What Agenda

First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

PROCEEDINGS
27-28 November 2000 UNESCO, Paris
First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions
UNESCO, Paris 2728 November 2000
Editors: UNESCO Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance Social and Human Sciences Sector
The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNESCO. The designations employed throughout the publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Any communication concerning this publication may be addressed to: Ms Moufida Goucha / Ms Claudia Maresia Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance Social and Human Sciences Sector UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France Tel: +33 (0)1 45 68 45 52 / 54 Fax: +33 (0)1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org
Published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France Composed and printed in the workshops of UNESCO UNESCO 2001 Printed in France
SHS-2001/WS/12
CONTENTS
FOREWORD ...............................................................................................................................................................
OPENING CEREMONY Inaugural speech ..................................................................................................................................................... 11 by Mr Kochiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences a.i. Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations ................................. 13 by Mr Hassen Fodha, Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security .............................................. 15 by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace .................................................................. 19 by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme Specialist, International Year for the Culture of Peace, UNESCO
FIRST ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Africa .............................. 21 Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris, France.............................................................................................................. 23 Lecturers: Peace and human security in Africa ......................................................................................................................... 25 by Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaound, Cameroon Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS ............................................................................ 31 by Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
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SECOND ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe ............................ 37 Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO .......... 39 Lecturer: National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans ........................ 41 by Mr Bjrn Mller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark
THIRD ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Latin America and the Caribbean .................................................................................................................................................. 63 Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO ........... 63 Lecturers: Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America .................................................................. 65 by Mr Alejandro Bendaa, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua Human security: An academic perspective from Latin America ............................................................................. 69 by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Santiago, Chile The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean .................. 77 by General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay
FOURTH ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States .............. 83 Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Ren Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO ........................................................................................................................ 85 Lecturer: Challenges to human security in the Middle East ................................................................................................... 87 by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt
FIFTH ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Asia and the Pacific ........ 93 Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General, Priority Africa Department, UNESCO .... 93 Lecturers: What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa .............. 95 by Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia ......................................................................... 101 by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
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CLOSING SESSION Reports on the debates of the five round tables: ............................................................................................. 109 First round table, Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO ................................................................................................................ Second round table, Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO ................................................................................................... Third round table, Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO ............................................................................................................ Fourth round table, Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO .................................................................................................................... Fifth round table, Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO ..............................................................
109 109 110 110 111
Final Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 113 presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace ............................................................................................................................... 115
APPENDICES Organizing Committee ............................................................................................................................................... Programme .................................................................................................................................................................. Working document The promotion of human security: The state of play.......................................................... List of participants ...................................................................................................................................................... Bio-sketches of the lecturers ..................................................................................................................................... The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum ................................................................................................................................. UN Resolution A/RES/53/243 of 13 September 1999 Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace ............................................................................................................................................... UN Resolution A/RES/53/25 of 10 November 1998 International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (20012010) ............................................................................... Other UNESCO publications of interest ................................................................................................................... 119 121 125 127 139 143 145 151 153
FOREWORD
by Ms Moufida Goucha on behalf of the Organizing Committee
Human security is a paradigm in the making, as stressed in the Final Recommendations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, which had as its theme: What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? As the Director-General of UNESCO stated in his inaugural speech, The theme that has brought you together today links in with UNESCOs own proposals for the orientation of its future activities, since its Draft Medium-Term Strategy for 20022007 is entitled UNESCO Contributing to peace and human development in an era of globalization. In every one of its fields of competence education, the sciences, culture and communication the Organization will devote all its energies to helping states to grapple resolutely with the risks and threats hanging over humanity. Eradication of poverty, preservation of ecosystems (especially freshwater resources), respect for human rights and cultural diversity, and promotion of an ethics of science and technology are among the priorities which UNESCO has laid down in order to fight this battle. For human security is a global and inclusive concept. Some of its aspects extreme poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal immigration and AIDS go far beyond national boundaries. That is why international cooperation is essential in order to achieve tangible results. We must take action together without further delay. The meeting, whose objectives were the following: (1) to bring together directors of institutions concerned with peace research and training who are representative of several countries and regions, in order that they may present the priorities of their action-oriented research programmes; (2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in joint programmes aimed at promoting peace and human security; (3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation among such institutions in the form of networks; (4) to make plans for practical projects, particularly in the field of education and training for peace and human security, paying special attention to educational content and to UNESCO Chairs;
had the benefit of the contributions of a number of eminent specialists from the worlds regions, who gave the key lectures for each of the round tables. As may be seen, these lectures, starting out from widely different viewpoints, deal with the new challenges to be met and suggest new avenues of action for promoting human security. Our warmest gratitude is hereby expressed to these specialists for sharing their knowledge and experience with all the participants, and for allowing the meeting to draw up its Final Recommendations and to adopt an Agenda for Action on the basis of an in-depth analysis of major issues to be dealt with in the near future. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank all the other participants who contributed to the success of the meeting: those from all over the world who made valuable intellectual contributions to the debates with enthusiasm and conviction, the moderators, in particular Mr Bertrand Badie who made a major contribution to the preparation of the launching of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum, and last but not least, the Rapporteurs, representing all UNESCOs fields of competence. As this volume comes off the press, the followup to the Recommendations of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions is well under way, in particular with a view to defining human security agendas at the regional and in particular at the subregional level. Thus, in the framework of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace launched by the participants in November 2000, four regional follow-up expert meetings have been organized for the second half of 2001 on the theme Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention: first, on Africa, in cooperation with the Institute for Security Studies, in Pretoria (South Africa), July 2001; second, on South Asia, in cooperation with the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA), in Karachi (Pakistan), October 2001; third, on Central Asia, in cooperation with the National Commission for UNESCO, in Almaty, (Kazakhstan), November 2001;
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Foreword
fourth, on Latin America and the Caribbean, in cooperation with the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), in Santiago (Chile), November 2001. The proceedings of these expert meetings will also be jointly published by UNESCO and its partners and will serve to set the agendas of the regional international conferences planned for 20022003, as well as the Second International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, to be held in 2003 at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris. Last but not least, many of the issues already identified have also been duly reflected in UNESCOs Draft Medium-Term Strategy for 20022007, in which human security is given a prominent place under Strategic Objective 5, entitled Improving human security by better management of the environment and
social change. In this framework, UNESCO will, inter alia, further address the need to prevent conflicts at their source and the needs of the most vulnerable populations at regional and subregional levels, through its global network of peace research and training institutions, thereby reinforcing human security and contributing to the implementation of the Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (para. 108 of the Draft Medium-Term Strategy for 20022007). One of the expected outcomes under Strategic Objective 5 is the elaboration of integrated approaches to human security at the regional, subregional and national levels, targeting the most vulnerable populations, including the preparation of methodologies for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in particular over natural resources.
OPENING CEREMONY
Opening ceremony
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Inaugural speech
INAUGURAL SPEECH
by Mr Kochiro Matsuura, Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Directors, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Allow me to welcome you to UNESCO on the occasion of the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. This meeting, held as part of the International Year for the Culture of Peace, deals with an extremely topical theme: What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?. For although the Cold War belongs to the past, the same cannot be said of the many territorial, ethnic and religious conflicts which survive here and there on the fertile ground of intolerance, discrimination, environmental degradation and extreme poverty. When the United Nations system was set up in the mid-twentieth century, it gave UNESCO a special mandate, at the crossroads of human knowledge and human aspirations, to encourage all approaches that might strengthen individual human dignity, selfawareness and personal fulfilment. This meeting will be instrumental in strongly reasserting a number of values peace, democracy, justice, tolerance and freedom of expression which the Organization has defended since it was established, and in fulfilling the injunctions of its Constitution to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion. Many of you are already closely involved in our Organizations work for peace in the fields of research, education and training. The proceedings of this meeting will no doubt help to strengthen it. The theme that has brought you together today links in with UNESCOs own proposals for the orientation of its future activities, since its Draft MediumTerm Strategy for 20022007 is entitled UNESCO Contributing to peace and human development in an era of globalization.
In every one of its fields of competence education, the sciences, culture and communication the Organization will devote all its energies to helping states to grapple resolutely with the risks and threats hanging over humanity. Eradication of poverty, preservation of ecosystems (especially freshwater resources), respect for human rights and cultural diversity, and promotion of an ethics of science and technology are among the priorities which UNESCO has laid down in order to fight this battle. For human security is a global and inclusive concept. Some of its aspects extreme poverty, terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal immigration and AIDS go far beyond national boundaries. That is why international cooperation is essential in order to achieve tangible results. We must take action together without further delay. It is ten years since the international community became aware of the extent of the problem. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council expressly recognized that non-military threats to peace required urgent action just as much as conflicts between states and within states. Two years later, the United Nations Development Programmes Human Development Report 1994 on human security initiated a broad debate which substantially helped to enrich the concept of human security and provide the impetus for wide-ranging action to curb the impact of threats to it. I am thinking in particular of Canadas initiative to make the concept of human security more operational in order to establish a specific policy agenda, and of the priority given to promoting democratic security in the Council of Europe. I am also thinking of Japan, whose initiative facilitated the setting up of the human security fund in the United Nations in March 1999 with a contribution of $90 million, and which is preparing to fund an information, education and communication campaign on HIV/AIDS prevention in China that will shortly be launched by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and UNESCO. The 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen also underlined the urgent need to tackle poverty, especially extreme poverty, as well as
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Inaugural speech
social exclusion, both of which are being covered by the work of a broad coalition of international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The same holds true for the fields of food safety, environmental safety and a number of other areas which are now termed new dimensions of security. For UNESCO and the whole of the international community, one of the main keys to human security and all forms of development individual, social, economic and sustainable is education. The World Education Forum held in Dakar (Senegal) in April 2000 provided striking confirmation of this fact. There will be no lasting peace without sustainable endogenous development, which attacks the root causes of division and of entrenched poverty
and exclusion. Education fulfils its true purpose by allowing individuals to make their own decisions and take control of their own lives. What a distance we have travelled from that time, not so very long ago, when we thought of security in terms of defence and when resources for security were allocated solely for the purchase of arms! But there is still a long way to go before human security becomes a central concern of every society. Your discussions, I have no doubt, will help us towards that goal. I therefore wish you every success in your work. You may count on UNESCOs firm support. Thank you for your attention.
Opening ceremony
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Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations
KEYNOTE ADDRESS ON THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS
by Mr Hassen Fodha, Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France
It is with great pleasure that I take the floor today with the contribution of the United Nations system to the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, held on the initiative of UNESCO. Needless to say, this meeting is most timely since it comes in the wake of the Millennium Summit and its Declaration, marking the commitment of all Member States to refine and apply concerted, coordinated action for a better world of peace, tolerance and human security. The Millennium Declaration, signed by, among others, the 150 heads of state and government present, states: We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the worlds people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs We consider certain fundamental values [freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility] to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. The Millennium Declaration calls for strong partnerships with civil society and particularly nongovernmental organizations, including the private sector, in order to end poverty and destitution and to help advance development plans in the world. It must be recalled that with the year 2001 we are also entering the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (20012010) and will be celebrating the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. Peace research and training institutions respond to all these universal measures and priority objectives; and the United Nations is grateful to them for their willingness and their aptitude for playing a key role in peace-building, in that their research can throw light not only on the causes of conflicts but also on how to establish and then consolidate a just and lasting peace afterwards; moreover, their training activities produce a multiplier effect in terms of civilian actors for peace, tolerance and solidarity.
They can do much to create conditions for a dynamic promotion of human security, inseparable from human development, as the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have clearly shown, particularly since 1994. The theme you have chosen to look at in detail, What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?, is a central concern of many societies with the general realization of growing international action for security and the protection of individuals. Efforts to ensure the security of individuals and communities must today be conducted in unison by all players in society, with heed for the fact that the globalization under way requires new forms of interdependence concerning all spheres of life in society, without exception. I will not dwell upon the far-reaching changes to the concept of security that have come about in recent years, since a consensus is emerging on the multidimensional nature of security and the basic foundation needed for its construction, that is, respect for all the rights proclaimed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Like human rights, human security is indivisible; like human rights, human security must also be universal. Hence action for human rights has become a central prerequisite to all the programmes and activities of the United Nations system, since human security demands respect for and implementation of all human rights, including the various fundamental freedoms, the right to dignity and the right to development. I should like, for my part, to return to some aspects I see as essential and that deserve emphasis and, above all, incorporation in the work you are embarking on today at UNESCO. First, there is no getting away from the harsh fact that intra-state or internal conflicts persist despite the huge efforts in recent years by the international community, whether under United Nations auspices or through the regional intergovernmental organizations to which the Charter of the United Nations gives a major role in maintaining peace and security.
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Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations
The United Nations peace-keeping forces are present in sixteen countries in the world and step in to maintain an often purely notional peace, as they cannot end conflicts or try to alleviate the suffering and the consequences that peoples, particularly women and children, suffer in these regions of the world. Non-state forces and paramilitary groups, which are often predatory and closely linked to the most diverse trafficking, in particular of drugs and armaments, go unpunished in many countries, with the constant risk of perpetuating conflicts and spreading them regionally. The figures say it all: the internal conflicts of the past ten years have left more than 5 million dead and produced 25 million refugees worldwide. The international community has come to realize in the past decade that intra-state conflicts call for new approaches in preserving and maintaining peace. The Millennium Declaration calls for prompt action on all fronts: first, that of prevention, by promoting steady, balanced economic growth, while protecting human rights and minority rights and adopting political agreements that ensure the equitable representation of all groups. At the same time, protection of the most vulnerable, strengthening of peace-keeping operations, better targeting of sanctions and arms reduction remain priorities for the whole international community. The General Assembly is exploring the possibility of establishing a flexible and efficient follow-up mechanism able to react rapidly where necessary. Clearly, though, the objective of living in a world without fear cannot be dissociated from that of living in one protected from need. The known figures on the quarter of the worlds population living in extreme poverty means that the United Nations system must face up to the imperative of responding. The Millennium Summit and the various reports of the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, on the subject commit themselves to it: halving by 2015 the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. Member States are invited to submit by 2005 national plans and strategies for achieving this. The objective of halving poverty in the world by 2015 requires much effort from the entire international community, including civil society. It is a credible commitment to the prospects of human globalization. Extreme poverty is compounded by the devastating effects of pandemics, primarily the AIDS pandemic which is threatening to wipe out achievements in human development, in particular in subSaharan Africa, where its ravages will by 2010 produce 40 million orphans. However, AIDS is spreading well beyond Africa, with increases of more than 70 per
cent in the numbers of infected persons in Asia between 1996 and 1998, while starting to loom very large indeed in countries such as the Russian Federation. The AIDS pandemic was recently described in the United Nations as a genuine threat to peace and security, and it was stated that prevention strategies and strategies to treat people suffering from the affliction must be strengthened urgently. All these crucial problems, together with others such as environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources, have combined effects on population groups and particularly on the most vulnerable of them. Your work today and the follow-up to it provide an illustration of civil society in action; practical action with regard to peace training, the culture of peace and the attitude that all individuals must have in their daily lives. It is not enough for states to legislate or for international organizations to run conventions; education must also prepare people and information must build awareness. Your workshops concern all the regions of the international community: Africa, the Arab States, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe and Latin America. They are intended to build a universal network able to meet the challenge of human security and introduce a mechanism to implement urgent and priority decisions. Thanks to your voluntary action, the concept of human security is also turning into a veritable agenda for action drawing on all available knowledge and resources. Volunteers can play their part in transforming societies. In his report to the Millennium Summit, Kofi Annan proposed the creation of a corps of volunteers to travel throughout the developing countries and help to train communities in order to ensure that the new information technology actually serves human development. Forty development volunteers are already in the field. Several others are being assigned to the unit concerned with harnessing information technology for development and will soon be swelling the ranks of these volunteers. Our meetings at UNESCO contribute their own brick to the edifice and so consolidate action to promote a culture of peace. I will end by expressing the hope that your work here at UNESCO Headquarters will be thoroughly successful and productive. I am sure that the efforts we all make together within the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, in common with what you accomplish at this meeting and later, will over the years have beneficial consequences of a magnitude beyond anything we can predict or conceive of today.
Opening ceremony
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Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security
KEYNOTE ADDRESS ON THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN HUMAN SECURITY Towards human security: a people-centred approach to foreign policy
by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO
1. New global realities Canadas foreign policy of human security begins with this simple understanding: that nobody, in the present age, is safe from the violence that threatens the security of people. It is plain, for example, that war itself now occurs increasingly within states, and kills mostly civilians. But it is just as plain that the causes of conflict, and the consequences, extend far beyond national borders. And violence against human security also takes other forms. We see it in systematic abuses of rights and freedoms. In the cruellest exploitations of children and women. In the extortions of warlords and the drug trade, and in the disorders of corruption. No people anywhere are invulnerable to these threats, or unaffected by the violence. It is the defining nature of our age that whether or not we share the great benefits of globalization, we are all subject to its dangers. Canadas approach to human security responds to these global realities. And it addresses directly the imperative of human security to protect people from pervasive, violent threats to their rights, their safety, or their lives. Indeed, human security is now more widely and better understood as an imperative of governance an obligation of states, and of others in the global community. The provision of human security is a matter of good governance, within states and among them. As a policy imperative, human security serves to focus attention and action not just on the security of the state, but on the security of the person. Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General, has given voice to this new emphasis. The state, he has said, is now widely understood to be the servant of the people, and not vice versa. By looking more to the security of people in the conduct of international relations, we redefine the very meaning of security and transform the conduct of world affairs. human security and national security are complementary. People are made safer by an open, tolerant and responsive state, capable of ensuring the protection of all its citizens. At the same time, improving human security reinforces the state by strengthening its legitimacy and its stability. It is important to add, however, that while the security of the state is a necessary condition of human security, it is not a sufficient condition. When states are externally aggressive, internally repressive, or too weak to govern effectively, human security suffers. Sometimes, the state itself strong or weak is the most brutal enemy of human security. In such cases, the international community will hear calls for intervention and humanitarian necessity may ultimately outweigh arguments of sovereignty.
3. Human security, human development So human security and state security are closely related. Similarly, human security is brother and sister to human development. Human security provides the sheltering environment for human development, the social peace and freedom from fear that make development practical. Just as surely, good humandevelopment strategies can relieve the privations and inequalities and remedy the ills of bad governance that jeopardize human security. Human security and human development serve and strengthen each other.
4. Canadas human security agenda Human security is simply defined: it means freedom from pervasive threats to the rights, the safety, or the lives of people. It is the threat of violence that distinguishes the human security objectives of Canadian foreign policy. Of course, violence is not the only threat to human well-being. Poverty, the ruin of the environment, the pressures of urbanization, and epidemics of infection all constitute challenges to human security.
2. Human security, national security This is not to disparage the place of the state, or its importance in protecting people. On the contrary,
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Specifically, Canada has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security: First, protection of civilians. More than 80 per cent of all the casualties in present-day conflicts are civilians. That is why strengthening protection for people, especially those at risk from violence, is a defining priority on Canadas human security agenda. The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines is a successful example, but more challenges remain: to protect war-affected children and internally displaced persons; to strengthen human rights protection; to find better ways, and better rules, for international humanitarian intervention. Our second priority concerns peace support operations. These are no longer just about peace-keeping. Now, more than ever, peace support operations require complex combinations of military and civilian expertise. Enhancing international capacity to succeed at these complex operations is an urgent international objective. A third priority is conflict prevention. Just as the causes of violent conflict are fearfully diverse, so the means of prevention must be many and varied. The priority here is to improve international capacity, and develop local institutions, to prevent conflict and build peace. With sanctions that are more effective, and less harmful. With controls on the pernicious trade in small arms. With post-conflict peace-building that is lasting and just. Fourth is the promotion of good governance. Failures of governance carry grave consequences: political and social exclusion, inequities, discontent and civil strife. That is why the development of accountable, democratic governance is critical to building a societys capacity to manage conflict without violence. The fifth priority, one of critical importance, is public safety. Transnational, criminal violence threatens the safety of people everywhere. These are the destructive and complicated threats of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. Against these menacing forces, human security requires better international coordination of knowledge and action.
coalitions among states acting with others in the global community. These coalitions are being organized in a new, more open and more creative kind of diplomacy. They take many forms, with many different memberships, as needs and opportunities arise. At the United Nations, for example, we now see the Security Council, with several of the UN Specialized Agencies, turning more powerful attention and action to the protection of human security. One of the significant features of globalization is the proliferation, activism and special expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in advancing human security. It is often NGOs that give the first warning of crisis, inform the international media, and galvanize government action. Just as often, NGOs provide critical knowledge of local conditions, coordinate relief and development operations, and share the work of long-term peace-building programmes. In truth, NGOs and their worldwide networks have become indispensable partners and political allies in the protection and promotion of human security. Examples abound, from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, to the work of Human Rights Watch for the International Criminal Court, to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. The Canadian Government acknowledges and values these NGO partnerships. This is how successful governance in todays world, specifically on the human security agenda, will be achieved by ever more vigorous collaborations among government institutions, NGOs, business, and labour.
6. Conclusion The human security imperative responds to the violence of the present age it compels collaborative action. No government can succeed alone. It recognizes that our own security is indivisible from the security of others. Ultimately, it unites us all in the shared opportunity to redeem the meaning of our common humanity, to build a more just and peaceful global community.
5. Effective coalitions for human security The human security network Violent threats to human security, in all their diversity, share this common characteristic: they always interact, in dangerous contagions of cause and effect. Think of the connections between, say, the sufferings of war-affected children, failed discipline among security forces, a weak justice system, and corporate connivance in diamond smuggling or the drug trade. The linkages are insidious, and they reach across national borders. Against these interacting threats, not even powerful governments can prevail alone. Protecting human security requires cooperative The Human Security Network, which includes participation by over a dozen countries from all regions of the world, originally grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway the Lysen partnership, named after the Norwegian island where the idea was conceived. Building on the success achieved through international cooperation on the landmines campaign, Canada and Norway sought to apply the same energy and advocacy to a range of other threats to peoples safety.
Opening ceremony
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Since its establishment two years ago, the Network has promoted international support for UN efforts to protect civilians, including two ministerial meetings, in Bergen, Norway (May 1999), and in Lucerne, Switzerland (May 2000), attended by NGO experts from around the world. Jordan is to host the next ministerial meeting of the Network in Petra in May 2001. An informal, flexible mechanism, the Network identifies concrete areas for collective action, for example, coordinated preparation for the United
Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001. It also plays a catalytic role by bringing to international attention new and emerging issues, for example the challenge of engaging non-state actors, such as armed groups, in complying with international humanitarian and human rights law. Members of the Human Security Network include Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and, as an observer, South Africa.
Opening ceremony
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Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace
PRESENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR FOR THE CULTURE OF PEACE

by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme Specialist, UNESCO
On 20 November 1997 the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace in order to mobilize public opinion at the national and international levels for the purpose of establishing and promoting a culture of peace.1 The Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace adopted by the General Assembly in September 19992 supplemented the proclamation by indicating the key players and the major areas in which the culture of peace should be applied. The Programme of Action calls upon civil society in general and non-governmental organizations in particular, with governments and the United Nations system, to work in partnership to form a global movement for a culture of peace. The 72 million people3 more than a hundredth of the worlds population who have signed Manifesto 2000, pledging to apply in their daily lives the principles on which the culture of peace is based, give an idea of the extent to which public opinion has been mobilized in more than 160 countries of the world, thanks to the work of thousands of organizations in civil society. Of the 1,700 local, national and international organizations (associations, cities, schools, media, universities, companies, governmental and United Nations organizations), 183 are research and training institutions.4 Several of the institutions that you are representing at this meeting today have played an active part in the International Year. This global movement, which began with the International Year for the Culture of Peace, can be strengthened and broadened in the coming International Decade, 20012010. As a follow-up to the year 2000, the Decade is devoted to promoting a culture of peace and non-violence for the children of the world.5 In his most recent document about the Decade,6 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, presents two parallel approaches to be followed in its implementation: partnerships for a global movement and education to be extended to all the children of the world.
First, the global movement needs to be continued and strengthened in order to involve everyone, at all levels of society, in the transition from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace and nonviolence.7 In order to do this, the global movement will be able to use the network of National Committees and offices put in place by UNESCO during the International Year. Networks of international organizations are another channel for mobilizing civil society. Second, children should be at the centre of the Decade and, among the specific measures to be taken, priority should be given to education, including the teaching of the practice of peace and non-violence to children. All other areas of action for a culture of peace should take children into special consideration. Education should be engaged in the broad sense of the term not only formal education in schools but also out-of-school institutions, including the family and the media. It should involve the full participation of governments, intergovernmental organizations and the civil society an approach that is comprehensive and holistic, involving all educational partners and various agents of socialization, including nongovernmental organizations and community organizations in a process of democratic participation.8 One of the objectives of this meeting, to make plans for practical projects, particularly in the field of education and training for peace and human security, corresponds well with this way of implementing the Decade. The International Year for the Culture of Peace led millions of people to become sensitive to, aware of and committed: the Decade should transform this commitment into action in longer-term projects such as those you are going to plan and implement. The United Nations Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace set out the major fields of activity for such practical projects: (a) education for a culture of peace and non-violence; (b) sustainable economic and social development; (c) respect for all human rights; (d) equality between women and men; (e) democratic participation; (f) understanding, tolerance and solidarity;
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Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace
(g) participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge; (h) international peace and security. What is new about the concept of the culture of peace structured around eight major areas is that it provides a single framework within which to maximize the complementary nature of, and synergy between, all the players: governments, the United Nations system and civil society.
I invite you to join the global movement for the culture of peace or, for those of you who took part in the International Year, to continue and redouble your efforts during the Decade, particularly through the network of peace research and training institutions that you are going to form. I wish you a successful meeting. Thank you.
NOTES
1. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution E/1997/47, 22 July 1997. 2. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/53/243, 13 September 1999. 3. This figure is as of end November 2000. 4. This information can be found on the International Year website: www.unesco.org/iycp.
5. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/53/25, 10 November 1998. 6. Document A/55/377, 12 September 2000. 7. Idem. 8. Idem.
FIRST ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Africa
Moderator: Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris, France Lecturers: Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaound, Cameroon Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
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The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris, France
Allow me after all I must do something to deserve my chairmanship to open these proceedings with a few reflections, which you may rest assured will be brief. Human security which we have already heard something about, and the speakers at the opening session emphasized the point is a new concept, one that for me evokes four key words, and perhaps with these words we may begin to reflect. They are human purpose, globality, interdependence and rationality. Human purpose. For me it is a major event that security has now finally been reconciled with its true purpose: people, human beings. Security is becoming once again what it should always have been, an instrument for the advancement of human progress and the construction of humanism. The notion of military security tended to make security not so much an instrument as an end in itself, and tended, where security remained an instrument, to make it no more than an instrument of power. The idea of military security was associated more with the idea of an instrument of power than an instrument of human development. Reverting to the idea of human security means reshaping security into what it ought to be an instrument in the service of humanity. And that, I think, is one of the first gains. Globality, meaning that human security desectoralizes the principal constituents of social progress and human progress. We can no longer view food security, as we used to, in particular during the Cold War, as distinct from economic security, itself distinct from military security, which is in turn distinct from the defence and promotion of human rights. These are not compartments of human endeavours; they represent human endeavour as a whole. And then to be aware, to demonstrate, and to act, to ensure that the promotion of human rights, food security and economic security are efforts that converge towards a single goal, is a second very important element which is inherent in the idea of human security. The third idea is perhaps that of interdependence, which seems very important to me. It has become banal to say that we live in an interdependent world, but, when it comes to security, this is no longer so banal, since the security of my neighbour, near or far, is vital to my own security. I cannot live securely,
safely, or feel protected if my neighbour has no security. My neighbours insecurity today is my own insecurity tomorrow. And, therefore, linking the various social contracts on which the various nationstates are founded, is a correspondence which we must learn to promote and build on as an element of collective security. This is perhaps the second death of Thomas Hobbes; in any event I believe that it is the resurrection of this idea of humanity that has perhaps been and I speak here in the name of my own academic freedom somewhat hastily sacrificed, abandoned, to the notion of peoples. And lastly, the fourth element, rationality. Human security must not become a concept which is uniquely, or even chiefly, ethical or moral. Human security is a collective asset, a common good that is necessary for the advancement of men and women wherever they may find themselves and whatever they may be. It is not merely to satisfy a moral need that we promote, indeed must promote, human security; it is also because this is the only chance for humanity to survive in the face of the challenges confronting it. Promoting human rights and promoting food security are certainly positive accomplishments, but, beyond that, they entail the construction of a universe of security, assurance, tranquillity, which is an essential prerequisite to progress and the accomplishment of the collective goals of everyone on the planet. This is not only an ethical discourse I fear, moreover, that politicians are not very attentive to ethical discourse it is also a utilitarian discourse. Human security has real utility, and I think this is an aspect which will have to be highlighted in our work to show that we are fighting not only for what is good but also for what is clearly in our interest. For this reason I should like, very tentatively and very provisionally, to propose the idea that human security is first of all an attitude. Rather than a programme, it is an attitude, a way of being, a way of viewing the world, of viewing international relations, of viewing the interaction between economics and politics, between politics and culture, between culture and society, and so forth. It is a stance. Military security was not a stance; it was a budget, and it was a policy. Human security is a way of being and a way of fitting into the international system.
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Peace and human security in Africa
PEACE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA

by Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaound, Cameroon
1. Preliminary note Human security and peace can only be properly appreciated by those who, at some time or another, have experienced acts or scenes of insecurity, violence and war. For the rest of humanity, security and peace are very secondary considerations, and this forum is just one more of its kind, an opportunity for speeches, statements and debates; one more meeting, as ever here at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris; another international gathering to be consigned to oblivion once the curtain falls tomorrow. My agreeing to take the floor at this First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions and it goes without saying that the honour is mine signifies my belief that this meeting will come up with practical resolutions and recommendations that will be put into effect, whose influence will gradually spread so that the promotion of human security may be effective, so that a lasting peace may be established not just in Africa, in whose name I am speaking today, but also throughout the world. For human security and peace cannot be genuine unless shared by all the nations and all the citizens of the world, without exception. He who has the signal honour of addressing you today, while not claiming to have immediately suffered insecurity and war, was born in a country which, at the time, was engaged in a struggle for independence. That struggle coincided with a power contest between two rivals opposed by seemingly different ideologies that were exacerbated by the then colonial power. It was a dark period in the history of my country, marked by arbitrary detentions, summary executions, abductions, disappearances, new and ambiguous expressions such as curfew, state of emergency, the limited movement allowed to citizens provided that they could produce a laissezpasser, and with no freedom of expression or of assembly, as a corollary of the single-party system established between 1966 and 1990. I have also had occasion to take on the role of consultant in a very beautiful African country where security and peace today are no more than hollow,
meaningless words. For when children can be killed by crushing in a mortar or dissection, just as a butcher chops a piece of beef, cutting open the belly of a pregnant woman with a machete to pull out the foetus, then let us admit that we have reached the peak of horror and that this kind of act is very difficult to credit to human beings. And yet the evidence is there. This is a country where the only crime is to be born into one or other of the only two tribes; a country where killings have become so natural and frequent that one may be pleasantly surprised to learn at the end of the day that no one has been killed. This is a country where visibly starving and sick old people, orphans of war and AIDS, are crammed into veritable concentration camps set up near the capital for reasons that are clear though unspoken. I have also travelled up and down the coast of a country in West Africa and been struck by the practically unbreathable air, polluted from the open-air sale of petroleum; and I have visited, not far from there, the major market of a town built near an immense tip where rubbish and detritus of all kinds are deposited and where thousands of people converge. After such a summary account of my own unfortunate experiences of insecurity in the course of my brief existence, a question occurs to me: why is there this climate of insecurity and violence in the world? The causes of human insecurity are to be found in the mind and nature of people. The answer is bitter and sad: it is indeed the human mind. And this mind is marked by cruelty, selfishness, greed, egocentrism, hatred, distrust, contempt, and an obsession with power and money. As these personality traits cannot be modified by scientific and technical research nor by political speeches and programmes, we can understand the profound meaning of the Constitution of UNESCO which proclaims that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. This way of thinking coincides with that of the World Association for the School as an Instrument of
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Peace (EIP). The slogan of this Geneva-based international non-governmental organization (NGO), of which I run a national section, is Disarm the mind to disarm the hand. We may now understand the concern of the worlds nations after the Second World War, expressed in the Charter of the United Nations in these terms: We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. The proclamation by the United Nations is a call for more security and non-violence. Otherwise, how can we imagine a family enjoying security when the parents, as victims of an economic crisis, have been made redundant or when the children finish their studies and are still looking for their first job? How can we imagine human security in a village whose crops have been destroyed by a swarm of locusts, or which is permanently under threat from the neighbouring village, or in which there are no health and education facilities? How can we imagine people enjoying security in a town where factories pollute the air, where road traffic is dense, where slums and ghettos exist cheek by jowl with rich neighbourhoods? How can we imagine people enjoying security in a country where there is no political changeover, a country where corruption has been institutionalized, a country where the right to education and health is a right for some but not for all? How can we imagine human security in a world one-quarter of whose population lives below subsistence level; a world where three-quarters of the wealth belongs to one-quarter of its inhabitants and where a mere ten countries direct the conduct of all the other states? As the problems differ from one continent to another, however, I have been asked to look at the main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Africa. If these challenges are taken up in all continents, we can hope that they will in the aggregate allow human security to be ensured worldwide. Africa is the continent of all ills. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, Africa experienced the slave trade. This shameful commerce played its part in depopulating and weakening the continent. From the end of the nineteenth century to the independence period, around 1960 for most countries, Africa was colonized. That colonization resulted in the Balkanization of the continent. Africa was divided into colonial possessions regardless of geographical realities. Some conflicts sapping the African continent today derive from this arbitrary apportionment.
We have seen the upheaval of the social structures of the colonies with customs swept aside, changed habits, the emergence of social contrasts in short the acculturation of Africans. We have seen the weakening of communities through forced labour such as portering and corves, a further form of slavery. We have seen the looting of mineral resources for European industries. In the colonies, such work as road-building and the establishment of administrative structures was only carried out with an eye to the needs of the colonizing countries. We have seen the dismantling of the African economy, or what passed for it at the time. The word independence initially aroused many hopes. Since 1960, however, Africans have become disillusioned. Colonization was succeeded by neocolonialism, the continuation of the colonial system in another form, resulting in the omnipresence of the former colonizing power. We can count on the fingers of one hand the countries in Africa which have not experienced coups dtat and armed conflict. Even those that had become reputed havens of peace and political stability are now going through (and we hope only going through) a very alarming period of disorder, violence and insecurity. As if that were not enough, all these woes are compounded by: diseases such as ebola, cholera, malaria and, of course, the AIDS pandemic. Some experts think that by 2010, the twenty-three countries hardest hit by AIDS will have lost 66 million individuals. pollution. African countries are industrializing or still under-industrialized. However, the activity of industrialized countries is damaging the environment on a global scale and causing extensive pollution and disruption of ecosystems. If the current trend persists, the natural environment will be increasingly threatened, particularly since the effects of bush fires and deforestation must be taken into account in Africa. poverty. Almost 1.3 billion people live on less than a dollar a day, and nearly 1 billion cannot meet their minimum nutritional needs. The vast majority of them live in Africa, which moreover accounts for upwards of thirty-five of the fifty leastdeveloped countries in the world the poorest of the poor. The situation is worsening because of armed conflicts and violence that could reach unprecedented levels. This violence, generated by tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, will be the most common form of conflict in the coming century and will claim hundreds of thousands of victims each year in Africa. This whole catalogue of woes, and many others, are unmistakable signs of insecurity and war in Africa. The current situation is serious and it is time to find urgent solutions so that Africa, already badly
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affected, does not become definitively mired in violence. As already noted, it is not enough to list the evils afflicting the world and endangering world peace. This is no time simply to be surprised at the evergrowing number of refugees, street children, AIDS orphans and destitute, at the tragic scale of the effects of environmental damage, and so on. It is time to take action and to act positively in a way that will make people safer, and as a result to establish lasting world peace. The challenge here is on a world scale and, in my opinion, it cannot be confined to a single continent since security and peace are either a matter for all continents or they are nonexistent. Furthermore, the development train is one that travels fast, very fast indeed. Africa must catch it, hold on to it, keep up the same speed and avoid just submitting to it. The challenge of development is a major one, a challenge that cannot be met without security and without peace. There can be no sustainable development without peace. There can be no peace without security. Peace and security are two inseparable and imperative notions for the development of Africa. It is therefore urgent to promote them, but to promote them in terms of the strategies and major challenges set out below.
Students can find documentation for their research, dictionaries, encyclopaedias and maps. Farmers can connect to find out more about new cultivation methods. Commercial businesses have an ideal medium for vaunting their goods and services to millions of potential customers. The Internet is a gateway to leisure activities, sport and job opportunities. All over the world people can keep abreast of the latest national and international developments by consulting any of the countless news services available on the Internet. 2.2. Internet: still too expensive Unfortunately, as the cost of telecommunications is high and markets still limited, Internet service providers generally charge more in Africa than elsewhere for opening Internet accounts. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 20 hours of Internet access cost $29 in the United States, including telephone bills and tax charged by the provider, as against $74 in Germany, $52 in France, $65 in the United Kingdom and $53 in Italy. Seeing that per capita income in these countries is ten times the African average, one may well have misgivings about the spread of the Internet in Africa. And while that may be a financial problem, there is another more sensitive social issue involved: how can a community whose form of communication is based on the oral tradition prepare for the concept of universal communication?
2. The Internet and computer technology: to make up time 2.1. Internet: multiple services On 17 October 1996, at the meeting on Africa and the new information technologies held in Geneva, President Alpha Omar Konar of Mali stated: If we say yes to the challenges of the new information technologies, it is without being naive, since we are well aware of the considerable implications. The importance of information and communication is indeed no longer disputed. The opportunities offered by the Internet to Africa are countless. Internet users, wherever they are, whatever their education, can learn, meet one another, share hobbies, look for associations and information of all kinds and make friends with people on the other side of the world through electronic mail. What is more, scientific and technical information circulates with disconcerting ease and speed. African Internet users, who are increasingly numerous I am glad to say, may consult freely accessible databases of universities and research centres. Thanks to the Internet tool, African teachers can obtain documentation to use in their classes.
3. Education: a primary way of promoting the culture of peace 3.1. Education: at least able to read and write Imagine what someone who cannot read or write is missing. Surely, such people are completely cut off from any understanding of how their environment is changing and can take no effective part in running public affairs. They therefore constitute what amounts to a brake on social development. Of course, using a computer does not require a given intellectual level, but it does presume a universal language beyond the reach of illiterates. One has to be able, at least, to read and write. In addition to school-type teaching, this means a vast African literacy campaign to familiarize everyone with computers and use of the Internet. 3.2. Education: a matter of all and for all The great hope for Africa lies in the education of all its children. Education in the broadest
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sense, including formal, non-formal and informal education and demanding the participation of all partners ministries of education, families, the media, religious leaders, parents associations and, above all, NGOs. The EIP has understood that education is a prerequisite for peace and development, serves humanity and opens up the path to understanding for all the worlds children. It is therefore at pains to encourage education worldwide and secure respect for Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stipulating inter alia that education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages, and that elementary education shall be compulsory. It is therefore all-important to invest in education. Respecting the right to education means building peace, the progress of nations and sustainable development. Investment in sustainable human development, as Federico Mayor, former Director-General of UNESCO, said, means opting for an essential change of direction in a world where the gap that separates us from one another in terms of material prosperity and knowledge continues to grow rather than to shrink.
5. Combating poverty: a prerequisite for security and peace in the world 5.1. Combating poverty: for shared happiness Can one have it all and be happy alongside those who have nothing? Can one be happy alone? Can one live in security and peace in a world a quarter of whose population goes hungry, is ill and has no hope of improvement? The rich countries have understood this and a first step was taken on 18 June 1999 in Cologne, where almost $48 billion (i.e. less than 0.5 per cent of global gross domestic product) of debts owed by forty-one poor countries, out of a total debt of nearly $230 billion, was cancelled by the G7 countries. 5.2. Rich countries: could do better We may already appreciate the generosity of the Western countries but hope that they will, as soon as possible, adopt the position of Germany in favour of total and immediate debt cancellation. This would ease the burden of the poorest countries, which ought to be devoting their resources to development and in particular to social sectors such as education and health. When we take a close look at the forty-one countries that could be eligible for debtservicing relief, we realize that most of them have been or are involved in armed conflict. We are forced to the conclusion that poverty is a cause (if not the main cause) of insecurity and violence. Combating poverty, providing education in general and education on human rights and fundamental freedoms in particular, and popularizing computers and the Internet are the major challenges that Africa must take up to make security a reality. What can actually be done to move on from the dream to reality? The actions I put forward here, while neither entirely new nor unknown, are proposed to encourage reflection on the contribution that must be made in order that human security may cease to be just a matter of slogans in Africa. 5.2.1. Strengthen the capacity for action of civil society, in particular NGOs NGOs are support bodies seeking through their activities to complement government action. Their action in all fields deserves to be encouraged and consolidated, particularly through: training NGO officials in fund-raising techniques, project development and management of their structure; training NGO members in human rights and peace education; providing structures with computer equipment;
4. Human rights and fundamental freedoms: learn to live together Peace-loving states and individuals must do everything they can to ensure that the content of existing international and national instruments concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms is well known, popularized, put into practice, experienced and shared. Investing in education is good, while investing in the promotion of human rights is even better and complementary. Human rights education gives people the opportunity to get to know one another better, to practise mutual tolerance and to accept in some people feelings and ways of thinking and acting that differ from those of others. Through human rights education, we learn respect for life and human beings, we learn mutual understanding and we combat all attitudes that encourage war, violence and intolerance, the source of human insecurity. EIP-Cameroon is convinced that human rights education must start as early as possible, with the inclusion of human rights and peace education in state education systems, in particular from the primary level or even sooner. How, though, can education be promoted in an African population when the vast majority live below subsistence level? There is after all a saying that words are wasted on the starving.
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training members to use the Internet so that communities and associations able to join together in accordance with shared interests or affinities can be enhanced and energized; establishing and supporting NGO coalitions working to promote human rights and peace, which should meet regularly to take stock of their activities and refocus their work on the ground. 5.2.2. Introduce new development-oriented military policies The key purpose of the armed forces is of course to ensure national stability and the security of citizens. To that end, they use weapons spelling violence, death and desolation. Hence the military are trained and prepared for war. It is time to shape in them a new attitude, that of peace, by directing them towards development activities. The military, who in most states make up a substantial proportion of the working population, can be trained for social work. They can also take part in agriculture (bringing land under cultivation), health (increasing the number of health centres, especially in rural areas), building road infrastructure, public works, and so on. This new direction for the armed forces would disarm the minds of the military to disarm the hands and transform armed forces, defence and war ministries into ministries for peace. And, as revealed by a famous inscription that so aptly adorns a wall of the United Nations esplanade in New York, they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. Imagine for just a moment how many violations of human rights the world would be spared if all its inhabitants were to adopt this position today and learn war no more! Insecurity would give way to security and war (which is the antithesis of human rights) would disappear in favour of lasting peace. 5.2.3. World lobbying campaign to promote human security Such a campaign would mean encouraging the participation of all those involved in
development, without exception, in a vast world movement for peace. Let us recall the groups of men and women who, through their action and pressure, have secured the adoption of positions making for better human conditions in the world: The Jubilee 2000 Coalition, an association made up of NGOs, religious groups, media bodies and individuals, carried out an active campaign to persuade governments to adopt a stance on debt relief for insolvent countries. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), founded by human rights defenders, which has brought together over 1,000 organizations in sixty countries. Their significant achievement was the adoption of an international treaty banning landmines. The network being created here in Paris of directors of peace research and training institutions could follow this example and build awareness in the world for the sake of greater human security, in particular: by encouraging governments (which always feel politically vulnerable) to regard human rights as a humanitarian and not a political issue and to apply human rights treaties; by approaching the competent authorities with a view to including human rights and peace teaching in their education systems and ensuring that they abide by their obligations; by encouraging arrangements for monitoring, surveying and reporting on the application and violation of international standards regarding the right to education; by launching an appeal for support for popularization of the Internet to all those involved in development, such as NGOs, schools, research centres, government services, and so on; by backing all womens initiatives for peace and equal access for girls and women to quality education; by conducting a publicity campaign for parents so that they never buy or give their children toys associated with war and violence, such as toy rifles, tanks, swords, grenades, and so on. If all these initiatives were taken into account they, among others, would be bound to contribute to building a world in which human security and peace become realities.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The Culture of Peace and UNESCO; basic document summary report. See www.unesco.org/cpp. UNESCO transdisciplinary project Towards a Culture of Peace. See www.unesco.org/cpp. The following periodicals: Jeune Afrique, No. 2007, JuneJuly 1999; Amina, No. 367, November 2000; Rveillez-vous, 22 November 1998; 22 July 1997; The Watchtower, 15 September 2000. The latter cites: Global Environment Outlook 2000, Nairobi, United Nations Environment Programme, 2000; The Global Burden of Disease and Injury, Harvard University Press, 1996;
Confronting AIDS, the situation in the developing countries, joint report by the European Commission and the World Bank; Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1999; At the Dawn of a New World: the Security of the United States in the Twenty-first Century, United States commission on national security in the twenty-first century. The Human Right to Peace: declaration by the Director-General of UNESCO, January 1997, 15 pp. (UNESCO doc. SHS.97/WS/6.)
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Security in Africa: State formation and the impact of HIV/AIDS
SECURITY IN AFRICA: STATE FORMATION AND THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS

by Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa
1. Introduction For many the end of the Cold War promised an end to conflict and held out the prospects for peace and prosperity. This has proved inaccurate for Africa, as for much of the rest of the world. In fact, conflict in Africa has increased in recent years. To these challenges, and their impact on the continent, a new scourge is now added in the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on the already precarious African security situation. This paper deals with the issue of state formation in Africa followed by an analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The purpose is to explore and outline these two challenges as a basis for discussion rather than to suggest remedial action.
2. State formation in Africa Effective colonial rule of much of Africa lasted for a relatively brief historical space of some eighty years as opposed to settlements along the coast which go back several centuries. During this period the colonial countries sought to administer African countries along their own models, generally a foreign administration largely run by foreigners in a very different continent. The result, at the time of independence during the 1950s and 1960s, was a series of African states with the trappings of Europe, but inherently untouched by Western influence, politics and systems much like South Africa after apartheid. As a result, the modern state structure in Africa imposed on the continent during this period often forms little more than a thin carapace over the largely hidden realms of the informal economy and its companion polity. At root the colonial and apartheid state was based on domination and on its ability to impose its hegemony upon the subject peoples and to extract from them the taxes necessary for the maintenance of the colonial state apparatus. Colonial administrations were bound together by a common code of ethics and surety of racial
solidarity an intrusion ruled by a foreign elite banded together under the governor by a code of behaviour, a set of guardians whose strength lay in the pack.1 While the colonial state was essentially bureaucratic, the post-independence regimes have been ultrapolitical.2 Many African states came to independence through low-intensity conflicts waged by liberation movements against colonial powers. Having taken power in this way, the new state incumbents were left highly exposed and vulnerable to challengers from within sometimes from competitors bent on using these very same methods against them once the unifying solidity of a common enemy had disappeared. Rulers also now had to rely on their fellow nationals to maintain law and order, some with political ideas and ambitions of their own. It soon became evident, as in all functionally undifferentiated societies, that the closer one was to the centre of the political apparatus, the greater the chances of material reward. As a result, the state in Africa has often been the primary arena for competition, for power, and for influence over the distribution of scarce resources. Writing in the early 1980s, Jackson and Rosberg noted: What the Church was for ambitious men in medieval Europe or the business corporation in nineteenthand twentieth-century America, the state is today for ambitious Africans with skill and fortune.3 In the absence of other opportunities the state in Africa largely serves as a private resource instead of a public good. The driving force behind Africas second experiment with democracy during the 1980s and early 1990s came both from ideological conviction and the growing impatience of an ever-bolder public consciousness, and from the related matter of the continents prevailing economic crisis. For the first time since independence, domestic support became more important than foreign patrons, and African leaders had to confront the inherent weaknesses of their regimes and to consider sharing power with others. These were uncomfortable times, for all this happened at a time of deep and structural economic crisis.
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At the very moment when democratization stimulated the popular demand for better social and welfare services, structural adjustment required that this be denied. In broad terms this played a significant part in further undermining the states claims to legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens. As the World Bank itself recognized in its 1997 World Development Report, An institutional vacuum of significant proportions has emerged in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased crime and an absence of security, affecting investment and growth. By the 1990s the military balance between the state and society in Africa had changed profoundly. At independence, one could still argue that most of the post-colonial regimes retained the balance of force through control over the security apparatus and the level of armaments at their unique disposal. At the turn of the century an increased number of African states have atrophied and weapons have spilled over from armed conflicts throughout the region, circulating virtually uncontrolled. This has allowed groups in a number of societies to arm and challenge the incumbent elite, while in many instances the security agencies themselves have decayed and lost their coherence. As a result, a military victory by any of the various armed forces in a number of countries at war, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Sudan, is unlikely to reduce levels of social violence or the trend towards social fragmentation without additional and substantial negotiations and peace-building measures. At the same time state control, to the extent that it exists in the form of organized administration and the provision of services, has contracted inward, in many instances reflecting an exclusively urban bias and neglect of the rural populations. Today the surfeit of arms and lack of control over national territories has resulted in much of subSaharan Africa being characterized not by the states monopoly over the instruments of coercion, but by a balance of force between the state and the community. The result, in a highly armed and violent continent, ironically, is the creation of a security vacuum. Within Nairobi, Johannesburg or Luanda security is available to those who can afford it. In Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, war continues in those countries that have exploitable resources worth fighting for and that can sustain conflict. In all instances those vast sections of the population in the rural areas, dependent upon subsistence agriculture, are left to fend for themselves and forced to arm and organize to prevent their exploitation by local warlords, ethnically based politicians or criminals. Although the end of superpower competition had resulted in a reduction in state-sponsored arms transfers to Africa, the fact that local disputes were
less globalized meant that outside powers had less will to impact upon on the conduct, termination and outcome of these conflicts. Local rivalries and antagonisms were given freer rein, being more remote from world centres of power and insignificant in terms of the global system. Africans could no longer rely on outside assistance to end local wars that were no threat to vital foreign interests and are now forced to accept responsibility for peace and security themselves though at a time when the African state is at its weakest. The loss of the coherence of the state has also encouraged the emergence of new forms of power relations, notably between the central government and local actors, and of new institutions, such as vigilante groups and private militias. The creation of new economic and financial opportunities has seen the emergence of national and transnational actors who are directly implicated in criminal economic activities such as drug trafficking, trade in stolen cars, general smuggling, and more. In short, the outsourcing and commercialization of state functions in unconsolidated states have not proved a panacea for the lack of capacity that has characterized the postcolonial state. For a time external non-state actors, including private military companies, stepped into the void left by the international community, sometimes as proxies, sometimes as independent agents, able to influence local events to their own advantage or that of their paymaster. More recently it would appear as if a number of African leaders are using their armed forces in part pursuit of commercial opportunities in neighbouring countries. With the collapse of bipolar competition, Africas importance has reverted to a lower level, reflecting its lack of strategic relevance and marginal economic role. As the state weakened, governance contracted inward, often reflecting little more than the limits of the urban sprawl and an absence of administration in the countryside, making governance more myth than reality. The effect of the end of the Cold War has also forced sub-state actors to develop alternative resources from those prevalent during the bipolar era. Over time, organized violence itself has become an economic means of accumulation in certain areas. Previously organizations such as the MPLA and UNITA could obtain resources by presenting themselves as instruments in a much wider scheme, that of superpower competition. In the post-bipolar era, Cold War patronage has been replaced by the exploitation of easily accessible natural resources. Less dependent upon external support, the exploitation of diamonds, cobalt, hardwood and the like have reduced the ability of external actors to pressurize the protagonists. Increased internationalization and the apparent universal salience of economic liberalization,
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sometimes referred to as globalization, has opened up new avenues for linkages by local actors that can now bypass state control through networks that are neither geographically located nor internationally regulated. The information age has not only benefited traders on Wall Street, but also rebel leaders, allowing them to hold and transfer off-shore accounts, to hide liquid assets and to purchase arms through brokers in distant countries where control is weak. The business of war profiteering has become privatized and often relocated to less-developed countries where lack of controls and oversight ease operations. In this sense the rise in so-called resource wars reflects the changed domestic and regional economic and social patterns under conditions of greater international interaction and access to the global economy for developing countries. In a country such as Angola, Cold War patronage has been replaced by resource war instrumentalization. Direct conflict between African states, such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea, has in fact been a relatively isolated phenomenon. Not so war by proxy. Today any numbers of African countries are involved in indirect confrontations with one another. Often these conflicts are conducted through support to armed opposition parties in neighbouring states, sometimes with a religious or ethnic character, often taking place in a third country, drawing others into the war and expanding the conflict. There are many examples of these activities in the Horn and in Central Africa. In other cases neighbouring countries have involved themselves directly in the internal affairs of others or allowed their territory to be used as a springboard for such involvement. Possibly the most obvious examples today relate to what is happening in central and eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet in other instances countries have been drawn into conflicts by their difficulty in controlling their often inhospitable and rugged borders, particularly when international boundaries cut through rather than follow broad ethnic and tribal divides. But the most significant characteristic of these conflicts is the degree to which they are now African wars. Unsupported by foreign patrons, Africa is coming to terms with itself and the African state seeking a solid root. In this manner, free from colonialism and the Cold War, the turbulence in Africa reflects a delayed process of state formation. As state formation in Europe not that long ago was often a bloody and messy affair, so state formation in Africa is also serving to be violent and accompanied by intense human suffering. But, very different to Europe, Africa has already been carved into political entities the state has preceded the nation. At the strategic level the degree to which Africans are wrestling with their own security identity is a
source of hope for the future, despite the extent to which the global economic rules are biased against developing countries. The largest unknown factor is the potential role of HIV/AIDS.
3. HIV/AIDS and Africa4 It is hardly possible to overstate the potential impact of an epidemic that has the capacity to reverse decades of national development, to widen the gulf between rich and poor nations, and to cause unprecedented social disruption. In Africa the epidemic is now more devastating than war: in 1998, 200,000 Africans died from conflict, but 2.2 million died from AIDS.5 The rapid loss of human capital, from every walk of society, reflects the decimation of a major conflict, with similar consequences. The year 2000 began with 24 million Africans infected with the HIV virus. In the absence of a medical miracle, nearly all will die before 2010. Each day 6,000 Africans die from HIV/AIDS. Each day, an additional 11,000 are infected. The epidemic has proceeded much faster in some countries than in others. Altogether, at the end of 1999, there were sixteen countries (all in sub-Saharan Africa) in which more than one-tenth of the adult population aged 15 to 49 was infected with HIV. In seven countries (all in southern Africa), at least one adult in five was living with the virus. In Botswana, 36 per cent of the adult population is HIV-positive. In Swaziland and Zimbabwe, the infection rate is 25 per cent. Lesotho is at 24 per cent. In Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, the figure is 20 per cent. In none of these countries has the spread of the virus been checked.6 In contrast to most infectious diseases, which take their heaviest toll among the elderly and the very young, HIV/AIDS takes its greatest toll among young adults. By 2010, Africa is expected to have 40 million orphans roaming the countryside and city streets without schooling or work, prime candidates for the criminal gangs, marauding militias and child armies that have slaughtered and mutilated tens of thousands of civilians in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia in the last decade. HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming one of the key human security issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The effects of the epidemic are felt in a number of interrelated ways. Recently more attention has been paid to the economic consequences. A number of researchers have commented and tried to calculate the macro-economic consequences of HIV/AIDS on the gradual, but cumulative erosion of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in heavily affected countries. In a country such as Zimbabwe, for example, AIDS deaths had already severely impacted upon subsistence agriculture long before the recent politically induced economic crisis.
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It is evident that HIV/AIDS will exacerbate population pressures and trends, particularly migration and urbanization, to create more volatile social and political situations. This combination can produce heightened competition for limited resources and foster more intense rivalries among groups in countries marked by ethnic, religious, or other diversity. War serves to spread HIV/AIDS in ways that compound the impact and extent of the pandemic. The armed forces (both formal and guerrilla forces), which constitute a major population bloc in many African societies, are highly mobile and often active across borders. For example, a movement such as UNITA is active in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Namibia. Seeking to contain the rebels, the Angolan armed forces have long been deployed in the DR Congo and Congo-Brazzaville, while Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and others have deployed troops in the DR Congo, within which Uganda is also involved in a proxy war with the Sudan. As the infection pattern in African combat forces, largely composed of single males at the peak of their sexually active life, is generally higher than in the civilian population, conflict serves to spread the pandemic. The impact of HIV on civilian populations lies in the high rates of sexual interaction between military and civilian populations, whether through commercial sex, or in rape as a weapon of war; and in the extreme vulnerability of displaced and refugee populations to HIV infection. Women in a refugee camp are six times more likely to contract HIV than the general outside population.7 Apart from spreading the disease, HIV infection poses an additional and serious threat to the order function of the African state. Unlike the situation in many other areas, African armed forces are actively employed internally either in support of or parallel to the police in providing internal security. High AIDS attrition rates within the armed forces therefore does not only compromise the armed forces readiness, but also limits their ability to impose social order and to protect countries from external intervention. This compounds the security vacuum evident in many African countries and therefore contributes to the weakness of state institutions and the recourse to alternative sources of security. The spread of the disease can further intensify pressures on governmental structures. Disease can decimate the ranks of skilled administrators, diminish the reach or responsiveness of governmental institutions, or reduce their resilience. This will detrimentally affect the operational effectiveness of such institutions as the police, prosecution service and judiciary. Weaknesses in the criminal justice system will be exacerbated by increased poverty and social tensions, and a burgeoning orphan population. The result will
inevitably be an increase in crime from its already high levels. If a government is perceived to be incapable of adequately addressing health problems created by the spread of HIV/AIDS, this can produce a heightened sense of marginalization among affected populations and a stronger sense of deprivation and resentment. Alienation can be particularly adverse when combined with chronic poverty. These attitudes can contribute to the eruption of violence, not just spontaneously, but in some cases as the result of exploitation by ethnic, religious, or national elites to serve their narrow interests.8 But tragically it is not only war and conflict that spread the disease, but also the effects of peace. We already know that the aftermath of complex humanitarian crises presents particular opportunities that could accentuate the HIV/AIDS risk climate:9 social disruption resulting in sudden, widespread and profound poverty exacerbated by reductions in agricultural output; lack of income leading to sale of sex by women but also by children; increased child labour, and many children living on the streets; active migration to find work, further disrupting family integrity; lives characterized by a desperation that fosters increases in sexual and domestic violence and abuse, rape and gender inequality; decimated health infrastructure, and deterioration of most state services such as education, security and welfare. No wonder therefore that a January 2000 report by the United States Governments National Intelligence Council concluded that there is a definite link between infectious disease epidemics (in particular HIV/AIDS) and security10 and that the United Nations Security Council debate on AIDS in Africa some months later redefined the epidemic as a threat to human security. The US Government report found that: The impact of HIV/AIDS is likely to aggravate and even provoke social fragmentation and political polarization in the hardest-hit countries in subSaharan Africa. The relationship between disease and political instability is indirect but real. Infant mortality (likely to more than double in a number of southern African states because of HIV/AIDS by 2010) correlates strongly with political instability, particularly in countries that have achieved a measure of democratization. The severe social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS, and the infiltration of the epidemic into the ruling political and military elites and middle classes of developing countries, are likely to intensify the struggle for political power to control scarce state resources. This will hamper the development
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of a civil society and other underpinnings of democracy, and will increase pressure on democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa. An estimated 22 million orphans in sub-Saharan Africa by 2010 are expected to comprise a lost orphaned generation with little hope of educational or employment opportunities. Such societies will be at risk of increased crime and political instability as these young people become radicalized or are exploited by various political groups for their own ends the child-soldier phenomenon may be one example. The increase in crime and political instability, moreover, will be accompanied by a probable increased availability in illicit small arms and increased operations of organized criminals in sub-Saharan Africa. The more widespread the disease, the weaker the states capacity to respond. The weaker the states capacity to respond, the greater the increase in the prevalence of the disease.11 This negative spiral is most intense in southern African countries whose state capacity is severely limited since they have fewer human, financial, and other resources from which to draw to break the cycle.
4. Conclusion I began by arguing that the end of colonialism left most African states poorly prepared for selfgovernance, let alone independence. The subsequent Cold War served to buttress weak African states but at the same time stunted any further institutionalization of the state as somehow separate and distinct from private interests. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the situation is much changed. At independence, one could still argue that most of the post-colonial regimes retained sufficient monopoly of force through control over the security apparatus and the level of armaments at their disposal. Subsequently an increased number of African states have atrophied and weapons have spilled over their borders from armed conflicts throughout the region, circulating virtually uncontrolled. This has allowed groups in any number of countries to arm and challenge the incumbent elite while the security agencies themselves, in many instances, have decayed and lost their coherence. It has long been evident that a number of African states are either weak or exist as what some have
referred to as quasi-states they exist mainly because they are recognized internationally as existing, not because they perform the functions of a state or share its attributes. What will happen in this situation when one then considers the AIDS epidemic raging across subSaharan Africa a tragedy of epic proportions and one that is altering the regions demographic future reducing life expectancy, raising mortality, lowering fertility, creating an excess of men over women, and leaving millions of orphans in its wake? Undoubtedly the impact of the epidemic will be magnified by the fragility and complexity of the continents geopolitical systems. Eleven of the worlds twenty-seven conflicts are in Africa; fifteen subSaharan countries face food emergencies; drought in East Africa threatens to exacerbate food scarcity. These emergencies pose real threats to social and political stability in Africa. United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, told the Security Council at the beginning of 2000: By overwhelming the continents health and social services, by creating millions of orphans, and by decimating health workers and teachers, AIDS is causing social and economic crises which in turn threaten political stability.12 There are many unknowns in the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. How will the loss of so many adults in rural communities affect food security? What will be the social effects of the missing generation of young adults unable to rear their children? How will intra-African peace-keeping operations be affected by the epidemic that disproportionately affects military personnel? What impact will the virus have on the functioning of state departments in already poorly performing criminal justice systems in sub-Saharan Africa? How will 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the adult population, who are HIV-positive and dying, react when their government decides to spend limited state resources on policing, education or housing instead of building more hospitals and care centres for those infected by the virus? I believe that the threat of HIV/AIDS underlines the requirement for state-building and for the simultaneous engagement of civil society. Strong, efficient and capable states will remain the prerequisite for both stability and democracy in Africa the precondition for peace-building. But the experience in Uganda demonstrates the degree to which only civil society has the ability to engage in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
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NOTES
1. D. Austin, Things Fall Apart, Orbis, Winter 1982, pp. 9289. 2. Ibid., p. 929. 3. R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, p. 14, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1982. 4. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by Martin Schnteich of the ISS with the section on HIV/AIDS. 5. Council of Foreign Relations, Panel to discuss HIV/AIDS, A New Priority for International Security, Briefing Pack, Washington, D.C., 5 June 2000. 6. HIV Epidemic Restructuring Africas Population, Worldwatch Issue Alert 1A10, 31 October 2000. Available at http://www.worldwatch.org/chairman/issue/001031.html 7. Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit.
8. Contagion and Conflict. Health as a Global Security Challenge, Report of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the CSIS International Security Program, p. 14, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 2000. 9. Council of Foreign Relations, op. cit. 10. The Global Infectious Threat and its Implications for the United States, NIE 99-17D, Washington, D.C., US Government National Intelligence Council, 2000. 11. Contagion and Conflict, op. cit., pp. 1516. 12. AIDS Becoming Africas Top Human Security Issue, UN Warns, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) press release, 10 January 2000. Available at http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/press/eng/ pressarc00/ny10100.html
SECOND ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe
Moderator: Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO Lecturer: Mr Bjrn Mller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark
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The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO
A few words of introduction, if you will, before we hear Mr Mllers report, which he will present this afternoon. Remember that the Second World War had not yet ended when General de Gaulle decided to found the future and security of France, and more generally of Europe, on the concept of civil security. The purpose of the notion of civil security adopted immediately after the war was to create within society a force and a momentum that would ensure longterm peace. Let us recall also that that war, the Second World War, was the result of a bitter failure, the failure of collective security and the pacifist principles that had inspired it for a good many years before it collapsed with the failure of the League of Nations. And then, need I call your attention I rather hesitate to do so after a meal which probably held an element of risk to the fact that what is in the news today is food security, or rather food insecurity, and that if matters were taken to their logical extreme, the only reasonable position would be perpetual fasting. So, to extricate ourselves from this predicament, I would also like to call your attention as etymologists to the fact that the concept of security is a vague and curious one. The word comes from the Latin securus, free from care, from se (without) and cura (care, concern); and it is therefore a strange concept because it is based not on a reality but on the concern we have about it, the preoccupation that we have in relation to that reality. It is, in a sense, halfway between two concepts which flank it, the concept of defence on the one side where, clearly, we react to aggression, to attack and at the other extreme the concept of safety, safety being an ontological position in which we do not even have to worry about security. At this rather vague halfway point where we locate the concept of security, I would like, perhaps being provocative, to suggest that you think in contrary terms, in terms of curity. The word does not exist, the concept does not exist, but it has to do with taking care of something. Security is all well and good, but it is tragic when it means neglecting the changeable and vague situations that exist around us; the concept of security is only valuable insofar
as it inspires in us an attitude of curity, of care, of concern about things. We have many reasons to do this and I would like to mention just five areas in which this concept of security has its rightful place. The first is our relation to others in the classical tradition of the Peace of Westphalia moreover, it is state security that is going to be discussed here, I believe. In this case, we protect ourselves against the risks that others might make us run, others being an extremely large category, and which, within Europe itself, which is perhaps geopolitically the most stable part of the world today, is not without some worrying aspects, whether in the East, or recently in the Balkans, or perhaps in the South. But there are two other dimensions that considerably expand this relationship to others: the relationship, on the one hand, to the world, and on the other hand, to oneself. First, the dimension of the world, which is greater than the sum of its parts, and which is a global, holistic phenomenon. We have just witnessed the failure of the conference which was supposed to re-examine our concerns about the greenhouse effect, and which showed that states are unable, for the time being, to properly manage a global situation as worrying as this. Opposite is the dimension of the self, within societies, within nations, within communities, where the most serious threats to security may exist drugs, sects, social breakdown, loss of points of reference, and so forth. I would like to add two additional dimensions: after others, the world, the self, we have things: such as this amazing prion which has no name in any language, these viruses or retroviruses which act inside things, this piercing anxiety we have about the progress of science. This is the feeling that within things themselves, within the physical reality of what we eat, of where we go, of what we breathe, there may be very serious causes of insecurity. The final dimension is that of the future. Situations that are very safe today, which give us a feeling of extreme security, can change with time. I would therefore like to suggest a very simple framework to structure our debates a little. In the classic framework, we
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The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe
are in the middle and worried about our security in relation to others or the security between others. The four other dimensions, that which is known, i.e. the world and the self, the two extremes, that which is greater than the state, that which is smaller than the state (society, content, the individual, moral reference points), and then, in the same duality, things and the future, make up the five dimensions which may prompt us to reflect on the question of security. A difficult reflection, which is why it is fortunate that you are all here to debate the matter with your competence and knowledge. I would like to illustrate this difficulty with a second framework, before giving the floor to those for whom it is intended. Here is an example of another classic and extremely simple framework for security. In the middle is the territory. Everyone knows what a territory is, it has borders, it is limited, it is known. Around the territory is the nation. A nation is larger than a territory it has interests, it has commercial dimensions, it has a reputation, and so forth. And then, still larger than the nation, is the defence system,
which is projected outwards from the territory and the nation to protect them as far as possible. Next we have the three Ss: within the territory, the concept of internal security; beyond the limits of defence, the concept of collective security; and linking the two, that which is the most all-encompassing and the most internal, the problem of security, which is much more complex, inasmuch as it involves values and philosophical reference points, extremely subtle systems of international relations and legal values. This is a very comfortable situation because we know where the concepts are, where the problems are, and where the means of handling them are. The trouble is that this situation no longer exists, and the current situation, it seems to me, is much closer to a test for colour-blindness, in which people who cannot distinguish certain colours see only a mass of dots, a cloud of elements, which is extremely confusing and chaotic. The sharpest eyes will distinguish something resembling an S, but it may be a serpent, or a dollar sign, or perhaps security, we dont know.
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National, societal and human security: General discussion with a case study from the Balkans
NATIONAL, SOCIETAL AND HUMAN SECURITY: GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH A CASE STUDY FROM THE BALKANS
by Mr Bjrn Mller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark
1. Preface Human security has become something of a catchphrase, used both by United Nations agencies, national development aid agencies and international as well as national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been in the forefront of this debate, as illustrated by the following quotations: The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on peoples security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (Human Development Report 1993).1 For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a countrys borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations but these threats are real and growing. Most people instinctively understand what security means. It means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment (Human Development Report 1994).2 The Commission on Global Governance in its 1995 report on Our Global Neighbourhood likewise lent its support to a reorientation towards human security: Although it is necessary to continue to uphold the right of states to security, so that they may be
protected against external threats, the international community needs to make the protection of people and their security an aim of global security policy.3 However, the academic community has been more reluctant to embrace the concept of human security, perhaps out of fear that doing so might blunt the edge of an otherwise sharp analytical tool. There is certainly some justification for this reluctance. Security is such a positively value-laden term (in analogy with peace) that it is virtually impossible to argue against security. With the exception of Hecate, who in Shakespeares Macbeth (Act 3, Scene 5) described security as mortals chiefest enemy, everybody has to be in favour of security, however defined. Hence the temptation to subsume whatever is desirable (motherhood and apple pie) under it, which would surely do little to enhance its analytical utility. The following account analyses the development of the theoretical use of the concept, from a rather narrow, state-centric and militarized one (national security), via one focusing on national and other identities (societal security), to a much wider concept, including concerns for human rights, development, gender issues, etc., labelled human security. In conclusion is an illustration of how the different forms of security are interlinked, with a look at national, societal and human security problems in the Balkan conflicts.
2. From positivism to constructivism 2.1. International relations and peace research perspectives As an academic term, security was until fairly recently almost monopolized by the discipline of international relations (IR). IR theorists employed the term in a rather narrow sense, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power. According to this simplistic logic the more military power, or the more favourable the military balance, the more security. Surprisingly little was, however, written about the concept of security
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(as opposed to presumed strategies for achieving it) by the IR theoreticians. In his seminal work on Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define security.4 Arnold Wolfers was thus almost alone in venturing a definition, which has become standard: Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.5 Even this definition leaves open a number of questions: Whose values might be threatened? Which are these values? Who might attack them? By what means? Whose fears should count? How might one distinguish between sincere (albeit perhaps unfounded) fears and faked ones? And should the absence of threats and/or fear be understood in absolute or (as indicated by the term measure) relative terms? I shall return to most of these questions in due course. In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for decades endeavoured to develop meaningful conceptions of peace, security and violence6 a preoccupation that also reflects their longstanding interest in development issues7 and desire to break those bonds of ethnocentrism that have always characterized IR.8 Both Johan Galtungs term positive peace and the late Kenneth Bouldings stable peace could thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security concept.9 For security to be genuine and durable, it would have to be based on a positive or stable peace structure. This would entail considerably more than a mere negative peace, in its turn equated with an absence of war, representing merely one particular form of direct violence. Genuine peace and security would thus presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of what Galtung called structural violence, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population. Thus conceived, a positive peace was more or less synonymous with what is today referred to as human security (vide infra). Belatedly, members of the IR community have come to accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security.10 Barry Buzan and his collaborators (but not including the present author) at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) have belonged to the theoretical vanguard in this endeavour by virtue of their analyses of national as well as societal security (vide infra).11 However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the (now defunct) East-West conflict and military matters,12 most members of the strategic studies (now often relabelled security studies) community have continued their rearguard battle against
what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the concept of security. Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening, disagreement persists about where to draw the line. To expand the notion of security too far say, to include the absence of all types of problem would not be practical, as it would merely create the need for an additional term for traditional security, now relegated to being merely one species of the genus security. Not to widen the concept at all, on the other hand, might relegate security studies to a very marginalized position, if (as seems likely) traditional security problems will be perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience at the very least as far as the West (or North) is concerned. 2.2. Social constructivism The quest for a correct definition of an essentially contested concept13 such as security is probably futile. Rather, this is a matter of definitions, which may be more or less useful or relevant, and which may both reflect and impact on power relations, but which can be neither right nor wrong. One may thus have to agree with Lewis Carrolls fictitious Humpty Dumpty in his linguistic philosophy: When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I choose it to mean neither more nor less. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master thats all (Through the Looking Glass).14 The Humpty Dumpties of political science and IR, usually labelled constructivists, are probably right in rejecting as futile the quest for concepts that are correct in the sense of corresponding to reality, if only because this reality is itself socially constructed, inter alia, by means of concepts such as peace and security. Mindful of being part of the game oneself, what the analyst can do is merely to analyse how concepts are used, and how the security discourse is thus evolving.15 As argued by Ole Wver and others, the challenge is to analyse the security discourse as a complex speech act (or Wittgensteinean language game), i.e. to explore the evolving securitization and desecuritization of issues.16 Among other advantages, this approach induces caution with regard to elevating too many problems to the status of security problems, which inevitably has political implications, some of which may be undesirable. First, in the political discourse to label something a security problem may be (ab)used by
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the powers that be for a tabooization of issues and marginalization of ideological opponents. A matter with alleged national security implications is arguably off limits, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject for political or academic debate, but one where everybody has to show loyalty to the common cause. In order to prevent such a closure of important debates, a relevant political goal might be a desecuritization of pertinent issues, which may allow for a more open and fruitful debate. Second, certain strata in society may benefit from securitization, e.g. because they are traditionally viewed as responsible for security, however defined. To securitize various problems may thus provide the armed forces with a justification for their claim on national resources, which may not be desirable. Critical security studies devote themselves, inter alia, to uncovering the interests and power games underlying the security discourse.17 On the other hand, to proclaim something to be a security problem may certainly be justifiable, as it attaches a label of urgency to an issue. Hence the attraction of, for example, securitizing environmental problems, which is tantamount to elevating a problem to one of existential importance. Unless solved without delay such a problem may destroy all other values, which warrants giving it absolute first priority.18 Whether to expand the concept of security or not, and if so in which direction and to what extent, is thus a matter of both political choice and analytical convenience. In the following
I analyse how it might be expanded while paying a certain attention to both the positive and negative political implications thereof.
3. Axes of expansion In principle, expansion can take place along different axes, i.e. as answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according to how radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy. Security of whom? This is the question of focus, i.e. of the appropriate referent object (in the terminology of Buzan et al., whereas Bill McSweeney prefers the term subject).19 Three types of entity immediately spring to mind which might be either secure or insecure: the state, other human collectives, or the individual, more about which shortly. Security of what? Depending on whose security is at stake, security will be a matter of an absence of threats to different values, i.e. it may have completely different connotations. Security from whom or what? This is the question of the source of threat. Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors, in addition to which there may be numerous structural threats (global warming, for example) without any agents. These might, in principle, also be securitized, but they rarely are. My main emphasis is on these three questions (see Table 1), and especially on that of focus, as this is where human security represents the most radical departure from security studies orthodoxy. However, I also briefly discuss three additional sets of questions:
Table 1: Expanded concepts of security

Mode of expansion Security from whom or what? Source(s) of threat Other states (Sub-state actors) (States) Nations Migrants Alien culture Radical Human security Individuals Humanity Ultra-radical Environmental security Ecosystem Survival Quality of life Sustainability The state Globalization Nature Humanity
Degree of expansion
Label
Security of whom? Focus The state Nations Societal groups
Security of what? Value at risk Sovereignty Territorial integrity National unity Identity
No expansion Incremental
National security Societal security
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Security from what? Depending on which values are supposed to be threatened by whom (or what), these threats may appear in different dimensions (or sectors), such as the military domain, the environment, or the economy. Security by whom? This is a question of agency, as there will be different answers to the question of who is supposed to do security, depending on all of the above. Moreover, this question of agency has both a macro (international) and a micro (substate) dimension. The former refers to the level at which security is sought, e.g. by individual states, dyads or larger groups of states, or the international system as such. The latter refers to the abovementioned division of labour within society between the security services and the rest. Security by which means? This is a question of both strategies (or, rather, grand strategies) and of concrete plans determining, for example, the relative importance of military and other means to the end of security.
4. State-centric (national) security Most of the security discourse continues to revolve around the state, but even here it makes sense to distinguish between orthodox security studies and alternative security studies. 4.1. The orthodox version What characterized the traditional IR approach to security, especially during the era of almost unchallenged dominance of Realism and neorealism,20 was a focus on the state as the referent object of security, i.e. that entity which was allegedly insecure, but should be made secure. Even though the preferred term was national security, this was a misnomer, because nations are not the same as states, except in a score or so of genuine nation-states (Japan, for example) where nation and state happen to be (almost) coterminous.21 Even in those instances, however, the state, is an entity sui generis, often portrayed as endowed with almost metaphysical features or personified, i.e. treated as if it were an individual writ large. Neither the interests nor the will of the state are thus reducible to the sum of those of its citizens, but they are likewise sui generis.22 State security is, in the final analysis, only definable in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity.23 What Realists have really referred to has thus been the security of the territorial (rather than nation-) state, which was indeed the principal actor in their Westphalian universe. It was presumed (if only for the sake of the argument) to be both universal and perennial. In fact it
was neither, but a historical product of fairly recent vintage and, until the latter half of the twentieth century, a distinctly northern phenomenon.24 The international system, in its turn, was supposed to be anarchic, i.e. lacking in supranational authority and consisting of sovereign states, each pursuing its national interest defined in terms of power or, somewhat more modestly, in terms of security in the sense of state survival. Furthermore, this universe was characterized by perpetual strife, as national interests inevitably collided, hence the pervasiveness of competition, conflict and war.25 As states were thus inherently insecure, they were well advised to make sure that their power would suffice to parry threats from other states to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. As far as the system as such was concerned, the best safeguard of peace would presumably be a balance of power.26 As pointed out by critics, such balance is inherently difficult to define, and well-nigh impossible to achieve or preserve. Hence, such an anarchical system had an inherent propensity for arms races and war.27 While most Realists have placed the main emphasis on military threats, hence also on military strength as the most reliable safeguard of national security, a few authors have held a somewhat broader view of state security, for example by including the economic dimension of security.28 Such economic security, however, may mean (at least) two rather different things.29 Either it may be understood narrowly as referring to the economic foundations of military power, or it may be seen as an aspect (or dimension) of security in its own right. Economic power is eminently fungible in the sense that it may be transformed into almost anything, including military strength. Money can thus buy a state weapons from abroad, and economic strength may increase productivity, thus allowing for a transfer of labour from the civilian sphere into that of arms production or armed service. In the final analysis, wealth is thus tantamount to military mobilization potential, if not in the short term then at least in the medium to long term.30 Economic strength may also be seen as a viable functional substitute for military power, both for offensive and defensive purposes. Economic warfare may thus be employed to cripple the economy of an adversarial state, thereby indirectly also its military potential, as in the case of blockades or economic sanctions.31 Conversely, economic strength may be a powerful contribution to national security, as it may render the state invulnerable to such
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warfare. Certain peace researchers (Galtung and others) have therefore advocated economic self-sufficiency as a means of defence, i.e. of national security.32 4.2. Moderate alternatives Proposals for a modification of this security strategy without any radical rejection of its premises, and certainly without shifting the focus from state security, have been voiced (at least) since the early 1980s, inter alia under the label Common Security. The term was promulgated in the Palme Commissions 1982 report Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. Its main message was that security under conditions of anarchy and high levels of armaments required mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, in the absence of which the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned. Furthermore, the security even the existence of the world [was acknowledged as] interdependent, hence the admonition that security can be attained only by common action.33 Common Security was thus envisaged as a way of resolving (or perhaps better: circumventing or transcending) the well-known security dilemma, about which so much has been written by IR scholars, not least by Realists.34 The growing number of references to Common Security (alternatively labelled security partnership, mutual security, reciprocal security or cooperative security) in political statements as well as in the academic literature was, unfortunately, not matched by any rigorous theoretical analysis of the implications of the concept.35 Some (including the present author) advocated a rather austere, minimalistic and parsimonious concept of Common Security, tantamount to little more than an admonition to mutual restraint. This presupposes neither any abandonment of competition in favour of cooperation nor any far-reaching institutionalization much less a rejection of the Realist premises. Thus conceived, Common Security would be little more than an special instance of cooperation among adversaries, i.e. a form of regime entirely compatible with the teachings of both soft Realism, liberal institutionalism,36 and the so-called English School notions of international society.37 Moreover, it did not automatically entail any broader notion of security, but signified little more than the same type of security, only to be achieved by other, less confrontational means. The state remained the referent object of security and the focus remained
on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even primarily) military threats, against which a military defence was still deemed indispensable. For which purpose Common Security proponents tended to advocate non-offensive defence (NOD, also known as defensive defence or non-provocative defence).38 Other Common Security proponents went further, seeking to subsume a very broad panoply of security strategies under Common Security, and typically also emphasizing the need for broader concepts of security, including development, ecological security, etc. Laudable though such endeavours certainly were, very little was achieved in terms of rigorous theoretical analysis.39 Another extension of the state-centric concept of security was that of Collective Security, which is both more and less radical than (some versions of) Common Security. Less radical in the sense of being conceived of as a counter to the traditional state-versus-state military threats, yet more radical by envisaging a transfer of powers from the state to supranational authorities, i.e. a partial relinquishment of sovereignty. Whereas collective security was until recently dismissed as irrelevant by most of the IR community (because of its poor achievement in the inter-war years),40 it was being taken increasingly seriously in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.41 So far, however, the 1991 war against Iraq for the liberation of Kuwait remains the only real-life example of a collective security operation, and the victorious Wests systematic undermining of UN authority does not bode well for its future.42 Even if it should miraculously be given another chance, however, even collective security would do little to address other security problems. It does not fundamentally address the motives for aggression, but merely seeks to dissuade attack by deterrence and/or defence; and it does nothing to change, but rather tends to perpetuate, the Westphalian state system with all its detrimental implications for other forms of security (vide infra). 4.3. State security: the indirect approach The latter critique does not really apply to the more radical alternative strategy for state security that might be called the indirect approach to state security, borrowing from the terminology of Basil Liddell Hart.43 The furthering of interdependence, even to the point of integration, is such an indirect approach to state security, addressing primarily the motivation for aggression and doing so almost entirely by non-military means, thus representing a soft security strategy. This has, for example, been
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the predominant approach to security taken by the European Union ever since its infancy.44 The underlying understanding has been that a web of mutual interdependencies may serve as a powerful inhibition against war, in perfect conformity with the tenets of classical liberalism, as well as with the writings of Norman Angell, and modern analysts of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, among others).45 From its modest start with the European Coal and Steel Community, via the Rome Treaty and the European Economic Community (EEC) to the present EU, the European project has thus all along been motivated by the quest for peace, as was made explicit in the 1952 Schuman Declaration: World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.46 These considerations remain as valid today as they were then. The EU has already proceeded way beyond the Westphalian model, and is today more than a pluralistic security community in the traditional sense. Whether its progressive amalgamation will eventually produce a new superstate, or a polity sui generis remains to be seen, but it is surely a solid security community where traditional security concerns among the members have receded into near oblivion,47 i.e. a zone of stable peace.48 4.4. The limitations of state-centric security The Realist worldview upon which all of the above strategies were premised was not merely bleak and probably incorrect. With the exception of the aforementioned indirect approach, it also invited the development of strategies that were counterproductive in the sense of sacrificing other human values for those of the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of the state. So-called national security was thus achieved at the expense of human security. National (i.e. state) security was, moreover, all too often equated with the security of the regime
in power. Contrary to the Hobbesian view of the state, if controlled by an unscrupulous regime the state often ceases to be a protector of its citizens and becomes a security threat to them, as in the case of various African vampire states49 or totalitarian regimes.50 However, the rules of the game of Westphalia privilege existing states, regardless of their nature, and proscribe interference into domestic affairs, i.e. everything taking place within the territorially defined exclusive domain of the sovereign states comprising the system. Within this protected domain numerous unspeakable atrocities have been committed, and human security thus violated with impunity. More recently, there has been some movement on this issue. To the extent that UN forces [or those of other international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)] have not merely been employed for restoring peace between states, but also within states, or for safeguarding human rights there, they might be seen as harbingers of a modified international system with an amended set of rules. In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General thus included the following cautious formulation: The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the state. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.51 A new world order would, however, no longer be based on sovereign states with impermeable borders, but would be a truly global one in which international politics is replaced by domestic politics on a global scale (Weltinnenpolitik) where human security (vide infra) might receive its due priority.52 However, it remains to be seen whether those isolated instances of humanitarian interventions that the world has seen so far are in fact harbingers of such a new order, or merely aberrations from business as usual attributable to the confusion of the present transitional period or oldfashioned power politics dressed up as humanitarianism.53
5. From national to societal security Whereas most Realists and neorealists deny the importance of individual security, charging this approach with reductionism,54 some of them nevertheless acknowledge the inadequacy of the state-centric approach.
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5.1. Threats to identity The so-called Copenhagen School thus advocates accepting human collectivities as possible referent objects of security. The particular form of security applicable to such collective, yet nonstate, referent objects is labelled societal security, which in the seminal work on the topic was defined as the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.55 Societal security is thus a matter of identity, which has indeed become quite a fashionable topic in IR theory.56 It resonates quite well with the rediscovery of the cultural aspects of international relations (viz. the clash of civilizations debate),57 just as it corresponds to the actual securitization of such phenomena as migration or cultural imperialism (viz. the debate about franglais as a threat to French culture).58 Unfortunately, it also holds the potential of appealing to xenophobic political groupings on the extreme right with whom the authors surely do not want to join ranks. Combined with the aforementioned methodology of discourse analysis and the postmodern rejection of objectivist ethics,59 one might fear that the theory (however inadvertently) may simply lead to rubber-stamping all assertions of threats to national (or ethnic) security as equally valid. If there are no objective yardsticks against which to measure such allegations, the analyst is confined to merely recording what is being securitized, perhaps by opportunistic leaders seeking power by playing the nationalist card in a manipulatory fashion, as did such figures as Slobodan Milosevich or Franko Tudjman.60 If anything goes then the analyst must be prepared for this: If total moral relativism, which is undeniably one of the options of postmodernity, gains the upper hand, even the assessment of mass deportation and genocide becomes a matter of taste.61 This moral nihilism is part of the critique raised by Bill McSweeney against the Copenhagen School. Another part of his critique is the continuing focus of the state, not as the sole referent object, but as the mechanism through which all securitization attempts have to pass. Finally, the school (if so it is) is criticized for privileging some possible identities over others, namely national and ethnic ones. Rather than assuming a priori that these are always the most salient identities, the analyst should adopt a scientific
approach, requiring actual sociological investigations into how people rank-order their various identities.62 With these caveats in mind, the theory of societal security seems to have some merits, as it allows for a better understanding of certain recent phenomena than traditional security analysis. Much of the recent discourse about risks as opposed to threats may, for example, really reflect societal security concerns for national unity, as do the (alleged) new types of threats such as that from Islam (vide infra). Of course, the various societal developments referred to in this discourse also impinge on the state level in various ways, yet to make this their admission ticket into the field of security problems is often rather far-fetched. Run-away population growth has, for example, been singled out by some authors as perhaps the most serious security problem for the decades ahead,63 if only because of the Malthusian implications of a growing discrepancy between the available resources for consumption and the much-faster-growing number of would-be consumers. This may certainly constitute a (human) security problem in its own right, particularly of course for the losers in the competition for scarce global resources, but also with implications for the winners. It might, for example, become a societal security problem for the North if resource depletion in the South should lead to a tidal wave of migration to the North.64 Whereas it strains the imagination to envision, say, countries such as Denmark being more than marginally affected by this, countries in the borderland between North and South (such as the entire Mediterranean region) might well be more seriously affected. Migration may also flow in the East-West direction, not so much as a reflection of a population surplus, as because of a deficit of resources, say if the economic transformation embarked upon since 1989 should fail completely. One might, for example, envisage migration from the former Soviet Union to Poland, and/or from the latter or the Czech Republic to Germany. If sufficiently massive, such migration flows might conceivably place national identity in the receiving countries at risk.65 Another societal security problem is represented by the forces of nationalism that were unleashed by the democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1991 in the east and south-east of Europe.66 To the extent that this leads to violent strife between ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups (a phenomenon of which there have already been
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dozens of examples), it certainly constitutes a serious societal security problem, where one groups security spells insecurity for the others. This is a genuine societal security dilemma, which may even have such abhorrent manifestations as ethnic cleansing or even genocide.67 It also threatens to become a political security problem affecting the already weak states in the countries in question, if nationalism is manifested in a struggle for secession. This is often exacerbated by the so-called matrozka effect, which promises fragmentation down to very small, and often not survivable, political units.68 Problems such as the above may also have repercussions for the relations between states, i.e. develop into traditional (state-centric) security problems. Communal strife thus has an inherent propensity for internationalization, especially in those (numerous) cases where a suppressed, exploited or otherwise disadvantaged ethnic group can draw on the support of its paternal state.69 Also, nationalism entails the risk that the numerous unresolved territorial disputes may be reinvigorated. Were this to happen, especially during a period of political weakness, old-fashioned war for territorial conquest may, once again, become conceivable. This does not mean that societal security is a mere derivative of national security but simply serves to illustrate how all levels in the security game are interlinked (vide infra). 5.2. Religion and gender Even though societal security as a concept supposedly applies to any human collective, it has almost exclusively focused on national and ethnic collectives (viz. McSweeneys abovementioned critique). Important though these certainly are, one might also envision cleavages among other societal groupings that might eventually come to be securitized. A first step in this direction would surely be political organization. Because of the absence of this, it still strains the imagination to envision a securitization of, for example, the virulent smokers versus nonsmokers dispute, but in principle it could not be ruled out. More likely is a possible (societal) securitization of religion or gender. Religion has already been extensively politicized, if only because of its close links to some forms of nationalism.70 A few nations (Jews and Bosnian Muslims, for example) are thus defined in religious terms, which is also the case of states such as Pakistan and Iran (both with the prefix Islamic Republic of). In such cases, alien religions risk being viewed as threats to national cohesion, hence securitized. To the extent that nations or states are not defined in religious
terms, but as secular, the politization of any religion (even the national one) may likewise come to be seen as a threat, as in modern-day Turkey or India, or in certain Arab states where radical Islamic fundamentalism threatens already Islamic states.71 Even in the case of stable and cohesive states such as those of the West we see this phenomenon, as in the growing securitization of Islam by the West, not merely in the shape of allegations to the effect that Islamic states constitute a threat to peace, but also with a societal security twist, arguing that Islam (personified by migrants) is a threat to Western civilization.72 Gender might in principle also be securitized, as indicated by various strains of feminist IR studies, the gist of which seems to be that the traditional focus on the state reflects male domination, and that the concurrent emphasis on military means corresponds to innate male aggression, hence that an empowerment of women would produce more genuine and lasting security.73 Both these topics also have obvious human security aspects, if only because they are regulated in several human rights conventions. Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights thus makes clear that Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Article 18 of the same convention would also seem to proscribe any securitization of religion with the following unequivocal stipulation: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Regardless of whether, say, the influx of Muslims might arguably constitute a threat to some nations identity, i.e. a societal security threat (a very big if) it would thus constitute a violation of human rights to prevent these people from practising their religion, hence a threat to human security, to which I shall now, at long last, turn.
6. Human security Just as societal security may thus endanger individual security, the state-centred approach to security has
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been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. of jeopardizing human security. This is basically a matter of human well-being and, in the last analysis, survival of people, regardless of their national or other affiliations.74 6.1. Human security versus state and societal security Thus conceived, human security may indeed be placed in jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for state security, say if the latter should involve war. Hence, for example, the uncomfortable Red or dead dilemma which haunted NATO (and especially Germany) for decades: should one place the survival of the population at risk for the sake of such intangible values as sovereignty?75 Or should a developing state invest heavily in the implements of state security (i.e. armed forces) at the inevitable expense of economic development?76 According to a cosmopolitan ethics,77 what really matters is the survival and well-being of the individuals, or as the utilitarians formulated it, the greatest happiness principle.78 Such happiness is, of course, compatible with, but only rarely presupposes, the sovereignty of ones state, or for that matter the cohesion of ones societal group. Moreover, for principled proponents of this view, state security can merely be a relevant goal to the extent that the state derives its powers from la volont gnrale. If and when the state ceases to represent the interests of its citizens, say when state security places individual security in jeopardy, the latter must take precedence.79 Even though the state was presumably created for the sake of its citizens security, it can also constitute a threat to their security, as mentioned above. The life of man (and woman) in Hitlers Germany or Pol Pots Kampuchea, for example, was surely at least as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short as it was in the proverbial state of nature, i.e. before the establishment of the state as an institution.80 Too strong and oppressive Leviathans may thus constitute security threats in their own right, as acknowledged by at least some IR writers, even by some of the Realist or neorealist persuasion.81 The main security problem in todays developing world may, however, not be an excess but rather a deficit of state power. Most developing states are thus weak states in which there is a dissonance between the loci of authority and power (Mohammed Ayoob), where society and state boundaries are far from coterminous, inter alia as a reflection of the colonial legacy, and where the states administrative capacity is quite inadequate, making it little more than a
hollow shell, i.e. a quasi-state. Hence the lack of state as well as regime legitimacy and a perpetual struggle for control of the state apparatus and for autonomy or cessation a struggle which all too often assumes violent forms, and which sometimes leads to complete state collapse.82 The resultant armed conflicts may already be the most prevalent form of war (say, measured in terms of numbers of violent deaths) and will most likely become so in the coming years, where Hobbesian Warre (bellum omnium contra omnes) may almost supersede the Clausewitzian war among states as the most widespread form of violent conflict.83 Not only may war thus be getting smaller, but more widespread, but other forms of violent conflict also seem to proliferate. In weak states, ordinary crime and intercommunal strife may become so prevalent that security simply becomes privatized. When and where the state cannot ensure law and order, people tend to take matters into their own hands. In order to protect themselves, their families and their property, they will resort to self-help, such as by arming themselves, or by enlisting the services of private security companies as we have seen in a country such as South Africa.84 This gradually leads to an erosion of the states Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force, producing a vicious circle where violence spurs a proliferation of small arms, in its turn producing more violence, etc.85 6.2. Structural violence and human security Direct violence (in the terminology of Johan Galtung) is not, however, the only threat to human security, as various forms of structural violence (vide supra) may produce even larger numbers of casualties and even greater human suffering. In order to make any analytical sense of this rather fuzzy and vague term, however, we have to break it down into sub-categories. First, there are those non-violent, but nevertheless intentional threats to human security, for which the state is to blame, i.e. the broad category of human rights violations, documented inter alia in the annual Human Development Reports of the UNDP, or in the reports of NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International. Second, we have structural violence perpetrated by one societal group against another, as by the White minority against the Black and Coloured majority in South Africa under apartheid, or by Israelis against Palestinians in the occupied territories until the present day.86 The general oppression of women by men would fall into the same category, even though
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it is, alas, all too often also combined with direct physical violence, including rape.87 Third comes the kind of structural violence which the global order, according to some analyses, represents, either in the general shape of imperialism, centre-periphery relations or globalization, producing a relative deprivation of the peoples of the developing world.88 Fourth, we have threats from nature, some of which may surely be exacerbated, but which are not caused by, societal and/or political factors, as is the case of HIV/AIDS (viz. South African President Mbekis unfortunate and highly controversial formulations).89 Whether any of these forms of structural violence should be securitized, i.e. treated as human security issues, is, as argued above, a matter of political choice. It probably does little to enhance the analytical rigour of security studies to include the fourth type, which is basically a matter of humanitys struggle with nature.
enter into the picture. In extreme cases, the physical basis of a state could be placed in jeopardy by nature. For example, countries such as Bangladesh or the Netherlands would almost disappear in the case of severe global flooding. While state security might thus, in principle, be endangered by the environment, in most cases human beings would be the victims. Hence, environmental security as usually conceived is really a species of the genus human security. An even more radical position is, however, possible. All the above might be criticized as hopelessly anthropocentric, whereas the appropriate referent object might be the environment itself, i.e. the global ecosystem, as argued by Robyn Eckersley.94 One implication of this view might be that true environmental security might require an extermination of the main threat to the environment, namely the species homo sapiens. This would obviously be utterly incompatible with human security. Belonging to the species in question myself, however, I shall disregard this ultra-radical approach to security, its immaculate logic notwithstanding.
7. Environmental security 8. Conclusion and illustration The man/nature relationship is also at the heart of the debate about environmental security. That the environment is degrading was discovered several years ago. However, the awareness of ecological challenges was especially boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland Commission on Our Common Future, which inspired a flood of books on environmental or ecological security.90 However, to recognize environmental decay as a problem was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a security problem was something else which remains disputed. There are, at least, three different senses in which the environment might become subsumed under an expanded notion of security: First, environmental problems could be caused by war, or preparations for war, of such severity as to count among the most serious indirect war effects.91 A precursor of the current environmental awareness in peace circles was, for example, the debate in the early 1980s on the nuclear winter hypothesis, according to which even a small-scale nuclear war could have caused a climatic and ecological disaster, the casualties of which would not only be the warring states, but the entire globe.92 Second, wars might accrue from environmental problems, such as in the form of resource wars. An obvious example might be wars over scarce water supplies, say between states sharing the same river.93 Third, environmental problems might, according to some analysts, constitute a security threat directly, i.e. whether or not weapons and physical force ever 8.1. The need for a comprehensive approach We have thus seen that there are different forms of security, with national (i.e. state) security, societal and human security constituting the main categories, defined by the different referent objects (state, societal group, individual). As threats to the different values of the various referent objects (sovereignty, identity and survival) may appear in many different shapes, all three categories have different dimensions or sectors such as the military, economic, and environmental ones. While this may make for a neat analytical framework, the real world is less orderly, if only because the different forms of security impinge upon each other, and strategies to achieve one may damage the others as shown in the case study of the Balkans below. Hence the need for a comprehensive approach to security, as acknowledged by several states.95 Only by being mindful of the implications for other forms of security can strategies intended to solve security problems stay clear of the well-known fallacies of the last step and even of doing more harm than good. While this surely calls for a concept of security that goes well beyond the traditional one, one should also guard against excessive securitization, as this may entail risks such as A danger of militarization, as the security services (mainly the army and the police) tend
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to assume that security is their business. In times of impending cutbacks in military expenditures, the military tend to be quite eager to embrace expanded notions of security in the hope that this will protect them against further reductions. A danger that a subsequent desecuritization of issues may lead to a neglect of them. If security concerns, for example, are accepted as the primary rationale for development assistance, development aid may decline once it is realized that countries of the South constitute no real danger to the North. 8.2. Illustration: the Balkan conflicts The Balkan conflict(s) of the 1990s and (so far) the first year of the new millennium provide ample illustration of the complexities of the quest for security as well as of the linkages between state, societal and human security. The following, however, is merely a very tentative and preliminary analysis, intended mainly as illustration. The initial break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was the result of societal security problems, in casu of the quest for nationand statehood on the part of the constituent parts.96 However, it is difficult to judge to what extent the nations of Titos Yugoslavia were primordial (i.e. natural, hence enduring) or socially constructed,97 maybe even instrumentalized by unscrupulous leaders such as Milosevic and Tujman for their private ends.98 While there had certainly been ethnic and nationalistic strife before,99 there is no doubt that the nationalist leaders benefited from the economic hardships (i.e. a human security problem) afflicting the FRY from the mid-1980s100 as they were able to place the blame for the problems on the ethnic other. The attempted, and eventually successful, secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from the FRY101 could initially be seen as a problem of national security for the latter, and societal security for the former. Upon secession, however or rather, upon the international recognition of the new states102 what began as an intra-state conflict became transformed, literally by the stroke of a pen, into an international conflict between rump-Yugoslavia (comprising Serbia and Montenegro) and the others, i.e. a problem of national security. In legal terms, however, the struggle in Bosnia between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims (later renamed Bosniacs) was an internal conflict (i.e. a societal security problem for all three), albeit heavily internationalized through the support by Serbia and Croatia for their ethnic kin.103
It was further internationalized by the involvement of the United Nations, subsequently also NATO, the former in the form of peace-keeping forces and safe havens, the latter in the form of air strikes and subsequent leadership of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) established to implement the 1995 Dayton Agreement.104 All this amounted to a serious national security problem, especially for Serbia. Not only did the air strikes, the more or less conventional war between the three sides, and the genocidal atrocities committed by the Serbs and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Croats and Muslims constitute a human security problem for the civilian population. So did the sanctions regime imposed on Serbia, which turned it into the poorest country in Europe. It all culminated when the conflict reached Kosovo where a liberation movement, long suppressed by Serbia, rebelled. The societal security problem of the Albanian Kosovars constituted an obvious national security problem for Serbia.105 Whereas the initial Kosovar rebellion had been largely non-violent, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova,106 by 1998 it had come to bear all the imprints of a guerilla war. Even though some of the allegations against the Serbs should probably be taken cum grano salis,107 there is little doubt that the Serb regime acted with extreme brutality in its attempted counter-insurgency, thereby exacerbating the societal security problems of the Kosovars.108 At the same time, repression in Serbia became more severe, thereby aggravating the human security problems for the civilian population of Serbia itself.109 Something had to be done. As both developments in Serbia proper and in Kosovo (internationally recognized as being a province of Serbia) took place within the protected sovereign domain, however, there was no legal way of intervening militarily without a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. Hence, NATO acted unilaterally, in blatant violation of international law, albeit probably out of (mainly) humanitarian motives, i.e. for the sake of the human security of the Kosovar civilians.110 However, it is also possible to argue that NATO was partly motivated by societal security concerns of its own, i.e. by the (rather far-fetched, but nevertheless perhaps earnest) fear that a flood of refugees might upset the ethnic balance in European states. At the very least, all NATO countries went out of their way to ensure that the refugees remained in the Balkans, most of them in Macedonia, where they did in fact cause societal security problems.111 The resultant 78-day war went disastrously wrong.112 Far from stopping the killings or the
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ethnic cleansing, Serbia accelerated both once NATO started its war, as shown by the figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Table 2. At least temporarily, the human security problems were thus exacerbated.
Table 2: Refugees from Kosovo, 1999

Country of refuge Albania Macedonia 23 March 4 April 18 500 16 000 23 April 14 May
170 000 362 000 431 500 115 000 133 000 233 300 0 32 000 0 32 600 66 500 17 929 18 500 64 300 44 525
Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 000 Montenegro Other Total 25 000 0 69 500
317 000 612 029 792 125
Source: UNHCR, cited by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.um.dk/kosovo/pjece/
After the war, the returning Kosovars created an acute societal security problem for the Serb minority in Kosovo, most of whom chose to flee, seeking refuge in Serbia proper. This, of course, solved the societal security problem of the Albanian population, but in a rather brutal manner, which also led to the expulsion of the (completely innocent) Roma segment of the population.113 As the above account has, I hope, shown, the three forms of security are closely linked, illustrating the need for a comprehensive approach to security. To its credit, the EU took the lead in this respect. On its initiative a summit meeting was called in Sarajevo, where a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched.114 Somewhat ironically, the very same countries that had launched the attack against the FRY on 24 March 1999, by adopting the Pact on 10 June 1999 reaffirmed their shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided,
democratic and at peace (Sarajevo Summit Declaration, art. 2, cited from www.summit-sarajevo99.ba/documents.htm). 1. We affirm our collective and individual readiness to give concrete meaning to the Pact by promoting political and economic reforms, development and enhanced security in the region. 2. we affirm our determination to work together towards the full achievement of the objectives of democracy, respect for human rights, economic and social development and enhanced security to which we have subscribed by adopting the Stability Pact. We reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last undivided, democratic and at peace. We will work together to promote the integration of South Eastern Europe into a continent where borders remain inviolable but no longer denote division and offer the opportunity of contact and cooperation. 7. We will work together to accelerate the transition in the region to stable democracies, prosperous market economies and open and pluralistic societies in which human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, are respected, as an important step in their integration into euro-atlantic and global institutions. Our shared objective is the development of peaceful and good neighbourly relations. 8. The Stability Pact process will concentrate on the areas of democracy and human rights, economic development and cooperation as well as security. 9. Established ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities and rights should be consistently protected in accordance with relevant international mechanisms and conventions. We welcome the initiative by countries of the region to develop a dialogue and consultations on human rights issues. 11. We pledge to work towards ending tensions and creating peaceful and good neighbourly relations in order to strengthen a climate of security throughout the region. This was as clear a commitment to comprehensive security as one could reasonably expect, including both national, societal and human security concerns.
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NOTES
1. Human Development Report 1993: Peoples Participation, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1993. Overview available at http://www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm 2. Human Development Report 1994, New Dimensions of Human Security, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. Overview available at http://www.undp.org/hdro/e94over.htm 3. Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 82. 4. The closest he came to a definition was: National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions, in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, p. 562, 3rd edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960. In another connection, he added culture to the list, emphasizing that the survival of a political unit in its identity (i.e. security) constitutes the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis--vis other units. See The Problem of the National Interest (1952), in idem, Politics in the Twentieth Century, pp. 20437 (quote from p. 219), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971. 5. Arnold Wolfers, National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, in idem, Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics, pp. 14765 (quote from p. 150), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. 6. See also Gert Krell, The Development of the Concept of Security, in Egbert Jahn and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), Elements of World Instability: Armaments, Communication, Food, International Division of Labour, Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Eighth General Conference, pp. 23854, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1981; Egbert Jahn, From International Peace Research to National Security Research, in Nobel Jaap (ed.), The Coming of Age of Peace Research. Studies in the Development of a Discipline, pp. 5775, Groningen, Styx, 1991; Daniel Frei, Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?, in Wolfgang Heisenberg and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers. Frieden und Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa, Vol. 1, pp. 419, Bonn, Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, 1990; Carolyn Stephenson, New Conceptions of Security and their Implicatons for Means and Methods, in Katharine and Majid Tehranian (eds.), Restructuring for World Peace. On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, pp. 4761, Creskil, N.J., Hampton Press, 1992; Dietrich Fischer, Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach, Aldershot, Dartmouth/United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993. See also Bjrn Mller, Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks, Working Papers, No. 18, Copenhagen, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993. 7. See, for example, Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1971, pp. 81118; idem, A Structural Theory of Imperialism Ten Years Later, Millennium, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1980, pp. 18396; idem, The True Worlds. A Transnational Perspective, New York, Free Press,
1980; Peter Lawler, A Question of Values. Johan Galtungs Peace Research, pp. 709, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Arghiri Emmanuel, Lchange Ingal, Paris, Maspero, 1969; Samir Amin, Le dveloppement ingal, Paris, Editions du Minuit, 1973; idem, Laccumulation lchelle mondiale, Vols. 12, Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1976; Andre Gunter Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969; idem and Barry K. Gills (eds.), The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, London, Routledge, 1996; Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Second Conference, Vol. I: Studies in Conflicts, Vol. II: Poverty, Development and Peace, IPRA Studies in Peace Research, Assen, Von Gorcum & Co., 1968. 8. Stephanie Neuman (ed.), International Relations Theory and the Third World, New York, St Martins Press, 1998. On the US dominance of the discipline see also Ole Wver, The Development of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations, in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (eds.), Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, pp. 687727, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1999. 9. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, in idem, Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume I, pp. 10934, Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975; idem, Peace Research, ibid., pp. 15066; idem, What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s, in idem, Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI, pp. 6171, Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988. On stable peace, see Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978; or idem, Moving from Unstable to Stable Peace, in Anatoly Gromyko and Martin Hellman (eds.), Breakthrough. Emerging New Thinking, pp. 15767, New York, Walker & Co., 1988. 10. A good illustration of the development is the two consecutive versions of a textbook on security studies, Richard Shultz, Ray Godson and Ted Greenwood (eds.), Security Studies for the 1990s, Washington, D.C., Brasseys, 1993; and Richard H. Shultz Jr, Roy Godson and George H. Quester (eds.), Security Studies for the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., Brasseys, 1997. A precursor of the present debate was Richard Ullman, Redefining Security, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 16277. Good overviews are Joseph E. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones: International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field, International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 527; Sean Lynn-Jones, The Future of International Security Studies, in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds.), Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, Vol. 89, pp. 71107, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, 1992. See also Peter Mangold, National Security and International Relations, London, Routledge, 1990; Ken Booth,
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What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice, International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1991, pp. 52745; idem (ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, London, Harper Collins, 1991; Michael Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (eds.), World Security. Trends and Challenges at Centurys End, New York, St Martins Press, 1991; Michael Clarke (ed.), New Perspectives on Security, London, Brasseys Defence Publishers/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993; G. Wyn Rees (ed.), International Politics in Europe. The New Agenda, London, Routledge, 1993; Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edition, London/Boulder, Colo., Harvester Wheatsheaf/Lynne Rienner, 1991; idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wver et al., The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the PostCold War Era, London, Pinter, 1990; Ole Wver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, 1993; Barry Buzan, Ole Wver and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998. Good examples of expanded strategic studies are Neville Brown, The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century, London, Brasseys Defence Publishers, 1992; Lennart Souchon, Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Herford, Mittler Verlag, 1990. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in Max Black (ed.), The Importance of Language, pp. 12146, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Praeger, 1962. Lewis Carroll, Alices Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, p. 274, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1962. A basic work on social constructivism is Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman (1967), The Social Construction of Reality, London, Allen Lane. On this and various postmodern approaches to IR theory see Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994; John A. Vasquez, The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenments Fall, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, pp. 21740, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995; John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, in Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (eds.), op. cit. (note 8), pp. 21546. For a critique see yvind sterrud, Antinomies of Postmodernism in International Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1996, pp. 38590. Ole Wver, Securitization and Desecuritization, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, pp. 4686, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998, op. cit. (note 11). The notion of language games comes from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philisophische Untersuchungen, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953. Recent works of a related constructivist or post-structuralist orientation include David Campbell, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised edition, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998; Simon Dalby, Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and Theory, International Studies, Burnaby, B.C., Dept. of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1991; K. M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998; Jef Huysmans, Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 22655; Lene Hansen, A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 36997; Costas M. Constantinou, Poetics of Security, Alternatives, Vol. 25, No. 3, JulySeptember 2000, pp. 287306. For a critique of the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wver and others) for not being consistently constructivist see Bill McSweeney, Security and Identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School, Review of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1996, pp. 8193; idem, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. See, for example, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases, London, UCL Press, 1997; Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1999; K. M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998. A good example of this is the recent writings of Gwyn Prins, who argues in favour of a reorientation of security studies to the environment. See, for example, idem, Politics and the Environment, International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, 1990, pp. 71130; idem, A New Focus for Security Studies, in Ball and Horner (eds.), op. cit. (note 10), pp. 178222; idem, Global Security and Military Intervention, Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 716; idem, Security challenges for the 21st century, NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 2730; idem, The FourStroke Cycle in Security Studies, International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, October 1998, pp. 781808. Ole Wver, Self-referential Concepts of Security as an Instrument for Reconstruction of an Open-ended Realism in IR, in idem, Concepts of Security, pp. 34773, Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 3542; McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), p. 87. For a historical account of Realism see, for example, Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1986. The best example of classical Realism is Morgenthau, op. cit. (note 4). Good examples of neorealism are Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass., AddisonWesley, 1979; Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986; and Buzan, op. cit. (note 11). See also Frankel Benjamin, (ed.), Roots of Realism, London, Frank Cass, 1996; idem (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal, London, Frank Cass, 1996; Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, London, Routledge, 1998. For a critique see John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics. From Classical
11.
17.
12.
18.
13.
14.
15.
19.
20.
16.
Second round table Realism to Neotraditionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Buzan, op. cit. (note 11), pp. 6982. On the concept of nation see, for example, two excellent readers: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; idem and idem (eds.), Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. See also Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, London, Basil Blackwell, 1983; Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions of Nationalism, Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London, Verso, 1991; Paul Brass, Nations and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, London, Sage, 1991; James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Houndsmills, Macmillan, 1991; Charles Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1995; Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison, London, Sage, 1991. On the notion of raison dtat see, for example, Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism. The Doctrine of Raison dEtat and its Place in Modern History, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. Besides Machiavelli, other ancestors of modern Realism come close to a personification of the state, e.g. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968, who describes the Commonwealth as the multitude so united in one person (p. 227). On the concept of national interest see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), Origins of National Interests, London, Frank Cass, 1999. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Rodney Bruce Hall, Territorial and National Sovereigns: Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security Policy, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/Spring 1999, pp. 14597. On European state-building see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 9901990, Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Oxford, Polity Press, 1995; Bruce Porter, War and the Rise of the State, New York, Free Press, 1994; Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994. See also Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1999. On the export of the European state model to the developing world see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. The best example is Waltz, op. cit. (note 20). For a critique see Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391425. 26. Edward Vose Gulick, Europes Classical Balance of Power, 1955, reprint, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1967, passim; Arnold Wolfers, The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice, in idem, op. cit. (note 5), pp. 11731; Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, pp. 16194, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1997; Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power. History and Theory, London, Routledge, 1996. For a critique see Vasquez, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 24986. 27. K. J. Holsti, The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations (1964), in Robert L. Pfalztgraff Jr (ed.), Politics and the International System, 2nd edition, pp. 18195, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1972; Ernst B. Haas, Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?, pp. 45280, 1953, ibid.; Robert Neild, An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting, pp. 10610, London, Macmillan, 1990; Bjrn Mller, From Arms to Disarmament Races: Disarmament Dynamics after the Cold War, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), The New Agenda for Peace Research, pp. 83104, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999. 28. An example of this is Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981; idem, The Economic Dimension of International Security, in Henry Bienen (ed.), Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus, pp. 5168, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1992; Kenneth Waltz also included economic factors in his aggregate capabilities, for example in op. cit. (note 20), pp. 12931. For a recent attempt at measuring such aggregate strength see Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND, 2000. 29. See, for example, Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28), cf. Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 23069. 30. See, for example, Klaus Knorr, The Determinants of Military Power, in Bienen (ed.), op. cit. (note 28), pp. 69133; which is an update on idem, The War Potential of Nations, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956. The archetypal example of such a potential military giant with modest standing armed forces or military expenditures, hence with an unexploited mobilization potential is, of course, Japan. See, for example, Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japans Defense. Technology, Economics and Strategy, McLean, Virginia, Brasseys, 1992; Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock (eds.), Japan. A New Kind of Superpower, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; Michael J. Green, Arming Japan. Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; Glenn D. Hook, Militarisation and Demilitarisation in Contemporary Japan, London, Routledge, 1996; Thomas M. Huber, Strategic Economy in Japan, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1994; Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.), Japans Military Renaissance?, New York, St Martins Press, 1993; Neil Renwick, Japans Alliance Politics and Defence Production, New York, St Martins Press, 1995; Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1994.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
56
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? 31. On sanctions see, for example, Donald G. Boudreau, Economic Sanctions and Military Force in the TwentyFirst Century, European Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 2846; Elizabeth S. Rogers, Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts, Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 4372; Kimberly Ann Elliott, The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 5065; Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, ibid., pp. 6677; Franklin L. Lavin, Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, Foreign Policy, Vol. 104, Fall 1996, pp. 13953; David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.), Economic Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1995; Ernest H. Preeg, Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions. Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest, Washington, D.C., CSIS Press, 1999; Geoff Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions. Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool?, London, Pluto Press, 1999. 32. Johan Galtung, There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security, p. 13, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1984; Dietrich Fischer, Preventing War in the Nuclear Age, pp. 14253, Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld, 1984; idem, Wilhelm Nolte and Jan berg, Frieden gewinnen. Mit autonomen Initiativen den Teufelskreis durchbrechen, pp. 19599, Freiburg, Dreisam Verlag, 1987. 33. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival, pp. 138, 5, 7, 9, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1982. 34. John M. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951, passim; idem, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, World Politics, No. 2, 1950, pp. 15780; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 5893, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1976; cf. idem, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, pp. 167214; Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 294327; Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 171201; Randall L. Schweller, Neorealisms StatusQuo Bias: What Security Dilemma?, in Frankel (ed.), Realism, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 90121. The most elaborate study of the security dilemma is Alan Collins, The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War, Edinburgh, Keele University Press, 1997. 35. Among the theoretical analyses, the following deserve mention: Raimo Vyrynen (ed.), Policies for Common Security, London, Taylor & Francis, 1985; Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986; Richard Smoke, A Theory of Mutual Security, in idem and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), Mutual Security. A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations, pp. 59111, London, Macmillan, 1991; Kurt Gottfried et al., Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1989; Kurt Gottfried and Paul Bracken (eds.), Reforging European Security. From Confrontation to Cooperation, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1990; Janne Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1994. 36. On cooperation among adversaries see Helen Milner, Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 46696. Good examples of this tradition include Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 35778; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books, 1984; Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1990; Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, in Frankel (ed.), Realism, op. cit., (note 20), pp. 12263. On regimes see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982; Harald Mller, Die Chance der Kooperation. Regime in den inter nationalen B e z i e h u n g e n , Dar mstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993; Volker Rittberger (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford, Clarendon Paperbacks, 1995; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Vol. 55, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. On liberal institutionalism see Robert O. Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in idem (ed.), International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, pp. 120, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989; idem, Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 3951; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalism, London, Routledge, 1998. 37. Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, London, Macmillan, 1977; Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Hedley Bull on International Society, London, Macmillan, 2000; Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society, London, Routledge, 1992; Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School, London, Macmillan, 1998. 38. Bjrn Mller, Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; idem, Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on NonOffensive Defence, London, Brasseys Defence Publishers, 1991; idem, The Dictionary of Alternative Defense, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; or Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilitt. Bd. 3: Zu den militrischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfhigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988. 39. Egon Bahr and Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd. 2: Zu rechtlichen, konomischen, psychologischen und militrischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987; Dieter S. Lutz and Elmar Schmhling (eds.), Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Diskussion. Bd. 5: Beitrge und Dokumente aus Ost und West, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990.
Second round table 40. Cf. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 19191939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd edition 1946, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1964; Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshar es. The Pr oblems and Pr ogr ess of International Organization, 4th edition, pp. 2140, New York, Random House, 1984; George W. Downs, Beyond the Debate on Collective Security, in idem (ed.), Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, pp. 113, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1994; Charles Lipson, Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?, ibid., pp. 10531. 41. Dieter S. Lutz (ed.), Kollektive Sicherheit in und fr Europa: Eine Alternative? Beitrge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsprogrammatik. Pro und Contra, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1985; idem, Sicherheit 2000. Gemeinsame Sicherheit im bergang vom Abschreckungsregime zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und fr Europa, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991; Dieter Senghaas, Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990; Malcolm Chalmers, Beyond the Alliance System, World Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1990, pp. 21550; Robert C. Johansen, Lessons for Collective Security, ibid., Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 56174; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 11461; idem and idem, The Promise of Collective Security, ibid., Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 5261; Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a Changing World, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1993; Andrew Butfoy, Themes Within the Collective Security Idea, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 490510; Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stoll, Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 3359; Bjrn Mller, Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective Security, in Jrg Callie (ed.), Rstung Wieviel? Wozu? Wohin?, Loccumer Protokolle, No. 63/93, pp. 25190, Rehburg-Loccum, Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994; idem, UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1996, pp. 120. For a more sceptical view, see Richard K. Betts, Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 543; Mark T. Clark, The Trouble with Collective Security, Orbis, Vol. 39, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 23758; Josef Joffe, Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends, Survival, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 3650. 42. For an elaboration see Bjrn Mller, The Slippery Slope of Authority Eroded: A Rejoinder, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 8790; idem, The United States and the New World Order, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, Nos. 12, June and December 1998, pp. 77118. 43. Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy. The Indirect Approach, 2nd revised edition, 1967 reprint, New York, Signet Books, 1974. 44. Ernst Haas, International Political Communities, pp. 93110, New York, Anchor Books, 1966; Roger Hansen, Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts, in Michael Hodges (ed.), European Integration, pp. 18499, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972; Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1991, pp. 122. On the classics see Crauford D. Goodwin, National Security in Classical Political Economy, in idem (ed.), Economics and National Security. A History of Their Interaction, pp. 2335, Durham, Duke University Press, 1991; Doyle, op. cit. (note 26), pp. 23050. On the modern liberal peace theorem see, for example, Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade and War, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994. On complex interdependence, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown, 1977; and for a historical survey, Jaap de Wilde, Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1991. See also Hylke, Tromp, Interdependence and Security: the Dilemma of the Peace Research Agenda, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988, pp. 1518; Ernst B. Haas, War, Interdependence and Functionalism, in Raimo Vyrynen (ed.), The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States, pp. 10827, London, Sage, 1987; Katherine Barbieri, Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 2949; John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 195085, ibid., pp. 1128; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 19501985, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 26794. Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration, in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C.-G. Stubb (eds.), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, pp. 1112, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994. See also David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, ibid., pp. 7797. The classic work on security communities is Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, pp. 390, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957. On the EU project see Ole Wver, Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community, in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), Security Communities, pp. 69118, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; idem, Integration as Security: Constructing a Europe at Peace, in Charles Kupchan (ed.), Atlantic Security: Contending Visions, pp. 4563, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998. On zones of peace see Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky, The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, Chatham, N.J., Chatham House Publishers, 1993. The term stems from George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, New York, St Martins Press, 1998. See also William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1998.
57
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
58
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? 50. A contemporary example is Iraq. See Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear. The Politics of Modern Iraq, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1998. On the equation of Saddams cause with that of the nation, Arabism and even Islam see Ofra Bengio, Saddams Word. The Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 51. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and PeaceKeeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), United Nations, Divided World. The UNs Role in International Relations, new expanded edition, pp. 46898, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993. 52. Recent works about the possible modification, or even abandonment of the Westphalian order of sovereign states include J. A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, London, Edward Elgar, 1992; Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1996; Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995; Luis E. Lugo (ed.), Sovereignty at the Crossroads. Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1996; Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the SelfDetermination of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996. 53. On humanitarian intervention see, for example, Nigel Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London, Brasseys Defence Publishers, 1992; Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s. A New Logic of War, London, Routledge, 1992; Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds.), Foreign Military Intervention. The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, New York, Columbia University Press, 1992; Michael J. Mazarr, The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention, Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 15162; Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 1993, pp. 42950; Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998; John Williams, The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council and Yugoslavia, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 123. On Kosovo see the concluding chapter. 54. See, for example, Waltz, op. cit. (note 20), pp. 607; idem, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959. 55. Ole Wver, Societal Security: the Concept, in idem et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 1740 (quote from p. 23). See also Barry Buzan, Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization, ibid., pp. 4158. 56. Ole Wver, Identities, in Judit Balzs and Hkan Wiberg (eds.), Peace Research for the 1990s, pp. 13550, Budapest, Akadmiai Kiad, 1993; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwill, Revisiting the National, Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism, in idem and idem (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, pp. 10526, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Anthony D. Smith, The Formation of National Identity, in Henry Harris (ed.), Identity. Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford, pp. 12953, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995; Helena Lindholm, Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion, in idem (ed.), Ethnicity and Nationalism. Formation of Identity and Dynamics of Conflict in the 1990s, pp. 139, Gteborg, Nordnes, 1993; David Keithly, Security and Ersatz Identity, European Security, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 8096; Paul A. Kowert, National Identity: Inside and Out, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Winter 1998/Spring 1999, pp. 134; Iver B. Neumann, Identity and the Outbreak of War, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 3. No. 1, January 1998, pp. 722; Michael E. Williams, Identity and the Politics of Security, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1998, pp. 20425. 57. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. For a critique see Stephen Chan, Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilizations, Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997, pp. 13740; David A. Welch, The Clash of Civilizations Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon, Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, Summer 1997, pp. 197216; Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox, Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Dj Vu? Some Evidence, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 583608. 58. Ren tiemble, Parlez-vous Franglais?, Paris, Gallimard, 1973. See also Maxim Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation. Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France, London, Routledge, 1992; Ulla Holm, Det franske nationsbegrebs betydning for franske indvandrerdiskurser, forthcoming in Peter Seeberg (ed.), No Title, Odense, Odense Universitetsforlag, 2001. 59. See, for example, Mike Featherston, In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 5, Nos. 23, June 1988, pp. 195215; Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehr, The Postmodern Political Condition, Oxford, Polity Press, 1988. On (the lack of) postmodern ethics see Paul Saurette, I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, Millennium, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 128. For an attempted rebuttal of the charges against postmodernism see Jim George, Realist Ethics: International Relations and Postmodernism: Thinking Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic, ibid., Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 195223. 60. John A. Hall, Nationalisms, Classified and Explained, in Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions of Nationalism, pp. 833, Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995; Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction, Millennium, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1993, pp. 50545; Maurice Pearton, Notions in Nationalism,
Second round table Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996, pp. 115. On the Balkans see the concluding chapter. Heller and Fehr, op. cit. (note 59), p. 9. McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 6878. See, for example, Pierre Lellouche, Le nouveau monde. De lordre de Yalta au dsordre des nations, pp. 257305, Paris, Grasset, 1992. See, for example, Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 91126. Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal Security, in Wver et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 14866. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Averting Anarchy in the New Europe, International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Spring 1990, pp. 541; Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993; Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, A Council of Foreign Relations Book, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1995. On the societal security dilemma see Barry R. Posen, The Security Dilemma of Ethnic Conflict, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 2747; Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, New York, Columbia University Press, 1999; Paul Roe, The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as Tragedy, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, March 1999, pp. 183202. The image refers to the famous Russian wooden dolls: when you open the biggest one, a smaller appears, inside which is an even smaller, etc. On secession see Mortimer Sellers (ed.), The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-Determination of Peoples, Oxford, Berg, 1996; Antonio Cassese, SelfDetermination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Michael Freeman, The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1999, pp. 35570; Hudson Meadwell, Secession, States and International Society, ibid., pp. 37187; Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of Communal Strife, London, Routledge, 1992; Michael E. Brown (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1998. Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, London, Routledge, 1992; Luc Reychler, Religion and Conflict, International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 1938; Peter Janke (ed.), Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Europe and Asia, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1994. On Turkey see Metin Heper, Ayshe nc and Heinz Kramer (eds.), Turkey and the West. Changing Political and Cultural Identities, London, I. B. Tauris, 1993; Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey. The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000; Vojzech Mastiny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1996. On India see Partha Chatterjee, History and the Nationalization of Hinduism, in Vashuda Dalmia and Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.), Representing Hinduism. The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity, pp. 10328, New Delhi, Sage, 1995. On the Islamist threat to the Arab States see Laura Guazzone (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma. The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, Reading/New York, Ithaca Press, 1995. 72. Paul Rich, European Identity and the Myth of Islam, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1999, pp. 43552. See also Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lessler, A Sense of Siege. The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1995; Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, London, I. B. Tauris, 1996; Mohammed A. Muqtedar Khan, US Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology, Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 44962; Haifaa A. Jawad, Islam and the Threat: How Fundamental Is the Threat?, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 140, No. 4, August 1995, pp. 348; Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998; Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet. The Struggle for Islam, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1999; Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Broken Crescent. The Threat of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998; Scott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1997. 73. Lene Hansen, The Little Mermaids Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School, Millennium, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pp. 285306. In feminist circles the notion of male aggression seems to be fairly widespread. See, for example, Benina Berger Gould, Gender Psychology and Issues of War and Peace, in Knud S. Larsen (ed.), The Social Psychology of Conflict, pp. 2419, London, Sage, 1992; Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996; Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, pp. 408, London, Sage, 1997. On genderized security studies in general see also Terriff et al., op. cit. (note 10), pp. 8298; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Feminist Inquiry and International Relations, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory, pp. 7791, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1997; J. Ann Tickner, Feminist Perspectives on Security in a Global Environment, in Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin (eds.), Globalization, Insecurity, and the African Experience, pp. 4158, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1999. For a male perspective on the womans particular view of the world see Ken Booth, Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist, in Krause and Williams, op. cit. (note 17), pp. 83120, especially pp. 99101. 74. On human security as a concept see Astri Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests of States, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 26576; George MacLean, The Changing Perception of Human Security: Coordinating National and Multilateral Responses. The United Nations and the New Security Agenda, at www.unac.org/canada/security/ maclean.html; William T. Tow and Russell Trood, Linkages between Traditional Security and Human
59
61. 62. 63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
60
What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? Security, in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and InTaek Hyun (eds.), Asias Emerging Regional Order. Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, pp. 1332, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2000; Woosang Kim and In-Taek Hyum, Toward a New Concept of Security: Human Security in World Politics, ibid., pp. 3346; Peter Wilkin, Human Security and Class in a Global Economy, in Thomas and idem (eds.), op. cit. (note 73), pp. 2340; Caroline Thomas, Furthering the Debate on Human Security, ibid., pp. 17983; Agostinho Zacarias, Security and the State in Southern Africa, pp. 13960, London, I. B. Tauris, 1999; McSweeney, op. cit. (note 16), pp. 15272; Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival. Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity, pp. 13553 et passim, London, Earthscan, 1997; Ken Booth, Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1991, pp. 31326; idem, Human Wrongs and International Relations, International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 10326. See, for example, Carl Friedrich von Weizscker (ed.), Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhtung, 2nd edition, Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971; Horst Afheldt, Atomkrieg. Das Verhngnis einer Politik mit militrischen Mitteln, 2nd edition, Munich, dtv, 1987; Karl D. Bredthauer and Klaus Mannhardt (eds.), Es geht ums berleben. Warum wir die Atomraketen ablehnen, Cologne, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981; Henry Kendall, The Effects of a Nuclear War, in Hylke Tromp (ed.), War in Europe. Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives, pp. 3544, Aldershot, Gower Publishing Group, 1989; Robin Clarke (rapporteur), London Under Attack. The Report of the Greater London Area War Risk Study Commission, London, Basil Blackwell, 1986. Marcus Cheatham, War, Military Spending, and Food Security in Africa, in Norman A. Graham (ed.), Seeking Security and Development. The Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers, pp. 22953, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1994; Kwabena GyimahBrempong, Do African Governments Favor Defense in Budgeting?, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 191206; J. Paul Dunne and Nadir A. L. Mohammed, Military Spending in SubSaharan Africa: Some Evidence for 196785, ibid., Vol. 32, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 33143; K. Muepu, Defence Expenditures Reduction and the ReAllocation of Resources in Southern Africa with Specific Reference to South Africa, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol. 20, No. 1, May 1998, pp. 5890. On the general relationship between military spending and development see Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1988. For an analysis of the communitarian/cosmopolitan dichotomy, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory. New Nor mative Appr oaches, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in Max Lerner (ed.), Essential Works of John Stuart Mill, pp. 189248, New York, Bantam Books, 1963. See also Anthony Ellis, Utilitarianism and International Ethics, in Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions in International Ethics, pp. 15879, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. (Cambridge Studies in International Relations Series.) 79. Cf. Jean-Jacques Rosseau, Du contrat social, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1966. 80. Quotation from Hobbes, op. cit. (note 22), p. 186. 81. For example, Buzan, op. cit., 1991 (note 11), pp. 3556. 82. Ayoob, op. cit. (note 24); idem, The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective, in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States, pp. 6380 (quotation from p. 66), Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Brian L. Job, The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World, ibid., pp. 1135; Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States. Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Thomas G. Weiss and Maryl A. Kessler (eds.), Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1991; Holsti, op. cit. (note 24); Clapham, op. cit. (note 24); William I. Zartmann (ed.), Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1995; Ali A. Mazrui, The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa, in Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century, pp. 23344, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 1998,. 83. Taylor B. Seybolt, Major Armed Conflicts, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, pp. 1558; Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict, 198999, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 63550. See also Kalevi J. Holsti, International Theory and War in the Third World, in Job (ed.), op. cit. (note 82), pp. 3760; Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York, Free Press, 1991; Donald M. Snow, UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1996; Reno, op. cit. (note 49); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999; Bjrn Mller, The Faces of War, in Christian P. Scherrer and Hkan Wiberg (eds.), Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies, pp. 1534, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999. 84. Jacklyn Cock, The Cultural and Social Challenge of Demilitarization, in Gavin Cawthra and Bjrn Mller (eds.), Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa, pp. 11744, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997; Robert Chetty (ed.), Firearm Use and Distribution in South Africa, Pretoria, National Crime Prevention Centre, 2000; Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway House, Institute for Security Studies, 1999; Greg Mills and John Stremlau (eds.), The Privatisation of Security in Africa, Braamfontein, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999. 85. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation (1918), in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77128 (quote from p. 78), New York, Galaxy Books, 1958. 86. On the apartheid system in Gaza see Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip. The Political Economy of De-Development, Washington, D.C./London, Institute for Palestine Studies/I. B. Tauris, 1995. 87. Charlotte Bunch and Roxanne Carrillo, Global Violence against Women: The Challenge to Human
75.
76.
77.
78.
Second round table Rights and Development, in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani (eds.), World Security. Challenges for a New Century, 3rd edition, pp. 22948, New York, St Martins Press, 1998. On rape as a means of war see Mary Ann Ttreault, Justice for All: Wartime Rape and Womens Rights, Global Governance, Vol. 3, No. 2, MayAugust 1997, pp. 197212. See also the figures for rape in the Human Development Report 2000, New York, United Nations Development Programme, pp. 24751. 88. On centre-periphery relations see the works cited in note 7. On globalization see Michael Renner, The Global Divide: Socioeconomic Disparities and International Security, in Klare and Chandrani (eds.), op. cit. (note 87), pp. 27393; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997; Malcolm Waters, Globalization, London, Routledge, 1995; Jaan Art Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999; Roland Robertson, Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture, London, Sage, 1992; Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997; Nelson W. Keith, Reframing International Development. Globalism, Postmoder nity, and Difference, London, Sage, 1997; James H. Mittelman (ed.), Globalization. Critical Reflections, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1996; Anthony G. McGrew, Paul G. Lewis et al., Global Politics. Globalization and the Nation State, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992; Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.), Globalization. Theory and Practice, London, Pinter, 1996; Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization. A Critique, Oxford, Polity Press, 1999. 89. What he said, in an interview with Time was, among other things: If the scientists say that the virus is part of the variety of things from which people acquire immune deficiency, I have no problem with that. But to say that this is the sole cause and therefore the only response to it is anti-retroviral drugs, [then] well never be able to solve the AIDS problem. If you accept that there can be a variety of reasons, including poverty and the many diseases that afflict Africans, then you can have a more comprehensive treatment response. Quoted from the statement issued by the Presidents office, 10 September 2000, available at www.gov.za/president/index.html. 90. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987; Gro Harlem Brundtland, The Environment, Security and Development, SIPRI Yearbook 1993, pp. 1526; Richard H. Moss, Resource Scarcity and Environmental Security, ibid., pp. 2736. See also the articles by Gwyn Prins cited in note 18; Michael G. Renner, National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions, Worldwatch Paper, No. 89, Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute, 1989; Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations, pp. 11551 et passim, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992; Ernst U. von Weizscker, Erdpolitik. kologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt, 3rd, updated, edition, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992; Elise Boulding, States, Boundaries and Environmental Security, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application, pp. 194208, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993; Simon Dalby, Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of PostCold War Security Discourse, Alternatives, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 95134; Lothar Brock, Security Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion?, in Elise Boulding (ed.), New Agendas for Peace Research. Conflict and Security Reexamined, pp. 79102, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Patricia Mische, Security Through Defending the Environment: Citizens Say Yes!, ibid., pp. 10320; Ursula Oswald, Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World, pp. 1216. A good overview is Nina Grger, Review Essay: Environmental Security, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 10916. A good overview is Nils Petter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May 1998, pp. 381400. See, for example, Carl Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe, Foreign Affairs, Winter 198384, in William P. Bundy (ed.), The Nuclear Controversy. A Foreign Affairs Reader, pp. 11752, New York, New American Library, 1985; Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy and Walter Orr Roberts, The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984. Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 79112; Miriam R. Lowi, Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of Westbank Water, ibid., pp. 11338; Natasha Beschomer, Water and Instability in the Middle East, Adelphi Papers, No. 273, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992; Mary E. Morris, Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East, The Emirates Occasional Papers, No. 14, 1998; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1999; Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen, Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May 1998, pp. 299317; Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999; Mohamed Suliman (ed.), Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict, London, Zed Books, 1998. Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, London, UCL Press, 1992. See, for example, Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War. Japans Concept of Comprehensive National Security, Washington, D.C., Brasseys, 1984; Kurt R. Spillmann, 1989, Beyond Soldiers and Arms: the Swiss Model of Comprehensive Security Policy, in Joseph Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), Between the Blocs. Problems and Prospects for Europes Neutrals and Non-Aligned States, pp. 16174, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. See also Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice. Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1998. Hkan Wiberg, Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia, in Wver et al., op. cit. (note 11), pp. 93109; Paul Mojzes, Yugoslav Infer no. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans, passim, New York, Continuum Press, 1994.
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91.
92.
93.
94. 95.
96.
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What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? 97. For the distinction see John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Ethnicity, pp. 3256, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. 98. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, pp. 2159, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1996. 99. On the historical background see, for example, The Other Balkan Wars. A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections by George F. Kennan, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993. On the more recent background see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 19621991, 2nd edition, pp. 176213, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992. 100. See, for example, Ramet, op. cit., 1992 (note 99), pp. 13675; Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of its Demise, pp. 1023, London, Routledge, 1999; Vojin Dimitijevic, Disparity and Disintegration: The Economic Dimension of Yugoslavias Demise, in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (eds.), Yugoslavia, the Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region, pp. 75111, Washington, D.C./Geneva, Brookings Institution Press/United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995. 101. A good overview is Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds. Yugoslavias Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1995; and Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1995. 102. The EU played a special role in this connection, spearheaded by Germany. See Mario Zucconi, The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia, in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflicts in the Post-Communist World, pp. 23778, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1996; Stephanie Anderson, EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europes New Security Architecture, European Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 32853; Woodward, op. cit. (note 101), pp. 1839. 103. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in BosniaHerzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, passim, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1999. 104. Wolfgang Bierman and Martin Vadset (eds.), UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1998; Phillip Corvin, Dubious Mandate. A Memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995, Durham, Duke University Press, 1999; Elinor C. Sloan, Bosnia and the New Collective Security, Westport, Conn., Praeger Press, 1998. On Dayton and the aftermath see Pauline Neville-Jones, Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia, Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 199697, pp. 4565; David Chandler, Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton, 2nd edition, London, Pluto Press, 2000; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Bosnia, in Donald C. F. Daniel, Brad Hayes and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises, pp. 4178, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999; Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, pp. 12767, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, Former Yugoslavia, in James Mayall (ed.), The New Interventionism 19911994. United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, pp. 5993, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; Susan Woodward, Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End a Civil War, in Walter and Snyder (eds.), op. cit. (note 67), pp. 73145. On the background see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998; Greg Campbell, The Road to Kosovo. A Balkan Diary, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1999. Contrasting Serb and Albanian views are presented in Thanos Veremis and Evangeloss Kofos (eds.), Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War, Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, 2000. Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo. How Myths and Truths Started a War, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999. On the role of the media see Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman (eds.), Degraded Capability. The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, London, Pluto Press, 2000. Hannes Tretter, Stephan Mller and Violeta Demaj, Die Verfolgung der albanischen Volksgruppe im Kosovo, in Joseph Marko (ed.), Gordischer Knoten Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren?, pp. 12755, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999. Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. Politics in the 1990s, London, Hurst, 1999; Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia. Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999; Sonja Biserko, Serbia: Dictatorship, Implosion or Recovery, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 28990. For an unconvincing contrary opinion see Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo, London, Pluto Press, 1999. Elmar F. Pichl, Die albanische Frage in Mazedonien, in Marko, op. cit. (note 108), pp. 5773. Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure. NATOs War Against Yugoslavia, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999, pp. 28; Bjrn Mller, The UN, the USA and NATO. Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo, Working Papers, No. 23/1999, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999. For a more positive assessment see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. OHanlon, Winning Ugly. NATOs War to Save Kosovo, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000; Ansgar Rieks and Dieter Weigold, Der Kosovo-Konflikt eine militrpolitische Auswertung, in Joachim Krause (ed.), Kosovo. Humanitre Intervention und Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, pp. 1354, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2000; Bernhard Pfoh, Eine Bilanz des Luftkrieges der NATO gegen Jugoslawien, ibid., pp. 5588; Daniel A. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring 2000, pp. 538. Eric A. Witte, Der Wideraufbau des Kosovo: die ethnische Dimension, in Krause (ed.), op. cit. (note 112), pp. 16984. Johannes Varwick, Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg: Ein berforderter Stabilittsanker?, in Krause (ed.), op. cit. (note 112), pp. 185200.
105.
106. 107.
108.
109.
110.
111. 112.
113.
114.
THIRD ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Latin America and the Caribbean
Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO Lecturers: Mr Alejandro Bendaa, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) Santiago, Chile General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay
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Peace, human security and the democratic deficit in Central America
PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

by Mr Alejandro Bendaa, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua
1. Introduction Human security, in the post-war Central American context, must above all take the form of the consolidation of peace if the ending of war is to give way to the beginning of justice. The human security challenge in this respect has come to be known as postconflict peace-building. According to the United Nations Agenda for Peace, post-conflict peace-building consists of action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.1 In Central America, as in other parts of the world, concepts such as human security and peace-building were employed to draw attention to the specific character of post-Cold-War conflicts, post-war settings, and international responses appropriate to them. However, it was not always clear whether such terms were intended to be more descriptive than analytical. In the absence of such analysis, definitions and methodologies, their utility in dealing with the complexities of post-war Central America was questionable. Nearly eight years after the El Salvador peace agreements and four after the settlement in Guatemala, the question is whether these countries are able to make the profound kind of transformations put forward in ambitious peace-accord packages. There are differences between the two countries, as there are differences with Nicaragua where the peace settlement took the form of the February 1990 election and a quietly negotiated transition thereafter. In Guatemala and El Salvador, the principal accomplishment was the apparent consensus on an understanding of peace not only as the cessation of hostilities, but also as addressing the principal problems that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. In Nicaragua, a similar consensus came about as regards maintaining many of the basic changes undertaken as the result of the Sandinista Revolution, while reversing some of its undemocratic features. In this respect, one could argue that many elements of the human security agenda were already contained in the political settlements of the three countries:
democratization and human rights; strengthening civilian authority and defining the role of the army in a democratic setting; reforming the constitution and electoral system; addressing socio-economic problems, including land reform; resettlement and reintegration of the demobilized and displaced; incorporation of armed dissidents into political life. Much has been accomplished as regards civil and political rights. The restoration of civilian rule has greatly diminished the systemic state-sponsored abuses of the past. Questions remain, however, about the subordination of the armed forces in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as Honduras, and to a lesser degree in Nicaragua. The militarys realm of political action was greatly circumscribed, but it has retained much of its autonomy intact. Progress as regards the judiciary system remains limited. Police reform in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is in its infancy, and impartiality is severely questioned.
2. The new violence 2.1. Direct violence Violence and crime are surfacing as seemingly insurmountable problems. El Salvador has the highest murder rate in the world: an average of 120 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Deaths through violent crime for 1996 are estimated to be 8,200, while 15,000 people were wounded by criminal violence. This represents a ratio which, if it continues over the next nine years, will mean that crime will have claimed more than the 100,000 victims 25 per cent more known to have been killed during the twelve years of the war. In Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, polls reveal that common crime is the top public concern. The impact of this crime wave on human rights and human security is undeniable. Anti-crime legislation and policies designed to deal with crime do not always meet international standards for judicial processes or police accountability.
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Peace has thus not been achieved at the level of everyday life for most citizens. Violence has taken on a more social and multifaceted expression than the polarized political violence of the 1980s. Cultures and structures of violence are not vanquished in peace settlements; they must be uprooted over time, and across public and private life. For example, womens organizations have noted a rise in domestic violence throughout Central America, which they link to the impact of peace and unemployment on young men who have spent most of their youth fighting. A 1997 study from the Inter-American Development Bank showed that some 52 per cent of women in Managua had experienced some type of abuse in their homes: psychological, physical or sexual. 2.2. Economic violence The statistics tell a grim story. Between onethird and one-half of urban dwellers and about two-thirds of rural dwellers in Central America live in poverty. According to United Nations figures, in Nicaragua 47.9 per cent of the population lives in poverty, including 17.3 per cent in extreme poverty. In the rural areas the figures are 68.5 per cent and 28.3 per cent, respectively. Fifty per cent of children living under conditions of poverty do not go to school. Half of all children who abandon school do so for economic reasons. There is no access to potable water for 35 per cent of the population. Over 30 per cent of poor children and almost 40 per cent of extremely poor children are malnourished, compared with 12 per cent of non-poor children. Poor children under 5 years of age are particularly affected by chronic malnutrition, up to 36 per cent among the extremely poor. Although on an overall basis the surveys indicate that chronic malnutrition has declined since 1993, it has increased by 45 per cent among the urban poor and 30 per cent among the extremely poor. The worst levels of chronic malnutrition are reported in the north and central parts of Nicaragua, where nearly half of the extremely poor children suffer from this condition. A similar story can be told for Guatemala, where 75 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, or for Honduras (50 per cent) and El Salvador (48 per cent). 2.3. Globalized violence A human security programme must also take account of economic policies that perpetuate poverty. The priority given by the donor community to structural adjustment programmes after peace accords is interpreted by elites and the
public as signals that economic liberalization and privatization are more important than peacebuilding and human security concerns. National governments are not blameless, yet each claims that its hands are tied by the nature of the regions insertion into the global economy. The G7 and their multilateral economic organizations appear unwilling to make substantive concessions in the form of real debt cancellation or preferential trading arrangements for poor countries, including those recovering from war. This means, for example, that in Nicaragua only 11 per cent of the government budget is allocated to education, while 25 per cent goes towards debt payments.
3. Peace education as global education Human security is a precondition not an outcome of development. Economic policies that favour growth over equity and human development are not only analytically questionable, they are undemocratic. The human security agenda should require the development advocacy networks to push for modification in external assistance policies, particularly for war and post-war economies, to accelerate the reduction in foreign debt, and to support small-scale producers, particularly in the countryside. The value of a human security agenda lies partly in exposing the hypocrisy of governments extolling peace and democracy while at the same time imposing economic policies that increase the suffering and exclusion of millions of people. Human security entails worrying less about formal democracy and more about real democracy, understood as equal access to basic economic, social and cultural rights for the majority of the population, along with the recognition of, and if need be reparation for, historical injustice.
4. Conclusions and recommendations Ten years after the end of the war in Nicaragua, eight in El Salvador and four in Guatemala, a negative peace prevails in the region. Despite considerable external cooperation and international attention, the human security picture is not positive. Poverty and violence are everyday features of life for most Central Americans. To be sure, there are new political openings and peaceful electoral transitions. State reform and modernization is on the agenda, while non-governmental organizations are energetically working to ensure a voice for women and indigenous communities. The sum of local efforts to build socio-economic justice is however outweighed by the effects of an unfavourable global
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economic and political context. A key challenge takes the form of what has been termed civil society strengthening to compensate for state and institutional weakness, yet to do so in a way that is not disproportionately dependent on externally funded projects. The human security agenda must forcefully engage what others prefer to evade. We refer here to the perceived post-war need for national reconciliation, on the one hand, and the human rights imperative to counteract impunity and ensure justice to victims, on the other. Lately the United Nations, driven by Security Council orientations, seems to be acting as if there is an unavoidable tension between human rights and peace. The result in these cases is continuing impunity. If the human security agenda means anything, it is that the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law are nonnegotiable. The El Salvador and Guatemala experiences point to the danger of UN operations being perceived as prepared to sacrifice human rights for a short-term political deal falsely labelled peace. Many international actors and national political figures would prefer to pretend that the basic conflicts have been resolved, and that development as usual is back. Such reasoning is not acceptable. The human security agenda in Central America is first and foremost about social, economic and cultural rights. The educational and organizational challenge is how to better link the struggle for these
rights with civil and political rights, and to do so in a way that is not exclusively state-centred. Education is one answer. But let us not be naive as to the nature of the playing field. Awareness is one thing and implementation quite another, especially in poor countries still characterized by extreme (and growing) inequality and weak democratic traditions. International financial institutions and likeminded bureaucrats will argue that social and economic rights the human security and peacebuilding agenda have to be postponed: that they must be temporarily sacrificed in order to allow the correct application of pro-growth neoliberal economic policies. In this scheme of affairs, foreign investors should not be intimidated by overly zealous communities defending land rights, working women demanding better conditions in sweatshop factories, or labour unions resisting the privatization of public-sector enterprises and social-security schemes. Human security cannot be negotiated away in the name of peace, peace process, or economic reform and macro-economic stability. The macroeconomic and macro-political cannot be exclusive of the macro-social and macro-ethical. Therefore, a human security matrix will recognize and act upon the potential conflict between macro-economic requirements upheld by international financial institutions and donors (including UN donors) and economic rights and opportunities for people.
NOTES
1. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 17 June 1992. (UN doc. A/47/277S/24111.) Available at http://www.un.org.Docs/SG/agpeace.html
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Human security:An academic perspective from Latin America
HUMAN SECURITY: AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE FROM LATIN AMERICA

by Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) Santiago, Chile
1. Introduction At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the people have begun to take centre stage in the international system. This is a strategic change in perception. Today we recognize the origins of this change, in the implementation of which states and organizations of civil society must contribute simultaneously. Countries with similar perspectives seek to place human security as a pivot of international peace, governability and international cooperation in this new century. This innovative international approach will develop a new security agenda and a new perspective for global and regional actions. The idea that human rights are a value that should be preserved, and that they should take precedence over other rights, has been present since the birth of international public law. The Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria (14801546), in a work published in 1532, demonstrated that from the point of view of international law, action must be taken against those countries denying their citizens fundamental rights. Humanitarianism has been an essential source of international law in the past five hundred years, existing even before the Peace of Westphalia and inter-state order in 1648.1 With the end of the Cold War and the process of globalization, opportunities have increased for cooperation in the international system and in diverse subregions. The communication revolution, the new wave of democracies worldwide, and the phenomenon of globalization have contributed to universalizing the values and principles established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The promotion and respect of this charter require closer association and cooperation. An approach to global politics from the human interest perspective, as developed by Mel Gurtov, allows the differentiation of values from various theoretical perspectives.2 Realist theory looks at international phenomena, emphasizing conflicts and competitiveness, which means that cooperation among the different actors is not measured appropriately. The corporate-globalist transnational perspective
emphasizes the economic aspects and the hegemony of a production model and division of labour of a capitalist nature. However, if these are the rules of the game ensuring general preservation, they are seen as a zero-sum game in comparison with other values. In the absence of shared values, both the realist and the corporate-globalist perspectives emphasize competitiveness as the basis of conflict and permanent rivalry. Looking at the world from a new perspective, with a global-humanist projection, emphasizes different values. The need for a more holistic perspective means asking the central question: who speaks for the planet? Approaching international relations from another angle means thinking about them as matters for the people. With this focus it is possible to relate diverse problems to new priorities. The main priority is necessarily peace, which is directly associated with social and economic justice, political justice, human governance and the common responsibility for an ecological balance. All these priorities are expressed through multiple alternative emphases in terms of the values they seek to promote. Table 1 compares the main values promoted by those who support each theory. Conditions currently exist to establish an international coalition of states and organizations of civil society that could support and advance initiatives aimed at increasing human security and placing people at the centre of international security. This would be primarily achieved through the perfecting of a new international law to ensure peace and governability and the advancement of positive incentives. In this respect, we take the perspective outlined at the Lysen meeting of the Human Security Network, according to which an innovative international approach will be needed to address the sources of insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the recurrence of threats which affect the daily lives of millions of people.3 The academic role is fundamental to this endeavour. The experience of FLACSO-Chile, especially through its Peace and Security in the Americas
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Table 1: Alternative values to major theories

Realist Institutional Bargaining Influence Mission Control Alliance system Hegemony National mission Protectionism Intervention System-maintaining Power blocs Corporate-Globalist Access Hierarchy Influence Consumption Capitalism Global culture Equal interdependence Laissez-faire Integration System-maintaining Liberal order Global-Humanist Accountability Management Equal opportunity Decentralization Basic need Interdependence International regimes One world International law System-transforming World order
Norms
Structure
Source: Mel Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 256.
Program, demonstrates the importance of dialogue between academics, civil and military functionaries and other key actors in the analysis of this new international context and the formulation of recommendations to advance stability and develop peace. Their participation contributes to transparency of action and defines the terms of cooperation. In addition, it could help to identify specific problems related to the application of confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the academic role in Track Two diplomacy is crucial for positive development (as shown by recent experience of border problems between Ecuador and Peru). The building of common perspectives in the multilateral sphere, the support of states with similar political and social perspectives, plus a solid theoretical foundation, create the potential for new global public goods required for international security and the sustainable development of the planet. In other words, a fresh opportunity to construct linked international regimes, organized from a new perspective of international relations in which civil society and human beings increasingly occupy a relevant place. We do not need new laws, we need to institutionalize the existing ones. We need to develop a more comprehensive and global outlook on international security a holistic perspective capable of illustrating the direct interrelation between security, development and peace. This becomes clearer when we consider democratic political systems. Evidence exists that democratic regimes tend to maintain peaceful and demilitarized relations. War is therefore an unusual phenomenon among democratic political regimes. Yet there are exceptions. Nevertheless, if we also take into consideration the international regimes linking the capitalist democracies of the West, war has disappeared from the
regions future perspective. To this region should be added a group of countries which is growing in significance the Latin American countries. The combination of democratic political systems, cooperative multilateralism and common international regimes allow them to achieve and maintain peace in an efficient manner. Ensuring stability and peace makes it possible to adequately satisfy the growing demand for human security. Without inter-state security, citizens run the highest risks, producing a change in the conceptualization of international security.
2. Security: a concept in transition An important tendency is revealed when moving from a zero-sum paradigm to a paradigm which, while taking into account the importance of power, attempts to find possible solutions through cooperation.4 In this respect, the theory of international regimes is continually growing in significance and weight. The new paradigm is essentially founded in persuasion and in inducing achievements in a multilateral framework. From an operational point of view, prevention systems (preventive diplomacy), crisis prevention and early-warning systems are crucial. As interdependence plays a crucial role, cooperation and integration are also substantial elements. The plan of action reaffirms the multilateral search for solutions. Regimes will thus have a proactive character, given that their key elements are prevention, early warning, and the joint search for solutions. Security is a controversial concept, the conceptual definition and delimitation of which are the result of political processes. Security for some may mean insecurity for others. The same reality is perceived and communicated from different positions. Security
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is also an elusive concept, embedded in a broad category that transcends military issues and has nonmilitary aspects. Security must be understood in its social, historical, cultural and geographical context. During the Cold War, security concepts were broached from the perspective of the state or from considerations linked to state security and the militarization of international relations. Post-Cold-War, a new dimension of human security has made a forceful appearance as a key concept of a world in transition.5 Both perspectives have been seen as controversial, although both should have the welfare of human beings as their goal. The intellectual challenge, which is also an institutional and operational challenge, lies in the linking and associating of concepts from a human security standpoint and projecting these concepts into international security, including state security. Every area of security theory involves a chain of concepts that must be linked. In this way, international security is linked to multilateralism, state security to national sovereignty, and human security to governability and development. These three spheres must be articulated and related more efficiently. The complexity of the new reality and the new agenda cannot be comprehended by traditional concepts of international security. The response of some actors is to expand the concept of international security, situating the context of security issues at various levels (military, economic, social), hindering practical operability and the development of specific actions. The main threat in this respect is that social, economic and other policies will become militarized. The concept of international security must be centred primarily on issues related to war and peace. International security clings to the question of force: how to contain it, stop it, restrict it and occasionally threaten to use it or actually use it. This takes into account the conditions that reinforce or weaken organized violence in international affairs and the conduct of all types of military activity. In the postCold-War era, international security has to be repositioned at the core of the nature of conflict, as well as the use of force.6 The different regions and countries of the world have priorities that are important for sustaining life or avoiding threats to it, but they are not all security issues. Moreover, security is not necessarily at the top of all agendas. Everything tends to be securitized, therefore responses of a military nature, or those of bureaucracies dealing with organized violence, take priority. The emphasis changes when considering the trilogy of human security, state security and international security, depending on the scenario. In the majority of cases, the weight will fall upon state security, because the state continues to be the main international actor and the one that has the greatest
resource strength. Also, because the demands of civil society for the mandatory requirements of human security are voiced and implemented by the state, the latter has to meet the demands. In turn, international stability is threatened by multilateral alternatives in which the state is the actor issuing recommendations and solutions. For several geographical regions, mainly in Africa, the centre of gravity may be international security and its main actors, i.e. the reaction of the international system to a governance crisis in fragile or semi-defunct nations. Sovereignty is a closely related concept. In a globalized world, in addition to referring to the capacity of unilateral definition in a determined territory, sovereignty corresponds to the responsibility that the politicians and citizens of a territory should demonstrate towards themselves and towards humanity as a whole. Sovereignty in the globalized world represents national, as well as international, responsibility. It can thus be argued that if inter-state relations are demilitarized, and if basic intrinsic distrust that is perceived as a threat can be resolved, it should be possible to coordinate policies and foster international collaboration on security matters. The greater the global stability, the better that inter-state relations will focus on and attach priority to the resolution of the demands of human security. These demands are structurally connected to the solution of development problems. The effort of concentrating on a specific agenda avoids overstating the concept of security and the consequent militarization of all issues affecting human life. The human security agenda includes a wide variety of issues, such as natural disasters, racism, peace education, refugees, cooperation for development, natural resources, sustainable development, equity, small arms, child soldiers and war-affected children, landmines, International Criminal Court, ecological sustainability, etc. The breadth of these issues makes it difficult to generate policies that would have a significant impact on the international environment, hence the need to discover a means of expression that will give consistency and coherence to the concept of security. In my opinion, this continues to be the use of force. Many life or death problems affecting a large part of the population are linked to the use of force, whether because the state does not have a monopoly over violence or because of its inability to construct a demilitarized order. Establishing goals and objectives, in terms of international/global and regional public goods, facilitates the effective articulation and promotion of comprehensive agendas such as that outlined above. Intra-state problems are a central characteristic of the new international conflicts, highlighting the need to articulate more accurately the three different levels
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of the concept of security. Also, the growing presence of transnational phenomena (international mafias, terrorists and so on) that use force but do not have the capacity to pose strategic threats to the state, needs to be addressed in order to design coordination mechanisms and policies incorporating traditional non-military dimensions in the use of force. This implies new means of prevention. The current historical period facilitates the construction of new forms of association and international cooperation. Coalitions established on the basis of cooperative multilateralism help to reach the renewed goals of peace and international security. The Americas constitute a zone of peace. In the last decade substantive advances have occurred through inter-state links, as evidenced by the developments of diplomacy in the framework of the Summits of the Americas.7 In fact, one of the sections of the Second Summit (1998) action plan is dedicated to encouraging trust and security between states. In this section the participating governments are instructed to develop and bring to completion a series of specific measures in order to consolidate peace and stability in the region. To this end they entrusted a series of tasks to the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the setting up of a special conference on international security.8 The consensus on a common conceptual framework and the implementation of policies in areas of mutual trust, transparency, and cooperation will require the creation of specific follow-up mechanisms. In this respect, foundations have been outlined for the construction of a System of International Functional Regimes in Matters of International Security. Similarly, systems must be created in the other areas of concordance indicated by the heads of state and governments in the Americas. Some important deficiencies should be recognized, however, as manifested by civil wars, transnational crime, lack of governability, and the difficulty of confronting these non-military challenges in the international and domestic spheres. The academic community could make a great contribution here through its capacity to observe and contribute to early-warning measures; bring together actors from different sectors to participate and generate confidence; design alternatives and options. The main problem for the academic community is the lack of resources to facilitate the development of sustained perspectives, the experience of which could be transferred to other parts of the world.
emergencies. Rather than humanitarian intervention, I prefer humanitarian action. That is to say, the preventive capacity to protect peoples lives and their security. The most important goal is to create the conditions where events and crises affecting security can be foreseen. The Human Security Network represents positive action in the international multilateral environment. In the Declaration of the Second Ministerial Meeting of this Network the goal to promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and to strengthen the rule of law and good governance was highlighted. Participants recognized the need to foster a culture of peace, including the peaceful resolution of conflicts, to control the instruments of violence and to end impunity in case of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Ministers and representatives recognized that threats to human security differ from one region of the world to another, as do the resources available to meet these threats. Network governments would work to build, over time, a wider consensus on human security at the global level, and, at the same time, would promote regional approaches and flexible frameworks for cooperation. They emphasized the importance of an inclusive and transparent approach.9 Coming back to the use of force as a conductive thread in human security, two issues are particularly relevant: the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the role of non-state actors in armed conflicts. 3.1. Light weapons Latin America has taken substantial and significant steps towards the banning and control of small arms and light weapons. In the last few years, the countries of this region, on the basis of regional political cooperation in the Rio Group,10 decided upon a series of initiatives. A commission was set up on the auto-limitation of armaments and control of illicit arms trafficking. Substantive advances were made at a meeting in Cancun, Mexico, in March 1997. The accords were formulated into a proposition of the convention at the Rio Group Summit of Asuncin, Paraguay, in August 1997. The negotiations that followed were brought to a successful conclusion and approved by the OAS, culminating in the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and other Related Materials, 13 November 1997.11 The region has also made significant progress concerning transparency in the matter of conventional armaments. Of particular significance is the Inter-American Convention of Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions, which was approved on 7 June 1999.12
3. The human security agenda The human security agenda is associated with the ability to prevent, act and react to humanitarian
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Important accords have also been reached on the issues of international security, terrorism, and mutual confidence-building measures at both the Summit of Miami (Florida, USA) in 1994 and that of Santiago (Chile) in 1998. It is of special significance that the heads of state suggested calling extraordinary conferences to analyse the concept of security. These will provide an opportunity to present and apply the new conceptualizations of security emerging from the Lysen Network. It is also important to note that the Central American countries have signed The Central American Democratic Security Treaty,13 and that the members of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), along with Chile and Bolivia, have declared a zone of peace. Despite these important advances, some deficiencies remain. In terms of state security, several border delineation issues have yet to be resolved. These conflicts threaten international security, as shown by the crisis between Ecuador and Peru throughout the 1990s. Nicaragua and Honduras are other examples of states with territorial issues pending. Similarly, in the domestic sphere, civil wars threaten security and state viability, endangering international security as well as that of the state in question. Both of these spheres affect human security. The internal conflict in Colombia has had serious consequences, including changes in Colombias relationship with neighbouring countries, an increase in militarization in the region, and damage to civil society. The conflict has spilled over into other countries in the region. The central issue concerning human security and the possible use of force in Latin America is linked from a political point of view to a lack of democracy, from an economic point of view to inequality, and from a social point of view to discrimination. The lack of democratic culture and of pacific resolution of conflict increases the potential for the use of force in the region. The illegal trafficking of arms also has a negative effect on the chances of resolution. In the twenty-first century, domestic conflicts are also international conflicts, even more so when we place humanity at the centre of international action. The international system needs to generate multiple types of action before, during, and after conflicts. Focusing on each situation allows more appropriate action to be taken to positively influence the mitigation of conflict. The role of academia is very important at each of these stages. Academic institutions have the capacity to generate early-warning measures in the pre-conflict stages. During a conflict they
can suggest negotiated solutions and alternative methods of resolving conflict. At the post-conflict stage, they can help to design mechanisms to ensure governability. The following suggestions could be addressed at this multilateral forum in the perspective of integrating the question of light weapons within a broader policy: Exchange foreign debt for light weapons. Set up an international financial endowment to buy arms in pre- and post-conflict situations. Support the improvement of capacities to control the entry and distribution of light weapons. Explore technological developments, especially satellite technology, which allow greater levels of cooperation worldwide. New questions should be raised on how to develop accountability in a free market context. Cooperate in the exchange of laws and effective experience. Develop a culture of peace that gives a key role to negotiation and pacific resolution of conflict. Draw up an international code of conduct for states and companies related to the weapons trade. Without such a code, it is impossible to effect monitoring, sanctions or embargoes. 3.2. Non-state actors in armed conflicts Post-Seattle, The Economist referred to the presence of a non-governmental order.14 We live in a world that is becoming increasingly complex through the variety of actors and the different relationships that they establish. The most diverse powers are to be found among the nonstate actors. Some are very positive, such as the Red Cross, and are key factors in the protection of human security. But terrorist organizations are also acting internationally to cause grave damage to human and international security. This complex subject requires effective measures to avoid the escalation of a conflict because of non-state actors relation to it. All conflicts are simultaneously international and national today. Our fundamental guiding principles here should aim to promote a monopoly on the use of force by the main actor at both international and state levels. The dispersion of capacities and mechanisms of force increases opportunities for non-state actors to use force, and thus increases opportunities for human rights violations. Governance is the key. Governance means greater transparency, greater participation and greater accountability. We need to know more about the national and subregional contexts of conflict. With the
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end of the Cold War we need a more complete interpretation. We need to know why force is used. Poverty is not a sufficient explanation. In this respect there is a certain vision of the future in which cultural tradition is important. If this vision is incorporated appropriately, it could be an important element in the protection of human rights. Cultural traditions related to human rights and the use of force are important to understand the actions of different actors. The cultural aspect is closely related to the dominance of law and the establishment of effective national norms in accordance with international law. The cultivation of a culture of pacific conflict resolution completes our guiding principles. Each region has its own cultural perspective. We need to include these in a global perspective. One of the leading risks to the international system is to become involved with non-state actors that use belligerent force in the explicit or implicit sense. To avoid this risk, the space for dialogue generated by the academic arena and nongovernmental organizations is fundamental. It is through Track Two diplomacy that greater participation and transparency of the actors involved in this process will occur, a process that has as its principal objective respect for humanitarian law, human rights, and the search for alternatives to military conflict. The academic world can assist this process by providing more information, new interpretations, and a space for the dialogue of politics and diplomacy. International humanitarian action is always urgent in character, but it must be balanced with a perspective of support and cooperation for long-term development. Otherwise, stabilization will not be possible and crises will recur. The joint work of civil society (nongovernmental and academic organizations) with multilateral and intergovernmental organizations facilitates the creation of a space for generating efficient alternatives to protect the security of all humanity.
4. Cooperative multilateralism Effective cooperative policies are developed in the multilateral arena. This is where it is possible to give policies a fresh opportunity when violence appears. Multilateralism allows the creation of spaces for negotiation and opportunities for diplomacy. Building these multilateral spaces is essential. The trust they offer allows the timely development of jointly attainable goals. Even in extreme situations, it is possible to
present human rights as a significant factor in the (state or non-state) actors relationships. Without multilateralism, opportunities for cooperation are reduced and the costs of human security are increased; and multilateralism is compromised as a basic principle that orders and regulates rights. As a fundamental objective, multilateralism has had to resolve the basic anarchy in the relations among central actors. In the framework of multilateralism, agreement has been reached on the basic rules and norms allowing cohabitation, thus reducing conflict and promoting cooperation. International law effectively exemplifies this. We are moving from a strategic-state multilateralism towards one of another kind, a societalstate multilateralism, and although still disarticulated and disinstitutionalized, it will take precedence in the future. We are faced with an international society in the midst of an emergency. In this new multilateralism, the reduction of sovereignty and the permeability of the nation-state are expressed in all environments, the most obvious being matters of finance and human rights. National sovereignty ceases to exist, in the state sense, as we advance towards a world where access to various means of communication and trade is becoming easier. Values, in particular those of Western origin, have a decisive influence. We are experiencing the rise of a transnational civil society with distinct forms, strengths and interests. A segmented and asymmetric global framework, which combines multilateralism in some dimensions with strong monopolization in others, such as the armed forces. The traditional multilateral system is in crisis; a crisis expressed in the United Nations, in the OAS, and in the Organization of African Unity. The parliamentary-based international system is in crisis and seeks to be replaced by an ad hoc diplomacy. This is often exhausted by photo opportunities without adopting actual, concrete decisions. We should therefore advance towards an effective cooperative multilateralism. Multilateralism can change the reality of the international system and domestic politics. It is the only instrument capable of generating decisions that go beyond the states that compose the organization. How can one build such an association? It is a human creation and therefore depends on the political will of the individuals or organizations that develop it. Without shared values a political consensus is impossible, and without a consensus there will be no coordinated action; an institutional reality will not exist. The recognition and promotion of shared values allow for the design and creation of an international public well-being and a global public well-being. This is the main task of the twenty-first century.15 This will allow the objectives of the United Nations to be fulfilled.
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Global problems, especially those referred to in the new agenda (matters of finance, the environment, drugs, migration, natural resources and quality of life) cannot be tackled by unilateral politics. No state can resist their impact alone, action on a world scale is required.16 The development of a cooperative multi-
lateralism and the corresponding political determination will allow a new architecture and new international institutions to be built. The special task of the global system and regional groups is to envision international well-being and an institutional system capable of putting it into practice.
NOTES
1. Alfred Verdross, Derecho internacional pblico, Madrid, Editorial Aguilar, 1955. 2. Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 3. Chairmans Summary, A Perspective on Human Security, Lysen (Norway), 20 May 1999. The Human Security Network comprises the governments of Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand. 4. Danny Ertel, Negociacin 2000, Colombia, McGraw Hill, 1996. 5. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York, United Nations Development Programme, 1994. 6. Lawrence Freedman, International Security: Changing Targets, Foreign Policy, No. 110, Spring 1998. 7. Francisco Rojas-Aravena (ed.), Cooperacin y seguridad internacional en las Amricas, Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999; idem, Globalizacin, Amrica Latina y la diplomacia de cumbres, Santiago, FLACSOChile/Latin American and the Caribbean Centre (LACC), 1998. 8. Action Plan, Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago (Chile), April 1998. 9. Chairmans Summary, Human Security Network Second Ministerial Meeting, Lucerne (Switzerland), 1112 May 2000. 10. The Rio Group is a mechanism to reach common positions on significant subjects for Latin America at the
11. 12. 13. 14.
15.
16.
regional or global levels. Founder members in 1986 were Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Mexico (the former Contadora Group), as well as Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The Group expanded to include Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and one representative each from the Central American and Caribbean countries. At the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1999, the Group resolved to incorporate as members in full standing Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/inter_amer_firearms.html Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/fs_000622_transparency.html Available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ bureau_pm/csbm/cadst.html The World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, USA, November/December 1999, witnessed unprecedented public demonstrations against the policies, practices and organizational set-up of the global trading body. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York, United Nations Development Programme/Oxford University Press, 1999. Informe Desarrollo Humano 1999, New York, United Nations Development Programme/Mundi Prensa Libros, 1999. (Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a Human Face.)
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The principal challenges to the promotion of human security in Latin America and the Caribbean
THE PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
by General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay
1. Introduction Bearing in mind the time and framework allocated to this meeting, I would like to express some reflections and proposals that I hope will be constructive for the participants and contribute to cooperation on specific projects. First, I will briefly attempt to describe the institution that I am honoured to head; explain why we have integrated with UNESCOs Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme and mention some of the activities developed therein; discuss the theme for which we are here today; and conclude with some proposals. The Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN) of Uruguay, is a postgraduate studies institute run by the Ministry of Defence. It was established in 1976 to allow both civilian and military professionals to study assessment, planning and management within the national strategy arena. The CALEN provides a calm environment for study where absolute academic freedom prevails, together with the teachers right to instruct and investigate without government intervention or compromise while respecting the law of the state. My presentation today is my personal opinion and does not represent the position of my country nor that of the institute. Turning to my second point, I must offer special thanks to UNESCO for the opportunity to found a National Committee of the MOST Programme, thus widening our horizons in joining with UNESCO in the intellectual task of contributing to peace through the application of the social sciences, promoting security through education, science, technology, social communications, computer technology and culture. We are taking part in this initial experiment in order to commemorate fifty years of UNESCO in Uruguay. We began with a meeting on 7 December 1999 at the CALEN on the theme Human Security and Development at the Beginning of the 21st Century, attended by well-known figures from Argentina, Brazil, UNESCO and our own country. This year, all the activities of the institute were focused on the theme Civil Security for a Culture of
Peace and its Importance in Human Development, analysing thirty-one research projects and a DELPHI poll. This work will be presented at a seminar scheduled for December 2000, and the results of the poll, some of which I have with me today, will be published shortly. UNESCOs 20002001 budget refers to innovations in education for a culture of peace. The year 2000 was one of innovation for the CALEN, the results of which will be presented at the meeting in Montevideo to which you are all invited. Our country, Uruguay, has contributed to world peace through missions in different continents over the years: Chaco Boreal, 1935; Sinai, 1981; Iran-Iraq, 1988; Honduras-Nicaragua, 1988; Cambodia, 1992; Mozambique, 1993; Liberia, 1993; Rwanda, 1994; Georgia, 1994; Angola, 1995. It is one of the countries that, relative to the size of its population, has made the greatest efforts towards world peace. The theme of human security has been studied and developed in depth by the MOST Programme since its creation in 1993, and for this reason we are honoured to participate. Returning to the theme of this meeting, I think that some concepts need to be clarified because the same words, thoughts or concepts may mean different things to different people.
2. Basic concepts There is no doubt that the concepts of security and defence are intimately connected. However, this interrelation does not imply a single entity. If a national defence policy corresponds to that of the political representatives of society, with the advice of the professionals who are mainly responsible for it, the armed forces, a national security policy is something else altogether. The concept of security covers the widest areas of society, including the economy, education, health and welfare, social security, employment, the smooth running of the political system, development and modernization in harmony with the environment, internal public order and much more, such
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as sector policies. Clearly, responsibility for the design of a national security policy and its implementation at the level of a national security strategy transcends the institutions of the armed forces and the state as a political association, despite the states strategic role of advocate, coordinator, harmonizer and principal executor, through which it immerses itself in civil society. This raises questions about what is to be maintained in a condition of security, protected from risk or aggression: obviously the country, its inhabitants and the concept of nationality all of which require clarification. The central nucleus of every culture is based on its ideology or national myth. This concept involves at least two basic elements: on the one hand, a system of beliefs about the position of a group, community or society in the world and about its destiny. On the other hand, equally important, is the adherence to a system of values, symbolically expressed and reaffirmed through ritual ceremonies. This concept of national ideology is understood as a cultural dimension with an explicit unbiased logic, with strong characteristics that drive a society to historical action and form the most solid basis of its global identity, all of which constitute what we call nationality. Several points should be added to the case we have established so far: The theme under discussion implies the constitution and development of nation-states. The concepts of nationality and national identity are linked to the process of development of the nation-state. This relates to the kind of definition that a group attributes to itself concerning its strengths and weaknesses, hopes and fears, history, current prospects and future expectations, everything that is found to be intimately related to its traditions and values. The national identity resides in the collective memory. This memory is based on, and legitimized through, its relation to the differences separating groups from one another and produced by actor-narrators who interpret and manufacture situations, beliefs and values. In the background is always to be found the sphere of power with its struggles and conflicts, the driving force of national historical development. Also, a profusion of viewpoints indicates the presence of a profusion of actors and political movements. Nationality or national identity is not a simple thing. It consists of partial contributions that sometimes converge and sometimes diverge. The maintenance of a national identity is not a static process. Neither does it imply change. On the contrary, it requires an attempt to understand new indigenous and exogenous elements, which
could naturally bring about a synthesis with the national project, within a context of integration. A different, although complementary, approach considers that the concepts of strategy, policy, objectives, security and defence are intimately connected, to the point of constituting a true conceptual system. The policy of national objectives answers the question what to do?, while the national strategy relates to the preparation and application of power in the struggle for and/or maintenance of the objectives set out by the policy. It assumes the where, how and when. Speaking of strategy raises questions about how to follow the objectives, with what means and in what coordinates of time and space. Strategy, a political tool, must achieve the objectives that have been proposed in spite of internal and external threats to them. According to United Nations Document A 553/38, security is a situation in which states perceive that they are free from military aggression, economic coercion and political pressure, to freely continue with a development search. National defence is seen, in terms of action, as a strategy, because a strategy is how things are done. Human security is the sum of all the rights that a person may enjoy, and a fuller concept of security would be a situation of safety, transcending physical security and encompassing social tensions, dissidence within the state, political instability, economic and commercial problems, production, technological competition, etc., all factors that affect the survival and progress of humanity and the environment, intrinsic to the idea of security and incorporated in the collective feeling of the social body. If we think of the opposite situation, insecurity in any of its manifestations, it is clear that such a negative feeling is one of the major factors working against the balance required to sustain political and social stability in any country or region of the world. The introduction to the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) states: Convinced that the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations, and goes on to set out the nature and purposes of the organization. Two of these purposes stand out: to strengthen the peace and security of the continent (Article 2a); and to promote, by cooperative action, [the Member States] economic, social, and cultural development (Article 2f). The principles set out in Chapter II include social justice and social security as bases of lasting peace (Article 3j); the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex (Article 3l); respect for cultural values (Article 3m); and finally that the education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom and peace (Article 3n).
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All this is affirmed by a commitment to the fundamental rights and duties of states, with reference to collective security, integral development, and the creation of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, to take on board these themes. It was thus that the Charter of the principal international organization of the Americas expressed the will and collective concern for the continental and human security of the Member States and their populations. From this to our theme today, I believe, is no great distance. At the time of the gestation of these mechanisms of security for the hemisphere, the wise drafters of the OAS Charter anticipated the theme that brings us here today. It may be considered that new threats exist, such as those mentioned today, nevertheless, interpreting other parts of the text we see that some of them were foreseen: To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems (Article 2e); Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace (Article 3j); Economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent (Article 3k), already appear in the Charter of the OAS. The extent and accuracy of some of the so-called new threats, such as poverty, drug trafficking, international terrorism, international mafias, degradation of the environment, unemployment and social marginalization, cognitive exclusion, and selective emigration, are very difficult to determine. In recent years much has been written and debated about these threats, as if the penuries that our continent is suffering from today were new, although we should point out that national authorities and regional bodies have been actively involved. In meetings of the OAS, of heads of state and ministers, the more frequent topics of debate are related to human security and future projections. The security of the continent, the security of states and the security of humanity are convergent themes on the permanent agenda of our governments. I believe this would be a good opportunity to comment on certain regional data that bear out our case. For example, the population of China is six times that of the Mercosur region, with an economic growth rate of 9.6 per cent a year from 1983 to 1998, every seven years doubling its gross domestic product (GDP), which is rather smaller than the GDP of California but more than that of the whole of South America. Latin America has a growth rate of 1 per cent or negative, depending on the country. It has a trade deficit with the United States of $17 billion. On the European front, some interesting data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) show European Union subsidies of the order of $143 billion, to ensure what is referred to as the nutritional security of
285 million Europeans. This sum is greater than the GNP of all the countries of South America, with the exception of Brazil and Argentina. If we think of the Japanese, North American and European subsidies, $360 billion, we arrive at $1 billion per day almost the figure for Argentina. With reference to science and technology, the United States invests approximately $220 billion per year between private and state enterprises, almost a third of the entire Brazilian GDP. Global trade figures, beginning with the five largest, according to WTO 1999 estimates were: 1. United States: $710 billion, the equivalent of the GDP of Brazil exported per year; 2. Germany: $545 billion, the GDP of Argentina plus the rest of South America; 3. Japan: $388 billion, the GDP of Argentina; 4. France: $305 billion; 5. United Kingdom: $273 billion; 6. China: only $200 billion, but if Hong Kong and Taiwan were included the country would be the second-largest exporter in the world (and these figures were several months old); 7. Mexico: $120 billion, seventeenth on the WTO scale; 8. Brazil: locomotive of the Mercosur, exports $49 billion and cannot expand much more as this figure represents 0.8 per cent of the global market. These are simply some examples to guide us. This new international order, the gestation of which is so arduous and difficult that only its general outlines are recognizable at the moment, has attracted the attention of a number of academics. They have meticulously listed the problems faced by humanity, in transition from a bipolar world with the emphasis on state and military security, to a multipolar world where the concept of security is increasing in complexity and widening to include the concept of personal security as well as the theoretical construction of regional security. The strategic threats that have been detected are many and complex, in their causes as well as in their development and consequences. Of particular note are the demographic explosion, essentially affecting the poorest countries, which have fewer resources and smaller scientific-technological capacity; and the deterioration of the atmosphere partly caused by the struggle of the most needy societies to survive, and partly by the consumer culture that prevails in highly developed countries. It appears that the consumption of one North American child causes as much environmental damage as that of two Swedish children, three Italians, thirteen Brazilians or 280 Haitians. This discrepancy is without a doubt a cause of friction and conflict. The revolution in agriculture and biotechnology seriously threatens the productive and exporting capacity of the developing countries, in that the
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incessant development of computing and robotics increases industrial production and improves the quality of products while at the same time causing the loss of countless jobs. The revolution in international finance and communications, the ceaseless expansion of transnational companies, while transforming the world into a global village, limit the decision-making capacity of the smallest and least-developed states, threatening to widen the breach between those at the centre and those at the periphery. The nation-state is not free from challenges, pressurized by multiple local and independent demands and by the general tendency to transfer matters that were formerly of domestic interest to supranational entities and organs. The panorama becomes even more complex when the list of strategic challenges includes ethnic, cultural, religious and ideological conflicts, the latter vestiges of the bipolar strategy of the Cold War and the rigid mindset of certain groups. The demographic explosion, environmental pillaging, and exterior poverty encourages a current of illegal immigrants, many of whom are seeking the benefits of modernity in more opulent societies, often provoking ethnocentric and xenophobic reactions. This situation constitutes an unprecedented cultural soup among which mafia groups and terrorists interact in cycles that oscillate from mutual ignorance to reciprocal support. Finally, post-modern culture with its attitudes of hyper-consumerism, seen through the fleeting images of tele-reality, the basic principle of which seems to be the cultivation of an extreme hedonism, certainly does not help to promote solidarity and cooperation among individuals, groups and states. Consideration of new threats does not imply, affirm or admit that the traditional threats have definitively disappeared. The armed forces, as well as learning to deal with the new situations, thus have to maintain the capacity to respond to classic hypotheses, some of which could even derive from the escalation or evolution of new or current threats, as they are known today. As a corollary of this approach, priority does not need to be given to international instruments regulating cooperation in the hemisphere in the traditional way. The peculiar nature of the new threats raises delicate problems. Although it is desirable that states should cooperate to confront a threat, international agreement should not facilitate interference in the internal matters of a state. The boundaries between these situations can sometimes become blurred because of the nature of the threat. To attenuate the danger means recognizing the central role of the government in whose territory the situation that calls for international action is developing. Such action should aim at
cooperating with that government and obtaining its agreement. The link between new threats does not mean that they should all be confronted by the armed forces or by military means. The shape that they can assume, however, may have a substantial effect on security and require eventual military deployment, if the government so decides. The heads of South American states, meeting in Brasilia at the Second Summit of the Americas, pointed out the potential gravity of the new phenomena. The possible creation of international instruments to respond to the new threats also raises some complex questions. It is clearly convenient for different situations to be regulated by multilateral mechanisms, themselves responsive to a multilateral consensus of opinion. Thus state sovereignty could have been a topic for serious consideration if safeguards had not been foreseen in the successive treaties that link us. Today, certain facts are clearly recognized as new threats. We wish to draw attention to the fact that these new threats are the result of the application of technologies that are not only used for war but have been incorrectly, imprudently or perversely used. It is on these points that we should concentrate our efforts, generating knowledge, following up technological advances, above all in areas that affect security. Otherwise we give out signals of indifference or omission to the judicial system as well as those of security and defence. Likewise we must expect warnings from third parties in the event of their feeling threatened by our action or non-action. Finally, I wish to mention the concepts of Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, for whom one of the most delicate objectives for the twenty-first century is to avoid exclusion: cognitive exclusion will mean missing the train of history; incorporation in commercial and production platforms of global reach is imperative; understanding of the gravitational field of other cultures is required; subjection to inhabitual strategic policies is necessary, and this applies to certain politicians. Following this line of thought, we are facing two basic factors concerning the future of humanity. The first is the colonization of space. Not only military devices are launched into space, there are colonization projects, space technology, space laboratories, and so on. This is not Jules Vernes dream, it is reality; facing the challenge of a chimerical encounter with other forms of life. The second factor is that, for the first time in the recorded history of humanity, we are beginning to modify the physical and mental aspects of living beings, with human as well as animal cloning.
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These are two of the horizons towards which humanity is heading in the next hundred years. Must Latin America and the Caribbean be excluded? Should we gather the collective force to succeed? Would it be worth the effort? I believe that, although our leaders will decide our future, it is our duty to alert them to the risks and opportunities, and to the growing importance of the time factor. The decisions are for today, tomorrow could be too late, and we will be left on the platform.
In conclusion, I believe that the fundamental axes of the proposed Human Security Network should be the dissemination of projects and discoveries, the reform of academic links for the benefit of our societies, in both state and particular sectors, so that advances in science and technology may become the patrimony of humanity. The defence of equal opportunities in commercial trade could also condemn our economies to eternal poverty, no matter how strong our efforts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Human Security and Development at the beginning of the 21st Century Seminar, CALEN-UNESCO Montevideo, December 1999. Participants: Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, Colonel Carlos Rodrguez Lagreca, Dr Jorge Lanzaro, Ambassador Dr Hernn Patio Mayer, Mr Manuel Bernales, Professor Oscar Amorn, Mr Roberto Domnguez, Mr Francisco Lacayo. Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), signed in Bogot in 1948 and amended by the Protocols of Buenos Aires in 1967, Cartagena de Indias in 1985, Washington in 1992 and Managua
in 1993. Available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/charter.html Professor R. Armand Dreiffuss, Time of Perplexities, 1996. Our Creative Diversity, report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/United Nations, 1993. United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. Available at http://www. unesco.org.cpp/uk/declarations
FOURTH ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States
Moderator: Mr Ren Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO Lecturers: Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt
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The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States
Opening remarks by the moderator, Mr Ren Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO
We are now going to begin our fourth regional discussion, concerning the promotion of human security in the Arab States. Before giving the floor to Professor Moussa, I would like to make two general remarks. The first concerns a problem that I think is crucial to human security the articulation between the recognition that there are new and multiple dimensions of human security, as clearly expressed in our discussions up to now, and what I would call the compounded impact of all the new threats to populations. This is one problem that has not been analysed in its totality, not only at our meeting but in general. We do recognize that environmental problems, food problems, ethnic problems, cultural problems, have a direct impact on human security. But we still lack a view of their impact at the local level. Local can mean national, but we need to understand more specifically, within a nation, how all these threats affect populations, as a whole, at a given time and place. The second general remark concerns the Arab States. We are dealing here with a vast region, which has gone through very complex and different processes of state-building since decolonization, some states in relation to the Ottoman Empire, others to imperial powers such as France or the United Kingdom. It is a region that is striving for unity, as are many other regions in different organizational schemes, whether through the League of Arab States or at the subregional level through the Union of the Arab Maghreb, which is trying to build, in cooperation with the European Union, some structural articulations with other regions. A notable example is the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue framework which, as you know, has advanced only slowly and another,
which of course weighs very heavily on the Arab States as a whole, is the question of the Palestinian people. This is a critical question and as Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said on visiting the region, the situation of the Palestinian people is recognized by many in the international community to be intolerable. In conclusion, yesterday we talked about the diversity, the differences between regions of Latin America, the distinction between Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and in South America, the differences in development, in the problems of different regions. I think that today also we have to take cognizance of the great diversity of the Arab States and of their great creativity. The Arab States, from the cultural point of view, are called upon to enhance the exposition of this creativity. We may not know much about the region for linguistic or other reasons, but I think that it is one of the most creative in terms of political thought, in terms of the arts, in terms of music. This is a factor to be taken into consideration when talking about human security. The cultural dimension within a region is a very, very important factor and sometimes a threat to cultural diversity or cultural expression can also constitute a threat to human security. I will not deal here with the Huntington thesis, except to say that I feel that even within UNESCO, the concept of fractures or clashes of civilizations was not taken seriously enough at the time. It was taken seriously by a certain number of organizations, especially defence organizations, but I do not think we responded adequately to what was a schematic reorganization of power politics which of course closely concerns the question of Islam.
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Challenges to human security in the Middle East
CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, Researcher, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt
1. Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, the multilateral organizations have come up with new concepts and terms ranging from sustainable development to partnership and, last but not least, human security. Yet these concepts are interrelated and share many common principles, consistent with the commitment of protecting and promoting human lives. One of the most fundamental challenges that we face is the realization of a humane, safe and equal world. This is not only a moral imperative, it is a pragmatic goal, because the facts in the world around us speak for themselves. These facts drive us, as representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials and intellectuals, to search for new approaches and new tools. We need a new form of people-to-people diplomacy, based on the collective efforts of a variety of actors, inside and outside government bodies. It will depend on the ability of NGOs and governments to raise peoples awareness of fundamental human security needs and will require a broad-based consensus between the state and other actors within the state to address basic human rights, needs and fears affecting daily life. This diplomatic effort reaches beyond traditional and official relations between states to engage individuals and organizations from a variety of sectors within civil society. We have seen the beginning of this new drive towards a much more humane world in the successful fight against terrorism, pollution and drug trafficking in todays world, where a single state can accomplish little on its own. More than ever, we need not only to use but to empower the multilateral institutions that are available and to try to work with like-minded and opposing countries inside and outside these institutions to benefit from all ideas and resources. Among the first priorities is to increase efforts to strengthen international humanitarian law in order to improve the security of individuals, especially in disadvantaged regions such as Africa and the Middle East.
2. Challenges to human security In my opinion, human security means acknowledging nations and peoples rights to an equal share of economic, social and political world development and protecting them from threats emanating from within their own or other countries. And because the concept we are dealing with here is very broad, a wide range of old and new threats may be considered to be challenges to human security, ranging from epidemic diseases to economic crises and the use of weapons of mass destruction. These threats are not of the same level and severity in each country. Every country, although sharing similar threats with other countries, has its own strategic threats and prioritizes them. If human security is focusing on the security of people, we cannot neglect the fact that their security largely depends on state stability and a cooperative internal community. When dealing with human security issues we are not denying the major and necessary shift in internal relations and world affairs, which have long placed the predominant emphasis on the security of the state. However, protection of citizens, preventing violent conflicts, supporting peace operations, governance and accountability, combating terrorism, all these aspects engage the state as first priority, especially in developing countries where the NGOs and Track Three diplomacy (universities, research centres, public opinion) still play a minor role compared with that of the state and governments, and where people and states still fear traditional forms of intervention when state efforts fail. In todays world there are worrying trends that are disruptive in themselves and that threaten not only the existence of the state, as the best-known legal framework, but of the international order established in the last few decades. One clear trend is globalization which although it may have led to an emerging sense of community has brought new challenges to human security, principally the undermining of the importance of cultural diversities; and superpowers that exercise leadership in addressing problems of special interest to their countries, while
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undermining problems that constitute a real challenge to human security in developing countries and the Middle East, such as social and economic progress and democracy. As we make the transition into the new century, we must acknowledge the concerns associated with globalization and admit that it is a mere process, not a concept, and that we need to maximize the benefits of globalization for all countries and human beings. We also need to make every effort to secure full respect for different approaches to globalization. I believe that the concept of human security is of the greatest value and serves as a complement to existing international agendas focusing on promoting national security and human development.
3. Challenges to human security in Arab countries As mentioned above, we may distinguish between common challenges to human security, the solution of which is considered vital to all world citizens, and challenges specific to developing and Middle East and Arab countries. I intend to focus on challenges emanating from within the Middle East states, taking Egypt as an example, and challenges to human security imposed by the international order. In order to respond strategically to some of these diverse threats to human security in the Middle East and Arab countries, I have identified nine major priority areas, which include challenges affecting Egypt as a developing country and a key Middle East country. Egypt has survived changes of regime, ideology, patterns of leadership, and, in modern times, transformations in modes of production and social structure. Historically, most changes in Egyptian life have been generated from the top down. Egyptian bureaucracy has performed some useful functions. It has kept a steady statecraft functioning and allowed Egypt to adjust to sudden changes that could have upset the equilibrium of the state. Few factors are more critical to the future of Egypt and other Middle East countries than their progress on the economic front. While the Arab countries have made measurable progress in a number of areas, a critical distance has still to be traversed before they are out of the economic danger zone. These countries also have a great distance to traverse in order to overcome the political and social costs of rapid structural adjustment and its effect on internal stability. 3.1. Challenges to human security emanating from within the state 3.1.1. Population growth The most serious challenge to the domestic stability of Egypt and Arab countries, which
feeds on underlying economic and political discontent, is population growth. This constitutes the worst threat to human security. The rate of growth in Egypt has increased from 1.9 per cent in the 1970s to an estimated 2.9 per cent in 1996. Despite this relatively modest rise, the population is growing by 1.8 million a year. This increase has, for a number of years, exceeded the job-creation capacities of the Egyptian economy and increased the number of poor and marginalized people from 2.96 million (5.9 per cent of the total population) in 1990 to 3.44 million (6.5 per cent of the population) in 1994. The figures have not changed dramatically in 1999. The private and public sector together must create sufficient employment opportunities to absorb a workforce that is increasing by some 400 to 500 thousand new entrants each year. 3.1.2. Economic growth Economic growth is related to population growth, although it is also a reflection of world economic progress. In Egypt, as in most other countries that undertake economic reform, real growth in gross domestic product slowed after the Economic Refor m and Structural Adjustment Program from an average of 2.5 per cent annually (in Fiscal Year (FY) 8991) to 0.41 per cent annually (in FY 9293). Yet Egypt has managed to absorb a population increase of about 14 to 15 million between 1981 and 1993, equal to the combined population of Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. However, it has been estimated that Egypt would require a consistent growth rate of no less than 5 per cent annually to absorb the expected increase in population at the present level of per capita income of approximately $710 in 1997. Although Egypt achieved a 5 per cent growth rate by 1997, it is not clear that this level can be sustained. Without a substantial decline in population growth or an increase in employment, Egypt will face gradual erosion of the significant gains in standard of living achieved over the previous decade. Mobilization of new resources and skills at the national, regional and international levels is urgently required to ensure growth, employment and stability. One of the most pressing and immediate economic dimensions of human security is the employment problem. Egypt needs to create a minimum of 6 million jobs in the coming years. If current levels of unemployment are to be reduced significantly, another 1.5 to 2 million jobs must be found for the next three years. To reduce unemployment, the number of jobs
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must rise by about 50 per cent. Standards of professionalism must also be reinforced and an approach developed that stresses quality over quantity. All Arab countries need to launch more programmes of social and political adjustment to augment and enhance the programme of economic adjustment. To ensure continuity and confidence, all changes should be institutionalized within a clear, legal framework. The systems in many Arab countries, including Egypt, require the institution of much more serious measures of accountability from top to bottom and from bottom to top. The above findings and calculations affect the security of women, in particular, in a negative way, assuming that the current very low participation of women in the Egyptian workforce (about 12 per cent) will persist. Increasing womens market activities typically raises the opportunity costs of children and contributes to reduced fertility rates. These important long-term benefits will be foregone unless more jobs can be created at the same real wage. To reduce poverty in this sense real wages need to rise, which means a more rapid opening up of the demand for labour. 3.1.3. Water supply and food security Egypts total water supply is essentially fixed at 55 to 56 billion cubic metres annually. Whatever developments may occur, despite improved storage and sharing of water among Nile riparian states, they are unlikely to have much positive effect in the short term, if Ethiopia increases its utilization of the Blue Nile water resources and if the Sudan expands its irrigation projects. More sophisticated demand management will therefore be essential. This is overwhelmingly the responsibility of the agricultural sector, because about 85 per cent of all Egyptian water is used in farming. Water constraint could mean that Egypts only road to food security lies in exporting farm and factory products, depending on new land reclamation projects. The same problem exists in other Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq, which faced a water crisis when Turkey launched its GAP (Great Anatolia Project for electricity and irrigation in south-east Turkey). Therefore, in order to prevent conflict over water in the future, and because almost all rivers running through Arab countries have their source in non-Arab countries, intensive coordination between both groups should exist. We do not want to be caught by the saying that water wars are inevitable.
3.1.4. Improving human resources Any viable strategy of export-led growth, or any other growth strategy, must include investment in upgrading the quality of the most important resource in Egypt human beings. In this sense, the following points are of note: The failure to provide all Egyptians with basic literacy has been a serious deficiency in public policy. Not until the late 1980s were almost all Egyptian boys enrolled in primary schools, while almost a quarter of Egyptian girls are still not enrolled. Without accelerated progress in this area, poverty reduction will not be achieved and gender and social inequalities will widen. Improving human capital means the ability to respond to shifting technological and market conditions. If Egypt and Arab countries must export in order to employ and feed their citizens, they must be able to compete in the international market with a literate, skilled workforce. An illiterate workforce is poor material from which to craft an export-led growth strategy. It is not enough to be aware of new technologies; Arab countries need to possess the know-how to utilize them effectively. 3.1.5. Environmental crises Population growth, with an expansion in consumption and excessive production, has led to environmental crises, climate change and air pollution. In this endeavour, we still face the lack of cooperation between the stakeholders in this area to identify the barriers and come up with innovative solutions or to form a task force. Egyptian NGOs have played a major role in trying to bring conflicting parties together and in introducing new methods to resolve recurring conflicts. They have also participated in awareness campaigns, which still need to be expanded and strengthened. We are strongly committed to close cooperation among ourselves and with developing countries and international organizations to help to resolve major outstanding issues, such as air pollution, which have greatly affected human health and damaged production capacity. 3.2. Challenges to human security emanating from the international system 3.2.1. World economy and trade There is another form of patriarchy that has negative effects on developing countries. The twentieth century has achieved unprecedented economic progress, yet not all international parties have benefited from the boom. The
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world economy grew stronger, but the number of poor and marginalized people and countries grew more quickly, so that social safety nets failed to catch up and to ensure strong, sustainable growth and greater prosperity for all. It is true that the multilateral trading system embodied by the World Trade Organization has provided its members with enormous trade opportunities, but it has not until now addressed the legitimate concerns of developingcountry members, or the ineffectiveness of their participation because they were denied access to world markets. In this sense a comprehensive partnership cannot be developed because the partners are not on an equal footing and because the world trade challenges to developing countries do not address the improvement of the situation of the leastdeveloped countries. 3.2.2. Weapons of mass destruction The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction places a great burden on the financial and economic capabilities of all countries alike, depriving citizens of the opportunity of fulfilling their basic needs and shifting resources. Egypt has made great efforts to raise the awareness of the danger of proliferation in the Middle East, calling upon states in the region, including Israel, to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and remains committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, especially after the outnumbering of citizens in Sinai and Jordan living near the Israeli nuclear reactor at Negev, where there is fear of environmental damage. International concern is also growing about the threat of terrorist groups and individuals acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and concerted efforts must be made to prevent such a crisis. 3.2.3. Neglecting cultural diversity With the launching of the clash of civilizations thesis by Samuel Huntington in 1993,1 an attempt was made to transform into a threat the very core of the values that deeply inspire the lives of the great majority of the population of the Arab world in general, and of the Middle East in particular the values of Islam. Huntington went so far as to speak of Islams bloody borders and of a Muslim propensity towards violent conflict, and explained Muslim violence in the last two decades by the absence of one or more core states, or by the demographic explosion of Muslim societies and the number of unemployed men between the ages of 15 and 30. Needless to say, these
explanations and others referred to by Huntington are part of a clear-cut attempt to isolate what he calls the West from the rest of the world, with a view to legitimizing the exercise of armed power politics in the twentyfirst century. Even though many scholars have been highly critical of Huntingtons ideas, one should be careful not to underestimate the influence that they exert on strategic and defence communities in Europe and the United States. Although cultural diversities are a source of social and economic dynamism and enrich human life, new social trends neglect the fact that cultures not of Western origin could inspire creativity and stimulate innovation. Not acknowledging and respecting other cultures leads to racism and discrimination by the people and their states (recalling what has happened to foreigners and immigrants in Germany and France). Therefore, and from this honourable gathering, I support the work of the United Nations in its preparations for a Conference against Racism, to be held in South Africa in 2001.2 I also encourage education ministers from all countries to meet to promote education to foster the understanding of different cultures. 3.2.4. Lack of implementation of international humanitarian law In the course of the twentieth century the international community has witnessed many regional and civil wars, in which all kinds of weapons produced by human intelligence have been used against civilians and have threatened the security of nations worldwide. Until now the international community has failed to protect civilians from the effects of war, though advances have been made in setting humanitarian rules and norms, especially through the extensive efforts of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent. This is one of the major threats to human security in our region, and is particularly evident in Iraq and the Sudan where civilians are paying the price of international sanctions, or in the Palestinian National Authority where civilians, mostly children, are deprived of normal living conditions because of the Israeli occupation and aggression and Israels refusal to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its additional Protocol of 1977 concerning the protection of civilians in time of war. Last but not least, we in the Arab countries and the Middle East region clearly recognize that the process of globalization and the fast pace at which information and technology are
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advancing have engendered various concerns. It is not enough for conferences and meetings to address such concerns so that the participants can enjoy peace of mind. We need to see the results of such conferences and meet-
ings implemented, at least in one or two areas, to help in securing the future of humanity. We do have a common concern, but perhaps our legitimate tools differ, logically following the diversity of cultures.
NOTES
1. S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 2249.
2. World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, August/September 2001, Durban, South Africa.
FIFTH ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Asia and the Pacific
Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General, Priority Africa Department, UNESCO Lecturers: Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
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What perspectives on human security in Asia in the twenty-first century? Some parallels with Africa
WHAT PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY IN ASIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? SOME PARALLELS WITH AFRICA
by Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark
1. Introduction the building of cooperative peace within the framework of ASEAN is of paramount importance for other regions and their respective intergovernmental regional organizations. Indeed, much can be learned from the methods of the ongoing cooperative peace process within ASEAN (Goucha and Zapata, 1999, p. 19). The first few years of the twenty-first century may represent something of a hiatus for Asian regionalism, and other forms of economic and security institutional diplomacy may come to the fore . . . (Higgott, 2000, p. 262). While the concept of human security has attracted much attention in the West, including Canada, it remains poorly understood and contested in Asia (Acharya and Acharya, 2000, p. 1). The Asian crisis (crises, in fact?) of the late 1990s (Mastanduno, 2000; Soros, 2000, pp. 20834) transformed the character of security issues and discourses throughout Asia as well as prospects for and optimism about regional cooperation/integration (Higgott, 2000). In the preceding heady days of the Asian miracle, in which prevailing assumptions about the developmental state went unchallenged (Chan et al., 1998), it was largely conceived as national security. At the start of the new millennium still the Pacific century? not only the continents economic growth and development along with its myriad ambitious regional projects (Bergsten, 2000) but also its social and political stability are in question (Bello, 1990; The Economist, 2000b, p. 93; Jomo, 1998). One positive result of the unanticipated aftershocks of the late 1990s throughout Asia, which followed on the global earthquakes of the end of the Cold War half a decade earlier, has been a transformation in definitions of and debates about security around the region towards a more comprehensive notion of human security (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001). This parallels the overall evolution of this notion with its relevance to other continents such as Africa (Lee, 2000; UNDP, 1994). It also raises profound issues about the distinc-
tiveness and resilience of Asian forms of capitalism, now increasingly incorporated into more global forms via fireside sales of assets to established Western multinationals (Soros, 2000, pp. 20134). The exceptionalism of Asia was always problematic, notions of Asian values notwithstanding (Mead, 2000). Now its comparability is non-controversial, reinforced by assertions such as the African renaissance (Shaw and Nyangoro, 2000) in contrast to the Asian demise! This overview seeks to estimate prospects for human development in Asia by juxtaposing concepts of human security at the start of the new century. It privileges notions of governance in which a trio of actor types are involved: not just states but also companies and civil societies. This enables it to review the history and potency of three parallel tracks of diplomatic-cum-strategic governance Tracks One, Two and Three which reflect and reinforce the contributions of non-state actors (Kraft, 2000). In turn, I review the changing balance among conventional, nuclear and human security in the region. Section 5 speculates on a range of possible scenarios for Asia in the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and the final part considers implications arising from such a human security perspective for established modes of analysis and practice, both established disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspectives alike, with lessons for/from Africa (Shaw, 2000) as well as Asia (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Goucha and Zapata, 1999). In part, this presentation constitutes something of a personal confession or critique as I remained somewhat sceptical about the relevance and acceptability of human security for this region towards the end of the twentieth century (Quadir and Shaw, 1998) given the degree of resistance in much of the region (particularly emanating from the regime advocating the Singapore School!) towards even the notion of human rights. But the spillover from the series of interrelated crises, ecological as well as economic, has served to advance such analysis and practice from human rights to human security even if not all incumbent regimes so appreciate let alone welcome it (Acharya and Acharya, 2000). And I have been pleased to develop the notion of island
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governance how each island community (i.e. its regime, economy and society), no matter what its formal status, positions itself in the regional and global political economies in association with colleagues from the archipelagic states of South-East Asia (Shaw, 1998).
2. Governance for human security The Asian crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence in Asian values and revealed the tenuousness of links between the regions economies, polities and societies (Soros, 2000, pp. 20134). Continuing tensions among states, corporations and civil societies point to the imperative of re-examining the erstwhile developmental state and learning new lessons from/for Asia (Stein, 1995). Certainly, the intensity of the crisis/decline and resilience of response/revival have diverged dramatically throughout the region, with Hong Kong and Singapore least negatively affected and Indonesia and the Philippines the most (The Economist, 2000a, 2000b); i.e. the areas Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) are today further away from their aspirations than ever: the geese may be flying backwards! Moreover, the continuing stagnation of the Japanese economy in contrast to the sustained expansion of that in China affects the balance between these regional powers at the turn of the century. Furthermore, just as island governance draws attention to highly divergent patterns of development among neighbouring island political economies (e.g. Java versus Irian Jaya or Luzon versus Mindanao), so forms of globalizations have generated opportunities for high-tech islands such as the Special/Export Processing Zones of coastal China or Bangalore in India, which are becoming more integrated globally than nationally with profound implications for the cohesion of these two major Asian powers (Tiejun, 2000). Pressures for first political and then economic liberalization throughout the region have served to change the balance between state and non-state actors leading towards new patterns of governance between them. The sequences and consequences of these conditionalities are crucial factors determining whether human development and human security are achievable and sustainable in todays Asia (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001). Governance in Asia, as elsewhere in the new century, means the ongoing roles of companies and civil societies as well as states in policy- and decisionmaking on all issues, including security (Wolfish and Smith, 2000). These are advanced through the analysis of not-for-profit think-tanks (Stone, 2000) and the related advocacy of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), increasingly orchestrated and advanced through regional and global coalitions and networks
(McGann and Weaver, 2000). In turn, such triangular relations serve to reinforce notions of human rather than state security as other interests and threats are recognized; in the classic United Nations Development Programme conceptualization, protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). In short, human security (cf. www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity; www.unesco.org/ securipax) is less concerned with national, state or regime security than with basic needs, community, economic, environmental, gender, personal and political securities. These are internal and transnational rather than inter-state, and they can be advanced by a variety of interests and institutions rather than just the military. Thus, at least some analysts and activists in Asia have gone beyond common, comprehensive and cooperative security towards more inclusive conceptualizations of human development/security (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001).
3. Tracks One, Two and/or Three in the new millennium Conventional notions of national security imply a monopoly of Track One official, inter-state diplomacy: the classical realist world. Such exclusive interregime negotiations and confrontations still exist even if they are increasingly subject to non-state attention, especially from the local to global NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, Greenpeace) and media. However, reflective of presumed Asian values, to advance the Asian miracle in the 1980s, a second tier was developed: a distinctive Track Two of diplomats, academics and others in their personal capacities typically focusing on functional or technical matters, such as communications, disasters, energy, oceans, river valleys, etc. Such informal patterns of diplomatic governance, centred around the twenty-plus national/associate/regional members of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (www.cscap.org), advanced furthest in the Institute of Strategic and International Studies network in South-East Asia in the early 1990s (www.jaring.my/isis), reinforcing the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) of ASEAN (www.aseansec.org). But as Richard Higgott indicates, such optimism and attention was not to last: Thus the events of 199798 the most traumatic experienced in Asia since decolonization and the Cold War confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s also have spawned lessons for Asian regionalism. The crises have sidetracked policy elites from the regional dialogue activities trade liberalization and security popular throughout the first half of the 1990s. In this context, ASEAN, as the activist leader of wider
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Asian regional dialogues, has lost its way since 1997 (Higgott, 2000, pp. 2634). In short, reverberations from the regional crises of recent years have meant that the salience of Track Two peaked well before the end of the century, to be superceded by a return to more exclusive and antagonistic Track One inter-state relations along with the evolution of a Track Three of non-state actors (Kraft, 2000). The latter is also exclusive but not intentionally so: local and national, regional and global NGOs along with more progressive think-tanks, media. etc. (see www.twnside.org.sg). While the former concentrates on orthodox short-term military threats, the latter puts longer-term non-traditional issues on the agenda: cultural, economic, ecological, personal, social, technological threats to human development/security such as droughts and floods, drugs and gangs, landmines and small arms, etc. (Mbabazi et al., 2001; MacLean and Shaw, 2001). Unfortunately, currently Tracks One and Three exist in somewhat splendid isolation from each other, reflective of the lingering tensions between state and civil society, although Kraft (2000) hopes that mutual suspicion can be overcome by inter-track confidence-building measures. As Behera et al. indicate, Track Three reflects voices from the margins of international relations which seek to build constituencies for peace which can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official government positions (1997, p. 19). In the first decade of the new millennium, Track Two is clearly needed now more than ever to bridge the gap and facilitate a dialogue between the three corners of the governance triangle both intra- and inter-regionally. Such intentions lay behind some late-twentieth-century national architectures for Asian security and development such as CANCAPS (www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps), the Canadian adjunct of CSCAP [see also the new Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) supported by the Swedish International Development Agency, Sida (http://sasnet.soc.lu.se/) and related Asia-Pacific (national through human) security networks]. At the national level, it too seeks to bridge the statecorporate-civil society/academic divide in an ongoing series of workshops, discussions, publications, etc., which are largely compatible with current official and non-state foreign policy reflecting a human security orientation, so reinforcing the work of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (www.asiapacific.ca). Symptomatic of the interdependence of the Three Tracks, as well as their potential outside as well as inside ASEAN, was the award of the Nobel Prize for Peace in December 2000 to the President of the Republic of Korea, Kim Dae Jung, for negotiating an unprecedented summit with the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea in the north and facilitating family reunions, which are leading to other state and non-state attempts to engage the Kim Jong II regime.
4. Conventional, nuclear and human security in contemporary Asia Just as the trio of diplomatic Tracks have evolved within the last decade, so has the balance among conventional, nuclear and human security concerns (ISIS, 2000). If the first predominated in the era of the Asian miracle, the last two have become central at the turn of the century, reflective of an intensification of intra- and inter-state inequalities and insecurities. The escalation of nuclear-related stand-offs between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, and the two Koreas, has come to supercede the several decades of Cold War bipolarity between the two superpowers across the Arctic. Such contemporary Asian flashpoints are even more ominous because of the spread of ballistic-missile technologies. To date, a mixture of great-power cajoling and Track Two mediation has prevented either a nuclear accident or a protracted hot war, but recent Gulf Wars should provide history lessons of the potential costs entailed. In contrast to the revival of inter-state confrontations, intra-state inequalities are intensifying as the stages of the crisis unfold and the associated gains and costs are spread unevenly. These have already led to an escalation of internal conflicts around the peripheries of countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines which may yet lead to de jure as well as de facto separatist states such as Aceh and Irian Jaya. Like Africa, Asia has had to accommodate new states in the new century even if we had all assumed that the nationalist era of formal independence ended in the 1960s. The painful birth of East Timor (Kraft, 2000; Traub, 2000), like that of Eritrea, may not deter other aspirants as in the southern Philippines and reinforce the attractions of relatively flexible and informal inter-island triangles rather than more rigid archipelagic states. Moreover, the cumulative consequences of environmental decay are only beginning to be recognized, let alone calculated, as clean air and water become ever more scarce (Quadir and Shaw, 1998). Certainly the haze crises of the late 1990s constituted something of a wake-up call even if illegal logging practices have community as well as environmental aspects. Likewise, the intrusion and spread of viruses such as HIV/AIDS have served to concentrate minds on prevention, with the epidemic spreading from Africa to Asia, especially among poorer, migrant communities. Non-traditional security threats in Asia always bore more resemblance to other continents like Africa than was admitted during the boom years (MacLean et al., 2001). Even then syndromes around drugs/gangs/guns, migration/refugees, piracy, etc., were reminiscent of some African issues, including the privatization of security. So the centrality of Afghanistan in the world of hard drugs, as well as fundamentalism, may be
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contrasted to some African trans-shipment centres. In part because of geography as well as relative affluence, there has always been a much higher prevalence of piracy on Asias high seas than around Africas long coastline, although one correlate of on-land conflicts and peace-keeping is off-shore crime, both to humans and resources such as fish and coral (e.g. around Somalia). Indeed, the continuing instability around the South China Sea is in part an instance of the role of impoverished navies out of uniform! Hence the imperative of effective ocean and island governance, reinforcing novel patterns of Asian/archi-pelagic triangles (Shaw, 1998). Moreover, Asia has considerable experience of soldiers in power, so that civil-military relations have been as fraught there as elsewhere. New forms of democratic governance may lead towards a more transparent relationship in which NGOs join elected officials in monitoring statutory forces to ensure compliance with human rights and codes of warfare. As security is privatized, so such supervision is needed for private military companies as well. Soldiers continue to be engaged in private as well as illegal sectors, in part to finance their operations, particularly arms races, which seem to be heating up again at the turn of the century. Ubiquitous off-budget activities and incomes from small- to large-scale mean that official figures underestimate the real costs of military forces in Asia as elsewhere (Berger, 2000; ISIS, 2000).
5. Scenarios for Asian futures in the new century Given the above cautions about the elusiveness of human development/security, along with increasingly revisionist reflections around the Asian crisis (Bello, 1990; Jomo, 1998), including the balance between more exclusive forms of Asian bilateralism versus more inclusive forms of Asia Pacific regionalism (Asian Regionalism , 2000; Mastanduno, 2000), at least five plausible scenarios can be abstracted for the region over the first one or two decades of the new millennium, with profound implications for all other continents. These take into account alternative definitions of national to human security along with the parallel roles and relative salience of the three tracks (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Behera et al., 1997; Kraft, 2000). First, notwithstanding the continuing reverberations of the Asian crisis, the official, Track One optimistic scenario advanced by ASEAN and some of its state (i.e. ARF) and corporate supporters (i.e. emerging markets) consists of extrapolations from the NIC model (Chan et al., 1998; Stein, 1995), albeit postcrisis with some modest human-development dimensions added on: renewed high levels of growth and cooperation based on revived Asian values (Higgott, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000).
Second, the still unfamiliar yet all too realistic preview is that of instability; i.e. Indonesia on a regional scale, reflective of growing inequalities and the increasing ability or determination of elements in civil society to so articulate or even orchestrate. Given the prevalence of Asian corporatism between states and corporations, the third point of the triangle civil society has been largely marginalized and overlooked . until the fallout from the crisis (Soros, 2000)! Now a range of human (and national) security threats is both apparent and escalating, such as ethnic, ideological, racial, regional and religious identities and claims (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001). Third, in response to the above, a rather idealistic, green or civil society future is possible, however unlikely at the regional level as a whole: sustainable human development/security in which states and companies are restrained by pressures from the other point of the triangle, reinforced by pressures of ecology and equity, let alone extra-regional conditionalities about greenhouse gases, etc. This corresponds to a synthesis of think-tank, Track Three ideals (Kraft, 2000). Fourth, if inequalities and insecurities persist through the first decade of the new century, then a reversion to Asian values of a militaristic variety may occur. To contain either overly liberal reform or fundamentalist reactions, the secular and rational military may come to intervene to restore the dominance of the state against civil society, possibly exacerbating tensions over arms races, nuclear and chemical technologies, etc. (The Economist, 2000a, 2000b). Finally, fifth, given reverberations from Africa, an anarchy nightmare might yet impact on this region: a combination of ecological decay, economic decline, exponential corruption, exhaustion from unwinnable regional wars, privatized security, human and financial capital flight, and unstoppable viruses leading to communal/racial/regional/religious clashes (i.e. the other side of human security) too widespread for traditional peace-keeping or humanitarian interventions from within and/or outside the continent (MacLean et al., 2001; Soros, 2000, pp. 20834). Clearly, the last pair of possibilities serve as cautions lest some mix of the more attractive Asian miracle projections fail to materialize post-crisis. If, in the first years and decades of the twenty-first century, the region is to avoid the unattractive prospect of an unpacific Asia (The Economist, 1994, p. 77) then respect for non-state actors in governance and in Tracks Two and Three is imperative (Asian Regionalism , 2000). In brief, if the Asian crisis leads towards more sustainable, democratic and humane forms of human development/security then the regions unhappy as well as unanticipated fall from grace may in the long run be beneficial (Dewitt and Hernandez, 2001): a welcome prospect outside
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as well as inside Asia, with implications for development analysis and practice elsewhere (Gills, 2000; Payne, 1998, 1999; Shaw, 2001a, 2001b).
6. Implications for established perspectives and practices I conclude with a few tentative reflections on implications of the Asian and related cases for established disciplines and emerging interdisciplinary fields, with theoretical and applied implications. Such analytic challenges have intensified with the end of the Cold War, even if (still!) hegemonic discourses from the United States fail to so appreciate. As indicated at the start, the character and tone of the discourse inside and around Asia have been transformed in the last five years (Gills, 2000; Higgott, 2000). First, triangular forms of governance involving a range of mixed actors confront established assumptions in political science about the efficacy of statecentric forms of government. Similarly, notions of regional crisis confound orthodox regional notions about the developmental state and the NIC model. Second, the emergence of Tracks Two and Three along with the roles of non-state actors in general undermine the realist orthodoxies of international relations (Berger, 2000). Non-state actors such as
multinational corporations and NGOs now have their own foreign policies through which they relate to each other and states at an external level. The emergence of human development/security further condemns the international relations and foreign policy establishment who cannot begin to understand mixed-actor, global coalitions against blood diamonds, child soldiers, landmines, Multilateral Agreement on Investment/World Trade Organization at the 1999 meeting in Seattle, etc. (Lee, 2000; Soros, 2000). Third, Asias metamorphosis over the last five years also challenges established perspectives in development, even Asian, studies. Triumphalist notions of Asian exceptionalisms and the NIC model have evaporated along with Asian values (Mastanduno, 2000; Mead, 2000). Yet the regions histories cannot be ignored, just as other continents lessons should now be noted by Asia (Stein, 1995). Nevertheless, the recognition of non-state actors in forms of mixedactor governance and of human security in forms of sustainable development cannot be underestimated in terms of impact. If the Asian crisis forces rethinks within as well as around the region, it will not be in vain, as the regions people deserve much greater degrees of human development/security than they were able to realize in most of the twentieth century (Acharya and Acharya, 2000; Goucha and Zapata, 1999).
REFERENCES
ACHARYA, Amitav; ACHARYA, Arabinda. 2000. Human Security in Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea or Peril? CANCAPS Bulletin, 27 (November), pp. 15. ASIAN REGIONALISM, Asia Pacific Bilateralism and Canada. 2000. Canada Asia Commentary, 17 (December). BEHERA, Navnita Chadha; EVANS, Paul; RIZVI, Gowher. 1997. Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State of Non-official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia. Toronto, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies. BELLO, Walden. 1990. Dragons in Distress: Asias Miracle Economies in Crisis. Washington, D.C., Institute for Food and Development. BERGER, Thomas. 2000. Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia, Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July), pp. 40528. BERGSTEN, Fred. 2000. East Asian Regionalism. The Economist, Vol. 336, No. 8179 (July), pp. 23-6. CHAN, Steve; CLARK, Cal; LAM, Danny (eds.). 1998. Beyond the Developmental State: East Asias Political Economies Reconsidered. London, Macmillan.
DEWITT, David; HERNANDEZ, Carolina (eds.). 2001. Development and Security in South-East Asia. 3 vols. Aldershot, Ashgate. GILLS, Barry K. 2000. The Crisis of Postwar East Asian Capitalism: American Power, Democracy and the Vicissitudes of Globalization. Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July), pp. 381403. GOUCHA, Moufida; ZAPATA, Ren. 1999. A Shared Vision for the Peoples of Southeast Asia. In: ASEAN/UNESCO Proceedings: Cooperative Peace in Southeast Asia, pp. 1921. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. HIGGOTT, Richard. 2000. Regionalism in the AsiaPacific: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back? In: Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 25463. Toronto, Oxford University Press. ISIS. 2000. Strategic Survey 19992000. London, Institute of Strategic and International Studies/ Oxford University Press. JOMO, K. S. (ed.). 1998. Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East Asia. London, Zed Books.
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KRAFT, Herman Joseph S. 2000. Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor. Global Development Network Second Conference. Tokyo, December. LEE, Steve. 2000. The Axworthy Years: Humanist Activism and Public Diplomacy. Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 110. MACLEAN, Sandra J.; QUADIR, Fahim; SHAW, Timothy M. (eds.). 2001. Prospects for Governance in Asia and Africa: Globalizing Ethnicities. Aldershot, Ashgate. MACLEAN, Sandra J.; SHAW, Timothy M. 2001 (forthcoming). Canada and New Global Strategic Issues: Prospects for Human Security at the Start of the Twenty-first Century. Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 8. MASTANDUNO, Michael. 2000. Models, Markets and Power: Political Economy and the Asia-Pacific, 19891999. Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October), pp. 493507. MBABAZI, Pamela; MACLEAN, Sandra J.; SHAW, Timothy M. 2001 (forthcoming). Towards a Political Economy of Conflict and Reconstruction in Africa at the Start of the New Millennium: Challenges for Policy Communities/Coalitions. Global Networks, Vol. 1. MCGANN, James G.; WEAVER, R. Kent (eds.). 2000. Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action. New Brunswick, Transaction. MEAD, Walter Russell. 2000. The End of Asia? Redefining a Changing Continent. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December), pp. 15661. PAYNE, Anthony. 1998. The New Political Economy of Area Studies. Millennium, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 25373. . 1999. Reframing the Global Politics of Development. J. International Relations and Development, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December), pp. 36979. QUADIR, Fahimul; SHAW, Timothy M. 1998. Southeast Asia in the Twenty-first Century: Human Security and Regional Development. In: Nana Poku and Lloyd Pettiford (eds.), Redefining the Third World, pp. 17298. London, Macmillan. SHAW, Timothy M. 1998. Island Governance: Effecting ISLE in the New Millennium. Archipelago, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December), pp. 311. . 2000. Conflicts in Africa at the Turn of the Century: More of the Same? In: Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Les conflits dans le monde/Conflicts in the World 19992000, pp. 11138. Quebec, Institut Qubcois des Hautes tudes Internationales (IQHES). . 2001a. Contemporary Conflicts in Africa: Implications for Development Studies/Policies. Aalborg University, Denmark, February. (Development Research Series Working Paper No. 93.)
. 2001b. Development Studies at the Start of the New Millennium in South and North. Aalborg University, Denmark, January. (Development Research Series Working Paper No. 91.) SHAW, Timothy M.; NYANGORO, Julius E. 2000. African Renaissance in the New Millennium? From Anarchy to Emerging Markets? In: Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, pp. 275284. Toronto, Oxford University Press. SOROS, George. 2000. Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism. London, Little, Brown & Company (UK). STEIN, Howard (ed.). 1995. Asian Industrialization and Africa: Comparative Studies in Policy Alternatives to Structural Adjustment. London, Macmillan. STONE, Diane. 2000. Think Tank Transnationalisation and Non-Profit Analysis, Advice and Advocacy. Global Society, Vol. 14, No. 29, pp. 15372. THE ECONOMIST. 1994. The World in 1995. London, Economist Intelligence Unit. . 2000a. Asias Rollercoaster Rides, Vol. 357, No. 8193 (21 October), pp. 99101. . 2000b. The World in 2001, especially pp. 8796. London, Economist Intelligence Unit. TIEJUN, Zhang. 2000. Chinas Options in Asia-Pacific Regionalization. In: Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), National Perspectives on the New Regionalisms in the South, pp. 2556. London, Macmillan/World Institute for Development Economics Research. TRAUB, James. 2000. Inventing East Timor. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July/August), pp. 7489. UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York, United Nations Development Programme/Oxford University Press. WOLFISH, Daniel; SMITH, Gordon. 2000. Governance and Policy in a Multicentric World. Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Supplement, August), pp. S51S72.
www.aseansec.org www.asiapacific.ca www.cscap.org www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity www.gdnet.org www.ids.ac.uk/eldis www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps www.jaring.my/isis www.oneworld.org www.sasnet.soc.lu.se/ www.southcentre.org www.twnside.org.sg www.unesco.org/securipax
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Main challenges facing the promotion of human security in Asia
MAIN CHALLENGES FACING THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN ASIA

by Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh
1. Introduction The concept of human security has been in existence for centuries. As early as 1705, the German philosopher Leibniz expressed the need for the state to provide common security (la scurit commune) to its people. The French philosopher Montesquieu echoed the same sentiment, writing in the eighteenth century that true political freedom could only be achieved when people are secure.1 However, the concept has remained suppressed for so long, especially during the Cold War, because of overemphasis on the state-centric geopolitical and military aspects of security. This security discourse, which actually flows from the realpolitik paradigm of the 1940s, deals with war, violence and conflict. Security of the state or the regime in power is defined in terms of the absence of such threats. It was believed that security-related concepts such as containment, deterrence, balance of power, mutually assured destruction, etc., would ensure safety and security of the state and thereby its people. Following in the footsteps of the developed Western world, the impoverished newly emerging developing countries also placed excessive emphasis on the military aspects of security threats. They failed to comprehend that military security cannot respond to some of human beings basic needs freedom from poverty, hunger and threats to their individual lives. As a consequence, the developing world became highly militarized, with its defence spending undergoing a sixfold increase since 1960. Thus, the exhaustion of countries resources from the developmental front to the military front hampered not only their socio-economic growth but also caused continuing social and political unrest, with all its negative regional and international ramifications. These countries failed to provide their people with security against internal threats emanating from hunger, malnutrition, disease, unemployment and other hardships. According to Michael Renner, 1,300 million people in developing countries live in poverty and do not have access to safe water, 900 million
adults worldwide are illiterate and 800 million people have inadequate food supplies; 500 million of these people are malnourished and 175 million are under the age of 5 years.2 Not only was a developing state unable to provide these forms of security, but the state itself may be seen as a source of insecurity to its people through corruption, oppressive instruments for rent-seeking and extortion, and other forms of bad governance. This is quite understandable in view of the fact that the state apparatus itself develops vested interests in preserving the interests of the establishment entities, most of which run counter to those of ordinary people. In the face of dissent and protestation, the state apparatus, which monopolizes the instruments of violence, resorts to force and repression. However, over the last few decades or so, the changes witnessed in the national, regional and international arena such as human rights violations, poverty, economic underdevelopment, political instability, terrorism and proliferation of small arms, environmental degradation, ethnic and religious violence, and gender inequity, have led to the realization that the conventional or traditional security discourse appears inadequate to capture these emerging sources of insecurity. These newer sources of insecurity have had profound consequences for the individual human being, society, state, and interstate relationship. They tend to pose threats not only to the state but also to the community and the individual. It is now widely recognized that state security may not lead to human security.3 In fact, overemphasis on state security often endangers human security. Hence the need for an alternative approach to security. Such an alternative security paradigm, or an inclusive security discourse, includes among other issues those of the security of the individual and of the community. Here the prime focus is on the people, the human being. The paradigm of human security was thus brought to the centre stage because it creates a space where the issues affecting human beings can be taken care of. The primary concern here is how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they
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exercise their many rights, how much access they have to the market and other social opportunities and whether they live in conflict or in peace.4 It is a positive and inclusive concept which endorses peoples universal desire for self-preservation and selfimprovement. Scholars and analysts now believe that it has the potential to revolutionize society in the twenty-first century.5 As defined by the United Nations Development Programmes Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, human security is the summation of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. A Canadian paper defines human security as freedom of the individual from fear. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to peoples rights, safety or even their lives.6 The present paper looks into those socio-economic aspects that threaten individual security in day-today activities. In recent times human security is threatened everywhere, including Asia. Hence understanding the concept is not sufficient. One needs to know to what extent is human security at stake? What are the existing challenges to human security? And how do we face these challenges in order to ensure security now and in the future? The present paper addresses some of these questions.
development in terms of basic education, health care, employment and so forth. However, social and political indicators in these regions may not be so promising. To be more specific, gun-related crime, drug abuse, domestic violence, political unrest, etc., have endangered human security in these countries. In all these cases the target is the innocent person. It is not an overstatement to say that the very social fabric of these societies is severely threatened by such factors. Against this backdrop, we attempt to identify the main challenges to promoting human security in Asia. It is threatened by poverty and underdevelopment; small arms and light weapons; landmines; drug abuse and trafficking; trafficking of women and children; and gender violence and human rights violations. 2.1. Poverty and underdevelopment Poverty affects all aspects of human security. It is the most serious and persistent threat to human security. According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the rise in the total number of poor from 532 million to 562 million in South Asia is a great concern. The region is home to nearly three-quarters of the total number of poor in Asia and the Pacific, or about half the total number of poor in all developing countries of the world. Even though urban poverty is increasing, nearly four-fifths of the total number of poor in the Asia and Pacific region are still in rural areas. Poverty in the region continues to be primarily a rural problem. Although the basic concept of security is undergoing profound changes all over the world, as the security of people moves to centre stage, the policy-makers of South Asia appear to be undisturbed by this trend. According to the Human Development Report, soldiers outnumber doctors by 6 to 1, at a time when many people are dying of curable diseases. While foreign exchange budgets are tight the region still manages to spend twice as much as Saudi Arabia on the procurement of modern arms from abroad, although the latter has a per capita income twenty-five times higher than that of South Asia. While global military spending was declining by about 37 per cent during 198794, that of South Asia went up by 12 per cent.8 Needless to say that such heavy military spending is pre-empting scarce financial resources urgently needed for human development. In a nutshell, South Asia is fast emerging as the poorest, the most illiterate, the most malnourished, the least
2. Present state of human security in Asia Asia comprises a vast territory with each region having its own characteristics, giving rise to its own variety of problems and challenges. The concept of security also varies in different degrees in different parts of Asia. What may be the main challenges facing East Asia may not hold true for South Asia or Central Asia. Although the gap between South Asia and East Asia was almost non-existent in the 1960s, the remarkable economic performance of the East Asian countries in recent years has widened the gap tremendously. As a result of their high gross domestic product (GDP), the human development index and genderrelated development index of East Asia (excluding China) are now twice as high as those of South Asia.7 The question that one may ask is whether human security is ensured in its totality with the high GDP and high level of income in East Asia. We have attempted to define human security in terms of security that encompasses all aspects of the welfare of a human being economic, political, social, environmental but that nevertheless poses a threat to direct well-being. If we look at the state of human security in East Asia from this perspective, it is obvious that the people are economically secure and that East Asian economic prosperity has ensured human
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gender-sensitive, indeed the most deprived region in the world. Yet it continues to make more investment in arms than in the education and health of its people.9 2.2. Small arms and light weapons Apart from economic sources of human insecurity, the Asian countries are perhaps among the worst victims of violence, whether politically or socio-economically motivated. The main tools of violence in most cases are small arms and light weapons that have recently received much attention because of the havoc they are creating at the national, societal and, most importantly, at the individual level. These are the weapons that affect the security of the individual without nations entering into war. They have been taking a heavy toll on the lives of people in all countries, seriously endangering personal safety and security. The number of human lives lost through proliferation and trafficking of these weapons is staggering. In recent years they have emerged as having one of the most dangerous impacts on human security. While the developed countries have been quick to address the problem, not many developing countries have given the issue the attention it deserves. In the meantime, illegal trafficking of arms and drugs has assumed such enormous proportions that the internal stability of several developing countries is threatened. The evils of small arms are manifest in all parts of Asia. For example, in the countries of southern Asia, violence carried out by small arms and light weapons has become the norm rather than the exception. Sophisticated small arms and light weapons are smuggled in while cheap arms are manufactured in local markets. The state has also been a source of arms supply in Asia. Although small arms include portable weapons such as rifles, revolvers, heavy and light machine guns and chemical grenades, their size bears little relation to their destructive capability. Thousands of people have lost their lives by bomb and bullet in this region. In South Asia alone, although no data are available on illegal small arms proliferation, a rough estimation shows that more than 5 million illegal small arms exist in this region. With the widespread availability of the AK-47 assault rifle in South Asia, a Kalashnikov culture has taken deep-seated root in society. Improved technology has pushed children further into warfare. In 1988, there were around 200,000 child soldiers under the age of 15 years fully participating in conflicts all around the world.10 The dangerous dimension to the proliferation of small arms is that they are in the hands of
non-state actors. The largest users of small arms in South Asia are non-state actors comprising insurgents, separatist groups, terrorists, drug cartels, extortionists and criminals. Death and injury as a consequence of small arms and light weapons is a direct threat to human security. Reports show that in 1990, as many as sixteen ongoing conflicts and wars claimed 2,632,000 civilian lives. In the 1980s, the proportion of civilian deaths rose to 74 per cent of the total deaths in armed conflicts and in 1990 it appears to be close to 90 per cent. The war in Afghanistan cost the lives of more than 500,000 people.11 Currently, the prime target of the law-enforcing agencies in these countries is controlling the proliferation of small arms. At the intellectual level, however, the subject of small arms and light weapons remains a political and security taboo and, as such, not much systematic work has been done on the extent and impact of this menace in the region. 2.3. Landmines Landmines are another form of threat to human security. Some 120 million active mines are scattered in over seventy countries one for every sixteen children or forty-eight human beings on earth. Eight hundred people are killed and 1,200 are maimed every single month.12 Countries such as Viet Nam, Cambodia and Afghanistan are infested with landmines. The impact of landmines goes beyond physical suffering. In the long run, all of society has to pay. According to a Red Cross report,13 in Viet Nam each hectare can support roughly two families of five. The 3,500 hectares of farmland infested with mines in the Gio Linh district could normally support 35,000 people. Instead, these people are reduced to poverty because of a war fought before many of them were born. A 1995 study showed that in Cambodia, 61 per cent of victims go into debt to pay for their medical treatment, while in Afghanistan the figures are 84 per cent for residents and refugees and 87 per cent for nomads.14 The unique characteristic of anti-personnel mines is that they kill and injure more civilians after the ceasefire than during hostilities. They fail to distinguish between combatant and civilian.15 2.4. Drug abuse and trafficking Asia finds itself at the crossroads, flanked on both sides by two of the largest drug triangles (the Golden Triangle in the east, and the Golden Crescent in the west), not to mention the fact that the region is swarming with insurgencies and ethnic conflicts within and beyond its periphery. Today, Asia has turned into a safe haven for trafficking, producing, and marketing
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of both small arms and drugs. Being one of the largest and fastest-growing narcotics market in the world, it is no longer restricted to drug smuggling and trafficking to Europe and America. Drug consumption, especially among the young, has increased sharply over the years. Asias rising economic tide has made the drug problem worse, since the demand for narcotics increases with higher income levels. Higher incomes also lead to more variety in drug consumption.16 In the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, for example, addicts consume almost half of the estimated 200 metric tonnes of opium produced in the country each year, most of which used to be exported. There are 1.2 million heroine addicts in Thailand and 400,000 in Burma, and 500,000 registered heroine addicts in China.17 In India, there are an estimated 5 million drug users, but the worst victim is Pakistan which now has the largest heroine consumer market in the SouthWest Asian region.18 2.5. Trafficking of women and children Trafficking in and violence against women and children is directly related to the social and economic realities of each of the countries of Asia. It has greatly undermined and would continue to cause increasingly greater harm to families and individuals. The misery and agony of trafficking so many human lives throughout the world do not only have an impact on those involved but on society as a whole. Trafficking of women and children is rampant in the entire region, not only in South Asia. In the last two decades, there has been an alarming increase in trafficking of women and children from regions of South Asia and South-East Asia. On average around 10,000 Nepalese girls, most between the ages of 9 and 16, are sold to brothels in India every year. Researchers believe that more than 200,000 Nepalese girls are involved in the Indian sex trade. A report in Asiaweek19 shows that approximately 4 million under-age prostitutes operate in the bars and brothels of Thailand. It further states that of the 2 million street children in the Philippines, about 60,000 are involved in the flesh trade. Japan, however, is the biggest market for Asian women. Trafficking has taken the form of organized crime. There has been a tendency to stress the sexual exploitation aspect. While it cannot be denied that an overwhelming number of trafficked persons end up in brothels or are used in prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, etc., at the same time relatively recent trends such as organ sales and camel racing using young boys as jockeys also demand equal attention.
2.6. Gender violence and human rights violations Another threat to human security emanates from gender violence and violations of human rights. Increasingly, women in all parts of Asia are becoming vulnerable to various forms of violence. Rape, gang rape and murder, physical torture, honour killing, dowry-related violence, pyre-burning, acid-throwing, forced prostitution, disappearance, physical abuse and death in custody are some of the forms of violence against women. About 74 million women are quite simply missing in South Asia.20 Human rights are typically understood as equal and inalienable rights held by every person.21 The manifestation of human rights violations can vary from country to country and society to society. Broadly, human rights violations in Asia cover state repression, death in police custody, oppression of minorities, women and children. In many parts of Asia, awareness of individual rights and dignity is very low, either because of illiteracy or lack of comprehension of the very term human rights. The protection of human rights in Asia, where most of the population live below the poverty line and face illiteracy and socio-economic inequalities, is indeed a very complex task.
3. Conclusion Asias main challenge is to identify the sources of human insecurity in the light of the miseries that punctuate the daily lives of its people. Unless social and political institutions are improved and strengthened, it will be difficult to ensure human security. Effort is required at both governmental and nongovernmental levels if human security is to be promoted. There is no denying the fact that these issues should have been addressed decades ago. The problems may be internal but they have an external dimension because no country can deal with them alone. In Asia, we have not yet learnt to act as a collective force; we talk of East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia as separate continents. The time has come for the countries of Asia to deal with these challenges in collaboration. Since human security requires the nurturing of more stable and cooperative relationships among nations, and depends on greater cohesion among classes and societies, it cannot be achieved unilaterally. Now that human existence has come to be increasingly shaped by global and local trends, national policies need to be complemented by enhanced international cooperation among countries and by the strengthening of civil societies everywhere. We need more discussion, more studies and more exchanges of ideas and
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resources in order to overcome the threats of the past century that unfortunately linger on into the twenty-first century. From the above discussion it is clear that peace and human security need a shift from militarization to living economies that have the potential to meet peoples basic needs and provide day-to-day security.
True, traditional thinking will not wither away overnight. It will take sustained education and empowerment at the grass-roots level, and enlightened leadership, to overcome the biggest stumbling block to change of all, the human mind. Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.
NOTES
1. Quoted in Hussein Solomon, From Marginalised to Dominant Discourse: Reflections on the Evolution of New Security Thinking, Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) Monograph Series, No. 20, February 1998, p. 4. 2. Michael Renner, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity, p. 81, New York, Norton, 1996. 3. See Jack Donnelly, Rethinking Human Rights, pp. 38794; and Michael T. Klare, Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms, pp. 3538, Current History, Vol. 95, No. 604, November 1996. 4. Concept Paper, WISCOMP Summer Symposium, New Delhi, India, 2126 August 2000. 5. Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, Human Security: A Broader Dimension, The Daily Star, 4 August 1999. 6. David Preston and Don Hubert, Towards Freedom from Fear: An Agenda for Human Security, BIISS Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2000, p. 347. 7. Mahbub ul Haq, Human Development in South Asia, p. 66, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. 8. Ibid., p. 80. 9. Ibid., p. 1.
10. Christopher Louise, The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation, p. 6, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 1995. 11. For details see Neila Husain, Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh, RCSS Policy Studies, May 1999, pp. 1920. 12. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. 13. Land Mines Must Be Stopped, a publication of the Mines Campaign Unit of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva. 14. Anti-personnel Mines: An Overview, Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, August 1997. 15. Ibid. 16. James Shinn, Asias Drug Menace and the Poverty of Diplomacy, Current History, April 1998, p. 174. 17. Ibid. 18. ul Haq, op. cit., p. 13. 19. Asiaweek, 7 February 1997. 20. ul Haq, op. cit., p. 24. 21. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 387.
CLOSING SESSION
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Reports on the debates of the five round tables
REPORTS ON THE DEBATES OF THE FIVE ROUND TABLES The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace FIRST ROUND TABLE Africa
by Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the region, the discussions focused on the following issues: The question of the need to reinforce statebuilding versus the strengthening of civil society with a view to adequately ensuring human security was discussed in depth. Consensus was reached on the question of the responsibility of the state in creating an adequate context for the strengthening of civil society organizations, particularly in rural areas, and on the need to foster pluralism in the framework of the strengthening of democratic processes in Africa. It was also emphasized that international organizations should contribute to enhance the role and the capacities of NGOs in development and in the strengthening of democracy. The need to reinforce education for peace, in particular in the framework of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, proclaimed by the UN General Assembly, was stressed. Particular emphasis was placed on the responsibility of UNESCO in this field, in the light of its wideranging experience in promoting a culture of peace and citizenship education. Various remarks were made concerning the role of religion and tribalism as factors of division within societies: the majority of the participants considered that religion and tribal origin are often used by governing elites to create crisis within societies with a view to maintaining their grip on the state. Much stress was laid on the need to support African initiatives and the national, subregional and regional ownership of conflict prevention and human security initiatives and programmes. The interlinkages between environmental and natural resources protection and human security were repeatedly stressed, in particular concerning prevention of conflicts over natural resources in densely populated areas. Particular stress was placed on ensuring national ownership of poverty reduction strategies, taking into account the negative impact of initiatives based on conditionalities.
SECOND ROUND TABLE Europe

by Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the region, the discussions focused on the following issues: A comparative analysis was made of challenges to human security in Africa and Europe: questions of scale and in particular of urgency were
discussed in depth. In that context, various speakers dealt at length with the human security dimensions of the crisis in the Balkans. Many participants referred to the importance of the action of NGOs in the field, in particular those working in education.
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On the basis of a communication made by Ms Jacqueline Morineau (Mediation and Training for Mediation Centre, Paris) the participants debated the lessons drawn from field experience in Macedonia on mediation, and the need to accept the realities of the different insecurities affecting civilian populations in order to take into account all the factors having an impact on personal and individual behaviour. The impact of globalization on human security was also stressed, in particular the new divisions and fractures it is creating. The role of the weapons trade was also analysed in depth, in
particular regarding the relations between the more-developed and the less-developed countries. Stress was laid on the need to work closely with civil society, enhancing the role of NGOs and field projects in the building of human security. It was also suggested that the creation of social science observatories would be most useful for monitoring, studying and resolving major problems related to human security, in particular in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. The importance of networking was repeatedly stressed, in particular through the strengthening of the SecuriPax Forum launched by UNESCO.
THIRD ROUND TABLE Latin America and the Caribbean

by Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO
On the basis of the three main lectures concerning the region, the discussions focused on the following issues: The obstacles facing demobilization after civil strife and the need for effective implementation of social, economic and cultural programmes following the signing of peace agreements. The need to reinforce the capacities of civil society to deal with growing insecurity within states, in particular in urban and peri-urban areas. The need to reinforce citizenship education, with a view to deconstructing the culture of violence. The importance of confidence-building measures in the region and the need for strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms.
The need to refocus academic research as a basis for the formulation of alternative conflictprevention mechanisms. The need to increase dialogue between universities, research institutions and the armed and security forces with a view to enhancing peace and stability. Major emphasis was placed on the impact of both poverty and exclusion on the most vulnerable populations and the consequences for internal stability. Emphasis was also placed on the complexities of reconciliation processes, based on the different reports of truth and justice commissions in the countries of the region.
FOURTH ROUND TABLE Arab States

by Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO
On the basis of the main lecture concerning the region, the discussions focused on the following issues: Challenges to human security from within the state,
such as population growth, economic growth, water supply and food security, human resources and environmental issues; and raising public awareness on the impact of these developments.
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Challenges to human security from the international system: globalization, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the neglect of cultural diversity, which is a major problem in the Arab region both internally and from an external perspective. The negative consequences of sanctions and embargoes and the need for further international dialogue and cooperation on both of these issues. The framework for the future: globalization trends which would give new scope for security in terms of democratization, evolution of the role of the
armed and security forces, and increased participation of civil society. The respect for and development of international law, in particular concerning water resources management and further regional integration, emphasizing conflict-resolution mechanisms. The need to enhance the intellectual role of peace research and training institution networks in order to devise early-warning mechanisms related to human security issues and the development of alternative paradigms on peace, in the light of the ongoing discussions of Huntingtons and Kaplans works.
FIFTH ROUND TABLE Asia and the Pacific

by Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
On the basis of the two main lectures concerning the region, the discussions focused on the following issues: In recent times human security is threatened everywhere, Asia being no exception. This part of the world has its own characteristics that give rise to its own variety of problems and challenges. The concept of security therefore varies in different parts of Asia East Asia, South Asia or Central Asia as reflected in the presentations. During the two last decades, the remarkable economic performance of the East Asian countries has considerably widened the gap between this subregion, on the one hand, and South Asia and Central Asia, on the other. But the question could be raised whether, with the high GDP and high level of income in East Asia, human security is ensured in its totality? The answer is obviously no. Although East Asian economic prosperity has contributed to human development in terms of wealth, basic education, health care, employment, poverty reduction (as recognized by the World Bank); human security and the very social structure of these societies are severely threatened by new factors, such as gun-related crime, drug abuse, domestic violence, and political unrest. Indeed, these countries are also threatened by other factors assimilated to ecological insecurity, political instability and social disintegration. According to security experts (here we refer to the presentation of Major-General Ahsan from Bangladesh), human security in Asia is threatened
by poverty and underdevelopment; small arms and light weapons; landmines; drug abuse and trafficking; trafficking of women and children; and gender violence and human rights violations. Here, we come back to the concept of comprehensive security, a balanced approach between peace and human security mentioned by Mr Syed from Pakistan. Poverty affects all aspects of human security and represents the most serious and persistent threat to it. Although urban poverty is increasing, poverty in the Asia and Pacific region continues to be primarily a rural problem. Small arms and light weapons in recent years have been shown to have one of the most dangerous impacts on human security. The impact of landmines goes beyond the physical suffering of the wounded, as in the long term the whole of society has to pay the price. Drug abuse and trafficking: Asia, as one of the largest and fastest-growing narcotics market in the world, has turned into a safe haven for trafficking, producing and marketing of both small arms and drugs. Trafficking of women and children has shown an unhealthy increase in the last two decades and has taken the form of organized crime. Gender violence and human rights violations are another threat to human security, as women in all parts of Asia are becoming vulnerable to various forms of violence and the awareness of individual rights and dignity is very low.
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What makes Asia so different compared with other regions is that an unprecedented crisis has occurred, the Asian Crisis following the Asian Miracle of the late 1990s, which transformed the character of security issues and discourse throughout Asia as well as prospects for and optimism about regional cooperation and integration. The result has been a transformation in the definition of and debates about security within the region towards a more positive, inclusive and comprehensive notion of human security, which has to overcome the threats mentioned above. Thinking and reflection in Asia on security matters go far beyond what happens in other regions since there is an Asian regional dialogue through three channels: Track One: which deals with official, inter-state diplomacy related to conventional notions of national security; Track Two: composed of diplomats, academics and researchers who focus their approach on functional and technical matters (such as communications, disasters, energy, oceans);
Track Three: with non-state actors such as local and national, regional and global NGOs together with think-tanks and the media. The focus is on long-term, non-traditional issues of cultural, economic, ecological, personal, social and technological threats to human development and human security. The need for good governance for human security: the crisis of the late 1990s shook confidence in Asian values and revealed the fragility of links between the regions economies, politics and societies. Pressures for first political and then economic liberalization, perceived as a means of overcoming the crisis, helped to change the balance between state and non-state actors throughout the region, leading to new patterns of governance between them. In this context, good governance in Asia in the future requires a set of mechanisms which will ensure the appropriate roles of companies and civil societies as well as of states in policy- and decision-making on all issues, including peace, security and development.
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Final Recommendations
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General, Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO
1. Human security can be considered today as a paradigm in the making, for ensuring both a better knowledge of the rapidly evolving largescale risks and threats that can have a major impact on individuals and populations, and a strengthened mobilization of the wide array of actors actually involved in participative policy formulation in the various fields it encompasses today. As such, it is an adequate framework for: accelerating the transition from past restrictive notions of security, tending to identify it solely with defence issues, to a much more comprehensive multidimensional concept of security, based on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles; contributing to sustainable development and especially to the eradication of extreme poverty, which is a denial of all human rights; reinforcing the prevention at the root of the different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict and internal strife that are taking a heavy toll on mainly civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception; providing a unifying theme for multilateral action to the benefit of the populations most affected by partial and interrelated insecurities. The importance should be underlined of the multilateral initiatives taken in this respect by Canada and Japan as well as by other countries. 2. The ongoing globalization process offers new opportunities for the strengthening of large coalitions working to further human security, at the multilateral and national levels, and in particular at local level involving all actors of society. This in turn requires a much stronger participation of peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other bodies dedicated to the promotion of peace and human security, with a view to enhancing the involvement of civil society in all aspects of policy formulation and implementation of actions aimed at
enhancing human security at the local, national, regional and international levels. 3. The promotion of human security today therefore requires an enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives in the fields of research, training, mobilization and policy formulation, in which UNESCO can play a major role as a facilitator, forum and amplifier of proactive human security initiatives, in particular in the framework of the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum website launched in September 2000 for that purpose (http://www.unesco.org/securipax) 4. The strengthening of the action of the United Nations and, in particular, of UNESCO in favour of human security is essential today, taking into account the objectives set out in the UN Millennium Summit Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, and the Declaration and Plan for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (20012010), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly, as well as on the measures being taken to reach internationally agreed development targets, in particular in the fields of poverty eradication; education for all; the preservation of the environment and notably of water resources; and the struggle against AIDS. 5. The compounded impact of a growing number of threats to the security of populations requires the establishment of innovative interdisciplinary approaches geared to the requirements of inducing participative preventive action, involving all social actors. The intimate links that should exist between research projects and policy formulation in the field of prevention must also be stressed from the outset, taking into account the fact that current research on various dimensions of security is still largely dissociated from the existing policy formulation mechanisms, particularly at the national and subregional levels. On the basis of a common agenda for action, the
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6.
7.
8.
9.
peace research and training institutions, institutes for security studies and the NGOs working in related fields can play an essential role in creating these links, building bridges between the academic world and the policy formulation mechanisms, contributing to the establishment of such mechanisms wherever necessary, identifying priority fields to be tackled and the populations that merit particular and urgent attention. Regional and subregional approaches should be elaborated for the promotion of human security in order to more precisely identify the nature, scope and impact of the risks and threats that can affect populations in the medium and long term. UNESCO should contribute to the elaboration of these regional and subregional approaches, in cooperation with national and regional organizations and institutions and on the basis of the regional round tables (on Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean) held during the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions. Urgent attention should be paid to the reinforcement of the struggle against AIDS, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a real threat to peace and security, as stated by the United Nations Security Council. Special attention should be paid to the most highly populated countries, given the fact that in these countries the interrelationship between population growth, diminishing natural resources, environmental degradation and the overall impact of ongoing globalization processes is of great complexity and must consequently be dealt with, in particular in terms of designing local approaches focusing on specific population groups. The development of human resources is a key factor, if not the most important, for ensuring human security. Basic education for all and the building of capacities at the national level must therefore be placed high on the human security agenda. Institutes for peace and human security can play an important role in national capacity building in fields such as the setting up of earlywarning mechanisms related to major risks and threats to human security; and high-level training for the elaboration of regional and subregional long-term approaches for ensuring human security and the formulation of preventive action policies. Critical post-conflict issues such as reconciliation processes and mechanisms and the often harsh impact of sanctions on populations merit
more in-depth analysis in terms of human security, in the framework of an enhanced respect for international instruments, in particular of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Concerning reconciliation processes and mechanisms, due attention should be paid to the adequate dissemination of best experiences and practices and to the comparative analysis of these experiences and practices, especially of the work of the various truth and justice commissions set up in the last two decades in various countries. Concerning the impact of sanctions on populations, note should be taken of ongoing initiatives within the United Nations in order to review the modalities of the imposition of such sanctions and the action of UN Specialized Agencies to alleviate their impact on civilian populations. 10. The impact on human security of migrations and of movements of populations displaced due to conflict should be highlighted. Concerning migrations, attention should be paid to countering practices in host countries that discriminate against legal immigrants, and in the case of populations displaced due to conflict, the efforts of the international community should be reinforced, especially when the displacements take on a semipermanent character. 11. Due attention should be paid to countering the impact of negative paradigms (such as clash of civilizations, African anarchy, etc.), based on stereotypes and simplistic analyses of the interactions between cultures, societies and civilizations and which aim at fostering new divisions and fractures at the international and regional levels. The principles underlying the notions of cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination should be stressed and due attention should be paid to the follow-up to the Plan of Action of the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban, South Africa, 2001). 12. The role of the state in the promotion of human security must be addressed on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of challenges in matters relating to human security, both from within to ensure sustainable development, and from the rapidly evolving international processes linked to economic and financial globalization. States should be encouraged to establish ways of enlarging their cooperation with civil society, in particular with those NGOs and institutions that can contribute effectively to policy formulation and collaborative action in the field.
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Agenda for Action
AGENDA FOR ACTION of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace
The participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, organized by UNESCO on 27 and 28 November 2000, on the theme: What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?; Thank UNESCO for this initiative which allowed numerous peace research and training institutions to take part in the proceedings by means of a direct and fruitful dialogue; Unanimously note that current and future human security considerations are taking on global proportions, and that all factors in the human security equation are interacting on a world scale, in such a way that the need to understand them as one single theme is a cognitive step that increasingly needs to be taken everywhere, based on an intensive sharing of everyones contributions; Aware that peace research and training institutions, through their function as centres of training, analysis and policy elaboration, have a special responsibility in this respect, undertake to increase their cooperation in a common research effort to propose better ways to achieve peace, human security, development, respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic principles; Anxious to disseminate their conclusions as widely as possible, adopt as the basis of their continuing project the following Agenda for Action: Human security is indivisible. A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates the overall need for human security, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The worlds future depends upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals; Awareness of the global and universal nature of human security necessary to all forms of progress and acknowledgement of the appropriate
role of the peace research and training institutions in this respect, call for a considerable evolution in peoples minds; The representatives of peace research and training institutions share an important responsibility in this field, through their capacity to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis of the world in its current state, a clear perception of the changes awaiting it and a constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to provide general progress with the conditions necessary for human security, that is to say the possibility of its being of a lasting nature. Consequently, the participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, Decide to create the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace in order to remain united for the purpose of future activities; Welcome UNESCOs proposal to assign to the Network they have thus created, the SecuriPax Forum (http://www.unesco.org/securipax), aimed at facilitating the exchange of information and best experiences and practices in the field of human security; Decide to work together with a view to contributing to the promotion of concrete actions of general interest, ranging from joint efforts to define human security indicators to high-level training activities; Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple capacities, and this on the basis of all the contributions and recommendations made at this First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions; Express their willingness to organize regional and subregional meetings in the coming years in the framework of the International SecuriPax Network; Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda for Action to join them in the Network created and to share efforts with them.
APPENDICES
Appendices
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Organizing Committee
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS OF PEACE RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
Ms Moufida Goucha Responsible for Organization of the Meeting Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
Ms Claudia Maresia Responsible for Coordination of the Meeting Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
Ms Mercedes Aldrete Secretariat of the Meeting Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance (UNESCO)
With the assistance of: Mr Ren Zapata Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)
Mr Russ Russell Responsible for the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum Bureau of Strategic Planning (UNESCO)
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Programme
PROGRAMME First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions

UNESCO, Paris 2728 November 2000
General objectives Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed (UNESCO Constitution) In its transdisciplinary programme Towards a Culture of Peace, UNESCO advocates the notion of human security as a matrix in which matters pertaining to peace and human security could be addressed in an ongoing manner by all the various forces in society. Security and conflict-prevention specialists whether independent or operating within universities and institutions concerned with defence, security or strategic studies have a major part to play, specifically with a view to securing fuller acknowledgement of the real peace and security needs of peoples. The meeting, scheduled for 27 and 28 November, is intended:
(1) to bring together Directors of institutions concerned with peace research and training who are representative of several countries and regions, in order that they may present the priorities of their action-oriented research programmes; (2) to prompt reflection among them resulting in joint programmes aimed at promoting peace and human security; (3) to lay the foundations of steadier cooperation among such institutions in the form of networks; (4) to make plans for practical projects, particularly in the field of education and training for peace and human security. Special attention will be paid to educational content and to UNESCO Chairs.
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Programme
Programme1 Monday, 27 November 2000 8.30 a.m. 9.00 a.m. Reception of participants OPENING CEREMONY Inaugural speech by Mr Kochiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO read by Mr Ali Kazancigil, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences a.i. Keynote address on the promotion of human security within the United Nations by Mr Hassen Fodha, Director, United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), Paris, France Keynote address on the Canadian initiative to strengthen human security by H.E. Mr Louis Hamel, Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO Coffee break Presentation of the International Year for the Culture of Peace by Mr Enzo Fazzino, Programme Specialist, International Year for the Culture of Peace, UNESCO Presentation of the SecuriPax Forum2 by Mr Russ Russell, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO
9.45 a.m. 10.10 a.m. 10.20 a.m.
10.30 a.m. FIRST ROUND TABLE 12.30 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Africa Moderator: Mr Bertrand Badie, Graduate Programme Director, Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris, France Rapporteur: Mr Mambaelele Mankoto, Programme Specialist, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO Lecturers:3 Mr Gabriel Siakeu, President, World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace (EIP), Yaound, Cameroon Mr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa 12.30 p.m. 2.30 p.m. 4.30 p.m. Free time SECOND ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Europe Moderator: Mr Philippe Ratte, Senior Programme Planning Officer, UNESCO Rapporteur: Ms Antonella Verdiani, Programme Specialist, Education for Universal Values Section, UNESCO Lecturer:3 Mr Bjrn Mller, Former Secretary-General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA), Copenhagen, Denmark Coffee break THIRD ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Latin America and the Caribbean Moderator: Ms Kaisa Savolainen, Director, Division for the Promotion of Quality Education, UNESCO Rapporteur: Ms Suzanne Diop, Programme Specialist, Division for Intercultural Projects, UNESCO Lecturers:3 Mr Alejandro Bendaa, President, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Managua, Nicaragua Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena, Director, Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) Santiago, Chile General Juan Alberto Lezama, Director, Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), Montevideo, Uruguay Reception for participants offered by Mr A. Kazancigil, ADG/SHS a.i., UNESCO
4.30 p.m. 5.00 p.m. 7.00 p.m.
7.00 p.m.
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Tuesday, 28 November 2000 9.00 a.m. 10.30 a.m. FOURTH ROUND TABLE The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in the Arab States Moderator: Mr Ren Zapata, Director, Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, UNESCO Rapporteur: Mr Luis Salamanques, Programme Specialist, Bureau of Strategic Planning, UNESCO Lecturer:3 Ms Ghada Ali Moussa, National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES), Cairo, Egypt Coffee break
10.30 a.m.
11.00 a.m. FIFTH ROUND TABLE 1.00 p.m. The main challenges facing the promotion of human security and peace in Asia and the Pacific Moderator: Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos, Assistant Director-General, Priority Africa Department, UNESCO Rapporteur: Mr Quang Nam Thai, Programme Specialist, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO Lecturers:3 Mr Timothy M. Shaw, Director, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; Visiting Professor, Aalborg University, Denmark Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan, Director-General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, Bangladesh 1.00 p.m. 2.30 p.m. 5.30 p.m. Free time CLOSING SESSION Reports on the debates of the five round tables presented by Ms Moufida Goucha, Rapporteur-General, Director, Peace and Human Security Programme, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance, UNESCO Proposed establishment of a SecuriPax Network Adoption of the Agenda for Action of the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace
1. Working languages were English and French. 2. The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum was open to the participants during the meeting. 3. The lecturers presentations were followed by a debate open to all the participants.
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Working document
WORKING DOCUMENT The promotion of human security: The state of play

Drawn up by the Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance Peace and Human Security Programme
Several attempts have been made since the end of the Cold War to extend the concept of security. In general, the authors proceed simply by accumulation, adding on various non-military dimensions of security to traditional military parameters. Such efforts are mainly based on a conception of security that gives precedence to national security, which in most cases is no more than a defence policy.
These two concepts are in agreement in one vital area, that of respect for human rights. However, despite this common element which seeks to give full support to the protection of individuals and fundamental rights, they are far apart when it comes to defining the scope of security for individuals and peoples.
1. A new concept? Of all the attempts to formulate a new concept of security, two, in our opinion, deserve to be studied in greater detail. The first is the notion of human security, as presented in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994, while the second is the notion of democratic security, as promoted notably by the Council of Europe since 1993, but which has been developed to a remarkable degree in the Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, a little-known but none the less basic document. The merit of these two concepts human security and democratic security is that they are first and foremost integrative concepts of a special kind, in that they seek from the outset to define security around a core of non-military parameters. Accordingly, human security, as set out in the UNDP Report of 1994, falls within the context of the promotion of human development defined as a process of widening the range of peoples choices. Democratic security, as promoted by the Council of Europe and other European institutions, seeks to found security on common values, in particular the rule of law, observance of human rights and the separation of powers. In other documents, for example the Charter of Paris (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSCE), the principles of the philosophy of liberal democracy and the rule of law, featuring adherence to a single system of political values as the major parameter of collective security, are presented as the foundation of a broader vision of security.
2. From human insecurity to human security The UNDP Report of 1994 lists the threats to human security under seven main categories threats to economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security while the various texts on democratic security refer mainly to the democratic organization of public life modelled on the Western, and especially European, democracies to the rule of law and to human rights. It will be recalled that in the pioneering approach of the UNDP, human security is the outcome of two fundamental lines of action, themselves based on two key principles of the Charter of the United Nations: from fear to freedom and from want to freedom, or freedom from fear and freedom from want. The content of the concept of human security in fact corresponds to the solutions and measures that are needed to forestall the various kinds of threats and risks perceived as obstacles to human development and to the capacity of human beings to use their potential to the full. The different aspects of human security are therefore as follows: economic security (unemployment, job insecurity, disparities in income and resources, poverty and homelessness); food security (expressed in terms of the quantitative and qualitative availability of food); health security (diseases, new viruses, including AIDS, respiratory diseases caused by air pollution); environmental security (air, water, soil and forest degradation); personal security (conflicts, poverty, drug-related crime, violence against women and children, terrorism); community security (ethnic and cultural
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conflicts); and political security (violation of human rights). Many of these threats to human security have an international or global dimension in that they stem from events or processes occurring beyond territorial boundaries. Lastly, human security is meant to create favourable conditions for the flourishing of human development, another UNDP approach that was logistical and innovative for its time.
3. A new linkage? It is tempting to combine the two notions of human security and democratic security. The first to attempt this was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, in a document entitled Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, which he submitted for consideration by an informal group of diplomats from eleven countries, meeting on 19 and 20 May 1999 in Bergen, Norway. The aim of the document was to give the human security concept an operational character and to establish a precise political agenda. The contribution by Bertrand Badie, launching the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum in September 2000, defines the notion of human security by noting that the distinction between national security and international security is now meaningless and that there can be no international security when civil peace is uncertain. The article goes on to say that peace is no longer guaranteed by military power alone, but is dependent upon development, protection of the environment, respect for human rights, etc. The main distinguishing feature of human security is that it addresses the issue of war, violence and physical or psychological constraint from a human perspective, centred on the individual, unlike the traditional perspective which takes a state, national or social approach.
4. A new approach involving the role of freedom in development and human security The notion of freedom has always existed in conventional economic and political schools of thought. But more than any other basic text, the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in its preamble, lays the foundations of the notion of freedom: We the peoples of the United Nations determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses that Member States have pledged themselves to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On this basis, the work done, more specifically by Amartya Sen, winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize for Economics, represents an important stage in the investigation and theory of development as freedom. In Sens opinion, the essential point is the intrinsic value of human freedom, which must be the ultimate goal of development (see Development As Freedom: Human Capability and Global Need, Sen, 1999). This new approach to freedom, which is no longer abstract but centred on human beings and their actual relations with society, is also inseparable from human security. In fact, over the last few years, the approach to security has shifted from the concept of national security, based on the military defence of the state, to that of human security, which concerns human beings and their welfare. Human security therefore has two aspects: in negative terms, it refers to freedom, liberation from certain threats and risks such as the lack of basic necessities, hunger, natural disasters, torture, imprisonment without a fair trial, discrimination, etc.; while in positive terms, human security aims at freedom to achieve a goal or the ability or opportunity for every individual to enjoy life as fully as possible, starting with such basic needs as the best possible access to water, food, shelter and education. This approach to human security covers all political, economic, social, cultural and environmental dimensions and the many necessary links between them. It also leads to other approaches and measures involving action by the entire United Nations system, including UNESCO, in conflict-prevention and postconflict peace-building. * * * In the context of ever-greater globalization, whose adverse consequences outweighing the positive effects further impair and perpetuate what are now known in international cooperation circles (the United Nations, development non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, etc.) as risk societies, within which there is more and more talk of human vulnerability, the integrative and profoundly humanistic concept of human security can contribute, through innovative and exemplary activities, to peace and development.
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List of participants
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Major-General Jamil D. Ahsan Director-General Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) 1/46 Elephant Road Dhaka 1000 Bangladesh Tel: + 880 2 831 58 08/831 26 09 Fax: + 880 2 831 26 25 E-mail: dgbiiss@bd.drik.net Internet: http://www.biiss.org Ms Mercedes Aldrete Secretariat of the Meeting Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 45 53 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: m.aldrete@unesco.org Mr Joaqun Antua Len President Fundacin Paz y Cooperacin C/ Melndez Valds, 68, 4 28015 Madrid Spain Tel: + 34 91 549 61 56 Fax: + 34 91 543 52 82 E-mail: pazycoop@eurosur.org Mr Bernard Aussedat General Verification Coordinator Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Karntnerring 5-7 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: + 43 1 51 31 630 17 Fax: + 43 1 51 31 630 32/-33 E-mail: oscear24@atnet.at
Mr Ramdane Babadyt Consultant cole Instrument de Paix (EIP) 5, rue du Simplon Geneva Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 735 24 22 Fax: + 41 22 735 06 53 E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch Mr Bertrand Badie Director, Graduate Programme in International Relations Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris 27, rue Saint-Guillaume 75007 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 39 39 75/ + 33 1 45 49 50 90/-92 Fax: + 33 1 45 48 04 41/ + 33 1 42 22 40 26 E-mail: bertrand.badie@sciences-po.fr Mr Alejandro Bendaa President Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) Apartado Postal 1747 Managua Nicaragua Tel: + 505 278 54 13 Fax: + 505 267 05 17 E-mail: pedro47@aol.com Internet: http://www.ceinicaragua.org.ni Ms Marlena Bouche-Osochowska International Consultant 47-49, rue du Pre Corentin 75014 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 45 43 37 28 Fax: + 33 1 45 43 37 28 E-mail: mbouche@infonie.fr
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Mr Robert Bussire Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS) 18, rue du Pressoir 75020 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 46 36 29 07 Fax: + 33 1 46 36 29 07 E-mail: r.bussiere@wanadoo.fr Mr Luis Cardenas President Corporacin Servicio Paz y Justicia SERPAJ-CHILE Cienfuegos 85 Santiago Chile Tel: + 56 2 697 20 01 Fax: + 56 2 672 76 08 E-mail: serpaj@cmet.net Mr Christophe Carle Deputy Director, Director of Research United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Palais des Nations 1211 Geneva Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 917 17 93 Fax: + 41 22 917 01 76 E-mail: ccarle@unog.ch Ms Gabriela Castillo Minister Counsellor Permanent Delegation of Costa Rica to UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 25 73 Fax: + 33 1 42 73 16 45 E-mail: g.castillo@unesco.org Ms Caterina Casullo Head Office in Europe United Nations University UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75015 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 30 08 Fax: + 33 1 40 65 91 86 E-mail: unuoe@unesco.org
Ms Myriam Chantereau 88, rue de la Rpublique 95100 Argenteuil France Tel: + 33 1 34 10 93 80 E-mail: mchantereau@hotmail.com Mr Jean-Paul Charnay President Centre de Philosophie de la Strategie (CPS) 20, rue de Beaune 75007 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 42 61 06 81 Mr Dumitri Chitoran Consultant Higher Education Division UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 41 07 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 58 14 E-mail: d.chitoran@unesco.org Mr Adrin Ciancio Coordinator UNESCO Chair on Peace Philosophy Enmedio 82 12001 Castelln Spain Tel: + 34 964 23 25 51 Fax: + 34 964 23 02 12 E-mail: caraball@guest.uji.es Mr Jakkie Cilliers Executive Director Institute for Security Studies (ISS) PO Box 1787 Brooklyn Square 0075 Pretoria South Africa Tel: + 27 12 346 95 00/-2 Fax: + 27 12 460 09 98 E-mail: jkc@iss.co.za Internet: http://www.iss.co.za Mr Philippe Cocquebert Institut des Hautes tudes de Dfense Nationale (IHEDN-DEPFC) BP 41 00445 Armes France Tel: + 33 1 44 42 31 88 Fax: + 33 1 44 42 46 16 E-mail: etudes@ihedn.fr
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Ms Christine Cuvelier Universit de la Paix 4, Bd. du Nord 5000 Namur Belgium Tel: + 32 81 22 61 02 Fax: + 32 81 23 18 82 E-mail: universite.de.paix@skynet.be Internet: http://www.universitedepaix.org Mr Fernando De Salas Lpez Director Sociedad de Estudios Internacionales (SEI) Hortaleza, 104-2 Izda 28004 Madrid Spain Tel: + 34 91 308 49 34/411 18 28 Fax: + 34 91 308 49 34/411 18 28 E-mail: sei@seimadrid.org fernandosei@terra.es Ms Suzanne Diop Programme Specialist Division for Intercultural Projects (CLT/ICP) UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 47 68 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 88 E-mail: s.diop@unesco.org Mr Alfredo Dombe Instituto de Ralaoes Internacionais (IRI) Largo do Partido Edificio do Mirex, 7 andar Luanda Angola Tel: + 244 2 32 17 17 Fax: + 244 2 32 17 17 E-mail: mre.isri@netangola.com dombealfredo@hotmail.com Mr Daniel Durand National Secretary Mouvement pour la Paix 139, avenue Victor Hugo 93400 St-Ouen France Tel: + 33 1 40 12 09 12 Fax: + 33 1 40 11 57 87 E-mail: ddurand@mvtpaix.org
Mr Tahir Faradov Director Center for Peace and Conflict Studies Nizami Street, 12, Apt. 33 370001 Baku Azerbaijan Tel: + 994 12 92 27 34 Fax: + 994 12 93 85 28/90 11 80 E-mail: tfaradov@yahoo.com tfaradov@iatp.baku.az Mr Enzo Fazzino Programme Specialist International Year for the Culture of Peace (BSP/IYCP) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 05 68 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 57 E-mail: e.fazzino@unesco.org Internet: http://www.unesco.org/iycp Mr Vicen Fisas Armengol UNESCO Chair on Human Rights Escola de Cultura de Pau Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona Edifici G-6 Campus de la UAB 08193 Bellaterra (Cerdanyola del VallsBarcelona) Spain Tel: + 34 93 581 24 14 Fax: + 34 93 581 32 94 E-mail: unescopau@pangea.org Mr Hassen Fodha Director United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) c/o UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 49 00/-3 Fax: + 33 1 43 06 46 78 E-mail: h.fodha@unesco.org unic.paris@unesco.org Internet: http://www.onu.fr Mr Fernando Gonzalez Davison Deputy Director Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales e Investigaciones para la Paz (IRIPAZ) 1a, Calle 9-52 Zona 1 01001 Ciudad de Guatemala Guatemala Tel: + 502 250 04 21/232 82 60 Fax: + 502 253 15 32 E-mail: iripaz@internetdetelgua.com.gt
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Ms Moufida Goucha Director, Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 45 52 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: m.goucha@unesco.org peace&security@unesco.org Mr Gabriel Gumaraes Third Secretary Embassy of Angola 19, avenue Foch 75116 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 45 01 58 20 Fax: + 33 1 45 00 33 71 E-mail: anginfos@club-internet.fr H.E. Mr Louis Hamel Ambassador Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 35 17 Fax: + 33 1 43 06 87 27 E-mail: louis.hamel@dfait-maeci.gc.ca pesco@dfait-maeci.gc.ca Ms Brigitte Huissiet Auditor 8, Alle des Pins 78730 Saint-Arnoult en Yvelines France Mr Mangesh T. Karad World Peace Centre Maeers Mit S. No. 124, Paund Road, Kothrud Pune 411 038 Maharastra State India Tel: + 91 20 543 76 81 Fax: + 91 20 544 27 70 E-mail: wpcpune@hotmail.com
Mr Ali Kazancigil Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences a.i. Director, Division of Social Science Research and Policies (SHS/SRP) Sector for Social and Human Sciences UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 37 98 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 57 20 E-mail: a.kazancigil@unesco.org Mr Fatehyab Ali Khan Chairman Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA) Aiwan-e-Sadar Road PO Box 1447 Karachi-74200 Pakistan Tel: + 92 21 568 28 91/568 60 69 Fax: + 92 21 568 60 69 E-mail: piia@cyber.net.pk Mr Alwin Kramp Senior Programme Specialist Division for Intercultural Projects (CLT/ICP) UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75752 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 37 57 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 88 E-mail: a.kramp@unesco.org Mr Balkrishna Kurvey President Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection 537, Sakkardara Road Nagpur 440 009 India Tel: + 91 712 74 58 06 Fax: + 91 712 74 36 64 E-mail: iipdep@nagpur.dot.net.in Ms Imogen Lamb Journalist Radio France International (RFI) 104, avenue du Prsident Kennedy 75016 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 30 83 54 Fax: + 33 1 44 30 87 57 E-mail: imogene.lamb@rfi.fr
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Mr Patrick Lecomte Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair on Culture of Peace cole de la Paix de Grenoble 9, rue des Jardins 38420 Domne France Tel: + 33 4 76 77 15 69 Fax: + 33 4 76 77 15 69 E-mail: Patrick.Lecomte@univ-lyon2.fr Mr Jacques Le Dauphin Research Director Institut de Documentation et de Recherche sur la Paix (IDRP) 22, impasse des Champs Fleuris 92320 Chtillon France Tel: + 33 1 46 55 06 86 Fax: + 33 1 40 11 57 87 E-mail: jacques.le_dauphin@libertysurf.fr Mr Antoine Leonetti Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Developpement (IDPD) 39, av. Emile Henriot 06050 Nice Cedex 1 France Tel: + 33 4 92 15 71 99 Fax: + 33 4 92 15 71 97 E-mail: balmond@unice.fr Ms Dominique Levasseur Political Officer Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 35 17 Fax: + 33 1 43 06 87 27 E-mail: dominique.levasseur@dfait-maeci.gc.ca General Juan Alberto Lezama Director Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN) Br. Artigas 1488 Montevideo Uruguay Tel: + 598 2 709 17 76 + 598 2 709 49 88/709 89 18 Fax: + 598 2 707 53 14 E-mail: calen@adinet.com.uy Internet: http://www.calen.gub.uy
Mr Franois Mabille Deputy Director Centre de la Recherche sur la Paix (CRP) Institut Catholique de Paris 24, rue Cassette 75006 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 39 84 99 Fax: + 33 1 44 39 52 86 E-mail: fasse@icp.fr Mr Joseph Mala Dean Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences (IFOMENE-CRP) Institut Catholique de Paris 24, rue Cassette 75006 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 39 52 06 Fax: + 33 1 44 39 52 86 E-mail: fasse@icp.fr Mr Jean-Gabriel Makong President Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de la Personne (LCDP) BP 1514 Yaound Cameroon Tel: + 237 22 47 04/23 48 65/31 66 29 Fax: + 237 22 62 62/-3 E-mail: lcdp@iccnet.cm Mr Mambaelele Mankoto Programme Specialist Division of Ecological Sciences (SC/ECO) UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 40 37 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 58 04 E-mail: m.mankoto@unesco.org Mr F. Marchand President Institut de Recherche sur la Rsolution Nonviolente des Conflits (IRNC) 14, rue des Meuniers 93100 Montreuil France Tel: + 33 1 42 87 94 69 Fax: + 33 1 48 57 92 97 E-mail: irnc@multimania.com
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Ms Claudia Maresia Responsible for Coordination of the Meeting Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 45 54 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: c.maresia@unesco.org peace&security@unesco.org Mr Jean Marichez Director Action Civile et Defense 45, chemin de la Prouse 73800 Arbin France Tel: + 33 4 79 65 22 82 Fax: + 33 4 79 65 22 11 E-mail: act.civ.def@wanadoo.fr Ms Caroline Martinez Peace and Human Security Programme Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 45 52 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org Mr Vicent Martinez Guzmn Director UNESCO Chair on Peace Philosophy Enmedio 82 12001 Castelln Spain Tel: + 34 964 23 25 51 Fax: + 34 964 23 02 12 E-mail: martguz@fis.uji.es Ms Nicola McBean Expert on China Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) 34, rue Hamelin 75016 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 47 23 44 76 Fax: + 33 1 47 23 59 80 E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr
Mr Tuomo Melasuo Docent, Research Director Tampereen Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) University of Tampere 33014 Tampere Finland Tel: + 358 3 215 76 92 Fax: + 358 3 223 66 20 E-mail: yttume@uta.fi Ms Djalma Miala Third Secretary Permanent Delegation of Angola to UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 29 75 Fax: + 33 1 45 67 57 48 E-mail: del.angounesco@gofornet.com Ms Pascale Molho Center for Non-Violent Communication (CNVC) 28, rue Parmentier 92200 Neuilly-sur-Seine France Tel: + 33 1 41 34 04 42 Fax: + 33 1 41 34 04 52 E-mail: pascale.molho@online.fr cnvc@compuserve.com Mr Bjrn Mller Former Secretary-General International Peace Research Association (IPRA) c/o Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) Fredericiagade 18 DK-1310 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: + 45 33 45 50 52 Fax: + 45 33 45 50 60 E-mail: bmoeller@copri.dk Internet: http://www.copri.dk/ipra/bm.html Mr Rodrigo Montaluisa Vivas International Executive Director Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Relaciones Internacionales y Estrategicas (FERIS) 97, Bd. Carl-Vogt 1205 Geneva Switzerland c/o Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) Paez #118 y Av. Patria Quito Ecuador Tel: + 41 22 320 83 79 Fax: + 41 22 320 83 79 E-mail: feris.ge@bluewin.ch
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Ms Colette Morichard Centre de Mediation et de Formation la Mediation (CMFM) 9, rue de La Fayette 7800 Versailles France Tel: + 33 1 39 49 40 34 Fax: + 33 1 39 49 40 34 Ms Jacqueline Morineau Founder Centre de Mediation et de Formation la Mediation (CMFM) 24, rue Tournefort 75005 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 43 36 70 07 Fax: + 33 1 47 07 57 15 E-mail: cmfm@easynet.fr Ms Ghada Ali Moussa Researcher National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES) 1 Kasr El Nile Street Bab El Louk PO Box 18 Cairo 11513 Egypt Tel: + 20 2 577 00 41/-2 + 20 2 577 11 25/337 33 02 Fax: + 20 2 577 00 63 E-mail: ghada92@hotmail.com afakhr@idsc.gov.eg Mr Jean-Denis Mouton Scientific Director Centre Mondial de la Paix (Verdun) Centre Europen Universitaire 15, place Carnot 54042 Nancy Cedex France Tel: + 33 3 83 19 27 80 Fax: + 33 3 83 19 27 87 E-mail: mouton@droit-eco.univ-nancy2.fr Mr David Mutimer Deputy Director York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS) 3rd Floor, 363 York Lanes, York University 4700 Keele Str. Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada Tel: + 1 416 736 51 56 Fax: + 1 416 736 57 52 E-mail: dmutimer@yorku.ca
Ms Paula-Ramona Napirlica Programme Coordinator Human Ecological Association (GEEA) CP 1634, OP 7 6600 Iasi Romania Tel: + 40 32 21 32 79 Fax: + 40 32 21 32 79 E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro Mr Martin Ortega Research Expert Institut dtudes de Scurit de lUEO 43, avenue du Prsident Wilson 75016 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 53 67 22 13 Fax: + 33 1 47 20 81 78 E-mail: m.ortega@iss-weu.com Mr Christos Papadimitriou Deputy Commandant (Major-General) Hellenic National Defense College Moustoxidi & Evelpidon Str. Athens 11473 Greece Tel: + 30 1 882 41 66 Fax: + 30 1 883 75 27 E-mail: hndc@ath.forthnet.gr Mr Richard Petris Director cole de la Paix de Grenoble 7, rue Trs Clotres 3800 Grenoble France Tel: + 33 4 76 63 81 41 Fax: + 33 4 76 63 81 42 E-mail: richardpetris@ecoledelapaix.org Mr Daniil Pikouza Governing Member Programs Leader Belarus Peace Foundation H-80, Apt. 28 Brestskaya str. 220099 Minsk Belarus Tel: + 375 17 278 70 01 Fax: + 375 17 232 92 93 E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru
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Mr Alexandre Plevako Second Secretary Permanent Delegation of Ukraine to UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 26 60 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 26 61 E-mail: dl_ukraine@unesco.org Ms Marina Pok Member of the Board of Directors Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) 34, rue Hamelin 75016 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 47 23 44 76 Fax: + 33 1 47 23 59 80 E-mail: cicpmp@sky.fr PO Box 1007 Phnom Penh Cambodia Tel: + 855 23 72 27 59 Fax: + 855 23 36 25 20 E-mail: cicp@camnet.com.kh Mr Giuliano Pontara President International University of Peoples Institutions for Peace (IUPIP) Palazzo Adami Piazza San Marco, 7 38068 Rovereto (Trento) Italy Tel: + 39 0464 42 42 88 Fax: + 39 0464 42 42 99 E-mail: iupip@unimondo.org Ms Claire Poulin Counsellor for Political Affairs Canadian Embassy 35, avenue Montaigne 75008 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 43 22 62 Fax: + 33 1 44 43 29 95 E-mail: claire.poulin@dfait-maeci.gc.ca Ms Monique Prindezis Secretary-General cole Instrument de Paix (EIP) 5, rue du Simplon Geneva Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 735 24 22 Fax: + 41 22 735 06 53 E-mail: cifedhop@mail-box.ch
Mr Philippe Ratte Senior Programme Planning Officer Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP/BP) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 12 16 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 21 E-mail: p.ratte@unesco.org Mr Jean Ridoux President Association Internationale des Educateurs la Paix (AIEP/IAEP) 13, Alle Maximilien Robespierre 92290 Chatenay Malabry France Tel: + 33 1 46 30 61 26 Fax: + 33 1 46 30 61 26 E-mail: iaep@infonie.fr Mr Francisco Rojas-Aravena Director Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Chile) Leopoldo Urrutia 1950, uoa-Casilla 3213, Correo Central Santiago Chile Tel: + 56 2 204 52 06 + 56 2 225 69 55/225 99 38 Fax: + 56 2 274 10 04 E-mail: frrojas@flacso.cl Internet: http://www.flacso.cl Ms Judit Rnai Director Lszl Nmeth Central-European Folk Academy PO Box 40 9400 Sopron Hungary Tel: + 36 99 31 69 89/288 81 81 Fax: + 36 99 31 69 89 E-mail: jronai@sopron.hu Ms Isabelle Roy Counsellor for Political Affairs Canadian Embassy 35, av. Montaigne 75008 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 44 43 22 64 Fax: + 33 1 44 43 29 95 E-mail: isabelle.roy@dfait-maeci.gc.ca
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Mr F. W. (Russ) Russell Responsible for the UNESCO SecuriPax Forum Programme Specialist Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 12 19 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 57 E-mail: f.russell@unesco.org Mr Stephen Ryan Magee College, Peace Studies Programme University of Ulster Londonderry BT48 7JL Northern Ireland United Kingdom Tel: + 44 2871 37 13 71 Fax: + 44 2871 37 52 07 E-mail: s.ryan@ulst.ac.uk Mr Luis Salamanques Programme Specialist Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 14 39 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 21 E-mail: l.salamanques@unesco.org Mr Miguel Sales Figueroa Senior Programme Specialist Programme for Freedom of Expression, Democracy and Peace (CI/FED) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 42 01 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 84 E-mail: m.sales@unesco.org Mr Pedro San Gins Aguilar Instituto de la Paz y los Conflictos Universidad de Granada Rector Lopez Argueta, S.N. 18071 Granada Spain Tel: + 34 958 24 41 42 Fax: + 34 958 24 89 74 E-mail: eirene@ugr.es / psgines@ugr.es
Mr Eric Sapin Director Citoyens, Dfense et Paix 16, rue Jean Giono 91000 Evry France Tel: + 33 1 64 97 83 46 Fax: + 33 1 60 78 28 61 E-mail: cidp@free.fr Ms Mady Sarfati Consultant in Health Communication 10, rue des Bourdonnais 75003 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 55 80 72 93 Fax: + 33 1 55 80 72 92 E-mail: mady.sarfati@free.fr Ms Kaisa Savolainen Director Division for the Promotion of Quality Education (ED/PEQ) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 10 99 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 56 39 E-mail: k.savolainen@unesco.org Mr Timothy M. Shaw Visiting Professor, Development and International Relations Aalborg University Fibigerstraede 2 DK-9220 Aalborg East Denmark Tel: + 45 96 35 83 49/-92 12 Fax: + 45 98 15 32 98 E-mail: shaw@i4.auc.dk Director Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies Department of Political Science Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4H6 Canada Tel: + 1 902 494 66 30 Fax: + 1 902 494 38 25 E-mail: centre@is.dal.ca
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Mr Gabriel Siakeu President Association Mondiale pour lcole Instrument de Paix (EIP Cameroun) BP 7715 Yaound Cameroon Tel: + 237 98 02 06/91 83 09/70 27 75 Fax: + 237 22 62 62/22 62 63 E-mail: eipcam@hotmail.com Mr Peter Stania Secretary-General International Institute for Peace (IIP) Mllwaldpl. 5 1040 Vienna Austria Tel: + 43 1 505 32 36 Fax: + 43 1 504 64 37 E-mail: iip@aon.at Ms Carolyn Stephenson Associate Professor of Political Science Matsunaga Institute for Peace University of Hawaii at Manoa Program of Conflict Resolution Honolulu, HI 96822 United States Tel: + 1 808 956 81 95 Fax: + 1 808 956 68 77 E-mail: c.stephen@hawaii.edu Ms Elmira Suleymanova President Azerbaijan Alliance for Peace and Development 3/6, S. Rustamov St. 370001 Baku Azerbaijan Tel: + 994 12 92 79 20 Fax: + 994 12 97 20 73 E-mail: elmira@awdc.baku.az Mr Fasahat H. Syed Senior Research Fellow Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) 20-A, College Road, F-7/2 Islamabad Pakistan Tel: + 92 51 922 28 13/-6 Fax: + 92 51 920 12 04 E-mail: fasahat@ipri-pak.org Internet: http://www.ipri-pak.org
Mr Marian Tamas Vice-President Human Ecological Association (GEEA) CP 1634, OP 7 6600 Iasi Romania Tel: + 40 32 21 32 79 Fax: + 40 32 21 32 79 E-mail: apgro@mail.dntis.ro Mr Quang Nam Thai Programme Specialist Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 39 20 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 57 20 E-mail: n.thai@unesco.org Mr Noureini Tidjani-Serpos Assistant Director-General Priority Africa Department (AFR) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 15 35 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 44 E-mail: n.tidjani-serpos@unesco.org Mr Batbuyan Tsend Counsellor Embassy of Mongolia 5, avenue Robert Schuman 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt France Tel: + 33 1 46 05 23 18 Fax: + 33 1 46 05 30 16 E-mail: 106513.2672@compuserve.com Ms Nicole Valenta Associate Programme Officer United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Palais des Nations 1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 917 84 51 Fax: + 41 22 917 80 47 E-mail: nicole.valenta@unitar.org
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Mr Victor M. Valle Consultant United Nations University for Peace Finca del Rodeo Ciudad Coln Apartado Postal 138-6100 San Jos Costa Rica Tel: + 506 205 90 00 Fax: + 506 249 19 29 E-mail: victoval@hotmail.com Ms Laure Veirler Consultant Division of Cultural Policies (CLT/CP) UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 40 32 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 97 E-mail: mediationbalkans@unesco.org Ms Antonella Verdiani Programme Specialist Education for Universal Values Section (ED/PEQ/EUV) UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 11 77 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 56 33 E-mail: a.verdiani@unesco.org Mr Patrick B. Vidal Director Bowman Technologies 30, avenue Franklin Roosevelt 75008 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 53 83 91 47 Fax: + 33 1 42 89 97 96 E-mail: pbvidal@free.fr Mr George Wachira Director Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa (NPI Africa) 5th floor, New Waumini-House Westlands PO Box 14894 Nairobi Kenya Tel: + 254 2 - 44 14 44 / 44 00 98 Fax: + 254 2 - 44 00 97 E-mail: npi@africaonline.co.ke wachirag@africaonline.co.ke
Ms Karen Weisblatt Executive Director Rotari Centre Institut dtudes Politiques de Paris 27, rue Saint Guillaume 75007 Paris France Tel: + 33 1 45 49 50 67 Fax: + 33 1 45 49 51 42 E-mail: karen.weisblatt@sciences-po.fr Mr Marat Yegorov President Belarus Peace Foundation H-54, Block 2, Apt. 46 Kalinovskogo str. 220086 Minsk Belarus Tel: + 375 17 239 19 37/264 65 24 Fax: + 375 17 269 09 54/239 19 37 E-mail: egorov_marat@mail.ru Mr Akira Yoshikawa Deputy Permanent Delegate of Japan to UNESCO Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 35 23 Fax: + 33 1 47 34 46 70 E-mail: deljpn.ed@unesco.org Ms Claudia Zampieri Counsellor Permanent Delegation of Argentina to UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 34 38 Fax: + 33 1 43 06 60 35 E-mail: c.zampieri@unesco.org Mr Ren Zapata Director Division of Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting (BSP/PMR) Bureau of Strategic Planning UNESCO 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 Paris 07 SP France Tel: + 33 1 45 68 12 77 Fax: + 33 1 45 68 55 21 E-mail: r.zapata@unesco.org
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Bio-sketches of the lecturers
BIO-SKETCHES OF THE LECTURERS
OPENING CEREMONY Mr Hassen FODHA Tunisia Mr Fodha began his career as Charg de Mission in the Cabinet of the Tunisian Minister for Information (196970) and as Chef de Cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (197074). He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Oman in January 1974 as a diplomatic counsellor and was named Minister Plenipotentiary, Charg dAffaires of Oman in Vienna, representing Oman in Austria and at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). He served as Ambassador of Oman to the United Nations Office in Geneva (197584) and concurrently as Consul-General of Oman in Switzerland. He was a delegate to the 1970 and 1983 UN General Assembly sessions. As head of the Permanent Mission of Oman and Chairman of the Arab Group in Geneva, he participated in the 1983 International Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination. He also served as Chief of the Omani delegation to the International Conference on the Law of the Sea, the International Conference on the Question of Palestine and the first International Conference on African Refugees. Mr Fodha joined the United Nations Secretariat in March 1985 as Director of the Information Centre in Brussels, and since 1989 he has been Director of the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in Paris.
Relations Division (198992); Director of Promotion of the Arts and Cultural Industries (19972000). He is currently Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO.
FIRST ROUND TABLE Mr Gabriel SIAKEU Cameroon Mr Siakeu, co-founder of the Cameroon Association of Childrens Rights (ACDE) and Director of the Center for Childrens Rights within ACDE, organized the first national training session in childrens rights in 1992. In 1993 he set up the Cameroon Branch of the World Association for School as an Instrument of Peace (EIPCameroon), and in 1995 the Cameroon Committee of Childrens Rights (COCADE) of which he was elected Secretary-General. Posted to the Cameroon Ministry of National Education (Department of Health and Extra-curricular School Activities) in 1998, he was facilitator in a number of training sessions on human rights education and peace held from 19982000 in Burundi. In 1999 he participated in an international meeting organized by the ANAIS network on the Internet and development, and in 2000 he was elected as viceregional coordinator of education and training programmes and activities of ANAIS-Cameroon. The author of many articles on education and peace, he has also edited the magazine La Tribune des Enfants.
H.E. Mr Louis HAMEL Canada Mr Hamel joined the Canadian Department of External Affairs in 1973 and has served in Brussels, Tokyo, and Paris, where he was Deputy Director of the Canadian Cultural Centre (198589), and again in Tokyo as Consul from 1992 to 1997. In Ottawa, he has held a number of positions: Cultural Affairs Division (197779); North Asia
Mr Jakkie CILLIERS South Africa Following his resignation from the South African armed forces in 1988, Mr Cilliers co-founded the Institute for Defence Policy, subsequently renamed the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), during 1990, and since 1993 he has served as its executive director. By 2000 the Institute had become the largest
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independent body dealing with security issues in southern Africa, playing a leading role in the transformation of the armed forces and the institution of civilian control over the military. Its present activities revolve around small arms, early warning of conflict, peace missions, crime, policing, corruption and good governance issues. Mr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars, is a frequent commentator in the local and international media and participator at international conferences. He also regularly lectures on security issues and has published, edited and contributed to a large number of journals, books and other publications. His most recent book, edited together with Christian Dietrich, is Angolas Resource War The Role of Oil and Diamonds (2000).
Perspective (1999) and US Domination in the New Global Order (1996). He currently serves on the coordinating bodies of the International Networks on Small Arms (IANSA), Forum on Early Warning (Fewer), Jubilee South, the International South Group Network and on the International Advisory Council of the Hague Appeal for Peace, as well as co-chairing the Ethics and Justice Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Mr Francisco ROJAS-ARAVENA Chile Mr Rojas-Aravena, specialist in international relations and international security, is Director of FLACSOChile, Director of the International Relations and Military Studies Area of the Faculty and Co-Director of the Program Peace and Security in the Americas. A former Professor of international relations, security and negotiation in diverse universities in Latin America and Spain, as well as Fulbright Visiting Professor at the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, Miami, he currently teaches at the University of Stanford in Santiago and San Diego State University. He has also been an adviser and consultant to different international organizations and regional governments. Director of the review Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad and member of the Editorial Commission of the review Estudios Internacionales (Guatemala) and the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (University of Miami), he is the author and editor of several books and has published articles in specialized journals of various countries. His most recent publications are Cooperacin y seguridad internacional en las Amricas (1999); Argentina, Brasil y Chile: integracin y seguridad (1999); Globalizacin, Amrica Latina y diplomacia de Cumbres (1998); Chile-MERCOSUR, una alianza estratgica (1997, with Paz Milet and Gabriel Gaspar).
SECOND ROUND TABLE Mr Bjrn MLLER Denmark Since 1985, Mr Mller has been (senior) research fellow, subsequently programme director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), where he is also editor of the international research newsletter NOD & Conversion. He served as Secretary-General of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000, and as External Lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen, since 1994. In addition to being the author of numerous articles and editor of six anthologies, he has published three books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Non-offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995).
THIRD ROUND TABLE Mr Alejandro BENDAA Nicaragua Founder and former Director of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales in Managua, Nicaragua, between 1979 and 1990 Mr Bendaa served as Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador to the United Nations, and official spokesperson for the Nicaraguan Government. In 1993, he was Visiting Professor of History at the University of Chicago and in 1996 at the Conflict Transformation Program of the Eastern Mennonite University. His most recent books are Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America: A Peace-Building General Juan Alberto LEZAMA Uruguay General Lezama is currently Director of the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CALEN), where he was a student himself. He is co-author of Testimonios de una nacin agredida [Testimony of an Attacked Nation]. He took part in the operations of the combined peace forces (1996, Panama) and has since participated in a number of national and international conferences and seminars, including Peace Missions to the XXI Century, organized by the Uruguayan National Defence Ministry (1997, Punta del Este); the
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II Interamericana Conference of Directors of High Strategic Studies (1997, El Salvador); a seminar on Civic-Military Relations between the Americas for the XXI Century (1997, Santa F); a seminar on CivicMilitary Relations, Supporting Democracy with Cooperation (1998, Buenos Aires); the III Interamericana Conference of Directors of High Strategic Studies (1999, Buenos Aires); and an Iberoamerican College Meeting (1999, Madrid). As Director of CALEN, he signed an agreement with the Uruguayan National Connection Committee of UNESCOs Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme and participated in a seminar on Human Security and Development at the beginning of the 21st century organized with the collaboration of the Committee (1999); followed by a cycle of debates on National Debt and Hemispheric Security (2000, Rio de Janeiro) where he signed an agreement between CALEN and the Escuela Superior de Guerra of Brazil.
FOURTH ROUND TABLE Ms Ghada Ali MOUSSA Egypt A researcher at the National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES) and Assistant Researcher at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Ms Moussa has taken part in many conferences within Egypt and abroad. She has recently presented papers at such conferences as Women in Politics in the USA; Learning to Live Together: Coexistence in the Middle East; The Economic Situation in the Former Soviet Union Republics: The Slavic Republic and Estonia; The Challenges to Egyptian Women; Free Trade Zone in the Middle East. She was also the facilitator of a series of workshops concerning the implementation of methods of conflict resolution in Egypt, held at Cairo University and the NCMES in the 1990s.
Studies at Dalhousie (197778 and 198389) and as Director of its Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (19932000). General Editor of the International Political Economy Series (Palgrave, previously Macmillan/St Martins Presses) since 1985, and Series Editor of International Political Economy of New Regionalisms (Ashgate Publishing) since 1998, he has also been coordinator of the International Political Science Association Research Commission #40 on New World Orders? since 1994. Mr Shaws most recent publications include contributions to such journals as Third World Quarterly, Politeia, UNU Work in Progress, New Political Economy, and to a number of books: Oceans Governance and Human Security Towards the End of the Century: Regional Approaches, with Glen Herbert, in The Aegean Sea after the Cold War: Security and Law of the Sea Issues (2000); NGOs and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region: States, Civil Societies and Companies at the Turn of the Millennium, with Pamela Mbabazi, in New Roles and Relevance: Non-governmental Organisations and the Search for Development Alternatives (2000); Conflicts in Africa at the Turn of the Century: More of the Same? in Les Conflits dans le Monde/Conflicts around the World 19992000 (2000).
Major-General Jamil D. AHSAN Bangladesh Major-General Ahsan is currently Director-General of the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) in Dhaka, a think-tank on international affairs and security under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Decorated with the gallantry award, Bir Protik, in the War of Liberation of 1971, he has also served as Chief Instructor at the School of Military Intelligence in Bangladesh (198384); Director of Staff at the Defence Services Command and Staff College (198688); and Director-General of a Special Security Force assigned to the President and the Prime Minister (199196); His areas of interest are security and strategic issues with specific relevance to Bangladesh conflict studies, peacekeeping, and nuclear issues. Chief Editor of the BIISS Journal, a quarterly publication of the institute, Major-General Ahsan has participated in a number of international meetings: Peacekeeping (Austria, 1987); Senior Defence Management Course (India, 1990); Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics Seminar (New Zealand, 1998); and various national, regional and international courses on military tactics, weapons and intelligence. He also presented a paper at a seminar on Small Arms in South Asia (Sri Lanka, June 2000).
FIFTH ROUND TABLE Mr Timothy M. SHAW Canada Mr Shaw, currently Director of the Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Canada; and Visiting Professor at Aalborg University, Denmark, has been Professor at the Dalhousie University Department of Political Science since 1971, and at its Centre for International Development Studies since 1990. Having lectured in international politics and development at a number of African universities, he also served as Director of the Centre for African
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The UNESCO SecuriPax Forum
SECURIPAX FORUM UNESCO VIRTUAL FORUM ON HUMAN SECURITY www.unesco.org/securipax Taking preventive action
Welcome to the UNESCO Forum on Human Security.
This Forum should become a meeting place to exchange ideas and debate, presented in an interactive manner, about topical issues. You can share your opinions on the subject of human security, ask or answer questions, begin or join a discussion, or simply describe the action that you would like to see in order to achieve greater human security for all. You can also send a message to the organizers of the Forum. If you have never taken part in a discussion forum on-line before, just follow these simple instructions
In the future, you will receive all messages from every member of the Forum. To contribute, all you need to do is send an e-mail to: securipax@unesco.org with your contribution in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, just send an e-mail to: majordomo@unesco.org with the following text in the body of the message: unsubscribe securipax We are greatly looking forward to your contribution. For further information, please contact: Ms Moufida Goucha / Ms Claudia Maresia Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO 1, rue Miollis 75732 Paris Cedex 15 France Tel: +33 (0)1 45 68 45 52 / 54 Fax: +33 (0)1 45 68 55 52 E-mail: peace&security@unesco.org For technical assistance, please contact: f.russell@unesco.org
Instructions In order to contribute to the Forum, you need to subscribe. Subscription involves sending an e-mail message to: majordomo@unesco.org In the body of the message just type the words: subscribe securipax You will automatically receive an e-mail welcome message confirming that you are a member of the Forum.
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United Nations Resolution A/RES/53/243
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
A
Declaration on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly, Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, including the purposes and principles embodied therein, Recalling also the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed, Recalling further the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 and other relevant international instruments of the United Nations system, Recognizing that peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has widened possibilities for strengthening a culture of peace, Expressing deep concern about the persistence and proliferation of violence and conflict in various parts of the world, Recognizing the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance, including those based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status, Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace, and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 20012010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World, Recognizing the important role that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continues to play in the promotion of a culture of peace, Solemnly proclaims the present Declaration on a Culture of Peace to the end that Governments, international organizations and civil society may be guided in their activity by its provisions to promote and strengthen a culture of peace in the new millennium:
Article 1
A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life based on: (a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation; (b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law; (c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; (d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts; (e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations; (f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development; (g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men; (h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information; (i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.
1. Resolution 217 A (III).
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Article 2
Progress in the fuller development of a culture of peace comes about through values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life conducive to the promotion of peace among individuals, groups and nations.
Charter of the United Nations and embodied in the International Covenants on Human Rights,2 as well as in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
Article 4 Article 3
The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally linked to: (a) Promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts, mutual respect and understanding and international cooperation; (b) Complying with international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law; (c) Promoting democracy, development and universal respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; (d) Enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building and peaceful resolution of differences; (e) Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full participation in the development process; (f) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing inequalities within and among nations; (g) Promoting sustainable economic and social development; (h) Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women through their empowerment and equal representation at all levels of decisionmaking; (i) Ensuring respect for and promotion and protection of the rights of children; (j) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels and enhancing access thereto; (k) Increasing transparency and accountability in governance; (l) Eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; (m) Advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity among all civilizations, peoples and cultures, including towards ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; (n) Realizing fully the right of all peoples, including those living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, to self-determination enshrined in the Education at all levels is one of the principal means to build a culture of peace. In this context, human rights education is of particular importance.
Article 5
Governments have an essential role in promoting and strengthening a culture of peace.
Article 6
Civil society needs to be fully engaged in fuller development of a culture of peace.
Article 7
The educative and informative role of the media contributes to the promotion of a culture of peace.
Article 8
A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers, social workers, managers at various levels as well as to non-governmental organizations.
Article 9
The United Nations should continue to play a critical role in the promotion and strengthening of a culture of peace worldwide.
107th plenary meeting 13 September 1999
2. Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
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B
Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace
The General Assembly, Bearing in mind the Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted on 13 September 1999, Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace, and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 20012010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World; Adopts the following Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace: tion for all with a view to achieving human, social and economic development and for promoting a culture of peace; (b) Ensure that children, from an early age, benefit from education on the values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life to enable them to resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimination; (c) Involve children in activities designed to instill in them the values and goals of a culture of peace; (d) Ensure equality of access to education for women, especially girls; (e) Encourage revision of educational curricula, including textbooks, bearing in mind the 1995 Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy3 for which technical cooperation should be provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization upon request; (f) Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors as identified in the Declaration, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, aimed at developing values and skills conducive to a culture of peace, including education and training in promoting dialogue and consensus-building; (g) Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the relevant entities of the United Nations system aimed at training and education, where appropriate, in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management, peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as in post-conflict peace-building; (h) Expand initiatives to promote a culture of peace undertaken by institutions of higher education in various parts of the world, including the United Nations University, the University for Peace and the project for twinning universities and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Chairs Programme. 10. Actions to promote sustainable economic and social development:
A. Aims, strategies and main actors

1. The Programme of Action should serve as the basis for the International Year for the Culture of Peace and the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World. 2. Member States are encouraged to take actions for promoting a culture of peace at the national level as well as at the regional and international levels. 3. Civil society should be involved at the local, regional and national levels to widen the scope of activities on a culture of peace. 4. The United Nations system should strengthen its ongoing efforts to promote a culture of peace. 5. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization should continue to play its important role in and make major contributions to the promotion of a culture of peace. 6. Partnerships between and among the various actors as set out in the Declaration should be encouraged and strengthened for a global movement for a culture of peace. 7. A culture of peace could be promoted through sharing of information among actors on their initiatives in this regard. 8. Effective implementation of the Programme of Action requires mobilization of resources, including financial resources, by interested Governments, organizations and individuals.
B. Strengthening actions at the national, regional and international levels by all relevant actors
9. Actions to foster a culture of peace through education: (a) Reinvigorate national efforts and international cooperation to promote the goals of educa-
3. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Records of the General Conference, Twentyeighth Session, Paris, 25 October16 November 1995, vol. 1: Resolutions, resolution 5.4, annexes.
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(a) Undertake comprehensive actions on the basis of appropriate strategies and agreed targets to eradicate poverty through national and international efforts, including through international cooperation; (b) Strengthen the national capacity for implementation of policies and programmes designed to reduce economic and social inequalities within nations through, inter alia, international cooperation; (c) Promote effective and equitable developmentoriented and durable solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries through, inter alia, debt relief; (d) Reinforce actions at all levels to implement national strategies for sustainable food security, including the development of actions to mobilize and optimize the allocation and utilization of resources from all sources, including through international cooperation, such as resources coming from debt relief; (e) Undertake further efforts to ensure that the development process is participatory and that development projects involve the full participation of all; (f) Include a gender perspective and empowerment of women and girls as an integral part of the development process; (g) Include in development strategies special measures focusing on needs of women and children as well as groups with special needs; (h) Strengthen, through development assistance in post-conflict situations, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation processes involving all engaged in conflicts; (i) Incorporate capacity-building in development strategies and projects to ensure environmental sustainability, including preservation and regeneration of the natural resource base; (j) Remove obstacles to the realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, in particular of peoples living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, which adversely affect their social and economic development. 11. Actions to promote respect for all human rights: (a) Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;4 (b) Encouragement of development of national plans of action for the promotion and protection of all human rights; (c) Strengthening of national institutions and capacities in the field of human rights, including through national human rights institutions; (d) Realization and implementation of the right to development, as established in the
Declaration on the Right to Development5 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; (e) Achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (19952004);6 (f) Dissemination and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at all levels; (g) Further support to the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the fulfilment of her or his mandate as established in General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, as well as the responsibilities set by subsequent resolutions and decisions. 12. Actions to ensure equality between women and men: (a) Integration of a gender perspective into the implementation of all relevant international instruments; (b) Further implementation of international instruments that promote equality between women and men; (c) Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women,7 with adequate resources and political will, and through, inter alia, the elaboration, implementation and follow-up of the national plans of action; (d) Promotion of equality between women and men in economic, social and political decision-making; (e) Further strengthening of efforts by the relevant entities of the United Nations system for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against women; (f) Provision of support and assistance to women who have become victims of any forms of violence, including in the home, workplace and during armed conflicts. 13. Actions to foster democratic participation: (a) Reinforcement of the full range of actions to promote democratic principles and practices; (b) Special emphasis on democratic principles and practices at all levels of formal, informal and non-formal education; (c) Establishment and strengthening of national institutions and processes that promote and sustain democracy through, inter alia, training and capacity-building of public officials;
4. 5. 6. 7.
A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III. Resolution 41/128, annex. See A/49/261E/1994/110/Add.1, annex. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 415 September 1995 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.
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(d) Strengthening of democratic participation through, inter alia, the provision of electoral assistance upon the request of States concerned and based on relevant United Nations guidelines; (e) Combating of terrorism, organized crime, corruption as well as production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs and money laundering, as they undermine democracies and impede the fuller development of a culture of peace. 14. Actions to advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity: (a) Implement the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance8 (1995); (b) Support activities in the context of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations in the year 2001; (c) Study further the local or indigenous practices and traditions of dispute settlement and promotion of tolerance with the objective of learning from them; (d) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance and solidarity throughout society, in particular with vulnerable groups; (e) Further support the attainment of the goals of the International Decade of the Worlds Indigenous People; (f) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with refugees and displaced persons, bearing in mind the objective of facilitating their voluntary return and social integration; (g) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with migrants; (h) Promote increased understanding, tolerance and cooperation among all peoples through, inter alia, appropriate use of new technologies and dissemination of information; (i) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, solidarity and cooperation among peoples and within and among nations. 15. Actions to support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge: (a) Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a culture of peace; (b) Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication; (c) Make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a culture of peace involving, as appropriate, the United Nations and relevant regional, national and local mechanisms; (d) Promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making;
(e) Take measures to address the issue of violence in the media, including new communication technologies, inter alia, the Internet; (f) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies, including the Internet. 16. Actions to promote international peace and security: (a) Promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, taking into account the priorities established by the United Nations in the field of disarmament; (b) Draw, where appropriate, on lessons conducive to a culture of peace learned from military conversion efforts as evidenced in some countries of the world; (c) Emphasize the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in all parts of the world; (d) Encourage confidence-building measures and efforts for negotiating peaceful settlements; (e) Take measures to eliminate illicit production and traffic of small arms and light weapons; (f) Support initiatives, at the national, regional and international levels, to address concrete problems arising from post-conflict situations, such as demobilization, reintegration of former combatants into society, as well as refugees and displaced persons, weapon collection programmes, exchange of information and confidence-building; (g) Discourage the adoption of and refrain from any unilateral measure, not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, that impedes the full achievement of economic and social development by the population of the affected countries, in particular women and children, that hinders their well-being, that creates obstacles to the full enjoyment of their human rights, including the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for their health and wellbeing and their right to food, medical care and the necessary social services, while reaffirming that food and medicine must not be used as a tool for political pressure; (h) Refrain from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion, not in accordance with international law and the Charter, aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State;
8. A/51/201, appendix I.
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(i) Recommend proper consideration for the issue of the humanitarian impact of sanctions, in particular on women and children, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian effects of sanctions; (j) Promote greater involvement of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts and, in particular, in activities promoting a culture of peace in post-conflict situations; (k) Promote initiatives in conflict situations such as days of tranquillity to carry out immunization and medicine distribution campaigns, corridors of peace to ensure delivery of
humanitarian supplies and sanctuaries of peace to respect the central role of health and medical institutions such as hospitals and clinics; (l) Encourage training in techniques for the understanding, prevention and resolution of conflict for the concerned staff of the United Nations, relevant regional organizations and Member States, upon request, where appropriate.
107th plenary meeting 13 September 1999
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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

53/25. International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (20012010)
The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/47 of 22 July 1997 proclaiming the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace,1 as well as its resolution 52/13 off 20 November 1997 on a culture of peace, Taking into account Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/54 of 17 April 1998 entitled Towards a culture of peace,2 Recalling the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights concerning the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (19952004), Taking into account the project of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization entitled Towards a culture of peace, Aware that the task of the United Nations to save future generations from the scourge of war requires transformation towards a culture of peace, which consists of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society, Recognizing that enormous harm and suffering are caused to children through different forms of violence at every level of society throughout the world and that a culture of peace and nonviolence promotes respect for the life and dignity of every human being without prejudice or discrimination of any kind, Recognizing also the role of education in constructing a culture of peace and non-violence, in particular the teaching of the practice of peace and non-violence to children, which will promote the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, Emphasizing that the promotion of a culture of peace
and non-violence, by which children learn to live together in peace and harmony that will contribute to the strengthening of international peace and cooperation, should emanate from adults and be instilled in children, Underlining that the proposed international decade for a culture of peace and non-violence for the children of the world will contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace based on the principles embodied in the Charter and on respect for human rights, democracy and tolerance, the promotion of development, education for peace, the free flow of information and the wider participation of women as an integral approach to preventing violence and conflicts, and efforts aimed at the creation of conditions for peace and its consolidation, Convinced that such a decade, at the beginning of the new millennium, would greatly assist the efforts of the international community to foster peace, harmony, all human rights, democracy and development throughout the world, 1. Proclaims the period 200120010 as the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World; 2. Invites the Secretary-General to submit, in consultation with Member States, relevant United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations, a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session and a draft programme of action to promote the implementation of the Decade at local, national regional and international levels, and to coordinate the activities of the Decade; 3. Invites Member States to take the necessary steps to ensure that the practice of peace and nonviolence is taught at all levels in their respective societies, including in educational institutions;
1. Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1997, Supplement No. 1 (E/1997/97). 2. Ibid., 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chap. II, sect. A.
152
4. Calls upon the relevant United Nations bodies, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Childrens Fund, and invites non-governmental organizations, religious bodies and groups, educational institutions, artists and the media actively to support the Decade for the benefit of every child of the world;
5. Decides to consider, at its fifty-fifth session the question of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (20012010), under the agenda item entitled Culture of peace. 55th plenary meeting 10 November 1998
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Other UNESCO publications of interest
OTHER UNESCO PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
I.
Publications on the culture of peace and the new approach to security
The New Page, by Federico Mayor. 1995. Co-published by Dartmouth University Press and UNESCO Publishing, 180 pp. Non-military Aspects of International Security. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 260 pp. Peace!, by the Nobel prizewinners. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 570 pp. Peace and War: Social and Cultural Aspects, by Hakan Wiberg. 1995. Bel Corp Publishers, Warsaw. 125 pp. UNESCO and a Culture of Peace. Promoting a Global Movement. 1996. CAB-95/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 206 pp. The Venice Deliberations Transformations in the Meaning of Security: Practical Steps Toward a New Security Culture. The Venice Papers 1. 1996. CAB-96 WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 125 pp. Final Report of the Second International Forum on the Culture of Peace (The Manila Forum) Transformation Towards a Culture of Peace, 2330 November 1995. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Manila, Philippines. 1996. 103 pp. Security for Peace A Synopsis of the Inter-American Symposium on Peace-building and Peace-keeping (organized jointly by the Organization of American States and UNESCO). The Venice Papers 2. 1996. CAB-96 WS/2. UNESCO Publishing. 32 pp. Actes du colloque international sur le droit lassistance humanitaire (Paris, 2527 January 1995). 1996. SHS-96/WS/9. UNESCO Publishing. 218 pp. From a Culture of Violence to a Culture of Peace. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 276 pp. UNESCO: An Ideal in Action, by Federico Mayor. 1996. UNESCO Publishing. 131 pp. What Kind of Security? 1997. CAB-97/WS/3. UNESCO Publishing. 156 pp. (French, English) Proceedings of the International Symposium From Partial Insecurity to Global Security (organized jointly by UNESCO, IHEDN, CASD, CESEDEN and the Institute for Security Studies of the WEU).
1997. CAB-97/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 208 pp. (French, English) Actas del primer foro militar centro-americano para la cultura de la paz (San Salvador, 2627 June 1996). UNESCO Office, El Salvador. 1997. 151 pp. Professional Peacebuilding. A preliminary guide developed in an International Workshop and Simulation. The Venice Papers 3. 1998. CAB98/WS/04. UNESCO Publishing. Peace, Security and Conflict Prevention. SIPRIUNESCO Handbook. 1998. Oxford University Press. 230 pp. Cultura de paz y gestin de conflictos, by Vicenc Fisas, Introduction by Federico Mayor. 1998. UNESCO Publications and Icaria Antrazyt, Barcelona. 406 pp. Proceedings of the Regional Symposium Cooperative Peace in Southeast Asia (organized jointly by UNESCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN). 1999. CAB-99/WS/1. UNESCO Publishing. 220 pp. (English) The Unit for Peace and the New Dimensions of Security. December 1999. CAB-99/WS/5. UNESCO Publishing. 57 pp. (French, English, Spanish) Letter to Future Generations. 1999. Droit, Roger Pol; Series: Culture of Peace. 171 pp. (English) The Culture of Peace: A New Beginning. 1999. UNESCO Publishing/Oxford & IBH Publishing. Towards a Womens Agenda for a Culture of Peace, by Ingeborg Breines, Donota Griercycz and Betty A. Reardon. 1999. UN Division for the Advancement for Women; Series: Culture of Peace. 265 pp. (English) Women Say No to War, by Ingeborg Breines, Breda Pavlic and Roger, Dominique. 1999. Series: Women Plus. 81 pp. (English-French) Olives from Jericho: Peace in Winter Gardens, by Anees Jung. 1999. UNESCO Publishing; Series: Culture of Peace. 166 pp. (English) Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods. 2000. UNESCO documents; Series: Peace and Conflict Issues. 167 pp. (English, ISBN 92-3103640-8) Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence: A Culture of Peace Perspective, by Ingeborg Breines, Robert W.
154
Other UNESCO publications of interest
Connell and Ingrid Eide. 2000. UNESCO Publishing; Series: Culture of Peace. 288 pp. (English) Rethinking Development: Putting an End to Poverty, by Henri Bartoli. 2000. UNESCO Publishing. 183 pp. (English-French) World Culture Report 2000: Cultural Diversity, Conflict and Pluralism, by Lourdes Arizpe. 2000. UNESCO Publishing. 416 pp. (English-French-Spanish) World Order and Peace in the New Millennium, edited by Tai-joon Kwon and Dong-Sung Kim. 2000. Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Seoul. 357 pp. 2000 World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions/Rpertoire mondial des institutions de recherche et de formation sur la paix/Repertorio mundial de instituciones de investigacin y de formacin sobre la paz. 9th edition. 2000. UNESCO Publishing. 300 pp. The World Ahead: Our Future in the Making, by Jrme Blind; Jean Yves Le Saux and Raquar Gudmundssan. 2001. Zed Books. 496 pp. (EnglishFrench-Spanish) UNESCO Prize for Peace Education 2000. 2001. UNESCO Publishing. 56 pp. (French, English) Report on the Seminar on the Dialogue between the Three Monotheistic Religions: Towards a Culture of Peace. Organized under the High Patronage of His Majesty, King Hassan II, by the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture, and UNESCO, Rabat, Morocco, February 1998. 1998. (English-French-Arabic)
Science for Peace Series Volume 1 Proceedings of the International Meeting on Military Conversion and Science: Utilisation/ Disposal of the Excess Weapon Plutonium: Scientific, Technological and Socio-Economic Aspects, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1996. UNESCO Office, Venice. 469 pp. Volume 2 Forum Science for Peace Session of the Genoa Forum of UNESCO on Science and Society Science Ethics Workshop Science, Technology and National Systems of Innovation, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 181 pp. Volume 3 International Symposia on Science for Peace (First Symposium 11 December 1995; Second Symposium 2023 January 1997), Jerusalem, Israel, edited by Y. Becker, V. Kouzminov and R. Santesso 1997. UNESCO Office, Venice. 306 pp. Volume 4 Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards and Countermeasures, Como, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 159 pp. Volume 5 Nuclear and Biological Decommissioning: Management of Global Security Threats, edited by G. Aslanian, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 276 pp. Volume 6 Inauguration of the UNESCO International School of Science for Peace, First Forum of the International Scientific Panel on the Possible Consequences of the Misuse of Biological Sciences, edited by Y. Becke, A. Falaschi, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 574 pp. Volume 7 Energy Security in the Third Millennium: Scientific and Technological Issues, edited by G. Aslanian, U. Farinelli, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1999. UNESCO Office, Venice. 720 pp. Volume 8 Nuclear Disarmament, Safe Disposal of Nuclear Material for New Weapons Developments? Where are the National Laboratories Going?, edited by G. Gherard, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1998. UNESCO Office, Venice. 603 pp. Volume 9 Water Security in the Third Millennium: Mediterranean Countries Toward Regional Vision, edited by V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini, R. Santesso and A. Tilche. 1999. UNESCO Office, Venice. 499 pp. Volume 10 Nuclearization of South Asia: Problems and Solutions, edited by P. Cotta-Ramusino, V. Kouzminov, M. Martellini and R. Santesso. 1999. UNESCO Office, Venice. 388 pp.
II. Publications on science and peace Science and Power, by Federico Mayor and Augusto Forti. 1995. UNESCO Publishing. 230 pp. (English, French, Italian) Peace in the Oceans Ocean Governance and the Agenda for Peace. 1997. SC-97/WS/30. UNESCO Publishing. 266 pp. Genoa Forum of UNESCO on Science and Society Genoa Declaration on Science and Society. First Reflection Meeting: International Symposium on Science and Power, Genoa, Italy, edited by V. Kouzminov, S. Biggin and R. Santesso. 1995. UNESCO Office, Venice. 183 pp.
ORDER FORM
To be returned to the office of Ms Moufida Goucha, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO, Office B.9.26, 1, rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France Family name .......................................................... Forename ............................................................... Profession .................................................................................................................................................. Telephone/Fax .......................................................................................................................................... Address ...................................................................................................................................................... Postal code ................. Town ............................................... Country ................................................... Please supply copies of the What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? Date .........................................................
Signature .................................................
ORDER FORM
To be returned to the office of Ms Moufida Goucha, Division of Human Rights, Democracy, Peace and Tolerance UNESCO, Office B.9.26, 1, rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France Family name .......................................................... Forename ............................................................... Profession .................................................................................................................................................. Telephone/Fax .......................................................................................................................................... Address ...................................................................................................................................................... Postal code ................. Town ............................................... Country ................................................... Please supply copies of the What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century? Date .........................................................
Signature .................................................
NOTES
NOTES
NOTES
NOTES
The participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions, organized by UNESCO on 27 and 28 November 2000, on the theme: What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?; Thank UNESCO for this initiative which allowed numerous peace research and training institutions to take part in the proceedings by means of a direct and fruitful dialogue; Unanimously note that current and future human security considerations are taking on global proportions, and that all factors in the human security equation are interacting on a world scale, in such a way that the need to understand them as one single theme is a cognitive step that increasingly needs to be taken everywhere, based on an intensive sharing of everyones contributions; Aware that peace research and training institutions, through their function as centres of training, analysis and policy elaboration, have a special responsibility in this respect, undertake to increase their cooperation in a common research effort to propose better ways to achieve peace, human security, development, respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic principles; Anxious to disseminate their conclusions as widely as possible, adopt as the basis of their continuing project the following Agenda for Action: Human security is indivisible. A general dynamic of equitable and balanced development is its best cornerstone. The growing interaction of societies on a worldwide scale increasingly demonstrates the overall need for human security, though it is not yet enough to prevent all forms of violence or conflict. The worlds future depends upon a growing need for human security and a better understanding of all the risks and threats that affect populations and individuals; Awareness of the global and universal nature of human security necessary to all
SE
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ET
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forms of progress and acknowledgement of the appropriate role of the peace research and training institutions in this respect, call for a considerable evolution in peoples minds; The representatives of peace research and training institutions share an important responsibility in this field, through their capacity to bring into dynamic interaction a realistic analysis of the world in its current state, a clear perception of the changes awaiting it and a constructive vision of the actions to be undertaken in order to provide general progress with the conditions necessary for human security, that is to say the possibility of its being of a lasting nature. Consequently, the participants in the First International Meeting of Directors of P e a c e R e s e a r c h a n d Tra i n i n g Institutions, Decide to create the International SecuriPax Network for the Promotion of Human Security and Peace in order to remain united for the purpose of future activities; Welcome UNESCOs proposal to assign to the Network they have thus created, the SecuriPax Forum (http://www.unesco.org/securipax), aimed at facilitating the exchange of information and best experiences and practices in the field of human security; Decide to work together with a view to contributing to the promotion of concrete actions of general interest, ranging from joint efforts to define human security indicators to high-level training activities; Decide also to work together to mobilize multiple capacities, and this on the basis of all the contributions and recommendations made at this First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions; Express their willingness to organize regional and subregional meetings in the coming years in the framework of the International SecuriPax Network; Invite similar institutions interested in this Agenda for Action to join them in the Network created and to share efforts with them.
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First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

27-28 November 2000 UNESCO, Paris

First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

UNESCO, Paris 2728 November 2000

109 109 110 110 111

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

PRESENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR FOR THE CULTURE OF PEACE

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

First round table

PEACE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

SECURITY IN AFRICA: STATE FORMATION AND THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

First round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

Table 1: Expanded concepts of security

Security of whom? Focus The state Nations Societal groups

National security Societal security

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Second round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Table 2: Refugees from Kosovo, 1999

Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 000 Montenegro Other Total 25 000 0 69 500

317 000 612 029 792 125

Source: UNHCR, cited by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.um.dk/kosovo/pjece/

Second round table

61. 62. 63.

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PEACE, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Third round table

Third round table

HUMAN SECURITY: AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE FROM LATIN AMERICA

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Table 1: Alternative values to major theories

Source: Mel Gurtov, op. cit., pp. 256.

Third round table

What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?

Third round table