Proceedings of the International Colloquium

on

THE PORTUGUESE AND THE PACIFIC

University of California, Santa Barbara October 1993

edited by Francis A. Dutra and Joo Camilo dos Santos

Center for Portuguese Studies University of California, Santa Barbara

1995

Contents
Joo Camilo dos Santos, Foreword "Francis A. Dutra, Introduction Martin Torodash, Magellan Historiography: Some Twenty Years Later Alfredo Pinheiro Marques, New Light on the Problem of Cabrillo's Origin Anthony Disney, Contrasting Models of "Empire": The Estado da ndia in South Asia and East Asia in the Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries Manuel Lobato, The Moluccan Archipelago and East Indonesia in the Second Half of the 16th Century in the Light of Portuguese and Spanish Accounts Maria da Conceio Flores, Portuguese Relationships with Siam in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries Maria Ana Marques Guedes, D. Martini, an Arakanese Prince at the Service of the Estado da ndia and Portugal's Designs Jacques Npote, The Portuguese, Cambodia and the Mekong Valley: The Logic of Discovery Leonard Y. Andaya, The Portuguese Tribe in the MalayIndonesian Archipelago in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries Roderich Ptak, Asian Trade in Cloves circa 1500: Quantities and Trade RoutesA Synopsis of Portuguese and Other Sources George Winius, Embassies from Malacca and the "Shadow Empire" R.J. Barendse, Kraton and Castello: European Trade and Asian Influences in the Indonesian Archipelago 1500-1650 Kenneth McPherson, Enemies or Friends* the Portuguese, the British and the Survival of Portuguese Commerce in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia from the Late Seventeenth to the Late Nineteenth Century Bill M. Donovan, Rio de Janeiro and Portugal's Trans Oceanic Empire, 1700-1750 ' Teotonio R. de Souza, The Portuguese Discovery and lhe Jesuit "Conquest" of Japan Elsa Macedo de Lima Penalva, The Letters of the Jesuits: The Economy of the Jesuit Missions in Japan (1614-1639) Eugnio Lisboa, Triunfo, Medo e Silncio lohn Kelly, The Impact of the Portuguexe on Japan as Reflected 3 11 17 26 38 64

113 129 149 t7fl 179

211 238 250 261 272

Francis A. Dutra, The Order of Santiago and the Estado da ndia, 1498-1750 Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves, The First Decade of Sino-Portugaese Diplomatic Relations Following the Founding of Macau W.A.R. Richardson, A Cartographical NightmareManuel Godinho de Eiedia's Search for ndia Meridional Jaap R. Bruijn, The Dutch Role in Charting the Pacific Haraprasad Ray, The Eastern Ocean and the Western Ocean Chinese Involvement in the Geopolitics of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region Prior to the Advent of Portuguese Power Ng Chin-keong, Trade, the Sea Prohibition and the "Fo-lang-chi", 1513-1550 Deng Kaisong and Yang Renfei, The Historical Role Played by the Portuguese in China Before the Middle of the Nineteenth Century

287 305 314 349

364 381 425

The Moluccan Archipelago and Eastern Indonesia in the Second Half of the 16th Century in the Light of Portuguese and Spanish Accounts1
Manuel Lobato Instituto as, Investigao Cientifica Tropical, Lisbon

From about 1580, Portugal and Spain began to coordinate tbeir overseas policies under King Philip II. Portuguese settlements in Tidore and Ambon (Central Maluku) began to be supported by Spanish authorities in Manila against attacks from the Sultan of Ternate. Between 1581 and 1606, the Portuguese and the Spanish were compelled to fight the Ternatian "empire" from the Philippines, in the north, to the Lesser Sunda Islands, in the south. The Iberian condominium over the Spice Islands ended by 1607, when the Dutch, settled in the region, engaged with Ternate in the clove trade on friendly terms. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the Portuguese and Spanish involvement in the Moluccan archipelago, focusing on the political history of the Temate Sultanate in the second half of the 16th century, based on accounts written by Iberian crown representatives. Fortunately, many of these European accounts about the Moluccan archipelago are available. Permanent wars and a large number of Christian missions attracted the attention of many contemporary writers. Among them, one can find letters from governors, the voluminous Jesuit correspondence and a few narratives from 16th and 17th century chroniclers, such as the Portuguese Diogo do Couto, Friar Paulo da Trindade and Father Francisco de Sousa, on the one hand, and the Spanish Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, Dr. Antnio de Morga, Diego Aduane and Gaspar de San Agustn. Some accounts concerning military expeditions sent from Manila and Melaka respectively the Spanish and Portuguese capitals in Southeast Asia against the Dutch and the eastern Indonesian kingdoms, are also available.

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

39

The decline of the Portuguese influence in Maluku

The Portuguese had settled in the island of Ternate by 1522, the year in which they built a fortress there. Two decades after its foundation, their domination over Maluku was considerable. From the very beginning they tried to create a sort of protectorate over the Ternate Sultanate, which they considered to be a very faithful ally. Meanwhile, rivalry between the Portuguese and the Castilians festered until a diplomatic solution was found in 1529, when the Treaty of Saragossa was signed. Even then, the Portuguese continued to dispute control over the Spice Islands with the Spaniards. The Spaniards were allied to the Tidore Sultanate, a traditional rival of Ternate. In 1542, Rui Lopez Villalobos, chief of a Spanish expedition, founded a few Castilian settlements in Jailolo, Morotai and Tidore islands. However, the Portuguese took advantage of the Castilian failure to make theii way back to America on this occasion, and of. their lack oi access to Indian textiles for the trade in cloves in Maluku.z Once the Spaniards withdrew from the region, the Ternate Sultanate tried to counter the Portuguese hegemony. This attitude, when added to some internal disputes among the Portuguese, created a highly ambiguous relationship between Asians and Europeans in the region. The period dealt with in this paper begins around the late 1530s, the second part of the interrupted reign of Sultan Hairun. In the early period, the Portuguese had successfully reinforced their protectorate in Ternate. They thought they could control events through the device of a puppet ruler, as they had done formerly with other kings. They assured the new Sultan an uncontested power over his subjects, as well as a comfortable hegemony for the Ternate Sultanate over the other Maluku kingdoms. Hairun played their game, taking advantage of the situation as opportunities came his way. During the Castilian offensive in the 1540s, Sultan Hairun did not commit himself in the conflict, nor did he fight the local allies of the Spaniards, who, theoretically, were also his enemies.3 Tematians showed a great ability to moderate the Portuguese hegemony. After the definitive rupture between Tematian and Portuguese authorities, in 1570, a similar policy was followed by Tidore's rulers to secure the balance of power. To consolidate Hairun on the throne, Antnio Galvo, the Portuguese governor, promoted a marriage between Hairun and a daughter of the Sultan of Tidore. Initially, Hairun seemed to be receptive to the proselytising proposals of the Portuguese. He divorced his Christian wife according to the Jesuit design to separate Christians from Muslims. Hairun also promised that his son would receive

40

MANUEL LOBATO

baptism on the condition that he should be enthroned by the Portuguese as the king of all Christian people of Maluku.4 In this way, the Sultan tried to circumvent the Portuguese strategy of the 1540s and 1550s, which consisted in the creation of two blocs in Maluku: one composed of all the Christian communities, the other made up of Muslims. This new Christian state would have its centre at Moro, a fertile region tha: included Morotai island and Morotia in northern Halmahera island. In this particular region, animist and Christian people, converted by Prancis Xavier, outnumbered the Muslims. In this way, the Portuguese tried to ensure that they had a solid basis for the control of Maluku, since Moro was the main supplier of foodstuffs to the other regions which specialized in clove production. On the other hand, Hairun made a great effort to preserve his influence in Moro.s He appointed Christian members of his own family to rule Christian zones in Moro, but at the same time, he made war on them in order to extinguish Christian influence.6 In the 17th century, Father Francisco de Sousa disputed the profile of Hairun drawn by Gabriel Rebelo, a Portuguese settler at Maluku and a friend of the Sultan.7 Sousa criticised the two-faced policy of Hairun: the Sultan invoked his lack of authority over his subjects who were carrying out anti-Portuguese activities, hut, he argued, the king himself was its major instigator.8 Thus, the situation evolved from a limited influence of Hairun over the course of events to a complete manipulation by him of the Portuguese alliance. As a consequence, the Sultan increased his power and independence in the whole Maluku area. The Portuguese, or at least some of them, had realised the waste of their efforts in dismissing kings and promoting new ones, because local elites could always choose among a large number of candidates for king. Where the Temate Sultanate was concerned, constitutional dispositions acted as a tool used by Tcrnatian elites to prevent their king from becoming a puppet in the hands of the Portuguese authorities. Although the Portuguese failed to manipulate the succession system, the anti-Portuguese faction succeeded in this task after 1570. However, it was not until the 1550s that the increasing power of the Sultan became a threat to the Portuguese.9 The Sultanate no longer cooperated with Christian proselytism. The era of Muslim tolerance was over as Temate strengthened its links with Japara, the Javanese kingdom allied to Aceh. Thenceforth, Portuguese decline in Maluku also became apparent. By 1557, the king of Bacan accepted baptism. Like Jailolo, Tidore and Temate, Bacan belonged to the group of four legendary "pillar" kingdoms of Maluku, failolo disappeared as an independent kingdom

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

41

in 1550, when the Castilians and their allies were defeated.10 Thereafter, Hairun reinforced his position against the Christian faith by sending a few military expeditions to attack Christian villages in Moro and Eacan. Sultan Hairun and the Javanese community settled at Ambon also inspired a Muslim rebellion against the local Christian people. In reaction, the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun, but some Portuguese casados from Temate set him free to avoid a general revolt in all the Maluku islands. From now on, Hairun proved to be a skilful strategist. He did not permit his influence to be weakened by Christian expansion. At the same time, he made an effort to please the Portuguese authorities, above all the viceroy at Goa, for fear of major military interference from Goa or Melaka. In 1562, in a solemn but largely symbolic act, he granted his kingdom to the Portuguese crown. In 1563, he pre-empted a Jesuit mission in northern Sulawesi and the Syao islands, by forcing local rulers, still animists, to embrace Islam, avoiding in this way the expansion of Portuguese influence into the western and northwestern regions. He showed the same determination concerning the eastward regions. "The king of the Papua people, Emperor of Banggai", sent his son and heir as ambassador to Ternate to choose between Islam and Christianity. The ambassadors chose the Christian faith but Hairun, the most prestigious ruler of the region, changed their minds by promising to marry a daughter of the Papuan king.11 The Goa authorities, taking cognisance of the growing religious conflict in Maluku, decided to reinforce their military presence. The Portuguese plan included the promotion of Christian communities in both number and strength to secure Portuguese rule in the islands.12 The lower classes' reluctance to change their ancestral beliefs for the Muslim faith encouraged early missionaries and gave them excessive hope. In fact, initiatives of Christian proselytism often provoked Hainan's reaction. As a consequence, the animist communities of the most distant islands were forced to choose between the Christian and Islamic faiths. Some rulers and chieftaincies of the eastern Archipelago accepted the Christian religion to flatter the Portuguese and obtain advantages from them, but the kings depended on traditional and Islamic conceptions to legitimise and keep effective power.13

Expeditions to Maluku (1563-1569)

The Muslim revolt inspired by Ternate and the Javanese, in the later 1550s, encouraged a Portuguese project to establish clear suzerainty over Maluku. In 1562, the viceroy D. Francisco Coutinho

42

MANUEL LOBATO

ordered Antnio Pais to build a new fort at Rocanive, on Ambon island. The Portuguese authorities also wished to prevent the Javanese trade in spices. This plan failed due to the obstruction of Hairun. Antnio Pais's expedition to Ambon, in 1563-64, could not force southern Maluku to submit. Pais tried to obtain support from some independent chieftaincies, but Hairun pre-empted him by making some raids on Ambon, and attacking Christian people and local communities who were supporting the Portuguese. The latter, at the command of Henrique de S, governor of Ternate, withdrew from Ambon." Once news of this defeat was known in Goa, the new viceroy D. Anto de Noronha ordered a stronger expedition. The fleet led by Gonalo Pereira Marramaque left Goa around April 1566. Marramaque was charged with a large number of tasks in the MalayIndonesian seas.15 He was ordered to relieve Melaka from a possible siege by Aceh; resolve conflicts between the Portuguese governors of Ternate and Sultan Hairun; and force the surrender of Ambon, where, besides the Javanese traffic in cloves, the Muslim authorities encouraged by the Ternatian representatives continued a sanguinary repression of Christian communities.1* However, from the beginning, the plan did not succeed. Aceh did not besiege Melaka that year. The fleet, sailing along the northern coast of Borneo, had to come to terms with the recent Spanish settlement in the Philippines. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi had fortified himself in Cebu, with the Portuguese being impotent to expel the Spaniards. So, Marramaque had to quit the Philippines, arriving at Maluku in 1567. Meanwhile, Portuguese settlers from Ternate had begun to fight the Castilian presence in the Philippines, disturbing trade in Bohol and other islands. Marramaque's expedition was the most powerful fleet that had been sent by the Portuguese to Maluku in many years. It was made up of three galleons, two galleys, six foists and some five hundred soldiers, reinforced by the usual galleon of trade (gaeo da carreira). However, the expedition was depleted in terms of personnel and vessels as a result of battles with the Castilians in Ceb. As we have noted, Marramaque intended to force the East-Central Archipelago to submit. A fort was to be built in Ambon, the strategic port of call in the sea route followed by galleons to and from Maluku. Marramaque carried out a few military campaigns against the Javanese and their allies at Ambon and other neighbouring islands in south-central Maluku. The Javanese left Ambon after a fleet sent from Japara to the rescue of Hitu, the Muslim headquarters at Ambon, was defeated. The ambitious project, which included, besides the new fort, the provisioning of a fleet to secure the coasts of Maluku, failed after a few years.i7

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

43

The murder of the Sultan and the fall of Ternate fort

The Portuguese community in Maluku was concentrated at Ternate, It was composed of some 40 to 50 settlers (vizinhas] living in a separate compound next to the fort.18 They were not a harmonious community united in the same political and economic aims. Most of them were not on good terms with the natives. However, a few of them, rich and influential people, were linked by kinship ties to local elites, hi fact, by the late 1560s, a group of powerful casados acted as counsellors of Sultan Hainan, while most of the Portuguese settlers were persecuted by the Muslim authorities throughout the islands.19 To the first group belonged, for instance, Paulo de Lima, probably a half-caste "headman" married to a Christianised niece of the Sultan of Tidore. Because of this marriage, Paulo de Lima became landlord of a few villages in Motiel island and a relative of Hairun.20 These rich casados were second-generation settlers of European origin. The first generation had been settled by governor Antnio Galvo in early times. They played a decisive role in supporting Hairun. In other words, the usual alliances, through marriage, between regional elites and Maluku rulers, was enlarged to include the Portuguese community. To the first generation of casados belonged Henrique de Lima and Manuel da Silva, to whom M. A. Lima Cruz adds Gonalo Fernandes Bravo and Baltazar Veloso, both married Hairun's sisters, and Antnio Ribeiro and Lopo Ribaldo, also linked by kinship ties to the Sultan of Ternate.21 By 1575, the Portuguese withdrew from Ternate, after a long conflict with the local Sultanate. Contemporary writers condemned the governor Diogo Lopes de Mesquita for his tactlessness, because he ordered the murder of Sultan Hairun in 1570, despite his being a "trusted ally" of the Portuguese. But, in fact, the Sultan was far from being a faithful vassal of the Portuguese crown, and followed an ambiguous policy vis-a-vis the Portuguese. This attitude become more marked in his latter years. Mutual relations worsened after Hairun increased his persecution of Christian communities in Moro. This region includes, as we have said, Morotai, in northwestern Halmahera, the Morotia island, located northwards, and a few small islands, of which the most important was Rau. Christian communities in these islands included some eighty thousand souls and twentynine villages. Moro was the main exporter of rice and sago. The fertility of its soil, especially in Morotai, is the result of its being a plain, while most of the other neighbouring islands were mountainous. For several centuries, Moro had been coveted by all the kings of Maluku. Its possession conferred the right and the power to demand foodstuffs

44

MANUEL LOBATO

and to impose tributes. Continuous disputes and wars led natives to seek the protection of missionaries and the Portuguese, who could also gain access to provisions in Moro. In early times, the [esuit mission in Moro and local Christian people were persecuted by the Sultan of Jailolo, ruler of Central Halmahera, immediately south o Moro. Defeated by the Portuguese in 1550-51, Jailolo responded by attacking Moro in 1558 with the support of Hairun. From 1562 to 1566 there were some signs of appeasement, so that missionary work could go forward. But in 1566 the Sultan of Ternate ordered unprecedented violent persecutions, which became quite regular from 1569- Something similar had already been practised in Ambon. Perhaps the Sultan sought, by these means, to balance the influence achieved by Gonalo Pereira Marramaque in south-central Maluku.22 The strategy oi Hairun against the Portuguese was finally understood by Marramaque. After some hesitation, he decided to arrest the Sultan and thus recover the influence that the Portuguese had lost. Some casados, relatives of the Sultan, tipped him off, so that he could easily elude Marramaque's design." In 1570, Hairun was also informed about another plan for his murder, presented by the governor of Ternate, Diogo Lopes de Mesquita. This secret affair was leaked out from the council by some of the most prominent Portuguese residents. In that meeting, Francisco de Sousa attributes to the governor a speech, pronounced before his compatriots, summarising all Hairun's treacheries.24 Despite complicities and kinship ties between the Portuguese community and the Sultan, he was killed by order of the governor. Because of Hairun's murder, the Sultanate of Ternate, earlier the chief "vassal" and "ally" of the Portuguese, became their most powerful enemy.25 Local authorities fought the Portuguese for five years, finally expelling them from the island. The late P. R. Abdurachman has argued that the jihad or holy war against the Portuguese was declared just after the death of Hairun.26 However, a different version is given by Argensola. According to him it was not until 1572 that a confederation of all kings and sengaji of Maluku was built up against the Portuguese, the leadership of which none of Hairun's sons had the courage to take over, but which was accepted by Baab Ullah, the new Sultan of Ternate,27 On the other hand, the Portuguese and missionary sources refer to a rebellion all over the Eastern Archipelago, putting an end to the internecine disputes. A similar event had occurred in 1557, when the Portuguese governor arrested Hairun.z* Some cultural and ideological explanations have been found to justify these social and political reactions. Firstly, the kings of Ternate and Tidore claimed to be of divine origin.29 Secondly, Ternate island was a partthe chief one, because it was said to be the centreof a much

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

45

wider sacred area, extending beyond Maluku itself. The Portuguese insisted on the geopolitical division of the region, ignoring mythical ties between kingdoms. They only knew the intricate kinship links among royal families that offered them an inconsistent political pattern.30 Regicide perpetrated by foreigners was a violation of the idea, deeply rooted in tradition, that the Sultan of Ternate was the king of kings of Maluku and that his person was sacred and inviolable. On the other hand, Spanish writers, namely Gaspar de San Agustn, clearly note that the killing of Hairun was invoked by the Tematians as a pretext to turn things against the Portuguese. Inside the royal family itself, there was a faction inclined to a stronger resistance against the Portuguese. The Sultan's murder was very convenient to this political faction which gained power and encroached on the legitimate royal lineage. This fact partially influenced the subsequent Portuguese policy.31 From that time on, the old faction which had lost its power moved into "opposition", clustered around the legitimate lineage. This group agreed to make some concessions to the Portuguese, including, after 1575, to give them back the fortress, in exchange for support to recover the crown. This domestic opposition in Ternate also conspired with Tidorian authorities. According to Couto, the Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, ordered the killing of the presumptive heir who was also his own brother. The governor of Maluku, Duarte Pereira, now resident at Tidore, found this the propitious moment to recover Ternate, hatching a scheme with Kachil Tulo, "Regent of the Kingdom", and brother of the Sultan. Pereira appealed to the right of succession of Kachil Tulo, taking advantage of the general indignation in Maluku caused by the prince's murder ordered by the Sultan.32 Argensola presents a different version. According to him, after the death of Hairun, the new governor, Nuno Pereira de Lacerda, offered the throne of Ternate to Kachil Guarate, the eldest son of Hairun.33 Meanwhile, after the Marramaque expedition had withdrawn from Maluku, Asians achieved naval supremacy over the seas of the Eastern Archipelago. In Ternate, the Portuguese depended on the acquiescence of the Sultan to gain access to foodstuffs from Moro. The Sultan, for his part, often disrupted the supply lines.34 The fortress had not fallen earlier because the king of Tidore, breaking his alliance with Ternate, discreetly supplied the Portuguese encircled behind the walls.35 During the siege, both sides kept alive negotiations for peace. Finally, when the garrison was surrendered, Sultan Baab Ullah kept the fortress in the name of the king of Portugal, an unprecedented and surprising event.36 Reinforcement troops sent from Goa arrived too late and were of insufficient strength to recover it.37

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Goa abandoned Maluku to its fate, just as governors neglected the defence of a "conquest" that was also a place for exiled and convicted people.^ On the other hand, at the same time, Portuguese possessions in India suffered several attackssieges of Goa, Chaul and Chaliyamthat inhibited adequate aid from the viceroys.39 A fleet composed of four vessels left Goa in 1574, bui arrived at Ternate just after the fortress surrendered.40 Altogether, three rescue expeditions were sent to Maluku in a seven-year period, without any positive results." Though the Portuguese showed some interest in recovering their influence in Maluku,42 one may conclude that the Portuguese showed relatively little inclination towards conquest, giving priority to commerce over military enterprises. This was in contrast to the Spaniards: "The first thing the Castilians do when they conquer [a land] is to kill prominent people and to convert to the Christian faith the other people, unlike us [for] the first thing we pursue is the clove trade and [only] secondly Christianity."43 For the Jesuit priests, after the fall of the Ternate fortress, Maluku lost its value as a mission area. So they turned their eyes more and more to Japan." In 1574, just before the fall of Ternate, the Portuguese also experienced some troubles in the Banda islands. Their loss of prestige gave the Bandanese courage enough to escape their influence and attack them.45 In Maluku the Portuguese had a royal factory and a fortress, but their presence in Banda presented a different pattern. Here, the Portuguese presence was reduced to a seasonal visit by the Crown's agents and private traders, though there were some resident traders at Neira island, A similar pattern could also be found in the Solor islands in the early days.46 In the mid-1570s two political blocs emerged in the Archipelago: the first one led by Temate, the other one combining Tidore and Banda. However, though some members of the royal family of Tidore were convinced they should help Banda to fight the Portuguese, the Sultan had a different opinion. Because Tidore's policy was an ambiguous one, Banda moved eventually to Ternate's side, especially after the Portuguese built a fort at Tidore with the Sultan's permission. Thenceforth, the Portuguese presence in Banda depended on the surrender of Ternate: "If this Maluku surrenders, so will Banda."47 After 1575, Ternate's authorities multiplied fortifications on their own island, as well in their overseas possessions. The Sultanate received supplies, including artillery, from Johor, which was also allied to Banda.4 This means that the difficulties experienced by the Portuguese in Maluku were not isolated from the conflicts they had in the western Malay world. In some sense, such problems at Ternate were an extension of the war between the Portuguese and rival

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Sultanates. These events brought to light the existence of an antiPortuguese coalition linking Muslim power throughout the Indian Ocean. Aceh was the connection to the Western Indian Ocean, while Johor was the link of a Muslim chain to Java and the Eastern Archipelago.49 Expelled from Ternate, the Portuguese found themselves in a very we^k position, despite their new bases at Ambon and Tidore. The foundation of a fort at Tidore was due to the fears of the local Sultan regarding Ternate's hegemony. The Sultan of Tidore personally rendered tribute to the Portuguese governor of Ambon, reviving an old lost practice. Until then, neither party went back on the alliances and mutual attitudes that had been in place for some ten years or even more .so Besides this ambiguous alliance with Tidore, the coalition led by Temate left to the Portuguese a few villages of little significance. The Sultan of Ternate, Baab Ullah, intended to banish the Portuguese presence without harming the commercial links. Thus he continued to secure supplies of cloves for ships coming from India and Melaka. This policy on the part of Ternate remained unchanged until the Dutch arrival at Maluku at the end of the century.51

The Portuguese in Ambon: War and Islamization and Christianity

From 1501, Ternate claimed political suzerainty over Ambon. According to local sources, the Pati of Hitu made a defensive agreement with Sultan Zainal Abidin from Ternate. Hitu was a town or, to be exact, a confederation of some thirty Muslim villages, and the strongest political formation on the northern coast of Ambon.52 P. Abdurachman, who extracted this information from a late Hituan chronicle named Nadah, thinks the agreement served Ternate's claims for political paramountcy over Bum, Ceram, Ambon, Lease and Banda islands. The Hitu authorities adopted the Islamic faith in the late 15th or early 16th century, but most common people remained attached to animism till the next century.53 By 1525, a Portuguese settlement was created at Hitu. As in Maluku, the governor Antnio Galvo also introduced Christianity in Ambon about 1538. To protect Christian people and to prevent the clove trade to Java, the governor Jordo de Freitas built, around 1544, a stockade at Ative, then the most important Christian centre. From 1557, the Muslim authorities from Ambon, supported by Hainan and Japara, fought the Christian influence. In the early 1560s, several rebellions arose against Christian communities and Jesuit missionaries,

48
54

MANUEL LOBATO

followed by persecutions. This period set off an increasingly fierce offensive in Hitu. According to missionary figures, Christian communities in the Ambon, Lease, Ceram and Bum islands, amounted to some seventy thousand souls by 1565. The persecutions of which they had been victims were a reason for Goa to send the Marramaque expedition, as we have seen. He was ordered to built a new fort at Ambon, but the Portuguese settlers did not wait for him and they were forced to withdraw from the island as soon as 1565.55 This particular year saw the rise of a new geopolitical framework in the region: the Portuguese left Ambon, abandoning local Christians to their fate,- in the southeastern extremity of the Archipelago, the Portuguese settlement on Solor island was ravaged by a Javanese fleet initially directed against Portuguese positions in Ambon; and finally a change in the structure of alliances oi Hitu occurred. This micro-state set up close relations with Gresik, in Java. However, Japara, passing through an obscure phase, continued to support Hitu until a new king ascended the throne in Java.56 Marramaque forced Hituwhere he built a new stockadeas well as other populous centres in neighbouring islands to submit. Sancho de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese commander, of the fort, moved it tram Hitu, on ^he northern coast, to Gelala, on the southern shore, and, afterwards, to Batumerah. In 1576 it was rebuilt in stone and lime at the place where Ambon town today stands, deep inside the bay formed by the Hitu and Lcitimur peninsulas.57 When the Portuguese, expelled from Ternate, returned to their old settlement in Ambon island, they found a large and influential Javanese community there, whose members were mostly, from [apara and Tuban. The Javanese contributed in good measure to Hituan resistance against the Portuguese conquerors. These efforts were based on an anti-Portuguese agreement for the defence of Hitu, allying Japara and, probably, Tuban. It had been celebrated in the early 1570s after the Javanese, expelled from Ambon by the Marramaque expedition, moved into Saparua. This island was ruled by a Tematian governor who was also a close relative of Sultan Baab Ullah. Junks from Java usually came there for cloves. Despite their limited forces, Portuguese continued to patiol the seas and to attack small Javanese ships in the Spice Islands.58 The Portuguese had been settled in Ambon for a long time. In fact, some of them married women from Ative, a native group inhabiting the neighbourhood of the port where the galleons wintered, awaiting the monsoon, on their way to Maluku or back to India.59 The Portuguese survived at Ambon, after 1575, taking advantage of the internal conflict between Ulilimathe union of five

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

Muslim villagesand the Ulisiwa, the union of nine villages whose members weii; animist people, resistant to Islam and favourably inclined to the Portuguese. The Siwa also were considered to be a "foreign" people according to mythical and sacred geography.60 The conflict at Ambon, due to the increasing religious proselytism, took the appearance of a war between Christian and Muslim people. The advent of new political forces and new religions exacerbated the ritual nature of regional antagonisms, which emhodied opposed forces, each one allied to a foreign people who were also political-religious representatives. So, the Siwa from Leitimur peninsula, on the southern shore of Ambon, were allied to the Christiansfirst to the Portuguese, and later on, to the Dutch. On the other hand, the Lima, from northern Hitu peninsula, adopted Islam and sought an alliance with Ternate.61 Defeated by the Portuguese, the Hituan people took refuge in the mountainous hinterland of the island, earlier a deserted area.''2 Before 1580 the Portuguese had directed their attacks at targets in Ambon and its neighbouring islands, all areas rich in cloves. At the same time, Christian communities from distant islands, such as northeastern Sulawesi, Syao, Moro or Bacan, were waiting for Portuguese help to revolt against Ternatian rule.63 In the 1580s, Ternatian military operations in the Ambon archipelago were conducted by Rubuhongi, a member of the royal family of Ternate. This prestigious warrior besieged Ambon on at least one occasion in that decade. Later on, the same situation occurred twice, in 1593 and 1598. The last attack counted on the support of a Javanese fleet,64 The Sultan of Ternate, informed of the weakness of the Portuguese settlement on Ambon, tried to make use of a cunning strategy. He sought out an alliance with the Saparua island authorities and, at the same time, he made a peaceful and commercial agreement with the Portuguese from Ambon fort in prejudice of the Javanese settled at Saparua.fi5 In the very late 16th century, Hitu was no longer the main trading centre in southern Maluku. Its role was transferred to the Hoamal (or Veranula) peninsula in southern Ceram, in which Luhu, Kambelo and Lisidi ports were sheltered from Portuguese raids.66 The Jesuit priests at Maluku soon TcaLised the need G militaiy efforts to stop Islamization and to give some chance to their missionary project. Often, they felt the obligation to finance military structures and to pay salaries to soldiers and even to governors, as happened with Nuno Pereira de Lacerda.*7 New converts were recruited among opponents to Ternatian expansionism. Argensola states that many communities accepted the Christian faith to escape Ternatian suzerainty. Religious motives played little or no role in

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their decisions.68 When the arrival of a strong fleet was expected, many opponents of Ternate moved to the Portuguese side. The king of Syao, an old enemy of Ternate, became Christian and preserved his autonomy through military means. But the Christian king of Bacan was forced to embrace Islam. The single exception to this trend occurred in Bum island, where two Christian factions, fighting each other, were supported one by the Portuguese and the other by Temate. In fact, the adoption of a new faith was not enough to do away with old and deep-rooted political rivalries.''* Extra-cultural reasons also influenced the rejection of the Christian faith. Often, Christianity interfered with the internal structure of insular communities, provoking authority crises or conflicts. We can observe this at Maluku, Ambon and Solor, Local rulers, becoming Christians, fell under the jurisdiction of Portuguese or ecclesiastical authorities. Their Asian subjects, previously judged according to traditional procedures, often were punished by European authorities. Thus, the prerogatives of native authorities tended to disappear.70 Retraction in local Christian adherence was due, above all, to the Portuguese loss of political influence. This fact led to the defection of a large number of their followers.71 Until 1575, important Christian communities were to be found at Ternate, Bacan, Jailolo and Moro. But in Maluku, as everywhere in Southeast Asia, power and wealth consisted in controlling people, not land. Thus, the depopulation of Christian areas, not their conquest, was a Ternatian strategy. Massacres and dispersion of Christian communities became very common at Bacan. According to missionary accounts, about 1588, after three decades of continuous war and persecution, the population of Bacan was reduced to twenty percent of what it had been.71 In Ternate, people converted to the Christian faith were fugitive slaves of the sultan, freed by the Jesuits. They were forbidden to follow the Portuguese when they left the island, in 1575, and were taken back into slavery as oarsmen in the war fleet.73 However, a great number of them could run away to Tidore and, later on, to Ambon where they formed an important community. The Portuguese, in their turn, made iew slaves in the Maluku wars. They preferred to attract slaves from th enemy, thus avoiding raids, the usual method in the Eastern Archipelago. This policy failed when the Portuguese, losing their influence, were no longer in a position to sustain and give protection to a great number of dependent people. As the Portuguese and, with them, Christianity declined, Temate increased Islamization through a coordinated policy. The sons of the most important rulers, especially if they were Christians

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or rebels, were compelled to learn Arabic and study to become ulama.74 By forcing young men of royal blood to quit their lands, the Sultan made them hostages and used religious faith as an imperialistic ideology to reinforce his power and to consolidate people from different origins, hi the early 17th century, there were more than forty Christian communities spread throughout the Ambon archipelago, inhabiting, for defensive reasons, gunnong or fortified hillocks.7*

The Spanish period

The Portuguese inability to gain control over Maluku led them to fear a Spanish offensive in the archipelago. A plan to conquer Maluku was put into effect by the latter, using as their pretext its abandonment by the Portuguese/6 Later on, the Spaniards believed that Iberian influence in Maluku was lost because their presence in Philippines was not consolidated in the early period.77 Just before the Dutch arrival at Maluku, they wrote, the Portuguese had fallen in absolute discredit among Asian people.78 In 1578, before the Union of Crowns, the Spaniards, helped by the people of Luzon, dominated Bruneia Sultanate politically and economically influential in the Maluku areaand Mindanao, an Islamized political formation allied to Ternate. The Spaniards were well positioned to take over Portuguese commercial interests at Maluku, after 1580. However, Spain had no access to Indian cloth, needed for trade, nor to Asian markets where cloves were in demand. But during the northern monsoon, the distance between the Philippines and Maluku could be sailed in 15-20 days. Due to Spanish interference in Maluku it became possible to guarantee Iberian influence till the end of the century: in ten years, the Portuguese settlement in Tidore saw the number of casados increase to some sixty families under the protection of a Spanish garrison.79 According to San Agustin, King Philip II decided to conquer Maluku during his journey to Portugal for his coronation. At Lisbon he received an embassy from Ternate. Sultan Baab Ullah realised that the Iberian union was a threat to him due to reinforcements from the Philippines, and hence sent KacViil Naik as ambassaoi to Lisbon. Naik took the Borneo route, sojourning there and at the Bintan (Johor) and Aceh Sultanates, trying to bring their rulers to orchestrate an action against the Spaniards and the Portuguese.80 Official contacts between the Philippines and the Portuguese authorities at Maluku began in 1581. It was a very difficult moment for the Portuguese. By 1582, no galleon from India had arrived in the last three years. They felt totally powerless to "stop the war against

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the King of Ternate, together with that of Tidore, because they cannot sustain it any more".81 Argensola states that the Philippines brought financial losses to the Spanish crown, because of the continuous silver flow into Chinese hands. This was a reason why the Crown seriously considered the possibility of abandoning it and concentrating its efforts on the conquest and maintenance of the Maluku archipelago. However, private interests already consolidated in the Philippineswhich dealt with trade as well with native encomiendasinsisted on its preservation. This policy, aiming at shipping a great volume of valuable Asian goods to Europe through the Philippines, was prejudicial to the Portuguese East-West searoute.82 Meanwhile, in 1580, Francis Drake, the famous English corsair, visited Maluku and Banda, gaining friendship and protection from the Sultan of Ternate.83 According to Spanish sources, initially Drake was not welcomed because he purchased a certain amount of cloveswithouttke. Sultan's permission. However the Englishman appeased him by offers and promises of military support against the Portuguese.84 Thus, after the intra-Iberian struggle for Maluku in the first half of the 16th century, the larger European rivalry reached the political and commercial scene of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. The decline of Portuguese influence in Maluku is often attributed to the arduous and lengthy Melaka-Maluku searoute. However, by 1526, Jorge de Meneses discovered a shorter way along the northern coast of Borneo. Sailing from Melaka, it was possible to reach Maluku after two months of navigation. Only Portuguese sailors made use of the northern Borneo route in the 16th century. They did it in a single direction, from Melaka to Maluku. On their way back, they needed to call at Ambon and Java. Thus, Maluku could be rapidly reached from Melaka, although the political will to do so was not strong enough. Like Malay and Gujarati merchants, the Portuguese did not use the Borneo route in general. Instead, they gave preference to the Java searoute due to the very profitable trade of the Javanese ports of call.85 On the other hand, the private interests of some Crown representatives were among the motives behind the lack of support given by the Melaka authorities to the Portuguese settlements in the Eastern Archipelago. Just as Goa provided soldiers, ships and supplies to Melaka, Maluku, in turn, had to be supported from Melaka. To that end, royal orders were often sent from Lisbon. However, as the royal monopoly in cloves came to an end, Javanese traders brought increasing amounts of Indonesian spices to Melaka. Therefore, Melaka's governors often neglected human, material and financial supplies to the Tidore and Ambon fortresses, since most of the spices brought to

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Melaka by Asian merchants came into the governor's hands at very cheap prices anyway.86 Since the Philippines lay not far from Maluku, contacts between these archipelagos were suddenly increased.87 Just after the Iberian crowns' unification, the Spanish committed themselves to the retrieval of Ternate and to the establishment of a joint Hispanic dominion over Maluku. They never completely succeeded. Reasons for this must be found in the skilful policy of Ternate, and in the impossibility of locally supporting large fleets during the lengthy time required for military operations. The islands had suffered the effects of continuous wars, which had led to the abandonment of a large number of villages. Some native rulers lost their own wealth and became resourceless. In a situation of general scarcity, logistical support to the war fleets was reduced to assistance brought from the Philippines. From 1582 to 1585, the Spanish sent three expeditions to recovei the ioitiess of Ternate.88 On the other hand, Maluku and the Philippines remained two separate administrative areas to avoid commerce in cloves to Europe through Manila and America. Thus, navigation between the two never became a regular feature, contributing to the failure of the Spanish efforts to gain paramountcy over Maluku in the 1580s. Military expeditions did not promote colonisation or real administrative structures. As no solid trace remained after each expedition, their role was self-defeating, leading to discredit for the Spanish and the Portuguese. Passing over their own responsibility in the matter, later Portuguese texts insist that firearms supplied by the Dutch to the Asians rulers, namely to the Sultan of Ternate and his allies, were mainly responsible. In contrast, Spanish sources blame the Portuguese for flooding Maluku with all kinds of firearms. This particular fact sheds some Light on the attitude of Ternate and Tidore to the Portuguese during these decades. Such arms provided the Asian rulers the means to spread influence and consolidate power, as well as the means and a motive to resist the Portuguese and the Spanish offensives.89 Among the causes for the Iberian military failure, one can also point to dissensions among the Portuguese,90 as well as the rivalry between them and the Spaniards for the hegemony over the Spice Islands.91 By 1583, the inclusion of Maluku in the jurisdiction of the Philippines was being advocated. This was the answer to the threat created by an unprecedentedly strong alliance, including Ternate and Tidore, plus several Javanese eities, against the Portuguese fort in Maluku. The Javanese contributed the major war effort. The Iberian attack on Ternate, in 1585-86, was successfully repelled by three thousand Javanese soldiers, most of them supplied with guns. The

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MANUEL LOBATO

Portuguese tried to solve the conflictcentered, in their minds, on the retrieval of Ternate fortby diplomatic means. An embassy sent from Lisbon was, however, a complete failure. The war intensified and the Portuguese remained dependent on the assistance coming from the Philippines. As a result of unsuccessful campaigns, the Spanish reputation emerged seriously damaged.9* Temate enlarged its power and area of influence, threatening even the Philippines, where the Spanish presence was not yet consolidated.9* In the wake of the Spanish interference, the conflict opposing the Portuguese and the Muslim people of Maluku tended to spread out to the Philippines. From the 1580s, as the Spanish enlarged their sphere of influence in the Philippines, the seas of this archipelago began to be infested by Javanese and Japanese piracy."4 On the eve of the entry of the Northern European nations, a general conflict, even if a latent one, existed all over Southeast Asia, opposing the Portuguese and the Spaniards to Islam. By 1590, the whole of South and Central Maluku, including Ceram and Buru, joined the war against the Portuguese. This spread the conflict southwards. The Banda islands were chosen to lead the Muslim confederation and to coordinate the holy war. This Asian choice, not a very obvious one, was possibly due to the missionary and Portuguese presence at Solor and, generally, in the Lesser Sunda Islands. Probably the Bandanese leadership of the Islamic confederation was due to the need to attract new forces to the common cause. The grant of nominal leadership to a small and decentralised potentate would appease disputes for pre-eminence inside the alliance. The decision to opt for this form of weak leadership reflects the geopolitical realities in the Eastern Archipelago, with Saparua island being the strongest supporter of Ternatian power in Central and Southern Maluku. The union around the rising Islamic ideal was not enough to solve differences among the Sultanates. On the other hand, Banda lay in a peripheral area where the Portuguese had little influence.95 About 1592, the Muslim confederation had brought together a large fleet to carry on the holy war. From 1591, the Sultan SaidBerkat of Ternate and his allies were decided on the expulsion of the Portuguese from the positions they held- At the same time, with the arrival of a new governor in Ambon, Antnio Pereira Pinto, the local casados increased in number and strength.96 Spanish assistance in Maluku reassured Portuguese authorities in Goa, while Ambon did not cause great concern to Lisbon or Goa.97 In 1593, the Spanish failed in the last 16th century attempt to conquer Ternate, when the Chinese oarsmen from a powerful fleet revolted against the governor oi the Philippines and killed him.98 Thus, Ambon became a major

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55

source of trouble for the Portuguese in Southeast Asia, after Aceh, while the Tidore settlement was abandoned to the sphere of influence of the Philippines." In 1596, a great fleet from Ternate, on its way to help several kingdoms that had revolted against Spanish rule, was defeated by Juan de Ronquillo in the seas of the Philippines, hi 1597 Ambon was besieged by a powerful "Javanese and Moorish" fleet.100

Dutch interference and the new balance of power

The already weak position of the Portuguese in the Eastern Archipelago worsened with the arrival of the Dutch. They were determined to expel the Portuguese and the Spaniards from the Spice Islands and to sign monopolistic agreements with local rulers. The Dutch soon acquired a very accurate political and commercial perspective on the Indonesian Archipelago. By 1599, Wijbrand van Warwijk and Jacob van Heemskerck had signed treaties with the native rulers of Ambon and Banda, later on confirmed by the Sultan Said Berkat of Ternate. The Muslims of Maluku and the Javanese joined the Dutch to attack Ambon fortress. Ternate was ready to exchange its Portuguese trade-partnership for one with the Dutch, in exchange for help against the Portuguese from Ambon. But van Warwijk and van Heemskerck decided not to face the Portuguese and their allies from Tidore, despite the insistence of Said Berkat and his allies. The commercial agreements of the Dutch with Ternate and the Eastern Javanese cities placed in jeopardy the acquisition of cloves by the Portuguese.101 The Dutch built factories at Banda and Temate.102 Next year van Neck and Steven van der Hagen unsuccessfully attacked Tidore and Ambon forts.IQ3 The Dutch brought to their Asian allies a great advance in access to firearms and the Javanese increased their activities in Central Maluku.104 At Ambon, where no Spanish military presence existed, the Portuguese found themselves in a desperate situation. The Goa authorities gave priority to the rescue of Ambon by sending three galleons there in 1600. However they did not appeal to the Spaniards for fear of losing jurisdiction over Maluku.105 In 1602, another fleet commanded by the general Andr Furtado de Mendona, failing to conquer the Javanese port of Banten, sailed for Ambon. Mendona forced all the Muslim potentates in the area that recognised Ternatian paramountcy to submit. Several populous and important trading centres were ravaged, including Hitu, where the Dutch held a fortified factory. Mendona also attacked Veranula in western Ceram, where an English factory lay.106 The authorities from Veranula sent an embassy to Banten asking for Dutch help, promising to give them

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exclusive rights in the clove trade.107 Hiemao, on the northern shores of Saparua, remained the single Muslim centre free from Portuguese raids.10* After Central Maluku temporarily submitted, the general Furtado de Mendona was petitioned by Sultan Mole Madjimoe of Tidore and the local Portuguese settlers to defend the island against the Dutch and retrieve the old Portuguese fortress in Ternate. Sultan Mole had become king in 1599 with the help of the governor Rui Gonalves de Sequeira. After the arrival of the Dutch, who were friendly with Ternate, Tidore approached the Portuguese and the Spanish.109 In spite of the Ambon settlers being more interested in a campaign against Banda where the Dutch had a major influence, Mendona decided to attack their positions in northern Maluku.110 In 1603, his forces, together with an expedition from the Philippines, were not enough to defeat Ternate. The Portuguese attributed this failure to the lack of reinforcements from Melaka. The Spanish sources emphasised the incompetence of the Portuguese general and his officers, the lack of military discipline and experience of their soldiers, and the leakage of information through the casados of Tidore to the Sultan of Ternate. In 1603, Mendona's decision to leave for Melaka was followed by the usual syndrome of military expeditions in Maluku. As Ternatian strength was reinvigorated, Sultan Said Berkat became lord of Maluku and all Portuguese and missionary dreams were brought back to earth.111 hi 1605, both Ambon and Tidore forts fell into the hands of the Dutch. The Sultan of Tidore was forced to accept a Dutch factory in his capital and to sign a Treaty of Protection with them, as a result of which they came to dominate the trade in cloves. Next year, the Spaniards, under the command of the governor of Philippines, Pedro de Acuna, came back and regained all their lost positions, as well as the fortress and island of Ternate. Sultan Said and his presumptive heir fled. Persecuted by the Sultan of Tidore, Said presented himself before the governor Pedro de Acuna who took him to the Philippines.112 As a result of these events, the Iberian presence at Maluku came entirely into the military and administrative sphere of the Philippines. A Spanish governor was appointed at Malukuthe first one being [uan de Esquiveiunder the command of the governor of the Philippines. During the next decade, the Spanish resisted the Dutch military supremacy with the aid of many of the local rulers and inhabitants.113

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Conclusion
It is not easy to follow the twists and turns in the political trajectories of the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore on the basis of European sources alone. The changes in the states of the region that appear from a first reading of these sources reflect the particular vision that Europeans in the epoch had of these courts and rulers. For their part, the foundation myths of the inhabitants of the archipelago, which speak of their discovery and the establishment of the primordial hero in these islands, appear to have influenced the manner in which the Moluccans viewed the arrival of these foreigners. They were for the most part hardly seen as intruders. On the contrary, relations between the rulers of Maluku and the Portuguese and Castilians soon came to acquire a supernatural dimension: the very strength of the European presence was seen as a catalyst, pre-destined to favour the expansionist tendencies of the people of the archipelago. This formulation helps us understand the conduct of the Ternatians and Tidorians in the epoch, since they sought to profit from the Iberian presence in order to extract from it the greatest possible commercial and political gains for themselves. Even if the Portuguese were convinced that they were the principal obstacle to Ternatian expansionism, in fact the Portuguese presence, rather than damping the emerging power of the Sultanate, forced Temate to seek links with other Islamic states to the west, to build a solid military basis for its power, and to view in a rather different manner its relations with its neighbours, since Ternate took upon itself the role of the principal defender of an Islam threatened by Christianity in the region. By successfully resisting the Portuguese and Spaniards, Ternate attracted to its orbit a large number of principalities which were spread far beyond the rather limited ambit of the Moluccan archipelago. The most significant feature, as elsewhere in the whole of the Indonesian archipelago, is that the areas dominated by Ternate and Tidore were discontinuous and hardly well-defined in geographical terms; rather, they appear to be interpenetrating networks of possessions, creating a strategic web which on the one hand generated constant conflicts and military instability, but on the other created a geostrategic context that was far more stable than might be supposed. During the period of Portuguese hegemony in the Moluccas, both Temate and Tidore expanded their insular possessions, but the former kingdom did so in greater measure than the latter, and in part managed to do so by expanding into regions over which Tidore had earlier established its ascendancy.

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The Castilian presence in the region after 1580 in fact permitted, under the cloak of & radicalisation in the terms of the conflict between Temate and the Portuguese, the fine-tuning of the centralising machinery oi the Sultanate, which came to impose its stamp little by little over the whole eastern archipelago. During the latter half of the sixteenth century, the Sultan of Temate came to be less and less dependent on the traditional links of kinship, and managed to acquire sufficient personal power and authority to be able to define and implement fairly independent and personalised policies. The turning point here appears to have been the assassination in 1570 of Hairun, Under his son and successor, Baab Ullah, these tendencies culminated in a form of strong personal dominance asserted by the Sultan. As for the Portuguese, it may be inferred from the entire discussion above, that save for the clove trade that was conducted on the route that ran from the Moluccas to Melaka, and thence to Goa, they were unable to exploit regional conflicts to their own advantage, even if this was the stated policy as defined by the Portuguese Crown.114 NOTES
I.I am grateful to Professor Sanjay Subrahmanyam for helping in the revision of this text for publication. 2. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, 4 Vols. Editorial Presena, 21 ed., Lisboa, 1982, m, pp. 142-44. 3. M. Augusta Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco, lcabcrtura de um processo", Artur Teodoio de Matos and Lus Filipe P. Reis Thomaz (cds.|, As relaes entre a ndia Portuguesa, a sia do Sueste e o Extremo Oriente. AiXas dt> V! Seminrio Internacional de Histria Indo-Portuguesa (Macau, 22 a 26 de Outubro de!991), Mauau-Lisboa, 1993, p. S18 4. Id., ib., pp. 515, 518 and p. 521. 5. John Villiers, "Ls Yslas de Esperar en Dios: The Jesuit Mission in Moro 1546-1571", Modera Asiun Studies, 22,3 (1988), p. 500. 6. Francisco de Sousa, Oriente Conquistado a esus Crista, M. Lopes de Almeida |ed.), Lello & irmo, Porto, 197i,p, 1101. 7. Cf. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. S14-16. 8. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1050. 9. Hubert Jacobs, S.J., "The Portuguese town of Ambon, 1567-1605", // Seminrio Internacional de Historia Fndn-pnrtagassa, HCT, Lisboa, 1985, p. 604. 10. Leonardo Y. Andaya, "Los primeros contactos de los espanoles con el mundo de Ias Molucas en Ias Isls de Ias Espcies", Revista Espnnola dei Pacifico. H, 2 [1992), p. 82. 11. Sousa, Orients Canqaixtadu, pp. 1043,1059,1115 e 420-21. 12. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 526-27. 13. John Villiers, "The Cash-crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", J. Kathmthamhy-Wells S. John Villiers |eds.), The Southeast Asian Port and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1930, p. 96.

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14. Francisco de Sousa casts suspicion on Henrique de S, who may have been bribed by Sultan Hairun [Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1045-571. 15. Manamaque's departure from Goa is dated by Francisco de Sousa to 1567 contradicting 1566 as staled by Diogo do Couto (id., ibid., p. 1058). 16. It was not known in India that, meanwhile, the Portuguese had withdrawn from Ambon (Artur Basflio de S, (ed], Documentao para a Histria das Misses do Padioado Pnrtugues do Oriente - Insulinilia, E, Lisboa, 1955. p. 435-44, henceforth DHMPPO|. 17. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1066; DHMPPO-lnsuIindia, IV, p. 174, Caspar dc San Agustn, O.S.A., Conquistas de, las Isias Filipinas (1565-1615), Manuel Merino, O.S.A. (ed.|, C.S.I.C., Madrid. 1975, Liv. I, Cap. XXI, pp. 156-57; DHMPPO-Insuiindia, IV, pp. 457 e 472. On Gonalo Pereira Marrarnaque, see M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira Marraraaque do Minho s Molucss ou ns itinerrios da fidalguia portuguesa no Oriente", Slvdia, 49 (1989), pp. 333-36. 18. Hubert Jacobs, S.f., Documenta Malucencia, II, Roma, 1980, p. 79, henceforth DM. 19. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, W, p. igs. 20. Id., pp. 548-19; San Agustu, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 596. The Lima family was tKe most influential Portuguese family in Maluku. Their members were half-caste people married to women of royal blood. This did not inhibit the crown from recognising their aristocratic rank and appointing them to command fortresses and ships. Probably, they were the finly Portuguese married into the nobility and permanently resident in those islands. Paulo de [Bartolom Leonardo de Aigensola, Conquista de las Mas Malucas, Madrid, 1609, pp. 167-69). 21. M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 515, 518 and 522. 11. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1072 and ss.; L. Y. Andaya,'Los primeroa contactos de Ids espanoles", p. 82; J. Villiera, "Las Yslas dc Esperar cn Dios", pp. 594-604. 23. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335; idem, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", p. 517. The author emphasizes the Portuguese inability to deal with this problem. See Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1065. 24. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1075-79, Argcnsola, Conquistei, p. 73. 25. H. Jacobs, SJ., "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604. 26. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi, Portuguese Settlements arid Christian Communities in Solor and Flores (15.6-16.10)", Masyarakat Indonesia, X, 1 11983], p. 98. 27. Conquista, pp. 78-80. 28. Hairun was charged with involvement in Muslim activities at Amboa against local Christian communities, in close co-ordination with Japara. He was also charged with promoting clove smuggling from that island to Japara. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 525-26. 29. Argensoa, Conquista, p. 2. 30. L. Andaya, "Cultural State Formation in Eastern Indonesia", Paper submitted to the Internationa! Conference on Southeast Asia in lSth-18th Centuries, Lisbon, 4-7 Dec.1989, pp. 10-16. 31. San Agustn, Liv. II, Cap. XXV, pp. 527-28, Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p. 1114. 32. San Agustn, Liv. in. Cap. IV, pp. 598-99; DORO do Couto, Da sia, Lisboa, 1788, Dec. X, Pte. 2>, Liv. VIU, Cap. IV, pp. 289-^1, Liv. IX, Cap. X1U, pp. 511-15. 33. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 78-80.

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34. P. R. Abdurachman, "Niichile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queea", Modern Asian Studies, 22, 3 (1988), pp. 5S6-H7. 35. The King of Tidonr was afraid of a PoitUguese reaction against his alliance with the Sultan of Ternate. For this reason he sent small vessels to the shores of Borneo looking for Portuguese ships coming from India (Aigensola, Conquista, p. 89]. 36. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, pp. 1091-92. 37. DHMPPO-InsuIfndia, IV, pp. 215 e 252; P.P. Mendes da Luz (ed.), Livio das Cidades e,

gos, que nelas ha, e da importncia delles, ed. facsimilada do Ms. da Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid (cod. 3Z17), published in Stvdia, 6 \\96Q], fl.67. 38. DHMPPO-Insulndia, IV, pp. 313 e 382. 39. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Conalo Pereira Marramaque", p. 335. 40. Ajgensola, Couquisa, p. S3. 41. DHMPPQ-Insullnia, IV, p. 473. Such limited reinforcements led Spanish sources lo say that the Temate fortress did not receive any help from India during the six year siege (DM, II, p. 223). 42. In 1586, five galleons were used in military and trade operations in the Maluku area |J.H. Cunha Rivaia \e&.\, Aiehivo Poitaguez-Oriental, I1 ei., Nova-Goa, W&l-lWH,fl\,pt. \ pp 156-57, henceforth APO). 43. DM, E, pp. 32-33. 44. Letter from Father Duarte de Sande, Goa, 1579-11-07, ANTY, Armrio Jesutico, n 28, fl.119. 45. DHMPPO-Insulndia, IV, p. 254. 46. V. M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Eeanomia Mundial, 01, p, 146. 47. DM, n, p. 40; DUMPPO-Insuh'ndia, IV, pp. 255-56. 48. Aigensola, Conquista, p. 9; DHMPPO-insulnia, IV, p. 160; A. da Silva Rego |ed.|, Documentao Ultramarina Portuguesa, I, Lisboa, 1960, p. 15. 49. According to H. Jacobs, Temate was mainly visited by Javanese from fapara, Tuban, Sidayu and Cresik, for trade and military support (DM, II, p. 36, n,10|. The tole of Aceh in commerce with the westwards Islamic netwof k, K well as the role of Johor eastwards, have been emphasized by Kenneth R. Hall, "The Opening of the Malay World to European Trade in the Sixteenth Century", Journal of the Malay*'an Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, LVCI, 2 [Dec. 1985], p. S9. 50. Sousa, Oriente Conquistado, p, 1101. 51. DM, H, p. 438; DHMPPO-Insalindia, [V, p. 236, Couto, Dec. X, Pte. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VTI, pp. 55-56. 52. Concerning Hitu, in the context of the power structures in Eastern Indonesia, see H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604, and also John VUliers, "The Cash-crop Economy and State Formation in the Spice Islands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries", J. Kathirithamhy-Wells & John Villiers |eds.|, The Southeast Asian Foil and Polity. Rise and Demise, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1390, p. 92. 53. Paramita R. Abdurachman, "Niachile Pokaraga. A Sad Story of a Moluccan Queen", Modern Asian Studies, 22,3 11988], p. 575. 54. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague, 1962, p. 160, H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 612, Lus Filipe Thomaz, "Maluco c Malaca", A. Teiieira da Mota (ed.), A viagern de Fetaao tie MagaMes e a Questo das Molucas. Actas do II Colquio Luso-espanhol de Histria Ultramarina, Lisbon, 1975, p. 38, M. A. Lima Cruz, "o

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assassnio do rei de Maluco", p. 525; id., "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira", p. 333. 55. DHMPPO-Insulindia, p. 140. See M. A. Lima Cruz, "O assassnio do rei de Maluco", pp. 526-27. 56. P. R. Abdurachmart, "Atakiwan, Casados aad Tupassi", p. 98. Information from an Hituan, Malay language chronicle, tile Hikayat Tanah Hitu. The Portuguese sources say nothing about the role of Cresik in their departure from Ambon in 1565. 57. M. A. Lima Cruz, "A viagem de Gonalo Pereira", p. ,114; H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604. 58. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV, pp. 192-99, 229, 262, 368 and 458. 59. Id., ibid., pp. 196; R Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604. 60. The two groups may be distinguished on account of the alimentary taboo on pork that the Ulilima strictly observed {DHMPPO-Insulittdia, p. 195). 61. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604; P. R. Abdurachman, "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi", p. 107. 62. DHMPPO-Insulindia, pp. 200-03. 63. Id., ibid., p. 247; DM, II, pp. 39^0. In 1582, a secret agent sent by the governor of the Philippines "found at Ternate many crypto Christian people and many other nations that, when the time will come, would not refuse to fight side by side with the Castilians" [San Agustin, Liv, II, Cap. XXXVUT, p. 548). 64. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611. 65. DHMPPO-Insulindia, IV p. 327. 66. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 604. 67. DM, n, pp. 1-5. 68 Conquista, p. 72. 69. San Agustfn, Liv. D, Cap. XXXVIH, p. 548; DA, H, pp. 39-40, 55-56 and p. 79, Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.70, DM, n, p.l 14. 70. P. R., "Atakiwan, Casados and Tupassi", p.108; Manuel Lobato, "Os Portugueses em Timor", Coral, \ (Dec.1991], pp. 8-14. 71. Mendes da Luz, Livro, fl.73v. 72. DHMPPO-lnsulindia, V, p. 103. 73. Wars involving different ethnic groups, rival lineages, such as Christian and Muslim people, were the main source for slavery in Maluku and, generally, in Southeast Asia |A.Rcid, "The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, XI, 2 [Sept.1980], Sing. Univ. Press, p. 248]. 74. DM, H, p. 102. 75. Femo Guerreiro, Relao anua! das coisas que fizeram os Padies da Companhia de /e.us nas suas misses [...j nos anos de 1600 a 1609, l, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade, 1930, pp. 273-74. 76. San Agustin, Liv. n, Cap. XXXIH, pp. 505-10 and pp. 520-21, DM, II, pp. 32-A1). 77. DM, II, p. 223. Obviously it was mainly due to the lack of institutional collaboration between the Iberian kingdoms which, even after their unification, continued to be the case. 78. DM, II, p. 363j Guerreiro, Relao anual, I, p. 269. 79. DHMPPO-Insulindia, V, p. 116, DM, D, pp. 32-33 and p 169- San Agustn Liv U Cap XXXm, pp. 509-11, Cap. XXXIV, pp. 520-21 and Cap. XXXV, pp. 527-2S. SO. San Agustn presents an incorrect chronology. \id., ibid., pp. 527-28]. On chc Ternatian

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MANUEL LOBATO

81. Couto, Dec. X, Pee. l, Liv. m, Cap. VI, pp. 307 e 312; San Agusto, Liv. D, Cap. XXXV, p. 528; DHMPPQ-!ns\slinda. IV, p.! 13. 82. Argensola, Conquista, pp. 84-86. S3. DM, H, p. 93. 84. San Agustin, Liv. D, Cap. XXXIII, p. 508. Similar in Argensola, Conquista, p. 107. 85. See Roderich Ptak, "The Northern Trade Route to the Spice Islands: South China Sea-Sulu Zone-North Moluccas, (14th to early 16th century)", Aichipel, 43 (1992), pp. 27-55, passim. Hfi. "The Bishop of Melaka to the king", Melaka, 1588-12-31, A. G. Simancas, Sec. Ptov., cod.1551, fl.275v, quoted hy Artur Teodoro de Matos, O Extado da ndia nos anos de 1581-1588. Estrutura administrativa e econmica. Alguns elementos pata o seu estudo, Universidade dos Aeores, Ponta Delgada, 1982, p. 39. 87. DHMPPO-Insalndia, V, p. 10R. 88. DM, D, pp. 123, 165, n. 32 and p. i 79. The Spanish expedition led by Juan de Morn or Morones arrived at Tidore around March 1585, It was the third expedition sent from the Philippines to Maluku in four years: the first one in 1581 was commanded hy Juan de Ronquillo, a second one by Pedro Sarmiento in 15S4. See San Agustin, Liv. II Cap. XXXVTO, Liv. Ill, Cap. II and Cap. IV; Couto, Dec. X, Fee. 2a, Liv. VI, Cap. VI and Cap. VII, p. 49 and Caps.VIII and IX. For the 1580s Boxer refers to only two Spanish expeditions, both with a Portuguese contribution ("Portuguese and Spanish projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia", /oufflfll of Asian History, III (1969), p. 126]. 89. Argenaola, Conquista, p. 10. 90. Couto, Dec. X, Ptc. 2, Liv. VI, Cap. VII, pp. 46-49, Liv. VIII, Cap. IV, pp. 285-86. 91. DM, n, pp. 170 and 393; APO, in, 1 pt., pp. 156-57. 92. DM, D, pp. 134, 207 and 393; APO, HI, I a pt., pp. 34, 80 and p. 278; DHMPPQ-lasulindia, V, p. 27; San Agustin, Liv. Ill, Cap. IV, p. 597. 93. DM, II, pp. 190-91 and 222-24. A conspiracy by the people of Brunei and Luzon to take Manila hy force was discovered in 15S7 (San Agustin, Liv. HI, Cap. IV, p. 601). 94. Id., ibid,-, Jacques de Coiitre, Aadanzas Asiticos, Eddy Stols, B.Teensman and J.We/berckmoesieds.), Madrid, 1991, p. 146. 95. DM, E, p. 306. 96. DM, D, pp. 331, 359 and p. 369. 97. C" rgia a Peio Lopes de Sousa, Lisboa, 1590-03-06, AHU, Cons. Via., cod.281, 1.H6. 98. According to Proi. Roxer, the figure of a thousand Spanish soldiers, under the governor's command, is not reliable ("Portuguese and Spanish projects", p. 1,14]. 99. Regimento do vice-rei Conde da Vidigiieim, Lisboa, 1596-01-05, AHU, Cons, lllti., cod.lBl,fU66. 100. DM, II, pp. 389, 445^6 and 456,- Coutre, Andanzas Asiticas, p, 149; APO, in, 1" pt., p. 481, 2' pt., p. 580; Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Mas Filipinas, J. S. Cummins (ed.|, liakluyt Society, Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 9.V94. 101. DM, n, pp. 470, 490 and p. 505. 102 William Foster, "Introduction", Tlie Voyage of Sir Heaiy Middleton to the Moluccas. 16M-1606, Hakluyt Society, 1943, Klaus Reprint, Millwood, New York, 1990, p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 470 and p. 474. 103. Id., ibid., p. XXIV; DM, II, pp. 495-96. See also H.Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of 104. DM, D, pp. 520-21. 105. Francisco Pyrard de Laval, Viagem [1601-11], transi, and annot. by Cunha Uivara, II,

THE MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO

63

Liv. Civilizao, Potto, 1944, p.158; Carta de Toma de Sousa Couuniio do vce-rei, Goa, 1000-04-07, ANTT, MMCCiaa, Cx.6, t.n E, p. 349; C" de Luis da Goma. Secretrio do Eftado. ao vice-rci, Goa, 1600-04-07, ANTT, MMCGzaa, Cx. 6,1.11 E, p. 273, Couto, Dc. Xn, Pte. ltima. Liv. V, Cap. Vffl, p. 512. 106. Hoamoal is another name for this peninsula. See Htihert Jacobs, 5.T., "Un rglement de comptes entre Portugais et Javanais dans les mers de Indonsie en 1580", Archipel, 18 [1979), p. 170. 107. The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton..., p. 20. 11)8. C. R. Boxer & Frazo de Vasconcelos, Andr Furtado de Mendona, Lisboa, 1955 (reimp. 1989), pp. 40-45. 1(19. Argensola, Conijiiistii, pp. 155-5S. Argensola seems to use iuformatiun about Maluku ni)t available in the Portuguese and missionary reports, 1 ID. Roxer, Andr Furtado, p. 47. 111. H. Jacobs, "The Portuguese town of Ambon", p. 611. Magalhes Godinho clearly notes the failure of Andr Furtado at Ambon and Ceram. See Os Descobrimentos e a Econumiu Mundial III, p. 162. The Spanish sources alsn suggest it. The Portuguese sources, without aii evident reason, repeatedly glorify the achievement of Fuitado de Mendona. Boxer, Afldr Fartado, pp. 46-54, Argensola, Conquista, pp. 288-307. 112. Morsa, SiieiMiM, p. 233; Ferno Gueneiio, Relao armai, U, pp. 131-32 e 306-1L 113. V,M. Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, m, p. 163; Antnio de Morga, Sucesos, p. 239; "A discourse of the present state of the Moluccos, anexed to the former Journall Voyage of George Spitsbergen, extracted out of Apollonius Schot of Middleboiough' [1617], Pinchas Mis Pilgrimes, II, p. 227. 114. After completing this essay, 1 had an opportunity to read the work of Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku. Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modem Period, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1993, which may be consulted for another approach to the history of this period.