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LLC, Plaintiff, v. JEREMIAH T. AMMANN, et al. Defendants. _____________________________/ DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS TO THE HEARING OF 8 APRIL 2011 AND MOTION TO RE-CONSIDER ALL ORDERS FILED 8 JUNE 2011 Co-Defendants, Jeremiah and Laura Ammann (collectively, Defendants), file this paper as a courtesy to Judge Peter F. Estrada, so that he can clearly see our position and so he can have a chance to set things right. Defendants OBJECT to the misleading arguments of opposing counsel which led to the erroneous findings and conclusions1 of the Court made at the hearing on 8 April 2011 (Hearing). Defendants, also, OBJECT to the courts' chronic and persistent departure from their duty to enforce established rules. This judicial departure prevents a fair hearing and is prejudicial to Defendants. Defendants move the Court to vacate all of its Orders of 8 June 2011 and issue new orders consistent with Florida Rules and the persuasive and binding case law as stated more fully below: A. 2010 Verification Rule Should Be Applied "Prospectively" to Complaint 1. Opposing counsel and the Court confused the "initial" complaint with the "original" complaint. This confusion led to reversible errors by the Court. 2. The initial Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint (Initial Complaint) was FILED on 23 July 2008 and DISMISSED on 21 May 2009, because it failed to state a cause of action. Judge
1 Findings and conclusions of fact are either missing or unclear in the Orders of 8 June 2011.

CASE NO. 08 000 937 - GCS

Shinholser heard argument from both parties on Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action. As a result, Judge Shinholser found the

complaint fails to show the standing/right to sue of the plaintiff nor attaches the assignment documentation showing same.2
3. Although the Initial Complaint was dismissed, Plaintiff was granted 20 days to amend the complaint...." Plaintiff's first "Amended Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint" (Second One)3 also had two counts and was FILED with the Court's permission on 9 June 2009 almost one year after the Initial Complaint was filed. The first two complaints did not have to be verified. 4. Eight (8) months later, the Florida Supreme Court amended the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure on 11 February 2010. After this date, foreclosure complaints being filed against residential real property in Florida must be verified. See Fla. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 1.110(b) (New Rule). 5. Opposing counsel, the Court and Defendants all AGREE with the facts in the above paragraph and that the New Rule must be applied "prospectively" to complaints filed after the effective date. Everyone even agrees that the "Third Amended Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint" (Fourth One) was un-verified and filed AFTER the effective date. However, opposing counsel and the Court believe that the subject complaint deserves to be treated as an exception to the New Rule, because applying the New Rule to the subject complaint would be an improper retroactive application of the New Rule and would subject Plaintiff to prejudicial treatment barred under the "ex post facto" clauses of the Constitutions of both Florida and the United States.4 6. Viewed correctly, this New Rule is not "retroactive" because it does not require any complaints (such as the first two complaints in this case) filed before 11 February 2010 to be
2 See "Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Cause of Action" filed 21 May 2009. 3 There are four (4) complaints and each one is a separate and distincy entity. 4 See Florida Constitution, Article 1, Section 10 and U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 9.

verified. The New Rule is not "ex post facto," because it does not retrospectively change the legal consequences of complaints filed before the New Rule took effect.5 7. An "amended" complaint is still a "complaint." Although complaints are to be verified, "actions" can not be verified. "[I]nitial and amended complaints are similar but still distinct legal entities."6 Opposing counsel's arguments to the contrary are without merit. The Court's acceptance of these erroneous arguments does not support the enforcement of the New Rule. 8. On 12 April 2010, twenty-one (21) months after the Initial Complaint was filed, Plaintiff filed the purported "originals" of the alleged note and mortgage along with a frivolous "Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Count II-Re-Establishment of Lost Note." Defendants filed an opposition to the purported voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff, eventually, withdrew this "Notice...." 9. Two (2) months later, on 16 June 2010, Plaintiff filed its FIRST and ONLY motion-forleave-to-amend awkwardly7 entitled "Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint" (Motion for Leave) one year after it filed its first amended complaint (the 2nd complaint or Second One), and four (4) months AFTER the New Rule was announced by the Florida Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Totura,8 16 June 2010 is the proper "filing date" of the "original pleading" regarding the unverified "Second Amended Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint" (Third One) in this case. 10. The Fourth One had no motion-for-leave-to-amend. Although it could be implied that the filing of the Fourth One was valid because of the Third One's Motion for Leave, there were no findings to support this implication. "Findings" are not clear in the Orders of 8 June 2011. 11. The Record shows that BOTH the Third One and Fourth One were F I L E D after the New Rule became effective. Thus, BOTH complaints should have been verified.
5 See Black's Law Dictionary, pg. 520, 5th edition. 6 Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671 (2000) at 678, Florida Supreme Court. 7 It's title is awkward because it presumes to seek permission to file a complaint that is already filed with the motion. It should have been entitled: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended Complaint. 8 Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671 (2000) at 680, Florida Supreme Court.

12. Both opposing counsel and the Court assumed the Intitial Complaint to be the "original pleading" in this case. This erroneous assumption was their basis for arguing that the New Rule could not be applied "retroactively" to the Initial Complaint. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave was requested so Plaintiff could amend--NOT the Initial Complaint (which was dismissed, superseded, null and void)--but to amend the Second One. 13. Although Plaintiff served copies of its Motion for Leave upon all defendants, Plaintiff did not attach copies of the proposed, Third One, nor any exhibits to said motion. This violated Defendants' due-process rights and was prejudicial to them. 14. One month later, at the hearing on 19 July 2010, the Court instructed opposing counsel, Ronald Pereira, to file appropriate copies of the proposed Third One with the exhibits, upon all defendants. 15. Copies of the Third One were finally received by Co-Defendants on 29 July 2010, however, there were no CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE for 29 July 2010! 16. On 3 August 2010 Plaintiff FILED its Fourth One. Eight (8) days later, on 11 August, Plaintiff was granted leave to file its Third One. Plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to amend its Third One. Plaintiff did not serve a copy of any motion for leave to amend its Third One. The Court's acceptance of this conduct by Plaintiff and its attorneys is prejudicial to Defendants. 17. The Florida Supreme Court states the two (2) requirements for amending a complaint: "[A]n amended complaint requires a motion for leave to amend and direct judicial sanction under rule 1.190(a)."9 [Emphasis added.] 18. There are no accurate CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE for the subsequent, improperly allowed Fourth One.

9 Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671 (2000) at 678, Florida Supreme Court.

19. The Fourth One alleges one count for "Mortgage Foreclosure," and is the last and most recent complaint filed by Plaintiff. 20. The Fourth One is not verified, thus it violates the New Rule requiring that foreclosure complaints be verified when they involve residential real property as this case does. Apparently, Judge Estrada committed reversible error when he ignored this Rule and he failed to strike it. 21. Ms. Lewis's argument against striking the Fourth One was that an "amended" complaint relates back to the date the "original" complaint was filed. Ms. Lewis is referring to the wrong date of 23 July 2008. Such "relation back" relates to statutes of limitation and it is not absolute. 22. At the Hearing, Ms. Lewis said: [O]ur position is that the original [Initial] complaint in this action was started prior to the change of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to verification of complaints and it's not required on this complaint.10 23. Plaintiff's argument appears to be legally wrong in its identification and date of the "original" complaint (pleading). Ms. Lewis assumed the "original" complaint was the Initial Complaint filed on 23 July 2008. However, the actual "original" date for the Third One was the date it was filed with its corresponding motion, 16 June 2010. There is no "original" date for the Fourth One, because it had no corresponding motion. 24. Ms. Lewis offered no other Rule and, absolutely, no case law to support her argument. 25. When filing a motion for leave to amend, a copy of the proposed amended pleading should be attached to the motion. Each such motion has its own "original pleading" (which would be the proposed amended pleading attached to the motion) and its own filing date as stated by the Florida Supreme Court. 26. Rulings of the Florida Supreme Court are binding upon this Court, and according to the Florida Supreme Court: [R]ule 1.190(c) allows the relation back of an amended complaint to the date of the original complaint when the claim in the amended complaint arose out of the same conduct ... set out in the original pleading, the relation back concept
10 Transcript 8 April 2011 at page 17, lines 8-12.

under these circumstances has been utilized to relate a subsequent amended complaint back to an original pleading, with the "original pleading" being the motion to amend.11 [Emphasis added.] 27. As an example of how amended complaints do not always "relate back" to the date of the intial complaint: if a plaintiff filed a complaint, that plaintiff could not amend it to add a new count for a new cause of action whose statute-of-limitations deadline had passed during the pendency of the action. The same thing applies to adding a new party after the statute of limitations has passed in a pending action. 28. Ms. Lewis failed to cite any rule or any case law to support her argument and Ms. Lewis made a false statement about Defendant, Laura Ammann: "[S]he has not presented any case law to the court." Contrary to Ms. Lewis' statement, Mrs. Ammann and her husband, Jeremiah, attached copies of two "persuasive" cases as Exhibits A and B to their Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Their "Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 'Third Amended Foreclosure Complaint'." ONE) Exhibit A: Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Donnie J. Decker, et al., 6th Jud. Cir., Pinellas County, Florida, Civil Case No. 09-20548-CI-13--Circuit Judge Anthony Rondolino's Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint signed 21 October 2010; and TWO) Exhibit B: Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Matthew W. Denton, et al., 12th Jud. Cir., Manatee County, Florida, Civil Case No. 41-2010-CA-003006--Final Order Dismissing Sua Sponte, Due to Incompletely Verified Complaint, Action to Foreclose Residential Mortgage signed 6 May 2010. 29. In Exhibit A above, Judge Rondolino says: Plaintiff's counsel urges this court to allow the amended complaint to "relate back" to the initial filing date so that these new procedural verification requirements would not apply. ... The court has reviewed these arguments and finds the verification requirement is effective as of February 11, 2010. The court further finds there is no relation back theory which avoids the new rule. (Emphasis added.) 30. At the Hearing, Judge Estrada confirmed that he had read Judge Rondolino's order (Exhibit A above) and he said: "You have attached to your complaint, and I have read Judge
11 Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671 (2000) at 680, Florida Supreme Court.

Rondolino's rationale on this matter, I do have them." Judge Estrada admitted that these two cases were "persuasive but not binding."12 Interestingly, Mr. Ellis offered case law from Georgia which states it is "Not for publication" and Judge Estrada accepted it over Laura's two cases from Florida and the Judge's own Florida "Residential Foreclosure Bench Book."13 31. Mr. Ellis, apparently, was confused about the Georgia case: "It is, to my knowledge, the only case in Florida on this point."14 32. Rather than "support the uniform application of procedural rules,"15 Judge Estrada departed from the Florida Rules by twice "disagreeing with these findings of the Sixth and Twelfth."16 He did this without the support of any Florida rule or appropriate case law. 33. Judge Estrada reasoned that applying the new Rule to the Fourth One would be "retroactive" and would be like an "ex post facto" law. His reasoning is flawed in that the New Rule would only be retroactive if Plaintiff was not amending its complaint and the Court was ordering Plaintiff to verify the Initial Complaint that was filed 23 July 2008. Contrary to Judge Estrada's reasoning, the New Rule is not "ex post facto" because it only applies to complaints filed AFTER 11 February 2010, not BEFORE. The Fourth One was filed eight (8) months AFTER 11 February 2010, and it was filed before leave was granted for the Third One. 34. The New Rule, the "Bench Book," two "persuasive" Florida cases, and sound reasoning should have been enough to convince Judge Estrada to strike the Fourth One, but it wasn't. 35. Judge Estrada also reasoned that "verification" was not necessary because the case was "pending" and Defendants could use "discovery" as a do-it-yourself verification.17 Discovery has been around for a long time and the Florida Supreme Court, surely, would not have gone to all
12 13 14 15 16 17 Transcript 8 April 2011 at page 25, lines 11-12 and line 23. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 49, line 15 - page 50, line 2. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 52, lines 5-6. Totura & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671 (2000) at 681 in the "Conclusion," Florida Supreme Court. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 26, lines 8-9 and line 12. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 23, lines 23-25.

the trouble of amending the Rule, if discovery was good enough to do the job. As to making Plaintiff verify its complaint, Judge Estrada said, "I don't think that's the spirit or the body of the rule...."18 36. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court, the spirit or "primary purposes" of the New Rule are clear: (1) to provide incentive for the plaintiff to appropriately investigate and verify its ownership of the note or right to enforce the note and ensure that the allegations in the complaint are accurate; (2) to conserve judicial resources that are currently being wasted on inappropriately pleaded "lost note" counts and inconsistent allegations; (3) to prevent the wasting of judicial resources and harm to defendants resulting from suits brought by plaintiffs not entitled to enforce the note; and (4) to give trial courts greater authority to sanction plaintiffs who make false allegations. 37. The spirit of the New Rule was to ensure plaintiffs' standing, to prevent wasting the courts' time, to protect defendants, and to give courts more power to sanction plaintiffs for lying. Judge Estrada's ruling does nothing to support the spirit of the New Rule. In fact, his ruling works against the spirit of the New Rule. Without the mandatory verification of the Fourth One, Judge Estrada has LESS, not GREATER, authority to sanction the Plaintiff for false allegations, if-andwhen proven to the satisfaction of the Court. 38. After filing four (4) complaints and hiring umpteen attorneys who've had almost three (3) years' opportunity to get it right, the Plaintiff's Fourth One still:

fails to show the standing/right to sue of the plaintiff nor attaches the assignment documentation showing same.19
39. Plaintiff has had four "attempts" at filing a valid complaint. Not to appear harsh, but: Although there is no magical number of amendments which are allowed, dismissal of a complaint that is before the court on a third attempt at proper pleading is generally not an abuse of discretion. [Emphasis added.]20

18 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 26, lines 6-7. 19 See page 2, paragraph 2 above. 20 Barrett v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160 (1999) 4th DCA at 1162

40. ...and this Court would not give Defendants "one" chance to amend their cross-claim!?! This appears to be a manifest prejudice against the Defendants. 41. As cited previously, the Florida Supreme Court clarified the "date" of the "original pleading" to be the date the "motion for leave to amend" was filed along with its proposed amended complaint. In this case, that date can not be any sooner than the date the Motion for Leave was filed with the Third One, on 16 June 2010 (four (4) months after the Rule change). There was no "motion for leave to amend" for the Fourth One. B. Plaintiff's "in rem" Argument Has No Merit 42. Plaintiff's initial Mortgage Foreclosure Complaint (Initial Complaint) filed on 23 July 2008 purported to be an "in rem action." This is an inaccurate and prejudicial conclusion by Plaintiff, and the Court, against Defendants. Part of the relief sought in the Initial Complaint is the "entry of a deficiency decree." Seeking a "deficiency decree" for money is an in personam action, plus--Plaintiff had to serve Defendants "personally" with notice of this action. 43. Henry P. Trawick, Jr. discusses "in rem" and "in personam" actions: An action in personam is one directed against a person as distinguished from one directed against property. An action in rem is directed against property and anyone claiming an interest in it. Some actions are quasi in rem because they deal with property, but operate only between the parties to the action. This classification is unnecessary because the action, while it affects property, is directed to the rights of persons in the property and could be classed as an action in personam without extending the definition. The correct test is whether notice in the constitutional sense must be given to the defendant personally. If so, the action is in personam even though property is the subject matter of the action. If not, the action is in rem. Few in rem actions exist. [Emphasis added.]21 44. Clearly, this action passes the test for being IN PERSONAM even without the addition of the Plaintiff's request for a "deficiency" judgment, because each of the Defendants have to be served "personally." NOTE: The Court does not seem to be concerned about proper service.
21 Trawick, Fla. Prac. and Proc., 1.1 at page 2, 5 - page 3, 1.

45. At the Hearing, Ms. Lewis twice contradicts herself when she says: "[I]t's an action in rem," and then says "it's a breach of contract action."22 Then she says "[I]t's an in rem action against the property, which is a security interest being enforced by the breach of contract."23 A contract (such as the alleged note) is supposed to be a "promise to pay" and is not "in rem" because it deals only with money and not the property itself, thus it is "in personam." 46. At best, Plaintiff's action can only be considered "quasi in rem," because it involves an alleged mortgage with which the Plaintiff seeks to foreclose Defendants' rights in the subject property. However, it also seeks a deficiency judgment as Ms. Ammann stated at the Hearing.24 47. A technical term, "in rem," is used to "designate proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam."25 "Quasi in rem" refers to actions in which "the basis of jurisdiction is the defendant's interest in property...." Ibid. fn. 23. Just to be clear, "In rem mortgage" means "Foreclosure of mortgage is in the nature of an in rem proceeding but it approximates more closely a quasi in rem action because it is directed to the extinguishment of the rights of mortgagor as well as all others." Ibid p. 714. And, lastly, "In personam jurisdiction" is the "Power which a court has over the defendant himself in contrast to the court's power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in rem) or power over the property itself (in rem)." Ibid. p. 711. 48. Mr. Ellis got one thing right when he said: [F]or purposes of seeking that deficiency judgment Florida Default Law Group and its individual attorneys would, in my opinion, be deemed debt collectors at that point.... 49. Defendants OBJECT that Mr. Ellis was a non-compliant attorney at the Hearing whenever he spoke on behalf of Plaintiff, for instance, he said:

22 23 24 25

Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 62, lines 10-12. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 62, lines 16-18. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 69, lines 21-25. Black's Law Dictionary, at page 713, 5th edition.


This is an in rem proceeding against the property. All I am seeking to do here, or I should say all Chase is seeking to do here and all the attorneys that are employed by Florida Default Group are seeking to do is to foreclose a security interest in a piece of property. We don't seek any personal judgment with respect to this defendant personally. That would be a separate action that the bank may choose to bring at some point in the future, but certainly not here. We don't have a separate count for a suit on the note.26 I can't seek that deficiency judgment action now. I'm not doing so.27 50. Mr. Ellis and the Court completely ignored the fact that the Fourth One seeks a "deficiency" judgment and requests the Court to "retain jurisdiction" for that purpose. A deficiency judgment can be greater than the amount a plaintiff gets for selling a home! 51. Judge Estrada and Mr. Ellis discussed the possibility of the bank seeking a deficiency judgment through a separate action AFTER the sale of the subject property. Judge Estrada, asked Mr. Ellis if the federal and state consumer protection acts would become an issue when there is "a deficiency judgment on that?"28 Mr. Ellis replied: "If we were seeking a money judgment as opposed to a foreclosure or a security action, yes."29 Mr. Ellis was misleading the Court. Plaintif IS seeking a deficiency (money) judgment, it is in personam and the federal and state statutes are an issue. It was wrong for an officer of the court to make these misleading arguments. C. Defendants OBJECT to Mr. Ellis as a non-compliant attorney when he attempts to speak for, or on behalf of, Plaintiff. The record shows Mr. Ellis is making only a limited30 appearance for Florida Default Law Group (FDLG) and its attorneys. See his "Notice of Appearance" filed 15 March 2011. It is error to allow him to speak for Plaintiff.

D. Plaintiff's "Nothing-Outside-Litigation" and "Immunity" Arguments Have No Merit

26 27 28 29 30

Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 52, line 20 - page 53, line 5 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 54, lines 1-2. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 55, lines 1-2. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 55, lines 3-4. Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 5, lines 3-13.


52. At the Hearing, Mrs. Ammann, mentioned material documents that were created outside this litigation: 1) a dunning letter31 attached to the Fourth One which boldly states that FDLG is a "debt collector"32 and any statements by counsel to the contrary should be stricken; and 2) the purported assignment of mortgage filed in the Public Records of Highlands County which was prepared by FDLG. It is hard to believe that the Initial Complaint was dismissed for not having an assignment and three complaints later, there is--still--no assignment. It is no wonder Plaintiff does not want to verify its complaint. The real rub is that the Court is not interested in the truth. 53. On 21 April 2010, the United States Supreme Court allowed a "Plaintiff to pursue her FDCPA claim based solely upon the language contained in a letter served with a mortgage foreclosure complaint."33 [Emphasis added.] 54. Mr. Ellis got it wrong, again, when he said that our claims are "devoid of any reference to any acts other than the filing of papers and pleadings in the prosecution of this lawsuit."34 The two dunning letters are dated 15 July 2008--prior to the filing of the Initial Complaint and the purported assignment of mortgage was created by FDLG outside the proceedings of this litigation. Besides, the lawsuit can be the sole foundation for an FDCPA lawsuit as shown below. 55. Mr. Ellis' conclusion that the "Leggiere" case is "binding" upon the Court is invalid. Mr. Ellis wrongly used Rule 1.180 and Leggiere to say that we could only sue a non-party who is "liable" to us based only on indemnification, subrogation or contribution. Judge Harrison (4th Jud. Dist., Duval County) showed the inapplicability of Leggiere by quoting Rule 1.170(h) Fla. R. Civ. P.: "Additional Parties May Be Brought In...." Then Judge Harrison quotes the Krig case: "attorney filing lawsuit on behalf of creditor client is proper non-party counterclaim
31 Actually two letters--one addressed to Laura and one to Jeremiah. 32 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 49, lines 9-11. 33 Order entered 2 Sept. 2010, 4th Jud. Cir., Duval County, FL, Case No. 16-2008-CA-012971 quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNealy, Rani, Kramer & Ulrich L.A., 130 S.C. 1605 (2010). See also Gburik v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 2010 WL 2899110 (7th Cir. July 27, 2010) and Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995). 34 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 40, lines 5-8.


defendant." [Emphasis added.] See General Dynamics Corp. v. Hewitt, 207 So.2d 44 (Fla. 34d DCA, 1968), and Northstar Capital Acquisitions, LLC v. Krig, 611 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1330, (M.D. Fla. 2009).35 NOTE: Defendants contend that Plaintiff is not a "creditor" pursuant to FDCPA, because, according to papers in this case, Plaintiff obtained the alleged note AFTER it was in default. Thus Plaintiff is not a "creditor" and should be considered a "debt collector" along with FDLG and its attorneys who are self-admitted debt collectors. See FDCPA 1692a(4). 56. Judge Harrison's Order of 2 September 2010 says: These cases [Echevaria, Levin and Fridovich]36 are not relevant to the instant alleged violations [sic] the FDCPA involving false assignments and affidavits. It is clear the Florida litigation privilege does not bar these federal claims. The United States Supreme Court in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 293 (U.S. 1995) held attorneys' actions in litigation were subject to the FDCPA." [Emphasis added.] (See copy of Order attached hereto as Exhibit A.) E. Defendants' Standing Objections to Plaintiff's Army of Non-Compliant Attorneys 57. Defendants have objected to Plaintiff's army of non-compliant attorneys many, many times to no avail. The FDLG attorneys don't always serve us copies of papers, then falsely "certify" that they did serve them. They file some motions (i.e., for voluntary dismissal of a single count) that are so bogus the attorneys later withdraw them, after Defendants' objections. Other motions they should have filed, but did not (i.e., motion for leave to amend complaint). Brian Hummel files the Initial Complaint, but never files another paper while he remains the only "attorney of record" for Plaintiff. They fail to appear (telephonically or in person) at three hearings. They prepare and record a bogus assignment of mortgage AFTER the Initial Complaint is filed. They file a bogus complaint BEFORE their client owns and holds the alleged

35 GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Gasque, et al., v. Law Offices of David Stern, P.A., 4th Jud. Cir., Duvall County, FL, Case No. 16-2008-CA-012971, Div. CV-G, Order entered 2 September 2010 by Judge James L. Harrison. 36 Echevaria, et al. v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2007), Levin, Middlebrooks,...,P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1994) and Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992).


note and mortgage. They come to the mediation meeting without the Plaintiff. Defendants have complained about all these things and the Court ignores us. This is prejudicial to us. 58. In the past three (3) years, Plaintiff has not accused Defendants of any wrongdoing regarding the handling of our court papers, until this Hearing. 59. In court, Judge Estrada ordered Laura, not Jeremiah, and Plaintiff to show up at the Mediation Meeting. Laura went to the mediation, as ordered, and brought a cell phone so she could contact Jeremiah, if need be. When she realized that the person on the telephone was NOT the Plaintiff, she objected. When she saw the Mediator's Report which contained FALSE statements, Laura objected. When Laura was informed by the Mediator that she was not going to correct the false statements, Laura, filed an AFFIDAVIT, the same day as the hearing 1 February 2011, to inform the Court of these falsehoods. 60. As Laura heard at the Hearing, Judge Estrada did not want to know anything about it. He said, "I'm not supposed to know anything about it." Then he says, "people can appear telephonically and identify themselves...." This was the problem Laura wanted the Court to address: the Plaintiff did not appear by telephone or otherwise! The Florida Supreme Court says: [P]articipants physically attending mediation may consult on the telephone during the mediation with other persons .... 14. Failure to Appear at Mediation. If either the plaintiffs representative designated in the most recently filed Form A or the borrower fails to appear at a properly noticed mediation and the mediation does not occur, or when a mediation results in an impasse, the report of the mediator shall notify the presiding judge regarding who appeared at mediation without making further comment....37 61. It makes no sense that a judge would order someone to attend a meeting, then not want to know that the person did not attend. 62. What has SHOCKED our sense of fairness (remember "Truth, Justice and the American Way?") was when Judge Estrada said, "I hope Ms. Ammann does not do that again. I don't need to know about these things."38
37 Administrative Order, Florida Sup. Ct., In Re: Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, Case No. AOSC09-54, Kathleen J. Kroll, Chief Judge, signed 11 May 2009 at page A-10. 38 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 102, line 25 - page 103, line 1.


63. A plaintiff's case can be dismissed for failure to attend a mediation meeting and, yet, Judge Estrada does not want to know about these things!?! How can a case be dismissed unless the Judge knows who attended and who did not? 64. Then, Judge Estrada starts picking on Jeremiah for his physical absence from the mediation meeting. Judge Estrada went so far as to order Jeremiah to "be personally present at all future proceedings that are 'essential'...," and orders that Laura may not "represent the interests of Jeremiah" at any future "essential" proceedings. Judge Estrada surprised Laura with his sua sponte discussion and his orders regarding her and Jeremiah. For the last three (3) years, NO ONE has raised these issues. There was NO notice regarding Jeremiah's attendance at any hearings, and NO notice of any allegations that Laura was representing Jeremiah's interests-prior to the Hearing! This is another violation of the Rules and Defendants' due-process rights. This order does not comport with the Rules. As Mr. Trawick says: The court cannot determine a matter at a hearing that is not noticed for the hearing.....39 65. Regarding telephonic appearances as the Florida Supreme Court mentions above: Laura attended the meeting physically and she brought a cell phone to contact Jeremiah, if needed. In other words, Defendants did nothing wrong, so the Court's unduly concern over Jeremiah's absence was misplaced. The Court should have been concerned about the Plaintiff's absence and the F A L S E statements in the Mediator's Report which are now an ostensibly accurate part of the official records of this action. The Court has a duty to fix this. 66. Ms. Lewis, physically, attended the mediation meeting and "represented" Plaintiff's legal interests. On the telephone was a complete stranger who stated that they were employed by a company that was not the Plaintiff. As Laura stated at the Hearing, she did not object to the

39 Trawick, Fla. Prac. and Proc., 15:5 at page 262, 1.


telephonic appearance, itself. She objected to the Plaintiff's absence in spite of the Court's order to be there (either physically or telephonically). 40 CONCLUSION In order for attorneys to pursue their clients' cases with zeal, attorneys are afforded immunity from future litigation. This "immunity" is understandable up to a point. This immunity should not allow them the means to lie, cheat and steal for an illegal end without any accountability. In this action, Plaintiff and its attorneys have been granted immunity from the normal consequences of: not filing papers on time, not citing legal authorities, not serving court papers on opponents, not attending hearings either in person or telephonically, not filing notices of appearance, not filing a motion to amend, not filing accurate certificates of service, not obeying court orders, not verifying its complaint or otherwise complying with established Rules, not telling the truth! A foreign dignitary can commit a crime in America and not be tried for it due to diplomatic immunity. In this case, attorneys are doing all of the above and are not being held accountable for it, based upon a false immunity. In fact, they have been rewarded for it, just like bank presidents who received bonuses for running the economy into the ground.

40 Transcript, 8 April 2011 at page 101, lines 21-25.


Plaintiff is benefiting from the attorneys' bad behavior, and has also wrongly been considered immune from any accountability. The Court seems to think it would be too harsh to hold a client accountable for the acts and omissions of its agents who keep raking in the illgotten gains for them. WHEREFORE, Defendants move the Court to vacate all of its Orders of 8 June 2011 and issue new orders consistent with the information presented above, for findings of fact and conclusions of law, and for such other and further relief as the court deems appropriate. Respectfully submitted by: JEREMIAH T. AMMANN and LAURA U. AMMANN ____________________________ Co-Defendant, Self-Represented 1820 IRIS AVE SEBRING, FL 33875-6090 (863)-385-3138

________________________________ Co-Defendant, Self-Represented 1820 IRIS AVE SEBRING, FL 33875-6090 (863)-385-3138

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served upon the parties listed below on the 20th day of June 2011 as indicated below: by U.S. mail: BRIAN HUMMEL FLORIDA DEFAULT LAW GROUP, P.L. P O BOX 25018 TAMPA FL 33622-5018 Laura U. Ammann ___________________________________ 1820 Iris Avenue Sebring, FL 33875-6090 Telephone: (863)-385-3138 by hand delivery: HIGHLANDS COUNTY c/o ELIZABETH V LENIHAN 2543 US HWY 27 SOUTH SEBRING FL 33870-2125