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Rule 37 Haj Pernes

ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

Facts:

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent).On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. Thereafter, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings.On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. In its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy is an annulment of judgment or the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief for judgement and other appropriate remedies

Ruling:

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief

from judgment.However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings. A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. Rule 37 DE LOS SANTOS vs. ELIZALDE February 2, 2007

Facts:

On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Kalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots designated located in Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. After due hearing of the case, the trial court issued the April 29, 1996 Decision. Petitioners and respondent Fred Elizalde filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 7 and May 16, 1996,8 respectively. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief,9 requiring petitioners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs. On April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Said motion sought the withdrawal of the appeal on the ground that petitioners and respondents delos Santos entered into an amicable settlement on May 11, 1999. Thus, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and considering them withdrawn. On the same day, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Decision with Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal, which was verified solely by petitioner Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners alleged that they did not have any knowledge of the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the CA; that they never entered into any amicable settlement with respondents delos Santos; and that they never authorized their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their appeal.

On January 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, wherein it was ruled that: The "Motion for Reconsideration With Prayer for the Reinstatement of Appeal" filed on June 17, 1999 by the said

new counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, to which an Opposition has been filed by the first set of intervenors-appellees, is DENIED admission for being late by nine (9) days. The records show that plaintiffsappellants counsel of record, Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano received copy of the Courts Decision dated May 11, 1998, on May 24, 1999. Thus, appellants had only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of petitioners motion for reconsideration should be counted from the time when petitioners themselves obtained a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA on June 2, 1999, or from the time that their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, received a copy of said Decision on May 24, 1999

Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides for the period within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed.(Refer to Rule 37 Sec. 1 and Rule 41 Sec. 3) The fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA, and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been informed of the CA decision. In the present case, the assailed CA Decision was rendered on May 11, 1999, and the notice of it was received by Atty. Victoriano on May 24, 1999. Petitioners current counsel, Atty. Verano, filed his appearance only on June 17, 1999, with the sole conformity of Vicente delos Santos. Thus, The CA correctly served a copy of the Decision on Atty. Victoriano, which is considered notice to petitioners themselves. Therefore, May 24, 1999 is the correct reckoning point for the reglementary period of filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the assailed Decision which ended on June 8, 1999. Hence, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 17, 1999 was belatedly filed and correctly rejected by the CA.

Rule 38 Haj Pernes

PURCON vs. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. - HAJ G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by respondent MRM Philippines, Inc as a seaman on January 28, 2002. On June 2002, petitioner felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined, he was diagnosed with hernia. Subsequently, petitioner was repatriated due to

his ailment. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner was again examined by the company physician and the latter declared that he was fit to resume work. When petitioner reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. Petitioner a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter.However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Subsequently, the CA resolution became final and executory .Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. In Our Resolution dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment.

Issue: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review? Ruling:

is

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court. Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. Neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. A petition for relief raises

questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court. Rule 38 CAYETANO vs. CEGUERRA 13 SCRA 73 Facts:

excusable

On November 15, 1960, plaintiff Catalina Cayetano instituted a civil case for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, against defendants-spouses Osmundo Ceguerra and Felina Serrano. Summons and copy of the complaint for foreclosure were served on the defendants within the reglementary period. On January 11, 1961, the court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiff. It appears that this decision never became known to appellants-spouses, the same having been returned to the Court, as unclaimed.vi law library Subsequently, defendants were served with a copy of a Writ of Execution, addressed to the Sheriff of Quezon City, commanding the latter to seize the goods and chattels of the defendants-appellants in order to satisfy the judgment. The matter was referred to counsel who presented a Petition for Relief. Plaintiff-appellee interposed an opposition to the petition for relief. Resolving the petition and the opposition, the Court handed down an Order declaring that that the first registry notice for the decision of this Court was received by the defendant on January 13, 1961, and according to the provisions of the rules, five (5) days after the receipt of such first notice, he is presumed to have received the same when the petition for relief and that when it was filed, more than 60 days has elapsed. The said petition for relief was filed beyond the reglementary period thus, it must be denied. A motion to reconsider the above Order was filed,the main ground being that the petition for relief was presented on time. The argument in support of the contention is that defendants having actually known of the adverse decision rendered, only on April 21, 1961, the presentation of the petition on June 17, 1961, was only 57 days from the former date. To bolster the argument, See. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules was cited, wherein it was provided, among others, that petitions of this nature should be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside. This motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, for failure to comply with the rules regarding the three (3) day notice and for lack of merits. Issue: Was the petition provided for by the rules? Ruling: We consider the petition for relief to have been filed on time. This is so, because a petition for relief may likewise be taken from the order of execution, inasmuch as Sec. 2, Rule 38, Revised Rules, does not only refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other proceedings (PHHC v. Tiongco & Escasa, L-18891, Nov. 28, 1964). From the time they had actual knowledge of the order of execution, on April 21, 1961, until the filing of the petition for relief, on June 17, 1961, only 57 days had elapsed. It is conceded that defendants received a first registry notice on January 13, 1961, but they did not claim the letter, thereby giving rise to the presumption that five (5) days after receipt of the first notice, the defendants were deemed to for relief presented within the period

have receive the letter. This Court, however, cannot justly attribute upon defendants actual knowledge of the decision, because there is no showing that the registry notice itself contained any indication that the registered letter was a copy of the decision, or that the registry notice referred to the case being ventilated. We cannot exact a strict accounting of the rules from ordinary mortals, like the defendants. w library CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order denying the petition for relief and that denying the motion for reconsideration, are set aside and another entered remanding the case to the court below, for hearing on the merits. No costs. Rules 40 & 41 Rule 40 & 41 Haj Pernes HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO [2008] Facts: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were the children of the spouses and the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio. Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation" docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen.During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. Disagreeing with the judgment

of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. the CA reversed the RTC decision. Issue: Can respondents be ndbou nd by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 even if they were not made parties in the said case? Ruling: Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title. In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court.Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action.That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision. Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Rules 40 & 41 SPOUSES MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126196, January 28, 1998)

Facts: The lots in question were originally part of one whole parcel devoted to agriculture owned by one Enrique Bautista. Sometime in 1972, Bautista caused the subdivision of the land. His subdivision survey plan was duly approved by the Land Registration Commission.In 1979, Bautista sold two (2) lots to plaintiff Gregorio Morales. He also sold four (4) lots to plaintiff Maria Teresa Morales. Teresa in turn, sold three (3) of her purchased lots to three different persons who are likewise plaintiffs in the case.Plaintiffs assert that the defendant surreptitiously took possession of their lots and prepared them for planting, thereby altering its residential outline and appearance.Defendant countered with the allegation that reclassification of the land was not approved by the proper authorities and that he was duly constituted as tenant thereof by the previous owner, Enrique Bautista. The municipal court received evidence on the issue of right of possession and the land's proper classification.Finding the land to be agricultural and the fact that tenancy was in issue, the said court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.Plaintiffs appealed. The (Regional Trial Court) Judge who heard the case found that the (municipal) court had jurisdiction because the land was duly reclassified from agricultural to residential and that tenancy was not

involved. He then proceeded to decide the issues on the merits resulting in a judgment favoring plaintiffs' recovery of possession of the lots in litigation.Defendant-petitioner (on appeal by way of certiorari to the Court of Appeals) alleges that the (Regional Trial Court) Judge gravely erred its discretion and lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. Issue: Was the RTC correct in resolving the ejectment suit on its merits?

Ruling: We cannot sustain the Court of Appeals. Under Sec. 8 Rule 40 (refer to the codal provision), a Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should remand a case in the event it reverses a decision of the MTC which ruled on a question of law, provided that there was no trial on the merits. The significance of this second requirement cannot be overemphasized, for it reveals the rationale for remanding the case. A remand is a due process requirement, because it affords the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the case. Where the parties have presented their respective evidence before the MTC, a remand becomes a useless superfluity, an undue imposition on the time and the dockets of courts.In the case at bar, it is clear that the MTC afforded due process to the parties; it received relevant evidence sufficient to decide the ejectment case on its merits.The Court, therefore, finds no compelling reason to remand the case to the MTC, as the underlying purpose and objective for such remand is already fait accompli. As previously noted, the MTC observed due process; it received necessary evidence to decide the ejectment case under the Rules on Summary Procedure; and it discussed the issue of forcible entry. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was based on the facts adduced by the parties before the MTC. Consequently, remanding the case to the MTC serves no useful purpose, for the parties have already presented their evidence.

Rule 38

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL June 30, 2006 Facts:

Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating an Executive Committee to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia (Jancom International) was one of the bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. Thereafter, the above-said Executive Committee approved the recommendation of the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee to declare JANCOM as the sole complying bidder for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. A Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal

Site4 (the contract) was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM.Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. Petitioner GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM. Hence, respondents filed a petition for certiorari8 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of the MMDA calling for bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void and to enjoin petitioners from implementing the Resolution and making another award in lieu thereof. The Pasig City RTC found in favor of respondents Jancom, which decision of the lower court was affirmed by the CA. On appeal, this Court affirmed the November 13, 2001 CA Decision and declared the contract valid and perfected, albeitineffective and unimplementable pending approval by the President. Issue: Whether or not the order of execution was valid Ruling: As provided in Rule 39, Sec. 1 (refer to the codal provision), if the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. However, there are instances, when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party as where:1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.That a writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially to every essential particular thereof. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.51 In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected,the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.Indubitably, the alias writ of execution varied the tenor of this Courts judgment, went against essential portions and exceeded the terms thereof. The execution directed by the trial court being out of harmony with the judgment. The execution directed by the trial court being out of harmony with the judgment, legal implications cannot save it from being found to be fatally defective.

Rule 39

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. LANTIN - HAJ

G.R. No. L-59311, January 31, 1985

Facts: Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one addressed to a Mohammed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union, and the other to a Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The cablegrams were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destinations.However,both cablegrams went undelivered. Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages, moral damages, and exemplary damages before the CFI of Rizal against RCPI and GLOBE.The CFI rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.Thereafter, Rodriguez filed a "Motion for Execution Before Expiration of Time to Appeal" relying on Rule 39, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court alleging that the appeal is clearly dilatory and that the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment illusory and ineffective. An opposition to the motion was filed by RCPI and by GLOBE.A motion for reconsideration of the above order, however, even before the issuance of this order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent Sheriffinsisted on levying on the funds and assets of petitioners RCPI and GLOBE, prompting them to file an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. This urgent motion was likewise denied so RCPI and GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the civil case and from enforcing the writ of execution until further orders. The petitioners filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration,however, their motion for reconsideration was denied by the said court.Hence, a petition for appeal by certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court. Issue: May damages be executed pending appeal? If so, What are they? Ruling: Yes. Considering the nature of the wrongful acts found by the trial court and the amount of damages adjudicated as recoverable, both of which are stated in detail in the decisions and various orders of the trial court and the appellate court, we are constrained to sustain the respondent courts insofar as the award for actual or compensatory damages are concerned but to postpone the execution of the awards for moral and exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the cases now on regular appeal before the Court of Appeals are finally determined. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as wen as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

Rule 39 PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. vs. RAMOLETE G.R. No. L-60887, November 13, 1991

Facts: The Cimarron PUJ, owned and registered in the name of Nelia Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, collided with a private jeep owned by the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep.As a result, Calixto Palmes died and physical injuries was caused on the part of Adeudatus Borbon. Private respondents Primitiva Palmes and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of minor Adeudatus Borbon) filed a complaint against Cosme Casas and Nelia Enriquez (assisted by her husband Leonardo Enriquez) before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 3, claiming actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent Primitiva Palmes, ordering common carrier Nelia Enriquez to pay her P10,000.00 as moral damages, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of Calixto Palmes, P3,000.00 as exemplary damages, P5,000.00 as actual damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees. The judgment of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of execution was thereafter issued. The writ of execution was, however, returned unsatisfied. Thus, on 31 July 1979, private respondent Palmes filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued against the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor.On 6 August 1979, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the third-party liability insurance policy. Petitioner then appeared before the trial court and moved for reconsideration of the said Order. More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez. Petition should have been dismissed forthwith for having been filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not appear on the record, was nonetheless entertained. Issue: Is the garnishment proper? Ruling: We find no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor's third-party liability insurance. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor.In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes

creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff's suit.In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment.The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable.

Rule 42 LARANO vs. CALENDACION G.R. No. 158231, June 19, 2007

Facts: Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna. Petitioner and respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to buy a 50,000-square meter portion of petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500,000.00 as down payment and the balance payable in nine installments of P500,000.00 each, until September 2001.Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland was transferred to respondents under the condition that they shall account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to petitioner. Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and to account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland. Thereafter, petitioner sent respondents a demand letter to vacate the riceland but as her demand went unheeded, she filed a Complaint against respondents for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Victoria, Laguna. The MTC of Laguna rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The RTC affirmed the decision of MTC, with slight modification. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with the CA.For failure to file her comment despite receipt of CA Resolution which required her to file a comment, petitioner was deemed to have waived her right to file comment to the petition in CA Resolution dated August 28, 2002.The CA rendered a Decision setting aside the Decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the present petition with the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in giving due course to the private respondents' petition for review notwithstanding the fact that said petition contains no verification to the effect that the allegations therein were read and understood by the private respondents and that

they are true and correct of their own or personal knowledge or based on authentic records, as required by the rules, hence, the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for review. Issue:

Ruling:

As to the contention of petitioner that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petition for review because it was not verified, as required by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of instances that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in meritorious cases, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.[19] The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal.] Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.[21] Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[22] The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. Besides, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of verification before the CA. She did not file a comment to the petition and it is too late in the day to assail such defect, as she is deemed to have waived any objection to the formal flaws of the petition. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Rule 44 Haj Pernes

QUEZON CITY vs. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008)

Facts:

Petitioner City Government of Quezon City is a local government unit duly organized and existing by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 537, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City. Petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon City is primarily responsible for the imposition and collection of taxes within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City. ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No. 7966. ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. However, in view of the provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes, the

corporation developed the opinion that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. ABS-CBN filed a written claim for refund for local franchise tax paid to Quezon City for 1996 and for the first quarter of 1997. For failure to obtain any response from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN filed a complaint before the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the imposition of local franchise tax by the City Government of Quezon City for being unconstitutional. The RTC rendered judgment declaring as invalid the imposition on and collection from ABS-CBN of local franchise tax and ordered the refund of all payments made. The City of Quezon and its Treasurer filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by the RTC. Thus, appeal was made to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition of Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were purely legal questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners-appellants raised factual and legal issues before the Honorable Court of Appeals Ruling: Obviously, these are purely legal questions, cognizable by the Supreme Court, to the exclusion of all other courts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts. Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal taken to the CA under Rule 41 raising only questions of law is erroneous and shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the dismissal by the CA of petitioners appeal was in order. However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity, the Court opts to relax procedural rules and rule upon on the merits of the case