipulated venue necessary for collection of money should be in Makati, Metro Manila. However, it was denied. An answer was then filed by the respondent, and after which the case was then scheduled for pre-trial. However, the court terminated the pre trial due to the petitioners counsel failed to appear on time, so the respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte. This was opposed by the petitioner but the court upheld its allowance to the respondent to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner then filed an omnibus Motion on the ground that since she was not declared by the court as being default, the presentation of evidence ex parte should be suspended. The court denied the same. The court ruled against the respondent so petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals but nonetheless, the CA affirmed the validity of the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment. The petitioner move to reconsider but it was not heeded. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue(s): 1. Whether the writ of attachment was properly issued.

2. Whether there was improper venue. Held: This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter." This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment. We hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service. We resolve to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue but not for the reason stated by petitioner. The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed.

In the case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that Makati is the "only or exclusive" venue where the action could be instituted. We therefore agree with respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this case could be filed. Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue for this case. In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando, Pampanga while respondent resides in Paraaque City. However, this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of respondent is found. This would have been permissible had private respondents business been a corporation, just like the case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as admitted by the respondent in her Complaint in the lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in court. In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED on the grounds of improper venue and invalidity of the service of the writ of attachment.

Case 6/ Set 9 G.R. No. L-36629 September 28, 1973 B.E. BERKENKOTTER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISIDRO CLIMACO, respondents. Facts: Herein Petitioner B.E Berkenkotter filed a civil action seeking to nullify the subject deed of absolute sale against Respondent Isidro Climaco and others before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. On June 11 1969, the court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner. Aggrieved, Respondent Climaco filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently he also filed a motion for new trial and supplement to the said motions. On March 30, 1971, the same judge rendered another decision which completely reversing his first decision of June 11, 1969 and sentencing petitioner to pay damages. Petitioner Berkenkotter then filed motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the court. On the same day, June 13, 1972, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and an ex parte motion for extension of time (five days from June 13) within which to file the record on appeal which was filed two days later, or on June 15, 1972. When the records of the appeal was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA), respondent Climanco filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the 30-day reglementary period,

the last day for its filing being June 14, 1972, and not June 15th which is the 31st day. The defendant claims that plaintiff filed his record on appeal one day late as the court neither approved nor denied the motion for extension of time to file the same. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent. Hence, petitioner avail the remedy of petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue(s): Whether or not the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period to file an appeal as provided in the Rules of Court. Held: The Court ruled that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period. In the case, petitioner filed his record on appeal within the period of time requested and although no order of approval nor denial of the ex parte motion for extension was issued, the Order of the Court on November 14, 1972, approving the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal amounts to and should be construed as a ratification or approval of the motion for extension. It has always been the view of this Court that the period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed, may, however, be extended by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. What decisively matters is that the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal is filed before the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed by the rules. In Valero v. CA, et al, L-36667, June 29, 1973, this Court, through Mr. Justice Barredo, sustained the petitioner's claim that he appealed on time, considering that the record on appeal was filed within the extended period given to her upon motion filed before the expiration of the reglementary period but approval of which was granted thereafter. It may not be amiss to state here that although there is no vested right in technicalities (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315), in meritorious cases like the present case a liberal (not literal) interpretation of the rules becomes imperative and technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent and purpose of the rules the proper and just determination of a litigation. The petition is granted.

Case 6/ set 8 G.R. No. L-56294 May 20, 1991 SMITH BELL AND COMPANY (PHILIPPINES), INC. and TOKYO MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS A. GO THONG AND CO., respondents. FACTS: In May 1970, a collision took place in the port of Manila between the M/V Don Carlos, a vessel owned by private respondent Carlos Go and Company and the M/S Yotai Maru, a merchant vessel of Japanese registry. All the cargoes of Yotai Maru were damaged on the said collision. The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by their insurance companies. The insurance companies in turn, having been subrogated to the interests of the consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced actions against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained by the various shipments in the then CFI of Manila. Hence, two cases were filed in the CFI of Manila. The first case was commenced by Smith Bell and Company (Philippines) and Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Company in Branch 3 presided by Judge Bernardo Fernandez. Whereas, the second case was filed by Smith Bell and Company (Philippines) and Tokyo Marine Insurance Company in Branch 4, presided by Judge Serafin Cuevas. Both cases were against respondent Go Thong. In both cases, the CFI of Manila held that Go Thong is liable for damages. Aggrieved, respondent appealed the decision of the court with respect to both cases filed against him. With respect to the first case, on August 8, 1978, the Court of Appeals (CA) through Judge Reyes affirmed the decision rendered by Judge Fernandez of the trial court. However, two years after, a decision was rendered by the CA through Judge Sison with respect to the second case appealed from reversing the decision rendered by Judge Cuevas in the aforesaid case of the appellant. Motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was denied. Aggrieved, the insurance companies filed a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Sison Decision had disregarded the rule of res judicata. Held: There is substantial identity of parties and identity of cause of action, definitely, it will not preclude the application of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second aspect is that it precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions "necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved. (Lopez vs. Reyes) In the case at bar, the issue of which vessel ("Don Carlos" or "Yotai Maru") had been negligent, or so negligent as to have proximately caused the collision between them, was an issue that was actually, directly and expressly raised, controverted and litigated in C.A.-G.R. No. 61320-R. Reyes, L.B., J., resolved that issue in his Decision and held the "Don Carlos" to have been negligent rather than the "Yotai Maru" and, as already noted, that Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-48839 in a Resolution dated 6 December 1978. The Reyes Decision thus became final and executory approximately two (2) years before the Sison Decision, which is assailed in the case at bar, was promulgated. Applying the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, the question of which vessel had been negligent in the collision between the two (2) vessels, had long been settled by this Court and could no longer be relitigated. Private respondent Go Thong was certainly bound by the ruling or judgment of Reyes, L.B., J. and that of this Court. The Court of Appeals fell into clear and reversible error when it disregarded the Decision of this Court affirming the Reyes Decision. Wherefore, the Decision of the Court of Appeals with regards to the second case appealed from dated November 1980 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court with regards to the first case appealed from dated September 1975 is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in its entirety.

Case 6/ set 6 G.R. No. L-34897 July 15, 1975 RAUL ARELLANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, BRANCH I, and SANTIAGO UYBARRETA, respondents. Facts: On May 4, 1967, respondent Santiago Barreta filed with the respondent court against petitioner Raul Arellano, Emilio Bayona for reconveyance and damages of a certain parcel of land located in Sorsogon. Petitioner Arellano filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the complaint. Simultaneously, Arellano dispatched written interrogatories to which respondent had received on May, 9, 1967. The written interrogatories provide that should Barreta failed to file a responsive pleading to it within five (5) days upon receipt, his complaint will be dismissed. No action by the court was taken on the MTD until February 12, 1969, one and a half years later. The court then set the case for hearing and order Baretta to file an opposition on the MTD filed by Arellano. However, Baretta

failed to submit an opposition despite the extension to file an opposition given to him by the court. Petitioner then prays for the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule 29 and Section 3, Rule 17", alleging that Barreta had failed to serve answers to the interrogatories sent to him despite the periods previously given to him by the court. However, upon Barettas asking for deferment, the court gives another ten (10) days to the respondent to file any responsive pleading. Aggrieved, petitioner filed another instant dismissal in which the court finally granted. Three months later, Baretta filed a Motion for reclusion of Raul Arellano as indispensable party defendant because his action against him is dismissed due to the respondent failure to answer the written interrogatories and that it is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Moreover, respondent is now ready to answer the queries of the petitioner. However, such motion was denied. January 16, 1971, respondent with a new counsel filed a Motion to Set Aside Orders Dismissing Complaint against Defendant Raul Arellano, which was set for hearing on February 4, 1971. Arellano opposed on the ground that the case had already been dismissed. As a result, the court denied Barettas motion. However, to avoid his case from being terminated, Baretta again filed this time a Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint. Arellano moved to set aside this order, but after it was opposed by Barreta, the trial court issued an order of denial which counsel for Arellano claims he has never received, so much so that, unaware of such denial, under date of October 5, 1971, he filed a supplemental motion (to set aside). After Baretta filed an opposition to Arellanos motion, the court ruled that since the dismissal of the case against defendant Raul Arellano dated August 19, 1969 does not constitute res judicata, the filing of an amended complaint is admitted and petitioner is hereby order to file a responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days from receipt. Arellano then filed a motion for reconsideration but the court upheld its decision reiterating that the denial does not constitute res judicata considering that from the records of the case, it appears that the written interrogratories sent to the plaintiff was done without leave of Court and in violation of Section 1, Rule 24 of the New Rules of Court. The petitioner then was directed to file a responsive pleading within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an instant petition for certiorari seeking to nullify and set aside the orders of the respondent court. Issue(s): (1) Whether or not the court order of dismissal dated August 19, 1969 was legally issued by the court. (2) Whether or not the court order of dismissal dated August 19, 1969, does

not constitute res judicata. Held: With regards to the first issue, the court upheld that the order of dismissal in question on the strength of the basic principles of discovery procedure, more specifically, for failure of Barreta to serve any answer to Arellano's interrogatories is valid. The contention of respondent that it was erroneous for the trial court to dismiss the action without first ordering Barreta to answer the interrogatories of Arellano and waiting for his failure to do so has no merit. Neither is there merit in the claim that the sending of the interrogatories in question had not yet been given due course by the court. "Leave of court is not necessary before written interrogatories may be served upon a party." (2 Moran 90, 1970 ed.) In any event, if Section 1 of Rule 25 could be susceptible of the construction suggested by counsel for Barreta, it is to Us a sufficient basis for the discovery procedure of written interrogatories in this case to have proceeded in motion after plaintiff had been given a period to oppose and had failed to do so. Besides, the repeatedly unfulfilled promises of counsel to produce the answers of his client render such objection academic. With regards to the second issue, the court upheld that the defense of res judicats is unavailing. Although the order itself of August 19, 1969 does not say so expressly, the dismissal ordered thereby should be deemed to be for failure to prosecute. In effect, said order resolved not only Arellano's motion of August 11, 1967 therein specifically mentioned but also those of June 9, 1967 and April 7, 1969 which were to the same end and still unacted upon. The motion of April 7, 1969 invoked Section 3 of Rule 17. Reading all said motions together in the light of the relevant circumstances We have emphasized earlier, there can be no question that they had the dual thrust of complaining not only against Barreta's failure to answer the interrogatories but more importantly his disregard of the periods given him by the trial court to manifest his position. Moreover, the court repeatedly held that "the dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the same rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action." (1 Moran pp. 528-529, 1970 ed. and the cases therein cited.) And in the case at bar, if there is any abuse of discretion evident, it is the seemingly endless tolerance of the trial court to all continuous and repeated impositions of respondent Barreta. But all these is not to say that dismissal under Section 5 of Rule 29 does not constitute res adjudicata a point We do not here decide, albeit the writer of this opinion feels that such should be the

construction, considering that failure to answer interrogatories constitutes such a subversion of the objective of the rules on discovery designed precisely to obviate technical and lengthy proceedings in the determination of the substantial rights of the parties. The purpose of discovery procedures is to provide means by which both parties in an action may acquire, without waiting for the trial, knowledge of material facts and evidence which otherwise would be peculiarly within the knowledge only of the other. In that way, surprises and deceptions are avoided and the litigants must have to depend no longer on the techniques and tactics of trial lawyers but must win or lose on the basis of the bare facts constituting their causes. It is thus important that the rules on discovery should be duly observed and violations thereof, correspondingly dealt with. The petition is granted and orders of the respondent court are hereby annulled and set aside.

Sps. Jovito Rebuldela & Cristina Mapue vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 155 SCRA 520 G.R. No. 70856 November 11, 1987 Paras, J.: Facts: Plaintiffs secured a loan from the private defendants and as security thereof executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. The said loan was increased in an Amendment to Mortgage. Plaintiffs failed to pay the loans within the period specified and defendants filed with the Office of the Sheriff of Quezon City a request for extra-judicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage and for which the Notice of Sheriff's sale was issued by the Sheriff. The Notice of Sheriff's sale was duly published in the newspaper "New Record". During the auctions sale of the mortgaged property there were no other bidders and defendants submitted their Formal Bid Price and the corresponding Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was issued by the Sheriff in favor of defendants. After the sale of the mortgaged property has been accomplished and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was annotated on the title. Petitioners-mortgagors filed an action before respondent Judge in a Civil Case, to set aside the extra-judicial foreclosure and sheriff's sale, and for redemption with consignation of P24,000.00 on the ground of alleged fraud. Herein private respondent, before filing his answer with counterclaim for sum of money and damages, filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, which was granted by the Court.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering defendants to pay the former. Private respondent, being the defendant-mortgagee while herein petitioners are the plaintiffs-mortgagors, filed a Manifestation with Motion to correct the dispositive portion of Decision to the effect that petitioners (plaintiffs-mortgagor) should be the one adjudged to pay private respondents (defendants-mortgagee) and not the other way around. Before the decision became final, an Order correcting the said decision was issued, this time favoring the defendants. Private respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioners moved to quash the writ but the motion to quash was denied by the trial court. Petitioners then filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a Petition for Review by certiorari with Prohibition or Preliminary Injunction, wherein it was asserted that respondent trial court, committed grave abuse of discretion when it corrected the Decision ex-parte. The then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the aforesaid petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but in a Resolution *** the same was denied . Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it amended its decision ex-parte. Held: The court has inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice (Section 5 (g), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court), and when it finds that the ends of justice would be better served, the court may disregard technicalities and amend its order or process that has not become final. And even if the decision has become final it is already settled that clerical errors or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied after the judgment has been entered. In the case at, bar it will be observed that the trial court, as prayed for, corrected the dispositive portion as to the designation of the parties therein to make it conform with the body of the decision, which has not yet final. Such correction obviously made to rectify clerical errors, which interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee is beyond dispute within the power of the court in accordance with established jurisprudence above-cited.

Petition DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRME

Hibberd vs. Rohde G.R. No. L-8418, December 09, 1915 Trent, J.: Facts: D.J. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd. Later Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa against McMillian. The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and undertook McMillian's defense in the estafa case. Rohde testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd and McMillian. Later on Rohde agreed to sign the following note if Brand & Hibberd would withdraw the estafa complaint: Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911 For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and severally agree to pay to the firm of Brand & Hibberd, of the city of Baguio, P.J., tewelve hundred pesos Philipine currenct in monthly installments of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the first day of June 1911. W.M.J. Rohde D.J. McMillian Rohde did this because he did not want his client to remain in confinement pedning his trial in the Courts of First Instance. However the CFI found as a fact that the consideration of the note was the compromise of a public offense. Now because Rohdes have not entered a verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff cliams that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut off. Issue: Whether Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note due to not having verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note. Held:

By the admission of the genuiness and due execution of an instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it; that the documents was deliverd; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waved by him. Hence such defense as that the signature is a forgery or that it was unauthorized as in the case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership or of a corporation; or that, in that in the case of the latter, that the corporation was not authorized under its charted to sign the instrument; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity that that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never delviered are cut off by the admission of its genuiness and due execution. Undoubtedly when a plaintiff produces in court an instrument corresponding to the one set forth he is exempted from proving its execution. To so interpret section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to the plaintiff as to prohibit such a defense as illegality of consideration, which is clearly a defense of new mattter, would pro tanto repeal the second paragraph of Sec.94 which permits a defendant to answer by A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim.

ANGELES CASON (Plaintiff-Appellee) vs. VICENTE SAN PEDRO and CARMEN FAVILA (Defendant-Appellant) 9 SCRA 925 G.R. No. L-18928, December 28, 1963 BARRERA, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff, Angeles Cason , filed before the Courts of First Instance a complaint against defendant, Vicente San Pedro, seeking the permanent closing of certain windows and

balconies of a bulidng owned by the latter, as they offer direct and oblique views upon plaintiffs tenements.

To this complaint defendant filed an answer with counterclaim. Later plaintiff served written interrogatores to defendants. The latter failed to asnwer the same within the reglementary period of 15 days. Thus plaintiff moved to declare defendats in default.

Defendatns filed an opposition to the motion for judgment by default, on the ground that they did not receive the interrogaroties. Plaintieff filed their reply to the opposition alleging that plaintiffs motion is governed by Sec. 5 Rule 24 of the Rules of Court which authorizes entering of a default judgment against a party who fails to asnwer a written interrogatories. Defendats filed a rejoinder allegint that Rule 20 of the Rules of Court does not establish any sanction or specify the effect of failure or refusal to asnwer a written interrogatory.

The court issued an order granting the motion for judgment by default. Defendatns motion for reconsideraion was denied. Thus the direct appeal.

Issue: Whether the judgment by default was proper as a result or base on the failure to asnwer the written interrogatory.

Held: Sec. 5, Rule 24, of the Rules of Court, expressly authorizes the Court to render a dafault judgment against a party who fails to serve answers to written interrogatories submitted under Rule 20 after proper service of such interrogatories, upon motion of the serving party.

At the time the appellants in the case at bar filed their motion to declare appellees in default for failure to answer the former's counterclaim, said appellants were already declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer the latter's written interrogatories.

Having been declared in default, said appellants have lost their standing in court, and the trial court was justified in refusing to act on their aforementioned motion to declare appellee in default.