Overcoming Fundamentalism

Overcoming Fundamentalism
Ethical Responses from Five Continents
Overcoming Fundamentalism
Ethical Responses from Five Continents
Editors Heidi Hadsell / Christoph Stckelberger
Globethics.net Series No. 2
Globethics.net Series No. 2 Heidi Hadsell/Christoph Stckelberger (eds.) Overcoming Fundamentalism. Ethical Responses from Five Continents Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009 ISBN 978-2-940428-01-4 (Edition in Indonesia) 2009 Globethics.net Cover design: Juan Pablo Cisneros Editorial support: Natalie Emch Printed in Indonesia through Duta Wacana University Press Globethics.net International Secretariat 150 route de Ferney 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland Website: www.globethics.net Email: info@globethics.net This book can be downloaded for free from the Globethics.net Library, the leading global online library on ethics: www.globethics.net. The Copyright is the Creative Commons Copyright 2.5. It means: Globethics.net grants the right to download and print the electronic version, to distribute and to transmit the work for free, under three conditions: 1) Attribution: The user must attribute the bibliographical data as mentioned above and must make clear the license terms of this work; 2) Non commercial. The user may not use this work for commercial purposes or sell it; 3) No change of text. The user may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the author's moral rights. Globethics.net can give permission to waive these conditions, especially for reprint and sale in other continents and languages.
CONTENT
Preface .......................................................................................... 9
Walter Fust
Introduction ............................................................................... 11
Christoph Stckelberger ............................................................................
1 Development and Fundamentalism ...................................... 17

Nigel Dower, United Kingdom ..................................................................
1. Introduction............................................................................................... 17 2. Development: Concept and Conceptions .................................................. 18 3. Fundamentalism ........................................................................................ 20 4. Fundamentalism and Development ........................................................... 24 5. Is there Incoherence between Current Process and Future Vision?........... 26 6. The Ethics of the Means ........................................................................... 29 7. Economic Growth versus Other Paradigms, Fundamentalist, Otherwise .. 32 8. Concluding Remarks ................................................................................. 33
2 Fundamentalism versus Liberalism: Towards a Hermeneutical Turn to Ethics............................... 35

Girma Mohammed, Ethiopia .....................................................................
Introduction .................................................................................................. 35 1. Liberalism versus. Fundamentalism: Two Different Conceptions ............ 36 2. The Concept of Meaning as a Way to Go Beyond the Poles..................... 43 Concluding Remarks..................................................................................... 52 Bibliography ................................................................................................. 53
3 Fundamentalism or Tolerance: What Is the Public Role of Religion in Modern Society? .................................................... 55
Peter Pavlovic, Belgium ............................................................................
1. Fundamentalism ........................................................................................ 55 2. Tolerance .................................................................................................. 58 3. Identity ...................................................................................................... 62 4. Religion .................................................................................................... 65
4 Religious Fundamentalism and an Ethics of Recognition...69

Joseph I. Fernando, Thailand ...................................................................
1. Meaning of Fundamentalism .................................................................... 69 2. The Growth of Science ............................................................................. 71 3. Overcoming Religious Fundamentalism: An Ethics of Recognition ........ 82
5 Globalization and Religion - an Indonesian Perspective.....89

Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Indonesia .......................................................
Introduction .................................................................................................. 89 1. Globalization as a Fundamentalist Religion ............................................. 89 2. Globalization as a Neo-colonial Conspiracy............................................. 93 3. The Evolution of Developmentalism in the West ..................................... 96 4. Globalization as a Structure: World System Theory............................... 101 5. Religion and Globalization from an Indonesian Perspective .................. 106 Bibliography ............................................................................................... 109
6 Democracy, Tolerance and Civil Society Fundamentalism and Ethics in Indonesian Politics ..............111
Nick T. Wiratmoko, Indonesia ...................................................................
Introduction ................................................................................................ 111 1. In Search of Democracy Transition ........................................................ 113 2. Pancasila and Muslim Fundamentalism.................................................. 117 3. The Role of Civil Society as an Agent of Reformation .......................... 125 References .................................................................................................. 129
7 The Economic Ethics of Christian and Islamic Fundamentalism ......................................................................131

Yahya Wijaya, Indonesia ...........................................................................
1. Christian fundamentalism: Its Economic Dimension ............................. 131 2. The Gospel of Prosperity ........................................................................ 135 3. Neo-Pentecostalism and Global Capitalism............................................ 136 4. Controversies over Sharia ..................................................................... 139 5. Muslim Perspectives on Capitalism ........................................................ 140 6. Islamic Fundamentalism on the Economy .............................................. 143 7. The Sharia Economy in Practice ........................................................... 145 Conclusion.................................................................................................. 147
8 Why Catholics Cant Vote Pro-Life ................................... 151

Brett Salkeld, Canada................................................................................
The Ideal Candidate .................................................................................... 151 1. The Problem............................................................................................ 154 2. An Example ............................................................................................ 158 3. A Proposal .............................................................................................. 161 4. My Hope for the Future .......................................................................... 171 Bibliography ............................................................................................... 171
9 Tolerance, Democracy and Fundamentalism(s): Challenges in Time of Systemic Bifurcations........................ 173

Guillermo Hansen, Argentina/USA ...........................................................
1. From the Republic to the Empire ............................................................ 174 2. The Long and Winding Road of Catholic Integrism ............................... 184 3. Cultural and Epistemic Strategies: the Flight from Plurality towards a Post-modern Unum .............................................................................. 188 4. The Ethical Foundation of Tolerance ...................................................... 192 5. Does Democracy have a Future? Tolerance as its Condition .................. 198
10 Civil Islam as an Alternative to Islamic Fundamentalism ................................................... 207

Muhammad Machasin, Indonesia..............................................................
1. Introduction............................................................................................. 207 2. Islam is not Monolithic ........................................................................... 209 3. Theological Support for Islamic Fundamentalism .................................. 212 4. The Calling for Fundamentalism ............................................................ 217 5. Civil Islam .............................................................................................. 219 6. Promises and Limitations ........................................................................ 222 7. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 225
Contributors ............................................................................ 227

Editors......................................................................................................... 227 Authors ....................................................................................................... 228
PREFACE
Fundamentalism is a reality on all continents, in all world religions and in different political and economic movements and world views. Fundamentalisms in these different forms influence development, the international, regional, national and local agenda to a great extent. Overcoming fundamentalism, the title of this book, is a whole programme and a very ambitious one. The contributors of this book do not call for military or power-related answers to combat fundamentalism. They carefully analyse the root causes and call for ethical responses: through a values-oriented development; through respect and an active tolerance which is much more than an anything goes approach; through a holistic globalization which is much more than economic growth and open markets, and through new concepts of the public role of religions. This book shows the commitment of Globethics.net, the global network on ethics, to strengthen global common values while at the same time respecting the diversity and contextuality of values, and to respect faith based values while looking for an intense exchange and dialogue with non faith based and secular views of values. Join these efforts by sharing your views on the internet platform of Globethics.net, participating in the dialogues and working groups and submitting your documents to the online library. I am convinced that this book and Globethics.net can contribute to development that benefits humanity in our common, one world. Walter Fust President of the Board of Foundation of Globethics.net
INTRODUCTION
Christoph Stckelberger
What is fundamentalism? Fundamentalism can be defined, as in this book, as a religious or political movement or attitude with a strict adherence to a set of basic principles, based on a literal, not adapted interpretation, especially as a return to former principles. Separation, exclusion and extremism are characteristics of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is often associated with Islamic terrorism, with violence from Hindu extremists or with militant Christian Evangelicals or Catholic integrists. Religious forms of fundamentalism are the main subject in this book. Fundamentalism is not only a phenomenon of religions, but also of political and ideological world views. The contributions in this book therefore also analyse political and economic fundamentalisms from an ethical perspective. Economic liberalism or the free market can become fundamentalist when they are seen as the only model and solution for all problems without openness to new interpretations and adaptations to new challenges. The contributions also show the rich and confusing variety of positions that are fully fundamentalist and positions which seem to be the opposite, with many positions in the middle having different degrees and mixtures. Fundamentalism evolved as a Christian movement mainly within American Protestantism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries amongst conservative evangelical Christians who, in a reaction to modernism, actively affirmed a "fundamental" set of Christian beliefs. Strong com-
12 Overcoming Fundamentalism
mitment to the basic truth of a certain religion, belief, ideology or conviction is the first and foremost characteristic of not only Christian but any fundamentalism. Todays manifold forms of religious and political fundamentalism are often a symptom of the powers of an unfair globalization, forced liberalisation and lack of respect for cultural diversity. But fundamentalism is not an adequate answer and not its cure. Looking at fundamentalism and ways to answer and overcome it from ethical perspectives, as this book aims to, means to understand and evaluate the values behind fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist world views. The fundamentalist adherence to a set of principles means adherence to a set of a few values such as community-orientation through a specific form of family life or respect of authority in a specific hierarchical way. The challenge for those who call themselves nonfundamentalists is to show their values and their basis and ethical fundamentals as foundation of their orientation. They may refer to freedom as well as community-orientation, but in a different way, looking at forms of family life in their historical development and diversity and looking for respect between people rather in forms of partnership than hierarchy (e.g. of men and women). But values such as equality, long term sustainability or democratic participation in decision making are empty words which will not convince fundamentalists unless they are combined with the strong commitment to poverty reduction, environmental care, and respect of the diversity of languages, cultures and religions. The nine contributions in this book do not see fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists as polar opposites. They all take fundamentalism seriously and try to understand in their respective context the root causes, such as inequality, poverty or fast modernisation with a lack of values and perspectives. Many authors confronted with fundamentalisms underline the necessity to re-think globalization, liberalism, toler-
Introduction
13
ance, concepts of modernity, secularism and democracy in the light of fundamentalist challenges. Religion has to play a role not only in private but also in public life, values-orientation is a necessity, tolerance needs to be practised in a more pro-active way and not just in a laissez faire way, liberalism has to become more holistic, integrating values other than freedom and so on. Most of the authors also sharply criticise fundamentalist values which lack respect for the other, or lack tolerance, or lack the capacity of adaptation of historic principles to new situations and challenges. The first four contributions look especially at the relation between fundamentalism economic liberalism, secularism, religion and development, from global, European and African perspectives. The next three articles all come from Indonesia and look at religious fundamentalism(s) in relation to globalization, democracy and economic ethics. Indonesia as the country with the highest number of Muslims worldwide and a rich history of tolerance and conflicts, of colonialism and globalized development is a very interesting example of the diversity and pluralism of tendencies in the same society. The two final contributions look at the Catholic religious right in North America and Catholic integrism in the South American context, and formulate respective ethical alternatives. The ten contributors are: 1. Nigel Dower, a specialist for development ethics from Great Britain, asks Are fundamentalist conceptions of development compatible with liberal conceptions of development? He argues that they are in terms of goals but not in terms of means. His article concentrates on North American Christian fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism. 2. Girma Mohammed, coming from Africa and living in Europe, looks at the different Western and African perceptions of the relation between economic liberalism and fundamentalism. The borders between the two are sometimes the complete opposite in Africa and in Europe. Liberal views in Africa can be seen as fundamentalist and vice versa. He
looks at a hermeneutic of meanings and criticises both liberalism and fundamentalism for their one sided view of what is meaningful for life and society. 3. Peter Pavlovic from the Conference of European Churches in Brussels analyses the relationship between fundamentalism, tolerance, identity and religion in Europe related to other parts of the world. Secularism has failed in Europe and does not convince people on other continents. Identity is strongly linked to religion and its communities. Theocracy is not the solution to fundamentalism, but Europe needs to find a place for religion in public life as one of the conditions for a healthy society. 4. Josef Fernando from Thailand, in one of the conclusions to his analysis of Hindu, Muslim and Christian fundamentalism, says that The root cause of many problems in the world today is the rejection of the dignity and worth of the human person . He calls for an ethics of recognition as an answer to fundamentalism and in order to become human. 5. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta from Indonesia asks Is globalization a fundamentalist religion? He does not simplisitcally answer yes to this question as some authors do. After examining four theories of globalization he paints a differentiated picture of the relationship between globalization and religion from an Indonesian perspective. 6. Nick Wiratmoko from Indonesia shows the development and fragility of democracy in Indonesia, analyses Muslim fundamentalism in relation to Pancasila, the Indonesian concept of tolerance and respect, and underlines the role of civil society for the development of democracy in the country. 7. Yahya Wijaya from Indonesia looks at the economic interests and mechanisms of Christian Neo-Pentecostal and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Indonesia from the perspective of economic ethics. In a critical essay he shows how both are led by foreign models (USA and
Introduction
13
Arabic countries). He calls for a contextual economic ethics with a Christian and Islamic underpinning. 8. Brett Salkeld looks at fundamentalism of the Catholic religious right in the USA, but also at leftwing positions in the same country. He proposes a theological answer in a holistic pro-life perspective, overcoming fundamentalist one-sided answers. 9. Guillermo Hansen from Argentina analyses Catholic integrism as the dominant form of fundamentalism in Latin America. For him fundamentalisms signal a refusal of modernity, democracy and secularity, which are seen as weapons of liberal foreign or Western hegemony. Fundamentalisms are symptoms of the world system but not its cure because they are blind to the political dimension of love. He shows in detail the ethical foundation of tolerance as the basis for democracy and answer to fundamentalisms. 10. Muhammad Machasin from Indonesia, a leading figure among Indonesian Islamic scholars and Islamic higher education, shows and at the same time disproves the theological arguments of fundamentalist Muslims. The author describes civil Islam as an alternative to Islamic fundamentalism: Civil Islam is a way of practicing Islam within a pluralistic society in a polite manner. This book is the fruit of an international conference of Globethics.net, held in 2006 in Huissen, the Netherlands on Fundamentalism and Ethics. The contributions are selected from over 25 papers presented at the conference. We especially thank Jean-Daniel Strub, former Executive Coordinator of Globethics.net, for his excellent preparation and running of the conference.
DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDAMENTALISM
Nigel Dower, United Kingdom
1. Introduction
It is often thought that there is some kind of conflict between development and fundamentalism. Fundamentalists may be opposed to what they see as development particularly commitment to economic growth and the materialism associated with it, to liberty and to democracy which are central to a common paradigm of development. Advocates of development may regard fundamentalists as impeding development in practice and rejecting it in principle. And yet, I shall argue, there is nothing about fundamentalism that rules out support for some form of development and certainly not development as economic growth. How far fundamentalist conceptions of development are compatible with a typical Western view of development depends on a number of factors, whether for instance the commitment to fundamentalism involves rejection of materialist growth, or goes along with active intolerance of others, aggressive proselytising or the use of violence as a means. But I want to stress that there is nothing in the general idea of fundamentalism that involves these stances.
2. Development: Concept and Conceptions

We need to distinguish between a basic concept of development and various conceptions of it. A basic concept of development is something like a process of change social, economic, political in a society which ought to be pursued by public agents such as a government. By contrast a conception of development is a particular interpretation of what ought to happen. This will be based on certain normative views about what constitutes a change from a worse state to a better state involving conceptions of human well being, appropriate moral and political norms and so on, coupled with a broad empirical understanding of how best to realise these norms. There are, it hardly needs stressing, many different conceptions of development from libertarian conceptions, liberal conceptions such as Sens approach in Development as Freedom1, to conceptions in which redistributive justice are central, socialist or Marxist conceptions that emphasise state regulation of the economy. A common contrast is between conceptions that make economic growth central as providing the conditions of more choice, and conceptions that for a variety of reasons (e.g. spiritual, environmental) question the centrality of growth in the conception of progress. For someone in favour of the way development is pursued in a country, what is pursued by the government is broadly what ought to happen the governments values and the ways of implementing them are broadly right. But others may be critical of what is done in the name of development perhaps less radically because they think the proposed means are inadequate or inappropriate to the stated and acceptable goals, or more radically because they think the goals and values are themselves inadequate or wrong.
1
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Development and Fundamentalism
19
Development ethics, which is the intellectual stable from which I come and orient my approach on these issues, arose as a self-conscious area of intellectual enquiry about twenty years ago, partly in connection with the setting up of a new organisation called the International Development Ethics Association 2. It started out as critical enquiry into what was done in the name of development, particularly the commitment to economic growth, and into the failures nationally and internationally to tackle extreme poverty, at a time when those involved in government and business did not really think there were ethical issues involved in development itself. But of course once the issues are raised, those who defend development as it is usually pursued cannot just rest on established practice, but also have to give an account of why development as conventionally understood is the justified way to go. It is clear that the debates have become more sophisticated all round. Defenders of the main paradigm are rarely content to rest on economic growth, and have much more to say about values like democracy, human rights, fair distribution, transparency, good governance and so on, whilst being divided in opinion on the extent and nature of economic liberty. That is, some claim it should be as unrestricted as possible either because it is a fundamental value (I use this word fundamental deliberately since libertarianism can sometimes take a fundamentalist character) or because it will, it is believed, by trickle-down lead to prosperity for all eventually. Others hold that we must have some commitment to redistributive taxation as required by their understanding of social justice3. Given this general framework we can ask two questions of fundamentalism. First, can a fundamentalist have a conception of develop2 3
See www.development-ethics.org. For further information about development ethics see e.g. D. Goulet, Development Ethics: Theory and Practice (Apex Books, 1995); D. Crocker, Towards a Development Ethic, World Development, 1991; and Gasper, Des, The Ethics of Development (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). See also N. Dower, The Nature and Scope of Development Ethics, Journal of Global Ethics, Vol 4, Issue 3, 2008, 183-193.
ment? Second, given as I shall argue that they can, are such conceptions of development compatible with liberal conceptions of development?
3. Fundamentalism
I had a quick look on the web using Google to see what definitions came up on fundamentalism. To take the first four: Movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherence to a set of basic principles4; A usually religious movement or point of view characterised by a return to fundamental principles, by rigid adherence to those principles, and often by intolerance of other views and opposition to secularism5; Fundamentalism is a religious position typically characterised by a rigid adherence to what are perceived to be the most basic and traditional principles and beliefs of that religion6; 1. Movement with strict view of doctrine: a religious or political movement based on a literal interpretation of and strict adherence to doctrine, especially as a return to former principles and 2. Support for literal explanation: the belief that religious or political doctrine should be implemented literally, not interpreted or adapted7. There are of course some differences in these definitions: some limit it to religious fundamentalism others allow for other principles, of a political nature for example; some emphasise appeal to tradition others do not. What is striking about these (and I think they are typical) is that they stress literal and rigid adherence to their principles. What is also striking is that none of them make any direct reference to how someone
See http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/netdict?Fundamentalist (accessed August 2006) 5 See http://www.answers.com/topic/fundamentalism (accessed August 2006
6 4
http://atheism.about.com/library/glossary/western/bldef_fundamentalism.html (accessed August 2006) 7 See http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861613888/fundamentalism.html (accessed August 2006)
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who adopts a fundamentalist position defines himself or herself over and against others who do not accept it. They do not say (except for one where the point is not seen as defining the position) that a fundamentalist must be intolerant or hostile towards people of other beliefs; they do not say that one must strive to get others to accept ones beliefs; they certainly do not say that fundamentalists must use extreme means such as terrorism or violence to destroy or convert others. I rather like the first definition I gave and will proceed using this: Movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherence to a set of basic principles. One advantage of it is that it allows for forms of fundamentalism other than religious fundamentalism. It could include rigid adherence to Marxism or for that matter rigid adherence to libertarianism. It could include ethical positions, such as the position of the animal liberationist (though a clear belief in the moral status of animals need not lead to violent actions) and indeed to environmental radicalism. It could also include someone who was committed to any clearly worked out ethical position such as Kantianism (though most people adhering to Kants approach would not regard it in this way). I like it too because it does not build in reference to tradition. No doubt the fundamentalist motive is often a wish to return to earlier certainties (and it reflects the historical origin of the terminology in American religious history), but it need not be. It is also likely to have some reference to an authority whether Marx, Locke, the Bible, the Koran or a religious tradition. It is important at this stage to note that although it is often convenient to distinguish between fundamentalism and non-fundamentalism and also to regard liberalism as a form of non-fundamentalism, there are two respects in which this is highly misleading. First there is in fact a continuum between positions that are fully fundamentalist and positions which are its opposite, with many positions in the middle having different degrees or mixtures of relevant features. Second, setting liberalism against fundamentalism in simple opposition is also misleading, since
some forms of commitment to liberalism can take a fundamentalist form. No doubt typically those who see themselves as liberal would describe themselves as not fundamentalist and vice versa, but this is only typical, not part of the logic of the concept. This continuum is in fact not a smooth continuum either but a somewhat jagged spectrum in which different criteria will apply in different ways.8 Indeed, one can see a number of key elements for each of which if there are more of the elements present then the position tends more to being fundamentalist and if there are fewer then the position tends more to being non-fundamentalist. For instance, in regard to the way the basic beliefs are held: (a) how rigidly is the belief held? (a psychological question); (b) how certain is the belief (an epistemological question about the nature of the knowledge claim, in contrast to fallibilism which accepts fallibility as scientific principle, epistemological humility, or adopting an attitude of critical loyalty to the object of ones beliefs); and in regard to the nature and extent of the basic beliefs; (a) how large a body of such beliefs are held as non-negotiable (a large complex system of knowledge versus a very broadly defined simple set of core values and beliefs); (b) how far what is believed is a set of literal truths generally grounded in sacred texts and seen as important to the definition of who one is, versus the importance of interpreting such texts or not seeing texts as so important to defining who one is, and regarding such texts as only outward vehicles for something that lies beyond (and accessible via many different texts), or simply regarding texts as unimportant to ones core values (as in mysticism). A paradigm of fundamentalism is going to be a set of beliefs which are rigidly held, certain, extensive in scope and grounded in literal truth. A paradigm of non-fundamentalism is going to be a set of beliefs that are flexibly held, open to question, basic and non-extensive, and either
8 The distinctions outlined in this paragraph are based on reflections on discussions at the globethics.net conference in August 2006.
23
based on interpretation of sacred texts or not grounded in sacred texts at all but in experience, secular or spiritual, or life and/or rational reflection. But many positions may be fundamentalist or more fundamentalist in some respects and less so or not so in other respects. For the purpose of the rest of this article I will however fall in with a common assumption that we can talk of fundamentalism as one position defined in terms of all these features clearly exhibited, and liberalism as characteristically a position in which all the opposite features are clearly exhibited. I shall be considering religious fundamentalism (as most clearly exhibiting these features in varying degrees), and have in mind North American Christian fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism (although other religions of course have their forms of fundamentalism and much of what I say will apply to them equally). My general strategy is to look at possible differences between what a fundamentalist might say about development and what a liberal might say about it, and then show that these differences are not as clear as might seem at first sight. Some even most but not all fundamentalists clearly want the rest of society and even the world to come to accept their beliefs. Does that make them different from liberals? Arguably not, at least for most liberals. Some fundamentalists may act in democratic society in a democratic way to pursue their goals but have a nondemocratic vision they are aiming at. Does that make their position different from that of the liberal? Again, arguably not, at least for most liberals. Some a few fundamentalists are prepared to use violence in pursuit of their ends. Does that make them different from liberals? Here there is of course a real difference about the types of violence regarded as justified, but for any liberal who is not a pacifist, the use of violence as such is not ruled out either. Some fundamentalists may present a vision of development not based on economic growth as central or a necessary condition of other goals. Does that make them different from liberals? Not necessarily since there may be plenty of other reasons why
some liberals and certainly many others who are not fundamentalists also reject the development as growth paradigm.
4. Fundamentalism and Development

How might a fundamentalist think of development? Minimally he will want any changes in the society in which he lives to allow him and those who share his beliefs to continue to live as they want. If they are a minority, they may want a social order that tolerates their existence, provides support for their cultural ways with for example provision of separate schools, maybe economic support where needed and generally a peaceful and orderly social environment in which to live. Some groups of fundamentalists may focus primarily on this. Here the idea is of a fundamentalist minding his own business. He might ideally like a wider society or world which expressed his values, but that is not a basis of action. Maybe the Amish in the USA fit this model; they certainly seem to fit our definition well, and though they may in the abstract wish the world to conform to their values, their main concern is to preserve their way of life and relate to the wider world respectfully and non-violently. Some forms of monastic vocation may be like this too. However most fundamentalists will want the society they live in (and indeed the world as a whole) to be one in which more people come to accept their beliefs and they sees it as appropriate if not a duty to promote their values among others. Perhaps a fundamentalist has a vision of a society in the future in which everyone accepts his beliefs. How are these features wanting others to accept their values and having a vision of the future different from how many of us who do not see ourselves as fundamentalists think of development? First, if we have firm values for instance about fairness, integrity, human rights, social justice, punishment, or the environment, we may not hold these beliefs rigidly or literally, but if they matter to us, we also want other people to accept
25
these beliefs and in various ways (dialogue, public writing, democratic engagement and so on) seek to influence people, since if more in our society think our way, then there will be change in positive directions towards the kind of society we want to develop. Second, we also might have a vision of a future state of development in which these values are fully realised. That is, we all have differing views as to the desirable directions socio-economic development should take and the way it will go will depends on which views prevail. Furthermore, unless the fundamentalism in question involves a firm commitment to the view that material poverty is not a problem and that having more than minimal amounts of wealth is unimportant, then the fundamentalist no less than the liberal can be committed to development as a process of economic growth and to making poverty reduction central within that. So there may be no differences on that score. There may be further differences in what else we want development to achieve, but on this point economic improvement especially for the poor, often seen as the central feature of development anyway there need not be. Again it is perfectly possible for a fundamentalist (given our definition) to accept democratic process either in principle or pragmatically. She might accept this in principle if her fundamentalist beliefs included democratic values or at least she accepted that democratic processes were consistent with these beliefs as a means to advancing her beliefs. She might accept it pragmatically if, despite her vision of a future or ideally perfect society run on say theocratic or otherwise authoritarian lines (like the idea of benevolent dictator or philosopher king), she realised that in the world today she needed to work with the system we have got. Above I have been talking about fundamentalist minorities in a pluralist democratic society. Somewhat different things need to be said about the position of a fundamentalist living in a fundamentalist society, and I do not really go into this. I would just remark that her view might
be different depending on whether her form of fundamentalism was the same as that dominant in her society or somewhat different think of a Muslim in a fundamentalist Christian society or vice versa or indeed historically of the perceived incompatibilities between Protestants and Catholics not that long ago in Europe. If then the fundamentalisms are different and if her values and those dominant in her society both included some form of democratic procedure, she has and can welcome the chance for democratic change. If her values include democratic values but she lives in an undemocratic society, then she has the same set of problems as a liberal faces in such a society. But conversely if her own values are non-democratic but she lives in a society that, though fundamentalist, allows democratic expression, she has, as in a liberal society, the opportunity to engage in democracy pragmatically to advance her ideas.
5. Is There Incoherence between Current Process and Future Vision?

But you may say, surely the real problem is that if the fundamentalist is really not a democrat, and only goes along with it out of convenience, then his vision of development the perfect realisation of his values is deeply inconsistent with our conventional view. He may even reject development discourse altogether anyway. Our conventional view, it may be said, is about commitment to greater human well being through, amongst other things, commitment to human rights, democracy, freedoms, respect for diversity and so on. These incidentally are not just the means to human betterment, they are also constitutive of that betterment. Briefly, the increasing and strengthening of institutions and practices that reinforce democracy, liberties, respect for diversity and rights not only provide direct indices as instruments of development, but also enable more people to be actively de-
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mocratic, live lives enriched by welcoming diversity, exercise their rights and freedoms all of which contribute to their lives going well (in addition to their being healthy, well fed and housed, equipped with resources and abilities for a wide range of interesting activities ). Now it may be said that this view of development is, if you like, internally coherent over time. If we pursue these values now in the hope that they will be more instantiated in the future, this is consistent with, and indeed hopefully conducive to this continuing into the future in the same way, and so on until maybe just maybe there will be a society in the future which is fully democratic, free, respectful of diversity and so on. (Incidentally the trouble with many conceptions of sustainable development is that they fail this test.) But the kind of fundamentalist we are considering now is someone who goes along with these values now as a way of getting on with others and at the same time more effectively advancing his values, but has a vision of a socio-political order in the future in which these values would no longer hold sway. So his rationale for engaging in society now is different and somehow disingenuous. Here we have an echo of the Weimar Republic phenomenon where the National Socialists with a non-democratic agenda used the democratic process to get into power to destroy it. This is I grant a significant problem, but maybe one we can contain if we recognise that, as minorities in a pluralist society, their vision is hardly a realistic threat if democratically pursued, and if we recognise the following points. Indeed here we encounter a more general problem within the so-called Western paradigm: granted that we pursue development as creating the enabling conditions for people to develop and exercise their capabilities and this leads to fully rounded human lives (a justification like this must surely lie behind a commitment to economic growth it is not an end in itself), why are we committed to democracy, human rights, freedom and so on? These values are largely procedural values about the way we pursue goals and accommodate other peoples
pursuit of goals. As such they can be seen as intrinsically important or they can be seen as instrumentally important. If they are the former, that is intrinsically important, they could be but are unlikely to be the only public values we are really committed to promoting since there are likely to be others about education, defence or the environment for example. (Of course I may also have privately many values and goals music, bird watching, my religious life but my interest in these is not such that I think a society would be better for generally accepting these values.) If they are the latter, then in being instrumental they must be based on some other values thought to be important. Either way we must recognise that it is usual for people to have further substantive public concerns and agendas. For instance I may want euthanasia to be accepted, or cannabis legalised, or an area of nature preserved, or an increase of aid to other countries accepted, or restorative justice used in the penal system, or animal farming stopped. Engagement in civil society generally and in political life in particular is premised on wanting things to change. If we want to imagine a future society in which the values we think important are fully realised, it will be different for each person, both in respect to the particular substantive values each person accepts, but also in respect to how far a future society could both be democratic and fully respectful of liberty and diversity and realise these substantive values. Imagine a society for instance which conformed to ones preferred values in which say there was serious environmental protection based on the intrinsic value of nature, but if that society was democratic or respectful of diversity, what if people wanted to act in ways that did not protect that environment? There is also a potential tension between democracy, liberty and respect for diversity, such that they cannot all be maximally observed. These tensions are going to be more acute the more we try and focus on what a perfectly developed society would look like. Clearly there are also tensions on the journey of development
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what we are doing now but they are not so acute, and certainly not such as to separate out what the fundamentalist is doing and what many other groups of activists are trying to do. Perhaps it does not matter that we each have a different vision of a distant future (probably never realisable) or of how our current society might look like if all our values were fully realised. Such visions are not goals but orientations. What matters is how we pursue development here and now. But if this the case, then the fact that the fundamentalist may have an ideal which is not the same as yours or mine, does not prevent his view and its advancement from being a legitimate part of the current development process.
6. The Ethics of the Means

Where the real tension appears between our normal understanding of development in liberal societies and many fundamentalist views is when the fundamentalist adopts certain views about others who are not of her faith. If here and now a fundamentalist is actively intolerant of others, or proselytises in a way that is inconsistent with the spirit of open dialogue, or engages in violence including terrorism, then in various degrees we have serious problems. Incidentally it is interesting to note that these tensions are not, or at least need not be, about the standard conception of development as economic growth. A fundamentalist could well be committed to economic growth including a distributive principle that requires a significant part of that growth to be directed to the poor, but reject democracy, liberties, many human rights or the whole rights discourse in favour of undemocratic and illiberal socio-political regimes. This may be because these values are simply to be rejected in themselves or are seen as inappropriate to the promotion of development economically. (Consider an analogous case: the so-called Lee thesis that development in Asian countries
was better promoted in an authoritarian way than via democracy and human rights9). Such an advocate may in a liberal state promote these views or he may approve of them in an illiberal state (as some Marxists might have approved of the USSR, certainly committed to some forms of socio-economic development). Active intolerance of others is of course deeply antithetical to a liberal society which not merely tolerates other views but welcomes diversity, both of individual life-styles and of cultures. Aggressive proselytising conflicts with the key values of dialogue and rational discourse. This needs of course to be distinguished from the reasonable promotion of views, which seems to be a requirement of any seriously held view about what it is important to believe. The commitment to violence as a method is deeply inconsistent both with a commitment to democracy as a method of resolving differences and also with a basic acceptance of the ethics of the means, namely that there are certain non-violent ways by which we need to relate to fellow human beings, whatever ends we are pursuing. How does one handle people who take these approaches in a liberal democracy? One has to be tolerant of the intolerant and willing to be reasonable with those who use unreasonable methods. With violence there are two response: first, where at all humanly possible, one needs to be willing to have dialogue with those who reject dialogue and to use the ethics of the means against those who reject the ethics of the means; but second at another level, the perpetrators of violence and their supporters put themselves at odds with the society they are in but in a sense are not part of. How far and in what ways violence is justified against terrorist attack either from within or from outside ones society is a vexed and topical issue. I shall not pursue it here since my concern in this lecture is with development, but I note in passing that the discourse on the war against terror is not helpful.
9
Sen, op.cit., p. 15.
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In regard to development we should note that even the terrorist may have a conception of development, one involving economic growth even, coupled with a belief about the means that one may take to create such a future social order. The model of development whether including economic growth or not, may be based on social and political principles quite at odds with those we assume in Western society (as seems to be the case with current Islamic terrorism), but it could also include familiar concepts. Consider the IRA or the militant wing of the ANC: their goal was the overthrow of the political order, but they might want the new political order to pursue broadly the same conception of development. Terrorism, whether committed by fundamentalists or committed by others who have goals not seen as fundamentalist in character, is essentially about means an extreme version of the view that the end justifies the means.10 The challenge of the terrorist is not with his goals, but with his means. We may or may not be sympathetic to the kind of socio-political order a terrorist hopes will emerge from his acts, but what is deeply offensive is his view about means. So the challenge of the fundamentalist terrorist is not primarily about what he is after in the long run (generally unattractive as this is for most of us in the current Middle East con-
10
We can generalise a point about the difference between a freedom-fighter and a terrorist. Rather than saying as many want to say that a freedom-fighter is a terrorist of which one approves, it is better to say that terrorism is defined by the immediate goal of creating terror, whereas a freedom-fighter is defined by a long-term goal of attaining political freedom such as independence (Cf. Graham, G., Ethics and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 115-118). So a freedom-fighter may be a terrorist if he pursues his goal by creating terror. So likewise a terrorist may also be a democracy-fighter or a rights-fighter. Terrorists then could be committed to creating a new political order (and their leaders later become respected political leaders) in which democratic and liberal values are instantiated; they could be about creating socio-political orders in which these values are not instantiated. They could be committed to development as economic growth, or they could be wanting a socio-political order based on other principles.
text), but what characterises terrorism generally a blatant disregard for the lives of ordinary people, etc.
7. Economic Growth versus Other Paradigms, Fundamentalist or Otherwise

The paradoxical consequence of all this is that if development is seen as primarily economic growth, then there may not be as much difference in the ways of thinking about development between liberals and fundamentalists of a non-liberal kind as may be at first thought. What divides them is a view about what else development involves or at least needs to be combined with in terms of public commitment. Things like democracy, liberty, rights, protection of the environment as well as the establishment of the kinds of values fundamentalists think important in a society (or the world as a whole), are not things we simply have completely or do not have at all. They exist in degrees, so it makes sense to think of the progressive realisation of any of these kinds of values as a process over time which is the object of human endeavour. So it makes sense, as I implied at the beginning, to talk of rival conceptions of development as desiring social change. However, if we resist the widening of the concept and prefer to think of development as essentially economic change, then there may be fewer differences over development itself, at the same time as increasing disagreements about the other social and political values that go along with the pursuit of development. I say there may be fewer differences over development itself, but there are still even on a more limited view of the subject matter of development, significant differences of view about how it should be pursued (liberty versus regulation; trickle-down versus state taxation for redistribution), though these differences do not divide fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists as such.
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Of course many fundamentalists may be opposed to development as economic growth and even reject the discourse of development altogether. This may be because of the materialist assumptions behind it being seen as inconsistent with fostering the spiritual nature of human well being properly understood. But then opposition to development as economic growth may come from other quarters too, such as radical environmentalists or supporters of the sort of position advocated by Eric Fromm that true human well being comes from being more not having more11. These views may also be deeply opposed to the development as growth paradigm and I am personally sympathetic to them. Such positions may well be held rigidly and in a way that makes them fundamentalist, but there is no reason to suppose that they need be held in such a way. Again it is an open question whether these positions on development and economic growth are seen as rejections of development discourse altogether, as writers like Sachs have done12, or whether they lead to their advocates putting forward rival conceptions of development not so centrally linked either conceptually or empirically with economic growth - as do many in the organisation I belong to, namely IDEA the International Development Ethics Association).
8. Concluding Remarks
So a number of points emerge from this discussion. There is no inherent contradiction between development and fundamentalism. Fundamentalists could accept development as economic growth but combine commitment to this with values inconsistent with common assumptions in standard thinking about development such as liberty and democracy. How far there are tensions between different conceptions of development depends upon the approaches towards means which fundamental11 12
E. Fromm, To be or to have? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978). W. Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary (London: Zed Books, 1992).
ists take to others. Fundamentalists could reject development as economic growth but nevertheless present an alternative model of development in terms of the progressive realisations of their primary values. They could reject the discourse altogether as inconsistent with their vision. Rejection of development as economic growth or development discourse altogether is not something that makes a person a fundamentalist either. Deeply held views on for instance the real nature of human well being or about ecological value may also lead to radical critiques of the dominant growth paradigm, without advocates of these views claiming to be or being described by others as fundamentalist. So conceptually the field is wide open. Conclusions are not meant to bring in new material, but they can reassert what was indicated near the beginning and has been implicit in the rest of the text. I have used the neat distinction between liberals and fundamentalists as a heuristic device for showing how few things can be said about the one that cannot be said about the other. There are just too many combinations of positions, so generalisation is not very useful. But perhaps the main message is that the distinction is a dangerous one: the world does not fall into two camps liberal and fundamentalist rather there is a continuum of positions. Perhaps a spectrum of positions would be a better phrase since a continuum implies a smooth transition from more liberal to less liberal and from more fundamentalist to less fundamentalist. And this is not quite right either since the two ideas criss-cross each other in interesting ways as I indicated earlier. Since the polarisation of the world into binary groupings such as liberal and fundamentalist is actually one of the most dangerous processes occurring in the world today, we need to resist it. I hope that my discussion of development has helped to show why such polarisations are in the end not terribly helpful.
FUNDAMENTALISM VERSUS LIBERALISM: TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICAL TURN TO ETHICS
Girma Mohammed, Ethiopia
Introduction
I have had a couple of opportunities to attend international academic seminars on fundamentalism one as it relates to ethics (in its diversity) and the other as it is implied in the church and theology. It is intriguing, at least from an African point of view, that fundamentalism, as opposed to liberalism, is portrayed as the sole challenge, if not threat, in the West. What is evident is that liberalism is rarely put under serious scrutiny or silently endorsed, it certainly is not considered as a challenge. Understandably, this might partially be triggered by the anxiety that is triggered by the recent rise of various forms of extremisms. However, raising a few questions is of utmost importance with regards to this mode of conceptualisation. First, is historical fundamentalism as inherently dangerous as it is portrayed in (post)modern media [and even academia]? Second, is there room to conceptualize the debate in a different way, using cultural currents and traditional values other than the Western ones? Third, even more importantly, would there be a possibility to
formulate a conceptual matrix that overcomes both cultural and conceptual rifts and yet adequately account for the questions that are raised by both wings? Certainly, this essay does not have any interest in defending one wing over against the other. However, it aims at pondering the aforementioned two questions. The first part will make an attempt to trace the historical roots of the debate and then put the discourse into the Western and the African perspectives. This helps to see how the issue is perceived in these two culturally diverse parts of the world. As relativist or even divisive as this approach may sound, I contend it will serve as an antidote to the claimed universalism of any of the wings. In addition it gives an opportunity to the local cultures to make their voices heard on the issue at stake. In the second part I will try to come up with my own alternative for the two poles. It is helpful to go beyond them and search for a conceptual framework that goes beyond differences in cultures, traditions and experiences regarding the fundamentalism versus liberalism debate.
1. Liberalism versus Fundamentalism: Two Different Conceptions
1.1 The Origins and the Western Conception

Words are disguises, as the clich goes. They can mean different things to different people. It might therefore be helpful to briefly define and trace the origin of the terms before discussing further. First, let us start with liberalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy rightly suggests that liberalism could be different things in different countries such as Britain, France, the USA and Australia as well as in fields of research such as in political tradition, political philosophy, general philosophical theory and in religion. Admittedly, its wide threads and flexible uses in several domains do not seem to help to come up with a clear
Fundamentalism versus Liberalism
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definition. However, it might be helpful if we go on with describing generic features and assumptions which underlie the whole notion of liberalism albeit in diverse fashions. For one thing, individual liberty is at the heart of liberalism. Second, liberalism takes the emancipation of the individual from beliefs and prejudices which do not yield to rational veracity very seriously. Third, as a reaction to ideological and religious absolutism, liberalism became a way of escaping from religious and political authorities (priests and kings). Second, lets have a look at fundamentalism.1 Grant Wacker, a professor of history of religion at Duke University, suggests distinguishing between historic Fundamentalism and generic fundamentalism. Historic fundamentalism refers to the phenomenon that is closely linked to the historical and cultural context of Protestantism in 1920s in America through which the term fundamentalism appeared on the social and academic scene. On the other hand, generic fundamentalism, Wacker maintains, refers to a global religious impulse, particularly evident in the twentieth century, which seeks to recover and publicly institutionalize aspects of the past precisely because modern life has obscured it. 2 In other words, it sees the secular (liberal) state as an inherent threat, for its sole interest lies in education, economy and democratisation at the expense of the spiritual dimension of life. Such a move, for the fundamentalists, has religious, social, and also very acute ethical implications. From the religious standpoint, sacred scriptures which used to be regarded as having authority over everyday life have come
The term at the inception was not used with a negative connotation, precisely because its meaning had to do with preserving religious, cultural and traditional fundamentals against the sweeping tide of modern move. The apparent change of the meaning of the term seems to have been occurred [from neutral or even constructive to pejorative] as several religious radicalism(s) unfold themselves. As the result, many groups described as fundamentalist often strongly object to this term because of the negative undertones it carries, or because it implies a similarity between themselves and other groups, which they find disagreeable. 2 Grant Wacker, The Rise of Fundamentalism (http://www.nhc.rtp.nc.us).
under attack. Introduction of different schools of criticism such as literary, form, reduction are seen as indicating many things but not of stripping the authority of sacred books away. From the social perspective, overarching governing norms and values of the believing society are conceived to be under fire. Ethically, communal warmth, long cherished traditions, and as a result, shared codes of discipline have increasingly been watered down. Hence, both historic and generic fundamentalism(s) are reactions to the apparently new trajectory of religious, social and ethical dynamics. Now, what are the main assumptions and motivations behind these seemingly unbridgeable divergences? What are the major questions that they pose to one another? The chief concern of liberalism is human liberty be this in political, religious or ethical form. Humanness therefore is defined in terms of freedom. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, is anxious to preserve supposedly enduring traditions, values and sources of authority whether that of a religious or other kind. Liberals are troubled by the presumed tyranny of universalistic conceptions of fundamentalism on individual rights and liberties, whereas fundamentalists, conversely, are wary of looming social fragmentation and everadvancing ethical relativism. Both schools have got some salient points which have to be accounted for. Liberalism is right on target in its claim that human identity cannot be fully grasped apart from individual liberty. Fundamentalism, on the other hand, should be given a credit for their search for guiding normative principles, religious and social warmth as well as communal ties. This is precisely because both human liberty and a search for the unifying principle are universal quests. Now, where did things go wrong? The main deficiency with both views is a tendency to pick one aspect of humanness and one portion of history and to absolutise it. Reductionism plays a pivotal role in both wings. A need for individual liberty, for
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instance, is one of the very essential aspects of humanness, but, it has also to be stressed, it is far from being everything. Let me give one semi-hypothetical example. Consider this, as an Ethiopian who is living in the Western part of the world, I obviously have got better private space, reliable protection under the law and probably a better life setting compared to Ethiopia. In other words, Im living in an individually fulfilling atmosphere. The situation back in Ethiopia is in considerable contradiction with what I individually need. People recently got killed by the forces of the ruling regime in the streets; elites are dragged behind the bars for demanding democracy. Freedom of expression in Ethiopia is far from being realised. However, to my surprise, my nostalgic experience with Ethiopia persists despite all sorts of problems that could threaten my individual freedom. My inner part always whispers that I lack something in the Western hemisphere that I used to enjoy back home: communal warmth and noise - remember utter silence is synonym to death in Africa, and deeper awareness of the supernatural realm as the governing principle of human life. Interestingly, however, such a search seems to be even beyond nostalgic experience. In other words, my experience in the Western hemisphere indicates that the fear of silence is not unique to me as an Ethiopian. Even the people who are brought up in the most individualistic atmosphere are not completely immune. The unique thing with the West however is that technology seems to be offering artificial and impersonal alternatives through electronic devices to deal with the horror of silence. Most of the people walk, work and even read with their ears plugged by earphones. Yet it is still highly questionable if it is a sufficient alternative to listening to something deeper, personal and even superhuman. Second, fundamentalism is not open to new possibilities and developments in society as history unfolds, whereas liberalism is highly conditioned by a particular history and context, to the extent of turning a blind eye to universally enduring principles. Both wings then
lack depth in relation to the ultimate reality, conception of humanness and understanding of time and history. Such a lack of depth gives fundamentalism an oppressive face whereas it makes liberalism a cause of societal fragmentation and parentless-ness, to use the word of Roger Lundin of Wheaton College.
1.2. An African Perspective on the Debate

The fundamentalism versus liberalism controversy is never foreign to Africa. In fact it is the drive to maintain the traditional status quo (in the fundamentalists zone) and the passion for liberty of local cultures (not of individuals as such) which underlie the debate. However, the debate takes quite a different shape in Africa. Hence, there seems to be a good reason to give a brief analysis in order to put fundamentalism versus liberalism debate into the conceptual frame of the global south.
1.2.1. The nature of Debate

The trend of the debate seems to be taking a shape of tension rather than polarity in Africa. For instance, John Pobee identifies two worlds in the African life: the realms of traditional value and modern technology.3 Desmond Tutus observation seems to be even sharper when he explains the struggle as a split in African soul.4 Two observations can be made from the foregoing remarks. For one, unlike in the West, the split of fundamentalism and liberalism is not only an ideological division between two schools, or two different parties, but is also something that occurs within individuals as they try to keep the seemingly irreconcilable edges together. For another, their trust on either side is quite superficial as it lacks a comprehensive conceptual framework to filter what is
John S. Pobee (1978). The Church in West Africa. In The Church in Africa: Papers Presented at the Symposium at Milligan College, March 31-April 3. Charles R. Taber ed., pp. 139-159. CA: William Carey Library, 1978, p. 158. 4 Desmond M. Tutu, Whither African Theology? Christianity in Independent Africa, eds. Edward Fashole-Luke, et al., (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 366.
3
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at stake in the polarities. Peter Lwamindas illustration is captivating when he says that the tension resembles a frog with two legs on the dry land and two in water, ready to jump in the opposite direction from whatever danger was coming5
1.2.2. Its Expression

Both fundamentalism and liberalism express themselves in quite different ways from those in the West. Lets take an example from the church setting. Some (missionary churches) try to maintain the enduring traditions, practices and ecclesiastical dogma even at the expense of local cultures and beliefs. On the other hand, others (indigenous churches) tend to integrate the local beliefs and tradition as a very crucial aspect of Christianity even at the expense of some central Christian doctrines. It all depends on the perspective of the beholder to determine who is fundamentalist and who is liberal. This is precisely because, from the indigenous perspective, the former category falls into the liberalism spectrum, for they have very little or no regard for local values and beliefs. From the missionary churches point of view, indigenous churches could be labelled as liberals for mixing Christianity with local practices at the expense of presumed timeless ecclesiastical traditions. The same applies for fundamentalism depending on the issues at stake.
1.2.3. The Issues

The issues attached to the fundamentalism versus liberalism debate seem to be affecting the independent and missionary churches differently in Africa. For instance, the quest for womens ordination was not a demand that emerged from the public ethos in the Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus of Ethiopia, not at least at this stage. If it were the quest of Ethiopian Christians it should have come from the Ethiopian Ortho5
Peter. Lwaminda, The Teaching of Theology and Philosophy within the Realities of Africa, Doing Philosophy and Theology in the African Context, eds. Luke G. Mlilo CMM and Mthanael Y. Soede (IKO: London, 2003), p. 9.
dox Church, not only because it claims more than a half of the Ethiopian population, but also, compared to Mekane Yesus Church where there already were a significant number of women evangelists, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is a context where womens ordination is apparently unimaginable. The same seems to be true with the introduction of the debate over same sex marriage and gay ordination in some African churches. They are issues which have come from the top down to the grassroots (imported by the local headquarters from partner churches abroad). The non-missionary churches are quite different though. For one, they have far less chance, if at all, of borrowing controversies which are less pertinent to the African context from overseas, than the missionary churches. For another, they try to deal with challenges that are immediately emerging from the grassroots. Their pressing concerns are issues pertaining to healing, the place of ancestors, polygamy, gender equality, church discipline, ethnicity, and social and economic justice. This does not however mean that the issues are always treated in a credible manner. There are instances where the churches, in the name of accounting for indigenous beliefs, are exposed to bizarre practices. Belief in the evil eye and the attempt to give two names to a new born child at the time of baptism to protect it against a demonic attack, and some biblically incongruent exorcism practices in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church stand out as good examples. However, this should not discredit their attempts to address the issues that pose themselves as real challenges for believers. Two things have to be added here. First, some of the state of affairs in the African context do not always easily fit into liberalism versus fundamentalism frames. This is because there are issues which seemingly pertain to both sides in a given tradition. For example, indigenous people appear to be fundamentalist in their appeal to indigenous values
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and practices, whereas their philosophical conceptions might, at times, fall into the liberal category.
2. The Concept of Meaning as a Way to go Beyond the Poles

Needless to say, the notion of meaning is one of the concepts that is extremely intriguing and highly contested, in the fields of both natural science and the humanities. Some argue that the concept of meaning has a rigid tie with the linguistic domain, and therefore, any search of meaning beyond the linguistic mechanism itself is entirely meaningless. In a broader sense, any strand of thinking that reduces the spectacularly diverse and yet coherent design and purpose of created reality to a mechanical cause can fall into this category.6 Others, on the contrary, take a broader view of the notion of meaning admitting that it has got wider and deeper inferences than simply being confined to the linguistic sphere. They however add that it does not transcend the subjective creation of human thought and imagination. The searching subject, they reason, is completely conditioned by the cultural and social upbringing as well as by a sense of solidarity and what is perceived to be good for the particular community in which the subject in question is living, to employ a Rortian term.7 The claim of the objectivity of meaning is anything, but pure myth.
David Armstrong, one of the best known naturalists, propagates such a view not directly in relation to hermeneutics per se, but by the way he interprets the created reality and societal foundations. He therefore argues that natural science is the first philosophy in a sense that it is the only field that fully accounts for reality. Interestingly enough, reality according to Armstrong consists of nothing, but a single all embracing spacio-temporal system. See his article Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy in Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, eds. Paul Moser and J.D. Trout, Routledge. 7 For more sophisticated argument on this strand of thinking see Richard Rortys Solidarity or Objectivity: Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
As someone who is captivated by the notion of meaning, I have tried to formulate the notion of meaning in a substantially different way elsewhere.8 The concept of meaning seems to have three different layers: deep existential, abstract philosophical and concrete practical. A careful identification and plausible use of these levels, I contend, would be a useful tool not only to deal with the challenges of fundamentalism and liberalism, but also in terms of avoiding reductionism in its diverse forms. Lets have a brief look at each of them before extracting its implication to ethics.
2.1. Deeper Existential Level

This is a level in which humankind tries to interpret and define itself by asking extremely acute questions in life. Such questions incorporate the problem of origin or arche (where did I come from?), purpose (why am I here?) and the question of telos (where am I going?). The interpenetration of the past, present and future in humanness is abundantly clear in these questions. Moreover, they exhibit what Wessel Stoker calls the fundamental lack in human existence9 a determining factor in terms of triggering such questions. Responding to these questions therefore is not an option, but is naturally inescapable. Henk Geertsema, a Dutch philosopher, seems to be hitting it right on the nail when he prudently writes:
Questions of meaning, of good and evil, of origin and destination, that are traditionally part of religion and the worldview, are more typical to the way we relate to the world as the whole than the method of science. It is part of our human nature that we have to answer these questions. They pose themselves to us and
I developed this idea in my masters thesis at the Free University of Amsterdam (2005). 9 Wessel Stoker, Is the Quest for Meaning the Quest for God?: A Religious Ascription of Meaning in Relation to Secular Ascription of Meaning (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1996), p. 5.
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we have to respond. Being human we cant avoid interpreting the world and our place in it and accept responsibility for our interpretation.10
No research, to my mind, has demonstrated this in as dramatic a fashion as that of Ernest Becker, who previously was a self-confessed atheist anthropologist and psychiatrist who converted to Christianity shortly before his death because of the impact of his own research. Becker made an extensive study of people who are on the verge of death and their search for meaning at a critical time. Becker then points out, in his book The Birth and Death of Meaning, that the human being is a tragically paradoxical creature. In other words, on the one hand, unlike other animals, Becker writes, he has an awareness of himself as a unique individual [] on the other; he is the only animal in nature who knows he will die.11 The birth of meaning therefore has to do with the awareness of mans unique significance, whereas the death has to do with a sense of fragility as humankind faces death. It has to be noted therefore that both spectrums celebration of unique significance on one hand and sense of fragility on the other are undeniably universal experiences. Such a paradoxical experience makes this level extremely noteworthy, for it is at this level that the human being seeks for an anchorage in life. It is at this stage that religious commitment provides people not only with a sense of security, but also with a basic orientation of interpreting reality.
Henk Geertsema, Dooyeweerds Transcendental Critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically, Contemporary Reflection on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd: A Supplement to the Collected Work of Herman Dooyeweerd, eds. D. F. M. Strauss and Michelle Botting, (Lewiston/Queenston/Lampster: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), p. 62. 11 Earnest Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning: An Interdisciplinary Perspective of the Problem of Man (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 141.
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2.2. Abstract Philosophical Level

The abstract philosophical or theoretical level, unlike the existential level which tries to tie the human subject with the ultimate reality, starts off from the human capability to theoretically analyse what is given. Therefore, the main question that this level strives to answer is: what possibilities and limitations in terms of interpreting reality do I have? This is the reason why scholarship in the field of hermeneutics is increasingly characterizing philosophical hermeneutics as a reflection on interpretation, a theory of what happens when we understand anything. Meaning at this level begins with natural human ability. Admittedly this level (compared to the existential level) is less passionate, substantially moderate and academically sensitive, for it is at this level which understanding itself will be the subject of careful scrutiny and adjudication. In other words, this level helps us to substantiate unnecessary zeal, directness and unconstructive fundamentalism.
2.3. Concrete Practical Level

The concrete practical level is a phase in which the concept of meaning is dealt with as it relates to individual things or entities such as language, culture, ethics, values, literature, artwork in daily practical life. The main question at this level would be: how do the possibilities and limitations affect the way I relate to an entity or a thing in question? Lets briefly turn to Herman Dooyeweerds theory of nave experience to shed some light on the notion of meaning on the practical level.12 According to Dooyeweerd, nave experience (or concrete experience as he sometimes calls it) as a purely pre-theoretical practice plays a great role in terms of interpreting the individual things and entities in a concrete daily life. But why is nave experience so crucial for Dooyeweerd? Nave experience, Dooyeweerd explains, is so basic precisely
12
It has to be noted that the term nave experience in this context is not used in a pejorative sense. Its nuance rather has to do with the way of understanding everyday experience unaided by any theoretical framework whatsoever.
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because it experiences reality in the indivisible meaning-coherence of its modal aspects, common sense intuitively repudiates any attempt to divide its experiential world into theoretically abstracted independent spheres []. In unsophisticated non-theoretical attitude, we experience reality in indivisible coherence of cosmic time.13 The genius of Dooyeweerds analysis lies in the fact that he explores nave or concrete experience as the primary medium by which reality introduces itself to us, and therefore it has to be accounted for. Inasmuch as theoretical thought is something to rely on, precisely because it is the only way that we experience things and values as concrete wholes without breaking them down into pieces, his analysis of nave experience exposes the weakness of a line of thought that reduces the wide and complex array of human experience to a single theoretical or scientific enterprise. However, one could wonder if concrete experience is always pretheoretical or completely detached from the above two levels. This might have to do with Dooyeweerds attitude towards what he calls primitive society of which a number of scholars including his fellow Reformed philosophers such as Sander Griffioen are quite critical. For instance, Dooyeweerd observes, primitive societies do not have a deepened notion of criminal law except on the basis of the factual consequences of an action in question. Hence, the principle of retribution hinges rigidly on the modal substrata without being deepened into the anticipatory principle of accountability for guilt. In the same manner, the legal subjectivity of man and the validity of norms, were characterized by quite closed social intercourse and limited members of the tribe. This is because the primitive communal order was an undifferentiated whole whose modal functions were yet to be articulated and distinguished. As sublime as the main line of his argument might appear, Dooyeweerds claim here is pretty problematic at its best, and outrageous at its
13
TCTT II, p. 29
worst. For one thing, the implied association of the second level with modern formal education readily insinuates that fundamentalism has to do with being uncivilized. However, empirical evidence might show that this is far from being the case. A difference in the way that primitive societies and civilized societies practise abstract thought should be mentioned - just to make use of the opposite of his gross generalization if such a polarization does make any sense after all. On the contrary, however, it is a crude fact that the societies which are labelled primitive have their own theoretical frames through which they filter and adjudicate practices, values and norms even if their theories are enveloped into their tales, narratives, arts and, even at times, rumours. Hence, even uneducated societies can use the theoretical level although the method of theorization might differ from culture to culture. What does the above analysis of meaning offer with regards to overcoming polarization? A number of scholars, leaders (religious and secular) and activists have taken one side over against the other, which left (and is still leaving) its own mark in our society. However, there are some who do not want to take one side over against the other and try to strike a balance in between. Richard Bernsteins book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983) is one of the best examples of this category. The salient feature of this work is that it aims at making both spectrums obsolete. How? In dealing with such issues, Bernstein suggests, we need to look for what he calls the hermeneutical circle a philosophical conception that focuses on the interpretive process as a dialogue between part and the whole to bring an end to the apparently unbridgeable poles. This method, Bernstein opts to maintain, not only takes history, tradition and prejudices quite seriously, but it also accounts for the fact that humankind is a dialogical being who always is engaged in conversation as a process of understanding.14 In other words, there are both
14
Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) p. 137.
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objective (in the form of institutions, values, practices) and subjective (openness of the interpreting subject to listen and share) dimensions to his theory. Bernstein is aware of both universalistic tyranny (which functions behind distorted forms of fundamentalism), on one hand, and the so-called Cartesian Anxiety (the fear of sliding into relativism and fragmentation of which liberalism is presumed to be the main cause). He therefore suggests practical reason as a remedy for both problems in a promise that it could mediate between the two poles. Admittedly, Bernsteins repudiation of elevating one pole over against the other is feasible, as both are irreducibly essential, but yet not complete by themselves. His call to apply the hermeneutical circle is very significant with regards to enhancing a comprehensive understanding of what is at stake and promoting dialogue. However, the question still remains whether Bernstein has really gone beyond objectivism and subjectivism as the title of his book suggests. Intriguingly enough, Geertsema points out that Bernstein finds the common concern of telos in the works of prominent philosophers such as Hannah Arendt, Gadamer and Habermas. Nevertheless, Geertsema laments Bernsteins failure to account for the place of telos as deeply embedded in human projects such as ethics and politics. Moreover, he remains unconvinced that practical reason as a solution in Bernsteins project would offer a sufficient answer to the question of human finitude and universal need of anchorage.15 Geertsema then comes with much deeper and conceptually sensible alternative. He starts off by defining the human being as Homo Respondens (a responding species). In other words, he contends, it is only the human being that has awareness of normativity, a distinct sense of self, knowledge of the quality of things, potential to respond to the Creator
15
Henk Geerstema, Homo Respondens: On the Historical Nature of Human Reason, Philosophia Reformata. 58, p. 120-52.
and a sense of call to fellowship with Him.16 Answering therefore is not an option precisely because, according to Geertsema, the whole creation is characterized as answering to Gods promise-command to be. Human beings, compared to the rest of creation, have got an even further dimension: answering with responsibility. Answering therefore is normative to human beings.17 This line of thinking makes the liberal tendency towards an individualistic ethic effectively obsolete. In other words, it bases its argument on what we previously called the deeper existential level. The question of telos, in a way, is dealt with when Geertsema portrays human beings even the whole creation, for that matter as answering to the Creators promise-command to be. The responding aspect therefore signifies the hermeneutical act as deeply embedded in the essence of humanness. This signifies that the liberal tendency of individualism, and the fearsome inner silence, is incoherent with the normative design of humanness. Elsewhere Geertsema depicts the whole of creation as a book a book with an Author. Not only that, he adds, creation as a book cannot be fully grasped without paying due attention to the authorial intention though the book has its own voice which declares its Author18 This takes us to the second level of meaning understanding possibility and limitations in theorizing. Fundamentalism arguably has (or better, claims to have) an awareness of normativity. Its consistent appeal to abiding ethical, traditional and societal norms and quest for universal application might imply such an awareness. However, it is extremely weak in acknowledging possibility as well as limitation. In other words, creation as a book is not fixed and static. It is ever-moving and dynamic. Discovering new possibilities is a part of the creational dynamic in both the areas
Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., pp. 146-150. 18 Henk Geertsema, Higher Education as Service to the King, Critique and Challenge of Christian Higher Education (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1987), p. 65.
17 16
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natural science and the humanities. Fundamentalism seems to be struggling to let the dynamism and new possibilities go. It instead tries to prevent a possible change and its aftermath, by imposing a fixed value and tradition on others. As a result, un-scrutinized zeal, instead of thorough articulation, seems to be taking the upper hand. Human liberty in that way is under great jeopardy. Instead of trying to avert the force of historical change, the goal should be a search for a reliable conceptual matrix through which the changes can be channelled and adjudicated. The fear of change in the camp of fundamentalism has visibly affected the way they relate to culture, society and otherness at the practical level. The fact that the very term fundamentalism has become increasingly associated with violence, killings and intimidation, exhibits the consequence of ignoring the level of theoretical articulation and making unjustifiable transposition to the practical application. This is because the second level would not only facilitate mutual dialogue and understanding, but it could also serve as a check to filter needless zeal from creating a seemingly unbridgeable rift between human societies. On the other hand, liberalism seems to have no less a negative reputation as it is associated with ethical permissiveness, societal fragmentation and extreme individualism. Both seem to have one common grave problem: ignoring the authorial intention behind created reality, to use Geertsemas metaphor of the book. This is because the authorial intention does not make individuals and community on a hierarchical basis. They both seem to be placing their own impulses at the centre in the process of understanding reality. Looking for a governing universal principle is plausible. However, the purpose should be serving the Author rather than maintaining the interest of certain religious or political traditions. On the other hand, searching for human liberty is one of the basic things, but realization of human liberty must go deeper to the extent of using the liberty of others, and ultimately, that of the Author.
Concluding Remarks
We started off with three crucial questions: about the way fundamentalism is handled in media and academia, the cultural divergences in the conception of the sides in the debate and the possibility of overcoming both cultural and conceptual rifts. I have tried to demonstrate that both fundamentalism and liberalism have raised and wrestled with vital questions without which it is hard to understand both the human subject and its endeavour. Grooming one wing with saint-like status while condemning the other to a devilish grade is very unlikely to do good for human society. This is precisely because finding a common rhythm and living a covenantal life is as decisive as realizing human liberty for human good. Polarization appears to be struggling to eradicate one tyranny of universalism with another. The grave consequence of such a move, as we saw, is the reduction of a wide array of human nature to one single aspect. Namely, sacrificing the communal meta-narrative on the altar of individual liberty or vice versa. The example of the African understanding of the fundamentalism versus liberalism debate opens another window to see things differently, depending on ones cultural context. However, there still is a danger of propagating cultural closure [as opposed to openness] and hostility towards otherness, when full-blown localism is applied. It is then that the third question becomes very important. We laid the foundation that hermeneutics, as a search for meaning, has got three levels: deeper existential, abstract theoretical and concrete practical. In order to understand (get the inner logic of) the created reality, we stressed, these three levels have to function in a credible manner. The question of liberalism, according to this conceptual framework, not only seems to be bypassing the first level but also it is most likely that the second level is also hijacked by the individual category. It is apparent that it failed to offer the much needed harmony and tolerance in society
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even if it emphasizes one of the important aspect of humanness (individual liberty). Fundamentalism on the other hand seems to be going the opposite route by rigidly acknowledging the existential orientation and universal principle. However, the diverse assortment of human society including the possibility and limitation of understanding seems to be under fire. This essay suggests that the best possible orientation with regards to formulating an ethical matrix is conceiving of oneself as a responding creation. Response always presupposes a call a call for covenant. It is this covenant that gives a credible frame to theorization that acknowledges both possibility and limitation. Far from being neutral, theorization aims at realizing the covenant. It is therefore this covenant that makes harmony possible and enables us to overcome the challenges of fundamentalism and liberalism. This is precisely because in the context of covenant it is not only that the past, present and future are completely fused, but also freedom and responsibility are accounted for without making a hierarchy between community and the individual.
Bibliography
Agbeti, J.K, African Theology: What it is, in: Presence, Nairobi: Afropress, 1972. Geertsema, Henk. (1993) Homo Respondens: On the Historical Nature of Human Reason. Phil. Ref. 58, pp. 120-152. Kato, Byang, Theological Pitfall in Africa, Evangel: Kisumu, 1975. Lwaminda, Peter, The Teaching of Theology and Philosophy within the Realities of Africa, in: Luke G. Mlilo CMM and Mthanael Y. Soede (eds.), Doing Philosophy and Theology in the African Context, IKO: London, 2003. Mbiti, John, African Religion and Philosophy. Heinemann: Oxford, 1969.
_________, New Testament Eschatology in African Background. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. McGavran, Donald, Crucial Issues in Missions Tomorrow, Chicago: Moody Press, 1972. Pobee, John S, The Church in West Africa, in: Charles R. Taber ed. The Church in Africa: Papers Presented at the Symposium at Milligan College March 31-April 3, 1978, pp. 139-159. CA: William Carey Library. Ramm, Bernard. Protestant Biblical Interpretation: A Text Book of Hermeneutics, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1956. Tutu, Desmond M, Whither African Theology? in: Edward FasholeLuke, et al., (eds.) Christianity in Independent Africa, New York: Academic Press, 1978, pp. 9-64.
FUNDAMENTALISM OR TOLERANCE: WHAT IS THE PUBLIC ROLE OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY?
Peter Pavlovic, Belgium
This text deals with four topics: fundamentalism, tolerance, identity and religion and links between them.
1. Fundamentalism
In a widespread understanding, the term fundamentalism is today mostly linked to religion. Fundamentalism, in general, is characterised primarily by the notion of separation and exclusion and, in contemporary language, is very often linked with extremism. It is an expression of a passionate opposition to liberalism in all its possible forms. In Western societies fundamentalism is labelled by negative connotations and accompanied by the perception about its link to old-fashioned religious superstition that needs to be overcome. Fundamentalism is perceived as an enemy of Western democracies. Along with the religious connotations, it is however acknowledged that it is also possible to speak about economic, political, national or ideological fundamentalism. In such cases, as with its religious equivalents, fundamentalism could be characterised by extreme posi-
tions, rigidity and inability for dialogue. Following this approach, we can speak also about fundamentalism in its secular guise. A number of European countries in which religious symbols are prohibited from the public places exemplify this. Such a stance is backed by the presupposition that secularism has a worldview, a privileged position and, by the assumption that it is a value neutral system, stands above all religions, religious disputes, quarrels and differences. Fundamentalism has much to do with religion. To limit this phenomenon purely to religion is a superficial simplification unhelpful to a fuller understanding of this phenomenon. It is thus worth exploring the concept of fundamentalism in a broader context and in consonance with other trends inseparably linked to it. Fundamentalism evolved as a Christian movement mainly within American Protestantism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries amidst conservative evangelical Christians who, in a reaction to modernism, actively affirmed a fundamental set of Christian beliefs. Strong commitment to the basic truth of certain religion, belief, ideology or conviction is the first and foremost characteristic of any, not only Christian, fundamentalism. Since then, the use of the term has gone through substantial development and a shift of its original meaning. The widespread use of the word fundamentalism does not mean that its understanding is clear and shared by all. Fundamentalism is today mostly used as a phenomenological description linked to the world of Islam. Many Muslims, however, regardless of their place of origin, protest against the use of the term when referring to Islamist groups. The identification of fundamentalism with extremism, typical of the Western use of the term, is simply not shared. As an example, Shiite groups, which are considered fundamentalist in the Western world, are not considered as such in the Islamic world. As opposed to the Western use, Islamic fundamentalism is most often used by them in a limited sense: as a description of Muslim
Fundamentalism or Tolerance
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individuals and groups that advocate Islamism, a political ideology calling for the replacement of secular state laws with Islamic law. In evaluating fundamentalism, it is beneficial to make a cautious differentiation and carefully look at the balance between politics, religion and society. The realm of politics is where fundamentalism starts to be a dangerous instrument. An oversimplified negative labelling of fundamentalism as describing everything that does not fit with a vision of secular society cannot do justice to those who do not share the idea of secular dominance and who see religion as an integral and constructive element in a mosaic of society. Differentiation between religion and politics is of utmost importance. Putting aside a political cover of fundamentalism and concentrating on its religious roots, it is not possible to overlook those signs which are very difficult to mark simply as negative. The basis of fundamentalism includes conviction, care, firm value orientation and strong social ties. These are worth noting, despite the generally negative attitudes to fundamentalism prevalent in Western societies. Fundamentalism, since its inception, has been a movement of conviction. It is evident that it is not possible to speak about a person having a conviction and self-respect without recognising in this person strong roots for the persons conviction and character. Whatever this conviction may be, it is the fixed point in a changeable world that enables personal orientation. This is then the source of human individual and collective identity. It is acknowledgment of roots, of firm conviction and consequently of self-respect. It is an acknowledgment of a strong vision of the person and his/her place in the world as an agent of the change in this world: a vision of a person who has a task to do, a mission. The presented arguments do not mean that our judgement of fundamentalism should start to be uncritical. It is a reminder of a Western simplified position and a reminder of the complexity which is associated with this term..
2. Tolerance
Europe is a continent that, in most of its parts, cherishes tolerance as one of its principal values, often presented as an opposite to fundamentalism. Tolerance has been instituted within the continent as one of the achievements in the effort to overcome the bloody religious conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries. Since then, tolerance has been cultivated in the way of life of many different communities living in the continent and as the fundamental value found in numerous declarations stating the political principals on which European society rests. In spite of that, practical tolerance has often been called into question and not only at times of conflicts that dominated Europe on several occasions since the Enlightenment during which an appeal to tolerance did not find an echo. Even in the modern era tolerance is not an instrument effectively implemented in all the tensions and conflicts within our reach. It suffices to look at some instances in which tolerance is about to play a major role and in which modern Europe has to face considerable difficulties. Tolerance may be seen as an ideal. Its full reality is, however, not at hand. In the West, tolerance is often portrayed as an opposite to fundamentalism. In its easygoing approach, tolerance is characterised by the scheme in which everything is possible, everything that does not limit freedom of the other is allowed and everything is of equal value. Another word for this kind of tolerance is indifference. An end product of this development of the value realm in Europe is the fact that European society is increasingly characterised by laxity, value relativism and opportunism. One illustration of a kind of degenerated tolerance serving in Europe as the guiding value, as well as the operational strategy, can be seen in the attitude to a great number of immigrants arriving in the member states of the European Union. According to statistics, more than 20
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million immigrants are living in the EU and every year hundreds of thousands of new incomers arrive. There are good human, political and economic reasons for this. Governments, NGOs and churches in Europe spend considerable effort in managing this influx. Living under the motto of tolerance, Europeans are in principle open to arriving newcomers. Then, however, their interest and care stops halfway. It is widely recognised that the integration of immigrants in Europe faces a considerable number of problems. Integration of incomers and their introduction to the cultural and value setting of their new home countries obviously does not happen in a way that could bring palpable results. The simple fact is that a large percentage of immigrants fail to integrate into European society.1 The result is the fast growth of parallel societies and the creation of barriers between different communities, between us and them. Street violence in France in 2005 and the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in November 2004 were visible demonstrations of the lack of integration. Very soon after these incidents it became clear that to consider them as isolated acts would be inappropriate. These are tips of the iceberg covering a serious problem. Tolerance, in the shape as presented in most of the continent, is not leading to the expected results. There can be numerous explanations of the root causes of this situation. In our view, the problem is the widespread and dominating understanding of openness and toleration. To reduce tolerance to openness is insufficient. This kind of tolerance is limited tolerance, narrowed to its passive component. The active part, that requires not just to accept or to be open but requests to go far beyond is not at hand. In this way tolerance loses its proper meaning and content. In the absence of
1 Even in the UK which has been portrayed itself as an example of tolerance towards migrants and one of the best examples of multicultural society almost 40% of population believe that the presence of Muslims in the country poses a threat to national security [Harris poll data presented in the Financial Times, 19 August 2007].
active personal attitudes and in the absence of common standards tolerance becomes indifference and integration is replaced by ignorance. In such a situation, as the American philosopher Christopher Lasch reminds, the ideal of an open mind degenerates into that of an empty mind. The key word in addressing this problem has to be respect. Openness as well as tolerance has to go hand-in-hand with respect. There must be nothing cheap in this attitude. In observing tolerance stopping halfway is as equally dangerous as to accept only nice declarations without accompaniment by concerted effort for implementation. The problem is that we are determined to accept everyone, but we have forgotten that acceptance means little if it is not accompanied with respect and that respect has to be earned. Tolerance without respect is, as it is called by Lasch, a tourists approach to morality. In order to be clear what the relationship between tolerance and respect is he writes:
Respect is what we experience in the presence of admirable achievements, admirably formed characters, natural gifts put to good use. It entails the exercise of discriminating judgement, not indiscriminate acceptance. Respect is not another word for tolerance or the appreciation of alternative lifestyles and communities.2
Here we are, I believe, at the core of the problem. True tolerance does not mean discarding the value of judgement. True tolerance does not mean indifference and indiscriminate acceptance. Tolerance stripped of one of its basic meanings is not able to fulfil its original role. Tolerance accompanied by respect would have an impact on the integration process in Europe, and is what is needed is to avoid an empty tolerance and replacement of tolerance by ignorance.
Roger Kimball, Christopher Lasch vs. the elites, Vol. 13, New Criterion, 1995.
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Respect as a necessary counterpart to tolerance is a difficult enterprise. It means attempting to understanding the context of values settings, which may be very different from those of the West and to launch a dialogue about these differences; dialogue that would be able to overcome barriers leading to assignment of those who are privileged and underprovided. Such a dialogue would be a dialogue between equally committed partners. How strongly relativism combined with ignorance has been established in European society is demonstrated in the Europe values study 2005. Only 37% of EU citizens responded positively to the question as to how important it is to integrate minorities and other cultures into our societies.3 In comparison to the same question in Turkey where 63 percent of participants in the survey responded yes. Tolerance identified with openness to everyone, everything and closely linked to value relativism seems to be one of the mains signs of Western societies. Lack of value orientation, and assigning one and the same value to all cultures and values also has another effect. If everything is acceptable and all directions are the same, this also implies that all religions are the same. If everything is accepted then everything has the same value and is equal. In such a situation there is no reason to be an adherent of this or another religion. Such relativism leads to ignorance, passivity and apathy as signs of decreasing ability for value orientation. Zeal rarely accompanies a point of view that remains apathetic to what is right or wrong. Inevitably, the passive relativist must yield to an absolutist who is willing to advance his viewpoint through force. Careful observation witnesses that exactly this lack of value orientation and the growth of relativism are increasingly present in European societies. Attempts to be objective in looking at the different worldviews, cultures and religions is not a viable way forward for effective dealing
3
Social values, Science and Technology, Special Eurobarometer 225/Wave 63.1, June 2005.Special Eurobarometer 225 / Wave 63.1Sp
with issues like tolerance and identity in a multicultural society. Even a conscious effort to be impartial and not to prefer any given worldview and religion does not guarantee an impartial approach. It is one of the widespread characteristics of Western societies by claiming objectivity and impartiality it is in a hidden way giving priority over religious and cultural values of others to our own standpoint. It is giving the priority to rationality and the ideas of the Enlightenment. We have to be tolerant, because it is reasonable and rational, is one of the leading mottos in the West. Hand-in-hand with this notion of tolerance and rationality goes the feeling of superiority; thus a self-understanding is cultivated: We are rational, therefore we are the best.. This is one of the major points creating hate in non-Western societies. Western superiority is strongly challenged by non-Western societies. Together with challenging superiority, the Western concept of tolerance is also challenged. The only possible conclusion is that this kind of superficial tolerance is not and cannot be a sufficient counterpart to Western understanding of fundamentalism. If tolerance is not fully developed to its full meaning an effective instrument developing an identity then it fails.
3. Identity
This leads then to the crucial element that needs to be addressed in this respect. It is a consequence of the narrowed tolerance ad intro, in the direction of human self and individual consciousness. Tolerance reduced to openness and indiscriminate acceptance is not enough for developing individual and collective identity. Not only because formulations of full acceptance are only a theoretical construction. It is hardly possible to implement it fully in reality because of limited human capacities. The limited human self cannot accept fully everything that surrounds him or her. Selection and value judgement are inevitable.
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The concept of identity is very much linked to the question, who are we? and where do we belong? For positive answers to these questions material prosperity is not necessary. In the recent global survey looking for the answer as to where in the world live the most contented people, European countries did not figure prominently. Perhaps astonishingly, citizens of poor developing countries occupied the first places in the survey. A positive image of the life and positive identity does not necessarily needmaterial prosperity, nor all the achievements characterising everyday life in Western Europe. In searching for elements contributing to the development of identity it may be helpful to look at some of the characteristics of world development of recent years. Here we cannot overlook some conclusions relevant to the relationship between fundamentalism and identity. Some of the most important are: a) Religion, particularly Islam, but also other world religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, is becoming a source of identity, a source of popular movements and uprisings with increasing intensity. Almost any area in the Middle East (from Iran to Palestine) can be found as a particularly strong proof of this assumption. The situation in the Indian subcontinent is not far behind in providing the evidence with similar clarity. Secularism, imported to many of these places by Western influence, is making way for religious enthusiasts. This has consequences for the situation in Europe as well. It would be a fatal mistake to expect that secularism, which attempted to be implemented in many places as a universal norm and all-embracing values system, could be a counterpart for a meaningful exchange for immigrants from these regions coming to Europe as well as for residents in all these countries,. b) Western society is not only characterised by its belief to the capacity of human ratio. Yet humanism and renaissance, the Enlightenment and rationality are not the only sources of the Western worldview.
The Western mind is also influenced by the heritage of Christianity and Judaism. The devaluing of the influence of religion in particular Christianity is an increasing tendency in Europe. Some difficult moments that European societies have had to face are, however, consequences of this contempt. The loss of a traditional religious dimension is one of the causes for the problem with European identity. As opposed to secular rationalism, Christian theology questions the absolute character of the individual subject. The person is in Christianity characterised as an individuum who has an ability to step out of himself or herself, one who has the ability of self-reflection. The personality of the human individual is not as something already given and, in this respect, finished. The subject becomes a person only after an act of selfreflection. This process can be realised only as a conscious act, i.e. with an active use of the consciousness. This condition is however not the only one. The other one is that the process cannot be realised in isolation, without the presence of other persons. Full personality and full identity is gained only in relationship to other human beings. This means that overstated individualism leads necessarily and unavoidably to serious deficiencies in personal identity. The human being is truly human only in community. This is missing in secularism. Overstated rationalism and individualism are reasons why secularism is unable to deal easily with any kind of collective identity except for those defined by geography. In this regard it may be interesting to mention one of the examples of how this is dealt with identity at this continent. In the closing address of the European Intellectual Summit Europe. A beautiful idea?, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Jan Peter Balkenende said: Europe is unique because it has so many different identities. This makes it impossible to define European identity once and for all.4 In our perspective
4
Europe A Beautiful Idea, European Intellectual Summit, Rotterdam, December 2004.
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there are good reasons to criticise this and similar statements. The reason for criticism is not the notion of multiple identities in Europe. It is this fact that needs to be taken seriously and that requires serious work. The reason for criticism is the second part of the statement that from the right premise leads to the wrong conclusion. A refusal of the definition of Europes own identity and lack of effort to develop one is alarming.
4. Religion
There is an underlying assumption in Western secularism that there is something wrong with religion. The heritage of the Enlightenment and humanism is strong, particularly in Western Europe. Secularism of society is one of the dominating tendencies here. Aside from Western Europe, there is a rise of religious feeling on the global scale. As Juergenmeyer demonstrated in his remarkable book, Western democracies in the post-colonial era made quite an effort to establish secular political regimes in numerous post-colonial countries of Africa and Asia that would, according to Western standards, push religion out of public sphere.5 It is increasingly clear that this effort is not going to be successful. The tragic failure in Iraq is just the latest episode in this long-term process. The crucial question in this regard is why secularism has failed to inspire millions in developing countries all over the globe? In pursuing this question one cannot overlook one of the basic features of Western effort: the claim of secularism to universality. An appeal to rationality that it supposes to be above religion should make of secularism a universal platform that would enable it to judge all other worldviews and religions. The link of secularism and rationality should have created a universally acceptable norm. It is interesting to observe
5
Mark Juergenmayer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts The Secular State (University of California Press, 1993), p. 26.
how this claim goes hand-in-hand with such attractive privileges as impartiality and objectivity. Only the secular view, according to its own judgement, could have been universal, impartial and objective. The other no less questionable characteristic of secularism has been its overstated individualism. The claim of universality, impartiality and objectivity has been very difficult to accept in non-Western societies. In addition religious communities all over the world make Western secularism responsible for the moral decline on its own territory, in Western society. It is interesting that communities all over the world, otherwise behaving to each other as enemies, are united in this judgement. Widespread mistrust of Western secularism in non-Western societies is to be noted all around. Other continents refuse to subscribe to Western secularism and to the universality of its two pillars individualism and rationalism. Following de Tocqueville, it is increasingly recognised that in secularism, in spite of its fervent hostility towards religion, elements of religion are also present. This leads to the conclusion that secular rationality based on the Enlightenment does not provide the superior platform that allows for judging other worldviews and religions. It is one of the worldviews. Secularism can be described as a kind of natural religion.6 In its basic characteristics it includes doctrine, myth, ethics, ritual, experience and social organisation. Both secularism and religion are expressions of faith. Secular rationalism as a political and social strategy in the global scale proved not to be able to fulfil expectations to be a universally acceptable platform superior to all other worldviews and religions. In judging it from this perspective it cannot be said anything else than it has failed. Secular rationalism is not a universal worldview superseding religions and creating a universal framework into which a plurality of
Mark Juergenmayer, ibid.
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religions operates. Secularism has to enter into relationship with other religions as one of the worldviews, not as a universal platform. This has, however, a substantial impact on the critical question of the relationship between individual and society. Based on the idea of a strong self-centred and rational individual, self-sufficient with his/her rationality to decide everything that is needed on their own, is a Western attitude characterised by the conviction that religion is a private matter of each individual. This is in significant contradiction to the selfunderstanding of all the world religions, which all claim to provide not only fulfilment of mans personal needs, but also to have substantial contributions at the communitarian level and in the building of society. The relationship between individual and society seems to be the cornerstone of all religions. In this point both religions and secular rationalism fulfil the same function. Both provide a glue that holds together broad communities. The issue is that in both cases the bond functions with very different mechanisms and leads to different results. The question of identity is one of those that are influenced by these different mechanisms the most. After rising doubts about the universality which both secularism and rationality make claim to, and noting some of the similarities and differences between secularism and religion, we come to the final point. This is a question, which is of crucial importance in this regard, the role of religion in public life. Europe should not renounce religion at the expense of preference for secularism, nor be negative towards influence of religion in society. In spite of some historical excesses where religion was identified with the political power, a positive influence of religion can be witnessed, in particular of Christianity, demonstrated throughout European history. This influence is to be seen not only in culture, art, spirituality and the way of thinking in Europe, it is to be seen also in how society has been organised. Taking the role of religion(s) in society more seriously can
free the way to clarifying important issues that seem to be increasingly deficient in the society on the continent nowadays. Nobody in Europe can today seriously call for the establishment of theocracies. To find a place for religion in public life is, however, a necessary condition for a healthy society. It is one of the deep challenges for the future development of European society.
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND AN ETHICS OF RECOGNITION
Joseph I. Fernando, Thailand
1. Meaning of Fundamentalism
The Oxford advanced learners dictionary defines fundamentalism as the practice of following very strictly the basic rules and teachings of any religion; (in Christianity) the belief that everything that is written in the Bible is completely true. The term fundamentalism was coined by Curtis Lee Laws in 1920 in the United States.1 At a meeting of the Northern Baptist Convention in 1920, Curtis Lee Laws defined the fundamentalist as one who was ready to regain territory which had been lost to Antichrist and to do battle royal for the fundamentals of the faith.2
Curtis Lee Laws (1868-1946) was born in Loudoun County, Virginia and educated at Crozer Theological Seminary. He was an editor, denominational leader and pastor at the First Baptist Church of Baltimore, Maryland and at the Greene Avenue Baptist Church of Brooklyn, New York. 2 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2001), p. 3.
Christian fundamentalism is identified in the European study as a phenomenon directed
[1] against every theological, cultural and political liberalism; against the historical and critical view of Christian faith documents (Scriptures, etc; [2] against the infallibility of the pope, the infallibility of the Bible is affirmed); [3] against the theory of evolution as compared with a literal understanding of the biblical creation stories; and against every syncretism as seen in all inter-religious dialogue, in ecumenism, and (secularly) in the League of Nations and the United Nations; [4] .3
Although the term fundamentalism has its origin in American Protestantism, Karen Armstrong in her The Battle for God traces Jewish, Muslim and Christian fundamentalism to the 15th century. Henry Munsen notes that:
The use of fundamentalism as an analytical category for comparative purposes remains controversial (We) can discern a fundamentalist impulse in the Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh movements commonly called fundamentalist insofar as they insist on strict conformity to Holy Writ and to a moral code ostensibly based on it. Such an impulse is lacking in Hindu nationalism and it is not of equal significance in all Christian, Jewish, and Muslim movements.4
Today, fundamentalism is not only alive and kicking in all the world religions including Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism but is also making inroads into politics.
4 Henry Munsen, Fundamentalism, The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. John R. Hinnells, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 351.
Ethics of Recognition
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(In) some states Pakistan, Morocco, Israel, India, and the United States, to name a few religious fundamentalists influenced the terms of political and social discourse, but they found the construction of an Islamic or Christian or Jewish polity to be well out of reach.5.
I am trying to figure out what factors contributed to fundamentalism. Could they be the growth of science, atheism, agnosticism, secularity, foreign rule and so on?
2. The Growth of Science

For August Comte, there are three stages in the evolution of human society. 1. The theological stage: The primitive man in his helplessness in the face of nature personified and deified it. He explained the origin of the universe and of life and almost everything in terms of religion. Religion had a tremendous hold on ancient societies. The priest played a key role. 2. The metaphysical stage: The religious stage was surpassed by the metaphysical stage. Man began to ask questions concerning the nature of the world and of beings. Philosophers in India and Greece sought answers to several perplexing questions. Rational reflection was developed into a fine art. Man was not merely satisfied with myths but reached for rational explanations. This was a transition from mythos to logos. 3. The positive stage: The theological and metaphysical stages gave way to the positive stage. Some believe that science alone can provide man true and valid knowledge. The scientific method can unravel the mysteries of the universe. Science is hailed as a liberator of humankind from superstitions, myths and metaphysical theories. The scientific stage is seen as in the age of enlightenment and truth.
Gabriel A. Almond et al, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World (The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 12.
To respond to Comte, the positive stage has not brought about the end of theology and metaphysics. Philosophical reflection is an ongoing process. Millions of people believe in God or the ultimate reality. Religion, philosophy and science could be seen in complementary and not necessarily in contradictory terms. Could the arrival of science be a threat to religion so much that some people become fundamentalists in their defence of religion? If we take a look at the intellectual history of Western civilization we may notice three periods the pre-modern, modern and postmodern. The pre-modern period could be called the age of faith with a theocentric conception of the universe. The sense of the sacred was predominant. The universe is a manifestation of God. God is the beginning and end of all. God created man as the best of creatures and placed him on earth with conditions suitable for life. Therefore, the earth must be the centre of the universe. This geocentric view of the universe was supported by Ptolemy. The Church was powerful, as it was thought to be a divinely established institution to guide people to heaven. Art and philosophy were at the service of religion. The great philosophers and theologians of the pre-modern period besides the Greeks were St. Augustine, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, Roger Bacon and so on. The great artists like Michael Angelo, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci and writers like Dante and so on, and the great Gothic cathedrals, were products of this God-centred pre-modern period. People were probably working out their salvation in fear and trembling. The pre-modern period gave way to the rise of the modern period. Martin Luther was the first to challenge the Catholic Church in the 16th century followed by King Henry VIII in England. Rene Descartes, the father of modern philosophy philosophized in an altogether new way, rejecting scholastic philosophy. Copernicus showed the universe was heliocentric, not geocentric. Francis Bacon developed inductive logic which led to the advancement of the scientific method. Science was
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mathematised nature. Nature was studied to be controlled and to be at the service of man. Nature was meant to be used to provide a comfortable life. The Cartesian dualism of mind and matter resulted in the domination of matter by mind. It looks as if man has become the lord of the universe and everything is at his disposal. All things in the world are reduced to use-value and cash-value. The world is no longer the place where beings display their glory, magic and beauty but is seen as raw material. As Heidegger puts it, the river Rhine is no longer the home of the Rhine maidens, nor as something of intrinsic value, but as something to produce hydroelectric power. Man designs the world to suit his purposes. As Schopenhauer remarks, science is at the service of the body. The philosophies of utilitarianism and pragmatism would support reordering, rearranging and manipulating the world for human gratification. Science is apparently the new wonder-worker and panacea to all human ills. Some people fear that science as a new god may banish religion from the face of the earth. If religion disappears, then will morality survive? Could there be a desacralised morality? In the absence of religion, what kind of social life would be possible? As Dostoevsky says in his Brothers Karamazov, if God did not exist, everything would be permitted. Similarly, I would say if man did not have an immortal soul, cannibalism would be permitted. For the believer, a world without religion would be unthinkable. A fundamentalist might ask, Is it not worthwhile to defend religion at any cost? He would justify a militant piety. The postmodern or post-war period is marked by a gigantic progress in science. Mans landing on the moon, computer technology, advanced communications media, breakthrough in genetic engineering like cloning and so on, are some of the milestones in postmodern scientific achievements. Mankind has gained a new confidence through science. In such an environment myths, religions and superstitions may appear weird. Science dismisses the creation story as myth and explains the
origin of life through evolution. But the fundamentalist rejects the theory of evolution in favour of intelligent design. The Bible teaches a great truth that God created the world. Science tells us how the world evolved. Religion and science need not contradict each other; they can throw light on each other. But the perceived threat from science to religion may fan the flames of fundamentalism. The growth of science may have a link to the erosion of the sense of mystery and of transcendence. In fact, believers need not fear the growth of science or its impact on religion. Aristotles Metaphysics begins with the statement, All men, by nature, desire to know. Man has a natural inclination to knowledge. The desire to know more and more about the universe is perfectly in keeping with human nature. As Aquinas had demonstrated long ago, there cannot be conflict between reason and faith as both are complementary and not contradictory. Scientific rationality discloses the world, provides facts about the world. Although a scientist provides amazing facts about the world, he may not answer questions like, what is the purpose of life? Does life have a meaning? Is there life after death? Why should one be good? Philosophy and religion will be able to answer such questions. Genuine scientific advancement can certainly be at the service of humankind. Science cannot be blamed for the way technology is abused. At the same time there cannot be science without ethics. Scientific enquiry cannot sideline moral concerns. Discoveries which may bring about disaster cannot be ventured upon. Where there are wicked inventions, there are wicked uses, and where there are wicked uses, there are wicked hearts.6 Science needs to be governed by the purity of intentions. As science advances, myths must be preserved as part of cultural heritage. The scientific age would be poorer without myths which are another kind of discourse about the world. What is needed is apprecia6
Karl Jaspers, The Future of Mankind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 193.
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tion and interpretation of myths. For the Christian fundamentalists who understand the Bible literally, myths are part of the revealed word of God. Bultmannian demythologizing would be unacceptable to them. Studies on myths by scholars like Mircea Eliade, Claude Levi-Strauss, Paul Ricoeur and others affirm the value of myths.
2.1 Secularism and Secularity

In Medieval Europe, the church was thought to be superior to the state, as it was concerned with guiding people to attain eternal happiness. The state appeared subservient to the church in the sense that the former should care for the welfare of the citizens and not hinder the spiritual concerns of the latter. The state and the church were not watertight compartments; they overlapped each other in Christendom. Finally, at a point of time in European history, secularism came to be accepted. Secularism is separation of the state and the church. The state is an autonomous institution and the church cannot dictate to it. Secularism marked the birth of the civil society. Secularism appears to be more of a theory than a practice. It is hard to separate politics from religion. Religion and politics are part of the whole of human concerns. The Presidency of the US, the most powerful democracy in the world is influenced by the Bible belt of America. Some politicians in India, the largest democracy in the world, play the religious card when it is a question of seeking and retaining power. The Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian Peoples Party) stands for Hindutva (Hinduness), the creation of a Hindu theocratic state. It is reported that there are hardly any Catholics employed in Buckingham palace. There are Christian political parties in some European countries. President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR went to the Vatican and met Pope John Paul II, who was said to have been keen on dismantling communism. Total elimination of religion from politics even in a secular state seems
impossible because such separation is more theoretical than practical. Any such attempt would be tantamount to fragmenting man. This is not to say civil society is not possible. What is meant here is banishing religion from governance of the state cannot be total. Secularity which is largely a contemporary phenomenon refers to the affairs of the world, temporal concerns, not distinctly sacred or ecclesiastical. A secular society is a nonreligious society and its members may have nothing to do with the precepts of religion. Some of those who believe in secularity could be extremists, known as secular fundamentalists, the opposite of religious fundamentalists. Born and brought up in the atmosphere of narrow Christianity, Hinduism or the closedness of an Islamic state or Buddhist nation, religious fundamentalists are an unhappy lot with the emergence of secularism. For them, secularity may be worse than secularism because the latter stands for the separation of politics and religion, whereas the former is indifferent to or positively hostile to religion. No wonder, the religious fundamentalist takes up the cudgels for religion for, in his scheme of things, human life is meaningless without religion which in its fundamentalist form must be thrust down the throat for the good of man.
2.2 Foreign Rule and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism

From time immemorial India has been known for its spirit of tolerance and hospitality, especially towards foreigners. The Muslims invaded India and became its rulers. Later the Europeans came as traders to India and ended up as rulers. The British ruled almost the entire country except Goa and Pondicherry which were Portuguese and French colonies respectively. The foreign rulers took advantage of the people of India. The culture of the ruler was considered superior to that of the ruled. The foreign rulers probably asked, can anything good come from India? Except for a few scholars, the British could not appreciate the
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antiquity and immense richness of Indian culture. As Huntington remarks,

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.7
Hinduisms contribution to Indian civilization is enormous. Some writers call India the wonder that was (before the Muslim invasion). Indian civilization is the only living ancient civilization. The other ancient civilizations of Egypt, Greece, Rome and so on have become museum pieces. India has made remarkable contributions to philosophy, literature, architecture, sculpture, fine arts, mathematics, astronomy and so on. But the European rulers with a Eurocentric mindset failed to recognize Indian cultural heritage. Educated and self-respecting Indians felt humiliated and insulted by the attitude of the European rulers. As a student, philosopher-President S. Radhakrishnan heard his British professors telling him that only the West had a rich philosophical tradition dating back to Greece and Indian civilization had none. Radhakrishnan was challenged by the ignorance of the British and vowed to make it his mission to propagate Indian philosophy in the West. He lectured in British universities and wrote widely on Indian philosophy for the Western readers. Some self-respecting Hindus were unhappy that their nation was too long under foreign rule and thought it necessary to assert themselves in terms of their culture, religion and identity. The Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, Prarthana Samaj, Ramakrishna Mission and so on emerged as reform movements within Hinduism to respond to the challenges posed
7
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 51.
by British rule in India. In the process some of them, unfortunately, embraced fundamentalism. Hindu fundamentalism, combined with nationalism, became a militant force exemplified by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) founded in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar. The Vishva Hindu Parishad (The World Hindu Council) is the religious and intellectual wing of the RSS and the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian Peoples Party) its political wing. Gandhi was assassinated by Nathuram Godse who was known to Hedgewar, the founder of RSS. Muslims, Christians and Sikhs are the targets of the RSS attack and communal riots are not uncommon in India
2.3 The West and Muslim Fundamentalism

Millions of Muslims the world over are spiritually nourished by the faith of Islam. Besides them, there are fundamentalist and ultrafundamentalist Muslims. The latter are terrorists.
In the eighteenth century, the Wahabi puritan school arose in the Arabian peninsula. Championed by a regional prince who eventually conquered the entire peninsula with religious zeal, its paradigm today is dominant in Saudi Arabia, which controls the leading pilgrimage city of Islam, Mecca (which is closed to non-Muslims). It is one of a fundamentalism from above. The Saudis immense oil riches have given them worldwide power and influence, and they support generously their kind of fundamentalist Islam in other lands even as they fear and oppose its Shiite Iranian version.8
Muslim fundamentalism has spread almost all over the world. The Taliban in Afghanistan, the al-Qaida and the Islamic militant groups in Kashmir and Pakistan are well known.
Niels C.Nielson, Jr., Fundamentalism, Mythos, and World Religions, p. 99.
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Muslim fundamentalists appeal to a succession of teachers: Ibn Hanbal (d. 865), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and Ibn Abd-al Wabah (d. 1792), to mention only a few. We may ask, how does this model from the past translate into fundamentalism today? The paradigm identified by analysts is very specific. Essentially it means (1) renewal by a return to Islamic roots; (2) militancy and jihad, holy war, in defence of Islam; (3) a condition of ideology with political activism in personal life; and (4) a readiness to challenge traditional religions and political authority and willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Islam.9
Islamic fundamentalism became prominent in recent years with the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini and his rise to power in 1979 in Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a well known fundamentalist group organized by Hasan al-Banna. Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt wrote that Any society that is not Muslim is jahiliyya ... Thus, we must include in this category all the societies that now exist on earth.10 Confrontation between the West and Islam dates back to the crusades. The children of Abraham the Jews, Christians, and Muslims have not always enjoyed cordial relationship among themselves. Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is deadly with regard to its confrontation with the West. Samuel P. Huntington remarks that: Islam is the only civilization which has put the survival of the West in doubt...11 As Karen Armstrong writes,
September 11, 2001, will go down in history as a day that changed the world. This was the day when Muslim terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center and a wing of the Pentagon, killing over five thousand people... For the first time ever, the people of the United States were attacked by a foreign enemy on their
Ibid., pp. 90-9. Ibid., p. 100. 11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 210.
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own soul; not by a nation-state, and not by a nuclear missile, but by religious extremists brandishing only penknives and box cutters. It was an attack against the United States, but it was a warning to all of us in the First World... We are facing a period of frightening, disturbing change.12
London was attacked by the Muslim terrorists in July 2005. AlQaida says it is planning more attacks against the West. Why do the Muslim fundamentalists target the West? Samuel P. Huntington warned already in 1997 in his Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order that it is most important to recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilisational world.13 The Muslim world, especially the fundamentalists, resent Western interference in their affairs. Huntington says that:
During the fifteen years between 1980 and 1995, according to the U.S. Defence Department, the United States engaged in seventeen military operations in the Middle East, all of them directed against Muslims. No comparable pattern of U.S. military operations occurred against the people of any other civilization.14
In Islamic nations there is no separation of politics and religion unlike in the Western democracies. Currently, America is involved in imposing democracy on Iraq. More than 100,000 Iraqis, mostly innocent civilians and nearly 3,000 Western troops are dead in an effort to make Iraq a democracy. Saddam Hussein allegedly killed 5,000 Kurds and the American-led coalition decided to eliminate his evil regime. The promoters of democracy have made a mess of Iraq. In my opinion, it is very undemocratic to impose democracy suddenly on any nation. American
12 13
Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God, p. vii. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, p. 312. 14 Ibid., p. 217.
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occupation of Iraq has provoked the Muslims, especially the ultrafundamentalists, against the West as a whole. There are serious drawbacks too in the mindset of the Muslim fundamentalists. Huntington has the following observations on Islam and Muslims:
While at the macro or global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest, at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others15the relations between Muslims and peoples of other civilizations Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Hindu, Chinese, Buddhist, Jewish have been generally antagonistic; most of the relations have been violent in the 1990s. Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peaceably with their neighbours.16 Islams borders are bloody, and so are its innards.17 Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military virtues. Islam originated among warring Bedouin nomadic tribes and this violent origin is stamped in the foundation of Islam. Muhammad himself is remembered as a hard fighter and a skilful commander. (No one would say this about Christ or Buddha.) The doctrines of Islam, it is argued, dictate war against unbelievers, and when the initial expansion of Islam tapered off, Muslim groups, quite contrary to doctrine, then fought among themselves. The ratio of fitna or internal conflicts to jihad shifted drastically in favour of the former. The Koran and other statements of Muslim beliefs contain few prohibitions of violence, and a concept of non-violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice.18
But is the West non-violent or less violent? How about the crusades? President George W. Bush called Operation Infinite Justice (the initial name of U.S. military response to the September 11 terrorist attack) a
15 16
Ibid., p. 255. Ibid., p. 256. 17 Ibid., p. 258. 18 Ibid., p. 263.
crusade.19 The West too has aggravated violence in its confrontations with the Muslims. It all began with the colonial exploitation of the nonWestern people by the Westerners. It is pertinent to ask, Is colonialism over or do we have neo-colonialism? It is alleged that the unholy trinity of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, perpetuate neo-colonialism. It is not surprising that the ultra-fundamentalists react to the West so vehemently.
3. Overcoming Religious Fundamentalism: An Ethics of Recognition

Religious fundamentalism, especially the Christian or Muslim variety, is myopic. It does not perceive beings beyond itself. For a fundamentalist, to be is to be a fundamentalist. A non-fundamentalist cannot exist. This is a denial of diversity, plurality, multiplicity, history and culture. Religious fundamentalism rejects an ethics of recognition. An ethics of recognition calls for the perception of other groups and their right to exist. Recognition of the other is in a way self-recognition as the self is part of a universal web of beings. The self is inextricably related to others parents, siblings, relatives, neighbours, communities, nations, the environment, universe, and the ultimate reality. Diverse human groups have their own histories, cultures, traditions, religions, beliefs and so on. So long as these are not a threat to oneself, and to ones freedom, they are perfectly legitimate and have a right to be. This right is sacred and elicits respect and recognition. For instance, there are several ways of perceiving the divine animism, shamanism, totemism, fetishism, polytheism, anthropomorphism, pantheism, theism, monotheism, monism, pan-en-theism and so on. Atheism and agnosticism are attitudes of negation or uncertainty regarding Gods existence. An ethics of recognition is not necessarily an ethics of unanimity and
19
Gabriel A. Almond et al, Strong Religion.
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consensus, but a healthy, humane, mature, acceptance of difference. The best antidote to religious fundamentalism seems to be an ethics of recognition. An ethics of recognition means recognition of the other persons, races, communities, cultures, nations, languages, traditions, ideologies and so on which are different from ones own. An ethics of recognition means respect for the rights of others to be. Racism, genocide, fascism, exploitation, discrimination and so on are the antitheses of an ethics of recognition. In its most fundamental form an ethics of recognition is the recognition of the human person who has his own intrinsic dignity, worth and value. As Kant says, man is an end in himself and never a means. The sanctity of the human person is the bedrock of an ethics of recognition. An ethics of recognition upholds recognition of self as essentially related to others. It is recognition of what it means to be human, of how one can discover in the other the truth of oneself. An ethics of recognition is a rediscovery of the value and dignity of the human person in oneself and others. What is it to be human? To be human is to be in the world. To be human is to celebrate our humanity. To be human is to exult in fellowship. To be human is to be pluralistic. To be human is to belong to a culture. To be human is to be historical. To be human is to be part of a community. To be human is to be linguistic. To be human is to be caring. To be human is to be creative. To be human is to be finite. To be human is to be open to alterity and transcendence.
In the absence of an ethics of recognition, religious fundamentalism will continue to challenge ethics in several ways and can have the following negative impact: 1. Rejection of Pluralism: The religious fundamentalists claim fullness of truth of their religions and look down upon others. The Christian fundamentalists believe and preach that Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation and whoever rejects Christ will go to hell. Some Christian fundamentalists say that the Catholics will not be saved. Poor Catholics! They quote the Bible in support of their claim. For the Muslim Fundamentalists, whoever does not accept Allah and his prophet Mohammed is an infidel. Denial of religious pluralism amounts to denial of human rights. 2. Threat to Peace: Fundamentalist beliefs and actions can destabilize society by creating warring camps which may indulge in violence. Violence inflicts injury, death, destruction and insecurity. The Muslim terrorists are ready to be suicide-bombs and to die as martyrs. Their martyrdom is glorified and it is a slur on Islam. Have they not deviated from the teaching of Islam? If Prophet Mohammed were alive today, would he ever approve of the suicide-bombs? The suicide-bombs mark humanitys entry into the darkest era of history by rejecting the sanctity of life and the worth and dignity of the human person. They represent the horror of horrors, death of reason, the peak of hatred, and negation of the beauty and goodness of human life. The suicide-bombs challenge and mock the Creator, the Author of life, and discredit and murder Islam. 3. Rejection of History of Scholarship: The fundamentalists reject the value and contribution of scholarship and intellectual pursuit. This is tantamount to irrationality. The Pakistani Muslim scholar Fazlur Rahmans criticism of fundamentalism sounds valid:
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Neo-fundamentalism ... seems to think it has a divine mission to shut down Islamic intellectual life ... But its assumption that Muslims can straighten out the practical world without serious intellectual effort, with the aid only of catchy slogans, is a dangerous mistake. Not only have neo-fundamentalists failed to seek new sights into Islam through broadening their intellectual horizons, they have even let go the richness of traditional learning.20
4. Intolerance: Fundamentalist intolerance threatens the social fabric How is social life possible without tolerance? A pluralistic society cannot exist without respect and tolerance for the beliefs and practices of others which in no way are harmful to ones own interests. Intolerance is a moral blindness, the inability to recognize the rights of others and to perceive difference and ontology of multiplicity. 5. Threat to Welfare and Progress: A society controlled by the fundamentalists can hardly progress, and the welfare of the citizens will be at stake. Fundamentalists can take society backwards and deprive the citizens of growth and advancement. For example, in some fundamentalist societies, there is a tendency to deny girls education. In such societies, Aristotles dictum that All men by nature desire to know would be falsified. Fundamentalism as regimentation is a denial of freedom, rights and the social nature of human beings. A fundamentalist society could be a joyless conglomeration of men and women restricted by outmoded, unreasonable, extremist and inhuman codes of beliefs and behaviour. Today, the West and the Muslim fundamentalists are locked in a violent confrontation with each other. What could be the causes of this confrontation? Does Euro-centrism have anything to do with that? Eurocentrism is the belief that Europe or the West is the centre of the world, perhaps based on the idea of the alleged superiority of the European
20
Niels C. Nielsen, Fundamentalism, Mythos and World Religions, p. 101.
civilization. But how is the European civilization said to be superior to other contemporary civilizations? Is it because of 1) science and technology, 2) the European race and 3) the claim of Christianity as the true religion and so on? But these so-called reasons for the superiority of the West seem to be no reasons at all. 1) Science and technology: The fascination with science and technology may not be so exciting today, as their abuse has almost wrecked the world. Environmental decay and a nuclear holocaust may terminate human existence. Science and technology played their role in making the West almost a predatory civilization preying on the natives of the colonies and on nature. 2) The European race: We are judged not by the colour of our skin, but by our character and the quality of our lives. So ones race is not what really counts. 3) Christianity as the true religion: If Christianity is the true religion, others must be false. I am not questioning the beliefs of Christianity but the claim that it is the true religion. What the Bible teaches is that the Christians must love others rather than claim that theirs is the true religion. Their love, not their claim to absolute truth, shall save the world. So where is the room for Euro-centrism? What both the West and the Muslim fundamentalists need is a good dose of an ethics of recognition. How could the West practice an ethics of recognition? The West needs to recognize a lot of things about itself in relation to the rest of the world. Such things would include Eurocentrism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, use of technology and so on. Colonialism has had a damaging effect on both the colonial powers and the colonies. It boosted the false image of power and superiority in the colonizers. It exploited the colonies which are even today affected by the aftermath of colonialism. The West strengthened its economy at the cost of the colonies. Some Western nations have had empirebuilding ambitions. Colonialism is over but without restitution and reparation. The West needs to recognize that the colonies have to be com-
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pensated for centuries of exploitation. Until today, hardly anything in this regard has been done. Neo-colonialism seems to be another mode of exploitation by the West. The rest of the world resents it. One gets the impression that the rest of the world exists for the sake of the West which already has enormous resources. Universalism cannot be imposed on the whole world. Universalism is often perceived as imperialism. Since 2003, some Western nations have ignored the United Nations and unilaterally in mafia style, invaded a non-Western nation with the alleged intention of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and of introducing democracy. How can democracy be imposed? Is it not undemocratic to impose democracy? How do these Western nations legitimize their behaviour? Such behaviour can only create more enemies and destroy the possibility of peace. Unfortunately, some terrorist leaders are said to be the creation of the West. In fact sanctions must be imposed on these nations. Their leaders together with those responsible for September 11 terrorist attacks, must be tried for crimes against humanity. Western interference in the affairs of non-Western nations should cease. Today, Iraq is the largest killing field in the world, created by the United States. The U.S. must withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible to save more lives. The longer is the U.S. presence in Iraq, the greater will be reign of death and the aggravation of Muslim fundamentalism. On the other hand, the Muslim fundamentalists cannot threaten the Western way of life. The West has its rights to be a free society and to its way of life within the limits of decency. The West would do well to develop an appreciation of non-Western cultures and their lifestyles. Both need to dialogue with each other. The Western powers cannot say, We will not dialogue with terrorists. Unless dialogue takes place between the two there is no way of understanding the problems, grievances, aspirations and beliefs of each other. By avoiding dialogue, both have been destroying themselves and others since September 11, 2001.
They rely more on deadly weapons than on the saving power of dialogue. Both have a bloody history of violence, hatred and destruction. In the absence of common sense in both of them, a third party is needed to take initiative to bring them to the negotiating table. This is an urgent need so that sanity will prevail and more lives will be saved. They will benefit a lot if they learn the value of non-violence. Non-violence is not only for the terrorists, it is for the people of the whole world. An ethics of recognition cannot be separated from an ethics of non-violence. Both the West and the fundamentalists are obliged to transcend violence, to rediscover what it means to be moral persons and to live a higher life of the spirit, which is possible for human beings. Militarism, suicidebombs and deadly confrontations should become things of the past. An ethics of recognition will be seen as an ethics of friendship. It takes a lot of efforts to recognize the other who is inalienably tied to ones own destiny. It is my firm conviction that the root cause of many problems in the world today is the rejection of the dignity and worth of the human person. It is imperative for humankind to understand what it means to be human. In the absence of such an understanding, there is little hope that things will improve. We may be eventually heading towards a global suicide.
GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGION FROM AN INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE
Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Indonesia
Introduction
This chapter critically evaluates several of the dominant narratives about globalization and religion from an Indonesian perspective. I examine the metaphors of: 1. globalization as a fundamentalist religion, 2. globalization as a neo-colonial conspiracy, 3. globalization as progress and development, and 4. globalization as the capitalist world system. I find all these narratives useful but limited. They are all over-simplistic and conceal as much as they reveal, especially when viewed from a perspective that places Indonesia at the centre of the world.
1. Globalization as a Fundamentalist Religion

Dwight N. Hopkins pictures globalization as a false religion centred on the worship of Mammon (wealth). The unholy trinity of this globalization consists of the World Trade Organization (WTO), International
Banks (including the IMF) and Monopoly Capitalist Corporations.1 Similarly, Paul F. Knitter, drawing on David Loy2, sees free market fundamentalism as the new world religion, the religion of the market. He says, The free market has become the new, universal, absolute, and exclusive religion of peoples all over the world.3 For most people it is the religion of consumerism. Knitter and Loy both suggest that true religion is the best hope for opposing this false religion that is destroying our planet and condemning millions of people to abject poverty. The argument that globalization is a fundamentalist religion of consumerism (greed, lies and waste), is attractive as a rhetorical wake-up call to the major religions of the world, to oppose this new idolatry. Knitter and Loy (and John B. Cobb, Jr.) are persuasive in pointing out many similarities between free market capitalism, consumerism and religion. However I am unconvinced that this metaphor adequately describes globalization. I agree with Knitters moral outrage at the current world order and his analysis of the catastrophic consequences of capitalism on the natural world and on the poor. But globalization is not religion, not even false religion. Globalization is a vast, interlocking mosaic of structures that are transforming human relationships at an almost unimaginable speed. Transnational finance capitalism is also not a religion. It is only one of the structures of globalization, a structure of eco-
1 Dwight N. Hopkins, The Religion of Globalization in Religions/Globalizations: Theories and Cases, ed. Dwight Hopkins, et.ET. al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 11. 2 David R. Loy, The Religion of the Market, Journal of the American Academy of Religion (vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1997), pp. 275-290; also in Visions of a New Earth: Religious Perspectives on Population, Consumption and Ecology, eds. Harold Coward and Dan Maguire (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 15-28. 3 Paul Knitter, Globalization and the Religions: Friends or Foes? unpublished paper presented on May 24, 2006 at a Research Seminar on Globalization and Religion: Friends or Foes? at Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
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nomic power that has invaded almost every area of human relationships, including religion. Religious people from all over the globe should oppose free market fundamentalism and the idolatry of consumerism. But there are conceptual problems with viewing these realities as either synonymous with globalization, or as a, new, universal, absolute, and exclusive religion. Globalization is much bigger than economic relations. It encompasses hundreds of thousands of organizations and billions of people who are now linked with each other for better or for worse. Economic relations influence all of these connections, often to the detriment of the poor. But economic relations are not always, or even usually, the primary value at stake in the networks of relationship. Globethics.net and the conference that gave rise to this book, for example, are part of globalization. But they are certainly not motivated by profit. Secondly, globalization, including transnational finance capitalism, is not something we do or do not believe in. It is the structured reality in which we live. It is an unjust, destructive structure. I agree with Loy that it is a human-created structure that is not absolute and can be changed. But it is a structure that has taken hundreds of years to build and will not disappear in the foreseeable future. The ongoing changes in many interlocking parts of this structure are moving blindingly fast. They are beyond the ability of anyone to even predict, let alone control. That doesnt mean the structure cannot be modified. It is modified continually by human effort and ingenuity. Religions should play a part in modifying the mosaic of structures that make up globalization, especially those that tend towards idolatry, destruction of the environment and oppression of the poor. Thirdly, we are all consumers, more or less influenced by the master manipulators of the marketplace. Most consumers in the world are religious people. Truly religious people cannot be neatly separated from the followers of the new, universal, absolute, and exclusive religion of
consumerism. Consumerism is neither new, nor universal, nor absolute, nor exclusive, nor a religion. Consumerism drives us through sophisticated lies and beautiful illusions towards the idolatry of Mammon. This is not a new religion, but an old sin that grows fat on the life force of its victims. Iris Murdoch wrote, We are not isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but poor, benighted creatures, sunk in a reality whose nature we are constantly and almost overwhelmingly tempted to deform by fantasy.4 One of the things I love about living in Indonesia is that I experience far less pressure to buy things here. Whenever I go to America, after a little while I always feel like there are so many things that I need and want. Like in a nightmare false consciousness grows and I begin to plot how to acquire the latest laptop. Americans are colonized by overwhelming structures of commercial manipulation and a culture of fear. One of the problems of viewing globalization, capitalism or consumerism as a religion is that we think we can change it by good moral teaching. People just need to repent, renounce their old, false religion and follow the truth. None of the structural realities of globalization will change as a result of sermons, no matter how many people believe them. Some of my friends, who hate consumerism, still cannot wait to go out and buy some new camping equipment. I myself am quite addicted to expensive running shoes!5 We do not primarily need conversion of individuals out of false beliefs, but rather structural changes in relations so that the weak are empowered and the powerful are weakened. Paradoxically, some of these changes are happening because of globalization. The internet has enabled transnational organising and broken the mo-
Iris Murdoch, Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch, Revisions, eds. Stanley Hauerwas and Alastair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 49. 5 Of course it does not hurt to boycott the institutions that promote consumerism. Turn off the TV. Do not go to malls. Remove yourselves from the structures that manufacture seductive illusions.
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nopoly on information controlled by conglomerates. For example, an Italian priest worked with poverty stricken fishermen in East Java, to learn from the internet how to make better boats. Now they sell their hand-made boats over the internet and have many more orders than they can fill. A community that was teetering on the brink of subsistence has now grown quite prosperous.6
2. Globalization as a Neo-colonial Conspiracy

Globalization and religion are code words for multiple narratives. Both words have many definitions. But the definitions are not nearly as important as the stories that lie behind them. Many authors view globalization as neo-colonialism, the continuation by other means, of the project for world domination by the West. At the beginning of the 20th Century, up to 85% of the worlds surface land was controlled by colonial powers. However, by the end of World War II, the European colonial powers were devastated and were forced to give up all their colonies. World hegemony shifted from Europe to the United States of America. U.S. policy maker, George Kennan wrote a secret memo in 1948 that said,
We have about 50% of the worlds wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population ... In this situation, we ... [must] devise a pattern of relationship which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming ... We should cease to talk about vague and for the Far East unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and
Unpublished research (2006), by Suwignyo, a doctoral student at Duta Wacana Christian University, Yogyakarta.
democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts.7
Kennans quote supports the perception of some writers that there is an international conspiracy by members of what Leslie Sklair calls the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC). This includes: TCC executives and their local affiliates, Globalizing state bureaucrats, Globalizing politicians and professionals, and Consumerist elites (merchants, media).Sklair writes,
This class sees its mission as organizing the conditions under which its interests and the interests of the system can be furthered in the global and local contexts. The concept of the TCC implies that there is one central transnational capitalist class that makes system wide decisions, and that it connects with the TCC in each locality, region and country.8
In a poignant article, Egyptian activist, Sherif Hetata, suggests that globalization is just a new form of an old reality. A more accurate term for globalization is neo-colonialism, which describes the essential reality of our situation.9 Britain has just been replaced with the United States. The Group of Seven countries control more resources, wealth and technology than all the rest of the world put together. Five hundred multinational corporations (MNCs) carry out 80% of world trade and 75% of investment. As a result, the South is being systematically plun-
U.S. Department of State, State Department Policy Planning Study 23, 24 February 1948. See, Masao Miyoshi, Globalization, Culture and the University The Cultures of Globalization, eds. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 251-152. 8 Leslie Sklair, Social Movement and Global Capitalism in Jameson and Miyoshi, p. 299-300. 9 Sherif Hetata, Dollarization, Fragmentation, and God in Jameson and Miyoshi, p. 281.
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dered by the North. Far more money and resources are flowing from the South to the North than vice versa. Between 1980 and 1990, net transfers from South to the North were equal to about 10 Marshall Plans. As a result of the international division of labour and integration of global markets, the prices of most commodities are in dollars. However average earnings are 70 times lower in the South than in the North. A pair of Nike shoes sells for around $80 in the States. However a woman working at the Nike factory in Indonesia only receives 12 cents for every pair she makes. We can all guess who receives most of the remaining $79.88. Globalization supports a worldwide system of economic injustice, ecological devastation and human suffering. But I do not believe this system is controlled by some shadowy capitalist elite. The narratives of globalization as neo-colonialism, are varied and complex. The most sophisticated theories do not resort to a conspiracy theory that all the injustice is caused by a group of evil finance capitalists, out to conquer the world. Rather globalization is a structure, a worldwide system of relationships that is not controlled by anyone. Unfortunately, in Indonesia conspiracy theories are very popular. For those whose only knowledge of Judaism is The Protocols of Zion10 the Jews provide a convenient scapegoat as mythical, almost superhuman, capitalist, puppet masters (dalang), who work hand in glove with America to control the world. Instead, I believe that the structure of globalization creates and controls its main players, not vice versa. Finance capitalists are not necessarily more evil than you or me. For example, George Soros is the archetypical, Jewish, American, finance capitalist, whose currency speculations contributed to the impoverishment of millions of Indonesians in 1997-1998 (and also to the fall of Suharto). Therefore it was with sur-
10
The Protocols of Zion is an anti-Semitic fictional work about a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world. In Indonesia it is sometimes quoted as if it were a factual work of history that proves there is a Jewish conspiracy.
prise that I read that he is a massive philanthropist. Among his many projects, he contributed millions of dollars towards the effort to defeat George W. Bush in the U.S. elections. If Bush had been defeated he could have lost millions more in taxes. That does not absolve Soros of guilt for the disastrous effects of his financial manipulations. But it does suggest that he may not just be an evil capitalist. Perhaps he is a good man who is brilliant at playing a perfectly legal game in a fundamentally unjust system. He did not create the system, but the system created him.
3. The Evolution of Developmentalism in the West

Globalization is not new. Some theories suggest that information and communication technologies are creating a fundamentally new structure of relationships in the world. That may be true, but even so, the current structure of globalization is the product of a long process. Previous stages of globalization used the ideologies of Christianization (Spanish and Portuguese empires), civilizing mission (British and French colonialism), and development or modernization (U.S. imperialism). All three imperial models told stories to justify their actions but were essentially motivated by competition for power and wealth. Walter Mignolo points out that before the discovery of the New World, Europeans conceived of humanity as limited to the area of known maps.11 People thought that outside the human boundaries of the known world there were only strange, alien creatures with two heads, three arms. Humanity was confined to the boundaries of known human settlements. However with the discovery of the Americas, a new social imaginary (Charles Taylor12) came into play. The earth came to be seen as a bounded whole. The formerly imagined non-human monsters were
11
Walter D. Mignolo, Globalization, Civilization, and Languages Jameson and Miyoshi, p. 35. 12 Cf. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
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replaced by a new image of the pagan savages and cannibals located in far away spaces such as Borneo and the Americas. In the 16th Century a heated debate took place (Las Casas, Sepulveda, and Victoria), over whether the savages were truly human and what sorts of rights they should be granted. If they were human, then they should be Christianized. Muslims were also imagined as cruel pagans, located in faraway places that should be subjugated and converted if possible. Europeans considered Christendom as the centre of the world, the place of truth. Mignolo suggests that towards the end of the 19th Century, Europeans gradually replaced spatial, geographical boundaries of full humanity with temporal boundaries. With the rising power of secularism, religion was no longer the criteria of full and equal humanity. The narrative of pagan savages in remote areas (like the Far East), was replaced with a new narrative of primitive and exotic Orientals who were far removed in time from the present civilized stage of humanity. Hegels Philosophy of History exemplified this narrative of cultural differences in a time frame having the European idea of civilization and Western Europe as a point of arrival.13 Primitive peoples were now conceived as human (though not equal), and just located at an earlier stage of evolution. If pagan savages needed to be converted, primitives needed to be civilized: thus developed a narrative of the white mans burden to civilize the world. After World War II, movements for national independence exploded all over the world, along with increasing awareness of the oppressions carried out under the guise of colonialism. After the horrors of two world wars and the atomic bomb, the West was no longer so sure of its superior civilization and social science banned the word primitive from academic vocabulary. However there was no change in the basic evolutionary narrative established by classic social scientists like Weber and Durkheim. Most people still imagined societies as somewhere along the
13
Mignolo, in Jameson and Miyoshi, pp. 35-37.
process of a linear evolution from simple, traditional societies to modern complex ones. Instead of primitives, the new character in the narrative was underdeveloped. As Mignolo puts it:
Although savages/cannibals were people to be converted to Christianity, primitives to be civilized and Orientals to be westernized, underdeveloped people instead have to be modernized. Progress and Modernity replaced the Christian mission of Spain and Portugal, the civilizing mission of France and England, and became the new goal of the U.S. imperial version of previous colonialisms.14
Even though developmentalism has sustained continual and sharpening criticism ever since the 1970s, it is questionable whether this narrative has lost its power. Up until the break-up and delegitimation of the Communist block in 1989, the critics of developmentalism sustained the hope that socialism provided a convincing counter narrative to that of capitalist developmentalism. However, even though the chasm between rich and poor in the world continues to widen, the Northern, rich countries have strengthened their fragile narrative that they are maintaining an order intended to bring development, progress, democracy and freedom to all the peoples of the world. In one sense the fall of communism strengthened the developmentalist narrative by discrediting its main rival. The socialist narrative collapsed under the weight of the oppression, poverty and totalitarianism that characterized communist countries. This led to the prematurely optimistic prediction of the end of history, i.e. the end of conflict between different narratives. The liberal, democratic, capitalist narrative became the only story on the block. But the loss of a communist enemy also provoked a crisis. The developmentalist story of progress and
14
Ibid., p. 37.
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freedom needs an enemy. The spectacular gap between the wealth and freedom of Northern capitalist countries and the poverty and totalitarianism of communist countries gave the capitalist narrative an edge of credibility. Apparently at least some developing countries, like the Asian tigers, reached the take off point of capitalist development and soared into the company of wealthy nations.15 In contrast, communist countries appeared full of secret horrors. Without a communist threat, the many failures of developmentalism came under closer scrutiny. Developmentalism was the primary ideology during the thirty-two years of Suhartos New Order government in Indonesia. This ideology was intertwined with the cold war and the physical annihilation of the communist party in 1965-66. Global information systems and the cooperation of the CIA contributed to the massacre. Under President Soekarno, Indonesia had led the Non-Aligned Movement and resisted domination by either the communist block or the West. Soekarno resisted the bipolar world structure of power but the country fell deeper and deeper into economic and political chaos. In contrast President Suharto systematically embraced the world, capitalist, economic system, of course with adaptations to strengthen his own power and benefit his family. Since Suhartos fall, the reformation period has brought deep and significant changes in the structures of political power in Indonesia. However Indonesia remains as firmly anchored as ever within the global economic structures that are justified with reference to developmentalism. When I moved to Indonesia permanently in 1991, I was disturbed by the daily, optimistic discourse about progress (kemajuan) and development (pembangunan). Most of my graduate students believed that Indonesia was a developing nation (sedang berkembang), not as ad15
Countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore provide positive examples to support the capitalist narrative. However other countries, like Chile and Brazil, are used to support a counter narrative of how capitalism leads to increasing impoverishment for the great majority of poor people.

vanced as the West (kurang maju) and that most of the people were backward and stupid (terbelakang and masih bodoh). This was the dominant narrative of the New Order regime of President Suharto. Why did Indonesians consider themselves less developed than Westerners? What are the criteria? Are wealth, formal education, technology and scientific knowledge the only things that matter? How do we factor in things like close family ties, joyful living in simplicity, rich cultural hybridity, religious sincerity and creative survival? I do not believe that Indonesia is less developed or less advanced than the United States. It depends on what you count. Nor are the common people (wong cilik) less intelligent than in Western nations. Are the Indonesians who chose Susilo Bambang Yudoyono as President more backward and stupid than the Americans who chose George W. Bush, Jr.? I am not sure we should consider the last 40 years in Indonesia as progress. Were the citizens who rode bicycles and watched shadow puppet shows (wayang kulit) all night, when I first visited Yogyakarta in 1972, less advanced than those who whiz around on motorcycles and watch TV today? Im not so sure. Yogyakarta was still lively with students at that time, but there was no pollution, traffic accidents or noise. If we factor in the massive ecological damage, the destruction of the rain forests, the depletion of natural resources, skyrocketing debt, and the deepening poverty of people whose land has been raped by multinational corporations, then we might not consider the past forty years as development or progress, but rather as regression and oppression. On the other hand, better education and health care, improved nutrition, a growing middle class, infrastructure such as roads, electricity, telephones, internet and a much higher life expectancy should warn us not to romanticize the past or discount all the benefits of development. The story of globalization, religion and development in Indonesia is not simple, or black and white.
Globalization and Religion 101 4. Globalization as a Structure: World System Theory

According to world system theory, globalization is a complex process in which one subsystem of human societies, the capitalist economy, keeps expanding into all other aspects of human life and produces world-wide integration. Integration results from diffusion. In other words, everyone on the globe is related to everyone else (global integration), because all important elements of our lives have become aspects of the economy. Capitalist economic structures are diffused into all other structures. Mono-metastructural16 theories suggest that all the myriad global structures that tie people together are structured by unjust economic relationships. Political, social, religious and cultural relationships are all determined by the flow of money. World system theory is not a new idea. When I was a doctoral student in the late 1970s we read dependency theory and liberation theology which told the same story. Wealth flows from the peripheries of the world to the centre. Jose Miranda taught us that the history of the world was a history of oppression and struggle for liberation. For example, an international, academic seminar such as produced this book may apparently be anti-globalization. However from the perspective of world systems theory, the seminar is actually part of an international educational network that is controlled by global economic interests. The seminar strengthens international ties and brings in substantial funding from multinational foundations. Globalization may be attacked in the seminar, but in practice it is strengthened. Global capitalism is the necessary condition to make the seminar possible. Global capitalism ultimately provides the funding that makes all our educational
16 Eduardo Mendieta offers a very helpful typology of theories of globalization with three types: 1. Mono-metastructural theories, 2. Matrix Rearrangement and Differentiation theories, and 3. Metatheoretical Reflexivity theories. The typology is helpful even if the names for the types are horribly obtuse! See Mignolo in James and Myoshi, pp. 47-51.

institutions possible. Immanuel Wallerstein tells a frightening story in which even left wing opponents of capitalism are integrated members of the capitalist world order, whether they like it or not.17 Revolution has lost its allure, not only because the capitalists in power are too strong, but because seizing political power provides no escape from the global, capitalist market. If you change the government, the new government will still be powerless to opt out of the global economy. Even China is now integrated into the capitalist system. In fact, even international terrorist organizations are part of the global structure of capitalism and play their part to keep it afloat. They could not exist without petrodollars. They provided the excuse for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror provided a needed enemy to replace the Communist Threat. Terrorism justified a renewed, Western, global agenda that legitimized the use of violence to strengthen centre-periphery relationships.18 Islamic Fundamentalism became the new villain in the story: the enemy of progress, freedom, democracy and development. As in all good stories, there is a great deal of truth in the narratives of globalization as the capitalist world system. In Habermas version of the story money is colonizing the life world. However there are serious weaknesses in this account. Every story is told from a certain point of view. No story is neutral. World systems theory is only one of many ways to view globalization. World systems theories are fundamentally Eurocentrist. They view America and Europe as the centre of power, technology and wealth. The West is the source of all good things and the
17
See Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (New York: Verso, 1983); cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, After Liberalism (New York: New Press, 1995). Cf. Michael Hard and Antonio Negeri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 18 Cf. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia, Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social, and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, eds. K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Has him Kamala (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005).
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measuring stick for determining the meaning of a good life. Irrespective of whether globalization is considered a vast conspiracy by capitalists or an impersonal structure of economic relations, Western wealth and power are assumed as the criteria for what is valued. World systems theory is correct in showing how injustice, imbalance and oppression are structured into global relationships. But it fails to question the materialist assumptions of Western modernity. From the perspective of this story of global domination, religion is a secondary category. Religion is considered just a sub-system of economics. In dependency theory, religion may be seen as a tool for domination. Religion may be a political base or an interest group. Or religion is viewed as a commodity, something that is sold for economic motives. George Ydice suggests that religion and culture are increasingly understood as resources to be managed.19 But in any case, religion is considered marginal. The real system of globalization runs on wealth and power. I do not believe that religion is a sub-system of economics. In different ways, Durkheim, Mendieta, Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor all argue that religion shapes the fundamental social imaginary that makes human communities possible, including the global community. Whether or not this is so, religion, at the least, is a basic structure of human communities that interacts with other basic structures, including economic structures, to create and maintain our world. Religion is one of the major forces of globalization, tying people together across the globe,
19
Sociology has been dominated since Durkheim by analyses of the social functions of religion. More recently the Frankfurt School critiqued the commodification and instrumentalization of culture and religion. George Ydice offers a fascinating account of how culture and religion are now being absorbed into a new epistemic framework as resource. As a resource, religion is not just a commodity, but rather should be managed, conserved, invested in, and distributed. Thus religion and culture are absorbed into an economic and/or ecological rationality. See, George Ydice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

transcending race, nationality, culture and class. We may view religion as sometimes the handmaid of imperialism, blessing the colonizers and softening up their victims for domination. But that is not the whole story. Religion also frequently works for liberation, resistance to oppression, education, health and human equality. Religion will never be just a subsystem of economics because people from all religions are frequently motivated by transcendent values that cannot be tamed by economic greed. Fundamentalist Muslims are particularly troubling to the high priests of global capitalism because they are apparently irrational. That is, they are not primarily motivated by wealth, comfort or security. Muslim fundamentalists, most of whom are as horrified by terrorism as anyone in the West, also abhor the moral decadence and facile hedonism that dominates the capitalist media. Even though most Fundamentalists eschew violence, they can at least understand the rationality of the terrorists. They have rediscovered values that are worth dying (and killing) for. The power of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia does not come from petrodollars but rather from a compelling counter narrative in opposition to the determinist narrative of world systems theory. When I was a student, we campaigned for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), a new international regime that would strengthen the bargaining power of the periphery over against the centre so as to create more just economic relations. Unfortunately not much has changed. The centre still dominates the periphery. The categories of centre and periphery are very useful terms for understanding the structures of unjust economic relations. But these terms are just a heuristic device for analysis not a description of reality. There is no centre. There are no peripheries in objective reality. There is one world and the centre is wherever you happen to be standing. My centre of the world is Indonesia. In my story of globalization, economic relations are not the final determinant of value.

Every story can be told from an economic perspective. Almost all of our actions are mediated in some way (directly or indirectly), by economic motives. But dialectical materialism (Marx), is no more convincing than sex (Freud) as the fundamental basis for all human relationships (superstructure). As Charles Taylor observed, The only general rule in history is that there is no general rule identifying one order of motivation as always the driving force.20 Enrique Dussel tries to break the hold of Eurocentrism by arguing from a neo-Marxist, Latin American perspective. He suggests that North America and Europe are currently the centre of wealth and power, not because of some genius of Western ability, but rather because Europe gained a decisive economic advantage through their discovery of the Americas.21 According to his narrative, Europe used to be on the periphery, with India and China at the centre. In trying to get to the centre, Columbus accidentally discovered America. The tremendous wealth of the Americas flowed into Spain and its colony in Amsterdam, paving the way for colonial expansion in the 16th Century. European power led to globalization. But globalization is not the result of Europes superior ability but rather is a product of the wealth of the whole world which flowed into Europe. Dussels story is important because it offers a new perspective. But it is still only one perspective, another lens for examining a very complex history. I am incapable of judging whether or not Latin American wealth was the decisive factor that led to modernity and globalization. I have my doubts, especially since Spain was one of the last places in Europe to industrialize. However even if we modified the story to include Indian wealth as the foundation of the British Empire or Dutch East Indies (Indonesian) wealth as the source of modernity in the Netherlands, Dus-
20 21
Taylor, 2004, p. 33. Enrique Dussel, Beyond Eurocentrism: The World System and the Limits of Modernity in Jameson and Miyoshi, pp. 3-31.

sels reading still is trapped in centre - periphery categories that make wealth, technology and political power the fundamental values of meaning and success. Why should economic and political power be the determining factors for defining the centre of the world? I do not mean to denigrate these values as if they were insignificant. But I do want to question whether they are adequate for understanding globalization and the role of religion in our post-modern world. My Javanese neighbours think that Mount Merapi is the centre of the world.
5. Religion and Globalization from an Indonesian Perspective

What does religion and globalization look like from an Indonesian perspective? This book, which comes out of an international seminar, is important, not primarily because it justifies the flow of funds from Western foundations to third world scholars and activists. Rather it is important because it gives voice to people who have been taught to believe they are on the periphery; that the centre of knowledge and truth lies in the West. The world needs to hear our story about the relation between religion and globalization, not as stories from far off exotic places (periphery), but rather as stories from the centre, our centre. The so called developing or third world is actually the two-thirds world where most of human beings live. The international character of this book reminds us that we are all part of globalization. We are globalised people whose education comes from all over the globe. We need each other to deepen our stories. If we think about globalization and religion, we are not telling someone elses story, we are trying to understand ourselves. We learn from the whole world. But in the end, we can only tell what globalization and religion looks like from the centre of the world, which is, naturally, in Yogyakarta.

I wish I had the space and ability to tell the story of religion and globalization from the perspective of the past 5,000 years of these islands. The Java Man and prehistoric stone monuments tell a story of the ancient search for God in this land. Long before Borobodur was built 1,200 years ago, the ancestors of Indonesians travelled to and from India and China. Pilgrims came here from all over the world in search of wealth and enlightenment. The stories of globalization and religion from Indonesian perspectives include great cultural riches as well as suffering and oppression. When Europe was destroying itself through incessant wars of religion, Indonesia enjoyed a tolerant, pluralistic society where different religions lived side by side in peace. Islam came peacefully, through trade, while Christianity arrived with the sword of the Portuguese and Dutch colonizers. Indonesia was settled by migrations of peoples, from South China, India, the Middle East, Portugal, the Netherlands, England, Japan and other countries. I am one of the later arrivals from America, England and China.22 Indonesians are who they are today because of thousands of years of interactions with a great diversity of cultures. During the Suharto years, the dominant narrative viewed globalization and religion as completely different spheres. Globalization that brought investment, economic growth, new technology and scientific knowledge was good. Globalization that threatened stability through Western ideas of democracy and human rights was bad. Individualism, moral decadence and competition were negative effects of globalization. Religion was viewed as good, as long as it opposed bad globalization. Religion was a partner with the government in combating Western immorality and promoting development. Critical religion that threatened the status quo was outlawed. This simplistic narrative was destined to fall apart. Religion and globalization are part of each other. They are
22 My father is English, my mother, American, and I was born in China. I am a permanent resident of Indonesia.

neither partners nor enemies, but interlocking systems in a continual state of tension and symbiosis. Suharto tried to use religion to shore up his power. But religion could not be controlled. Mobilization of religious groups helped to bring him down. Since the collapse of Suharto the reformation period has opened the way for many new narratives. One popular narrative in Indonesia suggests that globalization and religion are implacable enemies. Globalization is based on Neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism is a Western philosophy of greed, immorality, individualism and capitalist domination. In contrast, religion is the will of God. Religion supports morality, justice, law and clean government. According to this narrative, the clash of civilizations is real. Islam is the religion of truth that the decadent capitalist West is trying to destroy. This narrative is like a mirror image of Bushs opposite narrative of free and democratic America waging war against the fanatic Islamic terrorists. In both narratives the world is black and white, a fight to the death of the good guys against the forces of evil. According to my narrative, there are no good guys and no bad guys. We have seen the enemy and the enemy is us. I hate the malls that are springing up like evil mushrooms around Yogyakarta. But I like to buy Australian cheese and American running shoes (made in Indonesia). I hate the traffic and pollution. But I love my Japanese Honda on which I zip around Yogya, only slightly more cautiously than the kamikaze students. I love the social justice and ecological NGOs with their multinational networks of support. But I worry about young idealists writing endless grant proposals to international foundations in order to stay afloat. I hate orientalism and the hegemony of Western, liberal modes of thought. But I force my students to read Western philosophers and social scientists and worry about their limited skills in English. I love the azan, the call to prayer (sholat) five times a day. But I hate the Japanese loud speakers from the mosque that can knock your socks off at 4a.m. I hate the huge rise in the price of fuel and worry about how the poor can sur-

vive the general inflation. But I worry about the rapid depletion of oil reserves and wonder how Indonesia will survive the coming world with less and less fossil fuel. The massive earthquakes and tidal waves in Aceh and the trembling volcanoes throughout the Indonesian archipelago, remind us that we live within global systems that were not made by human hands. Plate tectonics created these islands and volcanoes made them fertile. The natural world systems that both give and take our lives are now interacting as never before with human systems of globalization. The result is a world ecological crisis of unimaginable proportions. As religious people we cannot save the world. We can barely even understand it. Religious people, including fundamentalists, have often done horrendous harm to the world in their efforts to save it. That should at least make us modest about what our individual religious communities can achieve. But for better or worse, the world will be shaped by religious convictions (or lack of convictions) for the foreseeable future. We are challenged to work together across religious, cultural and national boundaries, to raise awareness, oppose false consciousness, combat unjust structures, care for the victims and serve our neighbours. From our various religions we derive faith that God is our hope and our final destination. But the earth is our common home.
Bibliography
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia, in Nathan, K.S. and Kamala, Mohammad Hashim, (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social, and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005. Hard, Michael/Negeri, Antonio: Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Hopkins, Dwight N./Lorenzo, Lois Ann/Mendieta, Eduardo/Bat stone, David (eds.): Religions/Globalizations: Theories and Cases, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. Jameson, Fredric/Miyoshi, Masao: The Cultures of Globalization, Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Knitter, Paul, Globalization and the Religions: Friends or Foes? unpublished paper presented on May 24, 2006 at a Research Seminar on Globalization and Religion: Friends or Foes? at CRCS, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Loy, David R., The Religion of the Market in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 65, no. 2, Summer 1997. Murdock, Iris, Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch, in: Stanley Hauerwas/Alastair MacIntyre (eds), Revisions, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. Taylor, Charles, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. Wallerstein, Immanuel, Historical Capitalism, New York: Verso, 1983. Wallerstein, Immanuel, After Liberalism, New York: New Press, 1995. Ydice, George, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era, Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
DEMOCRACY, TOLERANCE AND CIVILSOCIETY FUNDAMENTALISM AND ETHICS IN INDONESIAN POLITICS
Nick T. Wiratmoko, Indonesia
Introduction
The question that appears, when people talk about democracy, is how to build the most democratic governmental order in a third world country like Indonesia. Various writings concerning this topic mention that from the time of its independence day in 1945, Indonesia has decided to be a democratic-secular country. History proves that to build a nation that pledges itself to give priority to democracy above all matters, that a nation needs an immense and tremendous commitment from all its political elites as well as its state. From 1945 until today, observing Indonesia from the models of its ruling regime, the colours of democracy exercised are far from being similar or identical. From the 1940s until the middle of 1960s, Indonesian democracy was one of guided democracy. From the mid 1960s until in the end of the 1990s, the democracy under Suhartos regime was that of promoting the tradition of authoritarian democracy. After the fall of Suhartos regime, which was preceded by the monetary and economic

crisis of the year of 1997, Indonesia has not come to a definite shape of democracy. For political observers, Indonesian democracy could be defined as being in the era of transition towards democracy. The reason lies in the fact that during the two longest ruling regimes in Indonesia, the democratic pillars couldnt be perfectly and ideally placed. This means, that democratic praxis, either electoral or deliberative, only applied to those groups of political elites and state bureaucracies, while, civil society, the group representing the people, acted as spectators, marginalised by the political processes. What is the correct model for, or terminology of, democracy for a third world country? Would it be similar to that of a democratic country in the Western world? What transition takes place that makes the-notyet-independent-country become a democratic-independent-one? What should be the choice of the third world country? Is it the electoral or deliberative or the blend of both electoral-deliberative models of democracy? Does the contrasting background of the Western countries, with majorities that are secular or Christian, as opposed to Indonesia as a nation with Muslim majority matter? Will Islam interfere with Indonesias commitment to being a democratic nation? Second, Indonesia claims to be democratic by virtue of the pluralism of its ethnic, religious and diverse cultural composition. In this condition, then, pluralism is unavoidable, even though in its reality, in order to possess such pluralism, collisions often occur between the majority and minority. The challenge for Indonesia is to have pluralism confront religious leaders, the intellectuals, politicians and bureaucracy elites, who do not have adequate capacity for promoting it. Therefore, it is worth questioning whether the mutual trust among the various parts of the society has been built. What about the public space which has to be maintained to guarantee egalitarianism in building up dialectics? Has the sustainability of the regulations by which they govern been entirely
Democracy, Tolerance, Civil Society 113

given to the authority of the state, or is it still the claim of certain religious groups, which, for example, are promoting a sharia-based religious state instead of a secular one? On what grounds do they base such efforts, and why do they choose such narrow-minded fundamentalism as the basis of their struggle? Concerning the public service provided by the government and impersonal bureaucracy, have women got equal access in dealing with the two agendas above? Thirdly, in the dynamic of a democratic country, a tangible and significant presence of the civil society is an imperative. The questions, then, are: How has the civil society discourse been perceived by the state and the democratic actors? In the electoral democracy, has civil society been involved in all processes of political education or has it only been an instrument to give the claims of democracy legitimacy? If such is the case, how is a real response expected when the election comes? In the way authority is exercised, does the state try to take advantage of the principles characteristics of the civil society by making them part of state corporatism or does the civil society grow independently? From the three groups of problems mentioned above, the three words of democracy, tolerance and civil society are where this paper will begin its focus.
1. In Search of Democracy Transition

Soekarnos era implemented guided democracy. Suhartos era developed authoritarian democracy to maintain the growth of the macro economy. Those two types of democracy failed to develop extensive democracy awareness in Indonesia. Despite the fact that both regimes tried to introduce the practice of democracy, unfortunately, both were centralized on each of the state leaders, Soekarno, at least, had conducted the procedural pattern of democracy in the form of democratic elections in 1955. The 2004 election was a very similar type of democ-

ratic procedure. The model of democracy that Suharto tried to implement did not last long, failing when he was forced to step down from his presidential position in 1998. After 1998, during the presidency of the four presidents succeeding Suharto (they are: B J Habibie, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), Indonesia has been understood as being in a transition towards democracy. Democracy in Western countries was initiated by the industrial revolution. Furthermore, competitive capitalism supports democratic life. Indicators for democracy would be procedural-electoral democracy and the growth of deliberative democracy. In Indonesia during Suhartos regime they believed in the correlation between the growth of economy and the growth of a democracy. Samuel Huntington, emphasising the principle, stated that:
The first wave of democratisation in 19th century until early 20th century, generally emerged in Europe and America when their GNP per capita was between $ 300 until $ 500 (middle income). In the context of the third wave of democratisation, there were four countries with income between $ 300 until $ 500 which were experiencing transition towards democracy.1
Even though Huntington traced the pattern of correlation between the growth of economy and the presence of democracy, the principle does not always work in every context. Guillermo ODonnell is a critic who strongly opposes the notion of a high correlation between economic growth and democracy. His observation in Latin America in 1970 showed that when a country demonstrates its inclination to further develop the industrial field and accelerate economic growth, what happens
1
See Eko, Sutoro, Introduction Democracy Consolidation Lesson for Indonesia, in: Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy towards Consolidation, (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2003), p. xxv.

as a consequence is the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, marked with the domination of military power, technocratbureaucrats, and also international business societies. The phenomenon of economic growth in East Asia, such as in Taiwan, proves that the success of a countrys development is greatly influenced by the significant role of the interventionist-authoritarian state, rather than of the police-passive state.2 In Suhartos era, Indonesia reached US$ 815 GNP per capita in 1990. This number was included in the World Banks middle income standard. By comparing it to the standard of GNP stated by Huntington, logically the transition towards the democracy ought to have happened. However, here is what actually took place in the monetary crisis in 1997. First, the construction of capitalism and corporations, that Suharto had undertaken, turned out to be built on collusion and nepotistic practices. Yoshihara Kunio, for example, calls such capitalism Ersatz capitalism or pseudo capitalism. Second, industrial-based development set its priority on the principle of an authoritarian regime, which claims to enforce growth and provide equality of job opportunities. Third, the regime of Suharto developed a dominant political party named Golongan Karya (the Work Group), and left political space for only 2 complementary parties at that time (PDI / Indonesian Democratic Party and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan / Development Unity Party). Under the special condition of floating-mass, the policy enabled Golkar to be the only political party to reach even the lowest level of the villages. The policy that was implemented at that time promoted the bureaucracys full supports for Golkar. Under such conditions, it is obvious that the dominant interests of the bureaucratic-technocratic elites, sustained by the military, interfered with the national political arena. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, bureaucracy has been released
2
Cf. Eko, Sutoro, ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi.

from the political arena. Yet, the last two elections left an intact conclusion that the existing democracy is an insufficient democracy, which perfectly reflects the fact that democracy is still dominated by the role of the political and state elites in the arena of politics. However, it is undeniably true, as research edited by John Higley and Richard Gunther demonstrates, that economic welfare is able to enhance elite convergence to institutionalise and consolidate the democracy.3 Southern European and Latin American countries are successful in institutionalising democratic regimes, despite their insufficient growth and welfare of the economy. Economic-based approaches for democracy studies can be categorised in the area of substantive democracy theory. Other approaches in the mass-structure are structural and class conflicts, which were ideas pioneered by Barrington Moore.4 He studied the relation of the middle class to democracy. The presence of the middle class in Western Europe was believed to have contributed towards the fall of the domination of the feudalism of the land owners. The bourgeois or the middle class community consisted of individuals or groups which possessed independence both politically and economically, like journalists, professional associations, artists, and intellectual academics. According to the belief of the bourgeois, who focused on the society approach, their resistance to bring feudal values or the old order down was to increase collective awareness and action. Unfortunately in the post-Suharto era in Indonesia, the collective awareness among the grassroots classes, like farmers, is still dominated by the bourgeois, who apply disadvantageous agricultural policies to farmers, and hence only advantage the urban community.5 On the other hand, even though work3 4
Ibid., p. xxvi. Ibid. 5 For the policy on agriculture, especially rice, the government tends to ignore the poor farmers and takes no concern in protecting their interests. Once again, it gives more advantages to the urban community. Most Indonesian farmers nowadays are having minus NTP (Farmers exchange values), which means that the cost of production is higher than the harvest price. On top of that, the areas

ers collective awareness has significantly been increasing, demands for fairer salaries and social charges have caused many capitalists to consider relocating their manufacturing to Vietnam and China6.
2. Pancasila and Muslim Fundamentalism

In the Indonesian context, implementing democracy implies several important points. Firstly, plurality is recognised, being proven by the national creed Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which indicates that Indonesian plurality be acknowledged, even though its realisation still has a long way to go. The idea that this creed carries has promoted the idea of multiculturalism, as it admits that in spite of existing differences, people should remain unified. This idea is often misunderstood as blending the differences into one. On the other hand, it may be perceived as promoting uniformity instead of enhancing plurality. In addition to that, ideologically, Indonesian people have been united by the national foundation Pancasila (the five principles).7 Historically speaking, the establishment of Pancasila as a set of ideological principles which Indonesian people have to follow and adopt, had previously
where farmers grow rice which should have been protected by strict regulations on import policy, in reality are violated and displaced for industrial locations. Such policy then promoted the substitute policy of a million acres of rice field provision in Central Kalimantan, which ended up causing severe environmental deterioration. 6 The labour policy that supports industrialisation cannot free itself from the corporate policy which tends to be exploitative towards labour. On the other hand, labours awareness of underpayment has forced them to strike for a raise. This condition has, in the end, forced the corporations to relocate their manufacturing factories to China or Vietnam where labour costs are much cheaper. Unattractive Indonesian industrial policies, other than the high cost of labour, include high over-head costs or other payments not related to industrial activities. The result is that the products are not competitive compared to those made in Vietnam or China. 7 Pancasila consists of: [1] admitting one and only God, [2] just and civilized humanity, [3] the unity of Indonesia, [4] the representation of the people, and [5] social justice.

strongly debates, sacrificing the Piagam Jakarta (The Jakarta Charter) in the process - that is a draft of a constitutional document demanding the putting in place of Islamic sharia for Muslims. Pancasila functions as a binding ideology that holds together the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and even territorial plural realities of each of Indonesias citizens. Even in the Suharto era in 1971, Pancasila had also been the only principle for political organisations.8 With such assumptions and ideological supports tolerance is a must and it should have been able to manage Indonesian pluralism. However, does it prevail in reality for the Indonesian people? Constitutionally, the Piagam Jakarta has not brought back to Indonesian peoples life discourse extensively through strong controversial debates and discussions in 2001 and 2002 People Council meetings. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as two of the biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia are strongly against the integration of Piagam Jakarta in the constitution. Does it make those parties aim to integrate the Islamic sharia into constitution lessening their efforts? Yet, the objective to implement sharia has been conducted through expansion of authority in regional parliaments under the regional autonomy policy where sharia is placed as part of the regional regulations. The Islamic bureaucrats and the law ministry have been reported to have prepared a number of legal modifications with a significant number of them aiming to put the Islamisation process into effect.9
Abdurrahman Wahid, Islam, Pluralism and Democracy in http://www.smu.edu/asianstudies/. 9 Martin van Bruinessen Utrecht University, 2003. Post Suharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and Democratization. A paper presented at the Third International Conference and Workshop Indonesia in Transition, organized by the KNAW and Labsosio, Universitas Indonesia, August 24-28, 2003, Universitas Indonesia, Depok. Check on: http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/

Second, it is high time to really make the creed true. With the recognition that plurality in Indonesia consists of different religions, ethnicities, races and cultures, tolerance should be contextualised in order to enter the public arena, which enables every citizen to perform democratically. Third, when each member of the plural community implements tolerance towards the other parties, they should also be able to maintain their uniqueness. Even though it is difficult to realise it in many contexts, including in Indonesia, as there is a tendency that when two cultures meet, there is always a possibility for them to blend, it is worth promoting. What is suggested above is often confronted with problems which are derived from the states interference which tries to dominate the discourse in this area.10 First, the state, especially under Suhartos regime, tried to impose and interfere with peoples private life, in this case marriage and religious life. They released marriage regulations that prohibited inter-religious marriage. Religious organisations had to include Pancasila as one of their basic principles.11 State recognition of religion was determined by the religions acceptance of the first principle of Pancasila. It means that when a religion did not apply the idea of the principle, it was not legally recognised.12 It left a long scar in the
10
Michel Foucault suggests that power is often discursive in terms that in order that they maintain their powerful position, they create discourse(s) to shape peoples mind. This seems to happen in Indonesia whenever we talk about religious relations, which eventually becomes one of the sensitive areas of difference between Indonesian people know as SARA (Suku, Agama, dan Ras Ethnic, Religion, and Race (differences). 11 An intervention was made in North Sumatera HKPBs leadership under Ephorus SAE Nababan and also in the leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama in their election in Cipasung, where the role of the state in intervening in a religions affairs was apparent. 12 There used to be only five religions legally acknowledged by the state. They are: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Religions such as Kong Fu Tse, Confucianism, and native-ethnic religions were not acknowledged as legal religions.

life of Indonesian people into the post Suharto era, even though the state no longer acts in this way, believers of different religions still find it difficult to apprehend the meaning of being tolerant. This is proven by the conflict in Ambon, for instance, which obviously reflects the concept of otherness in perceiving plurality, in which one group considered itself as better than the other. As a consequence, one of the parties tried to demolish the other as they attempted to gain power in society. Second, the state spread inconsistent interpretations of Pancasila. Very often, it was only used to win the powerful by twisting its meaning as a binding ideology. Pancasila tended to be twisted when a group of people or an organisation criticised the government or conducted an action that the government thought was threatening. These people would be considered as subversive and the reason often used to condemn them was that they violated Pancasila. It was never clear how they did so. The accusation was often absurd. Thus, Pancasila was used by the state as a means of repressing people. For example studying or discussing Marxism or even Karl Marx would be considered as anarchy and it was a reason to be sent to jail. Third, despite its success in developing the country physically, Suhartos regime failed to promote just and fair economic development. In order to raise a groups economic success development often pushed another group aside. It resulted in economic disparity that increased jealousy from the marginalised. The case of the bloody dispute13 between the native Dayak people and the migrant Madura-nese in Kalimantan (particularly in West Kalimantan) proves that economic disparity created jealousy of the local people towards the migrants, as they
13
Gerry van Klinken, 2002, Indonesias new Ethnic Elites in Henk SchulteNordholt and Irwan Abdulla (Eds), Indonesia in Search of Transition. Yogyakarta, Pustaka Pelajar, pp. 67-105. In Sampit conflict (Central Kalimantan), the number of murdered Madurese was 500 people. 100,000 people were fleeing out of the area inhabited by around 1.8 million people. The occurrence itself was considered to be an ethnic cleansing as part of the horizontal violence.

were marginalised economically by the migrants who were getting richer. Conflict prevailed. The anger and disappointment of the Dayaknese, which was only one of the examples of Indonesian peoples amok behaviour, may have been reinforced by the New Order in terms of the following three important points: (1) cultural marginalisation, (2) cultural aggressiveness, and (3) collective hardness.14 Fourth, Indonesia is very weak at implementing secularism in the life of its citizens in the midst of the international discourse of jihad and sharia. Even though Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (two big Moslem Civil Society Organisations CSOs) are convinced that the law of sharia has been accommodated and even reflected in the states legal or secular principles, there remains a strong tendency of some local Muslim communities to attempt to impose Islamic laws and principles as the basic regulation for Indonesia. Some other Islamic groups consider the post-Suharto era as a good moment to proclaim jihad and sharia at the same time when this discourse is globally acknowledged.15 The jihad movement that appeared in the post Suharto era was the Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunna wal Jammah led by Al-Ustaz Jafar Umar Thalib, an Afganistani war veteran who graduated from Islamic education in Pakistan. The movement has now faded away, yet more radical fundamentalist movements emerged after the September 11 attack in the World Trade Centre in New York. The movements were the Amrozi group, which bombed Kuta in Bali (October 12, 2002)16 and the group of Nurdin M Top, which bombed Jimbaran in October 1, 2005 (Bali)17 and JW Marriot Hotel in August 4, 2003 (Jakarta).18
14 15
Ibid., p. 89 Mark R Woodward, Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect of Democracy, Department of Religious Studies in http://www.smu.edu/asianstudies/ 16 202 people were dead. Almost of them were Australian. 17 31 people dead and 50 people were injured. 18 Mass media reported that almost 12 people dead and 52 people were injured.

The same fundamentalism has reached the implementation of a number of sharia-based local regulations (Peraturan Daerah Perda) in 36 provinces in Indonesia. Although people protested it, the protest went unheard. It means that peoples disagreement or disappointment regarding the Perda did not stop the issuing of the regulations. However, they are allowed to bring the issue to court. How is the fundamentalist movement significant in this tension? For the fundamentalist community, the objective law applied is the sharia order, in the aspects of leadership, law, or social-political relationship. Inconsistency with sharia principles will be considered as threatening the existence of Islam. The essence of fundamentalism as noted by Abdul Munir Mulkhan is illustrated as follows:
A struggle through political parties or social movement to take control of various strategic positions to influence political policies, which are conducive towards the realisation of the sharia regulations, is taken as a religious duty. This is called the doctrine of amar maruf nahi munkar, which means that whoever conducts it, they are struggling in Lords way or sabililah, which in certain cases when the person is deceased in the action, then they are believed to be mati syahid (martyr) and they will get into heaven. 19
Radical-fundamentalist movements will appear when there is support from society, the help of sharia experts or people believed to have the expertise in convincing their followers. On the other hand, such movements could also lose their popularity whenever its followers are able to anticipate social change towards a more modern domain.20 FundamenMulkhan, Abdul Munir, 1999, pp. 152-153 Cf. Quoted from Sartono Kartodirdjo (1984) and was referred by Abdul Munir Mulkhan, 1999. The Root of Fundamentalism in Islamic Movement in Indonesia in Journal Wacana, No II edition, 1999, p. 53; also check on the statement of Abdul Munir Mulkhan in Minutes Meeting Serial Discussion on Fundamentalism Problems in Indonesia. Salatiga: Percik Foundation, 29th November 2002
20 19

talism derives from at least six recorded ideological ideas21: 1) They believe that sharia regulations are able to comprehensively govern socio-political life; 2) all aspects of worldly profane life, including politics, have to show how Gods law as stated in the Quran is implemented as it has been entirely stated in the sharia; 3) the Islamic movement regeneration centres itself in the sharia, hence fundamentalism is related closely to this kind of movement; 4) fundamentalism is also apparent when it is perceived that everything stated by the ulama is universal and basically unable to change, and this becomes the dogma; 5) elitism in the Islamic movement makes the sharia experts the only authorities in charge of interpreting Islamic teachings; and 6) their psychological condition deems them as being vulnerable and threatened by other religious powers, local traditions (especially the Javanese) and secular movements. What does the pro sharia community consist of? A survey quoted by Martin van Brunessen showed that the followers and supporters of sharia are often close to people in the rural areas, have lower education and lower social-economic backgrounds. It shows that it is more about social disparity than is generally supposed with Islamic radicalism. Islamic radicals in many places tend to have relatively good education, to come from lower-middle class social status in the process of social climbing. In conclusion, this study found that the high percentage of
which states that one of the determining factors in the emergence of fundamentalism is the non-existence of renewals in the religious doctrines which are still maintaining its scholastic or middle age formulation, In times when the world was full of terrors and wars. See the minutes of the meeting of Discussion Serials on Fundamentalisms Problems in Indonesia. Salatiga: Percik Foundation, 29th November 2002; Whereas Aristarchus mentioned that the reason for fundamentalism is the tendency of religions to only understand things in the light of their holy scriptures. See Ibid. 21 Mulkhan, 1999:159.

pro sharia responses appears to reflect a general rural conservatism rather than support for an Islamic revolution.22 What does such a phenomenon imply? The phenomenon shows that the state is in a weak position in its function as the guardian of the principles of secularism. Whereas, if sharia is implemented by local government, the legal implication is that other religions are alienated and considered to be non-existent.23 In this case, it should be noted that religions have failed to implement the universal agendas of fighting poverty, law supremacy enforcement and freedom of expression. A religion is able to adopt these universal agendas only when they are able to put the priority on serving the community regardless of their cultural background. When it prevails, and only when this prevails, can the liberation function (tahrir) can operate. For Islam, this last role is defined only in the implementation form of rahmatan lil-alamin that is, a blessing for all living creatures.24 Fifth, tolerance is also defined as part of the public service the government gives, which requires equality in access to it and equality in decision-making participation. This premise implies that the state is obliged to provide non-discriminative public service, especially towards women. In its practice, women are facing marginalisation and discrimination, in the following aspects: 1) lower participation of women in the political arena, especially in realising the 30percent goal of women representation in legislative bodies/parliaments; 2) in many cases of
22
Martin van Bruinessen, Utrecht University, 2003. Post Suharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democratization. Paper presented at the Third International and Workshop Indonesia in Transition organized by the KNAW and Labsosio, Universitas Indonesia, August 24-28, 2003, Universitas Indonesia, Depok. Check on: http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/ 23 Cf. Abdurrahman Wahid, Religions and DemocravyDemocracy in Elga Sarapung, Alfred B Jogo Ena, and Noegroho Agoeng, 2004. New Sprituality: Religions and Peoples Aspirations. Yogyakarta: Institute of Dian Interfidei, p. 329-336. 24 Abdurrahman Wahid, Islam, Pluralism and Democracy http://www.smu.edu/asianstudies/

decision-making in development, men still play dominant roles. Bapenas policy and the Presidential Instruction to carry out gender mainstreaming are only responded to at a certain level of the bureaucracy, like in provinces or cities and regions. It means that strategic policies are only for the strategic bureaucracy and have never had a significant impact on womens empowerment. The result is that womens and childrens aspirations in the development field are not well reflected in political decision-making.
3. The Role of Civil Society as an Agent of Reformation

Regarding civil society, we should not disregard the development of the concept of civil society itself, which is related to the development of the economy and politics. It is undeniable that the economic and social transformation in the last decade has helped bring the authoritarian regime down, as well as seeing the rise of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. In particular, in the development of civil society in Asia, the ultimate democratic model is indicated by the rise of Civil Society Organisations which offer new methods in the provision of public services which have been carried out by nations and markets in ways that are questionable. The fall of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the rise of financial crisis, the increase of centralised economic integration in China and Vietnam towards the open capitalist economy, according to Porio (2002: 107-108), reflect the end of Cold War politics in super power countries, and the importance of finding an alternative development paradigm. In this era, civil society and civil society organisations play a very significant role. Diamond (1994:5) states that:
Civil society is the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, selfgenerating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a

legal order or a set of shared rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interest, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state.25
Borrowing the formulation of civil society developed by Diamond as mentioned above, civil society stresses voluntarism, self-generation, self-support, autonomy from the state, and obedience to the law. Civil society is not part of political parties, private spheres or the State. The other formulation, as Porio quoting Habermas stated, is that civil society is conceptualised as an intersection between the State and society.26 In the Indonesian context, the formulation of civil society was stated by Rocamora et al (1998), which mentioned that the growth of civil society is understandable in four levels of inter-relation: the state, political society, civil society and international actors. With such references, then it is imaginable that civil society and civil society organisations have become an alternative power authority in developing democracy at the national and political level.27 According to Willem Wolters, the role of civil society could be to help support a number of functions for democracy, they are:
1) protecting the citizens against state arbitrariness; 2) maintaining a balance between society and the state, based on the rule of law; 3) disseminating the democratic values of tolerance, honesty and mutual acceptance; 4) the creation of public sphere of discussion; 5) and finally that of moderating social conflicts,
25 26
Emma Porio, Ibid., p. 110. Ibid., p. 111. 27 Cf. Ibid.

by creating overlapping networks of organisations and crisscrossing sociocultural loyalties.28
In implementing the strategy on how the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are playing their roles, in the Suharto era many of them placed themselves as opponents of the state. In contrast, in the era of Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, most CSO movements positioned themselves either as opponents of the state or they started using a negotiation strategy. In Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonos era, many CSOs use strategies which focus on negotiation and facilitation of a number of empowerment programs and public awareness and/or by involving foreign donors. In the perspective of pre-election procedural democracy, for instance, many CSOs are initiating voter education programmes, and in the process of the election itself, the CSOs would monitor the process. CSOs which promote democracy are not only coming from the secular groups, but also some of them are coming from religious groups, like Islam. Western donors which work through the issue of neutralisation of fundamentalism in Indonesia include USAID, the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The issue of Fundamentalism is emerging and rising out of the notion that some radical Islamic groups take on the Christian groups and the spreading of Christian teachings. Anti-Christian conspiracy is deeply rooted in Indonesian history. Christianity as part of the missionary actions in the Dutch colonial era was and is associated with colonialism. Furthermore, it was reinforced by the perception of mass conversion to Christianity as the result of the 19651966 violence. According to Martin van Bruinessen, many Islamic leaders worry that similar to the Western intention to roll back communism, the same would be attempted to destroy the power of Islamic politics in Indonesia.29 Three strategies that support these views are:30 1)
28 29
Walter, Willem, 202, pp 133-138. Martin van Bruinessen, Ibid.

Christianisation through the expansion of Christian institutions and conversion among Muslims; 2) The stress on Islamic de-politicisation and de-Islamisation from the state apparatus in the early New Order led by Ali Murtopo and Catholic-Chinese intellectuals in CSIS; 3) Many parties were convinced by the controversial ideas of Nurcholish Madjid and his circle, who got a lot of press coverage in 1970, sponsored by Suharto regime to bring the true Islam down. What is the challenge for CSOs in the future in their inter-sections with the state and market? The challenging agenda for the CSOs are:31 1) Developing consensus about values among groups of plural and internally-heterogeneous civil societies. In this context, the implementation of something like the example of the CSO communities in the Philippines which have developed a code of ethics between CSOs and statecivil society will be the evidence of confidence in Indonesia. In Indonesia, since the 1990s, many Islamic CSOs have grown. They prove to be open-minded towards the non-Muslim groups, and they are expected to be able to get involved in inter-religious dialogue and work in partnership with other religious groups in many sectors of activity. Most activists think that it is easier to cooperate with the non-Muslim CSOs compared to the Muslim ones;32 2) CSOs will have to deal with international CSOs, the global economy, political society and the state; 3) Creating social institutionsthat aim at expanding the space for public debates on issues and values; 4) Giving attention to reducing poverty, promoting good governance, as well as strengthening the capacity and capability of the CSOs.
30 31
Ibid. Cf. Emma Porio, 2002, Ibid, pp. 124-125. 32 Cf. Martin van Bruinessen, Ibid
Democracy, Tolerance, Civil Society 129 References

van Bruinessen, Martin, Post Suharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democratization. Paper presented at the Third International Conference and Workshop Indonesia in Transition, organised by the KNAW and Labsosio, Universitas Indonesia, August 24-28, 2003. Depok: Universitas Indonesia, 2003 see http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/ Cammack, Paul, Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World The Doctrine for Political Development. London: Leicester University Press, 1997. Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation. Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2003. Eko, Sutoro, Introduction Democracy Consolidation Lesson for Indonesia, in Larry Diamond. Developing Democracy towards Consolidation. Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2003, pp. xxv-xxvi. Harriss, John, Kristian Stokke and Trnquist, Olle, The Politization of New Local Politic Democracy (Indonesian translation). Jakarta: Demos Publisher, 2005. van Klinken, Gerry, Indonesias New Ethnic Elites in Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Abdullah, Irwan (eds.), Indonesia in search of transition. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002. Mulkhan, Abdul Munir, Roots of Fundamentalism in Islamic Movement in Indonesia in: Journal of Wacana, Democracy Projects, 2nd edition, 1st year, 1999. Yogyakarta: Insist, 1999, pp. 151-172. Mulkhan, Abdul Munir, Minutes Meeting Seri Diskusi tentang Masalah-masalah Fundamentalisme di Indonesia (Serial Discussion on Fundamentalism Problems in Indonesia) Salatiga: Percik Foundation, 29 November 2002. Nordholt, Henk Schulte and Irwan Abdullah (Eds.) Indonesia in search of transition. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002

Porio, Emma Civil Society and Democratization in Asia: Prospect and Challenges in the new millenium in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (eds.), Indonesia in Search of Transition, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002. Sorensen, Georg, Democracy and Democratization, Tadjoedin Noer Effendi (Editing and Forewords). Yogyakarta: Center for Critical Social Studies and Pustaka Pelajar, 2003. Wahid, Abdurahman, Religions and Democracy in: Elga Sarapung, et al, New Spirituality: Religions and Peoples Aspirations, Yogyakarta: Institut Dian Interfidae, 2004, pp. 329-336. Wahid, Abdurrahman, Islam, Pluralism and Democracy in http://www.smu.edu/asianstudies/ Wolters, Willem, The Making of Civil Society in Historical Perspective in: Henk Schulte Nordholt and Abdullah, Irwan (eds.). Indonesia in Search of Transition, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002. Woodward, Mark. R, Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect of Democracy, Department of Religious Studies in http://www.smu.edu/asianstudies/ Uhlin, Anders, Democratization in Indonesia: Challenges and Opportunities in: Journal of Wacana, Democracy Projects, 2nd edition, 1st year, Yogyakarta: Insist, 1999, pp. 75-99.
THE ECONOMIC ETHICS OF CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Yahya Wijaya, Indonesia
In rejecting the claim that the role of religion in todays world is fading away, Bernice Martin1 points to two religious movements which are growing rapidly and world-wide. They are Islamic revival groups, and the third force of Christianity based on the Gifts of the Spirit. Martin focuses specifically on the context of Latin America, and she rejects the labelling of the latter movement as fundamentalist. Yet the phenomenon she highlights is quite common in many parts of the world, particularly in the so called third world, as she also admits. Despite the global spread of these movements, few have made a comparative study of them from the perspective of economic ethics. Concentrating on their development in Indonesia, this study is intended to stimulate more interest in this area.
1. Christian Fundamentalism: Its Economic Dimension

It can be disputed whether the Christian movement which Bernice Martin refers to should be classified as fundamentalist or postmodernist
1
Cf. Bernice Martin, From Pre- to Postmodernity in Latin America: the Case of Pentecostalism in: Paul Heelas (ed.), Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity, (London: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 102-146.

from the point of view of theology. James Barr recognises the differences, contradictions even, between Pentecostalism, Charismaticism and conservative-Evangelicalism which represents the main stream of Christian fundamentalism. Yet, the emphasis of the former on the experience of the charisma today in exactly the same way as in the New Testament church, reflects their place in the fundamentalist family.2 Similarly, Steve Brouwer, et al. say of Pentecostals that: they have transformed and energised the experience of worship while also adopting strong fundamentalist loyalties to Biblical inerrancy, creationism, and millenialist dispensationalism.3 From this position, they mention two types of Christian fundamentalism: book-centred rational fundamentalism, namely conservative-Evangelicalism, and experience-centred charismatic and Pentecostal fundamentalism.4 Opposing this view, David Martin argues that what is seen as fundamentalist in nature in neo-Pentecostalism, is not a part of the uniqueness of that movement. What makes a group Pentecostal or charismatic is its practice of the free and democratic availability of the gifts of the Spirit rather than a certain doctrine of the Bible.5 In Indonesia, however, there is a more practical reason to define neo-Pentecostalism in the same way as conservative-Evangelicalism. Both groups are growing rapidly particularly in urban areas. Both are quite successful in attracting people from the business and professional sectors. Also, both are American-oriented theologically, culturally and technically. Many conservative-evangelical churches are related to the ethnic Chinese business community. In depicting Asian business culture, Michael Backman notes the massive formation of fun-
Cf. James Barr, Fundamentalism (Jakarta: BPK, 1994), p. 242. Steve Brouwer, et al., Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 5. 4 Ibid, p. 43, 192. 5 David Martin, Forbidden Revolutions: Pentecostalism in Latin America, Catholicism in Eastern Europe (London: SPCK, 1996), p. 10.
3
Economic Ethics of Fundamentalism 133

damentalist congregations by ethnic Chinese business people. The names mentioned by Backman include leading business people who recently joined the Evangelical Reformed Church of Indonesia, founded by Stephen Tong, a famous fundamentalist Protestant preacher of Hokkien background. Tongs brother leads another conservative-Evangelical denomination based in Bandung, called the Indonesian Evangelical Church, whose membership is also dominated by industrialists and professional people. Backman sees the importance of these churches not only for the personal life of their members, but also in term of their business, as the churches substitutes for the traditional Chinese businessoriented association, whose existence was discouraged under the assimilation policy of Suhartos regime.6 Hence, these conservativeEvangelical churches serve both as a chaplaincy for the individual business people and as a social context for business networking, although they are not identified with a particular theological concept concerning business matters. Unlike most mainline Protestant denominations in Indonesia which have their roots in the Dutch and German missions of the past, the conservative-Evangelicals are linked to American Christian fundamentalism. The Tong brothers are respectable figures among ethnic Chinese communities in the USA as well as throughout Southeast Asia, and are mostly inclined to fundamentalism. They were involved in the founding of several evangelical seminaries in Indonesia, including the Southeast Asia Bible Seminary in Malang, East Java, Bandung Theological Seminary in Bandung, West Java and the Evangelical-Reformed Theological Seminary in Jakarta. Tongs youngest brother is the president of The International Theological Seminary in California. As with conservative-Evangelicalism, neo-Pentecostalism in Indonesia is also urban-centred. Unlike traditional churches which conduct
6 Cf. Michael Backman, Asian Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia (Singapore, etc: John Wiley & Son, 1999), p. 218.

their activities in permanent church buildings, neo-Pentecostal congregations use hotel rooms, restaurant ballrooms or conference halls, until it is big enough to build a mega-church building in a prestigious city centre location. This demonstrates the social context it prefers to reach, namely that of the middle and upper classes of the business sector. In this case, the neo-Pentecostal movement changes the composition of the Pentecostal community, which used to be composed of less educated people. One notable organisation which pioneers the spread of neoPentecostalism among the business community in Indonesia is the Indonesian Charter of the Full Gospel Business Mens Fellowship (FGBMF), an American-based organisation founded by Demos Shakarian in Los Angeles in 1952. Whilst claiming to be non-denominational, FGBMFs theological confession and worship style are strongly Pentecostal. Combining worship service, fellowship and gala dinners, this organisation plays a similar role to that of the conservative-Evangelical churches: as a chaplaincy resource, and networking facility for those involved in the business world. FGBMF neither develops a theological concept nor an approach that specifically addresses the unique situation of the Indonesian business sector.7 Rather, it copies its headquarters in the USA both in terms of its theological emphasis and in its activities. As Brouwer et al. argue, this kind of religious movement appears acultural or transcultural in the sense that it can be exported [from the USA] almost anywhere, [forming] the degree of similarity in terms of form, content and style that are strongly influenced by North American models.8 As in the USA and other countries, FGBMFs meetings have led to the development of
7 There is no specific reference to business matters in the Statements of Mission and Goals of the Indonesian FGBMF, cf. HBL Mantiri and Hakim Gani, Buku Pedoman Organisasi Full Gospel Business Mens Fellowship International Indonesia, 2003. 8 Steve Brouwer, et al., Exporting the American Gospel, p. 179.

mega-churches in Indonesia, including the Indonesian Bethany Church and the Indonesian Full Gospel Church, which are known for their remarkably effective programme of converting businesspeople, mostly of ethnic Chinese origin. Even most of the ministers in these churches were business entrepreneurs who turned to full-time or part-time ministry.
2. The Gospel of Prosperity

The Indonesian Bethany Church (IBC) and other churches of this kind are known particularly for promoting the doctrine of success and prosperity. The motto Successful Bethany Family is saliently displayed in front of the church, in the church bulletins, and in the stickers posted in car windows of the church members. Success and prosperity are primarily demonstrated in the lavish lifestyles of the church leaders. Ministers of such churches normally live in the most exclusive residential sector of the town, own luxurious cars, send their children to study in private schools abroad and stay in five star hotels when invited as guest speakers to other towns. According to Brouwer et al., the gospel of prosperity was first introduced in the 1960s in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where many Pentecostal evangelists come from. T.L. Osborn, Oral Roberts, Pat Robertson, Jim Bakker, Kenneth Copeland and Kenneth Hagin contributed much to the spread of the prosperity doctrine around the whole world.9 In Asia it is Paul Yonggi Cho of South Koreas Yoido Full Gospel Church, who inspires many Indonesian neo-Pentecostal ministers to promote the prosperity doctrine. It is Chos church which becomes the model for many Indonesian mega-churches. Despite the emphasis of the conventional Pentecostal churches on other-worldly things, relating prosperity to faith is actually not new in the history of Pentecostalism. 19th century Pentecostal leaders taught
9
Ibid, p. 24-25.

about the blessings of God in the forms of wealth and success, as Gods reward to Christians who work hard, as well as pray faithfully. What is different in the recent doctrine of prosperity is the absence of the importance of working hard as a precondition for success. As Brouwer, et al. argue, the new gospel of prosperity cranked up the equation of faith another notch, and taught that the Christian, if he truly believed, was entitled to receive the material blessings of the Lord on the basis of faith alone.10 This does not mean that the believers of that doctrine really stop working hard. In todays highly competitive market, one does not need a religious reference for working hard. The absence of the aspect of working hard in the doctrine thus does not affect the work ethic already formed by market demand. What the doctrine generates is the notion that what they do and gain in work is blessed and justified. The doctrine of wealth and prosperity is one point on which the conservative-Evangelical is in opposition to the neo-Pentecostal. Stephen Tong, a strong defender of conservative Calvinism, openly calls the doctrine of prosperity satanic. The relation between certain conservative-Evangelical churches and the business community is more historical and cultural than doctrinal. Their pastoral approach tends to be casuistic concerning personal issues. Yet, despite the contradiction, both Christian traditions share a positive attitude to the business realm and the market economy, areas to which more liberal traditions tend to be unfavourable.
3. Neo-Pentecostalism and Global Capitalism

Neo-Pentecostal messages seem to be remarkably compatible with global market values. This often leads to a suspicion that neoPentecostalism is a part of the expansion strategy of American-based multinational corporations. Neo-Pentecostal mission organisations are seen as partners of the corporations, with the task of preparing social10
Ibid, p. 26.

cultural conditions for the global market. Another explanation of the relation of neo-Pentecostalism and global capitalism, is one which is parallel to the relation of old Calvinism and early capitalism. NeoPentecostal messages are believed to have produced the sort of individual mentality that fits the demands of the global market society. To that extent the compatibility between neo-Pentecostalism and global capitalism is unintentional rather than engineered. Bernice Martin and David Martin represent those supporting the later explanation. Whilst realising there are differences between the present situation and that of 19th century, Bernice Martin contends that the success of neo-Pentecostalism in attracting many urban people, lies in its offering of power to overcome the confusion and inconvenience, as well as the excesses which result from the transition of society to post-modernity. She believes that the Pentecostal theological emphasis on healing and hope in the Holy Spirit creates a sense of self-confidence and a drive to a more orderly life, which have practical, constructive consequences in economic life.11 Martins theory implies an optimistic view that neo-Pentecostalism, with an individual transformation approach, enables the poor to improve their personal qualities so as to have respectful roles in the market economy, which in turn upgrades their social position. Brouwer et al. discard such a view. Although admitting the reputation of neo-Pentecostals and other fundamentalists in demonstrating honesty and discipline, they find no evidence, either in Latin America or Asia, which supports the claim that neo-Pentecostalism brings economic betterment to its followers.12 Brouwer et al. are correct in so far as the Indonesian context is concerned. In the case of FGBMF, it is those who are already rich who convert to neo-Pentecostalism. Joining that organisation means finding
11
Cf. Bernice Martin, From Pre- to Post-modernity in Latin America, p. 126129. 12 Cf. Steve Brouwer, et al., Exporting the American Gospel, p. 235.

pastoral support as well as incorporating into a new business network with a high degree of trust, and this may have the effect of increasing the strength and opportunity to do business better. This, however, is not a matter of transforming the poor into economically-better people. In fact, the conservative-Evangelical Christians of the business community, who do not share the neo-Pentecostals over-emphasis on healing and hope by the practical manifestations of the Holy Spirit, enjoy the same success and prosperity, given similar situations conducive to doing business, supported by the pastoral and fellowship atmosphere. At the same time, success and prosperity do not figure so strongly in the old Pentecostal churches and the conservative-Evangelical churches which are not specifically related to the business community,13 even when the former attempt to adopt the prosperity doctrine. The accordance between Christian fundamentalism and global capitalism is thus neither a matter of political conspiracy nor theological conformity. The meeting point could be the concept shared by both regarding the primary value of the individual. The absence of a critical social perspective in Christian fundamentalism, given its emphasis on individuality, makes fundamentalists at ease with the existing economic system and structure. This places them in an inconvenient position with the mainline Protestant groups which, influenced by liberation theology, tend to focus on the evil of the existing economic system and structure. The Christian fundamentalists uncritical acceptance of the market system even goes as far as employing market values and strategies in the churchs management and mission. Brouwer et al. underline Avril Edvardsens observation which finds a parallel between the cell system of the neo-Pentecostal church-growth programme and the multi-level marketing method of the U.S. companies Mary Kay and Amway.14 In Indo-
The Indonesian Baptist Church, a fruit of the mission work of the American Southern Baptist Convention, is an example of such churches. 14 Cf. Steve Brouwer, et al., Exporting the American Gospel, p. 243.
13

nesia, the IBC is known for allowing new congregations to use its church name under the franchise system. The Church of the Family of God, a mega-church in Solo City, issues membership cards that function as discount cards in partner shops and restaurants. In terms of the use of technology, these churches are among the first users of the newest products in information and communication technology, enabling the systems of their worship, management and mission projects to be upgraded regularly. Many mega-churches in Indonesia own FM radio stations, and some, such as the Church of the Family of God, have opened local television stations. The business-friendly approach is also attempted in the area of doctrine. For instance, a depiction of Jesus Christ as a successful business figure, such as Jesus the CEO, is quite popular among neoPentecostals.
4. Controversies over Sharia

Fifty-six members of the Indonesian parliament recently submitted a petition protesting bylaws which they consider sharia-based. Most of these members of parliament are affiliated with a political party which is supported by both conservative-Evangelical and Pentecostal/Charismatic Christians. The petition reflects the tension which exists between the Muslim and Christian communities, particularly their fundamentalist wings, concerning the attempt to implement sharia more explicitly in Indonesia. The Muslims are concerned with increasing moral problems of the country, which, they believe can only be solved by implementing sharia more comprehensively and assertively, not only in the conventional areas, such as marriage and worship within the Muslim community, but also in the wider public sphere of politics, the economy, public services, the media, civil law and education. Christians are afraid that a more explicit regulation of sharia, as reflected in the bylaws, endangers the national principle of unity in plurality which guarantees the equal-

ity of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation. The Christian petition failed to gain enough support from the wider circle of the Parliament. The idea of formalising sharia more explicitly is in fact controversial among Muslims themselves. Muslim scholars, Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean15 argue that the idea is simplistic, and lacks a credible analysis of contemporary social problems. According to them, the attempt to implement such an idea in several countries including Pakistan and Egypt has promoted internal conflict within the Muslim community itself. Similarly, Zuhairi Misrawi contends that the idea, as has been practised in Aceh, in fact, reduces sharia into Arabic customs, which is actually not the essence of sharia. He calls for hermeneutical work considering the progressive nature of sharia, so as to understand its real meaning, which, he believes, can be a paradigm for democracy and civil society.16
5. Muslim Perspectives on Capitalism

It is an influential view among Muslims that Islam is not only a religion in the sense of the common definition of this term. According to this view, Islam provides practical as well as philosophical concepts which cover all aspects of society, including politics and the economy.17 In terms of an economic system, Islam is believed to offer an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. Afzalur Rahman suggests that the Islamic economy contains the strengths of capitalism and socialism, yet at the same time is free from their weaknesses for it respects the ecoCf. Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariat Islam dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria (Jakarta: Alvabet), pp. 231-232. 16 Cf. Zuhairi Misrawi, Politik Islam: Syariat Simbolik atau Syariat Progresif? in: Khamami Zada and Arief R. Arofah, Diskursus Politik Islam (Jakarta: LSIP, 2004), pp. ix-xvi. 17 Cf. Masyhuri, Teori Ekonomi dalam Islam, (Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2005), p. v.
15

nomic rights of the individual, while not allowing them to endanger the interests of the community.18 From the point of view of economic discourse, Rahmans opinion is obviously debatable. Balancing the interests of the individual and those of society is in fact an ideal of any economic system, including capitalism and socialism. It can also be argued that the terms capitalism and socialism cover a wide range of different practical versions, so that interpreting capitalism as absolute individualism and socialism as absolute communalism is too simplistic. Rahman simply compares the ideal of what he calls the Islamic economy and the worst practices of other systems. Whilst Muslims may commonly agree that Islam should affect the whole of societal life, many would put Rahmans view into question. Khamami Zada and Arif Arafah, for instance, contend that the understanding of Islam as a complete and final system of both individual and social life is a form of romanticism, which often leads to the attempt to re-enact the old style of the Islamic community, without considering the real needs of the contemporary society.19 Zada and Arafah represent the groups of young Muslim scholars often associated with the liberal camp. Unlike the liberal-ecumenical Christian movement which openly resists global capitalism,20 the liberal Islamic groups, perhaps to avoid the impression of being radical, are not particularly hostile to capitalism. Mansour Fakih argues that liberal Islams approach is similar to that of secu-
Cf. Afzalur Rahman, Doktrin Ekonomi Islam, vol. I, terj. Soeroyo and Nastangin (Yogyakarta: Dana Bhakti Wakaf), p.10-12. 19 Cf. Khamami Zada and Arief R. Arofah, Diskursus Politik Islam, (Jakarta: LSIP), pp. 23-24. 20 As indicated in statements on economic issues by main ecumenical organisations, such as World Council of Churches and World Alliance of Reformed Churches; On WCC, cf. Ronald Preston, Confusions in Christian Ethics: Problems for Geneva and Rome. London: SCM Press; and On to Harare: Social Theology and Ethics in the World Council of Churches in: Crucible, Jan-Mar, 1997, pp. 24-33. Concerning WARC, cf. The Gospel Confronts Economic Injustice and the Destruction of the Earth: A Call to Confess Our Faith, Geneva:WARC, 1998.
18

lar developmentalism, in the sense that its critique of globalization and development focuses not on the conceptual level, but on the procedural one. For liberal Muslims the challenge is not how to change the system, but how to transform the mindset of traditional Muslims, which tends to be too fatalistic, to a rational and creative one, in order to increase Muslim capacity in the market economy. Hence, instead of offering an alternative, the liberal Muslim camp focuses on how to prepare Muslims to participate and perform better in the existing economic system. Fakih even accuses the liberal camp of not being aware of the damaging nature of neo-liberalism. He believes that such a perspective is quite dominant within the two largest Islamic denominations in Indonesia: Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.21 Fakihs critique may be biased, but the point I would like to show here is that as far as economic ethics is concerned the position of liberal Islam is not parallel to that of the liberal-ecumenical Christian or Christian liberation theology. There is however certainly an Islamic parallel to liberation theology, namely that referred to as Left Islam. Not particularly promoting the language of sharia, the agenda of the Left Islam movement in Indonesia includes anti-corruption investigations, the rejection of pro-market and neo-liberal economic policy, an appeal to boycott commercial public services, the call for the increase of labours wages, land redistribution, and cancellation of foreign debt.22 Yet the position of the Left Islam group in Indonesia is not significant within the Muslim community. Whilst attempting to share their vision with other Islamic groups and political parties, Left Islam activists tend to fulfil their mission through secular NGOs instead of Islamic organisations.23
21
Cf. Mansour Fakih, Islam sebagai Alternative in: Eko Prasetyo, Islam Kiri Melawan Kapitalisme Moda: Dari Wacana menuju Gerakan, (Yogyakarta: Insist Press, 2002), p. iii-xxi. 22 Cf. Eko Prasetyo, Islam Kiri Melawan Kapitalisme Modal: Dari Wacana menuju Gerakan, (Yogyakarta: Insist Press), pp. 309-314. 23 Cf. Mansour Fakih, Islam sebagai Alternative, p. xviii.
Economic Ethics of Fundamentalism 143 6. Islamic Fundamentalism on the Economy

The Indonesian economy after the 1997 crisis was marked by a remarkable growth of small businesses employing the sharia principle. The businesses claiming to be sharia-based cover a wide range of sectors from local supermarkets, restaurants and real estate to multi-level marketing networks. Their existence adds variety to the marketplace dominated by business chains. Responding to this phenomenon, many banks, including major and international ones open sharia units which offer an interest-free funding system. According to Pradana Boy24, the phenomenon of the sharia economy is related to the increase of religious fundamentalism, which drives the attempt to Islamise all levels of societal life. Quoting Bassam Tibi, Boy sees this attempt as a cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism to resist the domination of global (read Western) capitalism and its cultural invasion. Sharia is understood as a form of local culture to be reasserted in order to dewesternise the society. One of the Islamic organisations which overtly promotes sharia as the alternative to capitalism is Hizbut Tahrir (HT). Founded by Taqiyudin al-Nabhany in Jerusalem in 1953, Hizbut Tahrir started its operations in Indonesia only in 1982-1983, initiated by Abdullah Nuh, a lecturer at the Faculty of Letters at the University of Indonesia. With only 10,000 members HT Indonesia is relatively small in comparison to mainstream organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah (each with millions of members). Nevertheless, HT has attracted public attention when it organised the International Conference on Islamic State in 2000, and led mass rallies against the West on various international issues. In 2002, HT led a demonstration directed at Parliament demanding the
24
Cf. Pradana Boy ZTF, Simulasi Spiritual dalam Kapitalisasi Agama in: http://www.islamlib.com/, (last accessed: 16 June 06).

formalisation of sharia in Indonesia.25 The power of HT Indonesia is owed in part to its nature as an international organisation, making it less dependent on local support. At the heart of HTs mission is the creation of the Islamic super-state which transcends conventional national boundaries and is based on the complete system of sharia which is considered superior to (Western) democracy. HT assumes that the Islamic world has been distorted, not only by the religious, cultural and political invasions of the West, but also by Eastern philosophies and spiritualities. For it, such a serious situation requires a strict, uncompromising response, which must include both ideological and political steps.26 With this mission HT meets the characteristics of a fundamentalist organisation, and as such it is different from the Left Islam movement, despite their agreement on the evil of capitalism. Left Islams perspective includes contemporary social analysis and contains no obsession with an Islamic empire. Because of its mission HT totally resists the existing economic system. HTs perspective on the economy underlines Afzalur Rahmans attack on capitalism and socialism, and his claim that the Islamic economy is superior to any existing system. As a manifestation of its anticapitalist position, HT resists privatisation of public facilities, natural elements and mineral resources. This organisation also challenges two elements of modern capitalism. The first is the stock market. HT forbids participation in the stock market. The reason is that the stock exchange mechanism contradicts the Islamic principle of mutual contract, since one can become a shareholder of a company only by ones own act, namely buying its shares in the stock market. Thus, a shareholder is anonymous and the transaction is only a matter of material. The second
25
Cf. Syamsul Arifin, Ideologi dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Fundamentalis: Pengalaman Hizb al-Tahrir (Indonesia. Malang: UMM Press, 2005), See also Khamami Zada and Arief R. Arofah, Diskursus Politik Islam, pp. 82-102. 26 Cf. Syamsul Arifin, Ideologi dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Fundamentalis, p. 89-134.

is the world monetary system, which is based on the U.S. Dollar. HT argues against the use of paper money and contends that the use of paper money was a factor causing the 1997 economic crisis, because of its vulnerability. It calls for the return to gold and silver as used in the time of the prophet Muhammad. 27
7. The Sharia Economy in Practice

Are religious organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir practically related to the growing sharia-based businesses? Although both these religious organisations and the emergence of sharia-based businesses may have been inspired by the same religious-economic perspective that of Afzalur Rahman it is doubtful that both parties in practice share the same track. Whilst HT is totally pessimistic about the existing economy, the sharia-based businesses operate within the existing economy, not avoiding involvement in transactions, exchange and even partnerships with normal capitalist business institutions. Requiring the establishment of an Islamic super-state, HTs mission in the economic field seems to be too radical to be implemented at the practical level. Therefore, it would be more realistic to limit the position of HT in the ideological discourse. Criticisms of sharia-based businesses seem to focus on their tendency towards conformity. For instance, Pradana Boy observes that these businesses fail to separate themselves from the capitalist system, which they ideologically oppose. For Boy, these businesses fall into the practice of capitalising spirituality28, in the sense that they use reli27
Ibid, pp. 255-280. As such, HT rejects later developments in the Islamic philosophy on money, such as that of Al-Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun which allow the use of materials other than gold and silver as legal means of payment, cf.: Eko Suprayitno, Ekonomi Islam: Pendekatan Ekonomi Makro Islam dan Konvensional, (Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, 2005), pp. 202-204. 28 Pradana Boy ZTF, Simulasi Spiritual dalam Kapitalisasi Agama.

gious language for economic purposes. The result is business practices which have no essential difference from the existing capitalist system. There are reasonable factors which make sharia-based businesses a real alternative to the existing market system. First, it is only normal for businesses to interpret ideology in the manner that is workable in the real economic world. The marketplace is a socially plural context, where commitment to a particular ideology or spirituality should not obstruct economic competitiveness, even if they are unable to strengthen it. This economic interest inevitably prevents radical interpretation of an ideology from developing. Secondly, there is also an alternative interpretation of sharia, offered by the non-fundamentalist camp, which attempts precisely to promote the idea of compatibility or complementary between the sharia economy and the market economy, so as to counter sharia-phobic sentiments. This kind of interpretation is also a response to the recent awareness of the spiritual dimension of business, such as Danah Zohar and Ian Marshalls29 concept of spiritual capital. For instance, Hermawan Kartajaya and Muhammad Syakir Sula30 promote the concept of sharia marketing, which focuses on the character of the prophet Muhammad as the inspiration for modern marketing management. In this case, the religious reference functions as an ethical resource and, at the same time, as spiritual approval for the moral participation in the existing economic structure. This market-friendly version of sharia undoubtedly provides business people a more convenient and realistic option than the counter-globalization one does.
29
Cf. Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, Spiritual Capital: Wealth We Can Live By Using Our Rational, Emotional, and Spiritual Intelligence to Transform Ourselves and Corporate Culture (London: Bloomsbury, 2004). 30 Cf. Hermawan Kartajaya and Muhammad Syakir Sula, Syariah Marketing (Bandung: Mizan, 2006).
Economic Ethics of Fundamentalism 147 Conclusion

The contradiction between Christian and Islamic fundamentalist groups is not limited to the matter of truth claims as focused on in much inter-religious dialogue. In terms of economic ethics, there is potential conflict between the two groups in a way that reflects Samuel Huntingtons theory on the Clash of Civilisations. Whilst the Christian fundamentlist-neo-Pentecostal groups tend to take the existing market economy for granted, feeling free to employ its strategy and culture, the Islamic ones struggle for an alternative, designed according to the system operated in the early period of the development of Islam. However, a practical confrontation between them will not easily occur, since the ambition of the Islamic groups to put their concept into practice by first getting rid of the existing economic system, finds it hard to gain enough support from the wider Islamic community. Even the Muslim business community which may share the ideal of the fundamentalist groups, in practice takes a more pragmatic way, making possible easy relations with any business actor in the marketplace, regardless of religious affiliation. Both Christian and Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia are extensions of foreign movements. Each ones vision reflects the situation in a particular social-cultural context: North America for the Christians, and Arabic countries for the Muslims. None of them demonstrates sensitivity to the local context. Both of them suffer from the lack of careful hermeneutical work and contemporary social analysis. Their perspectives thus are far from contextual. As such, both are unable to provide an ethical reference which is not only critical but also constructive regarding the Indonesian economy. Although their influences in economic practice are still limited, they should be seen as a challenge for contextual theologians of both religions, to develop Christian and

Islamic economic theologies which would respond accurately to the real issues of the Indonesian economy.
Bibliography
Amal, Taufik Adnan/ Panggabean, Samsu Rizal, Politik Syariat Islam dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria. Jakarta: Alvabet. Arifin, Syamsul, Ideologi dan Praksis Gerakan Sosial Fundamentalis: Pengalaman Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia. Malang: UMM Press, 2005. Backman, Michael, Asian Eclipse: Exposing the Dark Side of Business in Asia. Singapore: John Wiley & Son (Asia), 1999. Barr, James, Fundamentalisme. Jakarta: BPK, 1994, translated by Stephen Suleeman. Boy ZTF, Pradana, Simulasi Spiritual dalam Kapitalisasi Agama in http://islamlib.com/, (last accessed: 16 June 2006). Brouwer Steve/ Gifford, Paul/ Rose, Susan, Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism. London: Routledge, 1996. Fakih, Mansour, Islam sebagai Alternative in: Prasetyo, Eko, Islam Kiri Melawan Kapitalisme Modal: Dari Wacana menuju Gerakan. Yogyakarta: Insist Press, 2002. Kartajaya, Hermawan / Sula, Muhammad Syakir, Syariah Marketing. Bandung: Mizan, 2006. Mantiri, H.B.L./ Gani, Hakim, Buku Pedoman Organisasi Full Gospel Business Mens Fellowship International Indonesia. Jakarta, 2003. Martin, Bernice, From Pre- to Postmodernity in Latin America: the Case of Pentecostalism in: Heelas Paul (ed.) Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity. London: Blackwell, 1998. Martin, David, Forbidden Revolutions: Pentecostalism in Latin America, Catholicism in Eastern Europe. London: SPCK, 1996. Masyhuri, Teori Ekonomi dalam Islam, Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2005.

Misrawi, Zuhairi, Politik Islam: Syariat Simbolik atau Syariat Progresif? in Zada, Khamami/ Arofah, Arief R., Diskursus Politik Islam. Jakarta: LSIP, 2004. Prasetyo, Eko, Islam Kiri Melawan Kapitalisme Modal: Dari Wacana menuju Gerakan. Yogyakarta: Insist Press, 2002. Preston, Ronald, On to Harare: Social Theology and Ethics in the World Council of Churches in: Crucible, Jan-Mar, 1997, pp. 24-33. Preston, Ronald, Confusions in Christian Ethics: Problems for Geneva and Rome. London: SCM Press, 1994. Rahman, Afzalur, Doktrin Ekonomi Islam, vol. I, Yogyakarta: Dana Bhakti Wakaf, 1995, translated by Soeroyo and Nastangin. Suprayitno, Eko, Ekonomi Islam: Pendekatan Ekonomi Makro Islam dan Konvensional. Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, 2005. WARC, The Gospel Confronts Economic Injustice and the Destruction of the Earth: A Call to Confess Our Faith, Geneva: WARC, 1998. Zada, Khamami and Arofah, Arief R., Diskursus Politik Islam. Jakarta: LSIP, 2004. Zohar, Danah / Marshall, Ian, Spiritual Capital: Wealth We Can Live By Using Our Rational, Emotional, and Spiritual Intelligence to Transform Ourselves and Corporate Culture. London: Bloomsbury, 2004.
WHY CATHOLICS CANT VOTE PRO-LIFE
Brett Salkeld, Canada
The Ideal Candidate

After the 2002 midterm elections, I attended a private dinner for Harvard Fellows in Cambridge. Our speaker was a Republican political strategist who had just won all the major senatorial and gubernatorial election campaigns in which he was involved. Needless to say, he was full of his success and eager to tell us about it. This very smart political operative said that Republicans won middleclass and even working-class people on the social issues, those moral and cultural issues that Democrats dont seem to understand or appreciate. He even suggested that passion on the social issues can cause people to vote against their economic self-interest. Since the rich are already with us, he said, we win elections. I raised my hand and asked the following question: What would you do if you faced a candidate who took a traditional moral stance on the social and cultural issues? They would not be mean-spirited and, for example, blame gay people for the breakdown of the family, nor would they criminalise the choices of desperate women backed into difficult and dangerous corners. But the candidate would decidedly be pro-family, pro-life (meaning really want to lower the abortion rate), strong on personal responsibility and moral values, and outspoken against the moral pollution throughout popular culture that makes raising chil-

dren in America a countercultural activity. And what if that candidate was also an economic populist, pro-poor in social policy, tough on corporate corruption and power, clear in supporting middle- and working-class families in health care and education, an environmentalist, and committed to a foreign policy that emphasised international law and multilateral cooperation over pre-emptive and unilateral war? What would you do? I asked. He paused for a long time and then said, We would panic! (Story of Jim Wallis)1
In the United States, the question of fundamentalism is generally associated with a Christian religious right wing. I agree that the position of the Christian right in the United States is often fundamentalist, but perhaps not in the sense that most people who level the charge intend. Fundamentalism is, popularly, associated with religious fervour, but a sincere, devout, even fervent, practitioner of religion is not necessarily a fundamentalist. Moreover, fundamentalism can exist without religion at all. Seculars, whose arguments suggest that the separation of church and state implies that anyone whose conscience has been formed by a religious community and tradition is unfit to participate in the public forum, showcase a non-religious fundamentalism. While I leave the comprehensive definition of fundamentalism to others at this conference, my own working definition does not see fundamentalism as an overwhelming commitment to a position, religious or not, that insists that those opposing the position are wrong. Dare we label Ghandi a fundamentalist? Or Martin Luther King? Or Mother Theresa? Firm convictions do not a fundamentalist make. Instead, I propose, that one aspect of fundamentalism is in the narrow application of broad principles. Non-Muslims are told that Islamic terrorists do not, in fact, practice authentic Islam. Rather, they have isolated certain ideas
1 Jim Wallis, Gods Politics: Why The Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesnt Get It (San Francisco: Harper, 2005, 72-73.
Why Catholics Cant Vote Pro-Life 153

from their broader context and, in applying them so isolated, violated Islams own principles. The right wing in Western democracies is identified, both by itself, and its opponents, as pro-life in the sense that it rejects abortion and euthanasia. But this demographic also tends to be more supportive of government policies that seem pointedly anti-life, such as capital punishment or aggressive military endeavours. To me, the heart of their fundamentalism does not lie in their opposition to abortion, but in the fact that their conviction about the sanctity of human life does not extend to convicted criminals, Iraqi civilians, or even the poor and oppressed in the streets of their own cities. The broad principle that all life is sacred is narrowly and selectively applied. The left, for its part, is no better in its narrow application of this principle; it merely makes the opposite selections. The United States, as a two-party system, provides an excellent example of the way in which the political spectrum in many Western democracies views some life issues as concerns of the left, and others as concerns of the right. In this paper I will: 1. Discuss the problem of voting pro-life in the United States; 2. Investigate an example in which one pro-life voters pro-life positions are compromised; 3. Propose that the division over the life issues in Western democracies is rooted in misapprehensions of the Christian conceptions of A) Sin, B) the Human Person and C) Salvation before suggesting that the D) Christian Concept of God provides a useful corrective for these misapprehensions. Finally in 4., I will call on makers of public policy to overcome the ideologies based in these misapprehensions and to value human life in all their policies. This is my Hope for the Future.
1. The Problem
I admit that the title, The Ideal Candidate is a bit subjective. The person described might be Jim Walliss ideal candidate and it might even be my own, but this is not, perhaps, enough to justify the use of the definitive article. Still, ideal or not, such a candidate would garner a lot of votes in the United States (and elsewhere) and, even if you wouldnt vote for such a platform, you probably know people who would. There is a large constituency of voters who are very frustrated with the leftright split in the political spectrum of Western democracies (I speak with experience of North American democracies in particular) and who do not feel that their values are represented by either group.2 For many of these voters the most difficult aspect of deciding how to vote is determining which life issues they will be able to support and which they can afford to oppose.3 The hypothetical candidate described above would allow pro-life voters to elect someone who truly represents their values on many of the issues that concern them the most. Nevertheless, such a candidate remains a hypothetical one. This paper is, at root, about why such a candidate does not exist. At this point it must be noted that this paper is, as has probably been ascertained, decidedly pro-life. It must also be noted that the term prolife is used here to indicate an entire platform which rejects any reason for artificially ending human life that does not stem from the protection of other, innocent human life, and not simply to mean anti-abortion.4 In
Jim Wallis, Gods Politics: Why The Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesnt Get It (San Francisco: Harper, 2005, 76. 3 See, for example, Mary Jo Bane, Eugene McCarraher, and George Weigel, You Catholic? Heres How to Vote, Commonweal CXXVII, no. 18 (20 October 2000), http://www.commonwealmagazine.org. 4 For instance, such a platform does not automatically reject the possibility of killing in self-defence or similar, though not parallel, possibilities such as just war, capital punishment when necessary to protect the broader public, or operating on an ectopic pregnancy.

a pluralistic society where we can find so many things that distinguish us from one another, we cannot use such distinctions to determine whose life is less valuable than someone elses not race, religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, size, criminal record, health, stage of development, wealth, handicap, or location (in the womb, or next to a munitions factory). It is my philosophical conviction that appealing to any of the above categories to demonstrate that one persons life is less valuable than anothers is the most severe violation of the principle of equality that must underpin a pluralist society. Furthermore, it is my religious conviction, as a Roman Catholic, that every human life is sacred and derives its dignity from being made in the image of God. Despite the concerns of many citizens about many life issues, in contemporary North American political discourse the term pro-life has been manipulated to refer to a single issue, that of abortion.5 The position of the Catholic Church on this issue is no secret. What many people, including many Catholics, do not realise is that the Churchs stance as a pro-life institution extends far beyond this one divisive issue. Even a cursory reading of magisterial documents on such matters indicates that the Church is anti-abortion, anti-euthanasia, anti-death penalty and antiwar. Catholicism presents a vision that is comprehensively and unapologetically pro-life in the widest sense of the term. To give an example of this breadth, while researching this paper I came upon the entry for Respect for Life, Dignity of Life in the New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality. There was no article following but rather a collection of other entries listed which the editors found pertinent to the topic. It said, See Confrontation and Protest; Ecological Consciousness; Environment; Justice; Peace; Pregnancy; War, impact on spirituality.. The Church sees all of these as life issues and always argues that approaches to any of these topics must regard the dignity of human life as a primary value.
5
On occasion the issue of euthanasia is included in this discussion.

Unfortunately the structure of our political systems does not reflect an overarching concern for human life as fundamental to human society. Rather, the two poles of the spectrum, referred to as right and left, embrace diverse ideologies whereby those on the right tend to be pro-life in that they oppose abortion and euthanasia, while those one the left manifest a pro-life attitude in their opposition to war and capital punishment and even by their environmental concerns. Neither position reflects the broad vision of the sanctity of human life which is espoused by the Catholic Church. Before the 2000 Presidential election in the United States, Commonweal magazine ran a feature entitled, You Catholic? Heres How to Vote.6 It was made up of three smaller pieces, each written by a Catholic, encouraging their fellow Catholic voters to support, in turn, the Democrats under Al Gore, the Republicans under George Bush, and the Greens under Ralph Nader. Mary Jo Bane, who advocated supporting the Democrats, opened her section by writing, I would like to vote, this year or sometime, for a ticket and a party that is pro-life, pro-family, and pro-poor.7 What followed was an anguished justification for her choice to vote Democrat. She laments the rabidly pro-choice8 Democratic primary, but eventually concludes that the Democratic Party even . . . shows more appreciation for the preciousness of life across the whole life cycle, especially in the lives of the very vulnerable,9 than their Republican adversaries. Catholic Christians are, as a whole, quite invested in the fight for the recognition of the dignity of every human person. Depending, however, within which context that fight takes place (i.e. within debates on war or
Mary Jo Bane, Eugene McCarraher, and George Weigel, You Catholic? Heres How to Vote, Commonweal CXXVII, no. 18 (20 October 2000), http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

debates on abortion) Catholics are forced to one side or another of the political spectrum a political spectrum that does not reflect Christian categories of thought that treat human life as a fundamental value. The present political organisation which surrounds life issues, and forces Catholics and other like-minded citizens, into supporting some policies to which they are radically opposed, also serves to erode the sense of the sanctity of human life amongst Catholic voters. The Church proclaims the dignity and value of every human life, but it is difficult not to find some justification for voting, say pro-abortion, when one is forced to support either that or a war which one feels is unjust. It is less rare than one might hope, to hear pro-life Catholics excuse voting for pro-choice politicians with specious arguments about how, though one would never get an abortion oneself, one could not prevent anyone else from getting one, as if taking life were simply a matter of personal preference. Such situations tempt Christians in North American democratic societies to fall into the trap of identifying one end of the political spectrum with Christian interests. The propensity for such identification is, due largely to the Republicans successful self-representation as the prolife party, more prevalent among conservative Catholics than liberal ones. Many Catholics in the United States who had traditionally voted Democrat supported the Republican Party under George W. Bush largely due to his strong stance against abortion. While there is clearly not a problem with a Catholic voting against abortion, problems arise when the support given to the Republican Party leads to justifying other Republican platforms platforms that are pointedly anti-life.
2. An Example
Catholic leaders and ethicists have roundly condemned the Bush administrations invasion of Iraq as unjust10, and the predictions of civilian casualties have proven accurate. Nevertheless, those Catholics who have come to identify conservative policies with Christian policies end up supporting a war which the Magisterium has clearly rejected.11 What follows below is a brief investigation into the situation of George Weigel, a prominent conservative Catholic writer whose support for the Bush administrations foreign policy has become the subject of some controversy in Catholic intellectual circles. While the Weigel situation is addressed to provide a concrete example of a Catholic identifying the Christian agenda with the Republican agenda, it is important to note that other Christian groups face similar concerns, as evidenced by the 200 theologians who lamented that a theology of war emanating from the highest circles of government is also seeping into our churches.12 Weigel, a widely read and influential voice in conservative Catholic circles and beyond, was one of Bushs most vocal, and articulate, supporters within the Catholic intelligentsia. His support of the war in Iraq has drawn fire from many quarters, particularly from liberal Catholics13 who, with the backing of most of the Church hierarchy,14 do not view the war as justified. With most conservative Catholics, Weigel considers fidelity to Church teaching on issues of morality a fundamental tenet of his CaMichael J. Baxter, A Pacifist Perspective in Seven Points, The Catholic Citizen: Debating the Issues of Justice, ed. Kenneth Whitehead (South Bend, IN: St. Augustines Press, 2004), p. 215. 11 See, for example, the George Weigel article Iraq and Just War, Revisited, http://www.eppc.org/ 12 Wallis, Gods Politics, p. xx-xxi. 13 George Weigel, Great Bosh, The Catholic Difference, 19 March 2003, http://www.eppc.org/ 14 Baxter, A Pacifist Perspective in Seven Points, p. 215.
10

tholicism. As such, charges that he is dissenting from Church teaching, or at least from the position of the hierarchy, are not kindly taken.15 Nevertheless, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that Mr. Weigels support for the Bush administration has extended well beyond support for issues which coincide with his Catholic values and now encompasses Republican policies which are pointedly at odds with the Church. While it is the prerogative of the Catholic to decide, upon careful consideration of the evidence available (and not available) to that person including the informed opinions of the Catholic hierarchy and other Catholic ethicists whether or not a given war is justified, Weigels support of the American policy in Iraq seems to stem from his proRepublican sentiments. It appears that this eminent voice in the American Church is as guilty of following partisan lines, rather than the broad vision of the Church, as so many of the Catholics who vote Democrat, and with whom he disagrees. This is, especially to someone like Weigel, a serious charge, and so must be supported with more evidence than the simple fact that he happens to disagree with the hierarchy on the justice of a particular war. Recall Mary Jo Banes situation earlier in this article: this Catholic writer agonized over the fact that there existed no pro-life, pro-family, pro-poor party for whom she could vote in the 2000 presidential election; no party that reflected the broad range of her Catholic concerns. George Weigel followed Banes commentary with his reasons for voting Republican. In his comments, there is no careful analysis of how the Democrats and Republicans reflect or do not reflect a Catholic vision, followed by a choice which, though it recognises the imperfection of its object, must be content to choose the best possible option in an imperfect system. Instead, Weigel opens with a litany of Republican
15
See, George Weigel, Great Bosh, The Catholic Difference, 19 March 2003, http://www.eppc.org/

policies, of which he approves, accompanied by their Democratic alternatives, which he condemns, before focusing on what, for him, is the most significant issue, appointments to the Supreme Court.16 It is not hard to agree with his points concerning this essential factor in determining what to do with ones Catholic vote. Three or four Gore appointed judges who insist on the abortion-on-demand system and who would take similar attitudes into upcoming cases concerning issues in human reproductive technology, regardless of the will of the American people,17 is enough to frighten any Catholic voter. The fact remains, however, that, in his analysis of how a Catholic ought to vote in an American presidential election, George Weigel gave no indication whatsoever that certain Republican policies could be problematic for Catholic voters. Even from a historical standpoint this is surprising given that Catholics have traditionally been a Democrat supporting constituency. The 2000 election was before the war in Iraq, but Weigels support of this war has taken basically the same tone. His writings seem not to acknowledge the concerns that other Catholics have with the war. In particular, his pre-war writings often dismissed just war concerns known as in bellum (like the concerns over civilian casualties), as impossible to predict and logically subordinate to ad bellum concerns.18 He has also been loath to criticise the Bush administration subsequently for civilian casualties, prisoner-abuse scandals and other in bellum considerations, of which there have been many.19 One gets the feeling that such criticism would have been easier for Weigel to level, had he not so unequivocally supported Bushs campaign for the presidency and his subsequent push for war. Certainly no one
16 17
Bane, McCarraher, and Weigel, You Catholic? Heres How to Vote. Ibid. 18 Peter Dula, How Conservative Catholics Got Iraq Wrong, Commonweal CXXXI, no. 21 (3 December 2004), http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ 19 Ibid.

would have accused Mary Jo Bane of hypocrisy were Gore to have won the election and then faced her criticism on certain Democratic policies. Weigel, instead, has provided an illustration of a serious problem: Catholic citizens becoming too committed to a particular party stand as consistent with Catholic principles and then being unable to abandon, or even critique, it when a dissonance arises. Weigel is now in a position of disagreement with the Church rather than the Republican Party line. He holds that a belief expressed in magisterial documents and promoted by most orthodox theologians and senior members of the church hierarchy, up to and including the pope, is mistaken. In other words, he is dissenting. This is not, de facto, a condemnation. There is an important role for responsible dissent in the Church. One of the best examples of this is John Courtney Murray, whose dissenting position on religious freedom was formally adopted by the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council. The problem lies not specifically in Weigels dissent, but rather in the fact that he rejects any suggestion he is dissenting as polemics... unworthy of serious people considering serious, life-and-death issues,20 and that his dissent seems very closely tied to the positions of a political party which he supports for its, ostensible, coherence with Catholic values.
3. A Proposal
If such an intelligent, articulate and serious Catholic as George Weigel can be shown to have followed partisan lines in his discernment of the issues which divide civil society between left and right, it is not surprising that many of the rest of us are often caught in the same problem. Indeed, there must be some deeper logic which underlies the dichotomy placing certain life issues within the purview of left-leaning parties and others within that of right-leaning parties; given our propen20
Weigel, Great Bosh.

sity to follow civil society in this dichotomy, this logic must be infiltrating Christian consciences as well. How is it that no political party has taken a stand as universally pro-life, particularly in a country like the United States where such a stand, it seems, would be welcome by a large part of the electorate? Why is Jim Wallis ideal candidate hypothetical? In a country whose politics are as dominated by religious ideology and language as those of the United States, I propose that what divides the life issues between the two major political parties are competing misapprehensions of three basic ideas of Christian theology: sin, the human person, and salvation. One of my professors at St. Michaels college is fond of saying that the true test of any doctrine is to discern what it ultimately says about God. Near the end of this paper I will reverse this test and suggest that what we know about God can help us to correct the misapprehensions of the above concepts. But first, what are our misapprehensions?
3.1 Sin
As I used the topic of war to demonstrate the problem of Christians supporting political positions opposed to what has been called a consistent ethic of life,21 I now turn to another life issue to illustrate our misconceptions about sin: poverty. Poverty is a life issue because it is so often the result of social injustice and the cause of conflict. The Second Vatican Council states in section 29 of Gaudium et Spes that
the excessive economic and social inequalities among members or peoples of the same human family are a scandal and are at variance with social justice, equity, the dignity of the human person and, not least, social and international peace.22
21 22
Wallis, Gods Politics, p. xxvi. Second Vatican Council: Gaudium et spes, no. 29, in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, ed. Norman P. Tanner, 1086 (London: Sheed and Ward and Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990).

By virtue of its constitutive relationship to peace, social justice is a pro-life issue. Poverty is also closely related to other life issues because the poor are more susceptible to things like death by capital punishment, or epidemic diseases. Referring to the left and right ends of the political spectrum in the United States, Jim Wallis says:
I am always amazed by the debate about poverty, with one side citing the need for changes in personal behaviours and the other side for better social programmes, as if the two were mutually exclusive. Obviously, both personal and social responsibility are necessary for overcoming poverty. When this absurd bifurcation is offered by ideological partisans on either side, I am quickly convinced that both sides must never have lived or worked anywhere near poverty or poor people.23
My brother-in-law is a social worker and I talked to him about this issue while preparing this paper. As someone who has worked among the poor his comments are insightful. He says that social workers learn, very early on, that if someone is unwilling to take personal responsibility for their lives, no amount of time and effort will help them. Further, he says, social workers get their hearts broken when they see those they work with who have taken personal responsibility constantly failing to turn their lives around because the systematic biases which they encounter are nearly impossible to overcome. Wallis continues:
That there are behaviours that further entrench and even cause poverty is indisputable, as is the undeniable power of systems and structures to institutionalise injustice and oppression. Together, personal and social responsibility creates the common good. Because we know these realities as religious facts, taught to us
23
Wallis, Gods Politics, p. 6.

by our sacred Scriptures, religious communities can teach them to those still searching more for blame than solutions to pressing social problems.24
Blame is a useful political category. If, in your rhetoric, you can convince people whose fault a given problem is, it is easily mistaken for your having proposed a solution. Further, if your political opponent blames one group, it is expedient for you to name another group and set it up in opposition to your opponents. But, as expedient as this may be for getting elected, it is far less so for solving problems. Whose fault is poverty (or the environmental crisis, or the war)? Whose mistakes led to the circumstance in question? In this pattern of fault-finding we encounter the ancient Christian category of sin. Sin is the concept by which the Judeo-Christian tradition has expressed the universal human experience that we are not as we should be. This has been articulated in two diverse but interdependent ways. The first is sin as a personal phenomenon whereby the individual falls short of his/her own dignity by damaging themselves and others. Eve ate the apple. The second is sin as a social phenomenon in which all of humanity has become entangled. The first emphasises personal responsibility, the second structural evil. Both Scripture and Christian tradition demonstrate that the two are inseparable. St. Paul tells us that all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, but also associates sin with the world. Individuals sin, but they are caught up in something bigger than themselves when they do it. We are all born into a world full of the effects of the sin of all of those who have come before us, but there is always, by definition, a non-sinful choice in a given situation. That is, to sin, an individual must choose to sin. Thus we are led away from our ideal selves both from
24
Ibid.

within and from without. A truly Christian vision of social policy will reflect this insight. Instead, Republicans have claimed the moral high ground with their emphasis on issues of personal responsibility, particularly those surrounding sexuality and, though shrouded in the rhetoric of the secularist left, the Democrats often more closely reflect the concerns of Christians when it comes to issues of structural evil. The bi-polar political spectrum does not reflect a truly Christian view of humanity, one in which personal responsibility is treated alongside, and in relation to, structural evils. The Catholic Church rejects abortion and euthanasia as sins, but it also recognises sinful structures in society, structures that do not reveal the truth about human beings.25 Such structures oppress the poor, leave the needy unaided, and perpetrate violence, institutionalised and other, against large segments of the population. It seems that each pole of the current political spectrum can appeal to Catholics voters on the basis of only one of the two traditional conceptions of sin. Conservatism, politically, has tended towards an emphasis on the individual. It is associated with the more raw forms of capitalism where persons are responsible for only themselves. The larger structures, like those of government, are to have only as much impact on the individual citizens as is necessary to run the state. It is not surprising that, within this framework, the moral concerns which emerge are those focusing on the individual. Many traditional Catholics are likely to support the fight against such individual sins as abortion and euthanasia in part because they are the more likely group to follow traditional Catholic penitential practice, which is highly focused on the individual.26
Leonardo Boff, Liberating Grace, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1981), p. 143. 26 Stephen J. Duffy, Sin, dictionary entry, Stephen J. Duffy in The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, dictionary, ed. Michael Downey (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1993), p. 900.
25

The left, called liberal, though hardly to be equated with classical liberalism, is more concerned with the group dynamic in society. It is more comfortable with big government, social programmes, and looking out for those who would slip through the cracks in an each-for-his-own environment. As such, the moral issues with which it identifies most strongly are more likely to be structural types of problems than individual ones. The left, then, appeals to those Catholics who want to fight structural injustice in the world. Sins committed by nation-states, like execution or war, are more likely to draw their political attention than individual sins, like abortion, which are easily passed off as merely a result of poorly organised societies. Both groups have a corner of the truth. The problem is that such conceptions are incomplete. The Catholic view of sin encompasses both personal and social sin. Further, they are not two independent categories. Nor is social sin just a collection of people committing personal sin.27 The two categories are, necessarily, integrated. Stephen Duffy writes:
Sinful structures are created and maintained by sinful persons, and personal sin makes alienating institutions worse by reinforcing and magnifying their impact. But the structures produced by corporate decision assume a logic of their own, inflict alienation by moulding consciousness, and become anonymous agents of social sin. Social sin, in turn, produces an environment in which personal sin is all but inescapable.28
An awareness of both personal and social sin is necessary to break such a cycle. The left will never solve the worlds structural problems if it ignores personal iniquity, and the right will never succeed in eliminating problems like abortion as long as its focus stays squarely on legislating against individual acts. It is not that trying to solve structural prob27 28
Ibid. Ibid.

lems or legislating against abortion are erroneous premises. They are just incomplete as incomplete as the notion of sin which underlies them.
3.2 The Human Person

Further, it should be clear, from the quick portraits of conservatism and liberalism sketched above, that their concerns for particular categories of sin stem from particular conceptions of the human person. To the right-wing, society is a collection of individuals. People are atomised taken out of their social context. To the left, people are the pieces of a society. People are collectivised denied their individuality. The further one gets to the extremes of the political spectrum, the more difficult it becomes to maintain a view of the human person that values both individuality and community. These two aspects of humanity are treated as competing rather than complementary. A look into another life issue, abortion, will serve to illustrate the incompatibility of a Catholic view of the human person with the current political spectrum. Catholics, being pro-life on abortion, find themselves siding with the right-wing on this issue. Nevertheless, the Catholic position sees the arguments for and against abortion as ideologically confused along party lines. The left insists that women own their bodies and can do what they please with their own property. But does not this appeal to ownership seem awfully capitalistic for the left? In discussing this issue with one of my professors, she suggested that, to her, pregnancy was a beautiful symbol of the interdependence of human persons, and abortion is a rejection of that. But would the left not want to encourage a communitarian view of the human person by valuing pregnancy? Listen to this excerpt from the entry on abortion in The New Dictionary of Theology:

Those opposed [to abortion] warn of a significant potential for devaluing all human life in an abortion accepting society. They judge abortion to be a symptom of a greater systematic illness in a society which uses and oppresses persons for commercial gain, neglects the elderly and the handicapped, exhibits gender and sexual discrimination, and spends proportionally more for defence than it does to alleviate the societal, educational, medical, and employment needs which lessen the quality of life for many. The presence of these social ills in a society suggests a lack of commitment to the Judeo-Christian ethic which values every human person regardless of age, condition or developmental stage.29
Can we imagine such a passage being written by the anti-abortion administration currently in office in the White House? Such an unlikely scenario demonstrates that the left is not immune from the phenomenon we investigated in the case of George Weigel. Many liberal Catholics, in line with Church teaching concerning war, are unwilling to support efforts to legislate against abortion. Because this issue has been so successfully framed as a womens rights issue by its proponents, many left-leaning Catholics, who determinedly support gender equality, often accept a womans right to abortion as a necessary corollary. Accepting that women have been historically mistreated and continue to suffer in many ways in our societies, and that this needs to be rectified, is not equivalent to demonstrating that a woman owns another human that happens to reside in her body and can do with it what she will. Accepting such logic is to accept the Democratic Party line, and not to give witness to a consistent idea of the value of the human person.
29
Robert M. Friday, Abortion, dictionary entry, Robert M. Friday in The New Dictionary of Theology, dictionary, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak et al. (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1990), p. 6.
Why Catholics Cant Vote Pro-Life 169 3.3 Salvation

If the concepts of sin that place some life issues within the prerogative of the right, and some within the prerogative of the left are, in fact, based in competing, incomplete, and confused concepts of the human person, it is only natural that these concepts should impact the views of salvation of those who hold them. It is not surprising that the right-wing finds support amongst churches whose theologies speak often of a personal Lord and Saviour, and are very concerned with the salvation of each individual soul. Catholicism, on the other hand, rarely invokes such language because, while it is individuals who must ultimately choose God as their highest good, this is usually seen as occurring in the context of a community of faith, from the parents who choose to have us baptised to the members of Christs body who pray for us in purgatory. As such, the dichotomy in our political structures which pits the concerns of the individual versus those of the community is foreign to the Catholic idea of the human person. The good of one is, for Catholics, ultimately and undeniably, the good of all. This is as true in this life as it is in the next. Salvation, even though it happens to specific individuals, is a community effort. Heaven is not a location you can go to, it is a relationship with God and all those in relationship with God. This is what is meant by the body of Christ. The logic of heaven also holds for solving societal ills: we must recognise both the inestimable worth of each human individual, and the fact that we are only fully human in relation to one another. Our personhood is, at least in part, defined by our relations to others.30 If, as religious people, we are aware that every person is irreplaceable in the Body of Christ, but that this is precisely because of their relationship to the whole, then we should not accept the current political debates that suggest personal
30
Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, Dogmatic Theology 9, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988, 232.

and social causes are unrelated, and that personal and social solutions are incompatible.
3.4 A Christian Conception of God

That man is both personal and social, and that both of these aspects must be given due appreciation in discussions of sin and salvation (or, in our political environment, blame and solution), should be amenable to the Christian conscience. As believers in the Incarnation, we profess that God became man and dwelt among us; that Jesus Christ, though God, was fully human; indeed, more fully human than the rest of us. When we say that He was like us in all things but sin, this does not suggest that this was the one thing lacking in His humanity. Indeed, it is the thing lacking in ours. When we sin, we are less than ourselves. Thus Christian anthropology flows from Christology , specifically from that part of Christology wherein Christ is portrayed as the paradigm of the human as intended by the creator. God created humanity to become his image and likeness (Gen 1:26).31 The fully human Christ, Jesus of Nazareth, is the model for humanity, but Christ is also fully God. He is the second person of the Trinity. Christian tradition has come to understand comments such as I and the Father are one, alongside others such as Not even the Son knows, but only the Father, as an indication of the plural nature of the one God. That the concept is difficult is evidenced by our necessity of referring to the Trinity as a mystery, but that does not mean we can learn nothing from it. The fully human Christ lived in the community of Israel, and the fully divine Christ exists only as a member of the community that is the Trinity. Still, He is a distinct member of these communities. If man is made in the image and likeness of God, and Christ has revealed both God as community and man to himself, it is imperative that
31
Michael J. Scanlon O.S.A., Christian Anthropology, dictionary entry, Michael J. Scanlon O.S.A.in The New Dictionary of Theology, dictionary, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak et al. (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1990), p. 28.

a Christian view of the human person be both personal and communitarian. Knowing God as both personal and plural teaches us to know ourselves, made in the image of God, as personal and plural. When we seek to understand the problems in our societies and discover solutions we cannot ignore either personal responsibility or social injustice.
4. My Hope for the Future

The views of the left and right in the United States are deadlocked on virtually every life issue, from abortion to poverty, because of the narrow vision of the human person espoused by each group. A truly pro-life perspective, an ideology that values every human person, will need to overcome the current stalemate by presenting a picture of humanity as both personal and communal. This broader vision should allow adherents of the right and the left to find common ground from which to approach the pressing issues of the day, issues that are sharply dividing both civil and ecclesial society. It is my sincere hope that one day soon the perspective of those responsible for public policy, and of those who elect them, will value life above political affiliation and ideology.
Bibliography
Bane, Mary Jo/McCarraher, Eugene/Weigel, George, You Catholic? Heres How to Vote, in: Commonweal CXXVII (no. 18), 20 October 2000, http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ Baxter, Michael J., A Pacifist Perspective in Seven Points, in: Whitehead (ed.), The Catholic Citizen: Debating the Issues of Justice, South Bend: St. Augustines Press, 2004, pp. 207-222. Boff, Leonardo, Liberating Grace, Translated by John Drury, Maryknoll: Orbis, 1981.

Duffy, Stephen J. Sin Dictionary entry. The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, Dictionary, ed. Michael Downey, Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1993, pp. 889901. Dula, Peter (3 December 2004), How Conservative Catholics Got Iraq Wrong, Commonweal CXXXI, no. 21 http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ Friday, Robert M. Abortion Dictionary entry. The New Dictionary of Theology. Dictionary, ed. Joseph 8434A. Komonchak et al., Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1990, pp. 2-6. Ratzinger, Joseph, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, Dogmatic Theology 9, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988. Scanlon, Michael J. O.S.A. Christian Anthropology Dictionary entry. The New Dictionary of Theology. Dictionary, ed. Joseph A. Komonchak et al, Collegeville, The Liturgucal Press, 1993, pp. 27-41. Second Vatican Council: Gaudium et spes, no. 29, p. 1086, in: Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, ed. Norman P. Tanner. London: Sheed and Ward and Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990, p. 1086. Wallis, Jim. Gods Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesnt Get It. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005. Weigel, George (19 March 2003) Great Bosh, The Catholic Difference, http://www.eppc.org/ Weigel, George, Iraq and Just War, Revisited, http://www.eppc.org/
TOLERANCE, DEMOCRACY AND FUNDAMENTALISM(S): CHALLENGES IN TIME OF SYSTEMIC BIFURCATIONS
Guillermo Hansen, Argentina
The globalising and unsettling forces of capitalism, technology, climate changes, mass media and popular culture, chart a reality marked by fleetness, disorientation and rapid social change. Millions of people have reacted by identifying themselves with religious fundamentalist views. While this phenomenon cannot be reduced to a single factor, it nonetheless signals a state of distress suffered by those marginalised by the global economy, many of whom also feel culturally threatened by the materialist and secular values of late modernity. Although fundamentalism in its many forms is certainly not keen on democracy, it is also true that the economic and political forces of late modernity are steadily driving existing (liberal) democracies into states of exception, posing also a peculiar threat to democratic principles. Hence democracy as a political system resting on values such as freedom, equality and the rule of civil law, is likely to be the real casualty of the struggle between fundamentalisms and globalization. Yet, democracy may also be facing today a new opportunity stemming from below, where new modes of relationships and power link locally and globally different religious identities, cultures, forms of labour, ecological concerns, ethnicities, and gender groups and issues. These new relation-

ships disclose a common bio-political desire that rests on a pro-active exercise of tolerance as an affirmation of life in its multiple expressions. Tolerance, therefore, becomes a key weapon in democratic solutions to systemic problems. While as moral beings we are always faced with ethical choices, our times on the verge of a systemic bifurcation accelerate the urgency to reach wide consensus over the values that will govern our lives. Freedom and equality have been focal desiderata of modernity, yet the historicist and progressive myth that cocooned these values is on the wane. Since values are not abstractions but always are embedded into mythical narratives, it is crucial to understand the modes of knowledge and cultural mutations which are coupled with socio-political and systemic changes. Today, with an increasing pluralisation of societies and consciousness, tolerance appears not only as a desirable moral virtue, but as a necessary systemic quality which, once grafted with freedom and equality, makes of democracy the best arrangement for shaping our collective and global fate. Within this horizon, religion(s) seems again to be poised to play a critical role either for or against tolerance, democracy and peace.
1. From the Republic to the Empire
(a) Symptoms of a transition

When approaching the relation between fundamentalism, tolerance and democracy, we may be tempted to fall into the vice of binary thought. Media, news, reports and discourses can lead to the conclusion that democracy broadly defined1 is today at peril because of the
Democracy understood as a set of institutional and legal principles and practices such as: the rule of law and equal access to justice; division of powers; guarantees of human and civil rights that are upheld and independently monitored; free and fair elections involving a genuine competition of ideas, permitting
1
Tolerance, Democracy and Fundamentalism 175

external and evil forces of religious fundamentalism (especially Islamic). Samuel Huntingtons highly influential theory of the clash of civilisations, for example, has given an academic veneer to a political paradigm that compartmentalises in antagonist camps what actually are inner dimensions of the contemporary world-system. This creates a false impression and consciousness, for the real danger to democracy may lie not only with those who, for whatever reasons, express their grievances against the hypocrisy of core democratic countries, but also with those forces which in the name of democratic values are increasingly committed to intolerant and vigilant practices. Obviously, inherent to the different forms of fundamentalism is the prospective establishment of regimes of intolerance, thus creating a formidable challenge to democracy as a system as well as a cultural horizon. But this cannot hide the fact that democracies around the world are increasingly sliding toward a perennial state of exception where freedom is curtailed in the name of freedom as once Latin-American dictatorships curtailed democracy in the name of democracy.2
consensual, non-violent changes of government; freedom of speech, press and media; healthy, autonomous civil society institutions and networks, independent of the state; accountability of authority and transparency of decisions; entrenched property and economic rights; social justice and basic security; an ethos of dialogue, questioning, trust, and moral awareness; widespread, free access to the information needed to discuss, scrutinize, make choices about and uphold all these components of a democratic society. Behind these principles lay certain core values such as the political equality of all citizens; open deliberation before decision-making so that all can voice their interests and concerns; a high degree of citizen participation in the processes of democracy, that respects and encourages the different views of others; a pluralism of institutions and the independence of critical voices that maintain the long-term health and openness of democratic societies. 2 In Stato di eccezione, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben shows how Western democracies become effectively invested with the need of turning emergency into the foundation of their existence. The military and the economic state of emergency often merge into one, employing war metaphors as main currency in public speeches. He states that The principle according to which necessity defines a singular situation in which the law loses its vis obligandi is inverted into that according to which necessity constitutes, so to speak, the

In order to situate the dynamics linking fundamentalism with the contemporary neo-conservative states of exception, it is essential to have a systemic view of the present globalised world-system. This allows us to perceive fundamentalism evangelical, Islamic and integrist as symptoms marking the passage to a new state of affairs.3 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, fundamentalisms signal a refusal of modernity, democracy and secularity, which rightly or wrongly are conceived as weapons of liberal, foreign or Western hegemony.4 But fundamentalist movements are not simply pre-modern remnants, but a late-modern outcome of contradictions triggered by modernity and its oppressive underside. They are late- or post-modern in a double sense: in that chronologically they follow and oppose modernity, and in that culturally they ride on the waves generated by the falling walls of modern (and Western) philosophical theories which placed religion in an interdict.5 The late-modern condition of fundamentalism requires that we take a look at the long-term economic, political, cultural and epistemological dynamics that characterise the present world-system. In doing so we understand why democracy and tolerance acquire today a new urgency, for we face a critical moment of systemic oscillations that points to an imminent bifurcation. Inspired by chaos theory, the social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein6 maintains that an existing system which can no longer function adequately within its defined parameters faces a bifurcaultimate foundation and the very source of the law. Stato di eccezione (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003), p. 37. 3 See Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 137ss. 4 See Ibid., p. 149. 5 This notion is developed by yet another Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, in La huella de la huella, Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds, La religin (Madrid: PPC, 1996), p. 111f. 6 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Analysis: an Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); and Id., The Uncertainties of Knowledge (Philadelphia: Temple University press, 2004).

tion where a choice is pressed upon it. It is not that one of the present antagonistic camps within the system will prevail, but that the system as a whole will change. In this junction, institutions and social arrangements face a new set of possibilities: either a radicalisation of democratic principles and practices, or the adventurous falling into new hierarchical and intolerant tutelages. These are the main contenders, and the outcome will depend upon the micro-decisions or small actions that people take in times of wild oscillations. History we have come to learn does not have any moral vector; it is not necessarily a tale of increasing humanness, tolerance, liberty or equality. Our evolution seems to be a highly improvised affair, where values are subject to endless psychological, philosophical, ideological, existential and religious variables, emerging and competing as we face the challenges of living. Therefore we find ourselves in the crucible of uncertainties, and yet this period in our lives has a tremendous and extraordinary importance because the intellectual, moral and political decisions made will have exponential effects. For this reason fundamentalism cannot be dismissed as a romantic reversal of history, destined to fail because history always progresses. Actually, it must be seriously considered as one of the possible outcomes of late modernity although we may question its long term adaptive value. In times where interdictions against religion are falling, this dimension of human living may be destined to play a critical role in democracys demise or, on the contrary, in its flourishing.7
(b) The longue dure: tolerance, intolerance, and violence

A systemic view posits as unit of analysis a world-system, namely, a spatial/temporal region that cuts across political and cultural units, creating an integrated zone of activity with institutions that obey certain
7
It is ironic that modern democracy, whose roots can partially be traced to a reaction against religious intolerance (Locke et al.), may today require the mystique and conviction given by religion.

systemic rules. The modern world-system, which traces its origins to the European expansion beginning in the 16th century, is not bound by a unitary political structure although after the second world war, liberal democracy purported to be the desirable political regime. In fact, there can be and there are many political units within a world-system since its unifying factor is not a political regime or a culture, but the division of labour that results from the pursuit of gain. The endless accumulation of capital, which splits the system along a core and a periphery, in turn determines the nature or kind of this division. 8 During the 19th and 20th centuries the political history of the modern world-system, radiating from its core, became the history of a debate about the line that divides the included from the excluded, as well as about the tenor, extent and limits of tolerance. It must be noticed that this debate was occurring within the framework of a geo-culture that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the good society.9 This geo-culture was Liberalism, which proved to be a formidable ideological force, acquiring a solid hegemony around 1848. Not only did it establish the juridical and institutional foundations to be emulated by most of the countries in the world, but it also had the plasticity to absorb the anti-systemic movements originated under its sway. Inside the nation-states, attempts by groups to achieve inclusion as full citizens were the central focus of radical movements. First it was the turn of industrial workers, who once organised in unions and syndicates then sought po8
The core, the comfort zone, does not necessarily have to coincide with nations or states, but with the dominant sectors of the production process cutting across them. However, since monopolies need the patronage of strong states, there is a geographical consequence of the core-periphery relationship. It is also the case that the same country or nation may present a mix of core and peripheral conditions. Usually, core-products and services are monopolies or quasimonopolies, while peripheral products and services are truly competitive, that is, abundant and diverse. Thus, when there is exchange for core products and services felt as critical and crucial for the advancement of well being of populations, an unequal or asymmetrical situation develops. 9 Wallerstein, World-System, p. 60.

litical power. After decades of struggle, the outcome was the compromise represented by the Welfare State. After that, beginning in the 1960s, the excluded from full participation and decision ethnic and sexual minorities, oppressed majorities in the colonies, youth and women voiced their anti-systemic claims through cultural strategies that sought the decolonisation of the psyche and political autonomy. All these movements were more or less successful in achieving full citizenship and/or independence, but did not succeed in terms of fully redressing systemic dynamics of exclusion. In the case of the present world-system, the 1960s marked the end of the liberal supremacy, thereby dislocating the geo-culture that had kept the political institutions intact.10 Decolonisation, womens movements, youth culture and labour, gender issues, vindication of difference and minorities, concern for the environment, have unhinged the underpinnings of the capitalist world-economy and exposed it to the full force of political and cultural shocks from which it has hitherto been sheltered.11 During the same time, previously existing fundamentalist trends started to gain cultural, social and political ascendancy in different corners of the world.12 Cultural transformations soon lead to a new selfesteem and political demands, which in turn put new pressures upon the system through the expansion of lineal trends. The result is that in the last fifty years there has been a growing squeeze on the average rate of profits, for costs of production have been rising while the margin of surplus is narrowing in core and some peripheral regions. Capitalist
This corresponds to what Eric Hobsbawm calls the end of the golden age. See The Age of Extremes: a History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 11 See Wallerstein, p. 77; Hobsbawm, p. 343. 12 In the case of Islamic Fundamentalism, the 1967 Israeli-Arab war signals a turning point. See Bassam Tibi, The worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalism: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology, in Martin Marty and Scott Appelby, eds, Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family and Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 81.
10

production had to face increasing costs in remuneration and salaries, inputs (infrastructure and raw materials), and taxation. Especially the first and the third trend can be said to be a consequence of increasing socio-political demands expressing new expectations regarding standards of living, education, health and prospects for the future. Of course, capitalist endeavours will always attempt to maintain oligopolistic conditions; our present neo-liberal phase which in Latin America was enacted by a capitalism of dispossession geared mostly to the enclosing the commons13 is an example. The Washington Consensus gave new impetus to institutions such as the IMF, WTO and the WEF (Davos), which in turn exercised pressure for a type of globalization which consisted in the opening of all frontiers to the free flows of goods and capital but not of people and/or labour.14 In the midst of this process, 9/11 served to legitimise the more conservative sectors within some core states by giving them new political clout. These events allowed for a drastic cut of its links with the more moderate centre and so undo the cultural and social transformations dating from the 1960s. The most dramatic result of this process has been the replacement of neo-liberalism by neo-conservatism a force supported by a religiously sanctioned view that is culturally and politically at war with the freedoms and social conquests of the last four decades.15 But these reactions, far from setting order and restoring equilibrium to the system, have in fact accelerated the cycle of crisis leading
13
A Marxist notion developed by David Harvey to refer to the reversion of common property rights and the commodification of cultural forms, histories, intellectual creativity, the environment, genetic information, public works, health and education. Capitalism resolved its cyclical crisis by expanding its secular trends; but in the new era of globalization the possibility of overflowing towards an other (land, population, and market) decreases. The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 137ff. 14 See Nstor Garca Canclini, La globalizacin imaginada (Buenos Aires: Paids, 1999); Zygmunt Bauman, La globalizacin: consecuencias humanas (Buenos Aires: FCE, 1999). 15 See Harvey, p. 184.

to a general global state of war. The secular trends are moving to a asymptotic point blocking the unrestrained continuation of an endless accumulation of capital, the engine of capitalist development. We are thus treading upon a territory whose horizon shows great social turmoil, responding to various factors: first, the very fluctuations of the system; second, the decline in legitimacy of state structures, and third, the cultural crisis of prevailing symbolic systems, all of which leads to a great conflict about the nature of the successor arrangement. As Eric Hobsbawm asserts, The world of the third millennium will almost certainly continue to be one of violent politics and violent political changes. The only thing uncertain about them is where they will lead.16 What sectors, forces and ideologies will dominate in the upcoming arrangement? Shall we speak of a system or multi-systems? What values will be paramount? One thing is certain: the present world-system, ideologically dominated by a centre-liberal outlook, has now achieved its full maturity. It will do anything possible to ameliorate the crisis, even adopting conservative discourses to suit the demands of electorates determined to behave in customary ways in the pursuit of short-term benefits.17 Precisely because the fluctuation and uncertainties are becoming more acute, the demand for security will be stronger and so, too, the violence.18 States of exception are slowly erected as paraHobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, p. 460. It is unrealistic to think that most people would willingly change their work patterns, technology and methods of exchanging goods and services in anticipation of a crisis whose results are utterly unknown. Anthropologically there is ample evidence to support the notion of improvised evolution, which assumes that there is a general unwillingness in most peoples in all societies to deal with crisis. We often wait, and then choose short-term minimal strategies. See Marvin Harris, Culture, People and Nature (New York: HarperCollins, 1988). 18 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri link this form of security to the contemporary strategies of biopower: Security requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an active shaped world is a secure world. This notion of security is a form pf biopower, then, in the sense that it is charged with the task of producing and transforming social life. Multitude (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 20.
17 16

digms for political rule, where all citizens are placed under permanent suspicion and surveillance (Patriot Act). Moreover, as stated in the (in) famous ideological blueprint of the Bushs administration, Project for the New American Century (1997), military strength and foreign territorial control become necessary steps in the larger project of spreading appropriate codes of conduct upon the rest of the world.19 This violence exercised in the pursuit of security doubtful ends combined with immoral means has received a strong popular backing and the ideological support from a growing social and cultural force evangelical fundamentalism, a backbone of contemporary neo-conservatism.20 In this fashion, liberty is curtailed in the name of security, which in turn exacerbates inequality. Discomfort zones, however, also spawn mirror images to this neoconservative state of exception. In these other zones, a similar phenomenon takes place through different forms of integrism and fundamentalism that promises a safer and more fulfilling world by submitting to new heteronomous codes and arrangements. Often this entails a rejection of the priority of universal rights and civil law, a refusal of the equality of men and women, a dismissal of the separation of religion and state, and a rebuff of general democratic values. Yet these are chiral, that is, they are not identical to their mirror image. While neoconservatism, at least in the US, receives the backing of an evangelical fundamentalism thoroughly supportive of the system, Islamic fundamentalisms, on the other hand, present an anti-systemic bent that makes it one of the most formidable counter-systemic claims. This integrist project, however, also presents an insurmountable conflict of values, for liberty is curtailed in the name of equality, which in turn exacerbates insecurity
See Harvey, pp. 184s. See Walter Mead, Gods Country, in Foreign Affairs 85/5 (Sept.-Oct. 2006), pp. 24-43.
20
19

But whether we speak of (evangelical) neo-conservatism or Islamic fundamentalism, both phenomena possess a common pattern creating similar effects. Their common theme is either the lowering of tolerance or the open practice of intolerance, which puts in interdiction the very nature of democracy. Both neo-conservative states of exception as well as integrist Islamic fundamentalism have an in-built tendency toward intolerance and the negation of the other in part because the illusion that a system can be stabilised by eliminating some of its components, in part because of the very epistemological limits inherent to their ideological view. This systemic transition and bifurcation is, therefore, also a cultural and epistemological mutation, for the structures of knowledge constitute an integral and dialectical dimension of the cultural complex that undergirds any social formation. Technological innovation, mass media, socio-political reorganisation, demographic pressures and ecological imbalances, also change the way people reason, affecting thereby religious and ideological views and mores. The questioning of canons of rationality, the legitimating of certain modes of knowing, and the establishment or debunking of frontiers between different areas of living, are symptoms of the repositioning of social bodies which feel freer or urged to experiment and adopt views which hitherto have been marginal or rejected. Grievances voice the insurrection of subjugated knowledges against hegemonic ideologies (Foucault). As a result, times of bifurcation witness strong and intense cultural debate seeking to mediate the crisis by offering different strategies symbolic environments to manage instability, uncertainty and stress. Some will attempt to reinforce the cyclical state of equilibrium, while others will push the lineal trends into a state of imbalance. We shall return later to this point. Before that let us look at an example of intolerance and counter-modernity stemming from another peripheral zone: the Latin American context. For a third phenomenon lies

between the outspoken intent to install a new regime of intolerance, as in some Islamic fundamentalist groups, and evangelical fundamentalisms efforts to effect a neo-conservative shift in family life and educational patterns. Roman Catholic integrism claims to navigate between the Scylla of an excessive focus on family and the Charybdis of a blatant overturn of social structures, seeking a middle course cutting across the intermediary associations of civil society. Yet, it shares with evangelical and Islamic fundamentalisms a common factor: they are all symptoms of a disease to which they purport to be the cure.
2. The Long and Winding Road of Catholic Integrism

Roman Catholicism (RC) is still the major religious force in most of Latin America. It is more than a religious denomination: it is a powerful social organization with an extraordinary cultural-formative power. Even though Protestants, Evangelicals and Pentecostals have experienced a steady growth during the last century, Catholicism still dominates the religious scene.21 Many assert that the category fundamentalism cannot be applied stricto sensu to Roman Catholicism. Fundamentalism they say is a valid description for a Protestant phenomenon whose origin is clearly located in the beginning of the 20th Century in the U.S., applicable today to the global evangelical movement that it has spawned. There are many elements that characterize evangelical (or Islamic) fundamentalism which are not present in the ultra-conservative sectors of Roman Catholicism.22 Yet, while a functionalist approach to individual aspects of
21 22
The Muslim presence is reduced to few ethnic enclaves. Take, for example, inerrancy of Scriptures, something difficult to assert for a church that has stressed as normative sources both Bible and its ongoing interpretation by a Magisterium (tradition). Or consider the evangelical-subjective emphasis on rebirth (born again), an awkward concept for the objectivist and sacramental self understanding of Roman Catholicism.

both traditions may fail in providing a useful comparative scenario, a more structural perspective uncovers in fundamentalism and the ultraconservative camp of Roman Catholicism a common regressive gestalt that attempts to undo the cultural revolutions stemming from the 1960s and thus discipline democratic demands.23 They are, in this regard, a powerful ideological resource for the implementation of states of exception. As in evangelical fundamentalism, Catholic ultra-conservatism seeks to resituate church and traditional beliefs in the face of the crisis brought by modernity and secularisation. The efforts to preserve the traditional ideological and organisational traits, and arrest and reverse the waning of Catholic hegemony in the social, cultural and political spheres, are similar. Yet battle lines are drawn according to the specific cultural and social geography. In the case of evangelicals, scriptural inerrancy, creationism, virginal birth, pre-millennialism, etc. are the main themes that rally the strands of an ideology embracing a host of ethical issues ranging from public education to abortion. In the case of RC, the authority of the Pope, the strict hierarchical organization, the objectivity of dogma, and the discipline and control of (mostly female) sexuality, is at stake. Even their conception of the role of the church in society, and the means for Christian influence in culture, are as diverse as the Calvinist and Thomist roots of their political theologies. Yet their common thread is the combination of an unrelenting resistance to the disruptive changes brought by modernity, the attempt to re-create stable institutions, and a strong political vocation to fight back and re-establish a social order congruent with the conservative mores of their religious vision. Both
23
I understand regressive in the sense of attempting to preserve in contemporary milieu the beliefs and practices from a sacred past as normative for today. Yet, it must also be born in mind that it is not simply a romantic reaction, but a deliberate effort to re-create social and political order that is oriented to the future. Cfr. Martin Marty and Scott Appelby, Fundamentalisms and Society, p. 3. As to the reaction to gender issues stemming from the 60s, see Hardacre, in Ibid, p. 134.

traditions feel that legal and governmental processes must recognise the way of life they see as prescribed by God and set forth in Scripture or the Magisterium. The state must be subservient to God, thus disciplining a society that has lost its moral core and direction. The particular Catholic conservative vision is nourished by two ideological streams that have significantly shaped the Catholic profile in many countries of Latin America: integralism and integrism. Catholic integralism is the name given to the curial opposition in the late 19-century and early 20-century to the heresies of modernism. At that time these heresies included the critical-historical studies of Bible and dogma, the Darwinian theory of evolution, liberal democracy, socialism, trade unions, free masonry and Protestants. Above all it championed a Christendom model of social order and the close relation between church and state. In sum, it represented the static categorization of tradition and the defence of an objectivist view of truth. Only an integral Catholicism, that is, the upholding of dogma and Magisterium, guarantees an institutional strength and clarity of beliefs that can be applied to all challenges and needs of contemporary society. This view of Catholicism is total, unwavering and exclusivist, inviting to a sort of antimodern crusade in the pursuit of a new social Catholicism (Catolicismo Total or Integral). Integrism, on the other hand, is an expression coined by the French right-wing intellectual Charles Maurras denoting the aim of bringing all aspects of a nation within a single political organisation. In this view Roman Catholicism is regarded as an integral aspect of the political structure of the country, along with language, customs and tradition. This version of integrism came to Latin America mixed with Spanish falangism and Italian fascism, all characterised by a strong corporatist view of state and society.24
24
In Argentina many sectors that converged into Peronism, as well as the nationalist party within the military, have historically supported this view. During the

Today integrism and integralism are used indiscriminately to refer to those sectors within Catholicism that views the core beliefs of Catholicism as integral to the nations or the continents identity. This type of Catholicism proved to be quite strong in the first half of the 20th century, losing some positions in the 1950s and 60s, to gain a protagonist role during the military dictatorships (in Argentina, 1976-1983). Since then, an increasing pluralisation of the Catholic Church has been the norm, although the core ideological elements of integrism still colour vast sectors of this church especially among clergy and bishops. During the 1990s, coinciding (paradoxically?) with the enforcement of neoliberal policies, several integrist congregations and religious societies were either created, or pre-existing ones spread with new vigour. Among these are: Opus Dei, Miles Christi, Comunin y Liberacin, Legionarios de Cristo (Juventud Misionera y Familia Misionera), Asociacin Profamilia, Tradicin-Familia-Propiedad (although waning during the 1990s), Instituto del Verbo Encarnado, Sodalitium Christianae Vitae, Comunidad Jerusaln, Camino Neocatecumenal, F.A.S.T.A., and many others. Following an ultra-conservative interpretation of Vatican II, these organisations stress lay discipleship in society, education and the formation of leadership, full engagement in the cultural wars relating to abortion and homosexuality, confrontation with the progressive liberal values spread by the media, opposition to the ideology of public schools, and so on. They loudly declare allegiance to the Pope, a feature that distinguishes them from other parallel integrist associations, properly
60s and 70s, it reached a gruesome maturation through the Doctrine of National Security, the ideological umbrella that supported the military dictatorship in its repression and disappearance of those elements considered subversive of the (Catholic) values and mores of the Argentine Nation. Heresies acquired social and political form, and culprits must be wiped out in order to purify the foundations of the polis.

called traditionalists.25 Yet they belong to the same wave of religious and ideological discontent with modernity and the liberal (and liberationist) interpretation of Vatican II.26
3. Cultural and Epistemological Strategies: the Flight from Plurality towards a Post-modern Unum
Militancy, exclusivism, a fight against the world attitude, and a profound distaste for (philosophical) relativism and (ideological) pluralism appear to be a common mark uniting different forms of religious fundamentalism and integrism. Boundary setting, identification of enemies, proselytism, creation and strengthening of intermediate institutions stand out as important watermarks. They also share some common moral positions, such as patriarchal models of family, antiabortion and homophobic stances, promotion of religious education in schools, etc. In sum, a counter-modern and anti-secularisation attitude seems to galva25 In the line of Lefebvre and others, the latter are schismatic groups (mostly clergy) setting up their own Magisterium, questioning the reforms introduced by Vatican II regarding the Roman missal, collegiality of bishops, ecumenism and the recognition of religious freedoms. 26 The argentine sociologist Fortunato Mallimaci distinguishes three strands in the integrist camp within the Argentine church. The first one is a small ultranationalist and anti-democratic minority that still cultivates a special relationship with the Military, the alleged institutional paladin of argentine and LatinAmerican identity. A second one, no doubt the majority, prioritizes the strengthening of the theological and ecclesial dimensions in order to face the modernist challenge in society and culture. Their main assumption is that a popular and ancestral Catholic heritage is today challenged not by atheism and communism, but by secularization, laicism, moral relativism, hedonism, consumerism, feminism, sects, and the liberal (or progressive) message of the media. They also have strong qualms regarding democracy. Many bishops and clergy, as well as numerous lay associations advocating traditional family values, are ideologically identified with this line. Finally a more populist form of integrism is camouflaged with a public and vociferous defence of the poor and marginalized. With a language resembling the left-wing criticisms of globalization and capitalism, they are firm defenders of the social doctrine of the church. See Fortunato Mallimaci, El Catolicismo latinoamericano a fines del milenio: incertidumbres desde el Cono Sur, Nueva Sociedad 136 (1995), pp. 154-176.

nise their focus. Yet there are some features in these movements that are clearly late-modern and even post-modern: Opus Dei and most evangelicals, for instance, do not seem inimical to such modern phenomena as capitalism, bureaucratic organisation, mass communication technologies or higher education.27 This indicates that they are not simply anti-modern, but rather critical of those aspects of the modern that are perceived to be threatening to their core beliefs, their social organisation and ideology. While capitalism is not considered such a threat, cultural developments leading to a pluralisation of consciousness and views certainly are.28 This (late) modern pluralisation of the cultural realm is perceived as an insurmountable, inimical, and hostile stance against church, faith, nature and truth. As a strategy facing pluralisation and secularity, fundamentalisms and integrism share a highly cognitive doctrinal religiosity marked by an objectivistic, dogmatic, legalistic and dissonant style. The claim to objectivity revamps a hermeneutical circle unaffected by human experience, interests and location. In a way they simply continue the epistemological objectivism of the West, with reality conceived as though it were composed by foundational blocks or bricks which possess a certain order and relationship. To uphold the truth means to respect this structure and order. This epistemological mapping (worldview) possesses an intrinsic appeal that is coupled with deep-seated tendencies of the human psyche. Such a worldview seems to infer no conflicting expectations or suggestions for human daily behaviour and ethical decisions. As the anthropologist Anthony Wallace asserts, there is a predisposition to be infatuated with a worldview that promises order, for this is perceived as diminishing stress. It is associated with every satisfaction derived from life and with the maintenance and reproduction of life
27
Cfr. Emilio Corbire, Opus Dei: el totalitarismo catlico. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2002. 28 Cfr. Peter Berger, Una Gloria lejana: la bsqueda de la fe en poca de incredulidad (Barcelona: Herder, 1994), p. 93.

itself.29 Consequently any element that produces disturbances in this worldview implies, automatically, a disturbance in the rules of behaviour and therefore in the satisfactions expected from life. The cognitive and the moral are, at this point, indistinguishable, and the terrain for the struggle sweeps across the multiple cultural choices in an effort to streamline them according to a divine norm. Yet, what (late) modernity has brought to the fore is that the nature of reality as such is complex, and therefore requires multiple metaphors and views in order to be understood.30 Any monolithic conceptual system will soon prove inconsistent and unable of establishing congruence with the diverse metaphors and symbols required for life in complex settings. In the end fundamentalisms and integrisms prove not only incapable of surmounting dissonance, but they become fertile terrain for new crisis. This generates additional cognitive dissonance, which may at best be able to offer a solution for individuals within modernity, but not to the injustices brought about by modern arrangements. As much of late-modern trends, they offer biographical-individual solutions to systemic problems.31 Integrism as fundamentalism expresses a cognitive strategy, which tries to homogenise what is radically plural. Against this background it can be considered as a form of superstition (super stare, standing over something that is a vestige from the past), to the extent that they intend to recreate conceptions of nature, society, culture and self which are thought or imagined as once having wide currency. Although to a certain point they share many of the traces of religious revitalisation
29
See Anthony Wallace, Revitalizations and Mazeways: Essays on Culture Change, vol. 1 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), p. 182. 30 Cfr. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 78 31 Cfr. Zygmunt Bauman, La sociedad sitiada (Buenos Aires: FCE, 2004), p. 94. However, this is not the case with Islamic fundamentalism(s), which are mostly counter-systemic movements.

movements, that is, the deliberate, organised and conscious effort to construct a more satisfying culture and social environment,32 they are epistemologically unable to produce what these movements successfully do: a widespread reduction and/or redirection of stress. Therefore it would be more adequate to consider fundamentalisms as truncated revitalisation movements, for they are constantly tempted to idealise a past in face of the perils of the present. The integrist-fundamentalist cognitive incongruence and the psychological stress produced even on its own membership shows that its appeal can only be partial. Very few can bear the implications of transforming the self as is required and demanded by these movements. Moreover, in a pluralised scenario marked by increasing reflexivity questioning authority, globalization and an enhanced consciousness of diversity,33 the chances to discipline both the religious and political body are increasingly difficult. This incapacity creates a loop-effect of pressure and tensions which cannot be resolved by the religious system as such. The temptation, therefore, is to seek to reduce incongruence not by modifying the symbolic system (which would imply a thorough revision of objective truth), but by confronting the societal and cultural conditions which generate such stressful stimuli. Sooner or later, violence including its many subtle forms would have to be exercised or legitimised in order to vindicate the truth of the religious-ideological system. In sum, different fundamentalisms appear to share a common counter-cultural strategy that is linked to the social, cultural and economic conditions of globalization and late-modernity. Facing the dislocation created by capitalism and modernity, their aim is to influence societies and cultures by encouraging high uncertainty avoidance, sanc-
32 33
See Wallace, p. 10. See Peter Taylor, Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 133f.

tioning power distance, stressing the collective rather than the individual and giving prominence to the masculine rather than the feminine.34 In this strategy stand prominently matters pertaining to sexuality, family and above all, the role of women.35 These issues not only have to do with the enforcement of patriarchal property rights and male monopoly of the labour market, but also with a definite notion of communal reproduction where women are perceived to be the most reliable agents in the transmission of culture and religion. Because modern economic pressures invariably change family patterns and gender roles, womb and school appear as the battlefront of fundamentalist and integrist reaction the first term signifying the power to control reproduction (a sort of container of male prerogative to fulfil an ironclad biological and divine law), and the second representing the entrance gate into the public sphere.
4. The Ethical Foundation of Tolerance

Cognitive, social and cultural uncertainties make of fundamentalisms and integrism direct or indirect supporters of political regimes set to
34
Cfr. Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), pp. 14ff. 35 See Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 64ff. This cognitive objectivism, distaste for pluralism, and legalistic outlook is illustrated in the case of Roman Catholic integrism by its militant opposition to issues ranging from the introduction of sexual education in schools and the distribution of condoms in state hospitals, to gay rights (civil union) and the decriminalisation of abortion. The war metaphor acquires new currency, as denoted by the statements of integrist ideologues when referring to feminism, one of the disturbing dissonances in late modernity. According to Adolfo Castaeda, director of Vida Humana Internacional and a consultant for the integrist circles in Latin America, we are facing a cultural subversion, where gender perspectives` represent one of the most dangerous ideological weapons mustered to destroy life and family, and therefore, society. That such views exist in the pluralistic setting of late modernity must not alarm us; what is cause for alarm is their active pursuit of political means to enforce their vision of a Catolicismo integral.

curb the range of tolerant practices and democratic demands. Many times this position adopts the form of an open protest against globalization and its discontents, thus coinciding with other forms of protest stemming from the left.36 But their strategies for change pursue a rigid cultural reinforcement of religious and traditional values, which severely questions not only the actual shortcomings of really existing democracies, but also the core values that inform and sustain democratic practices in any of its forms. When globalization, democracy and secularisation are lumped together as a threat, when pluralism and epistemological uncertainties are seen as equally eroding the very fabric of human society, then violence and intolerance appear as suitable weapons in an already violent and increasingly intolerant environment. In effect, uncertainty, pluralism, relativity, radical difference, liquid boundaries, diffuse hierarchy, soft epistemology, in sum, that which culturally characterises late modernity, represents a dreadful and demonic horizon that true believers must avoid and fight at all costs. While these late-modern variables appear to be easier to digest for certain sectors of comfort zones, fundamentalist movements especially Islamic and evangelicals outside the U.S. seem to provide a consoling response to the losers, subordinated, excluded and/or threatened by global cultural and economic trends.37 When differences of culture, ethnicity and religion coincide with class and/or geopolitical subordinations, the terrain appears particularly fertile for fundamentalist recipes. Here we face a monumental systemic challenge, pressing for new understandings of democracy, tolerance and the effective redressing of economic and social inequalities.
36 37
Cfr. Hard and Negri, Multitude, pp. 235f. Cfr. William McNeill, Fundamentalisms and the World of the 1990s, in Fundamentalisms and Society, pp. 558ff. One problem of his account is that he does not pay enough attention to the systemic dimension of fundamentalism, and the class component of it. Rather, he sees it mostly as a strategy that minimises friction in the transition from rural to urban life.

But in spite of the somehow defiant nature of the fundamentalist phenomena, one cannot forget what Hardt and Negri have noted, namely, that these reactions are symptoms signalling a passage to a new social, political and economic arrangement. The tragedy is that fundamentalism purports to be a cure, encouraging its social base through a strategy that curbs democratic practices, labelling plurality, diversity or tolerance as a surrender to materialism, consumerism, the cultural decadence of the West, or with the hypocrisy of neo-colonialism. Is it possible to decouple the waning forces of the world-system from the values associated with democratic practices? Is democracy indissolubly tied to the cultural and political history of the West? Can the value and practice of tolerance be proven to these popular movements as an equally effective way to redress social, cultural and economic grievances? It is true that when we speak about tolerance there is a certain arbitrariness in our definition or, if you will, a definite cultural and social tradition that informs our understanding. Intolerance may well not be a label accepted by the members of fundamentalist or integrist movements. They may also conceive themselves as somehow tolerant, if tolerance is understood as a passive forbearance. Yet tolerance is not only a relational term referring to an attitude vis--vis other existences, but also a practice whose definition is relative to the consideration and balancing of other values and moral goods. Paramount among these is the moral valuing of difference and plurality, thorns difficult to withstand not only from a fundamentalist position, but also by other philosophies, practices and ideologies. Otherness, difference and plurality are realities certainly difficult to openly assimilate, for they imply a deconstruction and reconstruction of our own identities. Tolerance, therefore, has received many definitions depending upon the social, political and cultural valuations of diversity, otherness and difference. It is not an absolute reality, but signifies different points on a

continuum, different possibilities and strategies that move from more passive to more pro-active understandings.38 For example, when a moral good such as peace is set as a social desirable goal which is not a minor issue then tolerance may come as a resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of that ultimate goal. Tolerance is therefore instrumental to the persecution of another moral good. This attitude may come very close to one where tolerance results from its lack of moral weight, as when a relaxed benignity stems from sheer indifference towards differences as such. A third possibility poses tolerance as the appropriate attitude that must follow the recognition that others have the same universal rights that we do, similar to stoic and Kantian philosophy. Tolerance, therefore, is associated with the realisation of universal sameness. All of these attitudes, however, appear today as quite brittle, fragile ways for facing a new phase in the collective history of humanity. Looking back to history, human experience shows different political arrangements to cope with difference and otherness multinational empires, millet system, consociate nations, nation-states, immigrant societies, etc. But in these regimes tolerance has always been an instrumental and external achievement, something necessary in order to enforce other ends and goods the rule by the few, peace as controlled violence, assimilation, economic exploitation, and so on. Yet the fragility of these regimes of tolerance was the latent or overt intolerant principle in-built, an intolerance that precisely made of tolerance a necessity of instrumental value. These different attitudes regarding tolerance and its concomitant political regimes place difference and plurality in a shadowy spot, where tolerance becomes something that must be endured, ignored or made dependent upon a homogenising identity. Yet another two attitudes regarding tolerance are possible which can be envisioned as a pro-active
38
In what follows I follow Walzers suggestions, although with certain modifications. See On Tolerance, pp. 10s.

response to the challenging globalised scenario. Here the issues of difference and plurality acquire a moral quality of their own, and where tolerance mutates from a simple negative or condescending forbearance to an active form of love. The first one corresponds to an attitude of curiosity toward the other that leads to a respect and a willingness to learn. Here tolerance would be a value subsumed under a behavioural and epistemological openness towards that which is different, that assumes the very incompleteness of our stories, traditions and being. Our identities are not final, but always in the making, as our epistemologies are ever soft, never closed. A second one corresponds not only to a positive valuing of difference as such, but an embracing of the virtue of tolerance as a sheer and unwavering acceptance of the others expressions of the largeness and diversity of human nature, Gods plan, or evolution. From certain ideological and religious points of view, this last scenario would constitute the ideal to which humanity is called a veritable state of grace and love. But in a pluralistic and globalised world, this position is almost certain to be confined to minorities inspired by the particular axiological pointers of their mythic narratives. For it is impossible for tolerance to have the same subjective meaning for all participants in society. Moreover, psychologically a normal and sane society is one in which people habitually strongly disagree, since general and homogeneous agreement is actually rare outside the sphere of instinctive human qualities.39 But the main objection that can be levelled against unqualified acceptance is that it doesnt leave much room for a critical appraisal of the other which can squarely face the constant conflict of values and interests that marks human reality. Since socially and politically it is desirable to avoid a sort of bad utopianism that purports to uphold lofty ideals without recognising its
39
See Carl Jung, ed., Man and his Symbols (New York: Dell Publishing, 1975), p. 46.

conflict with other values that we fear or dislike, we may favour the attitude represented by (critical) openness. Life always presses hard choices, which also have to be made in the larger and often conflicting arena of political life and arrangements. Therefore tolerance, as a moral practice, can be said properly to occur when we are open to communicate and interact with people whose beliefs we do not necessarily adopt, whose practices we often decline to imitate, in sum, when we coexist with an otherness that in spite of its right to be, still remains different, alien and strange. This is tolerance as an attitude of openness, thus recognising our ongoing incompleteness and relative truth. Yet it is also a critical openness which attempts to balance the moral weight of otherness with other values seen in correspondence to this respect for otherness such as freedom, peace, equality, integrity, etc. It entails not only the recognition that the other, with his or her truth, will perhaps never come closer to ours or vice versa, but also that in the exercise of our choices as moral beings will often set a collision course with other choices, interests and axiological prioritisations. Openness, a soft epistemology, and a critical engagement with the other, delineate a sound psychological, affective and cognitive approach for the contemporary social practice of tolerance. But a critical openness requires that tolerance must not restrict itself to its attitudinal dimension, but somehow must express itself in an institutional and political form. Otherwise, tolerance may just breed its own demise, navely sheltering its own negation. A point is reached where certain values and moral goods must be made effective in a social and political arrangement. Peace allowing for coexistence, for example, marks a limit and a horizon40, and so do freedom, equality and justice.
40
See Hard and Negri, Multitude, p. 311; Walzer, p. 5.
198 Overcoming Fundamentalism 5. Does Democracy have a Future? Tolerance as its Condition
Tolerance, therefore, is a multileveled compound of cognitive, social, institutional and psychological factors. For tolerance to be a successful practice, three dimensions must be addressed in the search for a tolerant and democratic culture and social arrangement: a) As the anthropologist Hofstede has shown, power distance and tolerance are key dimension structuring any society and culture. Its patterns, however, are not something that fall from above but are constructed through dynamics learnt in family, school and workplace.41 Acknowledging the complex ways in which subjectivities are formed and reshaped by the micro-dynamics of family, religion and affection (or lack thereof), we cannot dismiss the psychological and symbolic ground that instils certain views about tolerance. Background theories, social experiences and religious symbols are critical factors which set the parameters for an axiological universe which evokes different types of values. (b) But in order for this micro-dynamic to flourish, a corresponding receptive environment is necessary, i.e., a democratic horizon and regime that gives sustenance to the bio-political network stemming from the communications and relationships of the multitude. While the patterns of true democracy are created in the collaborative and respectful cooperative practices from below, the institutional guarantees provided from above are also necessary. (c) Finally, all that can be said about tolerance evaporates into thin air if the grievances and sufferings that may breed intolerant reactions are not redressed. Speaking about tolerance, therefore, implies the formation of a new world system where the services and resources involved in the business of reproducing and expanding life are more or less
41
See Hofstede, pp. 23ff.

equally shared and fairly exchanged. In other words, tolerance calls for new cooperative and communicative networks of labour and production. Lets have a closer look at the three levels: To (a) The first level has to do with the psychological and epistemological openness that is communicated through mythic narratives and/or hermeneutics either sacred or secular. It is the most immediate filter through which psychological lives of individuals and communities are formed. Thoughts, feelings, intention and adaptive practices are drawn from the range of belief system a culture present to them. Given the latemodern lifting of philosophical and ideological interdicts on religion, its symbols, narratives and myths acquire a renewed vitality and interest. This poses the ethical and theological endeavour in a new light, considering the fact that values never appear in a vacuum, independent from mythic narratives. We do not know what the human is outside our telling a story that intertwines the challenges and conflicts of values that face the realisation of that which is the human condition. Most of these stories, however, have deep religious roots either because they refer to a reality lying beyond the paramount one, or because they appear as eruptions and gifts from an unconscious level. Of course, these types of stories are effective to the extent that the primary caretakers not only socialise youth in this atmosphere, but are also committed to the realisation of values and prospects grafted into the myth. Theological reflection offers here critical clues for the interpretations of these myths and symbols, enhancing thereby its formative powers. Notions regarding the nature of the divine, time, space, will, animals, plants, land, and the human condition, have a direct effect in the way people situate themselves in face of otherness, plurality, and difference. Thus one of the foremost challenges faced by a theological discourse committed with critical openness would be the deconstruction of monotheistic God-symbols inherited from the axial age, allowing for a vision of transcendence able to accommodate the integrity and substantial

difference of other beliefs and conceptions of the sacred.42 Again, it is not a matter of simple and uncritical acceptance, a sort of postmodern embrace of everything in order to hold nothing, but a critical openness that is possible because of the non-exclusivist clues provided by the specific convictions of ones religion.43 Values pointing toward openness and tolerance can and must be found within the integrity of ones own narrative a veritable art considering that much of religious written sources were carved out from the corpse of a disparaged other. But the craftsmanship of a theological endeavour will be measured by the ability to reconstruct a language of freedom, equality and tolerance by deconstructing texts that once served for legitimising oppressive dominion. This is alchemy of sorts, yet it is an urgent task since the emphasis upon an absolute One, either ontologically or theologically understood, has served as the foundation for concepts of sovereignty and dominion forcing the heterogeneous multitude into a suffocating Unum: One God, one People, one Leader.44 This level, therefore, is a key in the conformation of a spiritual and psychological otherness that would be the basis for any challenge to hegemonic and intolerant views. The recent history of Christian theology and ecumenical agreements, moving from intolerance towards pro-active tolerance, shows that it is possible for a religious outlook to discover new views. We must never close this possibility to other world religions, however rigid they may seem, to explore new dimensions of the sacred. At the same time, it is also true that to create this climate, other variables must come into play, that is, key grievances must be institutionally and socially addressed as we will mention below.
42
Cfr. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: a Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), p. 6f. 43 In the case of Christianity, the concepts of grace, agape or justification by faith, point to this reality. 44 Cfr. Hard and Negri, Multitude, p. 329.

Of course, we are not only socialised through religious narratives school (state) and Hollywood also possess an incredible formative power. Religious views are constantly intertwined with other narratives, background theories and experiences, which in turn slowly modify or manipulate the prospective tolerant dimensions found in religious stories. These contextual aspects can never be dismissed; pluralised scenarios already constitute a powerful enticement for reviewing any sorts of exclusivism and intolerance. But while for some this is a blessing in disguise since it catalyses values and behaviours seen as central to ones own religious outlook as can be freedom, integrity, self-esteem, choice, diversity for others, however, this same scenario is simply harrowing, cognitively and psychologically impossible to bear, thus encouraging an epic account that places the stressful conscience in the path of either a militant, apocalyptic or messianic release. In this fashion, intolerant attitudes are one of the possibilities that a confusing and pluralised semiotic context may elicit, seeking a sort of totalitarian order that promises to reduce stress by negating alterities. To (b) Consequently the virtue of tolerance requires not only particular moral (and religious) sensitivities, but also of a political regime or arrangement providing the guarantees for a minimal climate of tolerance which must accommodate different degrees of tolerance precisely because of the crisis generated by diversity. Moral and religious sensitivities, as they are not independent of certain narratives, neither are they uncoupled from political and structural regimes. This is the second level to which we referred before, which points to democracy as both a cultural horizon for the containment of the multitude, as well as a political and institutional regime that aims to locate sovereignty in the hands of people. Following the polarisation during the Cold War, the concept of democracy has been unanchored from its rigid moorings and set adrift,

providing a new opportunity for re-conceiving it.45 In effect, the forces of globalization seem to pose formidable challenges, and opinions differ strongly as to the compatibility and future of democracy in the new globalised and late-modern scenario. From the left, social democratic arguments claim that democracy is debilitated or threatened by globalization, especially by its economic forces and fundamentalist reactions. The reassertion of the sovereignty of nation-states seems therefore the best strategy in the present global system. On the other hand, liberal cosmopolitan arguments stress that the forces of globalization, while not always beneficial at first, release the democratic potential of people by precisely promoting freedom from the rule of nation-states. From the right, neo-conservative ideologues stress that only the intervention by the coalition of the willing nations lead by the U.S. is able to foster democratic forces and institutions. Traditionalists, on the other hand, contest both the role of the U.S., and the compatibility of democracy with the cultural values of non-Western peoples.46 None of these views, however, seem sufficient for confronting the new demands for tolerance, justice, peace and democracy. For democracy is confronted today with a leap of scale, where the local appears more intensively related to the global superseding the mediation offered by the boundaries of traditional nation-states. The present grievances against political, ecological and economic aspects, including the current state of war, are all symptoms of a crisis within the present world system, a rebellion against the formal mechanisms of sovereignty and its failing system of representation and decision making processes. More than ever, local problems demand global solutions, and therefore tolerance as an active practice that signals openness to other expressions of the multitude is a key value in the conformation of a new biopolitical and democratic network capable of addressing and redressing
45 46
See Ibid, p. 232. See Ibid, pp. 233-237.

harmful, divisive, and exploitative scenarios. The tolerance that is expressed through this democratic network becomes thus a key factor for peace; for peace is not merely the absence of violence and war, but the basic precondition for reason, imagination, desire, emotions, feelings and affections, working its anarchic but lively ways through the maze of our world. Without tolerance, without peace, no cooperation, communication, forms of life and social relationships can emerge from the incredible potentiality of the swarming multitude. These are the weapons that signal the democratic critique of arms, launching a critique of the massive means of destruction at disposal of the core powers of the system, as well as of the equally disturbing weapons of the dispossessed, namely, the immolation of their own bodies. While these martyrdoms may well be considered a response to destruction and injustice, and a cunning strategy to deny sovereign exploitative powers of their object of sovereignty (the bodies of people), it is still a cog of intolerance that fits well in the grinding machine of the present world system. To (c) as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once asserted, human capability for justice makes of democracy something possible; but its inclination to injustice makes of democracy something necessary.47 The same can be said regarding tolerance. Therefore democracy should be measured both by its capability to voice grievance pertaining to a singular group as well as by the ability to connect different kinds of groups: economic, representation, poverty, human rights, education, ecology and health. These grievances give countenance to a multitude through which the future of democracy is at stake. This requires of a bio-political democratic ethics, that it bridge ideas, hopes and affection allowing an emotional yet also rational identification with a network of differentiated democratic power.
47
Cfr. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1944).

With this we reach a third level that relates to how we redress global and local grievances, above all, of economic, social and ecological natures different forms of intolerance that also generate intolerant reactions. If the world-system cannot show possibilities toward a more egalitarian arrangement, then the appeal of fundamentalisms will certainly be strengthened. For grievances and suffering bring us to the bedrock of human existence; it is the source of local knowledge that signals the inadequacies of ideological, social and economic systems.48 Grievances, therefore, voice the insurrection of subjugated knowledges against hegemonic ideologies which also include the different forms of fundamentalisms.49 Of course, suffering is never without interpretation, but our bodies make of it a mediated immediacy, enclosing thus a negative universality challenging programmes and systems that thrive on elusive promises and concrete duress. Deprivation and poverty may breed anger, indignation and antagonism, but revolt arises only on the basis of wealth a surplus of intelligence, vision, experience, knowledge and desire that is generated by a shift in social practices and cultural patterns. Here lies, precisely, the inadequacy of the intolerant strategies and weapons of fundamentalisms for a pluralised scenario crossed by grievances of every sort. They recoil from the most fundamental weapon of all, a pro-active tolerance that comes with love. Without it, neither justice nor peace can permeate the increasing webs connecting us all in this fragile but beautiful planet. We are not saying that fundamentalists are incapable of loving, or that they are all equally violent, but that they are blind to the political dimension of love. In this they are not alone; if both the forces that create economic disparities as well as many of the fundamentalist reactions
Cfr. Francis Schssler Fiorenza, The Crisis of Hermeneutics and Christian Theology, in Sheila Greeve Davaney, ed., Theology at the End of Modernity (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), p. 135. 49 See Michael Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 80f.
48

make of violent behaviour and intolerance a prime weapon in this time of bifurcation, then violence can only grow exponentially until it destroys us all. This is why fundamentalism is a symptom of the disruptive forces of an unfair globalization, but not its cure. It is one of the powerful fluctuations indicating a possible bifurcation. But so are the powerful cultural and political experiences disclosing a common bio-political desire that rests on a pro-active exercise of tolerance as an affirmation of life in its multiple expressions. For that to happen, the fight for democracy must always be tied to a relentless pursuit of fairness and the eradication of poverty, which can only be reachable through a serious reorientation of the disparities generated by capitalism and its global division of labour. For only when the grievances of the majority are duly heard and redressed, when we are ready to look at the grim face of asymmetrical power, then shall we be able to walk in the full promise and creative force of tolerance and democratic affirmation.
10
CIVIL ISLAM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Muhammad Machasin, Indonesia
1. Introduction
The 9/11 attacks shocked us into awareness of the fragility of the human system of relationships especially in the face of brutality by insane members of the community. Then there have been after-shocks, most of them reactions of the target of the attack and the failure of understanding the real problems leading to such an attack. Meanwhile, Islam is accused of feeding its adherents the teaching of holy war, making them ready to conduct the brutal destruction of civilization in the name of faith. This accusation was not without foundation. There were indicators that may lead many to make such an accusation. Here I will mention some of them, quite apart from the residue of historical tension caused by struggles between the adherents of this religion and those of others, especially Judaism and Christianity. Immediately after the news spread that Osama bin Laden was behind the attack, many youth in big cities of Indonesia wore T-shirt bearing the image of this bearded hero. Then, when American troops waged war

in Afghanistan, some people tried to lock MacDonald fast food restaurants in big cities in Indonesia. There was even sweeping (meaning vigilantism) targeting white people in some places. The perpetrators of this brutality were Muslims proudly bearing Islamic accessories while conducting the destruction, and they claimed to have done their religious obligation by doing so. The bombings that terrorized people in Bali, Jakarta and several other places in Indonesia also wear Islamic clothing. Almost all those accused of this violence are Muslim and some confessed to doing so for religious motives.1 Is it true, then, to imply that Islam is a religion of violence? Going deeper into what lies behind this violence, one can find the truth claim that Islam is the sole true religion, the concept of the finality of Gods guidance in the form of Islam and that of the obligation for every Muslim to realise Gods laws in earth. Such kinds of concepts will certainly prevent their bearer from seeing the possibility of truth from any other source. We also see strong campaigns in some majority Muslim countries for the implementation of Sharia (Divine Law) and the reinstallation of the caliphate as the only legitimate political system for Muslims. The saying al-islm dn wa daula (Islam is religion and state at the same time) that obliges every Muslim to observe religious duties and to establish an Islamic state is taught by many Muslim preachers. Some Muslims took this seriously as fundamental teaching of Islam and do their best to bring
One of them even wrote a diary that then was published under the title of Aku Melawan Terorist (I am Fighting against Terrorists`) saying that killing Islamic enemy projected as Americans and their friends is a religious obligation. If we targeted the civilians it was because the enemy killed before our civilians, he wrote. Cfr. Sigit Indra Imam Samudra in Gatra special edition, 14-11-2004, quoted here through Think Global Act Local Http://tianarief.multiply.com/reviews/item/6. A portion of the book can be found in http://swaramuslim.net/EBOOK/more. When the three Bali bombers (Amrozi, Muklas and Imam Samudra) were executed, many Muslims in their respective home village congratulated them as martyrs in the way of Allah (shuhad) and a banner was hung over the first two graves reading This is the grave of martyrs.
1
Civil Islam as Alternative for Islamic Fundamentalism 209

it about. Likewise the phrase udkhul f-l-silm kffa is understood in such a way that you have to practice totally Islamic teaching.2 Some questions, then, may arise: Is Islam compatible with the idea of pluralism or in the case of Indonesia with multiculturalism - after the formal decision MUI (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Ulama) prohibiting it? Can Muslims put aside their fudamentalistic views in living together with people of other beliefs? Can Muslims take part in the system of democracy while holding fast their religious belief?
2. Islam is not Monolithic

Many believe that Islam - as it comes as guidance from God - is one, but the reality is that from the very beginning there have been variants of what constitutes the fundamental teachings of this religion. The Koran itself condemns as contrary to religion, one who while doing prayers refuses to give help to needy people. This is a strong indication that there were and are people who see the fundamental teachings of Islam as constituting formal obligations.3 Discussions existed in the formative period of Islamic theology on the question of whether acts were part of belief. The Kharijites - blamed as the first fundamentalist group in Islamic history - held the opinion that acts are part of belief, judging as infidels those who perform wicked acts. The Murjiites held the opposite view, refusing the inevitable relationship between belief and acts. For them when belief is there in the heart of a believer, no deed can ever
This expression actually means Go into peace, all of you. However, many will simply read al-islm (the religion of Islam) into al-silm (peace) shifting the quantity of all of you to the quality totally. 3 These formal obligations are called arkn al-islm in Arabic or Rukun Islam in Indonesian, the pillars of Islam, i.e.: (1) proclaiming in public that there is no god save Allah and that Muhammad is a Messenger of Allah, (2) doing the fivetime-a-day obligatory prayers, (3) fasting the month of Ramadan, (4) paying alms, and (5) doing pilgrimage to Mecca.

change it, other than the proclamation of disbelief; al-mn l yazd wal yanqus (the belief does not neither increase nor decrease).4 Not long after the establishment of the Islamic political system there arose two authorities, the religious and the secular. They have competed at times for the loyalty of believers and, when political power managed to take religious authority onto its side making orthodoxy, there were always individuals or groups of people who took a stance against them. It is true that theoretically there is no human authority in Islamic teaching, but in reality the religious opinions of those who have greater knowledge of Islamic sources of teaching will gain more adherents. Ijm or consensus is the third of the four sources of Sunnite Islam is the agreement of the majority of the Muslim community on one particularl opinion, usually formulated by a religious scholar and developed by his follower-scholars.5 It is thus only natural that Islam itself is actually plural in most of its teaching.6 Nevertheless, over the course of time a set of teachings may become the only legitimate one and even be sacralized, neglecting other options and making them unavailable to the community, although there is always the possibility to rediscover what is buried under the soil of negligence. The case of an Egyptian writer Al Abd al-Rziq is worth mentioning here. When the last Caliph of Islam Abd al-Majd II was over-
Cf. Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1979), pp. 85-87. 5 The four sources of Islamic teaching are (1) the Quran, (2) the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, (3) the Consensus and (4) the Analogy. Muslim scholars disagree about whether consensus is that generated by Islam, the religious scholars or the whole community. However, what has been agreed upon can sometimes can be annulled by the practice of the community. Anyhow religious scholars play a significant role in leading, directly or indirectly, to any consensus. 6 On the plural Muslim politics, cf. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 7-10.

thrown by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and driven out from Istanbul in 1924, the Islamic world was shocked and tried to revive the caliphate. Up until then the caliphate had been the only political system of Islam for the Muslims. While leaders of the Islamic world were busy with meetings, gatherings, talks, international conferences etc. to reestablish the caliphate, our writer published a book saying that the caliphate system was not part of religion. There was no statement or allusion whatsoever in the Koran and the Tradition of the prophet to the obligation to establish it. For him, the caliphate system was only a result of Muslims struggle in the past to overcome their political problem.7 The publication of the book annoyed many ulamas and soon the writer was judged of blasphemy and kicked out of his position as professor at al-Azhar University. Another characteristic that deserves mentioning in relation to the non monolithic nature of Islam is the absence of authority in the system Islam. It is true that some organizations tried and managed to establish a kind of authoritative body that may make decision on religious matters, but no agreement has yet been reached by all Muslims on a person or body that may do this. There are always doors open to every Muslim to have and set out his or her personal opinion on any religious matter.8 Then, every Muslim may take whatever opinion of his/her coreligionist that fits his/her own situation. Since no system has as yet been worked out in Islamic communities for making decisions, many find personal judgment and decision legitimate. In addition to this, the main sources of Islamic teachings are in Arabic and preserved in such a form that only few can go to them directly
Cf. Azzam Tamimi, Can Islam be Secularized? written for La Vanguardia of Barcelona, November 2002, through http://www.ii-pt.com/web/articles. 8 Cf. my article Struggle for Authority between Formal Religious Institution and Informal-Local Leaders presented in the Final Conference The Dissemination of Religious Authority in 20th Century Indonesia, jointly organized by IIAS (Leiden) and UIN (Jakarta), in cooperation with the KITLV (Leiden/Jakarta), in Bogor, Indonesia, July 6-9, 2005.
7

and make a thorough reading. The majority of Muslims just rely on those they believe have a good knowledge of Islam, although there is no actual requirement to fulfil for that. One consequence is that a brave and confident Muslim may be very liberal in deducing religious opinion from the reading of the references, however weak his knowledge or lacking his thoroughness and capacity to understand.9
3. Theological Support for Islamic Fundamentalism

We can find in the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad passages that can be used to support an attitude of intolerance, violence and exclusivity towards people of other beliefs. There are many believers who take seriously what is literally stated in this scripture without enough knowledge of its historical contexts at the time of revelation. For believers the Koran is Gods guidance and commandment for every human being, therefore the proper attitude to it, for some of them, is to take the guidance and to implement the order without any questioning. For them the guidance and the order are there in the very words of scripture that can be understood easily by those who know the language. It is stated in the Koran: It is not fitting for a Believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His Messenger, to have any option about their decision: if anyone disobeys Allah and His Messenger, he is indeed on a clearly wrong Path.10 We may say that such an order has to be understood within its historical context, but in many cases it is simply taken as an obligation that needs no consideration save realising it without any ado. Such an atti9
Cf. the argument of Imam Samudra supporting his opinion that killing civilians of a colonialist nation is natural (read as: legitimate) for it is under the title of qisas (retribution): blood for blood, life for life and civilian for civilian, in Indra, ibid. 10 Sura 33/al-Ahzb: 36.

tude may come from a lack of knowledge of its historical context or due to reading the passage without any reference to other passages. It is usual that an order or a prohibition be given for a particular situation, while another order sometimes contradicting the first may also be in the same scripture. Read together, those different or contradictory orders will give balance in the attitude of the believer. In addition, we should not deny the fact that a certain attitude or interest of a reader may lead him/her choosing passages that fit his/her attitude, neglecting other passages that may give other guidance. The following verse gives a description worthwhile of consideration. Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and those who are with him are strong against Unbelievers, (but) compassionate amongst each other. Thou wilt see them bow and prostrate themselves (in prayer), seeking Grace from Allah and (His) Good Pleasure. On their faces are their marks, (being) the traces of their prostration. This is their similitude in the Taurat; and their similitude in the Gospel is: like a seed which sends forth its blade, then makes it strong; it then becomes thick, and it stands on its own stem, (filling) the sowers with wonder and delight. As a result, it fills the Unbelievers with rage at them. Allah has promised those among them who believe and do righteous deeds, Forgiveness, and a great Reward.11 Some of the expressions in the translation could easily be used to support fundamentalist viewpoints, although we can find also some pious Muslims reading the same things without adherence to fundamentalism at all. A saying of the Prophet Muhammad is reiterated by some Muslims: It was narrated from Ab Sa`d that he heard the Prophet saying, If any of you see any abomination change it by your own hand; if you cannot do that by your hand, do it by your tongue; and if you cannot do
11
The Qur'an, chapter 49/al-Fath: 29; bold printing by the present writer.

that by your tongue, do it with your heart. However this last is the weakest faith.12 Since places of gambling, prostitution and other disobediences are forms of abomination, those who are capable of destroying should destroy them. This is what this tradition means for some people. They will refuse any effort to understand it by more peaceful understanding without any allusion to physical destruction. The present writer convinces the audience that what is ordered by the Prophet in this tradition is to change the abomination. To change abomination means to make it no longer an abomination, to correct the situation disturbed by the abomination. If this means to make extinct the abomination, it does not mean the destruction of the buildings or the order of the society. The destruction of buildings and social order is not always effective enough to stop abomination and may even cause other greater abominations. There are in the Koran passages that may be given more than one meaning. This constitutes an opening for different understandings rather than those which may endorse exclusive attitudes, uncompromising intolerance and the like that are sometimes considered as characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism. Here as well the condition of the reader is decisive in choosing one understanding and putting away the other. At times, options are selected on the basis of interest and aspiration of the reader or even one selects passages that may support for his/her opinion. Some Islamic scholars have drawn up rules and technical knowledge required for the reading of the Koran. However, the very nature of Islam where there is neither hierarchy nor privilege in understanding the scripture and formulating the teaching, the right to do so is in the hands of the congregation. Scholars can always propose rules, but the consensus of the congregation has the right to make the final decision. Being referred to orders that cannot be carried out, for example because of their rational contradiction with civility, moderate people will
12
Tradition narrated by Muslim.

seek options of understanding or refer to the historical context of passages where the commandments are found, to avoid their literal implementation. This attitude may use logical reasoning or properness in social living together as supports. However, those who tend to take literal understanding of the scriptures and are psychologically predisposed to take action in compliance with such attitudes, will just take that literal meaning. Take for example the following verse: But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.13 Another verse in the same Surah orders killing of other kinds of peoples and states clearly by when this has to be done. Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.14 In certain psychological situations believers can take seriously such an order neglecting any logical consideration. For example when he or she is facing the fact that the Islamic community is marginalised in the distribution of political and economic power. Another example is when one realises the failure of modern state in making justice operative, offering adequate protection to the citizens and ensuring the prosperity. Likewise, when evil is everywhere and disobedience to religious obligation is spreading, while no serious action is taken by the government. Some believers are then led to remember the majestic time
13 14
Sura 9/al-Tauba: 5. Sura 9/al-Tauba: 29.

when Islamic umma was the most developed nation in the world. A Muslim writer even came forward with a formula: the West managed to develop modern civilisation by leaving aside their religion, while Islamic nations lagged behind because they do not take seriously the teaching of their religion. Accordingly, many conclude that to regain the majesty of Islam, Muslims should come back to the fundamental teachings of Islam. A verse of the Koran (surah 2/al-Baqara:208) is used to establish the notion of totality of Islam: Y ayyuh alladhna man-dkhul f-l-silm kffah. Some Muslims read this verse as saying: O believers, enter totally into the religion of Islam, although the word al-silm actually has more the meaning of peace and than that of Islam. It is true that some interpreters give other options for meanings such as obedience (al-t`ah) and peace treaty (al-sulh, al-mu`hadah), but they are refuted. A famous exegete, al-Qurtub, even said that the meaning of peace treaty was refuted for another verse stating: But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace.15 Thus, concluded this exegete, it is not allowed for Muslims to initiate peace! The order is that you should enter into peace with the enemy if they call you to do so and not the way around.16 What a conclusion! It can be said that one can find a basis for fundamentalistic attitude in the Koran and the Tradition of the Prophet. However, these sources of Islamic teaching, like other scriptures, can be interpreted in multiple ways. Any reader can find support for almost any attitude in scripture. A wholistic reading may gave balance, but the problem with scripture is that sometimes the reader seeks legitimation of what they have in mind rather than guidance for what should be done.
15 16
Sura 8/al-Anfl: 61. Quoted from CDROM al-Quran al-Karm Sakhr edition, release no. 6.3.1.
Civil Islam as Alternative for Islamic Fundamentalism 217 4. The Call of Fundamentalism
Islamic fundamentalism arises as a result of the failure of modernity or because of its negative sides. We cannot deny that modernity has come with many advantages for humankind, but it has also caused much disappointment, especially for those who cannot cope with it. The practice of political democracy, for example, has made many individuals, groups and families lost their power for the good of others who otherwise will never have it. Modern systems of governance cannot always ensure the establishment of justice and prosperity to all citizens. It is only natural, then, that some people raise questions about modernity and try to find another option. For Muslims, this other option lies in past majesty. The basis of that majesty for some of them is the implementation of Islamic teaching in all instances of life. As for the question of attractiveness of fundamentalism some answers can be put forward. The first answer is the above mentioned failure of modern solution for human problems. Democracy in its modern sense is a solution for management of political which was before in the monopoly of the king and his family, but later it is abused by elite to play with peoples loyalty. Modern democracy cannot distribute the prosperity to all citizens. When an official of Indonesian government gave a five billion house to his daughter as a wedding present many questioned on how he earned that amount of money. Second, the fact that in some cases the majority Muslim community represented by big Islamic organizations, especially Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah - reacts very slowly to contemporary problems of the umma. This makes believer disappointed by situations they feel to be desperate seek out leadership that may lead them to take any measures. When pious people come offering help, they welcome them clamorously. The piety here is indicated by fluency in reciting the Koran and Islamic terms, humbleness in daily life, sincerity and the like in contrast

to luxury, dishonesty, individuality etc. that they find in some modern people. The most important thing these people bring with them is an Islamic identity as against the secular disappointing sort of life brought by modernity. When conflict happened in Ambon and the surroundings and many Muslims became victims, nothing was heard from the side of NU and no action was taken to protect them. The NU leadership at that time did nothing to protect their religious fellows, perhaps feeling that the conflict was not essentially religious. However, for the victims what was needed was protection, which did not mean at all destroying the other side in the conflict. What was needed was fast action to prevent people no matter what their religion - from being killed. There we witnessed the coming of those who raise the Islamic banner to protect the Muslim victims. These people represented a small group that was not known before by the public. So such a situation is also an opportunity for such a group to become known and later become part of the elite of the Islamic community The use of Islamic identity is effective in gaining peoples belief. Third, the unfairness of some political authorities in their dealing with many kinds of religious disobedience (maksiat from Arabic masiya, pl. mas). Many assume, not without justification, that some of local authorities back up the practice of maksiat in return for money. At least they do not do enough to stop it. Then vigilantism arises bearing the religious banner of nahi munkar (or prohibiting bad deeds, from Arabic al-nahy an al-munkar). The case of burning down of a whorehouse and a cinema in Purworejo a couple of years ago is a good example. Long before the incident many complained of the existence of the house of ill repute and the increasing number of youths who consumed drugs and drank alcoholic drink, even in surrounding villages known as kampung santri (village of pious people of Islam). Meanwhile rumour had it that the cinema had become the central point for drug distribution.

When the tense situation continued without any significant action by the political authority, the vigilantism arose under leadership of a kiai, burning down both places of disobedience. An interesting question may then be raised: Until when will religious fundamentalism be attractive? Can we stop it by any means? We cannot stem it as long as there is severe disappointment caused by injustice, unfair treatment, marginalization etc. As long as modern solutions and the government fail in solving the problem of injustice, poverty, poor distribution of prosperity and power, and so forth, fundamentalism will continue to live. There will always be individuals who seek solutions themselves and take whatever action they can to solve the problem, and religion is always attractive to give support.
5. Civil Islam
I used to hesitate to use the word civil Islam for two reasons. First, the notion of civil religion used by Jean Jacques Rousseau and developed by Robert Bellah and others as a form of social cement, helping to unify the state by giving the state sacred authority, that is usually practised by political leaders who are laymen and whose leadership is not specifically spiritual.17 Civil Islam is for me a way of practising Islam within a pluralistic society in a polite manner. This pluralistic society is formed by or as a result of the establishment of state - or perhaps society came first and then the state - and therefore there is a kind of protocol or etiquette respected by both. Civil Islam, too, respects this protocol in expressing its aspirations and practising its teaching. In Indonesia where Muslims constitute the majority of the citizens, the incorporation of Islamic aspiration in the states administration is only natural, while in the Islamic system there is no church. The Islamic community therefore needs the state to help implement some religious
17
Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_religion (August 14, 2006).

obligations that in other religious communities might be done by the church. However, there are also state regulations that may be seen as interference in religious private matters. The case of marriage registration is a good example. The Indonesian law of marriage requires any marriage to be registered in the state office, but the office will only register legitimate marriage, i.e. marriage sealed by a religious institution. Since there is no religious institution in Islam, the office of religious affairs takes the function of making marriage. It is true that a religious leader (kiai, tuan guru, buya, tengku etc.) and the wal (literally protector, i.e. father, grandfather, brother, fathers brother etc.) of the bride may make marriage, but it will only be considered legitimate in the eyes of the office if done before an official of the office. Moreover, in many cases what has been practised by government that is usually led by lay people - changes some religious tenets as in the case of family planning. When the government introduced family planning programme, many ulamas opposed saying it was against the tenets of Islam. The Prophet said, they quoted often making argument, Marry and make children, for I will compete other communities with you. In the course of time, however, the objection fades and many try to interpret the quoted saying by competition in quality instead of quantity. Such an example bears witness that even lay person and secular institutions can call for a change in religious understanding. Thus, civil Islam is a kind of Islam that is open to and appreciates some proposals of change for itself. One of the theological arguments is a saying of the Prophet Muhammad that reads, Put the wisdom and it will not harm you that it comes out of any place, and another, Wisdom is a lost property of a believer and so he/she will take it wherever he/she find it.18
18
As reported by Tirmidh and Ibn Mja.

The second reason is that I found a dictionary giving the word civil the meaning of polite in a formal way but possibly not friendly.19 I do not mean by civil Islam a polite, unfriendly Islam. This kind of Islam must be polite in the sense of complying with the rules and active in doing whatever possible for the betterment of living together. The book of Robert W. Hefner brilliantly outlines the way Muslims live democratization in Indonesia (see note 6), and his writing encouraged me to use this term. I mean by civil Islam the kind of practising which is ready to enter any social frame while taking part in the process of filling and making necessary change for it, with politeness and confidence. Politeness here does not come from an external "must" to act in accordance with rules, but from the fact that the rules do not always collide with Islamic principles and that - if at any point the rules do collide with some of the principles - there is always the possibility to negotiate. This latter part can only work if one has confidence. Past Islamic scholars bequeath an adage meaning: if you cannot take the whole thing, do not leave it at all. Therefore, in the history of the introduction of Islam to the archipelago appreciation of some local customs was always conspicuous. Local, pre-Islamic wisdom can even be found in the body of Islamic tradition in this region. Of course one could say, that such an eclectic Islam is only acceptable as an interim stage in the process of Islamization and that it needs to be left when the process is completed. However, then we may disagree on the time of completion and which part of the interim practice that should be left. Besides, is it also a fact that from the very beginning Islam incorporates traditions of its adherents while orienting them to its orientation?
A. S. Hornby, Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English, Sixth edition, edited by Sally Wehmeier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th impression, 2003), p. 224.
19

Civil Islam is actually a way of taking one of many options available from Islamic heritage. The teaching of tawassut, (taking the middle path and going through with people), tawzun (balance), itidl (moderation) and tasmuh (tolerance), that characterises civil Islam is there beside that of jihd (holy war), shumlya (totality), shidda al al-kuffr (harshness against the infidels), self separation of the people etc. These seemingly contradictory attitudes were taught by the Prophet himself to different people in different situations, but sometimes they are recorded in Tradition literature without their concomitant context. Unfortunately, there arose an ahistorical reading in Islamic history, making texts lose their historical contexts. An Islamic legal maxim reads that what matters in a text is its universal meaning, and not the meaning related to the particular situation that brings about its existence.
6. Promises and Limitations

Civil Islam is one of many variants of Islamic expression. In the beginning, it was not the intention of the Prophet of Islam to build a religious system apart from the existing social system. When the turn came for him to build a new system, he did not demolish the old one, but added new elements to the old construction and by doing so gave it energy to be a wider system of civilisation.20 Thus, appreciation to local culture and working within the existing social systems is actually a genuine practice of Islam itself. The problem is that many Muslims pay attention to Islam as a complete system, forgetting the long process resulting in it. The genuineness of Islam is then confined to that system. This is actually a delicate point on which Muslims differ significantly. The genuineness of Islamic teaching for many is measured by the existence of support from the main sources especially the Koran and the
20
Arab culture and Abrahamic system of faith were the most conspicuous frames to which Muhammad launched his restoration.

Tradition. Civil Islam has the capacity of finding such support, but when the problem is dissatisfaction of the people towards the considerate, polite teaching and practice of Islam, the point at stake is not genuineness. It is only natural that for careful individuals who are aware of the complexity of social problems, thoroughness and patience are very important. Thoroughness will always mean taking more time, whereas in many cases some people just cannot wait. With its appreciation of any system it may encounter, civil Islam will prevent cultural conflict. It is rather an effort of betterment from within a cultural system rather than a revolution coming from without. With the openness to valuable heritage and findings of other existential human experiences, it will at the same time enrich its own self understanding and strengthen the confidence of human beings about their ability to live the human life responsibly. Nevertheless, civil Islam may not satisfy many Muslims in certain situations. When you feel abandoned, treated unfairly and neglected in the process of decision-making about public matters, you need something that gives or promises to give you what you deserve but is absent for the time being, such as care, identity, proud and bargaining power. It is better if you can get such things immediately. It would seem that civil Islam cannot give such things in a short time and in a form that can easily be seen. Islam has long been present without needing to exert itself as the only religion, not neglecting the fact that there are some passages in the sources of Islamic teaching that may be used as support for fundamentalism. Muslims do not feel any lack so far of their ability to practise Islam. They felt secure and capable of realising their mission in life in the frame of state and culture that did not bear formally Islamic name. Civil Islam is the reviving of this practice of Islam that will prevent internal conflicts of different groups within the community. By doing so,

Muslim identity will be absorbed by the larger identity of the community; something some Muslims in need of self exertion will surely deny. The same is true of some pious Muslims who see evil conduct and disobedience to religious norms everywhere, while no significant measures are done to ameliorate the situation. They may conclude that the majority should be blamed for that and that the proper way open for them to go out of the situation is to be different. In religion they may find holiness that will make them different from the rest of the people whom they accuse of being dirty for encouraging disobedience. Sometimes I have trouble with the fact there are many legitimate options in Islamic teaching, the soft one and the harsh one. The problem is how to find an opinion which fits my current situation. I tend to propose the use of rational consideration. However, it is good to know that even Imam Samudra21 said, while comparing different fatws(religious legal opinions of a person or a body having a kind of religious authority), on holy war, that he always sought points of convergence between those fatws if possible, but if not, he would read thoroughly the arguments of each fatw and take the most reliable to his opinion to be implemented.22 Here we need a kind of decision-making body to prevent individual decision that may lead to vigilantism. Civil Islam considers the democratic state capable and legitimate of undertaking such a task, although some Muslims will say the opposite for it is, in their opinion, only Islamic authority that may function as the decision maker.
7. Conclusion
Gentleness and consideration are actually normal expressions of religion, the essence of which is a deliberate response to Gods call, but these expressions cannot help some people of religion. At times they
21 22
One of the actors of the first Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people. Cf. Indra, ibid.

need harsh, non-compromising performance for an abnormal situation. Such oppositional options are inherent in almost every religion and therefore it is not suggested that we erase the options that we do not like but rather that we improve the conditions that may compel people to take such options. At times one is not aware about the goodness of a practice that has long been with him/her and when comes a new suggestion that may promises a solution for his/her frustrating situation, he/she will accept it easily. Therefore, civil people of religion have the obligation to spread the idea of moderate and peaceful practice with a tone of voice that cannot be less loudly than that of those who are campaigning exclusiveness, reason weakening, repudiation of differences and the use of violence in the name of religion. Fundamentalism is actually also a legitimate form of self-expression, especially for those who are neglected and marginalised in the life of society. It rises up from below and can mean that there is something wrong in the order of things in a particular society. Therefore, readiness to talking to the fundamentalists, making dialogue and trying to understand what is lying behind their persistence with the truth they think they have, is not just very important but a must for the betterment of our living together. Furthermore, forms of religiosity which promote such dialogue should be encouraged. In the case of Islam, isnt it a polite, considerate and tolerant religion that will be civil Islam?
CONTRIBUTORS
Editors
Hadsell, Heidi
Prof. Dr,. Professor of Social Ethics and President of Hartford Seminary, USA. Themes: environmental ethics, economic ethics, interreligious encounters and ethics, the public voice of the Churches, methods of ethics in a global context. Recent publications: Bejond Idealism, ed. with Robin Gurney and Lewis Mudge. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 2006; Environmental Movements as Forms of Resistance, in: Stone, Ronald/Stivers, Robert (eds), Resistance and Theological Ethics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Web: www.hartsem.edu E-mail: hadsell@hartsem.edu
Stckelberger, Christoph
Prof. Dr, Founder, former chairperson and since 2008 Executive Director of Globethics.net. Director of the Institute for Theology and Ethics of the Federation of Swiss Protestant Churches in Bern, Switzerland, until 2007. Professor of Ethics at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Reformed pastor. Director of the Swiss protestant development organisation Bread for all (1993-2004). Author of various books on economic ethics, environmental ethics, peace ethics. Regular visiting professor in developing countries.

Themes: economic and business ethics, environmental, peace and justice issues, bioethics, global ethics. Recent publications: Global Trade Ethics. An Overview, WCC Publications: Geneva, 2003 (also in German, French, Chinese); with Mugambi, Jesse K.N. (eds), Responsible Leadership. Global and Contextual Perspectives, Geneva: WCC Publications, 2007. Web: www.globethics.net; www.christophstueckelberger.ch E-mail: stueckelberger@globethics.net
Authors
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard
Prof. Dr, Executive Director of the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS-Yogya), a Ph.D. consortium of Gadjah Mada University, State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga and Duta Wacana Christian University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Asian Studies at University of Wisconsin, Asian religions at University of London and Religion and Society at the GTU, Berkeley. From 1982 until 1991 he taught at the GTU, Berkeley. Has lived in Indonesia since 1991. Currently writing and researching on Islam and Power in Indonesia. Themes: Interreligious ethics, Christian ethics, Islamic ethics. Publications: Strange Virtues. Ethics in a Multicultural World, Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995; Etika social lintas budaya, Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius, 2000. Web: www.icrs.ugm.ac.id; www.ukdw.ac.id E-mail: bernfar@indosat.net.id
Contributors 229
Dower, Nigel
Prof. Dr, Honorary Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Aberdeen and Academic Consultant, Until 2004 fulltime professor in Aberdeen, Zimbabwe, USA. Former president of the International development Ethics Association IDEA. Themes: World ethics, ethics of development, global citizenship. Recent publications: World Ethics: The New Agenda, Edinburgh: University Press, 1998; An Introduction to Global Citizenship, Edinburgh: University Press, 2003; Global Citizenship - A Critical Reader, edited with John Williams, Edinburgh: University Press, 2002. Web: www.abdn.ac.uk E-mail: n.dower@abdn.ac.uk
Fernando, Joseph Isidore

Dr, Lecturer in Philosophy at the Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok, Thailand. Themes: Hermeneutics, Ethics, Social Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, Thomistic Philosophy, History of Western Philosophy. Aristotle, Aquinas, Heidegger, Marx, Dostoevsky, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Philosophy of Technology, Justice, Peace, Non-violence, and Globalization. Web: www.au.edu E-mail: joseph_fernandoin@yahoo.co.in
Hansen, Guillermo
Prof. Dr,. Associate Professor of Systematic Theology and Ethics at the Luther Seminary, Minnesota,USA. 1996-2008 at ISEDET University,

Buenos Aires, Argentina as Chairperson of the Department of Systematic Theology and Director of Post-Graduate Studies. Born in Argentina. Themes: public theology, Christian theology and late-modernity, ethics and globalisation, science and theology. Recent publications: he is finishing three books on the doctrine of the trinity, science and theology and the Lutheran concepts from a Latin American perspective. Reasoning through Theology. The Encounter with the Sciences in Times of Cultural and Social Fragmentation, in: Studies in Science and Theology 10, 2005/6; Neoliberal Globalization. A Casus Confessionis? in: Karen Bloomquist (ed.), Communion, Responsibility, Accountability. Responding as a Lutheran Communion to Neoliberal Globalization, Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 2004. Web: www.luthersem.edu E-mail: ghansen001@luthersem.edu
Machasin, Muhammad Professor of History of Islamic Cultures at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He belongs to the traditional Muslim organization, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), being Vice Head of its Consultative Board in Yogyakarta province since 1987. Promoting interfaith sharing and local wisdom (especially religious) constitutes his recent concern. Since April 2008 he is Director of Islamic Higher Education, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Indonesia. He is member of the Board of Foundation of Globethics.net. Web: www.depag.go.id/ E-mail: mmachasin@yahoo.com
Mohammed, Girma
Ethiopean, PhD student in Amsterdam/Netherlands. Dissertation on Towards a Hermeneutic of Covenant: Reconceptualizing the Interface
Contributors 231
between Religion and Society in Ethiopia. 2001-2004 Lecturer at Evangelical Theological College in Addis Ababa/Ethiopia. Last publication: Beyond the Polarity: The Fundamentalism vs. Liberalism Debate and its Implication to the African Hermeneutics, in: Henk Geertsema & Jan van der Stoep (eds.), Philosophy Put to Work: Contemporary Issues in Art, Society, Politics, Science, and Religion. (Amsterdam: VU University, 2008. E-mail: girma_mohammed@yahoo.com
Pavlovic, Peter
Rev. Dr, Study secretary of the Church and Society Commission of the Conference of European Churches CEC in Brussels/Belgium. Secretary of the European Christian Environmental Network ECEN. Physicist, protestant pastor. Themes: Economic globalization, climate change, bioethics, church and society. Recent Publications: Drafter and editor of many church statements and publications such as: Church and Society Commission of the Conference of European Churches: European churches living their faith in the context of globalisation, Brussels 2006. Web: www.cec-kek.org E-mail: ppt@cec-kek.be
Salkeld, Brett
MA Student in Theology at the University of St. Michael's College, Toronto School of Theology, Toronto, Canada. Web: www.utoronto.ca/stmikes E-mail: bretzky@hotmail.com
Wijaya, Yahya
Prof. Dr, Professor of Ethics and Director of the Center for Business and Professional Ethics at Duta Wacana Christian University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Master of Theology from Princeton Theological Seminary and Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Leeds. Themes: business ethics, intercultural ethics, political ethics. Recent Publications: Iman atau Fanatisme? (Faith or Fanatism?), Jakarta: BKP, 1997; Business, Family and Religion. A Public Theology in the Context of the Chinese-Indonesian Business Community, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002. Web: www.ukdw.ac.id E-mail: yahyawijaya@ukdw.ac.id
Wiratmoko, Nickholas T.
Researcher at the independent Percik Institute (Institute for Social Research, Democracy and Social Justice), Salatiga, Indonesia. He obtained his first degree in agronomy and his Master in development studies both from Satya Wacana Christian University. Themes: His research activities are centred on advocacy of good governance, territorial reforms, and local politics. He has been an active member of the Salatiga Circle for In-depth Study of Science and Religion Relation (SCISOSARR) and he has also been working with several NGOs mostly in the area of environment, water advocacy, energy policy advocacy. Publications: several papers in Indonesian journals and conference proceedings. Web: www.percik.or.id E-mail: nicktwiratmoko@yahoo.com This book can be downloaded for free from the Globethics.net Library, the leading global online library on ethics: www.globethics.net.

Overcoming Fundamentalism

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Overcoming Fundamentalism

Ethical Responses from Five Continents

Globethics.net Series No. 2

1 Development and Fundamentalism ...................................... 17

2 Fundamentalism versus Liberalism: Towards a Hermeneutical Turn to Ethics............................... 35

4 Religious Fundamentalism and an Ethics of Recognition...69

5 Globalization and Religion - an Indonesian Perspective.....89

7 The Economic Ethics of Christian and Islamic Fundamentalism ......................................................................131

8 Why Catholics Cant Vote Pro-Life ................................... 151

9 Tolerance, Democracy and Fundamentalism(s): Challenges in Time of Systemic Bifurcations........................ 173

10 Civil Islam as an Alternative to Islamic Fundamentalism ................................................... 207

Contributors ............................................................................ 227

DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDAMENTALISM

Nigel Dower, United Kingdom

2. Development: Concept and Conceptions

Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Development and Fundamentalism

http://atheism.about.com/library/glossary/western/bldef_fundamentalism.html (accessed August 2006) 7 See http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861613888/fundamentalism.html (accessed August 2006)

Development and Fundamentalism

Development and Fundamentalism

4. Fundamentalism and Development

Development and Fundamentalism

5. Is There Incoherence between Current Process and Future Vision?

Development and Fundamentalism

Development and Fundamentalism

6. The Ethics of the Means

Sen, op.cit., p. 15.

Development and Fundamentalism

7. Economic Growth versus Other Paradigms, Fundamentalist or Otherwise

Development and Fundamentalism

FUNDAMENTALISM VERSUS LIBERALISM: TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICAL TURN TO ETHICS

Girma Mohammed, Ethiopia

1. Liberalism versus Fundamentalism: Two Different Conceptions

1.1 The Origins and the Western Conception

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

1.2. An African Perspective on the Debate

1.2.1. The nature of Debate

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

1.2.2. Its Expression

1.2.3. The Issues

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

2. The Concept of Meaning as a Way to go Beyond the Poles

2.1. Deeper Existential Level

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

2.2. Abstract Philosophical Level

2.3. Concrete Practical Level

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

Fundamentalism versus Liberalism

FUNDAMENTALISM OR TOLERANCE: WHAT IS THE PUBLIC ROLE OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY?

Peter Pavlovic, Belgium

Europe A Beautiful Idea, European Intellectual Summit, Rotterdam, December 2004.

Mark Juergenmayer, ibid.

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND AN ETHICS OF RECOGNITION

Joseph I. Fernando, Thailand

2. The Growth of Science

2.1 Secularism and Secularity

2.2 Foreign Rule and the Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism

antiquity and immense richness of Indian culture. As Huntington remarks,

2.3 The West and Muslim Fundamentalism

Niels C.Nielson, Jr., Fundamentalism, Mythos, and World Religions, p. 99.